



Physically Protecting Sensitive Data

Jim Shen and Lars Vilhuber February 8, 2021





Five Safes: In combination, stronger



ONS, The Five Safes: Ensuring Safe Use of Data, http://www.bris.ac.uk/media-library/sites/cmpo/documents/mcivor2018.pdf (Accessed 2021-02-07)

Five Safes: In combination, stronger

Focus here: SAFE SETTINGS



Physically Protecting Sensitive Data

- The physical protection of sensitive data is one of the key parameters that data custodians can and do influence
- Within the Five Safes Framework, "safe settings" are heavily influenced by how data are physically protected
- However, it is also a parameter that is very dependent on current state
 of technology, the types of threats, and interactions with the other
 Safes
- Knowledge of the technological possibilities is of importance for negotiating access to administrative data that does not have an existing access mechanism

Physically?

- In contrast to "statistically" or "computationally"
 - See Chapter 5 "Balancing Privacy and Data Usability: An Overview of Disclosure Avoidance Methods" (Ian Schmutte and Lars Vilhuber, <u>Webinar on 2020-11-02</u>)
 - See Chapter 6 "Designing Access with Differential Privacy" (Alexandra Wood and co-authors, Webinar on 2021-02-01)

Includes

- IT security measures
- Building security measures
- Choice of locations

Types of Security Threats

External Threats

Internal Threats

Adversarial Actors

Archetypical external hackers attempting to gain unauthorized access

Can exploit **technical vulnerabilities** or conduct **social engineering** attacks

Example: 2017 Equifax breach

Unintentional Breach

No active attempt at targeting data

Data left unsecured

Example: unsecured, unencrypted laptops or physical records being lost or stolen

Unauthorized Use

Authorized users become bad actors and misuse data

Threat is **internal** to the data access mechanism


Example: Facebook-Cambridge Analytica scandal

Connecting Researchers with Data





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


Data Storage

- Physical Media
 - Attached storage (e.g. hard drives, solid state drives)
 - Removable storage (e.g CD's, USB drives)
- Cloud Services
 - Proprietary (e.g. AWS, Google Drive, Dropbox, OneDrive)
 - Open Source (e.g. Nextcloud)
- Reliability and security
 - Prevent data loss and system uptime
 - Prevent unauthorized access to data
- Encryption!



Connecting Researchers with Data



Data transfers


Data Transfer

- Physical Media
 - Removable media can be used to transfer data
- Electronic Transfer
 - Encrypted network protocols (SFTP, HTTPS, VPN)
 - Cloud services

Never send data unencrypted!



Connecting Researchers with Data



Data Access

Electronic Access (network security)

- Virtual Private Networks
 - Exchange data over public networks as if directly connected on a private network
- IP Address Restrictions
 - Restrict allowed IP addresses with allow list or deny list

Encryption

- Minimum security requirement for any data access mechanism
- Full Disk Encryption
 - Software-based (Filevault, Bitlocker, various Linux options)
 - Hardware-based (requires specialized hardware, removes memory as attack vector)
- File Level Encryption
 - Encrypt individual files, only decrypt when in use
 - Examples: GnuPG, VeraCrypt
- Cloud services




Electronic Access (local security)

- System isolation
 - Researcher accesses only as allowed/trusted
 - Research system separate from administrative systems
 - User access isolated from each other
- Technical means of achieving isolation
 - <u>Data Access Controls</u>: Regulate what users can view or use in a computing environment
 - Physical system isolation: Stand-alone computer, dedicated researcher machine
 - Virtual system isolation:
 Virtual machines/ Virtual Desktop Infrastructure/ Docker/ chroot

Electronic Access (Connecting)

Remote Desktop

- Enable users to connect to another computer over a network
- Avoids need to
 - Transfer data to researcher
 - Store data at researcher site
- Subject to network issues (slow, lag, down)
- Thin Clients
 - Optimized for utilizing remote desktop software






Electronic Access (Connecting... sort of)

- Remote Processing / Query system
 - Only code is sent
 - No interactive work
 - May have job limits

```
#PBS -N MyJobName
#PBS -P MyJobProject
#PBS -q queue_1
#PBS -l instance_type=c5.18xlarge
# CD into current working directory
cd $PBS_O_WORKDIR
# Prepare the job environment, edit the current PATH, License Server etc
export PATH=/apps/softwarename/v2020/
export LICENSE_SERVER=1234@licenseserver.internal
# Run the solver
/apps/softwarename/v2020/bin/solver --cpus 36 \
     --input-file myfile.input \
     --parameter1 value1
# Once job is complete, archive output to S3
BACKUP=1
if [[ "$BACKUP" -eq 1 ]];
 then
     aws s3 sync . s3://mybucketname/
fi
```

Connecting Researchers with Data



- Secure Rooms
 - Hardened location for data storage and access
 - Various specifications for physical and electronic protections





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- Physical Access Cards
 - Electronic cards that identify the card bearer
 - Card reader validates card with central database





- Secure Rooms
 - Hardened location for data storage and access
 - Various specifications for physical and electronic protections
- Physical Access Cards
 - Electronic cards that identify the card bearer
 - Card reader validates card with central database
- Biometric Authentication
 - Physical and biological features unique to individuals
 - Can be used to authenticate users



Technical Features of Data Access Mechanisms

- Data Storage
 - Physical Media
 - Cloud Services
- Data Transfer
 - Physical Media
 - Electronic Transfer
- Encryption

- Electronic Access
 - Data Access Controls
 - Virtual Private Networks
 - IP Address Restrictions
 - Remote Desktop
 - Thin Clients
- Physical Access
 - Secure Rooms
 - Physical Access Cards
 - Biometric Authentication

Typical Access Mechanisms



Typical Access Mechanisms

- Remote Execution
 - Researcher submits a request to the data custodian
 - Data custodian runs analysis with automated service or staff executing by hand
- Physical Data Enclave
 - Researcher travels to secure location to access and analyze data
 - Data custodian maintains infrastructure and full control of data
- Virtual Data Enclave
 - Researchers remotely access and analyze data
 - More flexible than a physical data enclave
- Researcher Provided Infrastructure
 - Researcher provides infrastructure for storage and analysis

Five Aspects of Physical Security

- The level of researcher agency over analysis computers
- The location of analysis computers and data
- The location of access computers
- The level of security of access locations
- The range of analysis methods available to researchers
- For each aspect, data access mechanism is classified into three categories
- Weakly aligned with how restrictive it may be on the researcher and how much control the data provider exerts

Researcher Agency over Analysis Computers

- Analysis computers hold and analyze researcher accessible data
- Data custodians determine the level of control that researchers are allowed
- Low Agency
 - Limited to the software that the data provider allows
- Medium Agency
 - May allow some choice or limited configuration options
- High Agency
 - Few restrictions, researchers may own the computer or have administrative privileges

Location of Analysis Computers and Data

- Each data location comes with its own requirements, tradeoffs, and special considerations for the researcher and data provider.
- The location of the data on its own does not define how researchers access the data, or the type of analysis a researcher can conduct.
- Data Provider
 - Retains custody of analysis computer and data, acting as data custodian
- Third-Party
 - A third party acts as the data custodian, potentially serving multiple researchers and data providers
- Researcher
 - Researchers hold data, reducing costs on data providers but relying on enforcement of data use agreements

Location of Access Computers

- When data are not in the same location as the researcher, access computers are distinct from analysis computers
- Ownership is not necessarily aligned with location
- Non-researcher data custodian
 - Researchers must travel to the data custodian to access data
- Third-Party
 - Data custodians and access providers can see efficiency gains
- Researcher
 - Access computers are located with researchers

Security of Access Computers

- These are not concrete distinctions between different mechanisms but broad classifications of the overall rigor of physical security regimes
- High Security
 - Strong specifications of physical security such as secure rooms with hardening beyond standard locked doors
- Medium Security
 - Defined location with access restricted to approved researchers, with some security features
- Low Security
 - Few or no physical controls, relying on enforcement of DUA's or no restrictions at all

Range of Analysis Methods Available

- Researchers may be able to leverage a wide range of analysis methods, ranging from simple tabulations to complex machine learning tasks.
- In other cases, they may be limited to a small set of methods, defined by the data custodian for technical or security reasons
- Highly Restricted
 - Strong limitations such as only whitelisted commands or running tabulations
- Limited Restrictions
 - Software elements may be censored, such as inability to inspect individual records
- Unrestricted
 - Researchers can use the full set of methods available provided on analysis computer

Examples Along the Five Aspects: RDC-IAB

- Acts as internal third-party for German Federal Employment Agency
- Provides three different access mechanisms for labor economic data
- RDC-IAB holds most sensitive data for on-site access and remote execution, makes less sensitive data available for researcher provided infrastructure

On-Site Access

Researcher Agency: Medium

Data Location: Third-Party

Access Location: Third-Party

Access Security: High Security

Analysis Methods: Limited Restrictions

Job Submission System

Researcher Agency: Medium

Data Location: Third-Party

Access Location: Researcher

Access Security: Low Security

Analysis Methods: Limited Restrictions

Scientific Use Files

Researcher Agency: High

Data Location: Researcher

Access Location: Researcher

Access Security: Medium Security

Analysis Methods: Unrestricted

Examples Along the Five Aspects: OLDA

- Third-party data custodian that transfers de-identified, individual level data to researchers on behalf of Ohio
- Researchers provide local infrastructure for storage and analysis of the data
- Note: "Low security" does not mean "no security"


Researcher Agency: High

Data Location: Researcher

Access Location: Researcher

Access Security: Low Security

Analysis Methods: Unrestricted



Examples Along the Five Aspects: NB-IRDT

- Third-party data custodian for Province of New Brunswick
- Makes de-identified personnel and health data available to researchers
- Data held at, and researcher access at, secure NB-IRDT facilities

Researcher Agency: Medium

Data Location: Third-Party

Access Location: Data Custodian

Access Security: High Security

Analysis Methods: Unrestricted





Other Examples

- A wide range of examples from both the Handbook and selected outside examples
- Many options available for data providers and researchers when setting up new data access mechanisms

| Data Access Mechanism | Researcher Agency Over Analysis Computer | Location of Data and Analysis Computer | Location of Access Computer | Access Security | Range of Analysis Methods Available |
|------------------------------------|---|--|-----------------------------------|-----------------|--|
| IAB RDC (chapter 7) | Medium | Third-Party | Third-Party | High Security | Limited |
| IAB JoSuA (chapter 7) | Medium | Third-Party | Researcher | Low Security | Limited |
| IAB SUF (chapter 7) | High | Researcher | Researcher | Medium Security | Unrestricted |
| OLDA (chapter 8) | High | Researcher | Researcher | Low Security | Unrestricted |
| NB-IRDT (chapter 9) | Medium | Third-Party | Data Custodian | High Security | Unrestricted |
| PCRI (chapter 10) | Medium | Third-Party | Researcher | Low Security | Limited |
| Aurora (chapter 11) | High | Researcher | Researcher | Low Security | Unrestricted |
| Stanford- SFUSD (chapter 12) | High | Researcher | Researcher | Low Security | Unrestricted |
| Cape Town (chapter 13) | High | Researcher | Researcher | Low Security | Unrestricted |
| DIME (chapter 14) | High | Researcher | Researcher | Low Security | Unrestricted |
| FSRDC | Medium | Data Provider | Data Custodian | High Security | Unrestricted |
| NCES | High | Researcher | Researcher | Medium Security | Unrestricted |
| RTRA | Low | Data Provider | Researcher | Low Security | Highly Restricted |
| SPN | Low | Third-Party | Third-Party | Medium Security | Unrestricted |

Guidance and Examples



Guidance for Data Providers and Researchers

- There are many solutions that balance high security with relatively broad accessibility and convenience for researchers
 - RDC-IAB, NB-IRDT
- There are many examples of relatively simple but effective data access mechanisms with typically lower costs
 - OLDA, Stanford-SFUSD
- Data providers can allow researchers more flexibility in various aspects while maintaining the overall security of the system
 - RDC-IAB
- Necessary aspects of data access mechanisms and restrictions placed on researchers should be considered in the context of the other Five Safes
- Capacity for enforcing the DUA is an important factor for the flexibility of data access mechanisms

Thank you

