

The Universe as Quantum Computer

Seth Lloyd

Department of Mechanical Engineering
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge MA 02139 USA

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Abstract

This article reviews the history of digital computation, and investigates just how far the concept of computation can be taken. In particular, I address the question of whether the universe itself is in fact a giant computer, and if so, just what kind of computer it is. I will show that the universe can be regarded as a giant quantum computer. The quantum computational model of the universe explains a variety of observed phenomena not encompassed by the ordinary laws of physics. In particular, the model shows that the quantum computational universe automatically gives rise to a mix of randomness and order, and to both simple and complex systems.

1 Introduction

It is no secret that over the last fifty years the world has undergone a paradigm shift in both science and technology. Until the mid-twentieth century, the dominant paradigm in both science and technology was that of energy: over the previous centuries, the laws of physics had been developed to understand the nature of energy and how it could be transformed. In concert with progress in physics, the technology of the industrial revolution put the new understanding of energy to use for manufacturing and transportation. In the mid-twentieth century, a new revolution began. This revolution

was based not on energy, but on information. The new science of information processing, of which Turing was one of the primary inventors, spawned a technology of information processing and computation. This technology gave rise to novel forms and applications of computation and communication. The rapid spread of information processing technologies, in turn, has ignited an explosion of scientific and social inquiry. The result is a paradigm shift of how we think about the world at its most fundamental level. Energy is still an important ingredient of our understanding of the universe, of course, but information has attained a conceptual and practical status equal to – and frequently surpassing – that of energy. Our new understanding of the universe is not in terms of the driving power of force and mass. Rather, the world we see around us arises from a dance between equal partners, information and energy, where first one takes the lead and then the other. The bit meets the erg, and the result is the universe.

At bottom, the information that makes up the universe is not just ordinary classical information (bits). Rather, it is quantum information (qubits). Consequently, the computational model that applies the universe at its smallest and most fundamental level is not conventional digital computation, but quantum computation [1]. The strange and weird aspects of quantum mechanics infect the universe at its very beginning, and – as will be seen – provide the mechanism by which the universe generates its peculiar mix of randomness, order, and complexity .

2 Digital computation before Turing

Before describing how the universe can be modeled as a quantum computer, and how that quantum computational model of the universe explains previously unexplained features, we review computation and computational models of the universe in general.

Alan Turing played a key role in the paradigm shift from energy to information: his development of a formal theory of digital computation made him one of the most influential mathematicians of the twentieth century. It is fitting, therefore, to praise him. Curiously, however, Turing’s seminal role in a global scientific and technological revolution also leads to the temptation to over-emphasize his contributions. We human beings have a sloppy, if not outright bad habit of assigning advances to a few ‘great men.’ I call this habit the Pythagoras syndrome, after the tendency in the western world

to assign all pre-fourth century B.C.E. mathematics to Pythagoras without regard to actual origins. In evaluating Turing's contributions, we should be careful not to fall victim to the Pythagoras syndrome, if only to give full credit to his actual contributions, which were specific and great.

Computing machines are not a modern invention [2]: the abacus was invented in Babylon more than four thousand years ago. Analog, geared, information processing mechanisms were developed in China and Greece thousands of years ago, and attained considerable sophistication in the hands of medieval Islamic philosophers. John Napier's seventeenth century mechanical implementation of logarithms ('Napier's bones') was the precursor of the slide rule. The primary inventor of the modern digital computer, however, was Charles Babbage. In 1812, Babbage had the insight that the calculations carried out by mathematicians could be broken down into sequences of less complicated steps, each of which could be carried out by a machine [3] – note the strong similarity to Turing's insight into the origins of the Turing machine more than a century later. The British government fully appreciated the potential impact of possessing a mechanical digital computer, and funded Babbage's work at a high level. During the 1820s he designed and attempted to build a series of prototype digital computers that he called 'difference engines.' Nineteenth century manufacturing tolerances turned out to be insufficiently precise to construct the the all-mechanical difference engines, however. The first large-scale computing project consumed over seventeen thousand pounds sterling of the British taxpayers' money, a princely expenditure for pure research at the time. Like many computing projects since, it failed.

Had they been constructed, difference engines would have been able to compute general polynomial functions, but they would not have been capable of what Turing termed universal digital computation. After the termination of funding for the difference engine project, Babbage turned his efforts to the design of an 'analytic engine.' Programmed by punched cards like a Jacquard loom, the analytic engine would have been a universal digital computer. The mathematician Ada Lovelace devised a program for the analytic engine to compute Bernoulli numbers, thereby earning the title of the world's first computer programmer.

The insights of Babbage and Lovelace occurred more than a century before the start of the information processing revolution. Turing was born in the centenary of the year in which Babbage had his original insight. The collection in which this paper appears could equally be dedicated to the two-

hundredth anniversary of Babbage's vision. But scientific history is written to celebrate winners (see Pythagoras, above). Turing 'won' the title of the inventor of the digital computer because his insights played a direct role in the vision of the creators of the first actual physical computers in the mid-twentieth century. The science fiction genre known as 'steampunk' speculates how the world might have evolved if nineteenth century technology had been up to the task of constructing the difference and analytical engines. (Perhaps the best-known example of the steampunk genre is William Gibson and Bruce Sterling's novel, 'The Difference Engine' [\[4\]](#).)

The mathematical development of digital logic did not occur until after Babbage's mechanical development. It was not until the 1830s and 1840s that the British logician Augustus de Morgan and the mathematician George Boole developed the bit-based logic on which current digital computation is based. Indeed, had Babbage been aware of this development at the time, the physical construction of the difference and analytic engines might have been easier to accomplish, as Boolean, bit-based operations are more straightforward to implement mechanically than base-ten operations. The relative technological simplicity of bit-based operations would play a key role in the development of electronic computers.

By the time that Turing began working on the theory of computation, Babbage's efforts to construct actual digital computers were a distant memory. Turing's work had its direct intellectual antecedents in the contentious arguments on the logical and mathematical basis of set theory that were stirred up at the beginning of the twentieth century. At the end of the nineteenth century, the German mathematician David Hilbert proposed an ambitious programme to axiomatize the whole of mathematics. In 1900, he famously formulated this programme at the International Congress of Mathematicians in Paris as a challenge to all mathematicians – a collection of twenty three problems whose solution he felt would lead to a complete, axiomatic theory not just of mathematics, but of physical reality. Despite or because of its grand ambition to establish the logical foundations of mathematical thought, cracks began to appear in Hilbert's programme almost immediately. The difficulties arose at the most fundamental level, that of logic itself. Logicians and set theorists such as Gottfried Frege and Bertrand Russell worked for decades to make set theory consistent, but the net result of their work was call into question the logical foundations of set theory itself. In 1931, just when the efforts of mathematicians such as John von Neumann had appeared to patch up those cracks, Kurt Gödel published his beautiful

but disturbing incompleteness theorems, showing that any system of logic that is powerful enough to describe the natural numbers is fundamentally incomplete in the sense that there exist well-formulated proposition within the system that cannot be resolved using the system's axioms [5]. By effectively destroying Hilbert's programme, Gödel's startling result jolted the mathematical community into novel ways of approaching the very notion of what logic was.

3 Digital computation concurrent with Turing

Turing's great contribution to logic can be thought of as the rejection of logic as a Platonic ideal, and the redefinition logic as a *process*. Turing's famous paper of 1936, 'On Computable Numbers with an application to the *Entscheidungsproblem*,' showed that the process of performing Boolean logic could be implemented by an abstract machine [6], subsequently called a Turing machine. Turing's machine was an abstraction of a mathematician performing a calculation by thinking and writing on pieces of paper. The machine has a 'head' to do the thinking, and a 'tape' divided up in squares to form the machine's memory. The head has a finite number of possible states, as does each square. At each step, in analogy to the mathematician looking at the piece of paper in front of her, the head reads the state of the square on which it sits. Then, in analogy to thinking and writing on the paper, the head changes its state and the state of the square. The updating occurs as a function of the head's current state and the state of the square. Finally, in analogy to the mathematician either taking up a new sheet of paper or referring back to one on which she has previously written, the head moves one square to the left or right, and the process begins again.

Turing was able to show that such machines were very powerful computing devices in principle. In particular, he proved the existence of 'universal' Turing machines, which were capable of simulating the action of any other Turing machine, no matter how complex the actions of its head and squares. Unbeknownst to Turing, the American mathematician Alonzo Church had previously arrived at a purely formal logical description of the idea of computability [7], the so-called Lambda calculus. At the same time as Turing, Emil Post devised a mechanistic treatment of logical problems. The three

methods were all formally equivalent, but it was Turing's that proved the most accessible.

Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of Turing's mechanistic formulation of logic was how it dealt with the self-contradictory and incomplete aspects of logic raised by Gödel's incompleteness theorems. Gödel's theorems arise from the ability of logical systems to have self-referential statements – they are a formalization of the ancient 'Cretan liar paradox,' in which a statement declares itself to be false. If the statement is true, then it is false; if it is false, then it is true. Regarding proof as a logical process, Gödel restated the paradox as a statement that declares that it can't be proved to be true. There are two possibilities. If the statement is false, then it can be proved to be true – but if a false statement can be proved to be true, then the entire system of logic is inconsistent. If the statement is true, then it can't be proved to be true, and the logical system is incomplete.

In Turing's formulation, logical statements about proofs are translated into actions of machines. The self-referential statements of Gödel's incompleteness theorems then translate into statements about a universal Turing machine that is programmed to answer questions about its own behavior. In particular, Turing showed that no Turing machine could answer the question of when a Turing machine 'halts' – i.e., gives the answer to some question. If such a machine existed, then it would be straightforward to construct a related machine that halts only when it fails to halt. In other words, the simplest possible question one can ask of a digital computer – whether it gives any output at all – cannot be computed!

The existence of universal Turing machines, together with their intrinsic limitation due to self-contradictory behavior as in the halting problem, has profound consequences for the behavior of existing computers. In particular, current electronic computers are effectively universal Turing machines. Their universal nature expresses itself in the fact that it is possible to write software that can be compiled to run on any digital computer, no matter whether it is made by HP, Lenovo, or Apple. The power of universal Turing machines manifests itself in the remarkable power and flexibility of digital computation. This power is expressed in the so-called Church-Turing hypothesis, which states that any effectively calculable function can be computed using a universal Turing machine. The intrinsically self-contradictory nature of Turing machines and the halting problem manifest themselves in the intrinsically annoying and frustrating behavior of digital computers – the halting problem implies that there is no systematic way of debugging a digital com-

puter. No matter what one does, there will always be situations where the computer exhibits surprising and unexpected behavior (e.g., the ‘blue screen of death’).

Concurrent with the logical, abstract development of the notion of computation, including Turing’s abstract machine, engineers and scientists were pursuing the construction of actual digital computers. In Germany in 1936, Konrad Zuse designed the Z-1, a mechanical calculator whose program was written on perforated 35mm film. In 1937, Zuse expanded the design to allow universal digital computation *a la* Turing. When completed in 1938, the Z-1 functioned poorly due to mechanical imprecision, the same issue that plagued Babbage’s difference engine more than a century earlier. By 1941, Zuse had constructed the Z-3, an electronic computer capable of universal digital computation. Because of its essentially applied nature, and because it was kept secret during the second world war, Zuse’s work received less credit for its seminal nature than was its due (see the remark above on winner’s history).

Meanwhile, in 1937, Claude Shannon’s MIT master’s thesis, ‘A Symbolic Analysis of Relay and Switching Circuits,’ showed how any desired Boolean function – including those on which universal digital computation could be based – could be implemented using electronic switching circuits [8]. This work had a profound influence on the construction of electronic computers in the United States and Great Britain over the next decades.

4 Digital computation post-Turing

Turing’s ideas on computation had immediate impact on the construction of actual digital computers. While doing his Ph.D. at Princeton in 1937, Turing himself constructed simple electronic models of Turing machines. The real impetus for the development of actual digital computers came with the onset of the second world war. Calculations for gunnery and bombing could be speeded up electronically. Most relevant to Turing’s work, however, was the use of electronic calculators for the purpose of cryptanalysis. During the war, Turing became the premier code-breaker for the British cryptography effort. The first large-scale electronic computer, the Colossus, was constructed to aid this effort. In the United States, IBM constructed the Mark I at Harvard, the second programmable computer after Zuse’s Z-3, and used it to perform ballistic calculations. Zuse himself had not remained idle: he cre-

ated the world's first computer start-up, designed the follow-up to the Z-3, the Z-4, and wrote the first programming language. The end of the war saw the construction of the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer, or ENIAC.

To build a computer requires an architecture. Two of the most influential proposals for computer architectures at the end of the war were the Electronic Discrete Variable Automatic Computer, or EDVAC, authored by von Neumann, and Turing's Automatic Computing Engine, or ACE. Both of these proposals implemented what is called a 'von Neumann' computer architecture, in which program and data are stored in the same memory bank. Stored program architectures were anticipated by Babbage, implicit in Turing's original paper, and had been developed previously by J. Presper Eckert and John Mauchly in their design for the ENIAC. The Pythagoras syndrome, however, assigns their development to von Neumann, who himself would have been unlikely to claim authorship.

This ends our historical summary of conventional digital computation. The last half century has seen vast expansion of devices, techniques, and architectures notably the development of the transistor and integrated circuits. But the primary elements of computation – programmable systems to perform digital logic – were all in place by 1950.

5 The computing universe

The physical universe bears little resemblance to the collection of wires, transistors, and electrical circuitry that make up a conventional digital computer. How then, can one claim that the universe is a computer? The answer lies in the definition of computation, of which Turing was the primary developer. According to Turing, a universal digital computer is a system that can be programmed to perform any desired sequence of logical operations. Turing's invention of the universal Turing machine makes this notion precise. The question of whether the universe is itself a universal digital computer can be broken down into two parts: (I) Does the universe compute? and (II) Does the universe do nothing more than compute? More precisely, (I) Is the universe capable of performing universal digital computation in the sense of Turing? That is, can the universe or some part of it be programmed to simulate a universal Turing machine? (II) Can a universal Turing machine efficiently simulate the dynamics of the universe itself?

At first the answers to these questions might appear, straightforwardly, to be Yes. When we construct electronic digital computers, we are effectively programming some piece of the universe to behave like a universal digital computer, capable of simulating a universal Turing machine. Similarly, the Church-Turing hypothesis implies, that *any* effectively calculable physical dynamics – including the known laws of physics, and any laws that may be discovered in the – can be computed using a digital computer.

But the straightforward answers are not correct. First, to simulate a universal Turing machine requires a potentially infinite supply of memory space. In Turing’s original formulation, when a Turing machine reaches the end of its tape, new blank squares can always be added: the tape is ‘indefinitely extendable.’ Whether the universe that we inhabit provides us with indefinitely extendable memory is an open question of quantum cosmology, and will be discussed further below. So a more accurate answer to the first question is ‘Maybe.’ The question of whether or not infinite memory space is available is not so serious, as one can formulate notions of universal computation with limited memory. After all, we treat our existing electronic computers as universal machines even though they have finite memory (until, of course, we run out of disc space!). The fact that we possess computers is strong empirical evidence that laws of physics support universal digital computation.

The straightforward answer to question (II) is more doubtful. Although the outcomes of any calculable laws of physics can almost certainly be simulated on a universal Turing machine, it is an open question whether this simulation can be performed *efficiently* in the sense that a relatively small amount of computational resources are devoted to simulating what happens in a small volume of space and time. The current theory of computational complexity suggests that the answer to the second question is ‘Probably not.’

An even more ambitious programme for the computational theory of the universe is the question of architecture. The observed universe possesses the feature that the laws of physics are local – they involve only interactions between neighboring regions of space and time. Moreover, these laws are homogeneous and isotropic, in that they appear to take the same form in all observed regions of space and time. The computational version of a homogeneous system with local laws is a cellular automaton, a digital system consisting of cells in regular array. Each cell possesses a finite number of possible states, and is updated as a function of its own state and those of its neighbors. Cellular automata were proposed by von Neumann and by the mathematician Stanislaw Ulam in the 1940s, and used by them to investi-

gate mechanisms of self-reproduction [9]. Von Neumann and Ulam showed that cellular automata were capable of universal computation in the sense of Turing. In the 1960s, Zuse and computer scientist Edward Fredkin proposed that cellular automata could be used as the basis for the laws of physics – i.e., the universe is nothing more or less than a giant cellular automaton [10]. More recently, this idea was promulgated by Stephen Wolfram.

The idea that the universe is a giant cellular automaton is the strong version of the statement that the universe is a computer. That is, not only does the universe compute, and only compute, but also if one looks at the ‘guts’ of the universe – the structure of matter at its smallest scale – then those guts consist of nothing more than bits undergoing local, digital operations. The strong version of the statement that the universe is a computer can be phrased as the question, (III) ‘Is the universe a cellular automaton?’ As will now be seen, the answer to this question is No. In particular, basic facts about quantum mechanics prevent the local dynamics of the universe from being reproduced by a finite, local, classical, digital dynamics.

6 Classical digital devices can’t reproduce quantum mechanics efficiently

Quantum mechanics is the physical theory that describes how systems behave at their most fundamental scales. It was studying von Neumann’s book [11] *The mathematical foundations of quantum mechanics* that inspired Turing to work on mathematics [12]. (In particular, Turing was interested in reconciling questions of determinism and free will with the apparently indeterministic nature of quantum mechanics.) Quantum mechanics is well-known for exhibiting strange, counter-intuitive features. Chief amongst these features is the phenomenon known as entanglement, which Einstein termed ‘spooky action at a distance’ (*spukhafte Fernwirkung*). In fact, entanglement does not engender non-locality in the sense of non-local interactions or superluminal communication. However, a variety of theorems from von Neumann to Bell and beyond show that the types of correlations implicit in entanglement cannot be described by classical local models involving hidden variables [13]. In particular, such quantum correlations cannot be reproduced by local classical digital models such as cellular automata. Non-local classical hidden variable models can reproduce the correlations of quantum mechanics, but only at the

by introducing either superluminal communication, or a very large amount of classical information to reproduce the behavior of a single quantum bit. Accordingly, the answer to question (III), is the universe a cellular automaton, is ‘No.’

The inability of classical digital systems to cope with entanglement also seems to prevent ordinary computers from simulating quantum systems efficiently. Merely to represent the state of a quantum system with N subsystems, e.g., N nuclear spins, requires $O(2^N)$ bits on a classical computer. To represent how that state evolves requires the exponentiation of a 2^N by 2^N matrix. Although it is conceivable that exponential compression techniques could be found that would allow a classical computer to simulate a generic quantum system efficiently, none are known. So the currently accepted answer to question (II), can a Turing machine simulate a quantum system efficiently, is ‘Probably not.’

7 Quantum computing

The difficulty that classical computers have reproducing quantum effects makes it difficult to sustain the idea that the universe might at bottom be a classical computer. Quantum computers, by definition, are good at reproducing quantum effects, however [14]. Let’s investigate the question of whether the universe might be, at bottom, a quantum computer [1].

A quantum computer is a computer that uses quantum effects such as superposition and entanglement to perform computations in ways that classical computers cannot. Quantum computers were proposed by Paul Benioff in 1980 [15]. The notion of a quantum Turing machine that used quantum superposition to perform computations in a novel way was proposed by David Deutsch in 1985 [16]. For a decade or so, quantum computation remained something of a curiosity. No one had a particularly good application for them, and no one had the least idea how to build them. The situation changed in 1994, when Peter Shor showed that a relatively modestly sized quantum computer, containing a few thousand logical quantum bits or ‘qubits,’ and capable of performing around a million coherent operations, could be used to factor large numbers and so break public key cryptosystems such as RSA [17]. The previous year, Lloyd had showed how quantum computers could be constructed by applying electromagnetic pulses to arrays of coupled quantum systems [18]. The resulting parallel quantum computer is in effect a quantum

cellular automaton. In 1995, Ignacio Cirac and Peter Zoller showed how ion traps could be used to implement quantum computation [19].

Since then, a wide variety of designs for quantum computers have been proposed. Further quantum algorithms have been developed, and prototype quantum computers have been constructed and used to demonstrate simple quantum algorithms. This allows us to begin addressing the question of whether the universe is a quantum computer. If we ‘quantize’ our three questions, the first one, (Q1) ‘Does the universe allow quantum computation?’ has the provisional answer, ‘Yes.’ As before, the question of whether the universe affords a potentially unlimited supply of quantum bits remains open. Moreover, it is not clear that human beings currently possess the technical ability to build large scale quantum computers capable of code breaking. However, from the perspective of determining whether the universe supports quantum computation, it is enough that the laws of physics allow it.

Now quantize the second question. (Q2) ‘Can a quantum computer efficiently simulate the dynamics of the universe?’ Because they operate using the same principles that apply to nature at fundamental scales, quantum computers – though difficult to construct – represent a way of processing information that is closer to the way that nature processes information at the microscale. In 1982, Richard Feynman suggested that quantum devices could function as quantum analog computers to simulate the dynamics of extended quantum systems [20]. In 1996, Lloyd developed a quantum algorithm for implementing such universal quantum simulators [21]. The Feynman-Lloyd results show that, unlike classical computers, quantum computers can simulate efficiently any quantum system that evolves by local interactions, including for example the standard model of elementary particles. While no universally accepted theory of quantum gravity currently exists, as long as that theory involves local interactions between quantized variables, then it can be efficiently simulated on a quantum computer. So the answer to the quantized question 2 is ‘Yes.’

There are of course subtleties to how a quantum computer can simulate the known laws of physics. Fermions supply special problems of simulation, which however can be overcome. A short-distance (or high-energy) cutoff in the dynamics is required to insure that the amount of quantum information required to simulate local dynamics is finite. However, such cutoffs – for example, at the Planck scale – are widely expected to be a fundamental feature of nature.

Finally, we can quantize question three: (Q3) ‘Is the universe a quantum

cellular automaton?’ While we cannot unequivocally answer this question in the affirmative, we note that the proofs that show that a quantum computer can simulate any local quantum system efficiently immediately imply that any homogeneous, local quantum dynamics, such as that given by the standard model and (presumably) by quantum gravity, can be directly reproduced by a quantum cellular automaton. Indeed, lattice gauge theories, in Hamiltonian form, map directly onto quantum cellular automata. Accordingly, all current physical observations are consistent with the theory that the universe is indeed a quantum cellular automaton.

8 The universe as quantum computer

We saw above that basic aspects of quantum mechanics, such as entanglement, make it difficult to construct a classical computational model of the universe as a universal Turing machine or a classical cellular automaton. By contrast, the power of quantum computers to encompass quantum dynamics allows the construction of quantum computational models of the universe. In particular, the Feynman-Lloyd construction allows one to map any local, homogeneous quantum dynamics directly onto a quantum cellular automaton.

The immediate question is ‘So what?’ Does the fact that the universe is observationally indistinguishable from a giant quantum computer tell us anything new or interesting about its behavior? The answer to this question is a resounding ‘Yes!’ In particular, the quantum computational model of the universe answers a question that has plagued human beings ever since they first began to wonder about the origins of the universe, namely, Why is the universe so ordered and yet so complex [\[1\]](#)?

The ordinary laws of physics tell us nothing about why the universe is so complex. Indeed, the complexity of the universe is quite mysterious in ordinary physics. The reason is that the laws of physics are apparently quite simple. The known ones can be written down on the back of a tee shirt. Moreover, the initial state of the universe appears also to have been simple. Just before the big bang, the universe was highly flat, homogeneous, isotropic, and almost entirely lacking in detail. Simple laws and simple initial conditions should lead to states that are, in principle, themselves very simple. But that is not what we see when we look out the window. Instead we see vast variety and detail – animals and plants, houses and humans, and overhead, at

night, stars and planets wheeling by. Highly complex systems and behaviors abound. The quantum computational model of the universe not only explains this complexity: it requires it to exist.

To understand why the quantum computational model necessarily gives rise to complexity, consider the old story of monkeys typing on typewriters. The original version of this story was proposed by the French probabilist Émile Borel, at the beginning of the twentieth century (for a detailed account of the history of typing monkeys see [1]). Borel imagined a million typing monkeys (*singes dactylographes*) and pointed out that over the course of single year, the monkeys had a finite chance of producing all the texts in all the libraries in the world. He then immediately noted that with very high probability, they would produce nothing but gibberish.

Consider, by contrast, the same monkeys typing into computers. Rather than regarding the monkeys random scripts as mere texts, the computers interpret them as programs, sets of instructions to perform logical operations. At first it might seem that the computers would also produce mere gibberish – ‘garbage in, garbage out,’ as the programmer’s maxim goes. While it is true that many of the programs might result in garbage or error messages, it can be shown mathematically that the monkeys have a relatively high chance of producing complex, ordered structures. The reason is that many complex, ordered structures can be produced from short computer programs, albeit after lengthy calculations. Some short program will instruct the computer to calculate the digits of π , for example, while another will cause it to produce intricate fractals. Another will instruct the computer to evaluate the consequences of the standard model of elementary particles, interacting with gravity, starting from the big bang. A particularly brief program instructs the computer to prove all possible theorems. Moreover, the shortest programs to produce these complex structures are necessarily *random*. If they were not, then there would be an even shorter program that could produce the same structure. So the monkeys, by generating random programs, are producing exactly the right conditions to generate structures of arbitrarily great complexity.

For this argument to apply to the universe itself, two ingredients are necessary – first, a computer, and second, monkeys. But as shown above, the universe itself is indistinguishable from a quantum computer. In addition, quantum fluctuations – e.g., primordial fluctuations in energy density – automatically provide the random bits that are necessary to seed the quantum computer with a random program. That is, quantum fluctuations are the

monkeys that program the quantum computer that is the universe. Such a quantum computing universe *necessarily* generates complex, ordered structures with high probability.

9 Conclusions

This article reviewed the history of computation with the goal of answering the question, ‘Is the universe a computer?’ The inability of classical digital computers to reproduce quantum effects efficiently makes it implausible that the universe is a classical digital system such as a cellular automaton. However, all observed phenomena are consistent with the model in which the universe is a quantum computer, e.g., a quantum cellular automaton. The quantum computational model of the universe explains previously unexplained features, most importantly, the co-existence in the universe of randomness and order, and of simplicity and complexity.

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