A trace has been found.

Abbreviations

~M_4 = aenc(((groupkey_response,vid_10,gsk(vid_10,gmsk_5),gpk(gmsk_5)),sign((groupkey_response,vid_10,gsk(vid_10,gsk(vid_10,gsk(vid_10,gsk(vid_10,gsk(gmsk_5)),cask_3)),pk(vsk_6)) ~M_5 = aenc(((pseudocert(pk(a_4),gsk(a_5,gmsk_5)), revoke_request),sign((pseudocert(pk(a_4),gsk(a_5, gmsk_5)),revoke_request),vsk_6),cert(vid_10,pk(vsk_6),cask_3)),pk(cask_3))

~M_6 = aenc(((groupkey_response,vid_9,gsk(vid_9,gmsk_5),gpk(gmsk_5)),sign((groupkey_response,vid_9,gsk(vid_9,gsk(vid_9,gmsk_5)),gpk(gmsk_5)),cask_3)),pk(vsk_5)) ~M_7 = aenc(((pseudocert(pk(a_9),gsk(a_5,gmsk_5)), revoke_request),sign((pseudocert(pk(a_9),gsk(a_5, gmsk_5)),revoke_request),vsk_5),cert(vid_9,pk(vsk_5),cask_3)),pk(cask_3))

Honest Process Attacker

{1}new gmsk_5 {2}new cask_3 \sim M = pk(cask_3) Beginning of process CAGroupMasterSecretKeyReveal {156}event CAGMSKReveal(gmsk_5) {6}new vid_10 [6] new vid_9 {7}new vsk_6 {7}new vsk_5 \sim M_1 = gmsk_5 Beginning of process Vehicle Beginning of process CARevoke Beginning of process CARevoke Beginning of process CA Beginning of process CA {15} event ValidGroupKeyRequestSent(vid_9) ~M_2 = aenc((groupkey_request,sign(groupkey_request, vsk_5),cert(vid_9,pk(vsk_5),cask_3)),pk(cask_3)) Beginning of process Vehicle {15} event ValidGroupKeyRequestSent(vid_10) ~M_3 = aenc((groupkey_request,sign(groupkey_request, vsk_6),cert(vid_10,pk(vsk_6),cask_3)),pk(cask_3)) ~M_3 = aenc((groupkey_request,sign(groupkey_request, vsk_6),cert(vid_10,pk(vsk_6),cask_3)),pk(cask_3)) {116}get revokedcerts(=vid_10): else branch taken {109}event ValidGroupKeyRequestReceived(cask_3, {114}event ValidGroupPrivateKeySent(vid_10,gsk(vid_10,gmsk_5),gpk(gmsk_5)) ~M 4 ~M 4 {22} event ValidGroupPrivateKeyReceived(vid_10, gsk(vid_10,gmsk_5),gpk(gmsk_5)) Beginning of process VehicleReport(vid_10, vsk_6, cert(vid_10,pk(vsk_6),cask_3), pk(cask_3), gpk(gmsk_5)) (a_3,sign(a_3,a_4),pseudocert(pk(a_4),gsk(a_5, ~M_1))) = (a_3,sign(a_3,a_4),pseudocert(pk(a_4), gsk(a_5,gmsk_5))) {48} event RevocationAsked(vid_10,cert(vid_10,pk(vsk_6),cask_3),pseudocert(pk(a_4),gsk(a_5,gmsk_5))) ~M 5 ~M_2 = aenc((groupkey_request,sign(groupkey_request, vsk_5),cert(vid_9,pk(vsk_5),cask_3)),pk(cask_3)) {116}get revokedcerts(=vid_9): else branch taken {109}event ValidGroupKeyRequestReceived(cask_3, vid 9) {114}event ValidGroupPrivateKeySent(vid_9,gsk(vid_9,gmsk_5),gpk(gmsk_5)) ~M 6 \sim M₆ {22} event ValidGroupPrivateKeyReceived(vid_9,gsk(vid_9,gmsk_5),gpk(gmsk_5)) Beginning of process VehicleReport(vid_9, vsk_5, cert(vid_9,pk(vsk_5),cask_3), pk(cask_3), gpk(gmsk_5)) (a_8,sign(a_8,a_9),pseudocert(pk(a_9),gsk(a_5, ~M_1))) = (a_8,sign(a_8,a_9),pseudocert(pk(a_9), gsk(a_5,gmsk_5))) {48} event RevocationAsked(vid_9,cert(vid_9,pk(vsk_5),cask_3),pseudocert(pk(a_9),gsk(a_5,gmsk_5))) \sim M_7 \sim M_5 {154}get revokedcerts(=vid_10): else branch taken {127} event ValidRevocationReportReceived(pseudocert(pk(a_4),gsk(a_5,gmsk_5)),cert(vid_10,pk(vsk_6),cask_3)) {153}get revokedcerts(=a_5): else branch taken {130}event RevokedVid(a_5) {131}insert revokedcerts(a_5)

> {154}get revokedcerts(=vid_9): else branch taken {127}event ValidRevocationReportReceived(pseudocert(pk(a_9),gsk(a_5,gmsk_5)),cert(vid_9,pk(vsk_5),cask_3))

~M 7

{153}get revokedcerts(a_5)