

Final Year Project Report

MSci - Draft Interim Report

Implementing the PKCS#1 v1.5 Signature Scheme with provably secure parameters

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Aims

1.1.1 Why: The Context and Rationale

The PKCS#1 v1.5 digital signature scheme, rooted in RSA's hash-and-sign framework, has emerged as the de facto standard for digital signatures since its 1998 introduction [1]. Essential in security-focused network protocols like SSH, DNSSEC, IKE, and pre-TLS 1.3 X.509 certificates [2], its simplicity fostered broad adoption from its outset with a straightforward implementation across programming languages, and speedy verifications relative to alternatives like DSA or ECDSA [3]. Despite its widespread adoption the scheme lacks formal security proofs, raising concerns about its long-term reliability. Given its deep integration in various applications, even at the hardware level, transitioning to provably secure [4], [5] alternatives like RSA-PSS has been slow (RSA-PSS was only upgraded to a requirement for new applications in PKCS#1 v2.2 [6] long after initially being suggested as the replacement for PKCS#1 v1.5 in PKCS#1 v2.1 [7]) with imperative requirements of backward compatibility and interoperability acting as significant barriers to full adoption.

Additionally considered in a broader sense, for a cryptographic scheme i.e., RSA-PSS to gain traction it must first be developed and then subjected to rigorous scrutiny by the cryptographic community. Following this, its algorithmic primitives need to be standardised, which then facilitates the creation and standardisation of high-level protocols incorporating these components. Subsequent software implementations must align with these standards before the scheme can be set as the default in various applications. RSA-PSS, while superior to the older PKCS#1 v1.5 lingers in the early stages of this transition mainly between standardisation of its algorithm primitives and the standardisation of protocols that incorporate its primitives. The current landscape is one of fragmentation where RSA-PSS and PKCS#1-v1.5 often coexist within the same infrastructure, such as TLS implementations and RSA certificates. This state of the art considered, retaining PKCS#1 v1.5 scheme remains a preferable choice. Going even further, finding an applicable security proof to bridge its security to the level of its widespread adoption would be the ideal scenario.

In this direction a landmark development came in 2018 when Jager, Kakvi, and May [3] provided a security proof (an improvement on Coron [8] proof that was limited to the Rabin-Williams variant with $e=2$) for the PKCS#1 v1.5 signature scheme, with a caveat: usage of larger parameters are required. Their work offered insights that also apply to other deterministic RSA signature schemes, including ISO/IEC 9796-2 Scheme and ANSI X9.31.

1.1.2 What: The Primary Goal

The aim of this project was to bridge the theoretical insights presented by the authors [3] with practical implementation, subsequently evaluating the computational overhead induced by the application of provably secure parameters to deterministic RSA schemes, with a particular focus on the PKCS standard.

1.1.3 How: Overview of Objectives

The influence of the application of provably secure parameters to each of the mentioned deterministic schemes in terms of computational cost was investigated. This was done through the production of algorithms respective to both cases (standard and provably secure parameters) allowing for comparison. Performing the investigation across standards was means of ascertaining a more reliable and accurate assessment by enabling further comparison of introduced overhead across different schemes. The final deliverable constituted an all-incorporative user-interfaced benchmarking program for which results from automation of signature processes applied to data were generated for appropriate evaluations and conclusions to be drawn.

1.2 Objectives

To achieve the aim, the project will involve:

- Develop concrete implementations of the PKCS#1 v1.5 signature schemes using both standard and provably secure parameters.
- Develop concrete implementations of the ISO/IEC 9796-2 Scheme, and separately the ANSI X9.31 signature schemes using both standard and provably secure parameters.
- Demonstrate in practice, with larger parameters, how deterministic schemes, particularly the PKCS#1 v1.5 signature scheme can achieve a security level on par with less-practical, signature schemes, such as RSA-PSS.
- Create a user-interfaced benchmarking program that incorporates all objectives of the project to assess this overhead in various scenarios across standards

Chapter 2: Literature Review/Related Work

RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5 remains unbroken. There are no real attacks able to successfully exploit the scheme free of implementation errors. This distinction of being free of implementation errors is crucial. Potential proofs consider only forgeries that are accepted by a correct verification algorithm. It is now well established from a variety of follow up studies all originating from [9] that vulnerable implementations of a flawed signature verification algorithm for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5 can be exploited. Bleichenbacher presented a low-exponent attack on RSA-PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures at the CRYPTO 2006 rump session. This attack was later described by Finney [10] in a posting to the OpenPGP mailing list.

It was not until the efforts of Coron [8] in 2002 that a security proof applicable to RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5 arrived. This was due to the issue of deterministic padding scheme that RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5 uses rendering standard proof techniques void. Coron presented a security proof for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5 (and ISO/IEC 9796-2 signatures) albeit with a restriction that $e = 2$, i.e. the Rabin-Williams variant [8] which is secure based on the factoring assumption. The proofs' exclusive and/or restrictive value of e aside, a further caveat was that the output size of the hash function needed to be $2/3$ of the bit length of the modulus N . These restrictions diverge largely from the parameters used in the instantiation of RSA-PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures in practice.

Much later, Jager, Kakvi and May [3] showed an improved security proof for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5 with less restrictive conditions. It sufficed that e more generally be a small prime (Kakvi and Kiltz [11]). Still requiring a large hash function output, Jager, Kakvi and May achieved an improvement in hash function output requiring only $1/2$ of the modulus size. The modulus effectively doubles in bit length when compared to the norm with a newly introduced third prime factor necessitating the increase in bits. Withstanding the improvement and as a consequence of the proofs being founded in the random oracle model, the larger cryptographic parameters still deviate slightly from the standard parameters used in practice. Nonetheless this was sufficient enough for the authors to demonstrate how RSA-PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures can be instantiated in practice such that the improved proofs apply.

To all intents and purposes, regardless of the proofs being presented primarily for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5, uniformity in construction philosophy means other signature standards of the same deterministic RSA type (ISO/IEC 9796-2 signatures and ANSI X9.31 rDSA) still match the setting required for proofs to be applicable to them. For example theorem statements used in construction of Corons' proof [8] are general enough that corresponding proof theorems can also be presented for the remaining standards of deterministic signatures.

A full discussion of provable security extending to non-deterministic schemes lies beyond the scope of this project. Probabilistic padding poses an issue since generating sources of randomness, particularly on constrained devices is an ongoing challenge. Moreover RSA-PSS, the sole RSA-based randomised digital signature scheme uses two hash functions. This makes it difficult to compare with deterministic schemes that use only one. This project focused on standardised deterministic schemes which are directly comparable and subversion resistant [12] by default of not having to generate randomness. This lends well to the issue of examining computational overhead from various perspectives of the different deterministic standards.

Chapter 3: Cryptographic Foundations

3.1 Notations

The security parameter is denoted as λ . This parameter determines a system's security level/key sizes (higher values mean better security but more computational effort). For all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, the symbol 1^n represents the n -bit string of all ones. Given any set S , the notation $x \xleftarrow{R} S$ signifies that x is chosen uniformly at random from S . The set of prime numbers is represented as \mathbb{P} and the set of k -bit integers is denoted as $\mathbb{Z}[k]$. Similarly, the set of k -bit primes is indicated by $\mathbb{P}[k]$. The notation \mathbb{Z}_N^* represents the multiplicative group modulo N where $N \in \mathbb{N}$. Game-based proofs are employed, and the notation $G^A \Rightarrow 1$ indicates an event where the adversary A succeeds in game G , specifically when the Finalise Procedure yields an output of 1.

3.2 Digital Signature Schemes

Not every security issue revolves around confidentiality, and adversaries are not restricted to merely passive surveillance. In numerous scenarios, safeguarding the authenticity and integrity of communications from active opponents, who might manipulate or introduce unauthorised messages into the transmission, is paramount or even more critical. In the public key setting, the cryptographic primitive used to provide data integrity is a digital signature scheme. Essentially, Digital signatures function as a means binding an identity to specific information. A signature process consists of transforming the relevant message and the entity's confidential details to produce tag named a signature. For instance, authors can use these to ensure their writings are received by their readers unaltered, enabling readers to confirm the content's authenticity using the distributed public key.

Definition 3.1. A (digital) signature scheme consists of three probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Gen, Sign, Vrfy) such that:

1. Gen (key-generation algorithm): takes as input a security parameter 1^λ and outputs a pair of keys (sk, vk) , where sk is the signing key and vk is the verification key.
2. Sign (signing algorithm): takes as input a private key sk and a message m and outputs a signature σ . ($\sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}_{sk}(m)$).
3. Vrfy (deterministic verification algorithm): takes as input a public key pk , a message m , and a signature σ ; outputs a boolean ($b := \text{Vrfy}_{pk}(m, \sigma)$).

Correctness: It is required that except with negligible probability over (pk, sk) output by $\text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$, it holds that $\text{Vrfy}_{pk}(m, \text{Sign}_{sk}(m)) = 1$ for every (legal) message m .

Such a signature scheme can be utilised in the following way. Bob (sender) runs $\text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$ in turn generating the keys (pk, sk) . Bob then makes his public key (pk) available to everyone, including Alice (receiver). When Bob wants to send a message m to Alice and ensure it's authentic, he generates a signature σ for that message using his private key: $\sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}_{sk}(m)$. He then sends both the message and its signature, (m, σ) , to Alice.

Upon receipt of (m, σ) , Alice, who already knows Bob's public key can verify the authenticity of m by checking whether $\text{Vrfy}_{pk}(m, \text{Sign}_{sk}(m)) \stackrel{?}{=} 1$. This assures Alice both that Bob sent m , and additionally that m was not modified in transit

3.3 Security of signature schemes

Security for a signature scheme, represented as $\text{DS} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Vrfy})$, is depicted through a contest between a challenger and an Adversary A (probabilistic machine operating within polynomial time). This contest emulates a situation in which A endeavours to compromise the signature scheme by employing a specific attack model.

3.3.1 Default notion of Secure Signatures

The intuitive idea behind the default notion of security for digital signature schemes is that no efficient adversary should be able to generate valid digital signature for any "new" document that was not previously signed by the original signer. An adversary might see all documents and their associated signatures (with aid of sign oracle) and even influence document content (Replay Attacks).

A robust digital signature system, resistant to such forgeries, is termed existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen-message attack. "Existentially unforgeable" signifies that the adversary cannot produce a valid signature on any document. The protection should remain intact even if the adversary can carry out an adaptive chosen-message attack by which it is able to obtain signatures on arbitrary messages chosen adaptively during its attack.

Game UF-CMA(ROM)

<p><u>Initialise</u> $(pk, sk) \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$ return pk</p> <p><u>Hash(m)</u> if $(m, \cdot) \in \mathcal{H}$ fetch $(m, y) \in \mathcal{H}$ return y else $y \in_R \text{Domain};$ $\mathcal{H} \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \cup \{(m, y)\}$ return y</p> <p><u>Sign(m)</u> $\mathcal{M} \leftarrow \mathcal{M} \cup \{m\}$ return $\sigma \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{Sign}(sk, m)$</p> <p><u>Finalise($m^*, \sigma^*$)</u> if $\text{Vrfy}(pk, m^*, \sigma^*) == 1 \wedge m^* \notin \mathcal{M}$ return 1 else return 0</p>

Figure 3.1: Game defining UF-CMA security in the Random Oracle Model (section 3.12.)

Definition 3.2. A signature scheme DS is UF-CMA secure, if for any forger \mathcal{F} running in time at most t , making at most q_h hash queries and making at most q_s signature queries, we have:

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{F}, \text{DS}}^{\text{UF-CMA}} = \Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} 1 \leftarrow \mathbf{Finalise}(m^*, \sigma^*); \\ (m^*, \sigma^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{F}^{\mathbf{Hash}(\cdot), \mathbf{Sign}(\cdot)}(pk); \\ pk \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbf{Initialise}(1^\lambda) \end{array} \right] \leq \varepsilon$$

3.3.2 Stronger Notion of Secure Signatures

While a secure digital signature ensures that an adversary cannot forge a signature for a new, previously unsigned message, it does not prevent the adversary from generating a new, valid signature for a message that has already been signed. To address this, a stronger notion of security can be considered.

Consider a modified game **SUF-CMA(ROM)** defined in exactly the same way as Game **UF-CMA(ROM)**, except that now queries are to be restricted to an underlying Signature-Messages space \mathcal{S} , containing pairs of oracle queries and their associated responses (e.g., $(m^*, \sigma^*) \in \mathcal{S}$ if \mathcal{F} queried $\text{Sign}(m^*)$ and received in response the signature σ^*). The Sign and Finalise oracles are adapted as follows:

Game SUF-CMA(ROM)

<p>Sign(m)</p> <p>$\sigma \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{Sign}(sk, m)$</p> <p>$\mathcal{S} \leftarrow \mathcal{S} \cup \{(m, \sigma)\}$</p> <p>return σ</p> <p>Finalise(m^*, σ^*)</p> <p>if $\text{Vrfy}(pk, m^*, \sigma^*) == 1 \wedge (m^*, \sigma^*) \notin \mathcal{S}$</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">return 1</p> <p>else</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">return 0</p>
--

Figure 3.2: Game defining SUF-CMA

Definition 3.3. A signature scheme DS is said to be *Strong Existentially Unforgeable under an Adaptive Chosen-Message Attack* (SUF-CMA) secure if, for any forger \mathcal{F} running in time at most t , making at most q_h hash queries and making at most q_s signature queries, we have:

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{F}, \text{DS}}^{\text{SUF-CMA}} = \Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} 1 \leftarrow \mathbf{Finalise}(m^*, \sigma^*); \\ (m^*, \sigma^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{F}^{\text{Hash}(\cdot), \text{Sign}(\cdot)}(pk); \\ pk \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbf{Initialise}(1^\lambda) \end{array} \right] \leq \varepsilon$$

3.4 RSA

3.4.1 RSA Key Generation

RSA is widely used as the basis for digital signature schemes. There are various methods for generating digital signatures using RSA functions based on the RSA assumption.

While these methods differ in terms of operations in relation to signature and/or verification algorithms, the RSA key generation procedure is common to all RSA-based signature schemes. An RSA key consists of three elements: A modulus N , a public exponent e and a private exponent d .

Definition 3.4. Let *GenModulus* be a polynomial-time algorithm that, that on inputs $(1^\lambda, k, (\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_k))$ outputs $(N, (p_1, \dots, p_k))$ where $N = \prod_{i=1}^k p_i$ i.e., the product of k distinct random prime numbers $p_i \in_R \mathbb{P}[\lambda_i]$, for $i \in \llbracket 1, \dots, k \rrbracket$ for k constant.

To generate an RSA key pair, Each entity B runs the following algorithm:

Definition 3.5. GenRSA

- | |
|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Run GenModulus $(N, p_1, \dots, p_k) \leftarrow \text{GenModulus}(1^\lambda, k, (\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_k))$ |
|---|

2. Compute $\phi(N) = \prod_{i=1}^k (p_i - 1)$
3. Select an arbitrary integer e , $e > 1$, such that $\gcd(e, \phi(N)) = 1$
4. Compute d , $1 > d < \phi(N)$, such that $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(N)}$
5. return N, e, d

The exponents are chosen in a way that for any number S with $S < N$, the following is always true:

$$S = M^{d \cdot e} \bmod N = M^{e \cdot d} \bmod N \quad (1)$$

3.4.2 RSA Assumption

RSA's security is closely tied into the hardness of factoring with the concept of the RSA problem. Notably It's widely believed that if one could efficiently factor N into its prime components, they could solve the RSA problem. While the converse is not proven (if one could solve the RSA problem, this does not equate to factorising N efficiently), the link is strong enough - at least until the use of quantum computers becomes feasible.

Given a modulus N and a co-prime integer $e > 2$, exponentiation to the e th power modulo N generates a permutation, leading to the RSA problem's core concept. For any number $y \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$, if $x^e = y \bmod N$, then x is uniquely defined, setting up the RSA problem to compute $x = [y^{1/e} \bmod N]$, or the e th root modulo N , without the factorisation of N . Informally this is the RSA assumption.

Trapdoors and RSA. The strength of the RSA algorithm can be seen through the lens of trapdoor permutations. This process is easy to compute in one direction (finding y) but computationally hard in reverse (finding x), without the trapdoor d , which allows for the easy computation of the e th root modulo N .

Definition 3.6. (RSA Assumption [13]). The k -RSA $[\lambda]$, states that given (N, e, x^e) it is hard to compute x ,

where N is a λ -bit number such that $N = \prod_{i=1}^k p_i$

i.e., the product of k distinct random prime numbers $p_i \in_R \mathbb{P}[\lambda_i]$, for $i \in \llbracket 1, \dots, k \rrbracket$, for k constant.

Additionally, $e \in \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}^*$, and $x \in_R \mathbb{Z}_N$. k -RSA $[\lambda]$ is said to be (t, ε) -hard, if for all adversaries \mathcal{A} running in time at most t , we have

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{k\text{-RSA}[\lambda]} = \Pr[x = \mathcal{A}(N, e, x^e \bmod N)] \leq \varepsilon.$$

The assumption is the same as saying that the RSA function is a trapdoor permutation. In turn the security of any RSA-based signature scheme can be reduced to the security of the RSA function as a trapdoor permutation.

3.5 Textbook RSA

In its most basic form, RSA offers a clear blueprint for digital signatures. The loose resemblance between signatures and the RSA function hinges on their shared trait of asymmetry. While everyone should have the ability to verify a signature only the one possessing the signing key can have the capability to create a (legitimate) signature. The RSA function mirrors this asymmetry: If N and e are made public, then anyone can exponentiate using e ($m \stackrel{?}{=} [\sigma^e \bmod N]$), but only an individual with d can exponentiate using d ($\sigma := [m^d \bmod N]$).

Regrettably, textbook RSA signatures have security issues because the difficulty of RSA problem does not meaningfully relate to the computation of a signature, especially for non-uniform messages. Adversaries might bypass the RSA problem or deduce new signatures from others, leading to vulnerability.

Multiplicative attacks utilise RSA's multiplicative property: the product of two signatures is a valid signature for the product of their respective messages. If σ_1 and σ_2 are respective signatures for m_1 and m_2 , then $\sigma_1 \cdot \sigma_2$ is a valid signature for $m_1 \cdot m_2$. This allows forging by choosing messages to yield a desired product modulo N . Therefore, plain RSA is not UF-CMA secure.

3.6 Hash-and-Sign

Hash-and-Sign is designed to counteract the vulnerabilities observed in the textbook RSA signature schemes by enabling the disruption of algebraic relationships between plaintexts and ciphertexts. Respective to real world uses of digital signatures, it can also be noted that messages are bit strings of arbitrary lengths and not in the format of group elements required for plain RSA signatures.

Both issues are typically dealt with by pre-processing or in other words applying some transformation to a message x i.e., $H(x)$ where H is a suitable (public) hash function (with outputs interpreted as elements of \mathbb{Z}_N^*). The idea revolves around pre-processing messages or in other words applying some transformation to a message m i.e., $H(m)$ where H is a suitable (public) hash function, into elements of \mathbb{Z}_N^* . Signatures are then computed on the resulting message representative while verification now ensures signature equivalence with the corresponding representative. This significantly thwarts the efficacy of the discussed attacks if H is not efficiently invertible.

Definition 3.7. Let GenRSA be as in the text. The Basic hashed RSA signature scheme.

1. Gen: on input 1^n run GenRSA(1^n) to obtain (N, e, d) . The public key is $\langle N, e \rangle$ and the private key is $\langle N, d \rangle$.

- As part of key generation, a function $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ is specified.

2. Sign: on input a private key $sk = \langle N, d \rangle$ and a message $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$, compute the signature

$$\sigma := [H(m)^d \bmod N].$$

3. Vrfy (deterministic verification algorithm): on input a public key $pk = \langle N, e \rangle$, a

message m , and a signature σ , output 1 if and only if

$$\sigma^e \stackrel{?}{=} H(m) \bmod N.$$

3.7 Classification of Digital Signature Schemes

Digital Signature schemes can be divided according to two general classes:

Basic Definition 1. *Digital signature schemes with appendix.* Digital signature schemes that require the original message as input to the verification algorithm. Both the message and the signature are then transmitted to the verifier who applies the RSA public-key operation to the signature, and compares the result to the hash of the message.

Basic Definition 2. *Digital signature schemes with message recovery.* Digital signature schemes of which additional data in the form of redundancy is utilised for verification of correctness. A priori knowledge of the message is not required for the verification algorithm. The signature only is transmitted to the verifier, who applies the RSA public-key operation to recover the padded message and thereafter the message.

Digital signature schemes with appendix are the most commonly used in practice. They rely on cryptographic hash functions rather than customised redundancy functions, and are less prone to existential forgery attacks.

3.8 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5

PKCS1 signature scheme is one of the earliest standardised Hash-and-Sign signature schemes on record. The scheme was initially disclosed in version 1.5 [1], which is why it is typically known as PKCS1 v1.5.

Messages are encoded in representative “blocks” in PKCS v1.5#1 with the (hexadecimal) format

$$0x00\|BT\|PS\|0x00\|D$$

The leading 00 block ensures that the full message representative is less than the modulus N when interpreted as an integer. BT refers to the type of block which is 0x01 for signatures. D is the encoding of the message: the hash of the message prefixed with the hash id ID_H . PS is the “padding string”, used to ensure the length of message representative has equality with the number of bits n . PS is fixed to 0xFF . . . FF.

$$0x00\|0x01\|0xFF\dots FF\|0x00\|ID_H\|H(m)$$

For all of the signature scheme definitions to follow: let GenRSA be adapted as to not compute and subsequently return d but instead return the prime factors of N as additional arguments.

RSA-PKCS1-v1.5 signatures

```

Gen( $1^\lambda, k, (\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_k), \ell$ )
Run GenRSA( $1^\lambda, k, (\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_k)$ ) to obtain  $(N, e, (p_1, \dots, p_k))$ 
Choose a hash function  $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$ .
Look-up  $\alpha$ -bit  $ID_H$  for  $H$ 
Compute  $\nu = n - \ell - \alpha - 23$ 
Compute  $PAD = 0^{15} \| 1^\nu \| 0^8 \| ID_H$ 
return  $(pk = (N, e, PAD, H), sk = (p_1, \dots, p_k))$ 

Sign( $sk, m$ )
Compute  $z \leftarrow H(m)$ 
Compute  $y = PAD \| z$ 
return  $\sigma = y^{1/e} \bmod N$ 

Vrfy( $pk, m, \sigma$ )
Compute  $y' = \sigma^e \bmod N$ 
Compute  $z \leftarrow H(m)$ 
If  $(PAD \| z == y')$ 
    return 1
else
    return 0

```

Figure 3.3: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5

Definition 3.8.

3.9 ANSI X9.31 rDSA Signatures

ANSI X9.31 [14] is another Hash-and-Sign signature scheme standardised around a similar time to RSASSA-PKCS. Designed for use in the banking sector, the scheme is very similar RSASSA-PKCS1-v1 5. Both variants of the signature schemes with appendix class of signatures (requires message input to Verify), the two differ slightly with respect to padding and ordering of hash related data.

$$PS \| D$$

In this format, D composed a hash id and message again forms the encoded message alternately, this time the hash id ID_H is prefixed with hash of the message. The padding string PS is fixed to 0x6B...BA with 0xB...B forming the repetitive portion of the padding. More specifically the padding is structured with the a header 0x06 byte and a trailer 0x0A nibble (the last nibble of the final padding byte), indicating the start and end of the padding.

$$0x06 \| 0xB...BA \| H(m) \| ID_H$$

It should be noted that the considered changes to padding are insignificant in the context of the proofs to follow, as they are both for arbitrary padding.

ANSI X9.31 rDSA signature scheme

Gen ($1^\lambda, k, (\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_k), \ell$)
Run $\text{GenRSA}(1^\lambda, k, (\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_k))$ to obtain $(N, e, (p_1, \dots, p_k))$
Choose a hash function $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$.
Look-up 16-bit ID_H for H
Compute $\nu = \frac{(\lambda - \ell - 24)}{4}$
Compute $\text{PAD} = 0110 \parallel (1011)^\nu \parallel 1010$
return $(pk = (N, e, \text{PAD}, ID_H, H), sk = (p_1, \dots, p_k))$
Sign (sk, m)
Compute $z \leftarrow H(m)$
Compute $y = \text{PAD} \parallel z \parallel ID_H$
return $\sigma = y^{1/e} \bmod N$
Vrfy (pk, m, σ)
Compute $y' = \sigma^e \bmod N$
Compute $z \leftarrow H(m)$
If $(\text{PAD} \parallel z == y')$
return 1
else
return 0

Figure 3.4: ANSI X9.31 rDSA

Definition 3.9.

3.10 ISO/IEC 9796-2:2010 Signature Scheme 1

ISO/IEC 9796-2:2010 [15] Signature Scheme is the final standardised scheme to be considered. The scheme has widespread practical significance, primarily in the payments sector where it is used in the EMV payment system for chip and pin cards.

A variant of the signature schemes with message recovery class of signatures, ISO/IEC 9796-2:2010 offers a swift departure from the more common practice of signing with appendix. It differs from convention by embedding either the entire message or a part of it within the signature. This allows for the recovery of the corresponding message representative upon verification. This approach yields space and message length savings, although it requires more computational effort to extract the message during verification.

EMV Protocol: The consideration of ISO/IEC 9796-2:2010 Signature Scheme 1 is confined

to its application within the EMV standard. Previous versions of the schemes general susceptibility to attacks [16], [17] is thus immaterial since such attacks work only on message spaces that exceed the length of the messages space used by the EMV protocol.

The standard offers two modes: full message recovery for sufficiently shorter messages that can be completely embedded in the signature and partial message recovery, which is applicable for extensively ranged messages that exceed the signature's capacity. As part of the latter, any message excess is transmitted along with the signature.

Table 3.1: ISO/IEC 9796-2 Signature block Format table

Full Message Recovery	$0x4B_0, \dots, B_qA\ m\ H(m)\ 0xBC$
Partial Message Recovery	$0x6B_0, \dots, B_qA\ m\ H(m)\ 0xBC$

In this format the message representative starts with an initial padding pattern to the left of message which can be denoted as PAD_L for illustration purposes. PAD_L starts with a header nibble that distinguishes between the two variants of the scheme with 0x6 for partial message recovery or alternatively 0x4 for full message recovery. The trailer nibble of 0xA is an indicator to the end of PAD_L .

In between PAD_L 's header and the trailing 0x0A nibble is a repetitive portion padding: an optional sequence of Bs, B_0, \dots, B_q where q is the number of bytes required to fill in the remaining space for the full message representative. This sequence is optional and is utilised only when the recoverable message following PAD_L is shorter than the available space, as seen in the full message recovery scheme. The last nibble of this B sequence, B_q , combines with the trailing 0x0A nibble to finalise PAD_L . After PAD_L is the message portion that is recoverable which is followed by the hash of the complete message. The signatures conclude with a right padding pattern 0xBC denoted as PAD_R .

Typically, descriptions of the scheme do not mention the optional Bs and present PAD_L as solely comprising the header and trailer, i.e., $PAD_L = 0x4A$ or $PAD_L = 0x6A$.

*Note: For formal definitions next to follow, this simplification will be used with PAD_L assumed to take the values of 0x4A or 0x6A. Additionally, for any sufficiently long bit string x, $MSBs(x, n)$ denotes the n most significant bits of x

ISO/IEC 9796-2:2010 Signature Scheme 1 with partial message recovery

```

Gen( $1^\lambda, k, (\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_k), \ell$ )
Run GenRSA( $1^\lambda, k, (\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_k)$ ) to obtain  $(N, e, (p_1, \dots, p_k))$ 
Choose a hash function  $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$ .
Compute  $PAD_L = 01101010$ 
Compute  $PAD_R = 10111100$ 
return  $(pk = (N, e, PAD_L, PAD_R, H), sk = (p_1, \dots, p_k))$ 

Sign( $sk, m$ )
Compute  $z \leftarrow H(m)$ 
Compute  $\nu = \lambda - \ell - 16$ 
Compute  $m_1 = \text{MSBs}(m, \nu)$  distinct from  $m$  such that  $m = m_1 m_2$ 
Compute  $y = PAD_L \| m_1 \| z \| PAD_R$ 
Compute  $\sigma = y^{1/e} \bmod N$ 
return  $(\sigma, m_2)$ 

Vrfy( $pk, m_2, \sigma$ )
Compute  $y' = \sigma^e \bmod N$  and parse  $y'$  as:
 $y' = PAD_L \| m_1 \| z \| PAD_R$ 
If  $(H(m_1 \| m_2) == z \ \& \ PAD_L == 6A_{16} \ \& \ PAD_R == BC_{16})$ 
    return 1
else
    return 0

```

Figure 3.5: ISO/IEC 9796-2 Scheme 1 (PR)

Definition 3.10.

ISO/IEC 9796-2:2010 Signature Scheme 1 with full message recovery

```

Gen( $1^\lambda, k, (\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_k), \ell$ )
Run GenRSA( $1^\lambda, k, (\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_k)$ ) to obtain  $(N, e, (p_1, \dots, p_k))$ 
Choose a hash function  $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$ .
Compute  $PAD_L = 01001010$ 
Compute  $PAD_R = 10111100$ 
return  $(pk = (N, e, PAD_L, PAD_R, H), sk = (p_1, \dots, p_k))$ 

Sign( $sk, m$ )
Compute  $z \leftarrow H(m)$ 
Compute  $y = PAD_L \| m \| z \| PAD_R$ 
return  $\sigma = y^{1/e} \bmod N$ 

Vrfy( $pk, \sigma$ )
Compute  $y' = \sigma^e \bmod N$  and parse  $y'$  as:
 $y' = PAD_L \| m \| z \| PAD_R$ 
If  $(H(m) == z \ \& \ PAD_L == 4A_{16} \ \& \ PAD_R == BC_{16})$ 
    return 1
else
    return 0

```

Figure 3.6: IISO/IEC 9796-2 Scheme 1 (FR)

Definition 3.11.

3.11 Motivation for Provable Security

The hash-and-sign paradigm shows potential in countering known attacks by enabling the admission of a function H not efficiently invertible, but it's not a replacement for formal proof. This is especially true considering the Multiplicative property that hash-and-sign methods inherit from textbook RSA. It becomes hard to imagine how $H(m_1) \cdot H(m_2) \bmod N$ could have the algebraic structure required to make it look like the hash of some other distinct message m . While at the very most a solution to this problem is not evident, this is not a proof that the attack is impossible and thereby immaterial.

For a provably secure signature in the UF-CMA sense, a Hash function H that avoids multiplicative relations is needed. Moreover a stronger assumption to make would be: it must be hard to find collisions in H . Currently, there's no way to ensure the basic hashed RSA signature scheme is provably secure in standard settings.

The Hash-and-Sign scheme focuses on countering known threats and is based on classical design principles. While identifying essential features of the hash function offers some insight, it's just a starting point. Over-reliance on known threats is risky, as unforeseen flaws can exist due to unidentified features, potentially compromising security.

A better strategy is to understand how a signature scheme's security relates to the underlying primitive's assumed security, like the RSA Assumption. The focus should extend beyond just countering known threats to addressing all potential threats, even unknown ones. Under this very approach the (basic) hashed RSA signature scheme becomes unacceptable. This related philosophy drives the concept of provable security.

3.11.1 The difficulty of proving security of RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures

Provable security requires linking the security of a signature scheme to the assurance of its underlying primitives. For RSA signatures, this necessitates tying the security of the signature scheme to the hardness of the RSA problem, and some other security condition (collision resistance) on the hash function.

A complication arises with the PKCS#1 v1.5 signature scheme, stemming from potential message representatives described by the set

$$S_N = \{(PAD||z) \mid \sigma = (PAD||z)^{1/e} \bmod N\}.$$

Given a hash function like SHA-1 yielding l bits, the magnitude of S_N is bounded by 2^l . For example with SHA-1, this would mean $|S_N| \leq 2^{160}$. Despite its seeming breadth, S_N is insignificant within the RSA domain Z_N^* , insinuating a negligible chance for random elements from Z_N^* to belong to S_N .

This highlights a concern: it becomes feasible to compute e -th roots for values within S_N . This differential hardness poses a challenge. If the RSA function can be easily inverted on S_N , then signatures can be forged, and the security of the PKCS signature scheme can be compromised. Hence, relying simply on the RSA assumption does not directly ensure the security of the PKCS signature scheme.

The vulnerability is not necessarily in the hash function but in how the message, after hashing, is combined with deterministic padding to land in S_N . Because S_N lacks a known algebraic structure, conventional proof methods do not work. The deterministic nature of S_N might expose the scheme to potential attacks, making the subset's predictability a risk. To ensure the security, the RSA assumption would also need to apply more specifically to S_N . Even then, this is merely a necessary condition, not a guarantee of the signature scheme's security.

In summary, the lack of known attacks does not guarantee the security of the PKCS scheme or any cryptographic system. For the signature schemes examined in this project, design flaws with RSA usage can be pinpointed. Such flaws deviate from the understanding of the security of RSA based on its accompanying problem and this is cause for concern.

3.11.2 Limitations of Provable Security

As central as the paradigm of Provable Security it is important to keep in mind some of its limitations. It does not entail security absolute sense but indicates that security hinges on certain assumptions. Actual security may not always align with provable claims, as real-world applications might introduce vulnerabilities not covered in theoretical models. Indicatively, security claims might not completely encompass real-world scenarios. A cryptographic primitive with a theoretically defined break may still have unrelated vulnerabilities when put into practice. To formulate security definitions that provide meaningful guarantees it is thus necessary to understand how primitives are used in practice.

For instance, while indistinguishability theory posits that encrypted plaintexts of the same length should be indiscernible, real-world scenarios might allow deductions from ciphertext lengths, potentially compromising confidentiality. It's crucial to understand what security is guaranteed by a proof, as opposed to merely security requirements of particular primitive. Moreover, theoretical adversary models may not mirror the capabilities of genuine adversaries. Padding oracle attacks, where adversaries glean plaintext information, are not always accounted for in security models. Similarly, side-channel attacks exploit external information beyond a model's scope. A model's relevancy hinges on its accurate representation of actual adversary capabilities.

Implementing cryptographic systems is intricate, with design, integration, and coding all introducing potential pitfalls. While specifications may offer some leeway for those implementing the system, lacking clear and thorough instructions could lead them to make decisions that significantly compromise the security. Even a slight tweak to a proven system can drastically compromise its security. Thus, it's paramount that real-world applications adhere to their theoretical models as closely as possible.

3.11.3 Benefits and Real World Implications

The ad hoc security approach, relying on attack obscurity, is not only flawed but misleading, as seen in PKCS's encryption scheme within the PKCS#1 V1.5 standard from 1993 [1]. Despite rigorous scrutiny, schemes once thought secure were eventually breached. This paved the way for provable security, emphasising concrete security principles and the quality of cryptographic proofs.

By 1998, Bleichenbacher showcased an adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack on the PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption scheme [9]. Here, the decryption determined plaintext's validity based on padding. With incorrect padding, an error message was returned. This was exploited in some SSL/TLS protocol implementations, allowing adversaries to decipher plaintexts from error message information. This attack had profound implications, including subsequent attacks, even two decades later ([18]–[27] merely comprises a subset).

The reach of Bleichenbacher's attack extended to implementations of the PKCS signature scheme [10], [28], potentially allowing digital signature forgery and even more devastating in its effects, potentially allowing impersonation of vulnerable server without even requiring the respective private key. A real-world example targeting Facebook [27] underscored the risk. Though Meta since rectified their TLS implementation, the issue was widespread, affecting almost a third of the top 100 domains in the Alexa Top 1 Million list, and additionally many major domains and products from key vendors and open-source initiatives.

Other versions of the attack exploited code flaws in non-patched OpenSSL versions [29]. Some attacks bridged protocols and versions, targeting servers indirectly connected to vulnerable ones, highlighting the challenges of implementing RSA with PKCS#1 v1.5 padding. This underscores the pitfalls of an ad-hoc security approach and the necessity for rigorous, provable security measures to ensure cryptographic schemes can withstand evolving threats over time.

3.12 Random Oracle Model

The complexity of finding proofs for Hash-and-Sign schemes has been discussed but ultimately there are now proofs that apply in the random oracle model (ROM). The ROM [30] is

essentially an idealised theoretical model providing access to a H which is treated as a blackbox (for example, by calling it as a subroutine or by communicating with another computer program). This in turn allows you to prove a protocol to be correct assuming that H maps each input to a truly random output, i.e., it behaves like a truly random oracle. The oracle also “remembers” all inputs and if the same input is given, it produces the same output.

It can be said the hash function is “full-domain” because its values range through the full interval $[0, n]$ enabling messages to be hashed in a way that makes the resulting points more evenly distributed across the full RSA domain. This is an effective mitigation acting as resolution to the basic hash issue of messages being clumped in a tiny and predictable subset. Although truly random functions cannot be implemented in reality, the resulting soundness the ROM facilitates in a scheme’s design allows some measure of confidence to be derived at the very least. Loosely it provides a guarantee that a scheme is not flawed, based on the intuition that an attacker would be forced to use the hash function in a non generic way. This technique is the starting point, providing the foundational setting for the proof of deterministic signature schemes.

Chapter 4: Proof of Concept program

4.1 Requirements Specification

The overall goal of the system is to provide primarily, a basic implementation of the PKCS signature scheme from which a user can interact with via a user interface to perform relevant actions. The program will also include the other considered schemes, to be integrated once the implementation for the PKCS scheme has been established. The core actions comprise, the generation of keys, creation of signatures and finally verification of previously created signatures. The program will form the foundation for the eventual delivery of the benchmarking program used to examine the discussed provable security overhead.

4.1.1 Description of Actors

Table 4.1: Description of Actors for the POC Digital Signature Program

Actor / Role Name	Role Description and Objective
User/Signer	Individual who wishes to digitally sign a piece of content. The signer generates key pairs, can input content, and create a digital signature using their private key. Their main goal is to ensure that the content they're signing is authenticated and its integrity is maintained, proving that it hasn't been tampered with.
Verifier	Entity that needs to validate the authenticity and integrity of a digitally signed piece of content. The verifier inputs signed content, a corresponding public key, and attempts to verify a specified digital signature. Their primary objective is to ascertain that the content hasn't been altered post-signing and to confirm the identity of the signer.

4.1.2 Use Cases




Figure 4.1: UML Use Case Diagram

Please see Appendix A for a description of the involved actors, a full breakdown of relevant requirements (capturing essential behaviour), and a flow-of-events type description for figure 4.1 representing completed UML use cases, derived from preceding user stories.

4.2 Technology Choices

I opted to use Java for implementation detail. Particularly, its `BigInteger` class is well-suited for RSA due to its design. In practice it can handle arbitrarily long integers, provides essential arithmetic operations on these integers, and offers RSA-specific methods. Notably, the maturity and reliability of the `BigInteger` class add to its suitability. Being a part of Java since version 1.1 (1997), the class has undergone extensive testing and refinement, ensuring its robustness and reliability. Moreover, the class benefits from active and ongoing support and maintenance. These factors are especially valuable in the context of security, where the reliability of underlying algorithms and implementations is paramount.

4.3 Key Generation

4.3.1 Design




Figure 4.2: Key Generation Class Design

Figure 4.2 provides a conceptualised design view of the foundational GenRSA definition discussed in section 3.4.1 aiming to act as bridge to implementation. The process is broken down into smaller components corresponding to roles/entities supportive to the purpose of

generating keys.

Table 4.2: GenRSA Design

Class	Description
KeyGenRSA	Central class responsible for generating the key pair by providing a method to fulfil the generation process.
Key	Abstract class that serves as a blueprint for the public and private keys, encapsulating the use of the modulus and an accompanying exponent with further the ability to import/-export its content.
PrivateKey / PublicKey	These classes extend from Key, specialising it for private and public key functionalities respectively.

4.3.2 Implementation

My approach to key generation deviates from standard practices by offering customisable options, particularly in the number of prime factors forming the modulus. Unlike traditional methods that limit the number of primes to two, my code allows the user to specify any number of primes, each with different bit sizes. The modulus and, consequently, the RSA key, are computed based on this specification. This approach aligns with the generalised key generation process outlined in Section 3.4.1. It stems from the necessity to meet requirements for the considered security proofs for using a non-standard number of primes.

```

1 public GenRSA(int k, int[] lambda) throws IllegalArgumentException {
2     if (lambda.length != k) {
3         throw new IllegalArgumentException("Lambda array must have k elements."
4     );
5     }
6
7     for (int bitLength : lambda) {
8         keySize += bitLength;
9     }
10
11     this.k = k;
12     this.lambda = lambda;
13 }

```

Listing 4.1: Initialisation of parametrisable Key Generation

The suitability of Java's BigInteger class as discussed prior becomes evident from the outset. For example when considering the foundational task for the proof of concept program: RSA Key Generation and more precisely the generation of the large primes required to encompass the modulus N. Utilising the constructor BigInteger(int bitLength, int certainty, Random rnd), it is possible to generate probable prime numbers of some arbitrary, provided a certainty level is indicated.

```

1 public BigInteger[] generatePrimeComponents() {
2     BigInteger[] components = new BigInteger[k];
3     for (int i = 0; i < k; i++) {
4         components[i] = new BigInteger(lambda[i], this.certainty, new
5         SecureRandom());
6     }
7 }

```

```

6     return components;
7 }

```

Listing 4.2: Parametrisable Prime Generation with BigInteger

As with any RSA implementation the first step is initialising the RSA primes. Due to the magnitude of the integers in question, attempting to factorise both p and q to establish their primality with absolute certainty is computationally impractical. Instead, BigInteger employs the Miller-Rabin primality test to assess the probability of primality based with the probability

$$1 - \frac{1}{2^{\text{certainty}}}$$

For a balance between security and practicality, a certainty value between 50-100 is typical. I chose the midpoint value as a practical compromise.

```

1 public BigInteger computePhi(BigInteger[] components) {
2     BigInteger phi = BigInteger.ONE;
3     for (BigInteger prime : components) {
4         phi = phi.multiply(prime.subtract(ONE));
5     }
6     return phi;
7 }
8
9 public BigInteger computeE(BigInteger phi) {
10    BigInteger e = new BigInteger(phi.bitLength(), new SecureRandom());
11    while (e.compareTo(ONE) <= 0 || !phi.gcd(e).equals(ONE) || e.compareTo(
12        phi) >= 0) {
13        e = new BigInteger(phi.bitLength(), new SecureRandom());
14    }
15    return e;
16 }

```

Listing 4.3: Key components

The public key, e , should belong to the group $(\mathbb{Z}/\mathbb{Z}_\phi)^\times$. To achieve this, a (positive) random BigInteger with the same number of bits as ϕ is generated until a value from the group is identified. The BigInteger bitCount() method provides the means for doing this by returning the non-sign bit count of ϕ .

The remaining computation in the attempt to obtain the private exponent d is straightforward with a naturally supported modInverse operation.

```

1
2 public KeyPair generateKeyPair() {
3     BigInteger[] primes = this.generatePrimeComponents();
4     BigInteger N = genModulus(primes);
5     BigInteger phi = computePhi(primes);
6     BigInteger e = computeE(phi);
7
8     BigInteger d = e.modInverse(phi);
9     PublicKey publicKey = new PublicKey(N, e);
10    PrivateKey privateKey = new PrivateKey(N, primes, phi, e, d);
11
12    return new KeyPair(publicKey, privateKey);
13 }

```

Listing 4.4: Java Implementation of Key Generation (3.4.1)

4.4 Design




Figure 4.3: POC program Class Design

Figure 4.3 depicts the structure of classes to be used in the implementation of the PoC program. There is a focus on separation of concerns following the Model-View-Controller (MVC) design pattern. At the heart of the design is the `MainController`, which orchestrates the application flow by responding to user actions and coordinating the display of different views. In support is the `SignatureController`, which manages the signature processes, linking the signature-related views (`SignView` and `VerifyView`) with the `SignatureModel`. `SignatureModel` encapsulates the cryptographic logic and relies on a `SchemeFactory` to instantiate a concrete signature scheme as per user selection. The system is further extended by the `GenController` which is focused on generating cryptographic keys through the `GenerateKeysModel` which manages the `GenRSA` facilitated key creation.

Chapter 5: Security Proofs

Due to the breakthrough in 2018 when a security proof [3] was provided for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5. It is possible to formally prove the security of the full class of deterministic RSA signatures. The precise statement of security is if the RSA problem is hard when H is modelled as a random oracle, then the scheme is secure (with regards to the UF-CMA notion i.e., existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attacks). There are two different proofs for this, both which consider case where the modulus \hat{N} is a product of three primes. The first is based on the RSA assumption, the second is based on the ϕ -Hiding assumption.

5.1 Encode Algorithm

Jager, Kakvi and May overcame the difficulty of providing proof for PKCS with a specialised encode algorithm that allows the simulation of signatures in polynomial time.

Definition 5.1. (*Encode* [3]). Let

$$(\hat{y}, s, z) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Encode}(N, e, y, \ell, \text{PAD}, R)$$

be an efficient algorithm that takes as input an n -bit integer N , an exponent e , $y \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$, a hash value length ℓ , padding pattern PAD and an r -bit prime $R \in \mathbb{P}[r]$, and outputs $(\hat{y}, s, z) \in \mathbb{Z}_{\hat{N}} \times \mathbb{Z}_N^* \times \{0, 1\}^\ell$ or failure \perp .

The algorithm outputs (\hat{y}, s, z) such that \hat{y} has to be correct form for a PKCS#1 signature mod \hat{N} where z constitutes message hash and s comprises an e th root mod N . Using this and the knowledge of R the e th root modulo \hat{N} can be computed. More precisely it enables the encoding an arbitrary integer y modulo N as an integer \hat{y} modulo $\hat{N} = NR$ for some prime R , such that \hat{y} has correct PKCS#1-V1.5 padding modulo \hat{N} .

1. y denotes an embedded RSA challenge that given a forgery can be solved i.e., obtaining $\hat{y} = \text{PAD} || z$.
2. In the case that y is replaced by 1 the algorithm instead stimulates a signature.

With these two uses of the Encode algorithm, UF-CMA security of PKCS#1 was proved in the ROM.

```

Encode( $N, e, y, \ell, \text{PAD}, R$ )
 $n = \lceil \log_2 N \rceil$ ,  $r = \lceil \log_2 R \rceil$ 
 $z := 2^\ell$ ,  $k := 0$ 
while ( $z \geq 2^\ell$ ) and ( $k < n \cdot 2^{-\ell}$ ) :
     $k := k + 1$ 
     $s \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_N$ 
     $z := y^s e - 2^\ell \cdot \text{PAD} \pmod N$ 
     $\hat{y} := 2^\ell \cdot \text{PAD} + z$ 
if  $z < 2^\ell$  then
    return  $(\hat{y}, s, z)$ 
else
    return  $\perp$  .

```

Figure 5.1: Encode algorithm [3]

The algorithm outputs (\hat{y}, s, z) except with negligible failure probability (in n). It can be said that encode efficiently $(n - \mathcal{O}(\log n))$ -simulates the PKCS#1 v1.5 encoding modulo $\hat{N} = NR$ which is true for a large hash value $\ell \approx |n|$.

5.2 Background

See section 3.4.2 for the intuition behind trapdoor permutations in the context of its application to RSA.

Definition 5.2. A family of trapdoor permutations [31]. $TDP = (\text{Gen}, \text{Eval}, \text{Invert})$ comprises the following three polynomial-time algorithms:

1. **Gen:** A probabilistic algorithm that, given input 1^k , produces a public description pub (inclusive of an efficiently sampleable domain Dom_{pub}) and a trapdoor td .
2. **Eval:** A deterministic algorithm that, given pub and $x \in \text{Dom}_{\text{pub}}$, yields $y \in \text{Dom}_{\text{pub}}$. This relationship is expressed as $f(x) = \text{Eval}(\text{pub}, x)$.
3. **Invert:** A deterministic algorithm that, given td and $y \in \text{Dom}_{\text{pub}}$, produces $x \in \text{Dom}_{\text{pub}}$. This relationship is described by $f^{-1}(y) = \text{Invert}(\text{pub}, y)$.

It is required for all $k \in \mathbb{N}$ and any (pub, td) produced by $\text{Gen}(1^k)$:

$$f(\cdot) = \text{Eval}(\text{pub}, \cdot) \text{ must define a permutation over } \text{Dom}_{\text{pub}}$$

and additionally for all $x \in \text{Dom}_{\text{pub}}$:

$$\text{Invert}(td, \text{Eval}(\text{pub}, x)) \text{ should equal } x$$

It's important to note that $f_{\text{pub}}(\cdot) = \text{Eval}(\text{pub}, \cdot)$ needs to be a permutation for a correctly generated pub .

A trapdoor permutation is certified if one can publicly verify that it actually defines a permutation.

Definition 5.3. *Certified Trapdoor permutation* [32]–[34]. A family of trapdoor permutations TDP is called *certified* if there exists a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm *Certify* that, on input of 1^k and an arbitrary (polynomially bounded) bit-string *pub* (potentially not generated by *Gen*), returns 1 iff $f(\cdot) = \text{Eval}(\text{pub}, \cdot)$ defines a permutation over Dom_{pub} .

Lossy Trapdoor Permutations are a realisation of the lossiness security notion for trapdoor permutations. Essentially, these permutations function in two distinct modes. The first allows for complete input recovery using an (injective) trapdoor function, while the second ((lossy) trapdoor function) causes substantial input data loss. Notably, distinguishing between these two behaviours is hard for any efficient adversary.

Definition 5.4. *Lossy trapdoor permutation* [11], [35]. Let $l \geq 2$. A trapdoor permutation TDP is a (l, t, ε) *lossy trapdoor permutation* if the following two conditions hold:

1. There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm *LossyGen*, which on input 1^k outputs pub' such that the range of $f_{\text{pub}'}(\cdot) := \text{Eval}(\text{pub}', \cdot)$ under $\text{Dom}_{\text{pub}'}$ is at least a factor of l smaller than the domain $\text{Dom}_{\text{pub}'}$:

$$\frac{|\text{Dom}_{\text{pub}'}|}{|f_{\text{pub}'}(\text{Dom}_{\text{pub}'})|} \geq l$$

2. All distinguishers \mathcal{D} running in time at most t have an advantage $\text{Adv}_{\text{TDP}}^L(\mathcal{D})$ of at most ε , where

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{TDP}}^L(\mathcal{D}) = \Pr[\mathbf{L}_1^{\mathcal{D}} \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[\mathbf{L}_0^{\mathcal{D}} \Rightarrow 1]$$

procedure Initialise Game	L_0
$(\text{pub}, \text{td}) \leftarrow_{\$} \text{Gen}(1^k)$	
return pub	
procedure Initialise Game	L_1
$(\text{pub}', L) \leftarrow_{\$} \text{LossyGen}(1^k)$	
return pub'	

Figure 5.2: The Lossy Trapdoor Permutation Games.

Definition 5.5. *Regular lossiness* [11], [35]. A TDP is regular (l, t, ε) lossy if the TDP is (l, t, ε) lossy and all functions $f_{\text{pub}'}(\cdot) = \text{Eval}(\text{pub}', \cdot)$ generated by *LossyGen* are l -to-1 on $\text{Dom}_{\text{pub}'}$.

Definition 5.6. *The RSA trapdoor permutation* [11]. $\text{RSA} = (\text{RSAGen}, \text{RSAEval}, \text{RSAInv})$:

1. $\text{RSAGen}(1^k)$ outputs $\text{pub} = (N, e)$ and $\text{td} = d$, where $N = pq$ is the product of two $k/2$ -bit primes, $\gcd(e, \phi(N)) = 1$, and $d = e^{-1} \pmod{\phi(N)}$.
 - The domain is $\text{Dom}_{\text{pub}} = \mathbb{Z}_N^*$.
2. $\text{RSAEval}(\text{pub}, x)$ returns $f_{\text{pub}}(x) = x^e \pmod{N}$,
3. $\text{RSAInv}(\text{td}, y)$ returns $f_{\text{pub}}^{-1}(y) = y^d \pmod{N}$.

In the context of RSA, lossy trapdoor permutations can be viewed as the converse of certified trapdoor permutations. For example they entail an impossibility to differentiate an honestly generated (N, e) from (N, \hat{e}_{loss}) for which $RSA_{N, \hat{e}_{loss}}$ is many-to-1, thereby disqualifying themselves as permutations.

5.2.1 2v3PA

A final step computation assumption relevant to security statements in both proofs is the 2 vs 3 primes assumption $2v3PA[\lambda]$. It postulates that it's hard to discern if a specific modulus is derived from two or three prime factors. Although the assumption has never been formally studied it is widely accepted. Its role is to bridge the proofs to the setting of the typical two prime factor modulus.

Definition 5.7. *The 2 vs. 3 Primes Assumption* [3]. The $2v3PA[\lambda]$ states that it is hard to distinguish between N_2 and N_3 , where N_2, N_3 are λ -bit numbers, where

1. $N_2 = p_1 p_2$ is the product of 2 distinct random prime numbers $p_1, p_2 \in \mathbb{P}$;
2. $N_3 = q_1 q_2 q_3$ is the product of 3 distinct random prime numbers $q_1, q_2, q_3 \in \mathbb{P}$

$2v3PA[\lambda]$ is said to be (t, ϵ) -hard, if for all distinguishers \mathcal{D} running in time at most t , we have:

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{D}}^{2v3PA[\lambda]} = \Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{D}(N_2)] - \Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{D}(N_3)] \leq \epsilon$$

5.3 Proof Theorems

Both proofs consider signatures of the form

$$\sigma = (\gamma \cdot H(m) + f(m))^{1/2}$$

i.e., a scheme with (potentially) message-dependent padding. This stems from theorem statements used initially by Coron's proof [8] for the Rabin-Williams variant ($e = 2$) of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5. Coron's theorem statements were general enough to indeed be extended to the ANSI X9.31 rDSA and ISO/IEC 9796-2 Scheme 1 signatures. Therefore while not explicitly stated, it can be said that the considered proofs, essentially descendants of Coron's proof, also apply to the latter two schemes, with relevant adjustments.

Signature Scheme	Message Representative	γ value	$f(m)$ Value
PKCS#1 v1.5	$y = PAD \ z$	1	$PAD \times 2^\ell$
ANSI X9.31 rDSA	$y = PAD \ z \ ID_H$	2^{16}	$PAD \times 2^{\ell+16} + ID_H$
ISO/IEC 9796-2 Scheme 1	$y = PAD_L \ m_1 \ z \ PAD_R$	2^8	$(PAD_L \ m_1 \times 2^{\ell+8}) + PAD_R$

Table 5.1: Signature Schemes considered in the context of Coron's proof [8]

5.3.1 Security Proof under the RSA Assumption

The computation assumption relevant to security statements in the first proof is the RSA Assumption $k\text{-RSA}[\lambda]$ (See definition 3.6).

Theorem 1. (Jager-Kakvi-May [3]). Assume that $2\text{-RSA}[\lambda]$ is (t', ε') -hard. Then for any (q_h, q_s) , RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5 is $(t, \varepsilon, q_h, q_s)$ -UF-CMA secure in the Random Oracle Model, where

$$\varepsilon' = \frac{\varepsilon}{q_s} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{1}{q_s + 1}\right) \approx \frac{\varepsilon}{q_s} \cdot \exp(-1)$$

$$t' = t + \mathcal{O}(q_h \cdot \lambda^4).$$

The proof requires the following adaptations to bounds for applicability to the remaining schemes.

Table 5.2: Adaptation of the $2\text{-RSA}[\lambda]$ proof bounds to ANSI and ISO Schemes

Signature Scheme	γ value	Modified t' bound
ANSI X9.31 rDSA	2^{16}	$t' = t + 2^{15} \cdot \mathcal{O}(q_h \cdot \lambda^4)$
ISO/IEC 9796-2 Scheme 1	2^8	$t' = t + 2^7 \cdot \mathcal{O}(q_h \cdot \lambda^4)$

The reductions used in the first proof bounds the probability ε of breaking RSASSA-PKCS-V1.5 in time t by $\varepsilon' \cdot q_s$, where ε' is the probability of inverting RSA in time $t' \approx t$ and q_s is the number of signature queries by the forger. Equivalently, the security reduction is loose with a loss in the order of q_s . This is not ideal since it has a negative impact on the practical parameter choices for instantiations.

A realisation of this is the necessity for a significantly larger modulus relative to what can be achieved with a tight reduction to achieve a specific level of security, or more generally, obtaining a meaningful security proof. The loss is optimal for RSA with “large” exponents ([36], [11]). More precisely this refers to an exponent $e > N$ that is additionally prime [37], [38]. This is due to the fact that such an exponent defines RSA as a Certified Trapdoor Permutation. This is because if e is a prime, then it can never divide $\phi(N) < N$ and hence $\gcd(e, \phi(N)) = 1$.

In this case the $2\text{-RSA}[\lambda]$ proof implies SUF-CMA security as well as resilience against subversion attacks [12]. However this discovery serves primarily as a theoretical/initial insight and design validation since choosing $e > N$ is usually avoided in practice due to the costs for modular exponentiation.

5.3.2 Security Proof under the Phi-Hiding Assumption

The computation assumption relevant to security statements in the second proof is the φ -Hiding Assumption $k\text{-}\phi\text{HA}[\lambda]$. It posits that for a given modulus N and a sufficiently small exponent e ($e < N^{\frac{1}{4}}$), determining if $\frac{e}{\phi(N)}$ is hard.

By definition 5.5 when $\gcd(\hat{e}_{\text{loss}}, \phi(N)) = \hat{e}_{\text{loss}}$ the $RSAN_{N, \hat{e}_{\text{loss}}}$ function is \hat{e}_{loss} -to-1 i.e., \hat{e}_{loss} -regular lossy.

Definition 5.8. *The φ -Hiding Assumption* [37]. The $k\text{-}\phi\text{HA}[\lambda]$, states that it is hard to distinguish between (N, e_{inj}) and $(N, \hat{e}_{\text{loss}})$, where

1. N is a λ -bit number such that $N = \prod_{i=1}^k p_i$ i.e., the product of k distinct random prime numbers $p_i \in_R \mathbb{P}[\lambda_i]$, for $i \in \llbracket 1, \dots, k \rrbracket$, for k constant.
2. $e_{\text{inj}}, \hat{e}_{\text{loss}} > 3 \in \mathbb{P}$;

3. $e_{inj}, \hat{e}_{loss} \leq N^{1/4}$, with $\gcd(e_{inj}, \varphi(N)) = 1$ and $\gcd(\hat{e}_{loss}, \varphi(N)) = \hat{e}_{loss}$, where φ is the Euler Totient function.

$k\text{-}\phi\text{HA}[\lambda]$ is said to be (t, ϵ) -hard, if for all distinguishers \mathcal{D} running in time at most t , we have:

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{D}}^{k\text{-}\phi\text{HA}[\lambda]} = \Pr[1 \leftarrow D(N, e_{inj})] - \Pr[1 \leftarrow D(N, \hat{e}_{loss})] \leq \epsilon$$

Theorem 2. (Jager-Kakvi-May [3]). Assume $2\text{-}\Phi\text{HA}[\lambda]$ is (t', ϵ') -hard and gives an η -regular lossy trapdoor function. Then, for any (q_h, q_s) , RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5 is (t, ϵ, q_h, q_s) -UF-CMA secure in the Random Oracle Model, where

$$\epsilon = \left(\frac{2\eta - 1}{\eta - 1} \right) \cdot \epsilon'$$

$$t = t' + \mathcal{O}(q_h \cdot \lambda^4)$$

The proof requires the following adaptations to bounds for applicability to the remaining schemes.

Table 5.3: Adaptation of the 2-RSA $[\lambda]$ proof bounds to ANSI and ISO Schemes

Signature Scheme	γ value	Modified t bound
ANSI X9.31 rDSA	2^{16}	$t = t' + 2^{15} \cdot \mathcal{O}(q_h \cdot \lambda^4)$
ISO/IEC 9796-2 Scheme 1	2^8	$t = t' + 2^7 \cdot \mathcal{O}(q_h \cdot \lambda^4)$

The second proof bypasses the optimality result of the 2-RSA $[\lambda]$ proof (i.e., tight security proof that is independent of q_s), by using "small" keys that do not define a certified trapdoor permutation. More precisely "small" keys entail an exponent $e \leq N^{1/4}$ (i.e., e is at most $\frac{1}{4}$ of the bit-length of N). This provides a security proof tight to the φ -Hiding assumption. Furthermore, there is currently no known proof technique which achieves tighter security for small exponents.

The condition that $e_{inj}, \hat{e}_{loss} \leq N^{1/4}$ arises because with only the modulus N known, it is not possible to determine the number of prime factors it has or their relative sizes. It is understood that N is composite, implying it has a minimum of two prime factors. The bound then follows as a direct consequence of known attacks described by Coppersmith [39].

Such exponents define RSA as a Lossy Trapdoor Permutation. This is because when $\gcd(\hat{e}_{loss}, \phi(N)) = \hat{e}_{loss}$ the $RSA_{N, \hat{e}_{loss}}$ function is \hat{e}_{loss} -to-1 i.e., \hat{e}_{loss} -regular lossy (see Definition 5.5). In this case the $2\text{-}\Phi\text{HA}[\lambda]$ proof implies only the weaker UF-CMA security and no provable security against subversion attacks. The proof technique has direct relevance to real-world instantiations often in which small exponents e.g., $e = 2^{16} + 1$ are used.

5.4 Implications for practical instantiation

5.4.1 Both Proofs

Considering PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures instantiated with an λ -bit modulus:

Implication 1. Hash output $|H()| \geq \frac{\lambda}{2}$. Both proofs work only with a hash function that has an uncommonly large output. More precisely they work under the assumption that

breaking the RSA (or φ -Hiding) assumption is hard with respect to an $\frac{\lambda}{2}$ -bit modulus N with $|N| = |H(\cdot)|$. Concretely, for signatures instantiated with an 1024-bit RSA modulus \hat{N} , would mean security in the context of a 512-bit RSA assumption, with 512-bit padding and 512-bit hash function.

The PKCS#1 v2.2 standard, includes in Appendix B of RFC 8017 [6], a method for transforming a cryptographic hash function to generate outputs of any desired size. This method, known as Mask Generation Function 1 (MGF1) and involves the recurrent application of a conventional hash function to the input alongside incrementally changing counter values to achieve the required output length.

Implication 2. *3-Prime Factor Modulus N .* The Encode algorithm requires the modulus to double in bit length when compared to the norm with a newly introduced third prime factor necessitating the increase in bits. Thus if a λ -bit modulus is used in the key for the security reductions of $2\text{-}\phi\text{HA}[\lambda]$ or $2\text{-RSA}[\lambda]$, this includes an additional $\frac{\lambda}{2}$ -bits made up by a third prime factor. In turn the security proofs apply for keys where $N = p_1p_2p_3$, i.e., is the product of three primes. Under the assumption that 3-prime moduli are indistinguishable from 2-prime moduli, results can be brought back to the case $N = pq$.

5.4.2 Security Proof under the RSA Assumption

Implication 3. *arbitrary- e .* The proof allows for the selection of an arbitrary- e . Although the general security of a practical instantiation should be considered with respect to the aforementioned security loss (the number of signature queries) which is as discussed is not optimal in this setting. Furthermore this does not match the setting of practical instantiations where choices of e are commonly fixed and small values for efficiency purposes (see Implication 4).

5.4.3 Security Proof under the Phi-Hiding Assumption

Implication 4. *prime $e \leq 2^{\frac{\lambda}{4}}$.* The proof allows for the selection of a small e . This is ideal, since a widely-employed strategy in real-world instantiations, in order to enable efficient verification of signatures is to select small and fixed specific numbers such as $e = 3$ or $e = 2^{16} + 1$ (both of which $\leq N^{\frac{1}{4}}$). With such a choice, RSA signature verification is much faster than RSA signature generation which is useful because practically signature verification is often the predominant operation being performed.

5.4.4 Summary of Implications

Table 5.4: Parameter sizes and security of deterministic RSA hash-and-sign signatures (instantiated with a λ -bit modulus) [40]

Scheme	Proof methodology	Assumption	No. prime factors	Exponent e	$ H(\cdot) $	Security loss
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5 • ANSI X9.31 rDSA • ISO/IEC 9796-2 Scheme 1 	Jager-Kakvi-May	$2\text{-RSA}[\lambda/2]$	3	Arbitrary	$\geq \lambda/2$	q_s
		$+2v3\text{PA}[\lambda]$	2	Arbitrary	$\geq \lambda/2$	q_s
	Jager-Kakvi-May	$2\text{-}\phi\text{HA}[\lambda/2]$	3	Prime $\leq 2^{\lambda/4}$	$\geq \lambda/2$	$\mathcal{O}(1)$
		$+2v3\text{PA}[\lambda]$	2	Prime $\leq 2^{\lambda/4}$	$\geq \lambda/2$	$\mathcal{O}(1)$

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