

Codebook

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```
library(tidyverse)
```

```
Warning: package 'purrr' was built under R version 4.5.2
```

```
Warning: package 'forcats' was built under R version 4.5.2
```

```
-- Attaching core tidyverse packages ----- tidyverse 2.0.0 --
v dplyr      1.1.4      v readr      2.1.5
v forcats    1.0.1      v stringr    1.6.0
v ggplot2    4.0.0      v tibble     3.3.0
v lubridate  1.9.4      v tidyr      1.3.1
v purrr      1.1.0
```

```
-- Conflicts ----- tidyverse_conflicts() --
```

```
x dplyr::filter() masks stats::filter()
```

```
x dplyr::lag()     masks stats::lag()
```

```
i Use the conflicted package (<http://conflicted.r-lib.org/>) to force all conflicts to become
```

Introduction

When do supporters of authoritarian and democratic backsliding regimes turn on their former rulers? And what actions by opposition forces, civil resistance campaigns, or third party actors motivate such turns? This codebook presents a framework for collecting data to answer these questions. Our goal is to produce a cross-national dataset of the loyalty of key regime supporters, as well as instances of shifting loyalty among regime supporters.

Conceptual Framework

All political regimes rely on the continual support of key groups and institutions to provide them with the power and resources needed to sustain themselves. For example, for political regimes to engage in repression they require the continual cooperation of police and security forces. If security forces refuse to carry out orders to repress, then the state will be unable to repress opposition. Similarly, every state requires some degree of propaganda and public-facing narrative in order to ensure compliance. If media refuse to spread state narratives, then the state will be unable to gain the compliance of the populace. All political power rests upon a flow of resources and obedience that must be continually replenished.

In normal times, regime supporters provide their support for the regime in relatively unchanging ways. Orders are rarely questioned, norms of authority and obedience are followed, and politics proceeds as it always has. These common patterns of obedience create the illusion that power is stable and unchanging.

Yet loyalties shift. For many reasons, from changing self-interest, to fear of the future, to moral conviction, the individuals and groups that previously supported a political regime cease to do so, and behave in ways that go against the wishes of political leaders. Soldiers refuse to open fire on unarmed demonstrators. Government attorneys refuse to engage in politically-motivated prosecutions. Legislators resign their offices, or vote against the leaders or parties through which they originally came to power.

These two simple insights: that power flows up from the continual support of those within political regimes, and that this support can be cut off, come with profound implications. Political philosophers, social scientists, and activists have all highlighted the many ways in which understanding these insights opens space for a fundamental rethinking of the possibilities of political *change*. In particular, they provide the foundational framework behind the theory of nonviolent resistance (Sharp 1973).

Nonviolent resistance works through shifting the loyalty of regime supporters. It involves breaking down the ways in which individuals and groups passively or actively provide power to a political regime. It works not by destroying a political regime from outside with overwhelming force, but by pulling away its supports and allowing it to collapse under its own weight.

Extensive prior research has highlighted the importance of such loyalty shifts in the success of nonviolent resistance (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Chenoweth, Hocking, and Marks 2022; Pinckney and Trilling 2025).

```
# Labels for the wedges, from left to right
```

```
labels <- c(  
  "Active\nallies",  
  "Passive\nallies",  
  "Neutral",
```

```

"Passive\nopponents",
"Active\nopponents"
)

n_wedges <- length(labels)

# Angle boundaries for the semicircle: from 0 to pi (top half of the circle)

theta_bounds <- seq(0, pi, length.out = n_wedges + 1)

# Helper: build one wedge as a polygon (center -> arc -> center)

make_wedge <- function(i, n_points = 100, r = 1) {
  theta_min <- theta_bounds[i]
  theta_max <- theta_bounds[i + 1]
  theta <- seq(theta_min, theta_max, length.out = n_points)

  data.frame(
    category = labels[i],
    x = c(0, r * cos(theta), 0),
    y = c(0, r * sin(theta), 0),
    group = i
  )
}

# All wedges in one data frame

wedges <- do.call(rbind, lapply(seq_len(n_wedges), make_wedge))

# Label positions: mid-angle of each wedge, slightly inside the edge

label_theta <- (theta_bounds[-1] + theta_bounds[-length(theta_bounds)]) / 2
r_label <- 1.17 # label radius, outside the semicircle

label_data <- data.frame(
  category = labels,
  x = r_label * cos(label_theta),
  y = r_label * sin(label_theta),
  hjust = 0.5,
  vjust = 0.5
)

```

```

# Straight baseline under the semicircle

baseline <- data.frame(
  x = -1,
  y = 0,
  xend = 1,
  yend = 0
)

ggplot() +

# Wedges

geom_polygon(
  data = wedges,
  aes(x = x, y = y, group = group),
  fill = "white", # or set to category-based colors if you like
  color = "black",
  linewidth = 0.7
) +


# Baseline along the bottom

geom_segment(
  data = baseline,
  aes(x = x, y = y, xend = xend, yend = yend),
  linewidth = 0.7
) +

# Wedge labels

geom_text(
  data = label_data,
  aes(x = x, y = y, label = category),
  size = 4
) +
coord_equal(xlim = c(-1.3, 1.3), ylim = c(0, 1.3)) +
theme_void() +
theme(plot.margin = margin(10, 10, 10, 10))

```



In the civil resistance literature, such groups are typically referred to as “pillars of support” (Helvey 2004). More recently, scholars have identified and collected data on “regime support groups” (Knutsen et al. 2025).

Data Collection Strategy

Variables

References

- Chenoweth, Erica, Andrew Hocking, and Zoe Marks. 2022. “A Dynamic Model of Nonviolent Resistance Strategy.” *PLOS ONE* 17 (7): e0269976. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0269976>.
- Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. 2011. *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Helvey, Robert L. 2004. *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking about the Fundamentals*. Albert Einstein Institute.
- Knutsen, Carl Henrik, Sirianne Dahlum, Magnus B. Rasmussen, and Tore Wig. 2025. “Behind the Throne: Regime Support Coalitions Around the World, 1789-2020.” *British Journal of Political Science* 55: e37.

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Sharp, Gene. 1973. *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*. Boston, MA: Porter Sargent.