

#### First off

- Computers can't store letters, numbers, pictures, etc.
- Computers store bits: 1 or 0
- Given that, then how do computers interpret letter and number characters?

### Encoding

- An encoding scheme is a set of rules that translates bits to letter and numbers characters
- Encode: convert into a coded form
- In ASCII each character is one byte (8 bits)
- 01100010 01101001 01110100 01110011
- b i t s

#### **ASCII**

- All English letters a-zA-Z0-9, punctuation, some things like space, line feed, tab, backspace, etc.
- 128 characters in total = 7 bits
- Read left to write converting bits to characters
- Hello World

## What about other languages?

- 128 characters covers English, but what about Korean, Chinese, Hindi, Arabic, Russian, etc.
- To encompass all of these characters and languages more than a single byte (8 bits) is needed
- BIG-5 is a double-byte encoding that covers Traditional Chinese characters
- GB18030 does the same thing but covers simplified and traditional Chinese

#### GB18030

bits character

10000001 01000000 万

10000001 01000001 上

10000001 01000010 T

10000001 01000011

10000001 01000100 丏

#### **Unicode Overview**

- An attempt to unify all encoding standards
- A code table of 1,114,112 code points
- Enough to encode all European, Middle-Eastern, Far-Eastern, Southern, Northern, Western, prehistoric and future characters
- Big enough for unofficial private-use sections
- There is an unofficial section for Klingon
- How many bits does Unicode use to encode all of this?

#### none

#### Unicode

- Unicode is not an encoding
- Unicode is a table of code points for characters
- Does not concern itself with how to represent those code points as bits
- "65 stands for A, 66 stands for B and 9,731 stands for \*\*"
- There are several ways to encode Unicode code points into bits

#### UTF-X

- UTF-32 uses 32bits to encode all Unicode code points. Simple, but wastes space.
- UTF-16 and UTF-8 are variable-length encodings
  - (UTF-8) If a character can be encoded using a single byte it will
  - If it requires two bytes then it will use that instead
  - UTF-16 uses two bytes by default, up to 4 bytes
  - The encoding uses the highest bits to signal how may bytes the character uses

character encoding bits Α UTF-8 01000001 UTF-16 0000000 01000001 Α UTF-32 Α 0000000 00000000 00000000 01000001 あ UTF-8 11100011 10000001 10000010 あ UTF-16 00110000 01000010 あ UTF-32 0000000 00000000 00110000 01000010

#### **Code Points**

- Characters are often referred to by their Unicode code point
- Written in hex to keep numbers short
- Starts with a U+
- $A = U + 1E00 = 7680^{th}$  character

### **Encoding Issues**

```
bits encoding characters
```

11000100 01000010 Windows Latin 1 ÄB

11000100 01000010 Mac Roman fB

11000100 01000010 GB18030 腂

characters encoding bits

FøöWindows Latin 1Ø1000110 11111000 11110110FøöMac RomanØ1000110 10111111 10011010

### What encoding is this?

### Well...

- Most of the bytes start with 1 so not ASCII
- Most is not valid UTF-8
- Mac Roman works but you get
  - ÉGÉìÉRÅ[ÉfÉBÉìÉOÇÕìÔǵÇ≠ǻǢ
- Its Japanese Shift-JIS
  - エンコーディングは難しくない
- Some document viewers (and browsers) will start to read the bits and guess what the encoding is



- There's also the "Unicode replacement character" (U+FFFD)
- A program may decide to insert for any character it couldn't decode correctly when trying to handle Unicode
- If a document is saved with some characters gone or replaced, then those characters are really gone for good with no way to reverseengineer them

### **Security Considerations**

- Imagine a scenario where:
  - An input validation filter rejects characters such as <, >, ', and " in a Web-application accepting UTF-8 encoded text.
  - An attacker sends in a U+FF1C FULLWIDTH LESS-THAN SIGN 
    <i>✓ in place of the ASCII <.</li>
  - The attacker's input looks like: <script>
  - After passing through the XSS filter unchanged, the input moves deeper into the application.
  - Another API, perhaps at the data access layer, is configured to use a different character set such as windows-1252.
  - On receiving the input, a data access layer converts the multi-byte UTF-8 text to the single-byte windows-1252 code page, forcing a bestfit conversion to the dangerous characters the original XSS filter was trying to block. 7. The attacker's input successfully persists to the database.

# Best-fit Mappings

Target char	Target code point	Test code point	Name
0	\u006F	\u2134	SCRIPT SMALL O
0	\u006F	\u014D	LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH MACRON
S	\u0073	\u017F	LATIN SMALL LETTER LONG S
I	\u0049	\u0131	LATIN SMALL LETTER DOTLESS I
i	\u0069	\u0129	LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH TILDE
K	\u004B	\u212A	KELVIN SIGN
k	\u006B	\u0137	LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH CEDILLA
Α	\u0041	\uFF21	FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A
a	\u0061	\u03B1	GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA
"	\u0022	\u02BA	MODIFIER LETTER DOUBLE PRIME
II .	\u0022	\u030E	COMBINING DOUBLE VERTICAL LINE ABOVE
II .	\u0027	\uFF02	FULLWIDTH QUOTATION MARK
	\u0027	\u02B9	MODIFIER LETTER PRIME
1	\u0027	\u030D	COMBINING VERTICAL LINE ABOVE
1	\u0027	\uFF07	FULLWIDTH APOSTROPHE
<	\u003C	\uFF1C	FULLWIDTH LESS-THAN SIGN
<	\u003C	\uFE64	SMALL LESS-THAN SIGN
<	\u003C	\u2329	LEFT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET
<	\u003C	\u3008	LEFT ANGLE BRACKET
<	\u003C	\u00AB	LEFT-POINTING DOUBLE ANGLE QUOTATION MARK
>	\u003E	\u00BB	RIGHT-POINTING DOUBLE ANGLE QUOTATION MARK
>	\u003E	\u3009	RIGHT ANGLE BRACKET
>	\u003E	\u232A	RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET
>	\u003E	\uFE65	SMALL GREATER-THAN SIGN
>	\u003E	\uFF1E	FULLWIDTH GREATER-THAN SIGN
:	\u003A	\u2236	RATIO
:	\u003A	\u0589	ARMENIAN FULL STOP
:	\u003A	\uFE13	PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL COLON
:	\u003A	\uFE55	SMALL COLON
:	\u003A	\uFF1A	FULLWIDTH COLON

## Filter Bypass

- Overconsumption bug
  - <img src="#[0xC2]"> " onerror="alert(1)"</ br>
  - <img src="#> " onerror="alert(1)"</ br>
- Character deletion
  - Unicode BOM (Byte Order Mark) U+FEFF
  - <scr[U+FEFF]ipt>
- String transformation
  - toLower("&#x0130") == "i"
  - toLower("scr&#x0130pt") == "script"
  - Never assume: len(x) != len(toLower(x))
- Whitespace (assigned the whitespace category and whitespace binary property)
  - Ogham space mark U+1680
  - Mongolian vowel separator U+180E
  - <a href=#[U+180E]onclick=alert()>

#### Other Attacks

- Buffer Overflow
- Subtle Crypto Bugs
- Phishing
  - Who had the | domain?

#### Resources

- http://kunststube.net/encoding/
- http://www.joelonsoftware.com/articles/ Unicode.html
- https://websec.github.io/unicode-security-guide/ character-transformations/
- http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr36/
- http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr39/
- https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bhusa-09/WEBER/BHUSA09-Weber-UnicodeSecurityPreview-PAPER.pdf