



# Practical Malware Analysis & Triage

## Malware Analysis Report

### DemoWare Cryptor-Dropper Malware

Oct 2021 | HuskyHacks | v1.0



## Table of Contents

Table of Contents .....	2
Executive Summary .....	3
High-Level Technical Summary .....	4
Malware Composition .....	5
srvupdate.exe .....	5
crt1.crt:.....	5
Basic Static Analysis .....	6
Basic Dynamic Analysis.....	7
Advanced Static Analysis.....	8
Advanced Dynamic Analysis .....	9
Indicators of Compromise .....	10
Network Indicators.....	10
Host-based Indicators.....	11
Rules & Signatures .....	13
Appendices .....	14
A. Yara Rules .....	14
B. Callback URLs.....	14
C. Decompiled Code Snippets .....	15



## Executive Summary


SHA256 hash	A6AA84358130078F9455773AF1E9EF2C7710934F72DF8514C9A62ABEB83D2E81
-------------	--

DemoWare is a cryptor-dropper malware sample first identified on Oct 15<sup>th</sup>, 2021. It is a GoLang-compiled dropper that runs on the x64 Windows operating system. It consists of two payloads that are executed in succession following a successful spearphishing attempt. Symptoms of infection include infrequent beaconing to any of the URLs listed in Appendix B, random blue screen popups on the endpoint, and an executable named "srvupdate.exe" appearing in the %APPDATA% directory.

YARA signature rules are attached in Appendix A. Malware sample and hashes have been submitted to VirusTotal for further examination.

## High-Level Technical Summary

DemoWare consists of two parts: an encrypted stage 0 dropper and an unpacked and decoded stage 2 command execution program. It first attempts to contact its callback URL (`hxxps://demowarecallback.local`) and unpacks its stage 2 payload if successful. Then, loren ipsum...





## Malware Composition

DemoWare consists of the following components:

File Name	SHA256 Hash
srvupdate.exe	A6AA84358130078F9455773AF1E9EF2C7710934F72DF8514C9A62ABEB83D2E81
crt1.crt	A6AA84358130078F9455773AF1E9EF2C7710934F72DF8514C9A62ABEB83D2E81

`srvupdate.exe`

The initial executable that runs after a successful spearphish. Lorem ipsum...

`crt1.crt:`

A Base64 encoded CRT file containing the second stage payload. Lorem ipsum...

```
1  -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
2  Z2V0VXBkYXRlKCKKClN1YiBnZXRVcGRhdGUoKQphID0gIkN2VnY6dlZ2XHZWdlZ2
3  VnZpd1Z2bnZWdmR2VnZvd1Z2d3ZWdnN2VnZcd1Z2TXZWdm12VnZjd1Z2cnZWdm92
4  VnZzd1Z2b3ZWdmZ2VnZ0dlZ2LnZWdk52VnZFd1Z2VHZWdlx2VnZGdlZ2cnZWdmF2
5  VnZtd1Z2ZXZWdnd2VnZvd1Z2cnZWdmt2VnZcd1Z2dnZWdjR2VnYud1Z2MHZWdi52
6  VnYzdlZ2MHZWdjN2VnYxd1Z2OXZWdlx2VnZNd1Z2U3ZWdkJ2VnZ1dlZ2aXZWdmx2
7  VnZkd1Z2LnZWdmV2VnZ4dlZ2ZXZWdiIKCmFhID0gIkN2VnY6dlZ2XHZWdnV2VnZz
8  dlZ2ZXZWdnJ2VnZzd1Z2XHZWdlB2VnZ1dlZ2YnZWdmx2VnZpd1Z2Y3ZWdlx2VnZE
9  dlZ2b3ZWdmN2VnZ1dlZ2bXZWdmV2VnZud1Z2dHZWdnN2VnZcd1Z2eHZWdm12VnZs
10 dlZ2LnZWdnh2VnZtd1Z2bHZWdiIKCmFhYSA9IHVwZGF0ZShhLCAid1Z2IikKYWFh
11 YSA9IHVwZGF0ZShhYSwgInZWdiIpCgpTZXQgb2JqID0gR2V0T2JqZWN0KCJuZXc6
12 QzA4QUZEOTAtRjJBMS0xMUQxLTg0NTUtMDBBMEM5MUYzODgwIikKICAgIG9iaie5E
13 b2N1bWVudC5BcHBsaWNhdGlvbi5TaGVsbEV4ZW51dGUgYW50b3R1b3R1b3R1b3R1
14 LCAicnVuYXMiLCAwCgpFbmQGU3Vic21bmN0aw9uIHVwZGF0ZShjY2osIGpYyYkK
15 RGlthHN0cgpzdHIgPSBSZXBSYWNlKGNjaWwganpLCAiIikKdXBkYXRlID0gc3Ry
16 CkVuZCBGdW5jdGlvbg==
17  -----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

Fig 1: Base64 encoded cert of the stage 1 payload.



## Basic Static Analysis

{Screenshots and description about basic static artifacts and methods}



---

## Basic Dynamic Analysis

{Screenshots and description about basic dynamic artifacts and methods}



---

## Advanced Static Analysis

{Screenshots and description about findings during advanced static analysis}





---

## Advanced Dynamic Analysis

{Screenshots and description about advanced dynamic artifacts and methods}



## Indicators of Compromise

The full list of IOCs can be found in the Appendices.

### Network Indicators

{Description of network indicators}




Fig 3: WireShark Packet Capture of initial beacon check-in




0101 .... = Header Length: 20 bytes (5)	
> Flags: 0x018 (PSH, ACK)	
Window: 8212	
[Calculated window size: 2102272]	
[Window size scaling factor: 256]	
Checksum: 0x1cd5 [unverified]	
[Checksum Status: Unverified]	
Urgent Pointer: 0	
> [SEQ/ACK analysis]	
> [Timestamps]	
TCP payload (1460 bytes)	
<a href="#">[Reassembled PDU in frame: 97]</a>	
TCP segment data (1460 bytes)	
0000	45 00 05 dc 75 64 40 00 80 06 67 c8 0a 0a 01 ee E...ud@...g.....
0010	0a 0a 01 ee 00 50 43 df f8 c5 a8 fe 8c 0f e3 fc .....PC.....
0020	50 18 20 14 1c d5 00 00 53 65 72 76 65 72 3a 20 P..... Server:
0030	46 61 6b 65 4e 65 74 2f 31 2e 33 0d 0a 44 61 74 FakeNet/ 1.3...Dat
0040	65 3a 20 53 75 6e 2c 20 31 32 20 53 65 70 20 32 e: Sun, 12 Sep 2
0050	30 32 31 20 31 36 3a 31 38 3a 34 39 20 47 4d 54 021 16:1 8:49 GMT
0060	0d 0a 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 2d 54 79 70 65 3a 20 ...Conten t-Type:
0070	61 70 70 6c 69 63 61 74 69 6f 6e 2f 78 2d 6d 73 applicat ion/x-ms
0080	64 6f 77 6e 6c 6f 61 64 0d 0a 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e download ...Conten
0090	74 2d 4c 65 6e 67 74 68 3a 20 33 32 37 36 38 0d t-Length : 32768
00a0	0a 0d 0a 4d 5a 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 ff ...MZ.....
00b0	ff 00 00 b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 .....@.....
00c0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....L.....
00d0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 d8 .....!
00e0	00 00 00 0e 1f ba 0e 00 b4 09 cd 21 b8 01 4c cd .....L.....

Fig 4: WireShark Packet Capture of stage 2 executable download.

## Host-based Indicators

{Description of host-based indicators}





## Rules & Signatures

A full set of YARA rules is included in Appendix A.

{Information on specific signatures, i.e. strings, URLs, etc}



## Appendices

### A. Yara Rules

Full Yara repository located at: <http://github.com/HuskyHacks/PMAT-lab>

```
rule Yara_Example {  
  
    meta:  
        last_updated = "2021-10-15"  
        author = "PMAT"  
        description = "A sample Yara rule for PMAT"  
  
    strings:  
        // Fill out identifying strings and other criteria  
        $string1 = "YOURETHEMANNOWDOG" ascii  
        $string2 = "nim"  
        $PE_magic_byte = "MZ"  
        $sus_hex_string = { FF E4 ?? 00 FF }  
  
    condition:  
        // Fill out the conditions that must be met to identify the binary  
        $PE_magic_byte at 0 and  
        ($string1 and $string2) or  
  
        $sus_hex_string  
}
```

### B. Callback URLs

Domain	Port
hxxps://demowaredomain.local	443
hxxps://ec2-109-80-34-2.local	443
Hxxp://srv3.freetshirts.local	80



### C. Decompiled Code Snippets

```
push    0                ; BOOL bInheritHandle
push    0x1fffffff        ; DWORD dwDesiredAccess
call    dword [OpenProcess] ; 0x402004 ; HANDLE OpenProcess(DWORD dwDesiredAccess, BOOL bI...
push    0x40              ; '0' ; 64
push    0x3000
push    0x145            ; 325
mov     edi, eax
push    0                ; LPVOID lpAddress
push    edi              ; HANDLE hProcess
call    dword [VirtualAllocEx] ; 0x40200c ; LPVOID VirtualAllocEx(HANDLE hProcess, LPVOID lpA...
push    0                ; SIZE_T *lpNumberOfBytesWritten
mov     esi, eax
lea     eax, [lpBuffer]
push    0x145            ; 325 ; SIZE_T nSize
push    eax              ; LPCVOID lpBuffer
push    esi              ; LPVOID lpBaseAddress
push    edi              ; HANDLE hProcess
call    dword [WriteProcessMemory] ; 0x402000 ; BOOL WriteProcessMemory(HANDLE hProcess, LPVOID l...
push    0
push    0
push    0
push    esi
push    0
push    0                ; LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpThreadAttributes
push    edi              ; HANDLE hProcess
call    dword [CreateRemoteThread] ; 0x402010 ; HANDLE CreateRemoteThread(HANDLE hProcess, LPSECU...
push    edi              ; HANDLE hObject
call    dword [CloseHandle] ; 0x402008 ; BOOL CloseHandle(HANDLE hObject)
mov     ecx, dword [var_4b]
```

*Fig 5: Process Injection Routine in Cutter*