

Security and Privacy

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15 September 2023
TPAC 2023

Outline



Agenda (wiki) - 30m (20m presentation, 10m discussion)

- 1. Threat Model vs. Considerations (7m)
- 2. Use Cases and Requirements (8m)
- 3. Work Items and Reorganizations (5m)
- 4. Discussion (10m)

Threat Model vs. Considerations



- Detailed threat model and stakeholder definitions exist in the WoT Security and Privacy Guidelines (S&PG).
- Detailed security and privacy considerations exist in each deliverable,
 e.g. the <u>WoT Thing Description 1.1</u>
- S&P Considerations follow a template: risk, then mitigation(s)
- These are not consistent!
 - Risks in considerations should link to Threats in S&PG.
 - Names of Threats/Risks (and definitions) should be consistent.
- A related issue: UC&R lists "<u>stakeholders</u>", as does <u>S&PG</u>, but these are not consistent.
 - S&PG also has actual definitions, not just a list of names.

Use Cases and Requirements



- How to motivate/justify security and privacy features?
 - Submitted use cases often don't do a good job defining their security and privacy requirements
- Need chain: feature → requirement(s) → use case(s)
- Current (documented) justifications are incomplete:
 - https://w3c.github.io/wot-usecases/#security
 - https://w3c.github.io/wot-architecture/#sec-security-guidelines

Proposal:

- Establish set of "use case categories": Manages PII, Safety Critical, Confidential, etc.
- For each category, list use cases in that category
 - Use cases can be in more than one.
 - New use cases would self-identify what categories they fall under.
- List threats in Requirements section of UC&R document.
 - Names only; full definitions in S&PG
- For each threat, list the use case category for which mitigations are required.

Work Items and Reorganization



- Security Planning
- Proposed New Features with an S&P aspect:
 - Signing (also impacts Discovery)
 - Onboarding
 - Do we or don't we?
 - Where would it go?
- Reorganizations:
 - Context Extensions (also related to Bindings)
 - Ease of Use (e.g. inlined security)

Work Items - Discussion



- How do we deal with security and privacy considerations?
 - Should they be normative or not?
- How and when should we define best practices?
 - How does this overlap with existing mechanisms in protocols?
 - Should we define best practices in profiles?
 - Best practices for "new" Things (greenfield) should not constrain our descriptive power for "existing" Things (brownfield)
- Constraints on deployments vs. specification features/design?
 - Is use of TLS, for example, a deployment option?

General Discussion



- Need more people to work on the above...
 - Since security experts are limited, can't do all the work
 - Instead, want to engage experts for guidance and review, with other tasks taken up by other task forces
- Suggested Plan
 - Align considerations and threats/risks in S&PG and UC&R documents (proposed above)
 - Consistent names, categories, cross-references/link, etc.
 - Need to update considerations in each deliverable as well
 - While we are at it, may move considerations to more suitable deliverable or consolidate
 - Need to consider normative nature of S&P mitigations
 - Testability is important, maybe we need a pseudo-assertion "Guideline" or something.

Discussion



- Luca: split security concerns; SW stack vs. inappropriate use of device (e.g. using switch to turn on space heater remotely a dumb idea) vs. user configuration (not changing passwords).
- MM: related to "policy" assertions, e.g. for privacy or deployment. Note that threat model(s) exist because security is multifaceted
- Luca: also want actionable information
- Ege: also safety; is this "security" or another set of considerations? Testability. Awareness of S&PG doc.
- MM: One option would be to make the SP&G doc more central, e.g. move S&P detailed considerations there.
- Kaz: should do more work to review what other SDOs have done.
- MM: could also ask implementers or academics?
- Sal: very wide topic; also discussed a lot in Bacnet. IEC standards for automation is relevant. Could in general lean more heavily on external standards. See also IoT Alliance.
- MM: Also IoT SF. Should re-review, a lot has happened in the last five years.
- David Ezell: security is what the certification lab says it is. What about domains?