

#### HVOC Summary // Hacking Vehicle On-board Communications / ABE 590 / Spring 2023 Name: example1, example2, ... Input Parm1 Abrv. Parm2 Parm3 Output Block Encrypt: AES, Salsa20, Blowfish Block Decrypt: AES, Salsa20, Blowfish Stream Encrypt: AES-CTR Stream Decrypt: AES-CTR **Block Block** Stream Stream Enc Dec Enc Dec CT PΤ CT PT Hash: SHA256, SHA512, SHA512/256 Keyed Digest: AES-CMAC Key Agreement: X25519 **Key Derivation Function: HKDF** Message Message Role Secret or S<sub>x</sub>-Keyed Hash ΚA **KDF**





#### Inputs

- PT plaintext
- CT ciphertext
- Message message, not related to encryption. (Could argue that PT is also valid, but PT is usually reserved for situations where encryption is involved. That is, when there is also going to be a CT.)
- Signature used to verify message
- Box binary "blob" generated by NaCl box()
- 'cnf' confirmation claim (the public key of the ECU using the token)
- Claims other token claims
- PoP Token binary "blob" in a specific token format that supports proof-of-possession.

# **Input Sizes**

- b blocksize
- m message size
- s length of signature
- x length of claims before being put into token
- y length of encoded token

## **Keys / Secrets**

- S<sub>x</sub> symmetric key for entity X
- P/K<sub>A</sub> Alice's public/private keypair
- P/K<sub>B</sub> Bob's public/private keypair
- P/K<sub>OEM</sub> OEM's public/private keypair
- Shared Secret Information intended to be kept secret and used to generate symmetric keys

## **Non-Key Parameters**

- Role the intended role the derived key is for
- Other other input to KDF
- Length desired size of key created by KDF
- Nonce number used once to ensure boxed data is unique, even if message and keys are used repetitively

### Outputs (not included above)

- Digest fixed size "fingerprint" of (arbitrary size) message
- S<sub>X1</sub> the derived key
- <Boolean> 'true' when received message is verified by signature, 'false' otherwise

# Output Sizes (not included above)

- h hash size
- z size of shared secret from key agreement function
- L size of derived key

#### HVOC Summary // Hacking Vehicle On-board Communications / ABE 590 / Spring 2023 Name: example1, example2, ... Input Parm1 Abrv. Parm2 Parm3 Output Block Encrypt: AES, Salsa20, Blowfish Block Decrypt: AES, Salsa20, Blowfish Stream Encrypt: AES-CTR Stream Decrypt: AES-CTR **Block Block** Stream Stream Enc Dec Enc Dec CT PT CT NIST 800-38A NIST 800-38A NIST 800-38A NIST 800-38A Hash: SHA256, SHA512, SHA512/256 Keyed Digest: AES-CMAC Key Agreement: X25519 **Key Derivation Function: HKDF** Message Message Role Secret or S<sub>x</sub>-Keyed Hash ΚA **KDF** Other Digest Length, L Digest **Shared Secret** Digest FIPS 180-4 RFC 4493, NIST 800-38B RFC 7748 NIST 800-56Ar3 Verify: Ed25519 Sign: Ed25519 Message Message || Signature $\mathsf{P}_{\mathsf{OEM}}$ K<sub>OEM</sub> Sign Verify Signature <Boolean> RFC 8032 RFC 8032 Box: NaCl box() Box Open: NaCl box\_open() **Encode Token: CWT Decode Token: CWT** 'cnf' and other claims PoP Token Message Box 40+m

