# TO ATTACK, OR NOT TO ATTACK...

... that is the question.

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#### **SITUATION**



A big jackpot is sitting around on the blockchain



We're somewhat poor students and want to get it!



Coordination among attackers needed to succeed



There is COSTS associated with the attack.
Poor students!



We do not know how many attackers are sufficient

COOL!

**NOT COOL!** 

## SITUATION SUMMARISED



#### SOME THEORY FIRST: COMMIT-REVEAL

Keccak256-hash Commit = Hash gets stored Commit is linked to player Step

#### 31password

3 = player's bet in ETH (has to be an uint between 1 and 9) 1 = player's decision to attack (0 if no attack planned)

password = player's personal password (e.g. wewillwin)

Plain text («31password») Reveal = do they really match Player's decision is public

### HOW DOES IT WORK ON THE **BLOCKCHAIN?**

Let's gamble on Rinkeby testnet!

#### AREAS OF CONCERN

- Dynamic cost of attack along the number of Ether in the jackpot to disincentivize multiple attacks from a single person from different accounts
- Who provides the initial jackpot? Would such a contract be used in the wild?

# THANK YOU