Protecting Physics: A Strategic Playbook from the Ukrainian Crucible

Lessons from the 2015-2022 Grid Attacks for Defending Critical Infrastructure

The Core Conflict: IT Security Protects Data, OT Security Protects Physics.

The Ukrainian grid attacks reveal a fundamental evolution in cyber warfare. The adversary's tactics progressed from manipulating human operators to directly manipulating industrial protocols. Understanding this shift is the key to building a resilient defense.

2015: The Hijacking

Attackers **stole the keys** (credentials) and drove the existing system (the HMI) into a wall.

This was a sophisticated attack on ***process***.

2016: The Bomb



Attackers built a **custom weapon (Industroyer** malware) that knew how to **autonomously cut the brake lines** and **floor the accelerator.**

This was a direct attack on ***technology***.

The Adversary is a Security Level 4 (SL-4) Threat

These incidents are the **definitive case study** for an SL-4 threat actor: a **sophisticated state-level** entity with the resources and intent to cause **physical destruction** using custom-built **Industrial Control System (IACS) malware.**



Source: IEC 62443

SL-4 Intent

Causing loss of life or significant physical destruction.

SL-4 Resources

Extensive skills, significant financial backing, and deep IACS-specific knowledge.

SL-4 Methods

Usage of undisclosed vulnerabilities and custom, protocol-aware malware.

Anatomy of the Hijacking: The 2015 BlackEnergy3 Attack

Spear-Phishing

Malicious Microsoft Office attachments sent to corporate users.

Macro Execution

Embedded macros execute, installing BlackEnergy3 malware.

Credential Harvest

Attackers capture user credentials on the IT network.

Lateral Movement

Stolen credentials used to pivot from the IT network into the OT network.

Manual Control

Attackers manually operate the HMI software, clicking to open breakers and cause an outage.

The Failure of Process: Why the Hijacking Succeeded

The 2015 attack succeeded by exploiting weaknesses in human-centric processes and a lack of technical enforcement at the IT/OT boundary.

The Gap: Maturity Level 1/2

- **Awareness (Process 15):** Relied on users to identify and avoid sophisticated phishing.
- **Endpoint Protection (Process 9):** Permitted macros to run on corporate devices, allowing initial code execution.
- **Zone Boundary (IEC 62443):** Allowed attackers to simply ‘walk’ from a compromised IT network into OT using stolen credentials.

The Lesson: Technical Enforcement is Mandatory

“Maturity Level 3 (Advanced) requires that policy be enforced by technology. It is insufficient to train users not to click; the environment must be hardened so that clicking has no effect.”

The Attacker Evolves: From Exploiting People to Exploiting Protocols

2015: Man-in-the-Middle

Spear-phishing

Macro execution

Credential harvest

Manual control

2016: Machine-in-the-Middle



Malicious code execution

Network protocol manipulation

Automated, machine-level control and exploitation

The adversary learned that bypassing the human operator entirely was a more effective path to achieving their objectives. They stopped hijacking the car and decided to build a bomb.

Anatomy of the Bomb: The 2016 Industroyer Attack

The ‘**Industroyer**’ malware was a modular, purpose-built weapon. It did not need to interact with the HMI; it spoke the native languages of industrial equipment directly.



This removed the human operator from the loop, enabling a faster, more scalable, and automated attack.

The Failure of Technology: Why the Bomb Was Undetected

Standard IT security monitoring tools can see network traffic, but they lack the protocol-level intelligence to understand its operational meaning.

Standard IT Monitoring (The Gap)

Sees network traffic between a workstation and a substation. The activity is logged as **“Permitted Traffic on Port X.”**

OT-Aware Monitoring (The Requirement)



Uses Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) to understand the *content* of the traffic. It can **distinguish** between a benign **“Read Status” command** and a **malicious “Open Breaker” command.**

The Lesson: You Must Speak the Language of OT

“To stop Industroyer, your security controls must understand the difference between a monitoring command and an action command. A mature defense alerts immediately when an engineering workstation sends an IEC 104 ‘Open’ command outside of a scheduled maintenance window.”

The True Intent: Targeting Safety Systems for Physical Destruction

The most sinister component of the Industroyer attack was a Denial-of-Service (DoS) module aimed at Siemens SIPROTEC protection relays. This confirms an **intent** beyond a simple power outage.

1. Open Breakers: Use IEC 104 to cause the initial outage.

2. Blind Safety Relays: Launch DoS attack to render SIPROTEC devices unresponsive.

3. Prevent Re-energization: With safety systems blinded, operators cannot safely re-energize the grid. Attempting to do so could lead to catastrophic equipment failure.

The Lesson: Safety is a Non-Negotiable Zone

"This was a direct violation of the Safety Zone principle (IEC 62443). Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) and Protection Relays must be in a strictly isolated network zone, firewalled even from the primary SCADA control network."

Resilience Beyond Technology: Surviving the ‘Scorched Earth’ Aftermath

Attacker’s Tactics

After the primary attack, the goal was to disrupt recovery.

- **KillDisk (2015):** Wiped Master Boot Records (MBR), making workstations unbootable.

- **Telephony DoS (2015):** Flooded the call center to prevent customers from reporting outages.

The Operators’ Response

The Ukrainian operators restored power within 1-6 hours. How? **They switched to manual operations.**

The Lesson: The Ultimate Failsafe is Human

“OT Cybersecurity Maturity Level 4 focuses on ‘Degraded Operations.’ The IT layer (HMIs, Servers) is expendable. The physical layer (breakers, pumps) must remain operable by trained personnel, even in a blackout.”

2022 Validation: Active Defense Prevails Against Industroyer2

In April 2022, the same threat actor attempted to deploy a refined version of Industroyer. The attack failed.

Rapid Detection

The attack was identified almost immediately by defenders from CERT-UA and ESET.

Effective Response

The incident response plan was executed, neutralizing the threat before it could cause a significant outage.

The Lesson: The Shift to Active Monitoring Works

“The failure of Industroyer2 is direct proof that moving from a passive, perimeter-focused defense to an active, threat-hunting and monitoring-centric model (Maturity Level 3+) is effective at stopping even the most sophisticated IACS attacks.”

The Remediation Roadmap: A Three-Phase Defense

To defend against a ‘Sandworm-tier’ actor, the plan must address the full spectrum of tactics observed. We must build a defense that stops both the manual Hijacking of 2015 and the automated Bomb of 2016.

Phase 1: Hardening the Human Perimeter (Weeks 1-4)

Goal: Stop the Phish and the Macros.

Disable Macros & Scripting

- **What:** Implement a Group Policy Object (GPO) to block all Microsoft Office macros from the internet. Disable PowerShell on OT workstations unless digitally signed.
- **Why:** Kills the initial delivery vector used by BlackEnergy3 in 2015.

Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)

- **What:** Require Phishing-Resistant MFA (FIDO2/Smart Cards) for any remote or IT-to-OT access.
- **Why:** Prevents stolen credentials from being used to pivot into the OT network.

Phase 2: Architectural Defense (Months 2-6)

Goal: Break the Protocol Bridge.



Implement an Industrial DMZ (IDMZ)

- **What:** Terminate all incoming IT connections in a DMZ with ‘Jump Hosts.” Use a protocol break (e.g., Citrix, Guacamole) instead of direct RDP/VNC.
- **Why:** Prevents direct session hijacking, which was necessary for the 2015 manual attack.

Deploy Protocol-Specific Filtering

- **What:** Configure firewalls with Deep Packet Inspection to understand and filter IEC 104 and IEC 61850 traffic.
- **Why:** Allows for rules like ‘Deny any IEC 104 ‘Open Breaker’ command that does not originate from the main Control Center IP,” which would have blocked Industhoyer’s commands.

Phase 3: Ensuring Physical Resilience (Months 6-12)

Goal: Survive 'KillDisk' and Protect the Hardware.

Isolate Protection Relays

- **What:** Place all protection relays (e.g., SIPROTEC) in a dedicated, highly restricted network zone based on IEC 62443.
- **Why:** Mitigates the 2016 DoS attack by preventing any system other than the offline Safety Engineering Workstation from communicating with them.



Maintain 'Gold Image' Offline Backups

- **What:** Create and store offline, immutable backups of HMI and SCADA server configurations in a physical safe.
- **Why:** The only way to recover from destructive malware like KillDisk or CaddyWiper, which will also wipe online backups.

Conduct Manual Operations Drills

- **What:** Run a full blackout drill where operators must restore power without the HMI, using only phones and manual switching.
- **Why:** As proven in 2015, this is the ultimate failsafe. It ensures operational continuity when all else fails.

The Complete Playbook: From Data Protection to Physics Defense

2015 Was a Hijacking.

They stole the keys to the car and drove it into a wall.

So We Stole the Keys Back.

Phishing-Resistant MFA and blocking malicious macros.

2016 Was a Bomb.

They built a robot that cut the brake lines automatically.

So We Built a Blast Wall and Installed an Emergency Brake.

Architectural segmentation (IDMZ), protocol-aware filtering, and a drilled, resilient plan for manual manual operations.