



9th International Conference on Smart Energy Systems  
12-13 September 2023  
Copenhagen, Denmark  
#SESAAU2023

Supported by:



on the basis of a decision  
by the German Bundestag


# **GAME-THEORITIC ANALYSIS OF SUPPLIERS' MARKET POWER IN LOCAL MULTI-ENERGY MARKETS**

Júlia Barbosa, Florian Döllinger, Florian Steinke

# INTRODUCTION

Local Energy Markets (LEMs) are a promising approach to integrating of renewable energy resources:

- Electricity LEMs can help alleviate grid bottlenecks [1]
- LEMs reduce barriers to entry of small players [2]
- Mitigates resistance to new RE projects closeby [3]



Thermo-electric LEM.

[1] Dudjak et al. (2021) Impact of local energy markets integration in power systems layer: A comprehensive review. Applied Energy.

[2] Klement et al. (2022) Local Energy Markets in Action: Smart Integration of National Markets, Distributed Energy Resources and Incentivisation to Promote Citizen Participation. Energies.

[3] Hvelplund et al. (2006) Renewable energy and the need for local energy markets. Energy.

# INTRODUCTION

Thermal-Electric LEM Design studies often solve the market clearing as an **social-welfare maximization** ([4-5])

Perfect competition assumption is questionable:

- Small number of agents
- Much larger electricity market already suffered from market power abuse ([California energy crisis 2000](#))

Which lead to the question:

**How does imperfect competition affect thermo-electric LEMs  
and how it may be mitigated?**

[4] Brolin et al. (2020) Design of a local energy market with multiple energy carriers. International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems.

[5] Huynh et al. (2022) Local energy markets for thermal-electric energy systems considering energy carrier dependency and energy storage systems. Smart Energy.

# METHODOLOGY

## ENERGY CONSUMPTION MODEL


Consumers are assumed price-takers with a quadratic utility function.

## SUPPLIER AGENT MODEL

**Generation:** Supply of an commodity from some energy form for which no LEM exists.

**Storage:** Storage energy and retrieving at a later time.


**Conversion** The transformation between two energy commodities for which a LEM exist.



# METHODOLOGY


## PERFECT COMPETITION

All agents are price-takers and the market outcome maximizes the social welfare.



## OLIGOPOLISTIC COMPETITION


Suppliers are profit maximizer strategic players



# RESULTS:

## PERFECT VS IMPERFECT COMPETITION

Repeatedly increased the number of agents of a type, without increasing the total capacity of the type.



- Reduction of consumer surplus in oligopolistic competition.
- Market power reduces as number of agents increases.
- Producer surplus significantly increases with oligopolistic competition.

Thermal-Electric LEMs are not immune to abuse of market power.


# MARKET POWER MITIGATION STRATEGIES

## Seler of Last Resort (SLR)

Adding a regulated agent that can place an unlimited supply bid at a fixed regulated price.


## Diversification

Diversifying the local energy mix by adding new agent types.



# RESULTS:

## MITIGATION STRATEGIES



- Both strategies increase consumer surplus, however SLR is significantly more efficient.
- SLR reduces producer surplus and market efficiency.
- Diversification increases market efficiency and producer surplus.

The energy mix impacts the market power of the agents.



# OUTLOOK

- Thermo-electric LEMs are highly susceptible to market manipulation, which should be considered in the design of such markets.
- A well chosen mix of technologies in a LEM can contribute to avoiding abuse of market power.
- What is the energy mix that best mitigates market power?

**THANK YOU!**



TECHNISCHE  
UNIVERSITÄT  
DARMSTADT