

Internationalized Domain Name Homograph attacks

Project Proposal

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1 What

computers/crawlers, same for different browsers

- Explain the attack - When/how were IDN introduced - Homograph letters - How to use this to the attackers advantage
 - Research - On websites - Top 500 Alexa Websites - Try all possible variations - Classify: 404, redirect (legitimate), malicious, unrelated - Evaluation - On browsers - Screenshots before/after CVE (url bar, hover link) - Other possible policies: why they may work or they won't - Maybe domain providers should not allow IDNs close to real names?
- Whitelist/blacklist
 - Conclusion - Impact of the vulnerability based on empirical data and

2 Why

- Relatively new CVE discovered because this (<https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=683314>)
- How something beneficial for the users IDN could be turned against them - Hard for regular users to distinguish between real/fake sites - Easy to collect data to evaluate impact

3 Potential Issues

- The potential impact, it may be actually really low
- If we will find not legitimate sites by substitution (sample size may be low) - If there are a lot of illegitimate sites, we would need to check manually if they are just a redirect or a scam, maybe we will need to find an automatic way

4 Resources

Resources - We believe for the TOP500 sites + variations of each one we can check it with our own