



1. For this practice, I chose to use **zonetransfer.me**. It is a domain specifically set up by security professionals to allow students and researchers to practice DNS reconnaissance techniques safely and legally.



1


2. I started by running a basic **nslookup** on **zonetransfer.me**. Honestly, I just wanted to make sure the domain was reachable from my Windows host since my Kali VM was having network trouble. This gave me the basic A record, which is the IP address where the website lives. It's like checking the front door of a building before trying to find the blueprints.

Next, I needed to figure out which specific servers actually hold the records for this domain. I used **nslookup -type=ns zonetransfer.me** to pull the nameserver records. This is where things got interesting. I got a non-authoritative answer pointing to servers like **nsztm1.digi.ninja**. Even though the answer was "non-authoritative," which just means my computer pulled it from a cache instead of the source, it gave me the exact targets I needed for the deeper dive



2

3. Once I had the nameservers, I wanted to see how much data I could grab without even trying a zone transfer. I jumped into the interactive mode of nslookup and used **set type=any**. This is a classic move to see if a server is over-sharing. By then typing the domain name, I was able to see a mix of MX records for mail and TXT records.



The screenshot shows a web browser with the URL `diginiinja/projects/zone-transfer.php`. The page displays the ZoneTransfer.me logo and a silhouette of a person. Below the browser, a terminal window is open, showing the following commands and output:

```
C:\Users\jashv>nslookup
Default Server: Unknown
Address: 172.20.0.1

> set type=any
> zonetransfer.me
Server: Unknown
Address: 172.20.0.1


Non-authoritative answer:
zonetransfer.me text =

"google-site-verification=tyP28J7JAUA9fw2sHXMcCC0I6XBmoV104VLMewxA"
zonetransfer.me MX preference = 0, mail exchanger = ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.COM
zonetransfer.me MX preference = 10, mail exchanger = ALT1.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.COM
zonetransfer.me MX preference = 20, mail exchanger = ASPMX3.GOOGLEMAIL.COM
zonetransfer.me MX preference = 20, mail exchanger = ASPMX2.GOOGLEMAIL.COM
zonetransfer.me MX preference = 20, mail exchanger = ASPMX3.GOOGLEMAIL.COM
zonetransfer.me MX preference = 10, mail exchanger = ALT2.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.COM
zonetransfer.me MX preference = 20, mail exchanger = ASPMX4.GOOGLEMAIL.COM
zonetransfer.me internet address = 5.196.105.14
zonetransfer.me
primary name server = nsztm1.digi.ninja
responsible mail addr = robin.digi.ninja
serial = 2019100801
refresh = 172800 (2 days)
retry = 900 (15 mins)
expire = 1209600 (14 days)
default TTL = 3600 (1 hour)
zonetransfer.me nameserver = nsztm1.digi.ninja

So, the domain is zonetransfer.me and the two name servers are nsztm1.digi.ninja and
nsztm2.digi.ninja. Feel free to use this domain in your training and when talking to clients,
hopefully it will help educate people as to why it should be disabled in almost all cases on
```

3

4. After gathering the IPs **5.196.105.14** and **81.4.108.41**, I wanted to see if I could tie them back to the domain using a reverse DNS lookup. This is basically a way to double check if an IP actually belongs to the domain you are investigating. However, when I ran the command, it came back with a "Non-existent domain" error for both addresses. Instead of just assuming my command was failing or that my network was broken, I wanted to verify my methodology. I decided to try a reverse lookup on **8.8.8.8**, which is the well-known Google Public DNS. As you can see in the screenshot, it immediately gave me the answer **dns.google**.



The screenshot shows a web browser with the URL `diginiinja/projects/zone-transfer.php`. The page displays the ZoneTransfer.me logo and a silhouette of a person. Below the browser, a terminal window is open, showing the following commands and output:

```
C:\Users\jashv>nslookup
Server: Unknown
Address: 172.20.0.1

Non-authoritative answer:
zonetransfer.me text =

"google-site-verification=tyP28J7JAUA9fw2sHXMcCC0I6XBmoV104VLMewxA"
> exit

C:\Users\jashv>nslookup 5.196.105.14
Server: Unknown
Address: 172.20.0.1

*** Unknown can't find 5.196.105.14: Non-existent domain

C:\Users\jashv>nslookup 81.4.108.41
Server: Unknown
Address: 172.20.0.1

*** Unknown can't find 81.4.108.41: Non-existent domain

C:\Users\jashv>nslookup 8.8.8.8
Server: Unknown
Address: 172.20.0.1


Name: dns.google
Address: 8.8.8.8

C:\Users\jashv>
```

4

After that, I decided to dig into the TXT records by using the **set type=txt** command. I was specifically hunting for an SPF record to see how they handle email security, but the result came back with a Google site verification string instead.

The Analysis: Actually, the reason the SPF record didn't show up is simply that the domain hasn't configured one. While the Google string proves the domain is active, the missing SPF is a real security gap. Without it, there is no policy to stop someone from spoofing their email address. In a real audit, I'd mark this as a finding because what is "missing" from a DNS setup often tells you more about a target's vulnerabilities than what is actually there.



The screenshot shows a web browser window with a terminal application open. The terminal displays the output of several DNS lookup commands for the domain `zonetransfer.me`. The commands and their outputs are as follows:

```
zonetransfer.me nameserver = nsztm1.digi.ninja
zonetransfer.me nameserver = nsztm2.digi.ninja
zonetransfer.me ??? unknown type 37 ???
zonetransfer.me HINFO CPU = Casio fx-700G OS = Windows XP
> server nsztm1.digi.ninja
Default Server: nsztm1.digi.ninja
Address: 81.4.108.41

> ls -d
Unrecognized command: ls -d
>
> I didn't get this last step. I didn't do it as well. So I did the third step with what to say?#
Unrecognized command: I didn't get this last step. I didn't do it as well. So I did the third step with what to say?#
> exit

C:\Users\jash>nslookup
Default Server: Unknown
Address: 172.20.0.1

> set type=txt
> zonetransfer.me
Server: Unknown
Address: 172.20.0.1


Non-authoritative answer:
zonetransfer.me text =
"google-site-verification=tyP28J7JAUHA9fw2sHXMGcCC0I6XBmoVi04VLMewxA"
```

Below the terminal window, there is a note: "So, the domain is zonetransfer.me and the two name servers are nsztm1.digi.ninja and nsztm2.digi.ninja. Feel free to use this domain in your training and when talking to clients, hopefully it will help educate people as to why it should be disabled in almost all cases on where I either get account credits or cash back. Usually only pennies, but they all add up."

5

6,7. After getting the manual results, I wanted to see the "big picture" of the domain's infrastructure without sending any more packets directly to their servers. I used a passive **OSINT** method by putting the domain into DNSDumpster, which is an excellent tool for mapping out an entire digital footprint.

The Analysis: Actually, this visual mapping is vital because it reveals how different servers, like mail (MX) and web hosts, interact with each other. By looking at the graphic map and the record list, I could quickly spot the entire layout of the domain in a way that manual commands don't always show. It's a much stealthier way to work because you're gathering intelligence from a database rather than the target itself. For an analyst, this is about finding "orphaned" subdomains or forgotten assets that might have been overlooked by the IT team, giving me a complete view of the attack surface before deciding where to look closer.



6

The screenshot displays the results of a DNS lookup for 'zonetransfer.me' on the DNSDumpster.com website. The results are organized into two main sections: 'A Records (subdomains from dataset)' and 'MX Records'.

A Records (subdomains from dataset)

Host	IP	ASN	ASN Name	Open Services (from DB)	RevIP
www.zonetransfer.me	5.195.185.14	asn:16276 5.195.0.0/16	OWI, FR France	https: Apache title: 301 Moved Permanently tech: Apache HTTP Server https: Apache title: 301 Moved Permanently on: alertlab.digil.ninja tech: Apache HTTP Server https: Apache title: 404 Not Found	34

MX Records

Host	IP	ASN	ASN Name	RevIP
20 aspmx3.googlemail.com	192.178.223.26	asn:15169 public-192-178-19100.net	GOOGLE United States	
10 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com	192.178.223.27	asn:15169 public-192-173-16100.net	GOOGLE United States	
20 aspmx5.googlemail.com	142.250.102.26	asn:15169 19-19-178-16100.net	GOOGLE United States	
10 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com	172.253.116.27	asn:15169 15-19-173-16100.net	GOOGLE United States	
20 aspmx2.googlemail.com	172.253.116.27	asn:15169 15-19-173-16100.net	GOOGLE United States	
0 aspmx.l.google.com	172.253.63.26	asn:15169 19-19-178-16100.net	GOOGLE United States	
20 aspmx4.googlemail.com	173.194.76.26	asn:15169 15-19-178-16100.net	GOOGLE United States	

7

A Recommendations Section:

Implement an SPF Record: To prevent email spoofing, the domain should define a clear policy in its TXT records.

Restrict "ANY" Queries: The server should be configured to limit the amount of information it provides to generic queries to reduce the metadata leaked to attackers.

Configure PTR Records: Setting up reverse DNS for all active IP addresses would help in verifying the legitimacy of the infrastructure