
# SonicPrint: a generally adoptable and secure fingerprint biometrics in smart devices

Aditya Singh Rathore, Weijin Zhu, Afee Daiyan, Chenhan Xu, Kun Wang, Feng Lin, Kui Ren, Wenyao Xu




## **Promising Biometrics**






## Fingerprint: Touch-based access





## THEORY BEHIND





## FINGERPRINT VULNERABILITY






- Fingerprint is externally visible
- Can be sensed remotely (>1m)
- Fingerprint anti-spoofing relies on outer skin features



The interaction is in the form of swipe action. A unique signal is generated that contains some intrinsic






## FINGERPRINT-EXCITED SONIC EFFECT(FISE)

Secure: cannot be recorded by a conventional microphone

Unique: unique fingerprint

Accessible: surface independent




Carolina

## A FEASIBILITY STUDY


Experimental Setup	
Subjects	3
Device	Google Pixel 2
Sensor	In-built Microphone
Sampling rate	44.1KHz
Room temperature	21C
Action	Perform 15 swipes







#### **USER PERSPECTIVE: TRADITIONAL FINGERPRINT**





#### **USER PERSPECTIVE: PROPOSED APPROACH**

#### Preparation



- ✓ Download the Software App
- ✓ Permit Microphone Access Total Time < 1 minute

#### Training



- ✓ Swipe 60 times
- ✓ Location near microphone
- Different human dynamics

Total Time = 1 minute

#### Testing




- ✓ Swipe 3 times
- ✓ Location near microphone

Total Time < 3 second 29/75




#### SONICPRINT: AN END-TO-END BIOMETRIC

- Background isolation
- Friction event detection
- Acoustic fingerprint
- Ensamble election






## **Background** isolation






## FRICTION EVENT DETECTOIN






#### TAXONOMY OF ACOUSTIC FINGERPRINT



Boruta's algorithm to determine all-relevant features



## **ENSEMBLE CLASSIFICATION**



## **EXPERIMENTAL SETUP**


Subjects(users): 31 Device: google pixel 2


Sensor: in-built microphone



South Carolina

## **EVALUATION: ACCURACY**






1Hand 7cm Aluminum 2Hands 1cm Glass

Train: 15 subjects

Test: 16 subjects(not in the training) South Carolina

## **SWIPE DYNAMICS**





complexity of the swipe action

Distance to microphone



## **VULNERABILITY: FINGERPRINT PHANTOM ATTACK**

Similar to traditional fingerprint, the attacker wants to breach the sonic print using fake fingers.




Subjects	5
Action Type	2Hand and 1Hand
Count	100 (each)
Spoof rate	4.2%~6.4%



#### **VULNERABILITY: REPLAY AND SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACK**





Attack via microphone

Attack via vibration channel



## **INSIGHTS AND FUTURE EFFECTS**

- 1. Would using 2+ fingers to swipe improve the performance?
- 2. Can we build a "Sonic Engine" that can detect anything that a finger touches?
- 3. Is it possible to enable a gesture recognition approach from FiSe?

