



Software Diversification for WebAssembly

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Doctoral Thesis in Computer Science
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Stockholm, Sweden, 2023

TRITA-EECS-AVL-2020:4
ISBN 100-

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Akademisk avhandling som med tillstånd av Kungl Tekniska högskolan framlägges
till offentlig granskning för avläggande av Teknologie doktorexamen i elektroteknik
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Abstract

WebAssembly has become the fourth officially recognized web language, allowing web browsers to adapt native applications for Web. Moreover, WebAssembly has developed into a critical component of backend scenarios such as edge computing and cloud computing. Nowadays, WebAssembly is used in a wide range of applications, including web browsers, blockchain, and cloud computing. While security was a primary focus in its design, WebAssembly remains vulnerable to attacks, including side-channels and memory corruption. In addition, WebAssembly has been exploited to transport malware, especially in instances of browser cryptojacking. Remarkably, the predictability of the WebAssembly ecosystem, including its users and the programs it hosts, is exceedingly high. This predictability can exacerbate the impact of a vulnerability within these ecosystems. For example, a flaw in a web browser, instigated by a faulty WebAssembly program, could potentially affect millions of users.

This thesis aims to enhance the security of the WebAssembly ecosystem through the introduction of methods and tools for Software Diversification. Software Diversification is a strategy designed to augment the cost of exploitation by rendering the software less predictable. By automatically generating numerous variants of a program, we can decrease predictability within ecosystems. These variants harden observable properties typically utilized to carry out attacks. For instance, we can generate variants of a program with diverse memory layouts and control-flow graphs, thereby strengthening code analysis, execution traces, and execution times. Yet, in the context of WebAssembly, Software Diversification has not been explored.

We present three pioneering tools to the community: CROW, MEWE, and WASM-MUTATE. Each tool is specifically designed to address a unique aspect of Software Diversification. Moreover, these tools synergistically enhance each other. We furnish empirical evidence that Software Diversification is applicable to WebAssembly programs in two distinct manners: Offensive and Defensive Software Diversification. Our investigation into Offensive Software Diversification in WebAssembly reveals potential avenues for improving the detection of WebAssembly malware. In contrast, our experiments in Defensive Software Diversification demonstrate that WebAssembly programs can be strengthened against side-channel attacks, specifically against the Spectre attack.

Keywords: WebAssembly, Software Diversification, Side-Channels, Moving Target Defense

Sammanfattning

LIST OF PAPERS

1. ***WebAssembly Diversification for Malware Evasion***
Javier Cabrera-Arteaga, Tim Toady, Martin Monperrus, Benoit Baudry
Computers & Security, Volume 131, 2023, 17 pages
<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167404823002067>
2. ***Wasm-mutate: Fast and Effective Binary Diversification for WebAssembly***
Javier Cabrera-Arteaga, Nicholas Fitzgerald, Martin Monperrus, Benoit Baudry
Submitted to Computers & Security, under revision, 17 pages
<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2309.07638.pdf>
3. ***Multi-Variant Execution at the Edge***
Javier Cabrera-Arteaga, Pierre Laperdrix, Martin Monperrus, Benoit Baudry
Moving Target Defense (MTD 2022), 12 pages
<https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3560828.3564007>
4. ***CROW: Code Diversification for WebAssembly***
Javier Cabrera-Arteaga, Orestis Floros, Oscar Vera-Pérez, Benoit Baudry, Martin Monperrus
Measurements, Attacks, and Defenses for the Web (MADWeb 2021), 12 pages
<https://doi.org/10.14722/madweb.2021.23004>
5. ***Superoptimization of WebAssembly Bytecode***
Javier Cabrera-Arteaga, Shrinish Donde, Jian Gu, Orestis Floros, Lucas Satabin, Benoit Baudry, Martin Monperrus
Conference Companion of the 4th International Conference on Art, Science, and Engineering of Programming (Programming 2021), MoreVMs, 4 pages
<https://doi.org/10.1145/3397537.3397567>
6. ***Scalable Comparison of JavaScript V8 Bytecode Traces***
Javier Cabrera-Arteaga, Martin Monperrus, Benoit Baudry
11th ACM SIGPLAN International Workshop on Virtual Machines and Intermediate Languages (SPLASH 2019), 10 pages
<https://doi.org/10.1145/3358504.3361228>

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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Part I

Thesis

1

INTRODUCTION

Jealous stepmother and sisters; magical aid by a beast; a marriage won by gifts magically provided; a bird revealing a secret; a recognition by aid of a ring; or show; or what not; a dénouement of punishment; a happy marriage - all those things, which in sequence, make up Cinderella, may and do occur in an incalculable number of other combinations.

— MR. COX 1893, *Cinderella: Three hundred and forty-five variants* [1]

THE first web browser, Nexus, made its appearance in 1990 [2]. At its inception, web browsing consisted solely of retrieving and displaying small, static text pages. With Nexus, users could access for the first time interlinked hypertext documents, so-called HTML pages. However, the escalating computing power of devices, the proliferation of the internet, the valuation of internet-based companies, and the demand for more engaging user experiences gave rise the concept of executing code in conjunction with web pages. In 1995, the Netscape browser revolutionized this concept by introducing JavaScript [3], a programming language that allowed code execution on the client-side. Interactive web content immediately highlighted benefits: unlike classical native software, web applications do not require installation, are always up-to-date, and are accessible from any device with a web browser. Significantly, since the advent of Netscape, all browsers offer JavaScript support. In the present day, the majority of web pages incorporate not only HTML but also JavaScript code, which is executed on client computers. Consequently, over the past several decades, web browsers have evolved into intricate systems capable of running comprehensive applications, such as video and audio players, animation creators, and PDF document renderers.

Despite being the main scripting language in modern web browsers, JavaScript possesses inherent limitations due to its unique language characteristics [4]. Each JavaScript engine requires the parsing and recompiling of the JavaScript code, thereby causing substantial overhead. In practice, the process of parsing and compiling JavaScript code constitutes the majority of website load times¹. Additionally, JavaScript presents security issues, including the lack of memory

⁰Compilation probe time 2023/11/21 14:08:04

¹<https://hacks.mozilla.org/2017/02/what-makes-webassembly-fast>

isolation, which potentially enables information extraction from other processes [5, 6]. Numerous attempts have been made to port other languages, offering different guarantees, to the browser execution as alternatives to JavaScript. For instance, Java applets emerged on web pages in the late 90s, enabling the execution of Java bytecode on the client side ². Likewise, Microsoft attempted twice with ActiveX in 1996 ³, and Silverlight in 2007 ⁴. However, these attempts either failed to persist or experienced low adoption, primarily due to security issues and the absence of consensus among the community of browser vendors.

Importantly, in 2014, Alon Zakai and colleagues proposed the Emscripten tool ⁵. Emscripten employs a strict subset of JavaScript, `asm.js`, to facilitate the compilation of low-level code such as C to JavaScript. `Asm.js` was included as an LLVM backend ⁶. This strategy offered the advantages of the ahead-of-time optimizations from LLVM, resulting in performance gains on browser clients ⁷ when compared to standard JavaScript code. `Asm.js` outperformed JavaScript because it restricted language features to those that could be optimized in the LLVM pipeline. Moreover, it eliminated most of the language's dynamic characteristics, limiting it to numerical types, top-level functions, and one large array in memory accessed directly as raw data. `Asm.js` proved that client-side code could be enhanced with the appropriate language design and standardization. In response to persistent JavaScript-related issues, the formalization and creation of a formal specification following `asm.js` laid the groundwork for the emergence of WebAssembly. In 2015, the Web Consortium (W3C) standardized WebAssembly as a bytecode for the web environment. As a result, WebAssembly became the fourth official language for the web.

The first distinction from earlier attempts to port non-JavaScript languages to the web lies in WebAssembly's initial design. Unlike its predecessors, WebAssembly was crafted to supplement JavaScript in the browser as a platform-agnostic, low-level bytecode, rather than to completely replace it. Its primary goal was to replace computing-intensive JavaScript code in contemporary web applications. Additionally, WebAssembly is the inaugural major language that utilized formal specification and verification right from the design inception [7, 8].

Importantly, WebAssembly provides a platform for compiling several legacy code applications, like those written in C/C++. For example, LLVM includes WebAssembly as a backend since release 7.1.0 published in May 2019⁸. Therefore, the emergence of WebAssembly, a fast, low-level, portable bytecode for browsers, has the potential to transform web software as we know it. It paves the way

²<https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/javase/9-deprecated-features.html>

³<https://web.archive.org/web/20090828024117/http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/1996/mar96/activexpr.mspx>

⁴<https://www.microsoft.com/silverlight/>

⁵<https://emscripten.org/>

⁶<http://asmjs.org/spec/latest/>

⁷<https://hacks.mozilla.org/2015/03/asm-speedups-everywhere/>

⁸<https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/releases/tag/llvmorg-7.1.0>

for web applications to undertake roles traditionally reserved for native desktop applications. For example, applications such as AutoCAD and Adobe Photoshop have been ported to WebAssembly⁹.

The WebAssembly specification embodies several language design principles that pave the way for its extension beyond the web ecosystem. For instance, the architecture of WebAssembly guarantees self-containment. Inherently, WebAssembly binaries are prohibited from accessing memory beyond their own designated space, thereby amplifying security via Software Fault Isolation (SFI) policies [9]. Consequently, research has highlighted the benefits of integrating WebAssembly as an intermediate layer in contemporary cloud platforms [10]. In particular, the employment of WebAssembly binaries improves startup times and optimizes memory consumption, outperforming virtualization and containerization [11]. Furthermore, compared to virtual machines and containers, WebAssembly programs are more compact, highlighting their efficient deployment, especially when network transportation is a consideration. The methodology for standalone WebAssembly execution was formalized in 2019 when the Bytecode Alliance proposed the WebAssembly System Interface (WASI)¹⁰. WASI standardizes the execution of WebAssembly via a POSIX-like interface protocol, thereby facilitating the execution of WebAssembly closer operating system. This standardization enables WebAssembly to function outside web browsers, extending its use to cloud environments and IoT devices.

The extensive applicability and rapid adoption of WebAssembly have prompted requests for additional features. However, these demands do not always align with the initial specifications. For extending WebAssembly with a new proposal, it must satisfy particular criteria. A new proposal needs a formal specification and a minimum of two independent implementations, e.g., two different WebAssembly engines. This approach allows for swift incorporation of new formalization and features via the so-called "evergreen method", while maintaining the original WebAssembly specification intact. Since the inception of WebAssembly, numerous extensions have been proposed for standardization. For instance, the SIMD proposal enables the execution of vectorized instructions in WebAssembly. After approval, new extensions remain optional, ensuring that the core WebAssembly version remains 1.0. The ongoing development of WebAssembly provides avenues for research and development. However, it also gives rise to security concerns within the ecosystem, as new threats emerge.

1.1 Predictability in WebAssembly ecosystems

Over the past three decades, web browsers and JavaScript have significant evolution, leading to myriad implementations. However, only Firefox, Chrome,

⁹<https://twitter.com/Adobe/status/1453034805004685313?s=20&t=Zf1N7-WmzecA0K4V8R69lw>

¹⁰<https://github.com/WebAssembly/WASI>

Safari, and Edge are typically utilized on devices. Web page resources, including those containing WebAssembly binaries, are primarily served from centralized datacenters [12]. This situation creates a highly predictable ecosystem, where potential attackers can predict ecosystem behavior, from the browser to the code it executes. This predictability may be exploited to launch large-scale attacks, as predictability inherently increases the chances of successful attacks [13]. For example, if one-quarter of all devices operate the same code in the same browser, a single flaw could impact millions of devices in the same way [14].

The aforementioned issue is exacerbated when considering the adoption of WebAssembly by edge-cloud computing platforms to provide services. In addition to browser clients, thousands of edge devices operate millions of identical WebAssembly instantiations per second. This suggests that a single vulnerable WebAssembly binary in an edge network node could render every node identically susceptible due to the binary replication occurring on each node. A potential attacker could compromise all edge nodes concurrently, implying that a single distributed WebAssembly binary could trigger a global attack¹¹.

We devise two scenarios where predictability affects WebAssembly ecosystems. First, the predictability of execution engines and WebAssembly binaries themselves facilitates side-channel and memory attacks. Despite the praise for WebAssembly’s security, particularly its design that prohibits programs from accessing data beyond their own memory, it is not immune to such vulnerabilities. For example, Rokicki et al. highlighted the potential risk of port contention side-channel attacks using WebAssembly malware in browsers [15]. In such cases, mitigations often involve hardware and operating-level changes, which are not always feasible. Moreover, attacks within the memory of WebAssembly itself are feasible[16, 17] as innate vulnerabilities can exist in WebAssembly binaries due to flaws in the source code. Besides, the lack of stack-smashing protections could result in unnoticed overflows and crashes during WebAssembly executions[18]. In standalone deployments, Genkin et al. demonstrated the possibility of data extraction via cache-timing side channels in WebAssembly [19]. In a similar vein, Maisuradze and Rossow exhibited speculative execution attacks on WebAssembly binaries [20].

Second, the defenses for identifying and addressing vulnerabilities are generally predictable. In particular, this predictability can be manipulated by malicious actors to create programs aimed at deceiving these defense mechanisms. For example, malware can be distributed via WebAssembly binaries. The capability of WebAssembly for efficient computation makes it an appealing target for misuse by cybercriminals, especially for cryptojacking [21]. The challenge in identifying and eliminating cryptojacking enables it to function persistently on a victim’s computer, constantly utilizing resources and generating income for the attacker [22]. Several techniques, such as static analysis, dynamic analysis,

¹¹<https://www.fastly.com/blog/defense-in-depth-stopping-a-wasm-compiler-bug-before-it-became-a-problem>

and even sophisticated machine learning methods, are successfully applied to detect WebAssembly malware [23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28]. However, most of these research works do not consider the predictability of an attacker knowing that a WebAssembly program is not treated as obfuscated.

1.2 Problems statements

To sum up, predictability and potential vulnerabilities form a harmful combination. This principle does not exclude WebAssembly and its ecosystem. The effect of exploiting a single vulnerability in WebAssembly could prove catastrophic, given all devices running the same WebAssembly binaries could be affected. On the other hand, WebAssembly malware pose a severe threat. Present defenses may not adequately protect against them, as they have not been designed to manage situations outside predictable scenarios, such as obfuscation. Besides, mitigations might require hardware and operating-level changes, which are not always feasible. In this dissertation, we tackle the subsequent two problems:

- P1 The WebAssembly ecosystem and binaries are susceptible to attacks, especially those from side-channel threats.**
- P2 WebAssembly malware presents a substantial threat. Predictability leads to the assumption that malware is typically considered unique.**

1.3 Software Diversification

This dissertation introduces tools, strategies, and methodologies designed to address the previously enunciated problems via Software Diversification. Software Diversification is a security strategy that involves identifying, developing, and deploying program variants of a given original program [29]. Pioneers in this field, Cohen et al. [30] and Forrest et al. [31], proposed enhancing software diversity through code transformations. Their proposal recommended the creation of diverse program variants, maintaining their original functionalities. The aim of Software Diversification is to lessen potential vulnerabilities by enhancing their behaviour unpredictability.

Studies have demonstrated that Software Diversification effectively removes vulnerabilities. Eichin et al., in work in 1989, underscored the practical benefits of diversification [32]. They illustrated how diversification limited the exploitation of the Morris Worm to a few machines. From an attacker's perspective, the diversity of target systems rendered them unpredictable. For WebAssembly, Software Diversification could bolster browsers and standalone engines by providing diversified program variants, thereby making it harder for attackers to exploit vulnerabilities, addressing **P1**. Furthermore, it could increase the accuracy of WebAssembly malware detectors and WebAssembly

Contribution	Research papers			
	I [33]	II [34]	III [35]	IV [36]
C1 Defensive diversification	✓	✓	✓	
C2 Offensive diversification				✓
C3 Experimental contribution	✓	✓	✓	✓
C4 Theoretical contribution	✓		✓	

Table 1.1: Mapping between contributions and research papers.

analysis tools in general, addressing **P2**. However, the implementation of Software Diversification in WebAssembly is still largely unexplored. In light of this, we offer the following contributions within the context of Software Diversification, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

C1 Defensive Diversification: In order to address **P1**, we assess how diversified WebAssembly program variants could be used for defensive purposes. We provide empirical insights about the practical usage of the generated variants in preventing attacks.

C2 Offensive Diversification: In order to address **P2**, we evaluate the potential for using generated WebAssembly program variants for offensive purposes. Our research includes experiments where we test the resilience of WebAssembly analysis tools against these generated variants. Furthermore, we offer insights into which types of program variants practitioners should prioritize to improve WebAssembly analysis tools.

C3 Experimental contribution: For each proposed technique we provide an artifact implementation and conduct experiments to assess its capabilities. The artifacts are publicly available. The protocols and results of assessing the artifacts provide guidance for future research on **P1** and **P2**.

C4 Theoretical contribution: We propose a theoretical foundation in order to generate and improve Software Diversification for WebAssembly. We provide a formal definition of WebAssembly program variants and their diversity. We also provide a formal definition of WebAssembly program diversity generation.

1.4 Summary of research papers

This compilation thesis comprises the following research papers. In Table 1.1 we map the contributions to our research papers.

I: CROW: Code randomization for WebAssembly bytecode.

Javier Cabrera-Arteaga, Orestis Floros, Oscar Vera-Pérez, Benoit Baudry, Martin Monperrus

Measurements, Attacks, and Defenses for the Web (MADWeb 2021), 12 pages
<https://doi.org/10.14722/madweb.2021.23004>

Summary: In this paper, we introduce the first entirely automated workflow for diversifying WebAssembly binaries. We present CROW, an open-source tool that implements Software Diversification through enumerative synthesis. We assess the capabilities of CROW and examine its application on real-world, security-sensitive programs. In general, CROW can create thousands of statically diverse variants. Furthermore, we illustrate that the generated variants exhibit different behaviors at runtime.

II: Multivariant execution at the Edge.

Javier Cabrera-Arteaga, Pierre Laperdrix, Martin Monperrus, Benoit Baudry

Moving Target Defense (MTD 2022), 12 pages

<https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3560828.3564007>

Summary: In this paper, we synthesize functionally equivalent variants of deployed edge services. Service variants are encapsulated into a single multivariant WebAssembly binary. A random variant is selected and executed each time a function is invoked. Execution of multivariant binaries occurs on the global edge platform provided by Fastly, as part of a research collaboration. We demonstrate that multivariant binaries present a diverse range of execution traces throughout the entire edge platform, distributed worldwide, effectively creating a moving target defense.

III: Wasm-mutate: Fast and efficient Software Diversification for WebAssembly.

Javier Cabrera-Arteaga, Nicholas Fitzgerald, Martin Monperrus, Benoit Baudry

Submitted to Computers & Security, under revision, 17 pages

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2309.07638.pdf>

Summary: This paper introduces WASM-MUTATE, a compiler-agnostic WebAssembly diversification engine. The engine is designed to swiftly generate functionally equivalent yet behaviorally diverse WebAssembly variants by randomly traversing e-graphs. We show that WASM-MUTATE can generate tens of thousands of unique WebAssembly variants in minutes. Importantly, WASM-MUTATE can safeguard WebAssembly binaries from timing side-channel attacks, such as Spectre.

IV: WebAssembly Diversification for Malware evasion.

Javier Cabrera-Arteaga, Tim Toady, Martin Monperrus, Benoit Baudry
Computers & Security, Volume 131, 2023, 17 pages

Summary: WebAssembly, while enhancing rich applications in browsers, also proves efficient in developing cryptojacking malware. Protective measures against cryptomalware have not factored in the potential use of evasion techniques by attackers. This paper delves into the potential of automatic binary diversification in aiming WebAssembly cryptojacking detectors' evasion. We provide proof that our diversification tools can generate variants of WebAssembly cryptojacking that successfully evade VirusTotal and MINOS. We further demonstrate that these generated variants introduce minimal performance overhead, thus verifying binary diversification as an effective evasion technique.

■ Thesis layout

This dissertation comprises two parts as a compilation thesis. Part one summarises the research papers included within, which is partially rooted in the author's licentiate thesis [37]. Chapter 2 offers a background on WebAssembly and the latest advancements in Software Diversification. Chapter 3 delves into our technical contributions. Chapter 4 exhibits two use cases applying our technical contributions. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis and outlines future research directions. The second part of this thesis incorporates all the papers discussed in part one.

2

BACKGROUND AND STATE OF THE ART

You must have a map, no matter how rough. Otherwise you wander all over the place.

— J.R.R. Tolkien

THIS chapter discusses the state-of-the-art in the areas of WebAssembly and Software Diversification. In Section 2.1 we discuss WebAssembly, focusing on its design and security model. Besides, we discuss the current state-of-the-art of WebAssembly research. In Section 2.2 we discuss related works in the area of Software Diversification. Moreover, we delve into the open challenges regarding the diversification of WebAssembly programs.

2.1 WebAssembly

The W3C publicly announced the WebAssembly (Wasm) language in 2017 as the fourth scripting language supported in all major web browser vendors. WebAssembly is a binary instruction format for a stack-based virtual machine and was officially consolidated by the work of Haas et al. [7] in 2017 and extended by Rossberg et al. in 2018 [38]. It is designed to be fast, portable, self-contained, and secure.

Moreover, WebAssembly has been evolving outside web browsers since its first announcement. Previous works demonstrated that using WebAssembly as an intermediate layer is better in terms of startup time and memory usage than containerization and virtualization [10, 11]. Consequently, in 2019, the Bytecode Alliance proposed WebAssembly System Interface (WASI) [39]. WASI pioneered the execution of WebAssembly with a POSIX system interface protocol, making it possible to execute Wasm closer to the underlying operating system. Therefore, it standardizes the adoption of WebAssembly in heterogeneous platforms [40], i.e., IoT and Edge computing [41, 42].

⁰Compilation probe time 2023/11/21 14:08:04

Currently, WebAssembly serves a variety of functions in browsers, ranging from gaming to cryptomining [43]. Other applications include text processing, visualization, media processing, programming language testing, online gambling, bar code and QR code fast reading, hashing, and PDF viewing. On the backend, WebAssembly notably excels in short-running tasks. As such, it is particularly suitable for Function as a Service (FaaS) platforms like Cloudflare and Fastly. The subsequent text in this chapter focuses specifically on WebAssembly version 1.0. However, the tools, techniques, and methodologies discussed are applicable to future WebAssembly versions.

2.1.1 From source code to WebAssembly

WebAssembly programs are compiled from source languages like C/C++, Rust, or Go ahead of time, which means that Wasm binaries can benefit from the optimizations of the source language compiler. The resulting WebAssembly program is like a traditional shared library, containing instruction codes, symbols, and exported functions. A host environment is in charge of complementing the Wasm program, such as providing external functions required for execution within the host engine. For instance, functions for interacting with an HTML page's DOM are imported into the Wasm binary when invoked from JavaScript code in the browser.

In Listing 2.1 and Listing 2.2, we present a Rust program alongside its corresponding WebAssembly binary. The Rust program in Listing 2.1 iteratively calculates the Fibonacci sequence up to a given number that comes from the host engine. The code in the program encompasses various elements such as vector allocations, external function usage, and a function definition that includes a loop, conditionals, function calls, and memory accesses. The Wasm code shown in Listing 2.2 is simplified in its textual format, known as WAT¹. The function prototype in lines 4 and 5 of Listing 2.1 are converted into imported function, as seen in lines 8 and 9 of Listing 2.2. The `fibonacci` function, spanning lines 7 to 20 in Listing 2.1, is compiled into a Wasm function covering lines 14 to 31 in Listing 2.2. Within this function, the translation of various Rust language constructs into Wasm can be observed. For instance, the `for` loop found in line 14 of Listing 2.1 is mapped to a block structure in lines 17 to 31 of Listing 2.2. The breaking condition of the loop is transformed into a conditional branch, as depicted in line 23 of Listing 2.2. In this scenario, the function yields the final set value in the `local` variable. Note that for optimization purposes, the loop concludes by returning the result value, instead of returning post completion of the loop.

¹The WAT text format is primarily designed for human readability and for low-level manual editing.

```

1 ...
2 // Imported from host
3 extern "C" {
4     fn log(s: &str);
5     fn get_input() -> usize; }
6
7 fn fibonacci(n: usize) -> i32 {
8     // Iterative fibonacci
9     // Create a vector of size n+1
10    let mut fibo_result = vec![0; n + 1];
11    // Set ith 0 and 1
12    fibo_result[0] = 1;
13    fibo_result[1] = 1;
14    for i in 2..=n {
15        // f[i] = f[i-1] + f[i-2]
16        fibo_result[i] = fibo_result[i - 1] + fibo_result[i - 2];
17    }
18    // Return the last element
19    return fibo_result[n];
20 }
21 // Pub to export the function
22 pub fn main() {
23     // Get the input from the user
24     let nth = get_input();
25     // Calculate the fibonacci
26     let fib = fibonacci(get_input());
27     // Print the result in the host imported function
28     log(&format!("{}", fib));
29 }
```

Listing 2.1: Example Rust program which includes, external function usage, a function definition featuring a loop, function calls, imported functions, and memory accesses.

There exist several compilers that turn source code into WebAssembly binaries. For example, LLVM compiles to WebAssembly as a backend option since its 7.1.0 release in early 2019², supporting a diverse set of frontend languages like C/C++, Rust, Go, and AssemblyScript³. Significantly, a study by Hilbig [43] reveals that 70% of WebAssembly binaries are generated using LLVM-based compilers. The main advantage of using LLVM is that it provides a modular and state-of-the-art optimization infrastructure for WebAssembly binaries. Recently, the Kotlin Multiplatform framework ⁴ has incorporated WebAssembly as a compilation target, enabling the compilation of Kotlin code to WebAssembly.

²<https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/releases/tag/llvmorg-7.1.0>

³A subset of the TypeScript language

⁴<https://kotlinlang.org/docs/wasm-overview.html>

```

1 ; WebAssembly magic bytes(\0asm) and version (1.0) ;
2 (module
3 ...
4 ; Type section: 0x01 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x13 ...
5 (type (;type index 0;) (func (param i32 i32)))
6 ...
7 ; Import section: 0x02 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x57 ...
8 (import "__wbg__" "__wbg_log" (func (;1;) (type 0)))
9 (import "__wbg__" "__wbg_getinput" (func (;2;) (type 8)))
10 ...
11 ; Custom section: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x7E ;
12 (@custom "name" "...")
13 ...
14 (func (;func index 40;) (type 1) (param i32) (result i32)
15   (local i32 i32 i32 i32 i32) ;local variables;
16 ...
17   loop ; label = @1 ;
18 ...
19   i32.eqz
20   if ; label = @2 Compare the top of the stack ;
21 ...
22   local.get 0
23   return ; Return the last element which is saved in local 0 ;
24 end
25 ...
26 block ;label = @2 ;
27 ...
28   i32.store ; Store the fib value in the mem assigned to the
29   ↪ result array;
30   br 1 (;@1;) ;Continue the loop;
31 end
32 ...
33 (func (;44;) (type 8) (result i32)
34 ...
35   call 2 ; Calling the imported function to get input ;
36   i32.store ; Store the input in memory ;
37 ...
38 (func (;45;) (type 7)
39   (local i32 i32 i32)
40 ...
41   call 44
42   call 40 ; Calling fibo function ;
43   i32.store offset=20
44 ...
45 (table (;0;) 33 33 funcref)
46 ; Memory section: 0x05 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x03 ...
47 (memory (;0;) 17)
48 ; Global section: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x11...
49 (global (;global index 0;) (mut i32 ;mut global;) (i32.const 1048576))
50 ...
51 ; Export section: 0x07 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x72 ...
52 (export "memory" (memory 0))
53 (export "fibo" (func 40))
54 (export "main" (func 45))
55 ...
56 ; Data section: 0x0d 0x00 0x00 0x03 0xEF ...
57 (data (;data segment index 0;) (i32.const 1048576) "invalid args...")
58 ...
59 ; Custom section: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x2F ;
60 (@custom "producers" "...")
```

Listing 2.2: Refer to Listing 2.1 for the Rust code example. This example showcases the transition from Rust to Wasm, where numerous high-level language attributes convert into multiple Wasm instructions. For clarity, we've marked elements and portions of the WebAssembly binary as comments.

A recent trend in the WebAssembly ecosystem involves porting various programming languages by converting both the language's engine or interpreter and the source code into a WebAssembly program. For example, Javy⁵ encapsulates JavaScript code within the QuickJS interpreter, demonstrating that direct source code conversion to WebAssembly isn't always required. If an interpreter for a specific language can be compiled to WebAssembly, it allows for the bundling of both the interpreter and the language into a single, isolated WebAssembly binary. Similarly, Blazor⁶ facilitates the execution of .NET Common Intermediate Language (CIL) in WebAssembly binaries for browser-based applications. However, packaging the interpreter and the code in one single standalone WebAssembly binary is still immature and faces challenges. For example, the absence of JIT compilation for the "interpreted" code makes it less suitable for long-running tasks [44]. On the other hand, it proves effective for short-running tasks, particularly those executed in Edge-Cloud computing platforms.

2.1.2 WebAssembly's binary format

The Wasm binary format is close to machine code and already optimized, being a consecutive collection of sections. In Figure 2.1 we show the binary format of a Wasm section. A Wasm section starts with a 1-byte section ID, followed by a 4-byte section size, and concludes with the section content, which precisely matches the size indicated earlier. A WebAssembly binary contains sections of 13 types, each with a specific semantic role and placement within the module. For instance, the *Custom Section* stores metadata like the compiler used to generate the binary, while the *Type Section* contains function signatures that serve to validate the *Function Section*. The *Import Section* lists elements imported from the host, and the *Function Section* details the functions defined within the binary. Other sections like *Table*, *Memory*, and *Global Sections* specify the structure for indirect calls, unmanaged linear memories, and global variables, respectively. *Export*, *Start*, *Element*, *Code*, *Data*, and *Data Count Sections* handle aspects ranging from declaring elements for host engine access to initializing program state, declaring bytecode instructions per function, and initializing linear memory. Each of these sections must occur only once in a binary and can be empty. For clarity, we also annotate sections as comments in the Wasm code in Listing 2.2.

A WebAssembly binary can be processed efficiently due to its organization into a contiguous array of sections. For instance, this structure permits compilers to boost the compilation process either through parallel parsing. Moreover, the *Code Section*'s instructions are further compacted through the use of the LEB128⁷

⁵<https://github.com/bytocodealliance/javy>

⁶<https://dotnet.microsoft.com/en-us/apps/aspnet/web-apps/blazor>

⁷<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LEB128>



Figure 2.1: Memory byte representation of a WebAssembly binary section, starting with a 1-byte section ID, followed by an 8-byte section size, and finally the section content.

encoding. Consequently, Wasm binaries are not only fast to validate and compile, but also swift to transmit over a network.

2.1.3 WebAssembly’s runtime

The WebAssembly’s runtime characterizes the behavior of WebAssembly programs during execution. This section describes the main components of the WebAssembly runtime, namely the execution stack, functions, memory model, and execution process. These components are crucial for understanding both the WebAssembly’s control-flow and the analysis of WebAssembly binaries.

Execution Stack: At runtime, WebAssembly engines instantiate a WebAssembly module. This module is a runtime representation of a loaded and initialized WebAssembly binary described in Section 2.1.2. The primary component of a module instance is its Execution Stack. The Execution Stack stores typed values, labels, and control frames. Labels manage block instruction starts and loop starts. Control frames manage function calls and function returns. Values within the stack can only be static types. These types include `i32` for 32-bit signed integers, `i64` for 64-bit signed integers, `f32` for 32-bit floats, and `f64` for 64-bit floats. Abstract types such as classes, objects, and arrays are not supported natively. Instead, these types are abstracted into primitive types during compilation and stored in linear memory.

Functions: At runtime, WebAssembly functions are closures over the module instance, grouping locals and function bodies. Locals are typed variables that are local to a specific function invocation. A function body is a sequence of instructions that are executed when the function is called. Each instruction either reads from the execution stack, writes to the execution stack, or modifies the control-flow of the function. Recalling the example WebAssembly binary previously showed, the local variable declarations and typed instructions that are evaluated using the stack can be appreciated between Line 12 and Line 38 in Listing 2.2. Each instruction reads its operands from the stack and pushes back the result. Notice that, numeric instructions are annotated with its corresponding type. In the case of Listing 2.2, the result value of the main function is the calculation of the last instruction, `i32.add` in line 38. As the listing also shows, instructions are annotated with a numeric type.

Memory model: A WebAssembly module instance incorporates three key types of memory-related components: linear memory, local variables and global variables. These components can either be managed solely by the host engine or shared with the WebAssembly binary itself. This division of responsibility is often categorized as *managed* and *unmanaged* memory [17]. Managed refers to components that are exclusively modified by the host engine at the lowest level, e.g. when the WebAssembly binary is JITed, while unmanaged components can also be altered through WebAssembly opcodes. First, modules may include multiple linear memory instances, which are contiguous arrays of bytes. These are accessed using 32-bit integers (`i32`) and are shareable only between the initiating engine and the WebAssembly binary. Generally, these linear memories are considered to be unmanaged, e.g., line 28 of Listing 2.2 shows an explicit memory access opcode. Second, there are global instances, which are variables accompanied by values and mutability flags (see example in line 49 of Listing 2.2). These globals are managed by the host engine, which controls their allocation and memory placement completely oblivious to the WebAssembly binary scope. They can only be accessed via their declaration index, prohibiting dynamic addressing. Third, local variables are mutable and specific to a given function instance (e.g., line 15 in Listing 2.2). They are accessible only through their index relative to the executing function and are part of the data managed by the host engine.

WebAssembly module execution: While a WebAssembly binary could be interpreted, the most practical approach is to JIT compile it into machine code [45]. The main reason is that WebAssembly is optimized and closely aligned with machine code, leading to swift JIT compilation for execution. Browser engines such as V8⁸ and SpiderMonkey⁹ utilize this strategy when executing WebAssembly binaries in browser clients. Once JITed, the WebAssembly binary operates within a sandboxed environment, accessing the host environment exclusively through imported functions. This sandboxing follows the Software Fault Isolation(SFI) strategy, meaning that a WebAssembly program cannot arbitrarily access code or data of its runtime.

WebAssembly standalone engines: While initially intended for browsers, WebAssembly has undergone significant evolution, primarily due to WASI[39]. WASI establishes a standardized POSIX-like interface for interactions between WebAssembly modules and host environments. Compilers can generate WebAssembly binaries that implement WASI, which allows execution in standalone engines. These binaries can then be executed by standalone engines across a variety of environments, including the cloud, servers, and IoT devices [46, 45]. Similarly to browsers, these engines often translate WebAssembly into machine code via JIT compilation, ensuring a sandboxed execution process.

⁸<https://chromium.googlesource.com/v8/v8.git>

⁹<https://spidermonkey.dev/>

Standalone engines such as WASM¹⁰, Wasmer¹¹, Wasmtime¹², WAVM¹³, and Sledge[47] have been developed to support both WebAssembly and WASI.

2.1.4 WebAssembly’s control-flow

A WebAssembly function groups instructions into blocks, with the function’s entrypoint acting as the root block. In contrast to conventional assembly code, control-flow structures in Wasm leap between block boundaries rather than arbitrary positions within the code, effectively prohibiting `gotos` to random code positions. Each block may specify the needed execution stack state before execution as well as the resultant execution stack state once its instructions have been executed. Typically, the execution stack state is simply the quantity and numeric type of values on the stack. This stack state is used to validate the binary during compilation and to ensure that the stack is in a valid state before the execution of the block’s instructions. Blocks in Wasm are explicit (see instructions `block` and `end` in lines 16 and 34 of Listing 2.2), delineating where they start and end. By design, a block cannot reference or execute code from external blocks.

During runtime, WebAssembly break instructions can only jump to one of its enclosing blocks. Breaks, except for those within loop constructions, jump to the block’s end and continue to the next immediate instruction. For instance, after line 31 of Listing 2.2, the execution would proceed to line 32. Within a loop, the end of a block results in a jump to the block’s beginning, thus restarting the loop. For example, if line 29 of Listing 2.2 evaluates as false, the next instruction to be executed in the loop would be line 18. Listing 2.3 provides an example for better understanding, comparing a standard block and a loop block in a Wasm function.

```

block
  block
    br 1 ; Jump instructions
           ; are annotated with the
           ; depth of the block they
           ; jump to;
    end
  end
...
loop
  ...
  br 0 ; first-order break;
  ...
end } ; end instructions break
       ; the block and jump to next
       ; instruction;
...

```

Listing 2.3: Example of breaking a block and a loop in WebAssembly.

Each break instruction includes the depth of the enclosing block as an operand. This depth is used to identify the target block for the break instruction. For example, in the left-most part of the previously discussed listing, a break instruction with a depth of 1 would jump past two enclosing blocks. This design

¹⁰<https://github.com/wasm3/wasm3>

¹¹<https://wasmer.io/>

¹²<https://github.com/bytocodealliance/wasmtime>

¹³<https://github.com/WAVM/WAVM>

hardens the rewriting of WebAssembly binaries. For instance, if an outer block is removed, the depth of the break instructions within nested blocks must be updated to reflect the new enclosing block depth. This is a significant challenge for rewriting tools, as it requires the analysis of the control-flow graph to determine the enclosing block depth for each break instruction.

Notice that, WebAssembly’s control flow design adheres to a Control Flow Integrity (CFI) policy. CFI is a security mechanism that limits a program’s control flow to a specified set of valid targets, thereby preventing arbitrary jumps [48]. Thus, even when a WebAssembly program originates from potentially untrustworthy sources, CFI policy theoretically guarantees the prevention of arbitrary jumps to random code locations.

2.1.5 Security and Reliability for WebAssembly

The WebAssembly ecosystem’s expansion needs robust tools to ensure its security and reliability. Numerous tools, employing various strategies to detect vulnerabilities in WebAssembly programs, have been created to meet this need. This section presents a review of the most relevant tools in this field, focusing on those capable of providing security guarantees for WebAssembly binaries.

Static analysis: SecWasm[49] uses information control-flow checking to identify vulnerabilities in WebAssembly binaries. Similarly, Wasmati[50] employs code property graphs for this purpose. Wasp[51] leverages concolic execution to identify potential vulnerabilities in WebAssembly binaries. CT-Wasm[52], verifies the constant time implementation of cryptographic algorithms in WebAssembly. Similarly, Vivienne applies relational Symbolic Execution (SE) to WebAssembly binaries in order to reveal vulnerabilities in cryptographic implementations[53]. While these tools emphasize specific strategies, others adopt a more holistic approach. For example, both Wassail[54] and WasmA[55] provide a comprehensive static analysis framework for WebAssembly binaries. Yet, static analysis tools may have limitations. For instance, a newly, semantically equivalent WebAssembly binary may be generated from the same source code bypassing or breaking the static analysis [56]. Thus, there may be a lack of subjects to evaluate the effectiveness of these tools.

Dynamic analysis: Dynamic analysis involves tools such as TaintAssembly[57], which conducts taint analysis on WebAssembly binaries. Furthermore, Stiévenart and colleagues have developed a dynamic approach to slicing WebAssembly programs based on Observational-Based Slicing (ORBS)[58, 59]. This technique aids in debugging, understanding programs, and conducting security analysis. However, Wasabi[60] remains the only general-purpose dynamic analysis tool for WebAssembly binaries, primarily used for profiling, instrumenting, and debugging WebAssembly code. Similar to static analysis, these tools typically analyze software behavior during execution, making them inherently reactive. In other

words, they can only identify vulnerabilities or performance issues while pseudo-executing input WebAssembly programs. Thus, facing an important limitation on overhead for real-world scenarios.

Protecting WebAssembly binaries and runtimes: The techniques discussed previously are primarily focused on reactive analysis of WebAssembly binaries. However, there exist approaches to harden WebAssembly binaries, enhancing their secure execution, and hardening the security of the entire execution runtimes ecosystem. For instance, Swivel[61] proposes a compiler-based strategy designed to eliminate speculative attacks on WebAssembly binaries in Function-as-a-Service (FaaS) platforms. Similarly, Kolosick and colleagues [62] modify the Lucet compiler to use zero-cost transitions, eliminating the performance overhead of SFI guarantees implementation. In addition, WaVe[63] introduces a mechanized engine for WebAssembly that facilitates differential testing. WaVe can be employed to detect anomalies in engines running Wasm-WASI programs. Much like static and dynamic analysis tools, these tools may suffer from a lack of WebAssembly inputs, which could affect the measurement of their effectiveness.

WebAssembly malware: Since the introduction of WebAssembly, the Web has consistently experienced an increase in cryptomalware. This rise primarily stems from the shift of mining algorithms from CPUs to WebAssembly, a transition driven by notable performance benefits [64]. Tools such as MineSweeper[23], MinerRay[24], and MINOS[25] employ static analysis with machine learning techniques to detect browser-based cryptomalware. In addition, SEISMIC[26], RAPID[27], and OUTGuard[28] leverage dynamic analysis techniques to achieve a similar objective. Moreover, VirusTotal¹⁴, a tool incorporating over 60 commercial antivirus systems as black-boxes, is capable of detecting cryptomalware in WebAssembly binaries. However, obfuscation studies have exposed their shortcomings, revealing an almost unexplored area for WebAssembly that threatens malware detection accuracy. In concrete, Bhansali et al. seminal work[65] demonstrate that cryptomining algorithm's source code can evade previous techniques through the use of obfuscation techniques.

2.1.6 Open challenges

Despite progress in WebAssembly analysis, numerous challenges remain. WebAssembly, though deterministic and well-typed by design, is susceptible to a variety of security threats. First, most existing WebAssembly research is reactive, focusing on detecting and fixing vulnerabilities already reported. This approach leaves WebAssembly binaries and runtime implementations potentially open to unidentified attacks. Second, side-channel attacks present a significant risk.

¹⁴<https://www.virustotal.com>

Genkin et al., for example, illustrated how WebAssembly could be manipulated to extract data via cache timing-side channels [19]. Furthermore, research conducted by Maisuradze and Rossow demonstrated the potential for speculative execution attacks on WebAssembly binaries [20]. Rokicki et al. disclosed the possibility for port contention side-channel attacks on WebAssembly binaries in browsers [15]. Finally, the binaries themselves may be inherently vulnerable. For example, studies by Lehmann et al. and Stiévenart et al. suggested that flaws in C/C++ source code could infiltrate WebAssembly binaries [17, 18].

2.2 Software diversification

Software diversification involves the synthesis, reuse, distribution, and execution of different, functionally equivalent programs. As outlined in Baudry et al.’s survey [66], Software Diversification falls into five usage categories: reusability [67], performance [68], fault tolerance [69], software testing [70], and security [30]. Our work specifically contributes to the last two categories. Based on the works of Cohen et al. [30], Forrest et al. [31], Jackson et al. [71] and Baudry et al. [66], this section presents core concepts and related works.

Software variants refer to functionally equivalent versions of an original program, produced through Software Diversification at various stages of the software lifecycle, from dependencies (coarse-grained) to machine code levels (fine-grained). Diversification may be natural [66] or automatic [72]. Natural diversity refers to the side effect of humans creating software variants using different programming languages, compilers, and operating systems [66], all of which adhere to the initial requirements. The software market and competition typically address the creation of natural diversity. For example, Firefox and Chrome web browsers demonstrate natural diversity due to their practical differences in implementation and performance, despite serving the same purpose. This logic extends to operating systems, database engines, virtual machines, and application servers [66]. Natural diversity significantly aids in system security, as different variants are not susceptible to the same vulnerabilities [73, 74]. Unlike N-Version programming [75], natural diversity organically emerges over decades. In other words, while it does not require the allocation of additional human efforts, natural diversity cannot be automatically generated. This is because it is a side effect of the software development process. Given that WebAssembly is a relatively new technology, natural diversity is presently not a feasible option. Hence, for WebAssembly, feasible options are systematic and automatic diversification approaches.

2.2.1 Automatic generation of software variants

The concept of automatic software variants starts with Randell’s 1975 work [76], which put forth the notion of artificial fault-tolerant instruction blocks. Artificial

Software Diversification, as proposed by Cohen and Forrest in the 1990s [30, 31], gets its development through rewriting strategies. These strategies consist of rule sets for modifying software components to create functionally equivalent, yet distinct, programs. Rewriting strategies typically take the form of tuples: $\text{instr1} \Rightarrow (\text{instr2}, \text{instr3}, \dots)$, where instr represents the original code and $(\text{instr2}, \text{instr3}, \dots)$ denotes the functionally equivalent code.

Rewriting strategy: The automatic creation of Software Diversification commences with rewriting rules. A rewriting rule refers to a functionally equivalent substitution for a code segment, manually written. These rules can be applied at varying levels, from coarse to fine-grained. This can range from the program dependencies level [77] to the instruction level [72]. For example, Cleemput et al. [78] and Homescu et al. [79] inject NOP instructions to yield statically varied versions at the instruction level. Here, the rewriting rule is represented as $\text{instr} \Rightarrow (\text{nop } \text{instr})$, signifying a `nop` operation preceding the instruction.

Instruction Reordering: This strategy reorders instructions in a program. For example, variable declarations may change if compilers reorder them in the symbol tables. This prevents static examination and analysis of parameters and alters memory locations. In this area, Bhatkar et al. [80, 81] proposed the random permutation of variable and routine order for ELF binaries. Such strategies are not implemented for WebAssembly to the best of our knowledge.

Adding, Changing, Removing Jumps and Calls: This strategy generates program variants by adding, changing, or removing jumps and calls in the original program. Cohen [30] primarily illustrated this concept by inserting random jumps in programs. Pettis and Hansen [82] suggested splitting basic blocks and functions for the PA-RISC architecture, inserting jumps between splits. Similarly, Crane et al. [83] de-inlined basic blocks of code as an LLVM pass. In their approach, each de-inlined code transforms into semantically equivalent functions that are randomly selected at runtime to replace the original code calculation. On the same topic, Bhatkar et al. [81] extended their previous approach [80], replacing function calls with indirect pointer calls in C source code, allowing post-binary reordering of function calls. In the WebAssembly context, the most analogous work is wobfuscator [84]. Wobfuscator, a JavaScript obfuscator, substitutes JavaScript code with WebAssembly code, e.g., numeric calcula. This strategy effectively uses the interleaving of calls between JavaScript and WebAssembly to provide JavaScript variants.

Program Memory and Stack Randomization: This strategy alters the layout of programs in the host memory. Additionally, it can randomize how a program variant operates its memory. The work of Bhatkar et al. [80, 81] proposes to randomize the base addresses of applications and library memory regions in ELF binaries. Tadesse Aga and Autin [85], and Lee et al. [86] propose a technique to randomize the local stack organization for function calls using a custom LLVM

compiler. Younan et al. [87] suggest separating a conventional stack into multiple stacks where each stack contains a particular class of data. On the same topic, Xu et al. [88] transforms programs to reduce memory exposure time, improving the time needed for frequent memory address randomization. This makes it very challenging for an attacker to ignore the key to inject executable code. This strategy disrupts the predictability of program execution and mitigates certain exploits such as speculative execution. No work has been found that explicitly applies this strategy to WebAssembly.

ISA Randomization and Simulation: This strategy involves using a key to cypher the original program binary into another encoded binary. Once encoded, the program can only be decoded at the target client, or it can be interpreted in the encoded form using a custom virtual machine implementation. This technique is strong against attacks involving code inspection. Kc et al. [89], and Barrantes et al. [90] proposed seminal works on instruction-set randomization to create a unique mapping between artificial CPU instructions and real ones. On the same topic, Chew and Song [91] target operating system randomization. They randomize the interface between the operating system and the user applications. Couroussé et al. [92] implement an assembly-like DSL to generate equivalent code at runtime in order to increase protection against side-channel attacks. Their technique generates a different program during execution using an interpreter for their DSL. Generally, *ISA randomization and simulation* usually faces a performance penalty, especially for WebAssembly, due to the decoding process as shown in WASMixer evaluation [56].

Code obfuscation: Code obfuscation can be seen as a simplification of *ISA randomization*. The main difference between encoding and obfuscating code is that the former requires the final target to know the encoding key while the latter executes as is in any client. Yet, both strategies aim to tackle static reverse engineering of programs. In the context of WebAssembly, Romano et al. [84] proposed an obfuscation technique, wobfuscator, for JavaScript in which part of the code is replaced by calls to complementary WebAssembly functions. Yet, wobfuscator targets JavaScript code, not WebAssembly binaries.

Enumerative synthesis: Enumerative synthesis is a fully automated and systematic approach to generate program variants. It examines all possible programs specific to a given language. The process of enumerative synthesis commences with a piece of input program, typically a basic block. Incrementally, using a defined grammar, it generates all programs of size n . A generated program is then checked for equivalence to the original program, either by using a test suite or a theorem solver. If the generated variant is proved, it is added to the variants collection. The procedure continues until all potential programs have been explored. This approach proves especially effective when the solution space is relatively small or can be navigated efficiently. Jacob and colleagues [93] implemented this strategy for x86 programs. They named

this technique superdiversification, drawing parallels to superoptimization [94]. Since this strategy fully explores a program’s solution space, it contains the aforementioned strategies as special cases. The application of enumerative synthesis to WebAssembly has not been explored.

2.2.2 Equivalence Checking

Equivalence checking between program variants is a vital component for any program transformation task, ranging from checking compiler optimizations [95] to the artificial synthesis of programs discussed in this chapter. It proves that two pieces of code or programs are functionally equivalent [96]. We can roughly simplify the checking process with the following property: two programs are deemed equivalent if they generate identical outputs when given identical inputs from a closed collection of inputs [97]. We adopt this definition of *functional equivalence modulo input* throughout this dissertation. In Software Diversification, equivalence checking seeks to preserve the original functionality of programs while varying observable behaviors. Two programs, for instance, can differ statically and still compute the same result. We outline two methods to check variant equivalence: by construction and prove-driven equivalence checking.

Equivalence checking by construction: The equivalence property is often guaranteed by construction. Cleemput et al. [78] and Homescu et al. [79], for example, design their transformation strategies to generate semantically equivalent program variants. However, developer errors can occur in this process, necessitating further validation. The test suite of the original program can serve as a check for the variant. If the program variant passes the test suite [98], it can be considered equivalent to the original. However, this technique is limited by the need for a preexisting test suite and does not give guarantees. An alternative method for checking program equivalence involves the use of fuzzers [99]. Fuzzers randomly generate inputs that yield different observable behaviors. If two inputs produce a different output in the variant, the variant and the original program are not equivalent. The primary limitation for fuzzers is that the process is notably time-consuming and necessitates manual introduction of oracles. Recent advances in machine learning have prompted researchers to investigate the use of neural networks for verifying program equivalence. One such example is the work of Zhang and colleagues [100], which produces reference oracles and test cases by using Large Language Models. Although this method appears effective, it only achieves an accuracy rate of 88%, which is insufficient for total verification.

Formal checking: In the absence of a test suite or a technique that inherently implements the equivalence property, the works mentioned earlier use theorem solvers (SMT solvers) [101] to prove equivalence of program variants. The central idea for SMT solvers is to convert the two code variants into mathematical formulas. The SMT solver then checks for counter-examples [102]. When it

finds a counter-example, there is an input for which the two mathematical formulas yield different outputs. The primary limitation of this technique is that not all algorithms can be translated into a mathematical formula, such as loops. Nevertheless, this technique is frequently used for checking no-branching-programs like basic block and peephole replacements [103].

2.2.3 Variants deployment

Program variants, once generated and verified, may be utilized in two primary scenarios: Randomization or Multivariant Execution (MVE) [71].

Randomization: In the context of our work, the term *Randomization* denotes a program’s ability to present different variants to different clients. In this setup, a program, chosen from a collection of variants (referred to as the program’s variant pool), is assigned to a random client during each deployment. Jackson et al. [71] define the variant pool in Randomization as herd immunity, as vulnerable binaries can only affect a segment of the client community. El-Khalil and colleagues [104] suggest employing a custom compiler to generate varying binaries from the compilation process. They adapt a version of GCC 4.1 to partition a conventional stack into several component parts, termed multistacks. Similarly, Singhal and colleagues, propose Cornucopia [105]. Cornucopia generates multiple variants of a program by using different compiler flag combinations. Aga and colleagues [85], contributing to this discussion, propose the generation of program variants through the randomization of its data layout in memory. This method allows each variant to operate on the same data in memory but at different memory offsets. Randomization can also be applied to virtual machines and operating systems. On this note, Kc et al. [89] establish a unique mapping between artificial CPU instructions and actual ones, enabling the assignment of various variants to specific target clients. In a similar vein, Xu et al. [88] recompile the Linux Kernel to minimize the exposure time of persistent memory objects, thereby increasing the frequency of address randomization.

Multivariant Execution (MVE): Multiple program variants are composed into a single binary, known as a multivariant binary [106]. Each multivariant binary is randomly deployed to a client. Then, the multivariant binary executes its embedded program variants at runtime. These embedded variants can either execute in parallel to check for inconsistencies, or as a single program to randomize execution paths [80]. Bruschi and colleagues extend the concept of executing two variants in parallel, introducing non-overlapping and randomized memory layouts [107]. At the same time, Salamat et al. modifies a standard library to generate 32-bit Intel variants. These variants have a stack that grows in the opposite direction, allowing for the detection of memory inconsistencies [108]. Davi and colleagues propose Isomeron, an approach for execution-path randomization [109]. Isomeron operates by simultaneously loading the original

program and a variant. It then uses a coin flip to determine which copy of the program to execute next at the function call level. Previous works have highlighted the benefits of limiting execution to only two variants in a multivariant environment. Agosta and colleagues, as well as Crane and colleagues, used more than two generated programs in the multivariant composition, thereby randomizing software control flow at runtime [110, 83]. Both strategies have proven effective in enhancing security by addressing known vulnerabilities, such as Just-In-Time Return-Oriented Programming (JIT-ROP) attacks [111] and power side-channel attacks [112]. Lastly, only Voulimeneas et al. [113] have recently proposed a multivariant execution system that enhances security by parallelizing the execution of variants across different machines.

2.2.4 Measuring Software Diversification

Measuring Software Diversification presents a significant challenge. The size of the variant space does not necessarily correlate with a variant’s capacity to fulfill an objective such as hardening attacks [30]. Ideally, real scenarios would provide the most accurate measurement of diversification, e.g., demonstrating a variant’s effectiveness under specific attacks. However, such an approach is not always feasible, e.g., as previously discussed, Software Diversification is a preemptive strategy. Hence, a combination of static and dynamic metrics is required for measuring Software Diversification.

Static comparison of variants: Static metrics are used to measure diversity of programs without needing execution. The fundamental concept entails comparing variant source codes or binary codes to determine how diverse they are. Usually, comparing variants means defining a distance metric between programs. At the low-level of bytecode instructions, for example, these metrics include Levenshtein distance [114], and global alignments [33]. On the other hand, at the high-level of source code, these metrics often rely on Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) diffing, such as GUMtree-based distances [115]. Bostani et al. [116] illustrate the use of static distances in guiding the generation process of variants. They categorize the space of Android applications into malware and goodware. Then, they create malware variants by employing a static distance metric to approach the goodware group as closely as possible, thus successfully evading malware classifiers.

Dynamic comparison of variants: Static comparisons between variants inherently have limitations. For example, two variants may show differences at the source code level but exhibit identical behavior during execution. Take the addition of `nop` operations to a program as an instance. Despite source code level differences, the variant and the original program execute identical instructions, leading to similar behaviors modulo input. Measuring Software Diversification primarily aims to demonstrate variant-specific observabilities. While static differences are observable, runtime information holds complementary

relevance [117]. Therefore, dynamic metrics are essential to assess the diversity of variants. For instance, Forrest et al. [118] were pioneers in classifying program behaviors by analyzing their system call traces using n-grams profiling. Cabrera et al. utilized a global alignments approach to gauge the diversity of JavaScript bytecode traces within the Chrome browser [12]. Fang et al. proposed a method to counteract JavaScript obfuscation techniques used in malicious code, by analyzing dynamic information captured from V8 bytecode traces [119]. Dynamic metrics are primarily employed to cluster similar behaviors. Following the same logic, the diversity is greater when the difference between behaviors is larger. Notice that, dynamic metrics can be difficult due to the expense of program execution or the complication of required user interaction. On the other hand, malware programs, which usually do not require user interaction, are simpler to evaluate in controlled environments before actual deployment.

In the context of WebAssembly, there exist no explicit works on Software Diversification. Consequently, previous metrics have not been directly applied to measure diversification in WebAssembly binaries. However, in other domains, such as the analysis of WebAssembly binaries, several studies have employed static metrics. For example, VeriWasm quantifies attack-based patterns, stating that a WebAssembly binary is more secure with a lower pattern count [120]. This metric might potentially serve as a guide during variant generation. In the field of malware detection, MINOS [25] proposes transforming WebAssembly binaries into grayscale images. They then employ convolutional neural networks to identify malware, where an increased similarity to a malware image increases the probability of the binary being malware. Regarding the dynamic comparisons, Wang et al.'s study [26] profiles WebAssembly instructions during runtime to identify malicious behavior.

2.2.5 Offensive or Defensive assessment of diversification

Lundquist and colleagues [72] distinguish Software Diversification into two categories: Defensive and Offensive Diversification. On the one hand, Defensive Software Diversification introduces unpredictability in system behavior. By making software less predictable, defensive Software Diversification aims to proactively deter attacks, acting as a complementary strategy to other, more reactive, security measures. The majority of previously discussed works in this section contribute to defensive diversification. Yet, Software Diversification that aims to create diverse harmful programs is considered Offensive Diversification [121].

Offensive Diversification: Offensive Diversification is conceptually equal to Defensive Software Diversification. Yet, in an offensive context, one may apply diversification techniques to malware or other malicious codes to evade detection by security software [122]. For example, one might equate Offensive

Diversification with Code obfuscation, if its purpose shifts from preventing reverse engineering by malicious actors, to evading detection by malware analysis systems.

Malicious actors may employ previously discussed diversification strategies to evade detection, including genetic programming [123]. Over time, these evasion techniques have evolved in both complexity and sophistication [124]. Chua et al. [125], for instance, suggested a framework for automatically obfuscating the source code of Android applications using method overloading, opaque predicates, try-catch, and switch statement obfuscation, resulting in multiple versions of identical malware. Moreover, machine learning approaches have been utilized to develop evasive malware [126], drawing on a corpus of pre-existing malware [116]. These methods aim to thwart static malware detectors, yet, more advanced techniques focus on evading dynamic detection mostly by employing throttling [127, 128].

The term Offensive Software Diversification may appear counterintuitive. Yet, such approaches measure the resilience and accuracy of security systems. This is an almost unexplored area in WebAssembly, posing a threat to malware detection accuracy. Specifically, only Bhansali et al.’s seminal work[65] has demonstrated that a cryptomining algorithm’s source code can evade pre-existing malware detection methods. More recently, Madvex [129] has sought to obfuscate WebAssembly binaries to achieve malware evasion, but this approach is limited to altering only the code section of WebAssembly binaries.

2.3 Open challenges for Software Diversification

As outlined in Section 2.1.6, our primary motivation for the contributions of this thesis is the open issues within the WebAssembly ecosystem. We see potential in employing Software Diversification to address them. Based on our previous discussion, we highlight several open challenges in the realm of Software Diversification for WebAssembly. First, WebAssembly, being an emerging technology, is still in the process of implementing defensive measures. The process of officially adopting a new defensive measure is inherently slow, making Software Diversification a potentially valuable strategy. Second, despite the abundance of related work on software diversity, its exploration in the context of WebAssembly remains limited. This thesis is first to investigate Software Diversity in depth for the emerging WebAssembly ecosystem. Third, both randomization and multivariant execution remain largely unexplored within the WebAssembly context. The deployment of Software Diversification in WebAssembly poses unique challenges. WebAssembly ecosystems are remarkably dynamic. Web browsers and FaaS platforms serve as prime examples. In these environments, WebAssembly binaries are served millions of times simultaneously to the former, while new WebAssembly binaries are cold-spawned and executed upon each

user request in the latter. Thus, designing practical Software Diversification for WebAssembly requires careful consideration of the deployment environment. Last but not least, research on malware detection, as discussed in Section 2.1.5, suggests that offensive diversification may assist in evaluating the resilience and accuracy of WebAssembly’s security systems.

3

AUTOMATIC SOFTWARE DIVERSIFICATION FOR WEBASSEMBLY

All problems in computer science can be solved by another level of indirection, except for the problem of too many layers of indirection.

— David Wheeler

THE process of generating WebAssembly binaries starts with the original source code, which is then processed by a compiler to produce a WebAssembly binary. This compiler is generally divided into three main components: a frontend that converts the source code into an intermediate representation, an optimizer/transformer that modifies this representation usually for performance, and a backend that compiles the final WebAssembly binary. This architecture is illustrated in the left most part of Figure 3.1.

Software Diversification, a preemptive security measure, can be integrated at various stages of this compilation process. However, applying diversification at the front-end has its limitations, as it would need a unique diversification mechanism for each language compatible with the frontend component. Conversely, diversification at later compiler stages, such as the optimizer or backend, offers a more practical alternative. This makes the latter stages of the compilers an ideal point for introducing practical Wasm diversification techniques. Our compiler-based strategies, represented in red and green in Figure 3.1, introduce a diversifier component into the optimizer/transformer and backend stages. This optimization/transformer component generates variants in the intermediate representation of a compiler, thereby creating artificial software diversity for WebAssembly. The variants are then compiled into WebAssembly binaries by the backend component of the compiler. Specifically, we propose two tools: CROW, which generates WebAssembly program variants, and MEWE, which packages these variants to enable multivariant execution [106].

⁰Compilation probe time 2023/11/21 14:08:04




Figure 3.1: Approach landscape containing our three technical contributions: CROW squared in red, MEWE squared in green and WASM-MUTATE squared in blue. We annotate where our contributions, compiler-based and binary-based, stand in the landscape of generating WebAssembly programs.

Alternatively, diversification can be directly applied to the WebAssembly binary, offering a language and compiler-agnostic approach. Our binary-based strategy, WASM-MUTATE, represented in blue in Figure 3.1, employs rewriting rules on an e-graph data structure to generate a variety of WebAssembly program variants.

This dissertation contributes to the field of Software Diversification for WebAssembly by presenting two primary strategies: compiler-based and binary-based. Within this chapter, we introduce three technical contributions: CROW, MEWE, and WASM-MUTATE. We also compare these contributions, highlighting their complementary nature. Additionally, we provide the artifacts for our contributions to promote open research and reproducibility of our main takeaways.

3.1 CROW: Code Randomization of WebAssembly

This section details CROW [33], represented as the red squared tooling in Figure 3.1. CROW is designed to produce functionally equivalent Wasm variants from the output of an LLVM front-end, utilizing a custom Wasm LLVM backend.

Figure 3.2 illustrates CROW’s workflow in generating program variants, a process compound of two core stages: *exploration* and *combination*. During the *exploration* stage, CROW processes every instruction within each function of the LLVM input, creating a set of functionally equivalent code variants. This process ensures a rich pool of options for the subsequent stage. In the *combination* stage, these alternatives are assembled to form diverse LLVM IR variants, a task achieved through the exhaustive traversal of the power set of all potential combinations of code replacements. The final step involves the custom Wasm LLVM backend, which compiles the crafted LLVM IR variants into Wasm

binaries.




Figure 3.2: CROW components following the diagram in Figure 3.1. CROW takes LLVM IR to generate functionally equivalent code replacements. Then, CROW assembles program variants by combining them. Figure taken from [37].

3.1.1 Enumerative synthesis

The cornerstone of CROW’s exploration mechanism is its code replacement generation strategy, which is inspired by the superdiversifier methodology proposed by Jacob et al. [93]. The search space for generating variants is delineated through an enumerative synthesis process (see Enumerative synthesis in Section 2.2.1), which systematically produces all possible code replacements for each instruction in the original program. If a code replacement is identified to perform identically to the original program, it is reported as a functionally equivalent variant. This equivalence is confirmed using a theorem solver for rigorous verification.

Concretely, CROW is developed by extending the enumerative synthesis implementation found in Souper [130], an LLVM-based superoptimizer. Specifically, CROW constructs a Data Flow Graph for each LLVM instruction that returns an integer. Subsequently, it generates all viable expressions derived from a selected subset of the LLVM Intermediate Representation language for each DFG. The enumerative synthesis process incrementally generates code replacements, starting with the simplest expressions (those composed of a single instruction) and gradually increasing in complexity. The exploration process continues either until a timeout occurs or the size of the generated replacements exceeds a predefined threshold.

Notice that the search space increases exponentially with the size of the language used for enumerative synthesis. To mitigate this issue, we prevent CROW from synthesizing instructions without correspondence in the Wasm backend, effectively reducing the searching space. For example, creating an

expression having the `freeze` LLVM instructions will increase the searching space for instruction without a Wasm’s opcode in the end.

CROW is carefully designed to boost the generation of variants as much as possible. First, we disable the majority of the pruning strategies. Instead of preventing the generation of commutative operations during the searching, CROW still uses such transformation as a strategy to generate program variants. Second, CROW applies code transformations independently. For instance, if a suitable replacement is identified that can be applied at N different locations in the original program, CROW will generate 2^N distinct program variants, i.e., the power set of applying the transformation or not to each location. This approach leads to a combinatorial explosion in the number of available program variants, especially as the number of possible replacements increases.

Leveraging the ascending nature of its enumerative synthesis process, CROW is capable of creating variants that may outperform the original program in both size and efficiency. For instance, the first functionally equivalent transformation identified is typically the most optimal in terms of code size. This approach offers developers a range of performance options, allowing them to balance between diversification and performance without compromising the latter.

The last stage at CROW involves a custom Wasm LLVM backend, which generates the Wasm programs. For it, we remove all built-in optimizations in the LLVM backend that could reverse Wasm variants, i.e., we disable all optimizations in the Wasm backend that could reverse the CROW transformations.

3.1.2 Constant inferring

CROW inherently introduces a novel transformation strategy called *constant inferring*, which significantly expands the variety of WebAssembly program variants. Specifically, CROW identifies segments of code that can be simplified into a single constant assignment, with a particular focus on variables that control branching logic. After applying this *constant inferring* technique, the resulting program diverges substantially from the original program structure. This is crucial for diversification efforts, as one of the primary objectives is to create variants that are as distinct as possible from the original source code. In essence, the more divergent the variant, the more challenging it becomes to trace it back to its original form.

Let us illustrate the case with an example. The Babbage problem code in Listing 3.1 is composed of a loop that stops when it discovers the smallest number that fits with the Babbage condition in Line 4.

```

1 int babbage() {
2     int current = 0,
3         square;
4     while ((square=current*current) %
5             ↪ 1000000 != 269696) {
6         current++;
7     }
8     printf ("The number is %d\n",
9             ↪ current);
10    return 0 ;
11 }
```

Listing 3.1: Babbage problem. Taken from [37].

```

int babbage() {
    int current = 25264;
    printf ("The number is %d\n", current)
    ↪ ;
    return 0 ;
}
```

Listing 3.2: Constant inferring transformation over the original Babbage problem in Listing 3.1. Taken from [37].

CROW deals with this case, generating the program in Listing 3.2. It infers the value of `current` in Line 2 such that the Babbage condition is reached¹. Therefore, the condition in the loop will always be false. Then, the loop is dead code and is removed in the final compilation. The new program in Listing 3.2 is remarkably smaller and faster than the original code. Therefore, it offers differences both statically and at runtime²

3.1.3 Exemplifying CROW

Let us illustrate how CROW works with the example code in Listing 3.3. The `f` function calculates the value of $2 * x + x$ where `x` is the input for the function. CROW compiles this source code and generates the intermediate LLVM bitcode in the left most part of Listing 3.4. CROW potentially finds two integer returning instructions to look for variants, as the right-most part of Listing 3.4 shows.

```

1 int f(int x) {
2     return 2 * x + x;
3 }
```

Listing 3.3: C function that calculates the quantity $2x + x$.

¹In theory, this value can also be inferred by unrolling the loop the correct number of times with the LLVM toolchain. However, standard LLVM tools cannot unroll the `while`-loop because the loop count is too large.

²Notice that for the sake of illustration, we show both codes in C language, this process inside CROW is performed directly in LLVM IR.

```

define i32 @f(i32) {           Replacement candidates      Replacement candidates for
                                for code_1                code_2
    %2 = mul nsw i32 %0,2
    %3 = add nsw i32 %0,%2    %2 = mul nsw i32 %0,2      %3 = add nsw i32 %0,%2
                                %2 = add nsw i32 %0,%0    %3 = mul nsw %0, 3:i32
                                ret i32 %3
                                %2 = shl nsw i32 %0, 1:i32
}
define i32 @main() {
    %1 = tail call i32 @f(
        i32 10)
    ret i32 %1
}

```

Listing 3.4: LLVM’s intermediate representation program, its extracted instructions and replacement candidates. Gray highlighted lines represent original code, green for code replacements.

<pre>%2 = mul nsw i32 %0,2 %3 = add nsw i32 %0,%2</pre>	<pre>%2 = mul nsw i32 %0,2 %3 = mul nsw %0, 3:i32</pre>
<pre>%2 = add nsw i32 %0,%0 %3 = add nsw i32 %0,%2</pre>	<pre>%2 = add nsw i32 %0,%0 %3 = mul nsw %0, 3:i32</pre>
<pre>%2 = shl nsw i32 %0, 1:i32 %3 = add nsw i32 %0,%2</pre>	<pre>%2 = shl nsw i32 %0, 1:i32 %3 = mul nsw %0, 3:i32</pre>

Listing 3.5: Candidate code replacements combination. Orange highlighted code illustrate replacement candidate overlapping.

CROW, detects `code_1` and `code_2` as the enclosing boxes in the left most part of Listing 3.4 shows. CROW synthesizes $2 + 1$ candidate code replacements for each code respectively as the green highlighted lines show in the right most parts of Listing 3.4. The baseline strategy of CROW is to generate variants out of all possible combinations of the candidate code replacements, *i.e.*, uses the power set of all candidate code replacements.

In the example, the power set is the cartesian product of the found candidate code replacements for each code block, including the original ones, as Listing 3.5 shows. The power set size results in 6 potential function variants. Yet, the generation stage would eventually generate 4 variants from the original program. CROW generated 4 statically different Wasm files, as Listing 3.6 illustrates. This gap between the potential and the actual number of variants is a consequence of the redundancy among the bitcode variants when composed into one. In other words, if the replaced code removes other code blocks, all possible combinations having it will be in the end the same program. In the example case, replacing `code_2` by `mul nsw %0, 3`, turns `code_1` into dead code, thus, later replacements generate the same program variants. The rightmost part of Listing 3.5 illustrates how for three different combinations, CROW produces the same variant. We call this phenomenon a *code replacement overlapping*.

```
func $f (param i32) (result i32)
    local.get 0
    i32.const 2
    i32.mul
    local.get 0
    i32.add
```

```
func $f (param i32) (result i32)
    local.get 0
    i32.const 1
    i32.shl
    local.get 0
    i32.add
```

```
func $f (param i32) (result i32)
    local.get 0
    local.get 0
    i32.add
    local.get 0
    i32.add
```

```
func $f (param i32) (result i32)
    local.get 0
    i32.const 3
    i32.mul
```

Listing 3.6: Wasm program variants generated from program Listing 3.3.

Contribution paper and artifact

CROW is a compiler-based approach. It leverages enumerative synthesis to generate functionally equivalent code replacements and assembles them into diverse Wasm program variants. CROW uses SMT solvers to guarantee functional equivalence.

CROW is fully presented in Cabrera-Arteaga et al. "CROW: Code Randomization of WebAssembly" *at proceedings of Measurements, Attacks, and Defenses for the Web (MADWeb), NDSS 2021* <https://doi.org/10.14722/madweb.2021.23004>.

CROW source code is available at <https://github.com/ASSERT-KTH/slumps>

3.2 MEWE: Multi-variant Execution for WebAssembly

This section describes MEWE [34]. MEWE synthesizes diversified function variants by using CROW. It then provides execution-path randomization in a Multivariant Execution (MVE) [80]. Execution path randomization is a technique that randomizes the execution path of a program at runtime, i.e. at each invocation of a function, a different variant is executed. MEWE generates application-level multivariant binaries without changing the operating system or Wasm runtime. It creates an MVE by intermixing functions for which CROW generates variants, as illustrated by the green square in Figure 3.1. MEWE inlines function variants when appropriate, resulting in call stack diversification at runtime.

As illustrated in Figure 3.3, MEWE takes the LLVM IR variants generated by CROW’s diversifier. It then merges LLVM IR variants into a Wasm multivariant. In the figure, we highlight the two components of MEWE, *Multivariant Generation* and the *Mixer*. In the *Multivariant Generation* process, MEWE gathers the LLVM IR variants created by CROW. The Mixer component, on the other hand, links the multivariant binary and creates a new entrypoint for the binary called *entrypoint tampering*. The tampering is needed in case the output of CROW are variants of the original entrypoint, e.g. the *main* function. Concretely, it wraps the dispatcher for the entrypoint variants as a new function for the final Wasm binary and is declared as the application entrypoint. The random generator is needed to perform the execution-path randomization. For the random generator, we rely on WASI’s specification [39] for the random behavior of the dispatchers. However, its exact implementation is dependent on the platform on which the binary is deployed. Finally, using the same custom Wasm LLVM backend as CROW, we generate a standalone multivariant Wasm binary. Once generated, the multivariant Wasm binary can be deployed to any Wasm engine.

3.2.1 Multivariant call graph

The key component of MEWE consists of combining the variants into a single binary. The core idea is to introduce one dispatcher function per original function with variants. A dispatcher function is a synthetic function in charge of choosing a variant at random when the original function is called. With the introduction of the dispatcher function, MEWE turns the original call graph into a multivariant call graph, defined as follows.

Definition 1 *Multivariant Call Graph (MCG):* A multivariant call graph is a call graph $\langle N, E \rangle$ where the nodes in N represent all the functions in the binary and an edge $(f_1, f_2) \in E$ represents a possible invocation of f_2 by f_1 [131]. The nodes in N have three possible types: a function present in the original program, a generated function variant, or a dispatcher function.

3.2.2 Exemplifying a Multivariant binary

In Figure 3.4, we show the original static call graph for an original program (top of the figure), as well as the multivariant call graph generated with MEWE (bottom of the figure). The gray nodes represent function variants, the green nodes function dispatchers, and the yellow nodes are the original functions. The directed edges represent the possible calls. The original program includes three functions. MEWE generates 43 variants for the first function, none for the second, and three for the third. MEWE introduces two dispatcher nodes for the first and third functions. Each dispatcher is connected to the corresponding function variants to invoke one variant randomly at runtime.



Figure 3.3: Overview of MEWE workflow. It takes as input an LLVM binary. It first generates a set of functionally equivalent variants for each function in the binary using CROW. Then, MEWE generates an LLVM multivariant binary composed of all the function variants. Finally, the Mixer includes the behavior in charge of selecting a variant when a function is invoked. Finally, the MEWE mixer composes the LLVM multivariant binary with a random number generation library and tampers the original application entrypoint. The final process produces a Wasm multivariant binary ready to be deployed.

In Listing 3.7, we demonstrate how MEWE constructs the function dispatcher, corresponding to the rightmost green node in Figure 3.4, which handles three created variants including the original. The dispatcher function retains the same signature as the original function. Initially, the dispatcher invokes a random number generator, the output of which is used to select a specific function variant for execution (as seen on line 6 in Listing 3.7). To enhance security, we employ a switch-case structure within the dispatcher, mitigating vulnerabilities associated with speculative execution-based attacks [132] (refer to lines 12 to 19 in Listing 3.7). This approach also eliminates the need for multiple function definitions with identical signatures, thereby reducing the potential attack surface in cases where the function signature itself is vulnerable [133]. Additionally, MEWE can inline function variants directly into the dispatcher, obviating the need for redundant definitions (as illustrated on line 16 in Listing 3.7). Remarkably, we prioritize security over performance, i.e., while using indirect




Figure 3.4: Example of two static call graphs. At the top, is the original call graph, and at the bottom, is the multivariant call graph, which includes nodes that represent function variants (in gray), dispatchers (in green), and original functions (in yellow).

calls in place of a switch-case could offer constant-time performance benefits, we implement switch-case structures.

```

2 ; Multivariant foo wrapping ;
3 define internal i32 @foo(i32 %0) {
4     entry:
5         ; It first calls the dispatcher to discriminate between the created
       variants ;
6         %1 = call i32 @discriminate(i32 3)
7         switch i32 %1, label %end [
8             i32 0, label %case_43_
9             i32 1, label %case_44_
10        ]
11        ;One case for each generated variant of foo ;
12        case_43_:
13            %2 = call i32 @foo_43_(%0)
14            ret i32 %2
15        case_44_:
16            ; MEWE can inline the body of the a function variant ;
17            %3 = <body of foo_44_ inlined>
18            ret i32 %3
19        end:
20            ; The original is also included ;
21            %4 = call i32 @foo_original(%0)
22            ret i32 %4
23 }
```

Listing 3.7: Dispatcher function embedded in the multivariant binary of the original function in the rightmost green node in Figure 3.4. The code is commented for the sake of understanding.

In Listing 3.7, we illustrate the LLVM construction for the function dispatcher corresponding to the right most green node of Figure 3.4. Notice that, the dispatcher function is constructed using the same signature as the original function. It first calls the random generator, which returns a value used to invoke a specific function variant (see line 6 in Listing 3.7). We utilize a switch-case structure in the dispatchers to prevent indirect calls, which are vulnerable to speculative execution-based attacks [132] (see lines 12 to 19 in Listing 3.7), i.e., the choice of a switch-case also avoids having multiple function definitions with the same signature, which could increase the attack surface in case the function signature is vulnerable [133]. In addition, MEWE can inline function variants inside the dispatcher instead of defining them again (see line 16 in Listing 3.7). Remarkably, we trade security over performance since dispatcher functions that perform indirect calls, instead of a switch-case, could improve the performance of the dispatchers as indirect calls have constant time.

Contribution paper and artifact

MEWE provides dynamic execution path randomization by packaging variants generated out of CROW.

MEWE is fully presented in Cabrera-Arteaga et al. "Multi-Variant Execution at the Edge" *Proceedings of Moving Target Defense, 2022, ACM* <https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3560828.3564007>

MEWE is also available as an open-source tool at <https://github.com/ASSERT-KTH/MEWE>

3.3 WASM-MUTATE: Fast and Effective Binary Diversification for WebAssembly

In this section, we introduce our third technical contribution, WASM-MUTATE [35], a tool that generates thousands of functionally equivalent variants out from a WebAssembly binary input. Leveraging rewriting rules and e-graphs [134] for software diversification, WASM-MUTATE synthesizes program variants by transforming parts of the original binary. In Figure 3.1, we highlight WASM-MUTATE as the blue squared tooling.

Figure 3.5 illustrates the workflow of WASM-MUTATE, which initiates with a WebAssembly binary as its input. The first step involves parsing this binary to create suitable abstractions, e.g. an intermediate representation. Subsequently, WASM-MUTATE utilizes predefined rewriting rules to construct an e-graph for the initial program, encapsulating all potential equivalent codes derived from the rewriting rules. The assurance of functional equivalence is rooted in the inherent



Figure 3.5: WASM-MUTATE high-level architecture. It generates functionally equivalent variants from a given WebAssembly binary input. Its central approach involves synthesizing these variants by substituting parts of the original binary using rewriting rules, boosted by diversification space traversals using e-graphs.

properties of the individual rewrite rules employed. Then, pieces of the original program are randomly substituted by the result of random e-graph traversals, resulting in a variant that maintains functional equivalence to the original binary.

WASM-MUTATE applies one transformation at a time. Notice that, the output of one applied transformation can be chained again as an input WebAssembly binary, enabling the generation of many variants, leading us to enunciate the notion of *Stacked transformation*

Definition 2 *Stacked transformation:* Given an original input WebAssembly binary I and a diversifier D , stacked transformations are defined as the application of D over the binary I multiple times, i.e., $D(D(D(\dots(I))))$. Notice that, the number of stacked transformations are the number of times the diversifier D is applied.

3.3.1 WebAssembly Rewriting Rules

WASM-MUTATE contains a comprehensive set of 135 rewriting rules. In this context, a rewriting rule is a tuple $(\text{LHS}, \text{RHS}, \text{Cond})$ where LHS specifies the segment of binary targeted for replacement, RHS describes its functionally equivalent substitute, and Cond outlines the conditions that must be met for the replacement to take place, e.g. enhancing type constraints. WASM-MUTATE groups these rewriting rules into meta-rules depending on their target inside a Wasm binary, ranging from high-level changes affecting binary section structure to low-level modifications within the code section. This section focuses on the biggest meta-rule implemented in WASM-MUTATE, the **Peephole** meta-rule³.

Rewriting rules inside the *Peephole* meta-rule, operate over the data flow graph of instructions within a function body, representing the lowest level of rewriting.

³For an in-depth explanation of the remaining meta-rules, refer to [35].

In WASM-MUTATE, we have implemented 125 rewriting rules specifically for this category, each one avoiding targeting instructions that might induce undefined behavior, e.g., function calls.

Moreover, we augment the internal representation of a Wasm program to bolster WASM-MUTATE’s transformation capabilities through the `Peephole` meta-rule. Concretely, we augment the parsing stage in WASM-MUTATE by including custom operator instructions. These custom operator instructions are designed to use well-established code diversification techniques through rewriting rules. When converting back to the WebAssembly binary format from the intermediate representation, custom instructions are meticulously handled to retain the original functionality of the WebAssembly program.

In the following example, we demonstrate a rewriting rule within the `Peephole` meta-rule that utilizes a custom `rand` operator to expand statically declared constants within any WebAssembly program function body. The unfolding rewriting rule, as the name suggests, transforms statically declared constants into the sum of two random numbers. During the generation of the WebAssembly variant, the custom `rand` operator is substituted with a randomly chosen static constant. Notice that the condition specified in the last part of the rewriting rule ensures that this predicate is satisfied.

```
LHS i32.const x  


---

  
RHS (i32.add (i32.rand i32.const y))  
  
Cond y = x - i32.rand
```

Although this rewriting approach may appear simplistic, especially because compilers often eliminate it through *Constant Folding* optimization [45], it stresses on the spill/reload component of the compiler when the WebAssembly binary is JITed to machine code. Spill/reloads occur when the compiler runs out of physical registers to store intermediate calculations, resorting to specific memory locations for temporary storage. The unfolding rewriting rule indirectly stresses this segment of memory. Notably, with this specific rewriting rule, we have found a CVE in the wasmtime standalone engine [135].

3.3.2 E-Graphs traversals

We developed WASM-MUTATE leveraging e-graphs, a specific graph data structure for representing and applying rewriting rules [136]. In the context of WASM-MUTATE, e-graphs are constructed from the input WebAssembly program and the implemented rewriting rules (we detail the e-graph construction process in Section 3 of [35]).

Willsey et al. highlight the potential for high flexibility in extracting code fragments from e-graphs, a process that can be recursively orchestrated

through a cost function applied to e-nodes and their respective operands. This methodology ensures the functional equivalence of the derived code [134]. For instance, e-graphs solve the problem of providing the best code out of several optimization rules [137]. To extract the "optimal" code from an e-graph, one might commence the extraction at a specific e-node, subsequently selecting the AST with the minimal size from the available options within the corresponding e-class's operands. In omitting the cost function from the extraction strategy leads us to a significant property: *any path navigated through the e-graph yields a functionally equivalent code variant*.

We exploit such property to fastly generate diverse WebAssembly variants. We propose and implement an algorithm that facilitates the random traversal of an e-graph to yield functionally equivalent program variants, as detailed in Algorithm 1. This algorithm operates by taking an e-graph, an e-class node (starting with the root's e-class), and a parameter specifying the maximum extraction depth of the expression, to prevent infinite recursion. Within the algorithm, a random e-node is chosen from the e-class (as seen in lines 5 and 6), setting the stage for a recursive continuation with the offspring of the selected e-node (refer to line 8). Once the depth parameter reaches zero, the algorithm extracts the most concise expression available within the current e-class (line 3). Following this, the subexpressions are built (line 10) for each child node, culminating in the return of the complete expression (line 11).

Algorithm 1 e-graph traversal algorithm taken from [35].

```

1: procedure TRAVERSE(egraph, eclass, depth)
2:   if depth = 0 then
3:     return smallest_tree_from(egraph, eclass)
4:   else
5:     nodes  $\leftarrow$  egraph[eclass]
6:     node  $\leftarrow$  random_choice(nodes)
7:     expr  $\leftarrow$  (node, operands = [])
8:     for each child  $\in$  node.children do
9:       subexpr  $\leftarrow$  TRAVERSE(egraph, child, depth - 1)
10:      expr.operands  $\leftarrow$  expr.operands  $\cup$  {subexpr}
11:   return expr
```

3.3.3 Exemplifying WASM-MUTATE

Let us illustrate how WASM-MUTATE generates variant programs by using the before enunciated algorithm. Here, we use Algorithm 1 with a maximum depth of 1. In Listing 3.8 a hypothetical original Wasm binary is illustrated. In this context, a potential user has set two pivotal rewriting rules: (x, container (x nop,) and (x, x i32.add 0, x instanceof i32). The former rule, grants




Figure 3.6: *e-graph built for rewriting the first instruction of Listing 3.8.*

the ability to append a `nop` instruction to any subexpression, a well-known low-level diversification strategy [79]. Conversely, the latter rule adds zero to any numeric value.

```
(module
  (type (;0;) (func (param i32 f32) (result i64)))
  (func (;0;) (type 0) (param i32 f32) (result i64)
        i64.const 1)
)
```

Listing 3.8: Wasm function.

```
(module
  (type (;0;) (func (param i32 f32) (result i64)))
  (func (;0;) (type 0) (param i32 f32) (result i64)
    (i64.add (
      i64.const 0
      i64.const 1
      nop
    )))
)
```

Listing 3.9: Random peephole mutation using egraph traversal for Listing 3.8 over e-graph Figure 3.6. The textual format is folded for better understanding.

Leveraging the code presented in Listing 3.8 alongside the defined rewriting rules, we build the e-graph, simplified in Figure 3.6. In the figure, we highlight various stages of Algorithm 1 in the context of the scenario previously

described. The algorithm initiates at the e-class with the instruction `i64.const 1`, as seen in Listing 3.8. At ②, it randomly selects an equivalent node within the e-class, in this instance taking the `i64.add` node, resulting: `expr = i64.add 1 r`. As the traversal advances, it follows on the left operand of the previously chosen node, settling on the `i64.const 0` node within the same e-class ③. Then, the right operand of the `i64.add` node is chosen, selecting the `container` ④ operator yielding: `expr = i64.or (i64.const 0 container (r nop))`. The algorithm chooses the right operand of the `container` ⑤, which correlates to the initial instruction e-node highlighted in ⑥, culminating in the final expression: `expr = i64.or (i64.const 0 container(i64.const 1 nop)) i64.const 1`. As we proceed to the encoding phases, the `container` operator is ignored as a real Wasm instruction, finally resulting in the program in Listing 3.9.

Notice that, within the e-graph showcased in Figure 3.6, the `container` node maintains equivalence across all e-classes. Consequently, increasing the depth parameter in Algorithm 1 would potentially escalate the number of viable variants infinitely.

Contribution paper and artifact

WASM-MUTATE uses hand-made rewriting rules and random traversals over e-graphs to provide a binary-based solution for WebAssembly diversification.

WASM-MUTATE is fully presented in Cabrera-Arteaga et al. "WASM-MUTATE: Fast and Effective Binary Diversification for WebAssembly" *Under review at Computers & Security* <https://arxiv.org/pdf/2309.07638.pdf>.

WASM-MUTATE is available at <https://github.com/bytocodealliance/wasm-tools/tree/main/crates/wasm-mutate> as a contribution to the Bytecode Alliance organization ^a. The Bytecode Alliance is dedicated to creating secure new software foundations, building on standards such as WebAssembly and WASI.

^a<https://bytocodealliance.org/>

3.4 Comparing CROW, MEWE, and WASM-MUTATE

In this section, we compare CROW, MEWE, and WASM-MUTATE, highlighting their key differences. These distinctions are summarized in Table 3.1. The table is organized into columns that represent attributes of each tool: the tool's name, input format, core diversification strategy, number of variants generated within an hour, targeted sections of the WebAssembly binary for diversification, strength

of the generated variants, and the security applications of these variants. Each row in the table corresponds to a specific tool. The *Variant strength* accounts for the capability of each tool on generating variants that are preserved after the JIT compilation of V8 and wasmtime in average. For example, a higher value of the *Variant strength* indicates that the generated variants are not reversed by JIT compilers, ensuring that the diversification is preserved in an end-to-end scenario of a WebAssembly program, i.e. from the source code to its final execution. Notice that, the data and insights presented in the table are sourced from the respective papers of each tool and, from the previous discussion in this chapter.

CROW is a compiler-based strategy, needing access to the source code or its LLVM IR representation to work. Its core is an enumerative synthesis implementation with functional verification using SMT solvers, ensuring the functional equivalence of the generated variants. In addition, MEWE extends the capabilities of CROW, using its generated variants. It goes a step further by packaging the LLVM IR variants into a WebAssembly multivariant, providing MVE through execution path randomization. Both CROW and MEWE are fully automated, requiring no user intervention besides the input source code. WASM-MUTATE, on the other hand, is a binary-based tool. It uses a set of rewriting rules and the input Wasm binary to generate program variants, centralizing its core around random e-graph traversals. Remarkably, WASM-MUTATE removes the need for compiler adjustments, offering compatibility with any existing WebAssembly binary.

We have observed several interesting phenomena when aggregating the empirical data presented in the corresponding papers of CROW, MEWE and WASM-MUTATE [33, 34, 35]. This can be appreciated in the fourth, fifth and sixth columns of Table 3.1. We have observed that WASM-MUTATE generates more unique variants in one hour than CROW and MEWE in at least one order of magnitude. This is mainly because of three reasons. First, CROW and MEWE rely on SMT solvers to prove functionally equivalence, placing a bottleneck when generating variants. Second, CROW and MEWE generation capabilities are limited by the *overlapping* phenomenon discussed in Section 3.1.3. Third, WASM-MUTATE can generate variants in any part of the Wasm binary, while CROW and MEWE are limited to the code and function sections.

On the other hand, CROW and MEWE, by using enumerative synthesis, ensure that the generated variants are more preserved than the variants created by WASM-MUTATE. In other words, the transformations generated out of CROW and MEWE are virtually irreversible by JIT compilers, such as V8 and wasmtime. This phenomenon is highlighted in the *Variants strength* column of Table 3.1, where we show that CROW and MEWE generate variants with 96% of preservation against 75% of WASM-MUTATE. High preservation is especially important where the preservation of the diversification is crucial, e.g. to hinder reverse engineering.

Tool	Input	Core	Variants in 1h	Target	Variants Strength	Security applications
CROW	Source code or LLVM Ir	Enumerative synthesis with functional equivalence proved through SMT solvers	> 1k	Code section	96%	Hinders static analysis and reverse engineering.
MEWE	Source code or LL VM Ir	CROW, Multivariate execution	> 1k	Code and Function sections	96%	Hinders static and dynamic analysis, reverse engineering and, web timing-based attacks.
WASM-MUTATE	Wasm binary	hand-made rewriting rules, e-graph random traversals	> 10k	All Web-Assembly sections	76%	Hinders signature-based identification, and cache timing side-channel attacks.

Table 3.1: Comparing CROW, MEWE and WASM-MUTATE. The table columns are: the tool’s name, input format, core diversification strategy, number of variants generated within an hour, targeted sections of the WebAssembly binary, strength of the generated variants, and the security applications of these variants. The Variant strength accounts for the capability of each tool on generating variants that are preserved after the JIT compilation of V8 and wasmtime in average. Our three technical contributions are complementary tools that can be combined.

Takeaway

Our three technical contributions serve as complementary tools that can be combined. For instance, when the source code for a WebAssembly binary is either non-existent or inaccessible, WASM-MUTATE offers a viable solution for generating code variants. On the other hand, CROW and MEWE excel in scenarios where high preservation is crucial.

3.4.1 Security applications

The final column of Table 3.1 emphasizes the security benefits derived from the variants produced by our three key technical contributions. One immediate advantage of altering the structure of WebAssembly binaries across different variants is the mitigation of signature-based identification, thereby enhancing resistance to static reverse engineering. Additionally, our tools generate a diverse array of code variants that are highly preserved. This implies that these variants, each with their unique WebAssembly code, retain their distinct characteristics even after being translated into machine code by JIT compilers. This high level of preservation significantly mitigates the risks associated with side-channel attacks that target specific machine code instructions, such as port contention attacks [15]. For instance, if a WebAssembly binary is transformed in such a manner that its resulting machine code instructions differ from the original, it becomes more challenging for a side-channel attack. Conversely, if the compiler translates the variant into machine code that closely resembles the original, the side-channel attack could still exploit those instructions to extract information about the original WebAssembly binary.

Altering the layout of a WebAssembly program inherently influences its managed memory during runtime (see Section 2.1.3). This phenomenon is especially important for CROW and MEWE, given that they do not directly address the WebAssembly memory model. Significantly, CROW and MEWE considerably alter the managed memory by modifying the layout of the WebAssembly program. For example, the *constant inferring* transformations significantly alter the layout of program variants, affecting unmanaged memory elements such as the returning address of a function. Furthermore, WASM-MUTATE not only affects managed memory through changes in the WebAssembly program layout. It also adds rewriting rules to transform unmanaged memory instructions. Memory alterations, either to the unmanaged or managed memories, have substantial security implications, by eliminating potential cache timing side-channels [61].

Last but not least, our technical contributions enhance security against web timing-based attacks [138] by creating variants that exhibit a wide range of execution times, including faster variants compared to the original program.

This strategy is especially prominent in MEWE’s approach, which develops multivariants functioning on randomizing execution paths, thereby thwarting attempts at timing-based inference attacks [139]. Adding another layer benefit from MEWE, the integration of diverse variants into multivariants can potentially disrupt dynamic reverse engineering tools such as symbolic executors [56]. Concretely, different control flows through a random discriminator, exponentially increase the number of possible execution paths, making multivariant binaries virtually unexplorable.

Takeaway

CROW, MEWE and WASM-MUTATE generate WebAssembly variants that can be used to enhance security. Overall, they generate variants that are suitable for hardening static and dynamic analysis, side-channel attacks, and, to thwart signature-based identification.

■ Conclusions

In this chapter, we discuss the technical specifics underlying our primary technical contributions. We elucidate the mechanisms through which CROW generates program variants. Subsequently, we discuss MEWE, offering a detailed examination of its role in forging MVE for WebAssembly. We also explore the details of WASM-MUTATE, proposing a novel e-graph traversal algorithm to fast spawn Wasm program variants. Remarkably, we undertake a comparative analysis of the three tools, highlighting their respective benefits and limitations, alongside the potential security applications of the generated Wasm variants.

In Chapter 4, we present two use cases that support the exploitation of these tools. Chapter 4 serves to bridge theory with practice, showcasing the tangible impacts and benefits realized through the deployment of CROW, MEWE, and WASM-MUTATE.

4

ASSESSING SOFTWARE DIVERSIFICATION FOR WEBASSEMBLY

If you find that you're spending all your time on theory, start turning some attention to practical things; it will improve your theories. If you find that you're spending almost all your time on practice, start turning some attention to theoretical things; it will improve your practice.

— Donald Knuth

TN this chapter, we illustrate the application of Software Diversification for both offensive and defensive purposes. We discuss two selected use cases that demonstrate practical applications of our contributions. Additionally, we discuss the challenges and benefits arising from the application of Software Diversification to WebAssembly.

4.1 Offensive Diversification: Malware evasion

The primary malicious use of WebAssembly in browsers is cryptojacking [64]. This is due to the essence of cryptojacking, the faster the mining, the better. Let us illustrate how a malicious WebAssembly binary is involved into browser cryptojacking. Figure 4.1 illustrates a browser attack scenario: a practical WebAssembly cryptojacking attack consists of three components: a WebAssembly binary, a JavaScript wrapper, and a backend cryptominer pool. The WebAssembly binary is responsible for executing the hash calculations, which consume significant computational resources. The JavaScript wrapper facilitates the communication between the WebAssembly binary and the cryptominer pool.

⁰Compilation probe time 2023/11/21 14:08:04



Figure 4.1: A remote mining pool server, a JavaScript wrapper and the WebAssembly binary form the triad of a cryptojacking attack in browser clients.

The aforementioned components require the following steps to succeed in cryptomining. First, the victim visits a web page infected with the cryptojacking code. The web page establishes a channel to the cryptominer pool, which then assigns a hashing job to the infected browser. The WebAssembly cryptominer calculates thousands of hashes inside the browser. Once the malware server receives acceptable hashes, it is rewarded with cryptocurrencies for the mining. Then, the server assigns a new job, and the mining process starts over.

Both antivirus software and browsers have implemented measures to detect cryptojacking. For instance, Firefox employs deny lists to detect cryptomining activities [140]. The academic community has also contributed to the body of work on detecting or preventing WebAssembly-based cryptojacking, as outlined in Section 2.1.5. However, malicious actors can employ evasion techniques to circumvent these detection mechanisms. Bhansali et al. are among the first who have investigated how WebAssembly cryptojacking could potentially evade detection [65], highlighting the critical importance of this use case. The case illustrated in the subsequent sections uses Offensive Software Diversification for evading malware detection in WebAssembly.

4.1.1 Cryptojacking defense evasion

Considering the previous scenario, several techniques can be directly implemented in browsers to thwart cryptojacking by identifying the malicious WebAssembly components. Such defense scenario is illustrated in Figure 4.2, where the WebAssembly malicious binary is blocked in ③. The primary aim of our use case is to investigate the effectiveness of code diversification as a means to circumvent cryptojacking defenses. Specifically, we assess whether the following evasion workflow can successfully bypass existing security measures:



Figure 4.2: Cryptojacking scenario in which the malware detection mechanism is bypassed by using an evasion technique.

1. The user loads a webpage infected with cryptojacking malware, which leverages network resources for execution—corresponding to (1) and (2) in Figure 4.2.
2. A malware detection mechanism (malware oracle) identifies and blocks malicious WebAssembly binaries at (3). For example, a network proxy could intercept and forward these resources to an external detection service via its API.
3. Anticipating that a specific malware detection system is consistently used for defense, the attacker swiftly generates a variant of the WebAssembly cryptojacking malware designed to evade detection at (4).
4. The attacker delivers the modified binary instead of the original one (5), which initiates the cryptojacking process and compromises the browser (6). The detection method is not capable of detecting the malicious nature of the binary, and the attack is successful.

4.1.2 Methodology

Our aim is to empirically validate the workflow in Figure 4.2, i.e., using Offensive Software Diversification in evading malware detection systems. To achieve this, we employ WASM-MUTATE for generating WebAssembly malware variants. In this study, we categorize malware detection mechanisms as malware oracles, which can be of two types: binary and numeric. A binary oracle provides a binary decision, labeling a WebAssembly binary as either malicious or benign. In contrast, a numeric oracle returns a numerical value representing the confidence level of the detection.

Definition 3 *Malware oracle:* A malware oracle is a detection mechanism that returns either a binary decision or a numerical value indicating the confidence level of the detection.

We employ VirusTotal as a numeric oracle and MINOS [25] as a binary oracle. VirusTotal is an online service that analyzes files and returns a confidence score in the form of the number of antivirus that flag the input file as malware, thus qualifying as a numeric oracle. MINOS, on the other hand, converts WebAssembly binaries into grayscale images and employs a convolutional neural network for classification. It returns a binary decision, making it a binary oracle.

We use the wasmbench dataset [43] to establish a ground truth. After running the wasmbench dataset through VirusTotal and MINOS, we identify 33 binaries that are: 1) flagged as malicious by at least one VirusTotal vendor and, 2) are also detected by MINOS. Then, to simulate the evasion scenario in Figure 4.2, we use WASM-MUTATE to generate WebAssembly binary variants to evade malware detection (④ in Figure 4.2). We use WASM-MUTATE in two configurations: feedback-guided and stochastic diversification.

Definition 4 *Feedback-guided Diversification:* In feedback-guided diversification, the transformation process of a WebAssembly program is guided by a numeric oracle, which influences the probability of each transformation. For instance, WASM-MUTATE can be configured to apply transformations that minimize the oracle’s confidence score. Note that feedback-guided diversification needs a numeric oracle.

Definition 5 *Stochastic Diversification:* Unlike feedback-guided diversification, in stochastic diversification, each transformation has an equal likelihood of being applied to the input WebAssembly binary.

Based on the two types of malware oracles and diversification configurations, we examine three scenarios: 1) VirusTotal with a feedback-guided diversification, 2) VirusTotal with an stochastic diversification, and 3) MINOS with a stochastic diversification. Notice that, the fourth scenario with MINOS and a feedback-guided diversification is not feasible, as MINOS is a binary oracle and cannot provide the numerical values required for feedback-guided diversification.

Our evaluation focuses on two key metrics: the success rate of evading detection mechanisms in VirusTotal and MINOS across the 33 flagged binaries, and the correctness of the generated variants.

Definition 6 *Evasion rate:* This measures the efficacy of WASM-MUTATE in bypassing malware detection systems. For each flagged binary, we input it into WASM-MUTATE, configured with the selected oracle and diversification strategy. We then iteratively apply transformations to the output from the preceding step. This iterative process is halted either when the binary is no longer flagged by the oracle or when a maximum of 1000 stacked transformations have been applied (see Definition 2). This process is repeated with 10 random seeds per binary to

simulate 10 different evasion experiments per binary.

Definition 7 *Correctness:* This verifies the functional equivalence of the variants generated by WASM-MUTATE compared to the original binary. We execute the variants that entirely evade VirusTotal, using controlled and stochastic diversification configurations with WASM-MUTATE for both metrics. Our selection is limited to variants that allow us to fully reproduce the three components displayed in Figure 4.1. We then gather the hashes generated by the cryptojacking binaries and their generation speed, comparing these hashes with those from the original binary. If the hashes match, and the variant executes without error, with the minerpool component validating the hash, we can consider the variant as functionally equivalent.

4.1.3 Results

In Table 4.1, we present a comprehensive summary of the evasion experiments presented in [36], focusing on two oracles: VirusTotal and MINOS[25]. The table is organized into two main categories to separate the results for each malware oracle. For VirusTotal, we further subdivide the results based on the two diversification configurations we employ: stochastic and feedback-guided diversification. In these subsections, the columns indicate the number of VirusTotal vendors that flag the original binary as malware (#D), the maximum number of successfully evaded detectors (Max. #evaded), and the average number of transformations required (Mean #trans.) for each sample. We highlight in bold text the values for which the stochastic diversification or feedback-guided diversification setups best, the lower, the better. The MINOS section solely includes a column that specifies the number of transformations needed for complete evasion. The table has $33 + 1$ rows, each representing a unique WebAssembly malware study subject. The final row offers the median number of transformations required for evasion across our evaluated setups and oracles.

Stochastic diversification to evade VirusTotal: We execute a stochastic diversification with WASM-MUTATE, setting a limit of 1000 iterations for each binary. In every iteration, we query VirusTotal to determine if the newly generated binary can elude detection. We repeat this procedure with ten distinct seeds for each binary, replicating ten different evasion experiments. As the stochastic diversification section of Table 4.1 illustrates, we successfully produce variants that fully evade detection for 30 out of 33 binaries. The average amount of iterations required to produce a variant that evades all detectors oscillates between 120 to 635 stacked transformations. The mean number of iterations needed never exceeds 1000 stacked transformations. However, three binaries remain detectable under the stochastic diversification setup. In these instances, the algorithm fails to evade 5 out of 31, 6 out of 30, and 5 out of 26 detectors. This shortfall can be attributed to the maximum number of iterations, 1000,

Hash	#D	VirusTotal				MINOS[25]	
		Stochastic diversification		Feedback-guided diversification			
		Max. evaded	Mean trans.	Max. evaded	Mean trans.		
47d29959	31	26	N/A	19	N/A	100	
9d30e7f0	30	24	N/A	17	N/A	419	
8ebf4e44	26	21	N/A	13	N/A	92	
c11d82d	20	20	355	20	446	115	
0d996462	19	19	401	19	697	24	
a32a6f4b	18	18	635	18	625	1	
fbdd1efa	18	18	310	18	726	1	
d2141ff2	9	9	461	9	781	81	
aaffff87	6	6	484	6	331	1	
046dc081	6	6	404	6	159	33	
643116ff	6	6	144	6	436	47	
15b86a25	4	4	253	4	131	1	
006b2fb6	4	4	282	4	380	1	
942be4f7	4	4	200	4	200	29	
7c36f462	4	4	236	4	221	85	
fb15929f	4	4	297	4	475	1	
24aae13a	4	4	252	4	401	980	
000415b2	3	3	302	3	34	960	
4cdbbbb1	3	3	295	3	72	1	
65debcbe	2	2	131	2	33	38	
59955b4c	2	2	130	2	33	38	
89a3645c	2	2	431	2	107	108	
a74a7cb8	2	2	124	2	33	38	
119c53eb	2	2	104	2	18	1	
089dd312	2	2	153	2	123	68	
c1be4071	2	2	130	2	33	38	
dceaf65b	2	2	140	2	132	66	
6b8c7899	2	2	143	2	33	38	
a27b45ef	2	2	145	2	33	33	
68ca7c0e	2	2	137	2	33	38	
f0b24409	2	2	127	2	11	33	
5bc53343	2	2	118	2	33	33	
e09c32c5	1	1	120	1	488	15	
Median			218		131	38	

Table 4.1: The table has two main categories for each malware oracle, corresponding to the two oracles we use: VirusTotal and MINOS. For VirusTotal, divide the results based on the two diversification configurations: stochastic and feedback-guided diversification. We provide columns that indicate the number of VirusTotal vendors that flag the original binary as malware (#D), the maximum number of successfully evaded detectors (Max. #evaded), and the average number of transformations required (Mean #trans.) for each sample. We highlight in bold text the values for which diversification setups are best, the lower, the better. The MINOS section includes a column that specifies the number of transformations needed for complete evasion. The final row offers the median number of transformations required for evasion across our evaluated setups and oracles.

that we employ in our experiments. Increasing iterations further, however, seems unrealistic. If certain transformations enlarge the binary size, a significantly large binary could become impractical due to bandwidth limitations. In summary, stochastic diversification with WASM-MUTATE markedly reduces the detection rate by VirusTotal antivirus vendors for cryptojacking malware, achieving total evasion in 30 out of 33 (90%) cases within the malware dataset.

Feedback-guided diversification to evade VirusTotal: stochastic diversification does not guide the diversification based on the number of evaded detectors, it is purely random, and has some drawbacks. For example, some transformations might suppress other transformations previously applied. We have observed that, by carefully selecting the order and type of transformations applied, it is possible to evade detection systems in fewer iterations. This can be appreciated in the results of the feedback-guided diversification part of Table 4.1. The feedback-guided diversification setup successfully generates variants that totally evade the detection for 30 out of 33 binaries, it is thus as good as the stochastic setup. Remarkably, for 21 binaries out of 30, feedback-guided needs only 40% of the calls the stochastic diversification setup needs, demonstrating larger efficiency. Moreover, the lower number of transformations needed to evade detection, compared to the stochastic diversification setup, highlights the efficacy of the feedback-guided diversification setup in studying effective transformations. Consequently, malware detection system developers can leverage feedback-guided diversification to enhance their systems, focusing on identifying specific transformations.

Stochastic diversification to evade MINOS: Relying exclusively on VirusTotal for detection could pose issues, particularly given the existence of specialized solutions for WebAssembly, which differ from the general-purpose vendors within VirusTotal. In Section 2.1.5 we highlight several examples of such solutions. Yet, for its simplicity, we extend this experiment by using MINOS[25], an antivirus specifically designed for WebAssembly. The results of evading MINOS can be seen in the final column of Table 4.1. The bottom row of Table 4.1 highlights that fewer iterations are required to evade MINOS than VirusTotal through WebAssembly diversification, indicating a greater ease in eluding MINOS. The stochastic diversification setup requires a median iteration count of 218 to evade VirusTotal. In contrast, the feedback-guided diversification setup necessitates only 131 iterations. Remarkably, a mere 38 iterations are needed for MINOS. WASM-MUTATE evaded detection for 8 out of 33 binaries in a single iteration. This result implies the susceptibility of the MINOS model to binary diversification.

WebAssembly variants correctness: To evaluate the correctness of the malware variants created with WASM-MUTATE, we focused on six binaries that

we could build and execute end-to-end, as these had all three components outlined in Figure 4.1. We select only six binaries because the process of building and executing the binaries involves three components: the WebAssembly binary, its JavaScript complement, and the miner pool. These components were not found for the remaining 24 evaded binaries in the study subjects. For the six binaries, we then replace the original WebAssembly code with variants generated using VirusTotal as the malware oracle and WASM-MUTATE for both controlled and stochastic diversification configurations. We then execute both the original and the generated variants. We assess the correctness of the variants by examining the hashes they generate. Our findings show that all variants generated with WASM-MUTATE are correct, i.e., they generate the correct hashes and execute without error. Additionally, we found that 19% of the generated variants surpassed the original cryptojacking binaries in performance.

Reflection

Malware detection presents a challenging and well known issue [141]. However, previous research on static WebAssembly malware detection do not consider obfuscation techniques to augment their findings. Specifically, the current literature acknowledges only metadata (WebAssembly custom sections) obfuscation or the total absence of obfuscation techniques for WebAssembly [23, 24, 26, 27, 25]. As explored in Section 2.2, a software diversification engine could potentially serve as an obfuscator. We exhibit this potential with WASM-MUTATE. As a result, our software diversification tools offer a feasible method to improve the precision of WebAssembly malware detection systems. Existing tools could enhance their evaluation dataset of WebAssembly malwares by incorporating the variants generated by WASM-MUTATE.

Contribution paper

WASM-MUTATE generates correct and performant variants of WebAssembly cryptojacking that successfully evade malware detection. The case discussed in this section is fully detailed in Cabrera-Arteaga et al. "WebAssembly Diversification for Malware Evasion" at *Computers & Security*, 2023 <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167404823002067>.

4.2 Defensive Diversification: Speculative Side-channel protection

As discussed in Section 2.1, WebAssembly is quickly becoming a cornerstone technology in backend systems. Leading companies like Cloudflare and Fastly are championing the integration of WebAssembly into their edge computing platforms, thereby enabling developers to deploy applications that are both modular and securely sandboxed. These server-side WebAssembly applications are generally architected as isolated, single-responsibility services, a model referred to as Function-as-a-Service (FaaS) [10, 11]. The operational flow of WebAssembly binaries in FaaS platforms is illustrated in Figure 4.3.




Figure 4.3: WebAssembly binaries on FaaS platforms. Developers can submit any WebAssembly binary to the platform to be executed as a service in a sandboxed and isolated manner. Yet, WebAssembly binaries are not immune to Spectre attacks.

The fundamental advantage of using WebAssembly in FaaS platforms lies in its ability to encapsulate thousands of WebAssembly binaries within a singular host process. A developer could compile its source code into a WebAssembly program suitable for the cloud platform and then submit it (① in Figure 4.3). This host process is then disseminated across a network of servers and data centers (② in Figure 4.3). These platforms convert WebAssembly programs into native code, which is subsequently executed in a sandboxed environment. Host processes can then instantiate new WebAssembly sandboxes for each client function, executing them in response to specific user requests with nanosecond-level latency (③ in Figure 4.3). This architecture inherently isolates WebAssembly binary executions from each other as well as from the host process, enhancing security.

However, while WebAssembly is engineered with a strong focus on security and isolation, it is not entirely immune to vulnerabilities such as Spectre attacks [142, 132] (④ in Figure 4.3). In the sections that follow, we explore how

software diversification techniques can be employed to harden WebAssembly binaries against such attacks.

4.2.1 Threat model: speculative side-channel attacks

To illustrate the threat model concerning WebAssembly programs in FaaS platforms, consider the following scenario. Developers, including potentially malicious actors, have the ability to submit any WebAssembly binary to the FaaS platform. A malicious actor could then upload a WebAssembly binary that, once compiled to native code, employs Spectre attacks. Spectre attacks exploit hardware-based prediction mechanisms to trigger mispredictions, leading to the speculative execution of specific instruction sequences that are not part of the original, sequential execution flow. By taking advantage of this speculative execution, an attacker can potentially access sensitive information stored in the memory allocated to other WebAssembly instance (including itself by violating Control Flow Integrity) or even the host process. Therefore, this poses a significant risk for the overall execution system.

Narayan and colleagues [132] have categorized potential Spectre attacks on WebAssembly binaries into three distinct types, each corresponding to a specific hardware predictor being exploited and a particular FaaS scenario: Branch Target Buffer Attacks, Return Stack Buffer Attacks, and Pattern History Table Attacks defined as follows:

1. The Spectre Branch Target Buffer (btb) attack exploits the branch target buffer by predicting the target of an indirect jump, thereby rerouting speculative control flow to an arbitrary target.
2. The Spectre Return Stack Buffer (rsb) attack exploits the return stack buffer that stores the locations of recently executed call instructions to predict the target of `ret` instructions.
3. The Spectre Pattern History Table (pht) takes advantage of the pattern history table to anticipate the direction of a conditional branch during the ongoing evaluation of a condition.

4.2.2 Methodology

Our goal is to empirically validate that Software Diversification can effectively mitigate the risks associated with Spectre attacks in WebAssembly binaries. The green-highlighted section in Figure 4.4 illustrates how Software Diversification can be integrated into the FaaS platform workflow. The core idea is to generate unique and diverse WebAssembly variants that can be randomized at the time of deployment. For this use case, we employ WASM-MUTATE as our tool for Software Diversification.

Program	Attack
btb_breakout	Spectre branch target buffer (btb)
btb_leakage	Spectre branch target buffer (btb)
ret2spec	Spectre Return Stack Buffer (rsb)
pht	Spectre Pattern History Table (pht)

Table 4.2: WebAssembly program name and its respective attack.

To empirically demonstrate that Software Diversification can indeed mitigate Spectre vulnerabilities, we reuse the WebAssembly attack scenarios proposed by Narayan and colleagues in their work on Swivel [61]. Swivel is a compiler-based strategy designed to counteract Spectre attacks on WebAssembly binaries by linearizing their control flow during machine code compilation. Our approach differs from theirs in that it is binary-based, compiler-agnostic, and platform-agnostic; we do not propose altering the deployment or toolchain of FaaS platforms.




Figure 4.4: Diversifying WebAssembly binaries to mitigate Spectre attacks in FaaS platforms.

To measure the efficacy of WASM-MUTATE in mitigating Spectre, we diversify four WebAssembly binaries proposed in the Swivel study. The names of these programs and the specific attacks we examine are available in Table 4.2. For each of these four binaries, we generate up to 1000 random stacked transformations (see Definition 2) using 100 distinct seeds, resulting in a total of 100,000 variants for each original binary. At every 100th stacked transformation for each binary and seed, we assess the impact of diversification on the Spectre

attacks by measuring the attack bandwidth for data exfiltration.

Definition 8 *Attack bandwidth:* Given data $D = \{b_0, b_1, \dots, b_C\}$ being exfiltrated in time T and $K = k_0, k_1, \dots, k_N$ the collection of correct data bytes, the bandwidth metric is defined as:

$$\frac{|b_i \text{ such that } b_i \in K|}{T}$$

The previous metric not only captures the success or failure of the attacks but also quantifies the extent to which data exfiltration is hindered. For example, a variant that still leaks data but does so at an impractically slow rate would be considered hardened against the attack.

4.2.3 Results

Figure 4.5 offers a graphical representation of WASM-MUTATE’s influence on the Swivel original programs: `btb_breakout` and `btb_leakage` with the `btb` attack. The Y-axis represents the exfiltration bandwidth (see Definition 8). The bandwidth of the original binary under attack is marked as a blue dashed horizontal line. In each plot, the variants are grouped in clusters of 100 stacked transformations. These are indicated by the green violinplots.




Figure 4.5: Impact of WASM-MUTATE over `btb_breakout` and `btb_leakage` binaries. The Y-axis denotes exfiltration bandwidth, with the original binary’s bandwidth under attack highlighted by a blue marker and dashed line. Variants are clustered in groups of 100 stacked transformations, denoted by green violinplots. Overall, for all 100000 variants generated out of each original program, 70% have less data leakage bandwidth. After 200 stacked transformations, the exfiltration bandwidth drops to zero.

Population Strength: For the binaries `btb_breakout` and `btb_leakage`, WASM-MUTATE exhibits a high level of effectiveness, generating variants that leak less information than the original in 78% and 70% of instances, respectively. For both programs, after applying 200 stacked transformations, the exfiltration bandwidth drops to zero. This implies that WASM-MUTATE is capable of synthesizing variants that are entirely protected from the original attack. If

we consider the results in Table 3.1, generating a variant with 200 stacked transformations can be accomplished in just a matter of seconds for a single WebAssembly binary.



Figure 4.6: Impact of WASM-MUTATE over `ret2spec` and `pht` binaries. The Y-axis denotes exfiltration bandwidth, with the original binary’s bandwidth under attack highlighted by a blue marker and dashed line. Variants are clustered in groups of 100 stacked transformations, denoted by green violinplots. Overall, for both programs approximately 70% of the variants have less data leakage bandwidth.

Effectiveness of WASM-MUTATE: As illustrated in Figure 4.6, similarly to Figure 4.5, WASM-MUTATE significantly impacts the programs `ret2spec` and `pht` when subjected to their respective attacks. In 76% of instances for `ret2spec` and 71% for `pht`, the generated variants demonstrated reduced attack bandwidth compared to the original binaries. The plots reveal that a notable decrease in exfiltration bandwidth occurs after applying at least 100 stacked transformations. While both programs show signs of hardening through reduced attack bandwidth, this effect is not immediate and requires a substantial number of transformations to become effective. Additionally, the bandwidth distribution is more varied for these two programs compared to the two previous ones. Our analysis suggests a correlation between the reduction in attack bandwidth and the complexity of the binary being diversified. Specifically, `ret2spec` and `pht` are substantially larger programs, containing over 300,000 instructions, compared to `btb_breakout` and `btb_leakage`, which have fewer than 800 instructions. Therefore, given that WASM-MUTATE performs one transformation per invocation, the probability of affecting critical components to hinder attacks decreases in larger binaries.

Disrupting timers: Cache timing side-channel attacks, including for the four binaries analyzed in this use case, depend on precise timers to measure cache access times. Disrupting these timers can effectively neutralize the attack [143]. One key reason our results show variants resilient to Spectre attacks is the approach of WASM-MUTATE. It creates variants that offer a similar approach. Our WebAssembly variants introduce perturbations in the timing steps of WebAssembly variants. This is illustrated in Listing 4.1 and Listing 4.2, where

the former shows the original time measurement and the latter presents a variant with introduced operations. By introducing additional instructions, the inherent randomness in the time measurement of a single or a few instructions is amplified, thereby reducing the timer's accuracy.

```
;; Code from original btb_breakout
...
(call $readTimer)
(set_local $end_time)
... access to mem
(i64.sub (get_local $end_time) (get_local $start_time))
(set_local $duration)
...
```

Listing 4.1: Wasm timer code.

```
;; Variant code
...
(call $readTimer)
(set_local $end_time)
<inserted instructions>
... access to mem
<inserted instructions>
(i64.sub (get_local $end_time) (get_local $start_time))
(set_local $duration)
...
```

Listing 4.2: WebAssembly variant with more instructions added in between time measurement.

Padding speculated instructions: CPUs have a limit on the number of instructions they can cache. WASM-MUTATE injects instructions to exceed this limit. This effectively disables the speculative execution of memory accesses. This approach is akin to padding [144], as demonstrated in Listing 4.3 and Listing 4.4. This padding disrupts the binary code's layout in memory, hindering the attacker's ability to initiate speculative execution. Even if speculative execution occurs, the memory access does not proceed as the attacker intended.

```
;; Code from original btb_breakout
...
;; train the code to jump here (index 1)
(i32.load (i32.const 2000))
(i32.store (i32.const 83)) ; just prevent optimization
...
;; transiently jump here
(i32.load (i32.const 339968)) ; S(83) is the secret
(i32.store (i32.const 83)) ; just prevent optimization
```

Listing 4.3: Two jump locations. The top one trains the branch predictor, the bottom one is the expected jump that exfiltrates the memory access.

```
;; Variant code
...
;; train the code to jump here (index 1)
<inserted instructions>
(i32.load (i32.const 2000))
<inserted instructions>
(i32.store (i32.const 83)) ; just prevent optimization
...
;; transiently jump here
<inserted instructions>
(i32.load (i32.const 339968)) ; "S"(83) is the secret
<inserted instructions>
(i32.store (i32.const 83)) ; just prevent optimization
...
```

Listing 4.4: WebAssembly variant with more instructions added indindinctly between jump places.

Managed memory impact: The success in diminishing Spectre attacks is mainly explained by the fact that WASM-MUTATE synthesizes variants that effectively alter memory access patterns. We have identified four primary factors responsible for the divergence in memory accesses among WASM-MUTATE generated variants. First, modifications to the binary layout—even those that do not affect executed code—inevitably alter memory accesses within the program’s stack. Specifically, WASM-MUTATE generates variants that modify the return addresses of functions, which consequently leads to differences in execution flow and memory accesses. Second, one of our rewriting rules incorporates artificial global values into WebAssembly binaries. The access to these global variables inevitably affects the managed memory (see Section 2.1.3). Third, WASM-MUTATE injects ‘phantom’ instructions which do not aim to modify the outcome of a transformed function during execution. These intermediate calculations trigger the spill/reload component of the wasmtime compiler, varying spill and reload operations. In the context of limited physical resources, these operations temporarily store values in memory for later retrieval and use, thus creating

diverse managed memory accesses (see the example at Section 3.3.1). Finally, certain rewriting rules implemented by WASM-MUTATE replicate fragments of code, e.g., performing commutative operations. These code segments may contain memory accesses, and while neither the memory addresses nor their values change, the frequency of these operations does.

Reflection

Beyond Spectre, one can use WASM-MUTATE to mitigate other side-channel attacks. For instance, port contention attacks [15] rely on the execution of specific instructions for a successful attack. Not only WASM-MUTATE, but also our other tools, can alter those instructions, thereby mitigating the attack. The effectiveness of WASM-MUTATE, coupled with its ability to generate numerous variants, establishes it as an apt tool for mitigating side-channel attacks. Consider, for example, applying this on a global FaaS platform scale. In this scenario, one could deploy a unique, hardened variant for each machine and even for every fresh WebAssembly spawned per user request.

Contribution paper

WASM-MUTATE crafts WebAssembly binaries that are resilient to Spectre-like attacks. The case discussed in this section is fully detailed in Cabrera-Arteaga et al. "WASM-MUTATE: Fast and Effective Binary Diversification for WebAssembly" *Under review* <https://arxiv.org/pdf/2309.07638.pdf>.

■ Conclusions

In this chapter, we explore Offensive and Defensive Software Diversification applied to WebAssembly. Offensive Software Diversification highlights both the potential and the latent security risks in applying Software Diversification to WebAssembly malware. Our findings suggest potential enhancements to the automatic detection of cryptojacking malware in WebAssembly, e.g., by stressing their resilience with WebAssembly malware variants. Conversely, Defensive Software Diversification serves as a proactive guard, specifically designed to mitigate the risks associated with Spectre attacks.

Moreover, we have conducted experiments with various use cases that are not shown in this chapter. For instance, CROW [33] excels in generating WebAssembly variants that minimize side-channel noise, thereby bolstering defenses against potential side-channel attacks. Alternatively, deploying multivariants from MEWE [34] can thwart high-level timing-based side-channels

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[138]. Specifically, we conducted experiments on the round-trip times of the generated multivariants and concluded that, at a high level, the timing side-channel information cannot discriminate between variants. In the subsequent chapter, we will summarize the primary conclusions of this dissertation and propose avenues for future research.

5

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

You're bound to be unhappy if you optimize everything.

— Donald Knuth

THE growing adoption of WebAssembly requires efficient code analysis and hardening techniques. This thesis contributes to this effort with a comprehensive set of methods and tools for Software Diversification in WebAssembly. We introduce three technical contributions in this dissertation: CROW, MEWE, and WASM-MUTATE. Additionally, we present specific use cases for exploiting the diversification created for WebAssembly programs. In this chapter, we summarize the technical contributions of this dissertation, including an overview of the empirical findings of our research. Finally, we discuss future research directions in WebAssembly Software Diversification.

5.1 Summary of technical contributions

This thesis expands the field of Software Diversification within WebAssembly by implementing two distinct methods: compiler-based and binary-based approaches. Taking source code and LLVM bitcode as input, the compiler-based method generates WebAssembly variants. It uses enumerative synthesis and SMT solvers to produce numerous functionally equivalent variants. Importantly, these generated variants can be converted into multivariant binaries, thus enabling execution path randomization. Our compiler-based approach specializes in producing high-preservation variants. However, the use of SMT solvers for functional verification lowers the diversification speed when compared with the binary-based method. Furthermore, this method can only modify the code and function sections of WebAssembly binaries.

On the other hand, the method based on binary utilizes random e-graph traversals to create variants. This approach eliminates the need for modifications to existing compilers, ensuring compatibility with all existing WebAssembly

⁰Compilation probe time 2023/11/21 14:08:04

binaries. Additionally, it offers a swift, efficient and novel method for generating variants through inexpensive random e-graph traversals. Consequently, our binary-based approach can produce variants at a scale at least one order of magnitude larger than our compiler-based approach. The binary-based method can generate variants by transforming any segment of the Wasm binary. However, the preservation of the generated variants is lower than the compiler-based approach.

We have developed three open-source tools that are publicly accessible: CROW, MEWE, and WASM-MUTATE. CROW and MEWE utilize a compiler-based approach, whereas WASM-MUTATE employs a method based on binary. These tools automate the process of diversification, thereby increasing their practicality for deployment. At present, WASM-MUTATE is integrated in the wasmtime project¹ to improve testing. Our tools are complementary, providing combined utility. For instance, when the source code for a WebAssembly binary is unavailable, WASM-MUTATE offers an efficient solution for the generation of code variants. On the other hand, CROW and MEWE are particularly suited for scenarios that require a high level of variant preservation. Finally, one can use CROW and MEWE to generate a set of variants, which can then serve as rewriting rules for WASM-MUTATE. Moreover, when practitioners need to quickly generate variants, they could employ WASM-MUTATE, despite a potential decrease in the preservation of variants.

5.2 Summary of empirical findings

We demonstrate the practical application of Offensive Software Diversification in WebAssembly. In particular, we diversify 33 WebAssembly cryptomalware automatically, generating numerous variants. These variants successfully evade detection by state-of-the-art malware detection systems. Our research confirms the existence of opportunities for the malware detection community to strengthen the automatic detection of cryptojacking WebAssembly malware. Specifically, developers can improve the detection of WebAssembly malware by using multiple malware oracles. Additionally, these practitioners could employ feedback-guided diversification to identify specific transformations their implementation is susceptible to. For instance, our study found that the addition of arbitrary custom sections to WebAssembly binaries is a highly effective transformation for evading detection. In practice, no WebAssembly engine uses custom sections, so injecting them does not impact the performance of the WebAssembly binary. This logic also applies to other transformations, such as adding unreachable code, another effective method for evading detection.

Moreover, our techniques enhance overall security from a Defensive Software Diversification perspective. We facilitate the deployment of unique, diversified

¹<https://github.com/bytocodealliance/wasm-tools>

and hardened WebAssembly binaries. As previously demonstrated, WebAssembly variants produced by our tools exhibit improved resistance to side-channel attacks. Our tools generate variants by modifying malicious code patterns such as embedded timers used to conduct timing side-channel attacks. Simultaneously, they can produce variants that introduce noise into the execution side-channels of the original program, concurrently altering the memory layout of the JITed code generated by the host engine.

To sum up, our methods remarkably generate tens of thousands of variants in minutes. The swift production of these variants is due to the rapid transformation of WebAssembly binaries. This swift generation of variants is particularly advantageous in highly dynamic scenarios such as FaaS and CDN platforms. We have empirically tested the effectiveness of moving target defense techniques[111] on the Fastly edge computing platform. In this scenario, we incorporate multivariant executions[34]. Fastly can redeploy a WebAssembly binary across its 73 datacenters worldwide in 13 seconds on average. This enables the practical deployment of a unique variant per node using our tools. However, a 13-second window may still pose a risk despite each node potentially hosting a distinct WebAssembly variant. To mitigate this, we use multivariant binaries, invoking a unique variant with each execution. Our tools can generate dozens of unique variants every few seconds, each serving as a multivariant binary packaging thousands of other variants. This illustrates the real-world application of Defensive Software Diversification to a WebAssembly standalone scenario.

5.3 Future Work

Along with this dissertation we have highlighted several open challenges related to Software Diversification in WebAssembly. These challenges open up several directions for future research. In the following, we outline two concrete directions.

Improving WebAssembly malware detection via canonicalization: Malware detection is a well-known problem in the field of computer security, as outlined in works like Cohen’s 1987 study on computer viruses [141]. This issue is exacerbated in environments where predictability is high and malware is expected to be replicated identically across multiple victims. In such scenarios, attackers can exploit this predictability to their advantage. For example, malicious actors could craft functionally equivalent malware to evade detection by malware detection systems. Indeed, our research has shown that employing Software Diversification can be an effective method for evading malware detection systems. This technique involves creating varied versions of a program, thereby reducing its predictability and making detection more challenging.

In response to this challenge, our future research focuses on the potential effectiveness of program normalization in enhancing the accuracy of malware detection systems. This approach involves transforming a program into a

standardized, or "canonical," form before comparing it against a known dataset of malware signatures. By doing this, we aim to rapidly and efficiently identify malicious programs. A key strategy we explore is the pre-compiling of WebAssembly binaries, which can be done at a minimal cost. For example, a Wasm binary might first be JIT compiled to machine code. This step effectively reduces the number of malware variants that need to be considered, making it easier for classifiers to identify malicious software.

However, this method is not without its challenges. It relies heavily on the degree to which malware variants can be normalized. If a malware variant is highly preserved, meaning it maintains its original form and structure even after compiling to machine code, it might be difficult to normalize and subsequently detect. This limitation suggests that while program normalization can significantly improve the efficiency and precision of malware detection systems, it is not a foolproof solution. The ability to detect highly preserved malware variants remains an area for further research.

Feedback-guided Diversification: As presented in Chapter 4, feedback-guided diversification can facilitate the identification of specific transformations aiding particular objectives such as malware evasion and side-channel protection. On the contrary, stochastic diversification may generate variants that do not align with the specific objective. For instance, our approaches have shown less impact on ret2spec and pht side-channel attacks compared to btb attacks when using stochastic diversification. We can conceptualize this problem as an issue of search space exploration. By dividing the diversification search space, we can more efficiently focus the diversification process. The main benefit of this division is a narrowed search space, which can speed up and refine the process of diversification.

We intend to research into the previously mentioned concept. Our strategy could potentially incorporate feedback-directed methods that rely on specific code patterns, such as the disruption of embedded timers, to combat these problems. This method might also be modified to lessen the impact of particular types of side-channel attacks, such as port contention [15]. For instance, one might count the number of instructions that result in port contention and use this data to choose or eliminate variants with a high or low count of instructions leading to port contention.

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Part II

Included papers

WEBASSEMBLY DIVERSIFICATION FOR MALWARE EVASION

Javier Cabrera-Arteaga, Tim Toady, Martin Monperrus, Benoit Baudry
Computers & Security, Volume 131, 2023

<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167404823002067>



WebAssembly diversification for malware evasion

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ARTICLE INFO

Article history:

Received 21 December 2022

Revised 27 April 2023

Accepted 13 May 2023

Available online 18 May 2023

Keywords:

WebAssembly

Cryptojacking

Software diversification

Malware evasion

ABSTRACT

WebAssembly has become a crucial part of the modern web, offering a faster alternative to JavaScript in browsers. While boosting rich applications in browser, this technology is also very efficient to develop cryptojacking malware. This has triggered the development of several methods to detect cryptojacking malware. However, these defenses have not considered the possibility of attackers using evasion techniques. This paper explores how automatic binary diversification can support the evasion of WebAssembly cryptojacking detectors. We experiment with a dataset of 33 WebAssembly cryptojacking binaries and evaluate our evasion technique against two malware detectors: VirusTotal, a general-purpose detector, and MINOS, a WebAssembly-specific detector. Our results demonstrate that our technique can automatically generate variants of WebAssembly cryptojacking that evade the detectors in 90% of cases for VirusTotal and 100% for MINOS. Our results emphasize the importance of meta-antiviruses and diverse detection techniques and provide new insights into which WebAssembly code transformations are best suited for malware evasion. We also show that the variants introduce limited performance overhead, making binary diversification an effective technique for evasion.

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1. Introduction

WebAssembly is a binary format that has become an essential component of the web. It first appeared in 2017 as a fast and safe complement for JavaScript (Haas et al., 2017). The language provides low-level constructs enabling efficient execution, much closer to native code than JavaScript. Since its inception, the adoption of WebAssembly has grown exponentially, even outside the web (Cabrera Arteaga et al., 2022). Its early adoption by malicious actors is further evidence of WebAssembly's success.

The primary black-hat usage of WebAssembly is cryptojacking (Rokicki et al., 2022). Such WebAssembly code mines cryptocurrencies on users' browsers for the benefit of malicious actors and without the consent of the users (Musch et al., 2019b). The main reason for this phenomenon is that the core foundation of cryptojacking is: the faster, the better. In this context, WebAssembly, a binary instruction format designed to be portable and fast, is a feasible technology for implementing and distributing cryptojacking over the web. A Kaspersky report about the state of cryptojacking in the first three quarters of 2022 confirms the steady growth in the usage of cryptominers (Kaspersky, 2022). The report shows

that Monero (2022) is the most used cryptocurrency for crypto-mining in the browser. Attackers might hide WebAssembly cryptominers (Tekiner et al., 2021) in multiple locations inside web applications.

Antivirus and browsers provide support for detecting cryptojacking. For example, the Firefox browser supports the detection of cryptomining by using deny lists (Mozilla, 2019). The academic community also provides related work on detecting or preventing WebAssembly cryptojacking (Bian et al., 2020; Kelton et al., 2020; Kharraz et al., 2019; Naseem et al., 2021; Romano et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2018). Yet, it is known that black-hats can use evasion techniques to bypass detection. Only the previous work of Bhansali et al. (2022) investigates the possibility of WebAssembly cryptojacking to evade detection techniques. This is a crucial motivation for our work, one of the first to study WebAssembly malware evasion.

Our work is different from Bhansali et al. (2022)'s in the following aspects. First, we extend the evaluation of MINOS by using VirusTotal and, we empirically demonstrate that this latter is a valid cryptojacking malware meta-detector for WebAssembly to be used as baseline (see Section 5). Second, we conduct an evaluation of the correctness and efficiency of the Wasm variants, which provides insights into the trade-offs and limitations of bytecode-level transformations for malware evasion in WebAssembly. Our approach, performs bytecode transformations at the WebAssembly level, instead of source code based transformations like the

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Bhansali's technique. We focus on software diversification techniques in the spirit of Cohen (1993), as this technique has the ability to generate many variants, while the impact on the binary size and performance can be controlled through the selection of specific diversification transformations (Lundquist et al., 2016).

In this paper, we design, implement and evaluate a full-fledged evasion pipeline for WebAssembly. Concretely, we use wasm-mutate as a diversifier (Bytecodealliance, 2021), which implements 135 possible bytecode transformations, grouped into three categories: peephole operator, module structure, and control flow. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our evasion technique against two cryptojacking detectors: VirusTotal, a general detection tool that comprises 60 antivirus and, MINOS (Naseem et al., 2021), a WebAssembly-specific detector.

We evaluate our proposed evasion technique on 33 cryptojacking malware that we curated from the 8643 binaries of the wasm-bench dataset (Hilbig et al., 2021), to our knowledge, the most exhaustive collection of real-world WebAssembly binaries. We experiment with the 33 binaries marked as potentially dangerous by at least one antivirus vendor of VirusTotal. We empirically demonstrate that evasion is possible for all of these 33 real-world WebAssembly cryptojacking malware while using a WebAssembly-specific detector. Remarkably, we find 30 cryptominers for which our technique successfully generates variants that evade VirusTotal. Our set of malware includes 6 cryptojacking programs that are fully reproducible in a controlled environment. With them, we assess that our evasion method does not affect malware correctness and generates fully functional malware variants with minimal overhead.

Our work provides evidence that the malware detection community has opportunities to strengthen the automatic detection of cryptojacking WebAssembly malware. The results of this work are actionable, as we provide quantitative evidence on specific malware transformations on which detection methods can focus. To sum up, the contributions of this work are:

- A full-fledged cryptojacking malware evasion pipeline for WebAssembly, based on a state-of-the-art binary diversification. We provide the repository of the tool at https://github.com/ASSERT-KTH/wasm_evasion.
- A systematic evaluation of our cryptojacking evasion pipeline, including effectiveness, performance, and correctness.
- Actionable evidence on which transformations are better for evading WebAssembly cryptojacking detectors, calling for future work from the academic and the industrial community alike.
- A reproducible comparison of VirusTotal with MINOS, a WebAssembly-specific detector, showing the relevance of VirusTotal as a valid and practical cryptojacking meta-detector.

This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce WebAssembly for cryptomining and the state-of-the-art on malware detection and evasion techniques and its limitations for WebAssembly cryptojacking. In Section 3, we instantiate and explain malware evasion for WebAssembly cryptojacking in a real scenario. We follow with the technical description of our malware evasion algorithms in Section 4. We formulate our research questions in Section 5, answering them in Section 6. We discuss our research in Section 7, in order to help future research projects on similar topics. We finalize with our conclusions Section 8.

2. Background & related work

In this section, we introduce WebAssembly. Besides, we illustrate its usage for cryptojacking. Then, we discuss how WebAssembly cryptojacking can be detected, and the most common techniques used to evade such detection.

2.1. WebAssembly

WebAssembly (Wasm) is a binary instruction set meant initially for the web. It was adopted as a standard language for the web by the W3C in 2017, building upon the work of Haas et al. (2017). One of Wasm's primary advantages is that it defines its own Instruction Set Architecture (ISA), which is both straightforward and platform-independent. As a result, a Wasm binary can execute on virtually any platform, including web browsers and server-side environments. Since its introduction, all major web browsers have implemented support for WebAssembly, reporting to be only 10% slower than machine code during runtime.

WebAssembly programs are compiled ahead-of-time from source languages such as C/C++, Rust, and Go, utilizing compilation pipelines like LLVM. This allows Wasm to benefit from ahead-of-time compiling optimizations, improving its performance. A Wasm binary is comprised of sections, which are consecutive sequences of bytes in the binary file. In contrast to the absolute order of sections in Windows Portable Programs, sections in Wasm binaries have a relative order between them. Thus, Wasm can be considered a more flexible binary format.

WebAssembly programs operate on a virtual stack that allows for only four data types: i32, i64, f32, and f64. These same data types are used to annotate the numeric operations in the WebAssembly code. Additionally, a WebAssembly program might include several custom sections. For example, binary producers such as compilers use it to store metadata. A WebAssembly code also declares memories and globals, which are used to store, manipulate and share data during program execution, e.g. to share data with the host engine of the WebAssembly binary.

WebAssembly is designed with isolation as a primary consideration. For instance, a WebAssembly binary cannot access the memory of other binaries or interact directly with a browser's built-in API, such as the DOM or the network. Instead, communication with these features is constrained to functions imported from the host engine, ensuring a secure and safe Wasm environment. Moreover, control flow in WebAssembly is managed through explicit labels and well-defined blocks, which means that jumps in the program can only occur inside blocks, unlike regular assembly code.

In Listing 1, we provide an example of a C program that contains a function declaration, a loop, a loop conditional, and a memory access. When the C code is compiled to WebAssembly, it produces the code shown in Listing 2. The stack operations are folded with parentheses. The module in the example contains the components described previously.

2.2. Malware in WebAssembly

The use cases of WebAssembly in browsers focuses on computation-intensive activities such as gaming or image processing. Also, malign actors have taken advantage of WebAssembly to carry out their activities, and cryptojacking is the most common usage observed so far (Musch et al., 2019a; 2019b). The reason for this is that cryptojacking involves executing vast amounts of hash

```
int a[100];
void cc1(){
    for(int i = 0; i < 100;
        ↪ i++){
        a[i] = i;
    }
}
```

Listing 1. C program containing function declaration, loops, conditionals and memory access.

```

(module
  (@custom "producer" "llvm..")
  (func (;5;) (type 1)
    (loop ;; label = @1
      (if ;; label = @2
        (i32.eqz
          (i32.ge_s
            (i32.load
              (local.get 0))
            (i32.const 100)))
        (then (i32.store
          (i32.add
            (i32.shl
              (i32.load
                (local.get 0))
              (i32.const 2))
              (i32.const 1024))
            (i32.load
              (local.get 0)))
          (i32.store
            (local.get 0)
            (i32.add
              (i32.load
                (local.get 0))
              (i32.const 1))))
        (br 1 (;@1;))))
      )
    (memory (;0;) 256)
    (global (;1;) i32 (i32.const 0))
    (export "memory" (memory 0)))
)

```

Listing 2. WebAssembly code for C code in Listing 1.

functions, which requires significant computing resources. In comparison to JavaScript, WebAssembly is significantly faster at handling these intense hashing operations in the browser (Haas et al., 2017).

Web cryptojacking is often carried out by including a malicious JavaScript+WebAssembly payload, which then execute on the victim's browser without their knowledge (Tekiner et al., 2021). For example, websites that offer illegal download or adult sites, often include cryptojacking in their webpages to generate passive income. Since cryptojacking is difficult to detect and remove, it can remain on a victim's computer for an extended period, continuing to consume resources and to generate income for the attacker. This lucrative form of malware does need vulnerabilities or stealing credentials.

2.3. Malware detection

Malware detection determines if a binary is malicious or not. This process can be based on static, dynamic, or hybrid analysis (Aslan and Samet, 2020). In this section, we highlight works in the area of malware detection. Static-based approaches analyze the source code or the binary to find malign patterns without executing them. The literature reports a range of techniques, from simple checksum checking to advanced machine learning methods, that have subsequently been adopted by commercial antivirus (Botacin et al., 2022; Li et al., 2021). In the context of WebAssembly, MineSweeper is a detection method based on static analysis (Konoth et al., 2018) of WebAssembly. Its detection strat-

egy depends on the knowledge of the internals of CryptoNight, one popular library for cryptomining. In the same context, MINOS is a state-of-art static detection tool that converts WebAssembly binaries to vectors for malware detection (Naseem et al., 2021).

MINOS is a practical approach for detecting malicious WebAssembly binaries. It works by converting the Wasm binary's bytestream into a 100×100 grayscale image, which is then fed into a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN). The CNN has learned patterns in the image to classify it as either benign or malicious. This approach is similar to image-based methods used in other areas (Liu and Wang, 2016), e.g., for detecting Windows malware (Kalash et al., 2018; Lachtar et al., 2023). We believe MINOS is the optimal static approach to detect WebAssembly malware due to its simplicity and practicality, such as being easily implemented as a browser extension.

Dynamic analysis for malware detection is based on the execution of the malware code to identify potentially dangerous behaviors (Egele et al., 2008). Usually, this is done by monitoring some functions, such as API calls. For example, BLADE (Lu et al., 2010) is a Windows kernel extension that aims to eliminate drive-by malware installations. It wraps the filesystem for browser downloads for which user consent has been involved. It thwarts the ability of browser-based exploits to download and execute malicious content surreptitiously. SEISMIC and MineThrotle also perform dynamic analyses (Bian et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2018) on WebAssembly binaries to profile instructions that are specific to cryptominers. For example, cryptominers overly execute XOR instructions. SEISMIC and MineThrotle use machine learning approaches to classify the binary as benign or malign based on collecting runtime profiles. On the same topic, MinerRay (Romano et al., 2020) detects cryptojacking in WebAssembly binaries by analyzing their control flow graph at runtime, searching for structures that are characteristic of encryption algorithms commonly used for cryptojacking. CoinSpy is another malware detector based on dynamic analysis (Kelton et al., 2020). It uses a convolutional neural network to analyse the computation, network, and memory information caused by cryptojackers running in client browsers.

Hybrid approaches use a mix of static and dynamic detection techniques. The main reason to use hybrid approaches is the impracticality of executing the whole program. Thus, only pieces of code that can be quickly executed are dynamically analyzed. For example, AppAudit embodies a novel dynamic analysis for Android applications that can simulate the execution of some parts of the program (Xia et al., 2015). For WebAssembly, Outguard (Kharraz et al., 2019) trains a Support Vector Machine model with a combination of cryptomining function names obtained statically and dynamic information such as the number of web workers used in the web application that is analyzed.

It is possible to combine several independent detectors into a meta-antivirus. Each detector embeds some heuristics that are good at detecting specific types of malware (Moser et al., 2007). Hence, their combination can effectively detect a broader range of malware, e.g., using relationship analysis. VirusTotal (Google LLC, 2022; VirusTotal, 2020) is a consolidated meta-antivirus. VirusTotal operates with 60 antivirus vendors to provide malware scanning. Through its API, a program can be labeled by 60 antivirus. This aggregation is used to determine if an asset under analysis is malicious, e.g., by voting. Previous works used VirusTotal to assess detection efficiency, Peng et al. (2019) because it is a proxy to evaluate state-of-art techniques in combination with commercial antivirus. In this work, we follow the same methodology, using VirusTotal to assess our technique's ability to evade cryptojacking detectors.

While concerns have been raised about the use of VirusTotal for some malware and file type families (Botacin et al., 2020), it can be considered for WebAssembly cryptojacking detection. We empiri-

cally highlight later in this paper that VirusTotal is slightly better than the WebAssembly-specific detector MINOS regarding the detection of cryptojacking malware.

2.4. Malware evasion

Malware evasion techniques aim at avoiding malware detection (Afianian et al., 2019). Potential attackers use a wide range of techniques to achieve evasion, such as genetic programming (Castro et al., 2019). With time, the techniques to avoid detection have grown in complexity and sophistication (Aghakhani et al., 2020). For example, Chua and Balachandran (2018) proposed a framework to automatically obfuscate Android applications' source code using method overloading, opaque predicates, try-catch, and switch statement obfuscation, creating several versions of the same malware. Also, machine learning approaches have been used to create evading malware (Dasgupta and Osman, 2021), based on a corpus of pre-existing malware (Bostani and Moonsamy, 2021). While most approaches try to break static malware detectors, more sophisticated techniques avoid dynamic detection, usually involving throttling techniques or dynamic anti-analysis checks (Lu and Debray, 2013; Payer, 2014). Wang proposes the concept of Accrued Malicious Magnitude (AMM) to identify which malware features should be manipulated to maximize the likelihood of evading detection (Wang et al., 2021).

In the context of WebAssembly, malware evasion is nearly unexplored. Only Romano et al. (2022) recently proposed wobfuscator, a code obfuscation technique that transforms JavaScript code into a new JavaScript file and a set of WebAssembly binaries. Their technique mostly focuses on JavaScript evasion and not WebAssembly evasion.

Bhansali et al. (2022) propose a technique where WebAssembly binaries are transformed while maintaining the functionality with seven different source code obfuscation techniques. They evaluate the effectiveness of the techniques against MINOS (Naseem et al., 2021). They show these transformations can generate malware variants that evade the MINOS classifier.

3. WebAssembly cryptojacking malware evasion in practice

Figure 1 illustrates our attack scenario: a practical WebAssembly cryptojacking attack consists of three components: a WebAssembly binary, a JavaScript wrapper, and a backend cryptominer pool. The WebAssembly binary is responsible for executing the hash calculations, which consume significant computational

resources. The JavaScript wrapper facilitates the communication between the WebAssembly binary and the cryptominer pool. Overall, a successful cryptojacking attack on a victim's browser consists in the following sequence of steps. First, the victim visits a web page infected with the cryptojacking code. The web page establishes a channel to the cryptominer pool, which then assigns a hashing job to the infected browser. The WebAssembly cryptominer calculates thousands of hashes inside the browser, in parallel using multiple browser workers (Mozilla, 2022). Once the malware server receives acceptable hashes, it is rewarded with cryptocurrencies for the mining. Then, the server assigns a new job, and the mining process starts over.

Some detection techniques discussed in Section 2.3 can be deployed in the browser directly to prevent cryptojacking. The primary objective of our work is to demonstrate the possibility of using code diversification to bypass cryptojacking defenses. Concretely, the following workflow can happen to successfully evade placed defenses: i) The user visits a webpage that contains a cryptojacking malware, which utilizes network resources to execute, (1) and (2) in Fig. 1. Cryptojacking malware can be injected through malicious browser extensions, malvertising, compromised websites, or deceptive links (Tekiner et al., 2021). ii) A malware detector blocks WebAssembly binaries that are identified as malicious (3). The malware detector system can be implemented locally or remotely. For instance, a proxy can intercept and send network resources to an external detector through the detector's API. iii) The attacker, based on a malware oracle, crafts a WebAssembly cryptojacking malware variant that evade the detection (4). iv) The attacker delivers the modified binary instead of the original one (5), which initiates the cryptojacking process and compromises the browser (6).

The idea is that attackers rapidly diversify their WebAssembly code to stay ahead of the defense system and maintain successful cryptojacking operations. Crucially, attackers must ensure that the diversified binaries they use for cryptojacking meet specific performance requirements, which is an aspect we will study in Section 4.

4. Diversification for malware evasion in WebAssembly

In this section, we explain a technique for potential attackers to craft a WebAssembly binary that evades detection (steps 4, 5 and 6 in Fig. 1).

In Fig. 2 we illustrate our generic architecture for the malware evasion component. The workflow starts by passing a WebAssembly malware binary to a software diversifier (1). The diversifier generates binary variants, which are passed to a malware oracle (2). The oracle returns labeling feedback for the binary variant: malware or benignware. The oracle result is the input for a fitness function that steers the construction of a new binary on top of the previously diversified one. This process is repeated until the malware oracle marks the mutated binary as benign or a timeout is reached (4). For the sake of open science and for fostering research on this important topic, our implementation is made publicly available on GitHub: https://github.com/ASSERT-KTH/wasm_evasion.

4.1. Diversifier

Conceptually, our approach is parametrized by a semantic preserving diversifier (Cohen, 1993). For our prototype implementation, we select one diversifier that supports wasm-to-wasm diversification and performs almost non-costly transformations: wasm-mutate (Bytecodealliance, 2021). This tool takes a WebAssembly module as input and returns a set of variants of that module. wasm-mutate follows the notion of program equivalence modulo input (Le et al., 2014), i.e., the variants should provide the same




Fig. 1. WebAssembly evasion in practice. The user visits a webpage containing cryptojacking malware that uses network resources to operate. A malware detector blocks identified malicious WebAssembly binaries. The attacker, using a malware oracle, creates a WebAssembly cryptojacking malware variant that evades detection. Finally, the attacker delivers the modified binary, initiating the cryptojacking process and compromising the browser.




Fig. 2. Our original workflow of binary diversification for malware evasion in WebAssembly. The workflow begins with a WebAssembly malware binary sent to a software diversifier. The diversifier creates binary variants, which are analyzed by a malware oracle that labels them as malware or benignware. The oracle's results guide the development of a new binary based on the previous one. This process continues until the malware oracle labels the mutated binary as benign or a timeout occurs.

output for the same program inputs. It represents the search space for new variants as an e-graph (Willsey et al., 2020), and it exploits the property that any traversal through the e-graph represents a semantically equivalent variant of the input program. wasm-mutate can generate thousands of semantically equivalent variants from a single binary in a few minutes.

Wasm-mutate defines 135 possible transformations on an input WebAssembly binary, grouped into three categories. The peephole operator is the first category. It is responsible for rewriting instruction sequences in function bodies. It selects a random instruction within the binary functions and applies one or more of the 125 rewrite rules. Finally, it re-encodes the WebAssembly module with the new, rewritten expression to produce a binary variant. The second category of transformations in wasm-mutate implements module structure transformations. It operates at the level of the WebAssembly binary structure. It includes the following eight transformations: add a new type definition, add/modify custom sections, add a new function, add a new export, add a new import, add a new global, remove a type and remove a function. The third transformation category is on the control flow graph of a function code level. wasm-mutate performs two possible transformations: unroll a loop or swap the branches of a conditional block.

The decision of using wasm-mutate as a diversifier is based on three key factors. First, while diversification approaches for WebAssembly from LLVM sources exist (Cabrera Arteaga et al., 2022; Cabrera-Arteaga et al., 2021), compiler-based diversification may include compiler fingerprints in the built binaries, which is bad for stealthy evasion. Second, while optimization-based approaches could be used to diversify WebAssembly binaries from source code (Ren et al., 2021), optimizations are usually all applied at once, providing a smaller diversification space, hence fewer opportunities for evasion. Finally, wasm-mutate is a tool that implements many useful semantically equivalent transformations, making it well-suited as a diversifier with minimal engineering effort. Therefore, using wasm-mutate as a diversifier provides a practical approach for evasion in WebAssembly. We believe that attackers would take the same path and reach the same conclusion.

For the sake of illustration, in Listing 3, we present a variant of the WebAssembly code shown in Listing 2. We generate this variant using the wasm-mutate diversifier, with two transformations. The changes made to the original code are highlighted in orange and green. The first transformation, highlighted in orange, involves removing the custom section that indicates the producer of the original binary. The second transformation, highlighted in green, replaces the shift-left operation in the original binary with two consecutive multiplications of the same value.

```

(module
  - (@custom "producer" "llvm..")
  (func (;5;) (type 1)
    (loop ; label = @1
      (if ; label = @2
        (i32.eqz
          (i32.ge_s
            (i32.load
              (local.get 0))
            (i32.const 100)))
        )
      )
    )
  )
  (then (i32.store
    (i32.add
      (i32.mul
        (i32.load
          (local.get 0))
        (i32.load
          (local.get 0)))
      )
    )
    (i32.const 1024)
  )
  (i32.load
    (local.get 0)))
  (i32.store
    (local.get 0)
    (i32.add
      (i32.load
        (local.get 0))
      (i32.const 1))))
  (br 1 (;@1;)))
)
...

```

Listing 3. Wasm-mutate transformation applied over Listing 2.

4.2. Malware oracle

To determine whether a given sample is malicious or not, we rely on a malware oracle. The simplest form of malware oracle is a binary classifier that outputs a label of {malware, benignware}. In addition to binary classifiers, we also consider numerical oracles

that provide a value representing the likelihood that a sample is malicious.

In our experiments, we use [VirusTotal \(2020\)](#) as our malware oracle. VirusTotal operates with 60 antivirus vendors to provide malware scanning. Users submit binaries, and they receive labels from different vendors. The resulting 60 labels can then be used to determine if a queried asset is malicious, e.g., by voting. VirusTotal can be used as both a binary and a numerical oracle ([Zhu et al., 2020](#)). We use VirusTotal as a binary oracle by returning malware if at least one vendor classifies the binary as malware. We also use VirusTotal as a numerical oracle, using the number (between 0 and 60) of oracles labeling a binary as malware.

Research ([Botacín et al., 2020](#)), classification labels assigned to samples by vendors in VirusTotal can change over time due to new antivirus releases. In our work, we operate under the assumptions outlined in [Section 3](#) and consider a scenario where an attacker develops and executes an evasion technique in under an hour. This timeframe is significantly shorter than the time it takes for classification labels to change in VirusTotal, which typically takes several days.

4.3. Transformation selection & fitness function

The third step of our workflow consists of two actions towards synthesizing a malware variant: select a wasm-mutate transformation to apply; and determine if the transformation is applied. This latter decision depends on: 1) the result of the malware oracle at the previous iteration and 2) an estimation of the ability of the new transformation to generate an evading binary. For this estimation, we implement two variations of our evasion algorithm.

First, we use a binary malware oracle. In this context, we always apply the transformation. This is the *baseline evasion algorithm*, which is discussed in more detail later.

The second variation of the evasion algorithm includes a fitness function that uses a numerical oracle to estimate if the transformation should be applied. The fitness function uses the information from VirusTotal and is the total number of vendors (between 0 and 60) that label a binary as malware:

$$FF(m) = \sum_{i=0}^{i=60} \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } v_i(m) \text{ returns malware} \\ 0 & \text{i.o.c} \end{cases}$$

This fitness function is used in our second proposed algorithm and is discussed in details below.

4.3.1. Baseline evasion

The baseline evasion algorithm is described in [Algorithm 1](#). It uses VirusTotal as a binary oracle (true if at least one VirusTotal detects malware, false otherwise). In this algorithm, step 1 is in line 3, steps 2 and 4 are in lines 4 to 6, and step 3 is in line 7. Each iteration of this algorithm, “stacks” a transformation on top of the previous ones (line 7) until the binary is marked as benign (line 5) or the maximum number of iterations is reached (line 2).

With this algorithm, a transformation is randomly selected at each iteration, and always applied. Hence, the baseline algorithm

Algorithm 1: Baseline evasion algorithm.

```

input : binary  $W$ , diversifier  $D$ , Malware Oracle  $MO$ 
output: Benign binary  $M'$ 
 $M \leftarrow W$ while Not max iterations do
     $M' \leftarrow D(M)$ if  $MO(M') == "benign"$  then
         $\quad \quad \quad \text{return } M'$ ;
    else
         $\quad \quad \quad \text{ } M \leftarrow M'$ ;
return "Not evaded";

```

Algorithm 2: MCMC evasion algorithm.

```

input : binary  $W$ , diversifier  $D$ , fitness function  $FF$ 
output: Benign binary  $M'$ 
 $M \leftarrow W$ previous_fitness =  $FF(W)$ while Not max iterations do
     $M' \leftarrow D(M)$ current_fitness =  $FF(M')$ if  $current\_fitness == 0$ 
    then
        // Zero means that none vendor marks// the binary as malwarereturn  $M'$ ;
    else
         $p \leftarrow \text{random()}$ if
             $p < \min\left(1, \exp\left(\sigma \frac{\text{previous\_fitness}}{\text{current\_fitness}}\right)\right)$  then
                 $\quad \quad \quad \text{ } M \leftarrow M'; \text{previous\_fitness} = \text{current\_fitness};$ 
return "Not evaded";

```

can require many iterations and oracle queries to turn the original malware into a misclassified binary. Second, some transformations might suppress the effect of previous ones. Third, the baseline algorithm considers each vendor equally good at detecting a malware, which is naive as the vendors display considerable diversity regarding detection strength. An algorithm that would target evasion on the strongest vendor first would increase the overall performance of the evasion process. Finally, we might generate a binary that entirely evades the oracle but is unpractical in terms of size or its execution performance.

4.3.2. MCMC evasion

To overcome the limitations of the baseline algorithm, we devise the *MCMC evasion algorithm*, which we now discuss. It is a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling ([Hastings, 1970](#)) of the transformations to apply ([Schkufza et al., 2012](#)). MCMC is used to sample from the space of transformation sequences to maximize the likelihood of oracle evasion in two ways.

The algorithm for the MCMC evasion is given in [Algorithm 2](#). The halting condition is met when a mutated binary is marked as benign, or a maximum number of iterations is reached. The algorithm implements the MCMC in lines 6 to 15. The Markov decision function in line 12 is used to determine whether it is worth applying the transformation at this step or whether it should be skipped. This decision function is based on the current transformation's fitness and the fitness value saved at the previous step (line 14). The core idea is to favor a binary variant that evades the largest number of vendors (lines 4 and 13). Therefore, the number of oracle calls should decrease as the algorithm searches for transformations that converge toward total evasion. On the other hand, if a new transformation step decreases the fitness value, it is likely to be ignored. The classical MCMC acceptance criteria in line 12 is meant to prevent the algorithm from being stuck in local minima.

In line 12, the fraction calculated in the exponentiation is controlled by the σ parameter. By setting a low σ parameter, we can turn the MCMC evasion algorithm into a greedy algorithm. In this case, the algorithm selects a new transformation only if the fitness value is higher than in the previous iteration. On the contrary, if the σ parameter is significant, the algorithm searches for local maxima. In our experiments ([Section 5](#)), we explain how we select the values of σ .

The MCMC evasion algorithm addresses the three limitations of the baseline mentioned in the previous section. First, the fitness function selects transformations, thus reducing the total number of transformations that are actually performed. Second, MCMC aims at increasing fitness, which reduces the risk of suppressing a valuable transformation performed in the previous step. Third, by

favoring solutions that maximize the number of evaded vendors, MCMC biases the search towards evading the strongest vendors.

5. Experimental methodology

In this section, we enunciate the research questions around which we assess the ability of our technique to evade malware detectors. We also describe our dataset of malware, as well as the metrics we define to answer our research questions.

5.1. Research questions

- **RQ1. To what extent can cryptojacking malware detection be bypassed by WebAssembly diversification?** With this research question, we evaluate the feasibility of binary transformations on malware and how they affect the detection of cryptojacking.
- **RQ2. To what extent can the attacker minimize the number of calls to the cryptojacking detection oracle?** In real-world scenarios, the number of calls to the oracle is limited. With this question, we analyze the ability of our technique at limiting the number of oracles calls made during the evasion process.
- **RQ3. To what extent do the evasion techniques impact cryptojacking malware functionality?** The evasion algorithms might generate variants that evade the detectors but modify their core malicious functionality. This research question evaluates the correctness of the created variants, as well as their efficiency.

• **RQ4. What are the most effective transformations for WebAssembly cryptojacking malware evasion?** This research question provides empirical evidence on which types of transformations are better for WebAssembly cryptojacking evasion.

• **RQ5. To what extent can Wasm diversification evade cryptojacking detection with MINOS?** In this research question, we evaluate the feasibility of our technique for evading a state-of-the-art detector, MINOS, which is tailored to the analysis of WebAssembly.

5.2. Dataset selection

To answer our research questions, we curate a dataset of WebAssembly malware. For this, we filter the wasmbench dataset of [Hilbig et al. \(2021\)](#) to collect suspicious malware according to VirusTotal. The wasmbench dataset contains 8643 binaries collected from GitHub repositories and web pages in 2021. To our knowledge, this dataset is the newest and most exhaustive collection of real-world WebAssembly binaries. On August 2022, we passed the 8643 binaries of wasmbench to [VirusTotal \(2020\)](#), and we 33 binaries were marked as potentially dangerous by at least one antivirus vendor of VirusTotal. All malware were marked as cryptojacking programs and we use these WebAssembly binaries to answer our research questions for cryptojacking malware evasion.

In [Table 1](#) we describe the 33 binaries detected as malware by VirusTotal. The table contains the following properties as columns:

Table 1

The 33 real-world WebAssembly cryptojacking used in our experiments. The table contains: the 256 hash of the WebAssembly cryptojacking, its size in bytes, the number of instructions, the number of functions defined inside the binary and the number of VirusTotal vendors that detect the binary at the time of writing. The last column contains the origin of the binary.

Hash	S	#I.	#F.	#D	Origin
9d30e7f0	68,796	30,768	61	30	http archive
8ebf4e44	68,803	30,768	61	26	Web crawling
47d29959	68,796	30,768	61	31	Yara^a
aafff587	97,551	47,033	72	6	SEISMIC^b
dc11d82d	67,496	30,246	49	20	MinerRay^c
0d969462	70,972	30,531	30	19	SEISMIC, MinerRay
fbdd1efa	94,270	45,905	40	18	SEISMIC
a32a6f4b	94,461	45,940	40	18	SEISMIC
d2141ff2	70,111	31,783	30	9	MinerRay, SEISMIC
046dc081	74,099	31,783	29	6	MinerRay, SEISMIC
24aae13a	62,458	28,339	37	4	SEISMIC
000415b2	62,466	28,339	37	3	SEISMIC
643116ff	73,010	31,866		6	MinerRay
006b2fb6	87,502	39,544	90	4	DeepMiner^d
15b86a25	100,755	45,881	79	4	MinerRay
4cbd9bb1	104,666	47,916	62	3	SEISMIC
119c53eb	137,320	67,069	79	2	SEISMIC
f0b24409	77,572	34,918	59	2	MinerRay
c1be4071	77,572	34,918	59	2	MinerRay
a74a7cb8	77,572	34,918	59	2	MinerRay
a27b45ef	77,572	34,918	59	2	MinerRay
6b8c7899	77,572	34,918	59	2	MinerRay
68ca7c0e	77,572	34,918	59	2	MinerRay
65debcb6	77,572	34,918	59	2	MinerRay
5bc53343	77,572	34,918	59	2	MinerRay
59955b4c	77,572	34,918	59	2	MinerRay
942be4f7	103,520	46,208	79	4	MinerRay
fb15929f	77,054	33,562	112	4	MinerRay
7c36f462	121,931	55,839	79	4	MinerRay
89a3645c	75,003	34,134	58	2	MinerRay
dceaf65b	77,575	34,901	58	2	MinerRay
089dd312	79,883	34,989	58	2	MinerRay
e09c32c5	71,955	32,416	46	1	MinerRay

^a Yara project <https://github.com/davbo/yara-rs/tree/master/sample-miners>.

^b All Wasm binaries of the MinerRay project could be found at <https://github.com/miner-ray/miner-ray.github.io/tree/master/Data/SampleWasmFiles>.

^c All Wasm binaries of the SEISMIC project could be found at <https://github.com/wenhao1006/SEISMIC>.

^d Deepminer project <https://github.com/deepwn/deepMiner>.

the identifier of the WebAssembly binary which is the sha256 hash of its bytestream, its size in bytes, the number of instructions, the number of functions defined inside the binary and the number of VirusTotal vendors that detect the binary. The last column contains the origin of the binary according to the wasmbench dataset.¹

The programs include between 30 and 70 functions, for a total number of instructions ranging from 30,531 to 55,839. The size of the programs ranges from 62 to 103 kilobytes. These binaries are detected as malicious by at least 1 antivirus, and at most 31. We have observed that 6 out of 33 binaries can be executed end-to-end.

To validate that the detected binaries are cryptojacking, we manually analyze each of the 33 binaries identified as malign. First, we observe that the binaries in the dataset originate from two primary sources: project SEISMIC and project MinerRay. SEISMIC (Wang et al., 2018) is a research project about instrumentation and monitoring at runtime to detect cryptojacking binaries. MinerRay is also a research project to detect crypto mining processes in web browsers (Romano et al., 2020). Both projects have collected the binaries as real cryptojacking from the web and the dataset is a union of them.

Second, we observe that all binaries share code from cryptonight (XMRIG, 2016), which is a library for cryptomining hashing. This observation is consistent with the findings of Romano et al. (2020). We find 5 binaries that are multivariant packages (Cabrera Arteaga et al., 2022) of cryptonight. A multivariant package is a binary containing more than one hashing function. Concretely, the binaries 0d996462, d2141ff2, 046dc081, a32a6f4b and fbdd1efa contain between 2 and 3 versions of hashing functions cryptonight_hash.

Third, our manual analysis of the binaries reveals 6 main sources for these differences. (1) **Versions:** the binaries do not depend on the same version of cryptonight, (2) **Function reordering:** The order in which the functions are declared inside the binary changes (3) **Innocuous expressions:** Expressions have been injected into the program code, but their execution does not affect the semantic of the original program (4) **Function renaming:** The name of the functions exported to JavaScript have been changed (5) **Data layout changes:** The data needed by the cryptominers has different location in the WebAssembly linear memory. (6) **Partial cryptonight:** Some binaries exclude cryptonight functions, i.e., the cryptonight_create, cryptonight_destroy, cryptonight_hash functions. It is interesting to note that changes in function order, function names, or data layout leads to different programs that have the same number of instructions and functions, as is the case for 9 of our malign binaries.

5.3. Methodology

Based on our dataset of WebAssembly binaries, we follow the following procedures to answer our research questions.

RQ1: Evasion effectiveness To answer RQ1, we execute the baseline evasion algorithm discussed in Section 4.3. We first pass a sus-

¹Binaries that could be found in a live webpage at the moment of this writing are marked with ● http://.

²Yara project <https://github.com/davbo/yara-rs/tree/master/sample-miners>

³All Wasm binaries of the MinerRay project could be found at <https://github.com/miner-ray/miner-ray.github.io/tree/master/Data/SampleWasmFiles>

⁴All Wasm binaries of the SEISMIC project could be found at <https://github.com/wenhao1006/SEISMIC>

⁵Deepminer project <https://github.com/deepwn/deepMiner>

picious binary to wasm-mutate. The diversified version is passed to VirusTotal as a binary oracle. If at least one vendor still detects the diversified binary, we pass it to wasm-mutate again to stack a new random transformation. We repeat this process until VirusTotal does not label the binary as malware or reach a limit of 1000 transformations. The process is performed 10 times with 10 different random seeds for each binary.

RQ2: Oracle minimization Malicious actors have a limited budget to perform evasion before they get caught. The number of oracle calls is a proxy for such a budget, i.e., the lesser the number of oracle calls, the lesser effort spent. To answer RQ2, we aim at minimizing the number of oracle calls while keeping the same evasion effectiveness. In particular, we assess the capability of the MCMC evasion algorithm to minimize the number of calls to the malware oracle (Metric 1). For this, we execute the MCMC evasion algorithm (Algorithm 2) one time for each malware binary of our dataset. We use VirusTotal as an oracle and stop when we reach a limit of 1000 transformations. Since MCMC has a configuration parameter σ , we repeat the process with three σ values: 0.01, 0.3, and 1.1. The σ -value weights exploration and exploitation of transformations during the evasion process. For example, the first value is low, favoring exploration at the most, meaning that the MCMC algorithm will take any new transformation, whether it increases the fitness function value or not. On the contrary, the largest value 1.1 favors the exploitation and, meaning that during evasion, MCMC will only accept transformations with higher values from the oracle, i.e., more evaded detectors. We manually select the third value 0.3 as the balance between exploration and exploitation.

RQ3: Malware functionality A diversified binary that fully evades the detection, might not be practical due to behavioral or performance issues. RQ3 complements our first two research questions with a correctness and an efficiency evaluation. For every cryptojacking that can be executed, we reproduce all cryptominer components (described in Section 2.2) and replace the WebAssembly binaries with variants that fully evade VirusTotal. For each executable cryptojacking program, we generate 10 variants with the baseline evasion algorithm as well as 10 variants with the MCMC algorithm, with σ value 0.3 to balance the MCMC exploration-exploitation. Then, we replace the original cryptojacking by each of the 20 variants in order to determine that the behavior of the original cryptojacking program is preserved in the variants (Demetrio et al., 2021).

Our end-to-end pipelines provide data on the number of generated hashes in the webpage component as an HTML element. Besides, the number of successful or incorrect jobs are logged by the miner pool. This information can be used to measure both the correctness and efficiency of the generated WebAssembly variants. To collect data on the number of hashes per second, the webpage is accessed with Puppeteer, while the miner pool logs are saved to measure the number of successful and failed jobs with their respective log time. By analyzing these two types of data, the overall correctness and effectiveness of a diversified WebAssembly binary can be determined.

To check correctness, we verify that the hashes generated by the variants are valid. We determine whether the hashes reach the third component of a cryptojacking (see Section 2.2), i.e., how many successful and failed jobs are reported by the miner pool. If a miner pool correctly accepts the hashes, then the cryptojacking variant generated by our evasion algorithms is considered correct.

To check for efficiency, we measure the frequency of hashes produced by the variants binaries. For each WebAssembly cryptojacking and its generated variants, we execute and measure the hashes produced per second, during 1000 s. For each malware variant, we check if the hash production frequency is still in the same order of magnitude as the original.

RQ4: Individual transformation effectiveness As discussed in [Section 4.1](#), our diversifier comprises 135 possible transformation operators. In this research question, we want to study which transformations perform better in evading the VirusTotal malware detection oracle. This investigation will help future researchers and detectors engineers to improve their detection methods and tackle subversive transformations.

We use a value of $\sigma = 1.1$ to tune the MCMC evasion algorithm. With this parameter, the MCMC evasion algorithm only keeps transformations that significantly contribute to improving the fitness of the variant. In other words, a transformation is applied if at least one more detector of VirusTotal is evaded. Then, we count the number of applied transformations, aggregated by its type. By measuring this, we obtain the most used one (resp. the least used), and, therefore, understand where malware researchers should focus for counter-evasion.

RQ5: Effectiveness against MINOS This research question assesses the effectiveness of our evasion technique with respect to the state-of-the-art WebAssembly malware detector, MINOS ([Naseem et al., 2021](#)). This detector takes a Wasm binary as input and creates a 100×100 grayscale image from its pure byte stream. Using a Convolutional Neural Network, the generated image is classified as benign or malware.

We replicate MINOS. However, the model of MINOS is not publicly available, so we train our own model for this experiment. We use our own dataset to train the model with 33 malign programs and 33 benign programs. The 33 malign programs for training MINOS are the same listed in [Table 1](#), the 33 benign programs are collected from the original MINOS reproduction steps. Our reproduction of MINOS achieves the same results as the original paper, based on one-off validation. Our reproduction of MINOS is publicly available at <https://github.com/ASSERT-KTH/ralph>.

We use MINOS as an oracle and follow the same method proposed in RQ1, passing each one of the binaries in [Table 1](#) to our diversifier and then to MINOS. For each binary, we do the process 10 times with 10 different seeds, generating a total of 330 variants with no more than 1000 stacked mutations.

5.4. Metrics

In this section, we define the notions of total and partial evasion used in this work to measure the impact of the evasion algorithms proposed in [Section 4.3](#). Besides, we also define the number of oracle calls and number of stacked transformations metrics. In addition, we define the metrics for correct hashes generated by the malware variants and the hashes generation speed.

Definition 1. Total evasion: Given a malware WebAssembly binary, an evasion algorithm generates a variant that totally evades detection if *all* detectors that originally identify the binary as malware identify the variant as benign.

Definition 2. Partial evasion: Given a malware WebAssembly binary, an evasion algorithm generates a variant that partially evades detection if *at least one* detector that originally identifies the binary as malware identifies the variant as benign.

Metric 1. Number of oracle calls: The number of calls made to the malware oracle during the evasion process.

Metric 2. Number of stacked transformations: The total number of transformations applied on the initial malware binary during the evasion process.

Notice that **Metric 1** is the number of times that lines 4 and 5 in [Algorithms 1](#) and [2](#) are executed, respectively. The same could

be applied to **Metric 2**, in lines 7 and 13 of [Algorithms 1](#) and [2](#), respectively.

The main purpose of WebAssembly cryptominer is to calculate hashes. By measuring the number of calculated hashes per time unit, we can measure how performant the cryptojacking is. Therefore, the impact of the evasion process over the performance of the created binary can be measured, calculating the number of hashes per time unit:

Metric 3. Crypto hashes per second (h/s): Given a WebAssembly cryptojacking, the crypto hashes per second metric is the number of successfully generated hashes in one second.

Metric 4. Correct crypto hashes: Given a WebAssembly cryptojacking, the number of correct crypto hashes is the number of hashes that the WebAssembly cryptojacking generates and that the miner pool accepts as valid.

6. Experimental results

In section, we answer our four research questions regarding the feasibility of WebAssembly diversification for malware evasion.

6.1. RQ1. Evasion effectiveness

We run our baseline evasion algorithm with a limit of 1000 iterations per binary. At each iteration, we query VirusTotal to check if the new binary evades the detection. This process is repeated with 10 random seeds per binary, resulting in a maximum of 10,000 queries per original binary. In total, we generate 98,714 variants for the original 33 suspicious binaries.

[Table 2](#) shows the data to answer RQ1. The table contains as columns: the hash of the program, calculated as the sha256 hash, as its identifier, the number of initial VirusTotal detectors flagging the malware, the number of evaded antivirus vendors (cf. [Definition 2](#)) and the mean number of iterations needed to generate a variant that fully evades the detection (cf. [Definition 1](#)). The rows of the table are ordered with respect to the number of detectors for the original binary.

We observe that the baseline evasion algorithm successfully generates variants that totally evade detection for 30 out of 33 binaries. The mean value of iterations needed to generate a variant that evades all detectors ranges from 120 to 635 stacked transformations. For the 30 binaries that completely evade detection, we observe that the mean number of iterations to evade is correlated to the number of initial detectors. For example, the a32a6f4b binary, initially flagged by 18 detectors, requires around 635 iterations, while the 309c32c5, with only one initial flag, needs 120 iterations. The mean number of iterations needed is always less than 1000 stacked transformations.

[Figure 3](#) shows the evasion process with four different seeds for the binary 046dc081. Each point in the x-axis represents 50 iterations, and the y-axis represents the number of VirusTotal detectors flagging the binary. Three out of 4 seeds manage to totally evade VirusTotal in less than 250 iterations. We have observed that there are better evasion techniques than pure random transformations. For example, the seed represented by the green line partially evades the oracle but shows no tendency to evade detection before 300 iterations. Besides, some transformations help some classifiers to detect the mutated binary. These phenomena are empirically exemplified in [Fig. 3](#) in which the curves is not always monotonously decreasing, like the blue-colored curve. In this case, it goes from 3 VirusTotal detectors to 5 during the 50–100 iterations.

There are 3 binaries for which the baseline algorithm does not completely evade the detection. In these three cases, the algorithm misses 5 out 31, 6 out of 30 and 5 out 26 detectors. The explanation is the maximum number of iterations (1000) we use for our

Table 2

Baseline evasion algorithm for VirusTotal. The table contains as columns: the hash of the program, the number of initial VirusTotal detectors, the maximum number of evaded antivirus vendors and the mean number of iterations needed to generate a variant that fully evades detection. The rows of the table are sorted by the number of initial detectors, from left to right and top to bottom.

Hash	#D	Max. #evaded	Mean #trans.
47d29959	31	26 (83.8%)	N/A
9d30e7f0	30	24 (80.0%)	N/A
8ebf4e44	26	21 (80.7%)	N/A
dc11d82d	20	20 (100.0%)	355
0d996462	19	19 (100.0%)	401
a32a6f4b	18	18 (100.0%)	635
fbd1fe1a	18	18 (100.0%)	310
d2141ff2	9	9 (100.0%)	461
aaff587	6	6 (100.0%)	484
046dc081	6	6 (100.0%)	404
643116ff	6	6 (100.0%)	144
15b86a25	4	4 (100.0%)	253
006b2b66	4	4 (100.0%)	282
942be4f7	4	4 (100.0%)	200
7c36f462	4	4 (100.0%)	236
f1b15929f	4	4 (100.0%)	297
24aae13a	4	4 (100.0%)	252
000415b2	3	3 (100.0%)	302
4cbdbbb1	3	3 (100.0%)	295
65debcbe	2	2 (100.0%)	131
59955b4c	2	2 (100.0%)	130
89a3645c	2	2 (100.0%)	431
a74a7cb8	2	2 (100.0%)	124
119c53eb	2	2 (100.0%)	104
0894d312	2	2 (100.0%)	153
c1be4071	2	2 (100.0%)	130
dceaf65b	2	2 (100.0%)	140
6b8c7899	2	2 (100.0%)	143
a27b45ef	2	2 (100.0%)	145
68ca7c0e	2	2 (100.0%)	137
f0b24409	2	2 (100.0%)	127
5bc53343	2	2 (100.0%)	118
e09c32c5	1	1 (100.0%)	120




Fig. 3. The figure shows the evasion process with four seeds for binary 046dc081. Each point in the x-axis represents 50 iterations, and the y-axis represents the number of VirusTotal detectors.

experiments. However, having more iterations seems not a realistic scenario. For example, if some transformations increment the binary size during the transformation, a considerably large binary might be impractical for bandwidth reasons.

On the other hand, there is a balance between generating variants and avoiding detection by defense mechanisms. For example, VirusTotal detects when it is being stressed with too many requests and too many queries can be detected and blocked, effectively ruining evasion. In our attack scenario, where VirusTotal is used as an external detector (see Section 3), we must be mindful of this limit. In contrast, when defense mechanisms such as MINOS are

placed locally, we believe that the number of queries is not necessarily limited.

Wasm-mutate performs mutations based on the input binary. In the experiments for RQ1, the input binaries for the baseline algorithm comes from the application of a previous mutation. Yet, we have observed that some transformations can be applied in any order. This means that different sequences of transformations can produce the same binary variant. This often happens when two mutation targets inside the binary are different, such as two disjoint pieces of code. Therefore, a potential parallelization for the baseline algorithm is possible as soon as transformation sequences do not interfere with others.

Overall, our experiments prove that wasm-mutate is a powerful tool to perform malware evasion. By carefully selecting the order and type of transformations applied, it is possible to generate program variants that are both performant and effective at evading detection. This same idea is explored in the next section.

Answer to RQ1: The baseline evasion algorithm with wasm-mutate clearly decrease the detection rate by VirusTotal antivirus vendors for cryptojacking malware. We achieve total evasion of WebAssembly cryptojacking malware in 30/33 (90%) of our malware dataset.

6.2. RQ2. Oracle minimization

With RQ2, we analyze the effect of the MCMC evasion algorithm in minimizing the number of calls to the malware oracle (**Metric 1**). To answer RQ2, we execute the MCMC evasion algorithm discussed in [Algorithm 2](#).

In [Table 3](#) we can observe the impact of the MCMC evasion algorithm on our reference dataset. The first two columns of the table are the original program's hash and the number of initial VirusTotal detectors flagging the malware. The remaining columns are divided into two categories, maximum detectors evaded ([Definition 2](#)) and the number of oracle calls if total ([Definition 1](#)). Each one of the two categories contains the result for both evasion algorithms, first the baseline algorithm (BL) followed by the three σ -values analyzed in the MCMC evasion algorithm. Notice that, for the baseline algorithm, the number of oracle calls is the same value as the number of transformations needed to evade by construction. We highlight in bold text the values for which the baseline or the MCMC evasion algorithms are better than each other, the lower, the better.

We observe that the MCMC evasion algorithm successfully generates variants that totally evade the detection for 30 out of 33 binaries, it thus as good as the baseline algorithm. The improvement happens in the number of oracle calls. The oracle calls needed for the MCMC evasion algorithm are 92% of the needed on average for the baseline evasion algorithm.

For 21 of 30 binaries that evade detection entirely, we observe that the mean number of oracle calls needed is lower than those in the baseline evasion algorithm. For example, f0b24409 needs 11 oracle calls with the MCMC evasion algorithm to fully evade VirusTotal, while for the baseline evasion algorithm, it needs 127 oracle calls. For those 21 binaries, it needs only 40% of the calls the baseline evasion algorithm needs.

The impact of the MCMC evasion algorithm is illustrated in [Fig. 4](#). Each point in the x-axis represents 50 iterations, and the y-axis represents the number of VirusTotal detectors flagging binary 046dc081. 2 out of 3 σ -values manage to totally evade VirusTotal in less than 400 iterations. On the contrary, lower acceptance criteria $\sigma = 1.1$ (green line) partially evades the oracle, but does not fully evade within the maximum 1000 iterations limit of the experiment.

The σ value in the [Algorithm 2](#) provides the acceptance criteria for new transformations in the MCMC evasion algorithm.

Table 3

MCMC evasion algorithm for VirusTotal. The first two columns of the table are: the identifier of the original program and the number of initial detectors. The remaining columns are divided into two categories, maximum detectors evaded if partial evasion and number of oracle calls if total evasion. Each one of the two categories contains the result of the evasion algorithms, first the baseline algorithm (BL) followed by the three σ -values analysed in the MCMC evasion algorithm. We highlight in bold text the values for which the baseline or the MCMC evasion algorithms are better from each other. Overall, the MCMC evasion algorithm needs less oracle calls than the baseline algorithm.

Hash	#D	Max. evaded			#Oracle calls		
		BL	MCMC		BL	MCMC	
			$\sigma = 0.1$	$\sigma = 0.3$		$\sigma = 0.01$	$\sigma = 0.3$
47d29959	31	26	19	12	10		
9d30e7f0	30	24	17	9	10		
8ebf4e44	26	21	13	5	4		
dc11d82d	20	20	14	15		355	446
0d996462	19	19	14	4		401	697
a32a6f4b	18	18	6	1		635	625
fbdd1efa	18	18	3	3		310	726
d2141f12	9	9	9	5		461	781
aafff587	6	6	2	6		484	331
046dc081	6	6	6	6		404	159
643116ff	6	6	6	6		144	436
15bb6a25	4	4	4	4		253	208
006b2fb6	4	4	4	4		282	380
942be4f7	4	4	4	4		200	200
7c36f462	4	4	4	2		236	221
fb15929f	4	4	2	4		297	475
24aae13a	4	4	4	4		252	401
000415b2	3	3	3	3		302	376
4cbd9bb1	3	3	3	3		295	204
65debcb6	2	2	2	2		131	33
59955b4c	2	2	2	2		130	33
89a3645c	2	2	2	2		431	319
a74a7cb8	2	2	2	2		124	33
119c53eb	2	2	2	2		104	45
089dd312	2	2	2	2		153	166
c1be4071	2	2	2	2		130	33
dceaf65b	2	2	2	2		140	166
6b8c7899	2	2	2	2		143	33
a27b45ef	2	2	2	2		145	33
68ca7c0e	2	2	2	2		137	33
f0b24409	2	2	2	2		127	11
5bc53343	2	2	2	2		118	33
e09c32c5	1	1	1	1		120	488
				0			921




Fig. 4. The figure shows the MCMC evasion process for the binary 046dc081. Each point in the x-axis represents 50 iterations, and the y-axis represents the number of VirusTotal detectors. The figure shows less chaotic progress for oracle evasion.

We run the MCMC evasion algorithm with three values to better understand the extent to which the transformation space is explored to find a binary that evades successfully. We have observed that for a large value of σ , meaning low acceptance, 16 binaries cannot be mutated to evade VirusTotal entirely. The main reason is that, in this case, the MCMC evasion algorithm discards transformations that increase the number of oracle calls. Therefore, the algorithm gets stuck in local minima and never finds a binary that entirely evades. On the contrary, a small value of σ

accepts more new transformations even if more detectors flag the binary.

According to our experiments, $\sigma = 0.3$ offer a good acceptance trade-off. However, the best value of σ actually depends on the binary to mutate. Therefore, we cannot conclude the best value of σ for the whole dataset. This is a consequence of the particularities of each one of the original binaries and its detectors. For example, we have observed that for the bottom part of **Table 3** the highest value of σ works better overall. The main reason is the low number of original detectors. In those cases, the exploration space for transformations is smaller. Thus, for the MCMC evasion algorithm, the chances of a local minimum for the fitness function to be global are larger. Therefore, the MCMC evasion algorithm with low acceptance criteria can find the binary that fully evades in fewer iterations. On the contrary, if the number of initial detectors is more significant, the exploration space is too big to explore in 1000 max iterations. The reason is that the MCMC evasion algorithm applies one transformation per time. While we provide fine-grained analysis in our work, more than one transformation per iteration could be applied in the MCMC evasion algorithm to solve this.

In all 3 cases for which neither the baseline nor the MCMC evasion algorithms could find a binary that fully evades, the maximum evaded detectors are less for the MCMC evasion algorithm. The main reason is that the MCMC evasion algorithm might prevent transformations for which the number of detectors increases. As previously discussed, it is stuck in local minima, which means that it does not explore transformation paths for which a higher

Table 4

Malware correctness and efficiency. We execute each cryptojacking that can be reproduced, with the original malware, and with 10 baseline variants and 10 MCMC variants. The first left section indicates the identifier of the original binary and its original frequency of hash generation. The second section of the table shows correctness percentage and hashes per second for ten variants generated with our baseline algorithm. The third section of the table shows correctness percentage and hashes per second for ten variants generated with the MCMC algorithm. After each frequency of hashing measurement, we indicate the relative difference with the original frequency, in parentheses. A difference larger or equal to 1.0 indicates a variant that is faster or as efficient as the original; a difference lower than 1.0 is a variant slower than the original.

Hash	Original h/s	Baseline algorithm					MCMC algorithm				
0d996462	116.0	100%	25 (0.22)	100%	24 (0.21)	100%	26 (0.22)	100%	116 (1.00)	100%	70 (0.60)
		100%	116 (1.00)	100%	110 (0.95)	100%	30 (0.26)	100%	110 (0.95)	100%	76 (0.66)
		100%	55 (0.47)	100%	27 (0.23)	100%	23 (0.20)	100%	86 (0.74)	100%	60 (0.52)
		100%	27 (0.23)					100%	76 (0.66)		100%
a32a6f4b	48.0	100%	25 (0.52)	100%	24 (0.50)	100%	24 (0.50)	100%	26 (0.54)	100%	45 (0.94)
		100%	26 (0.54)	100%	25 (0.52)	100%	26 (0.54)	100%	46 (0.96)	100%	41 (0.85)
		100%	26 (0.54)	100%	24 (0.50)	100%	25 (0.52)	100%	44 (0.92)	100%	42 (0.88)
		100%	23 (0.48)					100%	45 (0.94)		100%
fbdd1efa	37.0	100%	25 (0.68)	100%	25 (0.68)	100%	25 (0.68)	100%	28 (0.76)	100%	47 (1.27)
		100%	25 (0.68)	100%	26 (0.70)	100%	26 (0.70)	100%	47 (1.27)	100%	47 (1.27)
		100%	25 (0.68)	100%	25 (0.68)	100%	25 (0.68)	100%	48 (1.30)	100%	48 (1.30)
		100%	25 (0.68)					100%	47 (1.27)		100%
d2141ff2	113.0	100%	54 (0.48)	100%	55 (0.49)	100%	55 (0.49)	100%	107 (0.95)	100%	107 (0.95)
		100%	57 (0.50)	100%	56 (0.50)	100%	56 (0.50)	100%	109 (0.96)	100%	106 (0.94)
		100%	57 (0.50)	100%	53 (0.47)	100%	53 (0.47)	100%	101 (0.89)	100%	100 (0.88)
		100%	55 (0.49)					100%	107 (0.95)		100%
046dc081	118.0	100%	58 (0.49)	100%	60 (0.51)	100%	59 (0.50)	100%	118 (1.00)	100%	120 (1.02)
		100%	60 (0.51)	100%	55 (0.47)	100%	62 (0.53)	100%	120 (1.02)	100%	116 (0.98)
		100%	55 (0.47)	100%	50 (0.42)	100%	57 (0.48)	100%	119 (1.01)	100%	120 (1.02)
		100%	55 (0.47)					100%	120 (1.02)		100%
006b2fb6	8.0	100%	7 (0.88)	100%	6 (0.75)	100%	4 (0.50)	100%	6 (0.75)	100%	6 (0.75)
		100%	9 (1.12)	100%	6 (0.75)	100%	4 (0.50)	100%	6 (0.75)	100%	6 (0.75)
		100%	4 (0.50)	100%	6 (0.75)	100%	4 (0.50)	100%	8 (1.00)	100%	9 (1.12)
		100%	6 (0.75)					100%	6 (0.75)		100%

number of detectors could lead to better long-term results and, eventually, full evasion.

Answer to RQ2: The MCMC evasion algorithm needs fewer oracle calls than the baseline algorithm. In 21 cases out of 33, it needs only 40% of oracle calls compared to the baseline, providing more stealthiness to the malicious organization directing the evasion. The acceptance criterion σ of the MCMC evasion algorithm needs to be carefully crafted depending on the original binary.

6.3. RQ3. Malware functionality

To answer RQ3, we select the six binaries we can build and execute end-to-end, because we have access to the three components previously mentioned in Section 2.2. For those six binaries, we are able to replace the original WebAssembly binary with variants generated by our evasion algorithms.

We execute the original binary and the variants generated by the baseline and MCMC evasion algorithms. The essence of a cryptojacking is to generate hashes at high-speed. Consequently, we assess the correctness of the variants concerning two properties: validity of the hashes and frequency of hash generation. With Metric 4, we determine the validity of the generated hashes by checking if the backend miner pool accepts them. The frequency is measured as the amount of hashes produced by the variant binaries in one second (Metric 3).

Table 4 summarizes the key data for RQ3. Each row of the table corresponds to one binary that can be executed end-to-end, by reproducing the three components mentioned in Section 2.2. The first two values of each row are the original binary's identifier and its original frequency of hash generation. Then, for our baseline algorithm, each row has the data for 10 variants generated during a successful oracle evasion. For each one of the variants, we include the correctness percentage and the hashes calculated per second. The last group of columns of the table contains the correctness percentage and the hashes calculated per second for the 10 variants generated with the MCMC algorithm. After each frequency of

hashing measurement, we indicate the relative difference with the original frequency in parentheses. A difference larger or equal to 1.0 means that the variant is faster or as efficient as the original. On the contrary, the variant is slower if the difference is lower than 1.0. The table contains the information for 120 variants.

We use the backend miner pools (see Section 2.2) of the six cryptojacking to determine the validity of the hashes computed by all the programs. All correctness assessments for the 120 variants indicate that the miner pools do not detect any invalid hash when executing the WebAssembly cryptominer variants. This means that the variants synthesized by the baseline and the MCMC algorithms to evade the malware oracle can still systematically generate valid hashes.

We have observed that 23 of 120 variants are more efficient than the original cryptojacking. For example, for the fbdd1efa binary, all its variants are from 1.27 to 1.43 faster than the original hash generation frequency. This phenomenon occurs because wasm-mutate can perform transformations in the executable code, which work as optimizations. Our experiments have revealed two sources of faster WebAssembly variants: loop unrolling transformations and code replacements that lead to smaller binaries. We have also found that debloating transformations, which remove unneeded structures and dead code, results in more hashes being produced by the cryptominer in the first few seconds of mining, likely because of faster compilation.

In summary, all this is evidence that focused optimization is a good primitive for evasion. On the contrary, 97 out of 120 variants underperform compared to the original binary. The worst case is the binary 0d996462. Its slowest variant has 0.20 of the original generation frequency. The main reason is that wasm-mutate also introduces non-optimal transformations regarding performance.

The variants generated by the baseline evasion algorithm tend to be slower than the MCMC evasion algorithm. The MCMC evasion algorithm triggers fewer oracle calls and can generate variants faster than the ones generated by the evasion algorithm. This phenomenon is a direct consequence of the MCMC evasion algo-




Fig. 5. Distribution of the number of hashes per second for the variants generated for the original `fbdd1efa` cryptojacking. In the figure we include the original binary (in blue), ten variants generated by the baseline algorithm (in orange), and ten variants generated by the MCMC evasion algorithm (in green). (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

rithm implementation, which has a selective strategy when applying transformations on a binary (see [Algorithm 2](#)). In summary, the MCMC evasion algorithm produces variants that fully evade the VirusTotal oracle with lower performance overhead during execution. The worst performant variant is only 1.93 times slower for the MCMC evasion algorithm.

In [Fig. 5](#), we plot the distribution of the hashes per second for variants generated for the `fbdd1efa` cryptojacking. In the figure, we include the original binary (in blue), the ten variants generated by the baseline algorithm (in orange), and the ten variants generated by the MCMC evasion algorithm (in green). Each violin plot corresponds to the hashes per second. We observe a normal distribution around the exact number of hashes per second. In this case, we have observed that the MCMC evasion algorithm provides a hash-per-second ratio better than the original. This phenomenon can be observed in the lines inside the violin plots, the green line is shifted to the right compared to the lines of the blue violin plot.

Answer to RQ3: Our algorithms synthesize WebAssembly cryptojacking variants that fully evade our malware oracle and that provide the same functionality as the original. The execution of evading malware systematically produces valid hashes, and the variations in performance are imperceptible. For 19% of the generated variants, we observe better performance, and in the worst case, the generated variant underperforms by five times the original binary.




Fig. 6. Distribution of applied transformation for the MCMC evasion algorithm with $\sigma = 1.1$ (low acceptance). The x-axis displays the names of the transformations. The y-axis indicates the number of transformations found in the generated variants. We can observe which transformations perform better in order to provide total evasion.

6.4. RQ4. Individual transformation effectiveness

With RQ4, we investigate what individual transformations are the most appropriate to generate evading malware variants. Both attackers and defenders can leverage this information as follows. On the one hand, attackers know which transformation operators they can discard to speed-up the search for evading malware and minimize calls to the oracle. On the other hand, defenders can focus on the most effective transformations to evade antivirus. For example, one way to defend against evasion is to use transformation as a preprocessing stage prior to detection. This can help to ensure that detection is more robust to potential evasion vectors.

In [Fig. 6](#) we plot the distribution of transformations applied by the MCMC evasion algorithm with $\sigma = 1.1$ when it generates variants that fully evade the VirusTotal oracle. On the x-axis, we provide the name of the transformation, as wasm-mutate implements them. The y-axis is the absolute number of transformations found among the generated variants. The transformations are sorted in decreasing order of usage in the variants. We use two colors for transformations: transformations that affect the execution of the binary (in blue color) and transformations that do not (in orange color). For example, adding a new type definition does not affect the execution of the binary, while a peephole transformation does.

First, we concentrate on non-behavioral transformations in orange. The most effective transformation is to add a random function, which is present 117 times in the evading binaries. The next most present structural transformation is the `modify custom section` transformation. This highlights the sensitivity of malware detectors to the custom section. We note that custom section modification at the bytecode level provides advantages against source code obfuscation because we are sure that the compiler does not add metadata information that would help malware detectors. In other words, metadata information injected by compilers into WebAssembly binaries ([Hilbig et al., 2021](#)), could be removed from being part of possible detection.

Transformations `remove function` and `remove type` also affect malware detection. This novel observation indicates that VirusTotal is looking for code common in malware yet dead code. For example, malware detectors probably check for code that does not affect the original functionality of the binary. Thus, if this information is removed, the detector misses the malware. In other terms, by removing code, the detection surface is reduced.

```
...
local.get 0
```

```
i32.const 4
```

```
i32.add
```

```
...
```

Listing 4. Original piece of code for the 089a3645c WebAssembly binary.

```
...
local.get 0
i64.const -461681990785514485
drop
i32.const 0
i32.shr_u
i32.const 4
i32.add
...

```

Listing 5. Peephole mutations of Listing 4. Only with this mutation VirusTotal passed from 2 initial detectors to 0 in our experiments.

The most significant transformation to generate evading malware consists of peephole transformations (the largest bar of the figure at the left-hand side of the figure). The peephole transformations operate at the bytecode instruction level. For example, in Listings 4 and 5 we show a piece of the binary 089a3645c, and one peephole transformation applied, respectively. The transformation in the listings corresponds to a variant generated with the MCMC evasion algorithm. Only this transformation is required to fully evade for the 089a3645c binary.

Our results show that malware detectors should prioritize the detection of peephole transformations in WebAssembly, to increase the likelihood of detecting cryptojacking. For example, the transformation of Listing 5 can be reversed with static analysis.

When we answer our four research questions, we generate WebAssembly cryptominer variants by adding one transformation at a time (See Section 4.3). This method allows us to answer our research questions at a fine-grained level. For instance, the answer to RQ4 could only be possible if the transformations are analyzed one by one in the evasion process. Now, our method can be easily tuned to one-shot evasion: the algorithms could apply multiple transformations simultaneously to produce evading malware in one iteration. Consequently, the evasion process proposed in this work could be faster and more practical for a potential attacker. On the other hand, our algorithms stop as soon as one binary is diversified enough to provide total evasion. Since the overhead introduced by wasm-mutate is imperceptible, the transformation process can generate remarkably more binaries. Our approaches could escalate to infinite cryptojacking variants.

Answer to RQ4: Our experiments reveal that peephole transformations are the most effective for WebAssembly cryptojacking malware evasion. We also show that transformations on non-executable parts of WebAssembly binaries can contribute to evasion. These novel observations are crucial for cryptojacking malware detector vendors to prioritize their work on improving malware detection.

6.5. RQ5. Effectiveness against MINOS

To evaluate the effectiveness of MINOS at detecting diversified malware, we reuse the protocol of RQ1. We repeatedly stack ran-

Table 5

The table provides the identifier of the program as its sha256 hash value and the mean number of iterations required to totally evade MINOS. Each binary was mutated with the baseline algorithm 10 times.

Hash	Mean #trans.	Hash	Mean #trans.
24aae13a	980.0	000415b2	960.0
59955b4c	38.0	119c53eb	1.0
fb15929f	1.0	5bc53343	33.0
47d29959	100.0	dc11d82d	115.0
a27b45ef	33.0	006b2fb6	1.0
942be4f7	29.0	7c36f462	85.0
0d996462	24.0	15b86a25	1.0
8ebf4e44	92.0	a7447cb8	38.0
fbdd1efa	1.0	089dd312	68.0
65debcb6	38.0	aaffff87	1.0
046dc081	33.0	6b8c7899	38.0
a32a6f4b	1.0	d2141ff2	81.0
68ca7c0e	38.0	dceaf65b	66.0
9d30e7f0	419.0	4cbd6bb1	1.0
643116ff	47.0	c1be4071	38.0
e09c32c5	15.0	f0b24409	33.0
89a3645c	108.0		

dom mutations to the original malware binary until MINOS is fully evaded or the maximum number of iterations is reached. We repeat this process 10 times for each binary. The results of our experiment are presented in Table 5. The table provides the identifier of the program and the mean number of iterations required to synthesize a variant that fully evades MINOS.

Our technique completely evades MINOS in all cases. In 2 cases out of 33, wasm-mutate needs more than 900 iterations to evade MINOS. The main reason is the application of symmetric mutations. For example, in some cases, wasm-mutate performs mutations that copy parts of the binary to another program location. Thus, when the binary is turned into a grayscale image, the embedding of the image is preserved, i.e., the code has changed, but the shape of the image has not. The contrary happens when non-symmetric mutations are applied. For example, removing functions also removes embeddings of the grayscale image used by MINOS.

Remarkably, this experiment shows that WebAssembly diversification requires fewer iterations to evade MINOS than VirusTotal, meaning that it is easier to evade MINOS. The minimum number of iterations needed overall for evading VirusTotal are 118 for the baseline algorithm Table 2 and 11 for the MCMC algorithm Table 3, while for MINOS, wasm-mutate totally evades detection for 8 out of 33 binaries in one single iteration. This shows that the MINOS model is fragile wrt binary diversification. According to those results, VirusTotal can be considered better than MINOS wrt to cryptojacking detection.

To further enhance the detection capabilities of MINOS, we believe in binary canonicalization (Bruschi et al., 2007). By creating a canonical representation of the malware variant before training and inference, one would help the classifier to better generalize. This is feasible as it is a preprocessing step in the pipeline. We believe this is an interesting direction for future work.

Answer to RQ5: Our approach fully evades detection by the WebAssembly antivirus MINOS. In our study, we achieve evasion for all cryptojacking binaries in our dataset. wasm-mutate needs fewer iterations to totally evade MINOS compared to VirusTotal, validating VirusTotal as a baseline.

7. Discussion

In this section, we discuss the key challenges we faced, in order to help future research projects on similar topics.

Dataset size The dataset is smaller than other similar works for malware evasion. However, the related work does not consider WebAssembly – e.g. Ling et al. (2023) focus on Windows. For example,

while Tekiner and colleagues consider cryptojacking (Tekiner et al., 2021), we entirely focus only on WebAssembly cryptojacking malware. In this context, to the best of our knowledge, wasmbench is the most complete dataset of WebAssembly binaries. We analyze this dataset through the lens of VirusTotal and systematically extract all the cryptojacking malware it includes. Despite novelty, we acknowledge that the limited size of our malware dataset poses a challenge in terms of the generalizability of our results. Some types of malware might be absent from our dataset. To address this issue, one solution for future work would consist in expanding the dataset by using the inherent diversity found within the popular Cryptonight library. One could utilize the release history of their GitHub repository to compile and mine distinct, yet semantically equivalent malware instances. This approach would entail the exploration of a broader range of variations of cryptojacking malware. Yet, this is considered as a new research paper per se as the process of mining and compiling code from a repository's release history is both time-consuming and computationally demanding. This is due to the need to analyze, filter, and compare a vast number of code commits and releases, as well as to validate their semantic equivalence. This process is even more complex in the case of malware reproduction due to the complex architecture in which this type of software operates (cf. Fig. 1).

VirusTotal observations The final labelling of binaries for VirusTotal vendors is not definitive (Zhu et al., 2020). For example, a VirusTotal vendor could label a binary as benign and change it later to malign after several weeks. This phenomenon creates a time window in which slightly changed binaries (fewer iterations in our case) sometimes evade the detection of numerous vendors. Also, we have observed that when our evasion algorithms manage to evade, some VirusTotal vendors result in timeout in several cases. This suggests that the evasion effectiveness is also due to performance constraints on the VirusTotal side.

Lack of abstraction A WebAssembly cryptojacking can only exist with its web complements. As we previously discussed, a browser cryptojacking needs to send the calculated hashes to a cryptocurrency service. This network communication is outside the WebAssembly accesses and needs to be delegated to a JavaScript code. We have observed that, the imports and the memory data of the WebAssembly binaries have a high variability in our dataset. The imported functions from JavaScript change from binary to binary. Their data segments also differ in content and length. This suggests that the whole JavaScript-WebAssembly polyglot package is the right direction for cryptojacking detection.

Mitigation As we noted in our response to RQ4 and RQ5, we believe that code canonicalization and is a promising mitigation technique if they are applied directly to WebAssembly. One way to do this would be to modify a diversifier such as wasm-mutate into a binary optimizer completely based on e-graph. This would provide canonicalization through a compact representation of WebAssembly code. In turn, malware variants with the same ancestor would be more seen as the "same" program, from its canonical representation.

8. Conclusion

We have demonstrated the potential for WebAssembly cryptojacking malware to be diversified and evade detection by leading malware detectors, such as VirusTotal and MINOS. Our generated variants are functional, performant, and do not trigger malware detection. Our evaluation of the technique against 60 state-of-the-art antivirus through the meta-tool VirusTotal highlights the superiority of meta-antiviruses over single tailored defenses, even when the latter are specifically designed for WebAssembly cryptojacking binaries such as MINOS. By studying effective code transformations for evading cryptojacking detection, our work provides valuable in-

sights and guidance for researchers in the field to better mitigate evasion.

As future work, we will improve the evasion fitness functions by including malware program properties, w.r.t. both evasion and malware execution performance. Some argue that the future of malware detection lies in machine learning. In future work, we believe in using our diversification technique to provide data augmentation for better malware detection.

Declaration of Competing Interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Data availability

Data will be made available on request.

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WASM-MUTATE: FAST AND EFFECTIVE BINARY DIVERSIFICATION FOR WEBASSEMBLY

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Submitted to Computers & Security, under revision

WASM-MUTATE: Fast and Effective Binary Diversification for WebAssembly

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ABSTRACT

WebAssembly has quickly ascended as a promise for web development, renowned for its efficiency and expanding utility beyond browser environments. Yet, the burgeoning ecosystem of WebAssembly compilers and tools has created a need for robust software diversification techniques. Traditional approaches, often tied to specific compilation pipelines, can be restrictive in their scope and application.

We introduce WASM-MUTATE, a compiler-agnostic WebAssembly diversification engine. It is engineered to fulfill key criteria: the rapid generation of semantically equivalent yet behaviorally diverse WebAssembly variants, universal compatibility with existing WebAssembly programs, and the capability to counter high-risk security threats. Utilizing an e-graph data structure, WASM-MUTATE pioneers its usage in the realm of software diversification. Our assessments reveal that WASM-MUTATE can efficiently generate tens of thousands of unique WebAssembly variants in a matter of minutes. Additionally, it can produce variants with distinct machine code instruction traces and memory profiles in milliseconds. Notably, WASM-MUTATE's generated variants are fortified against Spectre attacks. This research not only delivers a potent tool for WebAssembly diversification but also contributes valuable insights for the development of more secure and resilient WebAssembly applications.

1. Introduction

WebAssembly is the fourth official language of the web, complementing HTML, CSS and JavaScript as a fast, platform-independent binary format [21, 40]. Since its introduction in 2015, it has seen rapid adoption, with support from all major browsers, including Firefox, Safari and Chrome. WebAssembly has also been adopted outside of browsers, with world-leading execution platforms like Fastly using it as a foundational technology for their content delivery network [17]. In addition to major ones like LLVM, more and more compilers and tools can output WebAssembly binaries [23, 45, 26]. With this prevalence, it is of utmost importance to design software protection techniques for WebAssembly [27].

Software diversification is a well-known software protection technique [12, 4, 19], consisting of producing numerous variants of an original program, each retaining equivalent functionality. Software diversification in WebAssembly has many important application domains, such as optimization [5] and malware evasion [8]. It can also be used for fuzzing, a salient example of this was the discovery of a CVE in Fastly in 2021 [18], achieved through automated transformations to a WebAssembly binary.

To develop an effective WebAssembly diversification engine, several key requirements must be met. First, the engine should be language-agnostic, enabling diversification of any WebAssembly code, regardless or the source programming language and compiler toolchain. Second, it must

have the capability to swiftly generate semantically equivalent variants of the original code. The speed at which this diversification occurs holds potential for real-time applications, including moving target defense [6]. The engine should also possess the ability to counter attackers by producing sufficiently distinct code variants. This paper presents an original system, WASM-MUTATE, that addresses all these requirements.

WASM-MUTATE is a tool to automatically transforms a WebAssembly binary program into a variant binary program that preserves the original functionality. The core of the diversification engine relies on an e-graph data structure [48]. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to use an e-graph for software diversification in WebAssembly. An e-graph offers one essential property for diversification: every path through the e-graph represents a functionally equivalent variant of the input program [48, 37]. A random e-graph traversal can also be very efficient, supporting the generation of tens of thousands of equivalent variants from a single seed program in minutes [29]. Consequently, the choice of e-graphs is the key to build a diversification tool that is both effective and fast. We have designed 135 rewriting rules in WASM-MUTATE, which can transform the e-graph from fine to coarse grained levels.

We assess the effectiveness of WASM-MUTATE with respect to its capacity at generating variants, which code is different from the original and which execution exhibit diverse instruction and memory traces. Our empirical evaluation reuses an existing corpus from the diversification literature [7]. We also measure the speed at which WASM-MUTATE is able to generate the first variant that exhibits a trace different from the original. Our security assessment of WASM-MUTATE consists in evaluating the degree to which diversification can mitigate Spectre attacks. This assessment

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is made with WebAssembly programs that have been previously identified as vulnerable to Spectre attacks [36].

Our results demonstrate that WASM-MUTATE can generate thousands of variants in minutes. These variants have unique machine code after compilation with cranelift (static diversity) and the variants exhibit different traces at runtime (dynamic diversity). Our experiments also provide evidence that the generated variants are hardened against Spectre attacks. To sum up, the contributions of this work are:

- The design and implementation of a WebAssembly diversification pipeline, based on semantic-preserving binary rewriting rules.
- Empirical evidence on the diversity of variants created by WASM-MUTATE, both in terms of static binaries and execution traces.
- Demonstration that WASM-MUTATE can protect WebAssembly binaries against timing side-channel attacks, specifically, Spectre.
- An open-source repository, where WASM-MUTATE is publicly available for future research <https://github.com/bytocodealliance/wasm-tools/tree/main/crates/wasm-mutate>.

This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we introduce WebAssembly, the concepts of semantic equivalence and what we state as a rewriting rule. In section 3, we explain and detail the architecture and implementation of WASM-MUTATE. We formulate our research questions in section 4, answering them in section 5. We discuss open challenges related to our research in section 6, in order to help future research projects on similar topics. In section 7 we highlight works related to our research on software diversification. We finalize with our conclusions section 8.

2. Background

In this section, we define and formulate the foundation of this work: WebAssembly and its runtime structure, semantic equivalence modulo input, rewriting rules and e-graphs. Along with the paper, we use the terms, metrics and concepts defined here.

2.1. WebAssembly

WebAssembly (Wasm) is a binary instruction set initially meant for the web, and now also used in the backend. It was adopted as a standardized language by the W3C in 2017, building upon the work of Haas et al. [21]. One of Wasm’s primary advantages is that it defines its own Instruction Set Architecture (ISA), which is both platform-independent. As a result, a Wasm binary can execute on virtually any platform, including web browsers and server-side environments. WebAssembly programs are compiled ahead-of-time from source languages such as C/C++, Rust, and Go, utilizing compilation pipelines like LLVM.

```
fn main() {
    let mut arr = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5];
    // Variable assignment
    let mut sum = 0;
    // Loop and memory access
    for i in 0..arr.len() {
        sum += arr[i];
    }
    // Use of external function
    println!("Sum of array elements: {}", sum);
}
```

Listing 1: Rust program containing function declaration, loop, conditional and memory access.

```
(module
  (@custom "producer" "llvm..")
  (import "env" "println" (func $println (param i32)))
  (memory 1)
  (export "memory" (memory 0))
  (func $main
    (local $sum i32)
    (local $i i32)
    (local $arr_offset i32)
    ; Initialize sum to 0 ;
    i32.const 0
    local.set $sum
    ; Initialize arr_offset to point to start of the array
    ; in memory ;
    i32.const 0
    local.set $arr_offset
    ; Initialize the array in memory;
    i32.const 0
    i32.const 1
    i32.store
    ...
    i32.store
    ...
loop
  local.get $i
  i32.const 5
  i32.lt_s
  if
    ; Load array[i] and add to sum ;
    local.get $arr_offset
    local.get $i
    ...
    ; Increment i ;
    local.get $i
    i32.const 1
    i32.add
    local.set $i
    br 0
  else
    ; End loop ;
    i32.const 0
  end
end

; Call external function to print sum ;
local.get $sum
call $println
)
; Start the main function ;
(start $main)
)
```

Listing 2: Simplified WebAssembly code for Rust code in Listing 1.

WebAssembly programs operate on a virtual stack that allows primitive data types. Additionally, a WebAssembly

program might include several custom sections. For example, binary producers such as compilers use custom sections to store metadata, such as the name of the compiler that generates the Wasm code. A WebAssembly program also declares memory sections and globals, which are used to store, manipulate and share data during program execution, e.g. to share data with the host engine of the WebAssembly binary.

WebAssembly is designed with isolation as a primary consideration. For instance, a WebAssembly binary cannot access the memory of other binaries or cannot interact directly with browser's APIs, such as the DOM or the network. Instead, communication with these features is constrained to functions imported from the host engine, ensuring a secure and safe Wasm environment. Moreover, control flow in WebAssembly is managed through explicit labels and well-defined blocks, which means that jumps in the program can only occur inside blocks, unlike regular assembly code [22]. In Listing 1, we provide an example of a Rust program that contains a function declaration, a loop, a loop conditional, and a memory access. When the Rust code is compiled to WebAssembly, it produces the code shown in Listing 2. The stack operations are folded with parentheses. The module in the example contains the components described previously.

The WebAssembly runtime structure is described in the WebAssembly specification and it includes 10 key elements: the Store, Stack, Locals, Module Instances, Function Instances, Table Instances, Memory Instances, Global Instances, Export Instances, and Import Instances. These components interact during the execution of a WebAssembly program, collectively defining the state of a program during its runtime.

Two of these elements, the Stack and Memory instances, are particularly significant in maintaining the state of a WebAssembly program during its execution. The Stack holds both values and control frames, with control frames handling block instructions, loops, and function calls. Meanwhile, Memory Instances represent the linear memory of a WebAssembly program, consisting of a contiguous array of bytes. In this paper, we highlight the aforementioned two components to define, compare and validate the state of two Wasm programs during their execution.

2.2. Semantic Equivalence

Semantic equivalence refers to the notion that two programs or functions are considered equivalent if, for a given specified input domain, they produce the same output values or have the same observable behavior [30]. In other words, the semantics of the two programs are equivalent when the input-output relationship (w/ possibly some abstraction), even if the internal implementation details or the structure of the programs differ.

Let us illustrate this with an example. Assume two programs P and P' (Listing 3 and Listing 4 respectively) where P' is the result of modifying a code in the first instruction of its unique function. The program P' has two extra instructions right before returning from the function. The remaining components of the original binary are not modified.

```
func (();) (type 0) (param i32 f32) (result i64)
i64.const 1
```

Listing 3: Program P .

```
func (();) (type 0) (param i32 f32) (result i64)
i64.const 1
i32.const 42
i32.drop
```

Listing 4: Program P' , transformation of program P .

The state of the program P when entering the function is its stack $[S]$, the program P' has the same state before executing the function. The input values of the function for both programs are L , their outputs are the top of the stack at the end of the execution.

Program P has the state $[[S : i32.const 1]]$ just before returning from the function execution. When we trace the states of the program P' , we can construct the following sequence of states:

1. $[[S : i32.const 1]]$ the integer constant 1 is now on the top of the stack.
2. $[[S : i32.const 1, i32.const 42]]$ the integer constant 32 is the top of the stack.
3. $[[S : i32.const 1]]$ the top of the stack is dropped. The function execution stops.

Notice that, the stack state of program P' is the same as program P . Thus, we can say that these two programs are semantically equivalent. Even though the programs share semantic equivalence, they display differences during execution. Specifically, P' stresses more on the stack by adding and subsequently dropping more values. These subtle yet significant differences form the crux of the diversification approaches discussed in this study.

2.3. Rewriting rule

Our definition of a rewriting rule draws from the one proposed by Sasnauskas et al. [41], and integrates a predicate to specify the replacement condition. Concretely, a rewriting rule is defined as a tuple, denoted as $(\text{LHS}, \text{RHS}, \text{Cond})$. Here, LHS refers to the code segment slated for replacement, RHS is the proposed replacement, and Cond stipulates the conditions under which the replacement is acceptable. Importantly, LHS and RHS are meant to be semantically equivalent, per the definition of previous section.

For example, the rewriting rule $(x, x \ i32.or \ x, {})$ implies that the LHS 'x' is to be replaced by an idempotent bit-wise $i32.or$ operation with itself, absent any specific conditions. Notice that, for this specific rule, the commutative property shared by LHS and RHS , symbolized as $(\text{LHS}, \text{RHS}) = (\text{RHS}, \text{LHS})$. Besides, the Cond element could be an arbitrary criterion. For instance, the condition for applying the aforementioned rewriting rule could be to ensure that the newly created binary file does not exceed a threshold binary size.

Based on our understanding, our research is the first to apply the concept of rewriting rules to WebAssembly. This




Figure 1: WASM-MUTATE workflow and high level architecture. It generates semantically equivalent variants from a given WebAssembly binary input. Its central approach involves synthesizing these variants by substituting parts of the original binary using rewriting rules, boosted by a diversification space traversals using e-graphs (refer to subsection 3.3)

will expand the potential use cases of wasm-mutate. Beyond its role as a diversification tool, it can also be used as a standard tool for conducting program transformations in WebAssembly.

3. Design of Wasm-Mutate

In this section we present WASM-MUTATE, a tool to diversify WebAssembly binaries and produce semantically equivalent variants.

3.1. Overview

The primary objective of WASM-MUTATE is to perform diversification, i.e., generate semantically equivalent variants from a given WebAssembly binary input. WASM-MUTATE’s central approach involves synthesizing these variants by substituting parts of the original binary using rewrite rules. It leverages a comprehensive set of rewrite rules, boosted by a diversification space traversals using e-graphs (refer to subsection 3.3).

In Figure 1 we illustrate the workflow of WASM-MUTATE: it starts with a WebAssembly binary as input ①. It parses the original binary ②, turning the input program into appropriate abstractions, in particular WASM-MUTATE builds the control flow graph and data flow graph. Using the defined rewriting rules, WASM-MUTATE builds an e-graph ③ for the original program. An e-graph packages every possible equivalent code derivable from the given rewriting rules [48, 37]. Thus, at this stage, WASM-MUTATE exploits a key property of e-graphs: any path traversal through the e-graph results in a semantically equivalent code. Then, the diversification process starts, with parts of the original program being randomly replaced by traversal of the e-graph ④. The outcome of WASM-MUTATE is a semantically equivalent variant of the original binary ⑤. The tool guarantees semantically equivalent variants because each individ-

ual rewrite rule is semantic preserving.

3.2. WebAssembly Rewriting rules

In total, there are 135 possible rewriting rules implemented in WASM-MUTATE, those rules are grouped under several categories, called hereafter meta-rules. For example, 125 rewriting rules are implemented as part of a peephole meta-rule. There are 7 meta-rules that we present next.

Add type: In WebAssembly, the type section wraps definitions of signatures for the binary functions. WASM-MUTATE implements two rewrite rules, one of which is illustrated in the following rewriting rule.

```
LHS <module>
  (type (;0;) (func (param i32) (result i64)))
```

```
RHS <module>
  (type (;0;) (func (param i32) (result i64)))
+ (type (;0;) (func (param i64) (result i32 i64)))
```

This transformation generates random function signatures with a random number of parameters and results count. This rewriting rule does not affect the runtime behavior of the variant. It also guarantees that the index of the already defined types is consistent after the addition of a new type. This is because Wasm programs cannot access or use a type definition during runtime, they are only used to validate the signature of a function during compilation and validation from the host engine. From the security perspective, this transformation prevents against static binary analysis. For example, to avoid malware detection based on signature set [8].

Add function: The function and code sections of a Wasm binary contain function declarations and the code body of the declared functions, respectively. WASM-MUTATE add new functions, through mutations in the two mentioned sections. To add a new function, WASM-MUTATE creates a random type signature. Then, the random

function body is created. The body of the function consists of returning the default value of the result type. The following example illustrates this rewriting rule.

```
LHS (module
  (type (.0;) (func (param i32 f32) (result i64)))
```

```
RHS (module
  (type (.0;) (func (param i32 f32) (result i64)))
+-----(func (.0.) (type 0) (param i32 f32) (result i64))
+-----i64.const 0)
```

WASM-MUTATE never adds a call instruction to this function. So in practice, the new function is never executed. Therefore, executing both, the original binary and the mutated one with the same input, lead to the same final state. This strategy follows the work of Cohen, advocating the insertion of harmless ‘garbage’ code into a program. These transformations do not impact the program’s functionality; they increase its static complexity.

Remove dead code: WASM-MUTATE can randomly remove dead code. In particular WASM-MUTATE removes: *functions*, *types*, *custom sections*, *imports*, *tables*, *memories*, *globals*, *data segments* and *elements* that can be validated as dead code with guarantees. For instance, to delete a memory declaration, the binary code must not contain a memory access operation. Separate mutators are included within WASM-MUTATE for each of the aforementioned elements. For a more concrete example, the following listing illustrates the case of a function removal.

```
LHS (module (type (func)))
```

```
RHS - (module (import "" "" (func)))
```

Cond The removed function is not called, it is not exported, and it is not in the binary _table.

When removing a function, WASM-MUTATE ensures that the resulting binary remains valid and semantically identical to the original binary: it checks that the deleted function was neither called within the binary code nor exported in the binary external interface. As exemplified above, WASM-MUTATE might also eliminate a function import while removing the function.

Eliminating dead code serves a dual purpose: it minimizes the attack surface available to potential malicious actors [1] and strengthens the resilience of security protocols. For instance, it can obstruct signature-based identification [8]. With Narayan and colleagues having demonstrated the feasibility of Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) attacks [36], the removal of dead code is able to stop jumps to harmful behaviors within the binary. On the other hand, the act of removing dead code reduces the binary’s size, improving its non-functional properties, in particular bandwidth constraints.

Edit custom sections: The custom section in WebAssembly is used to store metadata, such as the name of the

compiler that produces the binary or the symbol information for debugging. Thus, this section does not affect the execution of the Wasm program. WASM-MUTATE includes one mutator to edit custom sections. This is exemplified in the following rewriting rule.

```
LHS (module
  ...
  - (@custom "CS42" "zzz...")
```

```
RHS (module
  ...
  + (@custom "CS42" "xxx...")
```

The *Edit Custom Section* transformation operates by randomly modifying either the content or the name of the custom section. As illustrated by Cabrera-Arteaga et al. [8], such a rewriting strategy also acts as a potent deterrent against compiler identification techniques. Furthermore, it can also be employed in an innovative manner to emulate the characteristics of a different compiler, *masquerading* as another compilation source. This strategy ultimately aids in shrinking the identification and fingerprinting surface accessible to potential adversaries, hence enhancing overall system security, or to make it a moving target.

If swapping: In WebAssembly, an if-construction consists of a consequence and an alternative. The branching condition is executed right before the *if* instruction; if the value at the top of the stack is greater than 0, then the consequence-code is executed, otherwise the alternative-code is run. The *if swapping* rewriting swaps the consequence and alternative codes of an if-construction.

To swap an if-construction in WebAssembly, WASM-MUTATE inserts a negation of the value at the top of the stack right before the *if* instruction. In the following rewriting rule we show how WASM-MUTATE performs this rewriting.

```
LHS (module
  (func ...)
  condition C
    (if A else B end)
  )
```

```
RHS (module
  (func ...)
  condition C
  i32.eqz
    (if B else A end)
  )
```

The consequence and alternative codes are annotated with the letters A and B, respectively. The condition of the if-construction is denoted as c. The negation of the condition is achieved by adding the *i32.eqz* instruction in the RHS part of the rewriting rule. The *i32.eqz* instruction compares the top value of the stack with zero, pushing the value 1 if the comparison is true. Some if-constructions may not have either a consequence or an alternative code. In such cases, WASM-MUTATE replaces the missing code block with a single *nop*

instruction. In the context of ROP [36], this transformation can protect a victim binary to be exploited.

Loop Unrolling: Loop unrolling is a technique employed to enhance the performance of programs by reducing loop control overhead [14]. WASM-MUTATE incorporates a loop unrolling transformation and utilizes the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) of the original Wasm binary to identify loop constructions.

When WASM-MUTATE selects a loop for unrolling, its instructions are divided by first-order breaks, which are jumps to the loop's start. This separation ensures that branching instructions controlling the loop body do not require label index adjustments during unrolling. The same holds true for instructions continuing to the next loop iteration. As the loop unrolling process unfolds, a new Wasm block is created to encompass both the duplicated loop body and the original loop. Within this newly established block, the previously separated groups of instructions are copied. These replicated groups of instructions mirror the original ones, except for branching instructions jumping outside the loop body, which need their jumping indices increased by one. This modification is required due to the introduction of a new `block ... end` scope around the loop body, which affects the scope levels of the branching instructions.

In the following text we illustrate the rewriting rule for a function that contains a loop.

```
LHS (module
  (func ...) (
    (loop A br_if 0 B end)
  )
)

RHS (module
  (func ...) (
    (block
      (block A' br_if 0 B' br 1 end)
      (loop A' br_if 0 B' end)
    end)
  )
)
```

The loop in the LHS part features a single first-order break, indicating that its execution will cause the program to continue iterating through the loop. The loop body concludes right before the `end` instruction, which highlights the point at which the original loop breaks and resumes program execution. Upon selecting the loop for unrolling, its instructions are divided into two groups, labeled `A` and `B`. As illustrated in the RHS part, the unrolling process entails creating two new Wasm blocks. The outer block encompasses both the original loop structure and the duplicated loop body, while the inner blocks, denoted as `A'` and `B'`, represent modifications of the jump instructions in groups `A` and `B`, respectively. Notice that, any jump instructions within `A'` and `B'` that originally leaped outside the loop must have their jump indices incremented by one. This adjustment accounts for the new block scope introduced around the loop body during the unrolling process. Furthermore, an unconditional branch is placed at the end of the unrolled loop iteration's

body. This ensures that if the loop body does not continue, the tool breaks out of the scope instead of proceeding to the non-unrolled loop.

Loop unrolling enhances resistance to static analysis while maintaining the original performance [38]. In particular, Crane et al. [13] have validated the effectiveness of adding and modifying jump instructions against Function-Reuse attacks. Our rewriting rule has the same advantages, it unrolls loops while 1) incorporating new jumps and 2) editing existing jumps, as it can be observed with the addition of the `br_if`, `end`, and `br` instructions.

Peephole: This transformation category is about rewriting instruction sequences within function bodies, signifying the most granular level of rewriting. We implement 125 rewriting rules for this group in WASM-MUTATE. We include rewriting rules that affects the memory of the binary. For example, we include rewriting rules that creates random assignments to newly created global variables. For these rules, we incorporate several conditions, denoted by `Cond`, to ensure successful replacement. These conditions can be utilized interchangeably and combined to constrain transformations (see subsection 3.3).

For instance, WASM-MUTATE is designed to guarantee that instructions marked for replacement are deterministic. We specifically exclude instructions that could potentially cause undefined behavior, such as function calls, from being mutated. For this rewriting type, WASM-MUTATE only alters stack and memory operations, leaving the control frame labels unaffected.

The peephole category rewriting rules are meticulously designed and manually verified. An instance of such streamlined transformation can is illustrated in subsection 2.3, (`x i32.or x, x, {}`) implies that the `LHS` '`x`' is to be replaced by an idempotent bitwise `i32.or` operation with itself, in the absence of any specific conditions. Therefore, this category continues to uphold the benefits previously discussed under the *Remove Dead Code* category.

3.3. E-graphs for WebAssembly

We build WASM-MUTATE on top of e-graphs. An e-graph is a graph data structure utilized for representing rewriting rules [9] and their chaining. In an e-graph, there are two types of nodes: e-nodes and e-classes. An e-node represents either an operator or an operand involved in the rewriting rule, while an e-class denotes the equivalence classes among e-nodes by grouping them, i.e., an e-class is a virtual node compound of a collection of e-nodes. Thus, e-classes contain at least one e-node. Edges within the graph establish operator-operator equivalence relations between e-nodes and e-classes.

In WASM-MUTATE, the e-graph is automatically built from a WebAssembly program by analyzing its expressions and operations through its data flow graph. Then, each unique expression, operator, and operand are transformed into e-nodes. Based on the input rewriting rules, the equivalent expressions are detected, grouping equivalent e-nodes into e-classes. During the detection of equivalent expres-




Figure 2: e-graph for idempotent bitwise-or rewriting rule. Solid lines represent operand-operator relations, and dashed lines represent equivalent class inclusion.

sions, new operators could be added to the graph as e-nodes. Finally, e-nodes within an e-class are connected with edges to represent their equivalence relationships.

For example, let us consider one program with a single instruction that returns an integer constant, `i64.const 0`. Let us also assume a single rewriting rule, $(x, x \text{ i64.or } x, x \text{ instanceof i64})$. In this example, the program's control flow graph contains just one node, representing the unique instruction. The rewriting rule represents the equivalence for performing an `or` operation with two equal operands. Figure 2 displays the final e-graph data structure constructed out of this single program and rewriting rule. We start by adding the unique program instruction `i64.const 0` as an e-node (depicted by the leftmost solid rectangle node in the figure). Next, we generate e-nodes from the rewriting rule (the rightmost solid rectangle) by introducing a new e-node, `i64.or`, and creating edges to the `x` e-node. Following this, we establish equivalence. The rewriting rule combines the two e-nodes into a single e-class (indicated by the dashed rectangle node in the figure). As a result, we update the edges to point to the `x` symbol e-class.

Willsey et al. illustrate that the extraction of code fragments from e-graphs can achieve a high level of flexibility, especially when the extraction process is recursively defined through a cost function applied to e-nodes and their operands. This approach guarantees the semantic equivalence of the extracted code [48]. For example, to obtain the smallest code from an e-graph, one could initiate the extraction process at an e-node and then choose the AST with the smallest size from among the operands of its associated e-class [35]. When the cost function is omitted from the extraction methodology, the following property emerges: *Any path traversed through the e-graph will result in a semantically equivalent code variant.* This concept is illustrated in Figure 2, where it is possible to construct an infinite sequence of "or" operations. In the current study, we leverage this inherent flexibility to generate mutated variants of an original program. The e-graph offers the option for random traversal, allowing for the random selection of an e-node within each e-class visited, thereby yielding an equivalent expression.

We propose and implement the following algorithm to randomly traverse an e-graph and generate semantically

Algorithm 1 e-graph traversal algorithm.

```

1: procedure TRAVERSE(egraph, eclass, depth)
2:   if depth = 0 then
3:     return smallest_tree_from(egraph, eclass)
4:   else
5:     nodes  $\leftarrow$  egraph[eclass]
6:     node  $\leftarrow$  random_choice(nodes)
7:     expr  $\leftarrow$  (node, operands = [])
8:     for each child  $\in$  node.children do
9:       subexpr  $\leftarrow$  TRAVERSE(egraph, child, depth - 1)
10:      expr.operands  $\leftarrow$  expr.operands  $\cup$  {subexpr}
11:    return expr

```

equivalent program variants, see 1. It receives an e-graph, an e-class node (initially the root's e-class), and the maximum depth of expression to extract. The depth parameter ensures that the algorithm is not stuck in an infinite recursion. We select a random e-node from the e-class (lines 5 and 6), and the process recursively continues with the children of the selected e-node (line 8) with a decreasing depth. As soon as the depth becomes zero, the algorithm returns the smallest expression out of the current e-class (line 3). The subexpressions are composed together (line 10) for each child, and then the entire expression is returned (line 11). To the best of our knowledge, WASM-MUTATE, is the first practical implementation of random e-graph traversal for WebAssembly.

Let's demonstrate how the proposed traversal algorithm can generate program variants with an example. We will illustrate Algorithm 1 using a maximum depth of 1. Listing 5 presents a hypothetical original Wasm binary to mutate. In this example, the developer has established two rewriting rules: $(x, x \text{ i32.or } x, x \text{ instanceof i32})$ and $(x, x \text{ i32.add } 0, x \text{ instanceof i32})$. The first rewriting rule represents the equivalence of performing an `or` operation with two equal operands, while the second rule signifies the equivalence of adding 0 to any numeric value. By employing the code and the rewriting rules, we can construct the e-graph depicted in Figure 3. The figure demonstrates the operator-operand relationship using arrows between the corresponding nodes.

```

(module
  (type (;0;) (func (param i32 f32) (result i64)))
  (func (;0;) (type 0) (param i32 f32) (result i64)
    i64.const 1)
)

```

Listing 5: Wasm function.




Figure 3: e-graph built starting in the first instruction of Listing 5.

```
(module
  (type (.0.) (func (param i32 f32) (result i64)))
  (func (.0.) (type 0) (param i32 f32) (result i64)
    (i64.or (
      (i64.add (
        i64.const 0
        i64.const 1
      ))
      i64.const 1
    )))
)
```

Listing 6: Random peephole mutation using egraph traversal for Listing 5 over e-graph Figure 3. The textual format is folded for better understanding.

In Figure 3, we annotate the various steps of Algorithm 1 for the scenario described above. Algorithm 1 begins at the e-class containing the single instruction `i64.const 1` from Listing 5. It then selects an equivalent node in the e-class (2), in this case, the `i64.or` node, resulting in: `expr = i64.or 1 r.` The traversal proceeds with the left operand of the selected node (3), choosing the `i64.add` node within the e-class: `expr = i64.or (i64.add 1 r) r.` The left operand of the `i64.add` node is the original node (5): `expr = i64.or (i64.add i64.const 1 r) r.` The right operand of the `i64.add` node belongs to another e-class, where the node `i64.const 0` is selected (6)(7): `expr = i64.or (i64.add i64.const 1 i64.const 0) r.` In the final step (8), the right operand of the `i64.or` is selected, corresponding to the initial instruction e-node, returning: `expr = i64.or (i64.add i64.const 1 i64.const 0)i64.const 1` The traversal result applied to the original Wasm code can be observed in Listing 6.

3.4. WASM-MUTATE in practice

In practice, WASM-MUTATE serves as a module within a broader process. This process starts from a WebAssembly

binary as input and iterates over the variants generated by WASM-MUTATE in order to provide guarantees. In particular, it ensures that the output variant exhibits a different machine code per the JIT engine that executes it and unique execution traces when running. This process is explicitly laid out in Algorithm 2. One of the key elements in this algorithm is line 8, which activates WASM-MUTATE’s diversification engine.

The algorithm starts by running the original WebAssembly program and recording its original execution traces, as denoted in line 5. These initial traces act as a reference for evaluating subsequent variants. An budget-based loop then initiates, as marked by lines 8 and 9, aiming to apply a series of code transformations. Upon the successful creation of a unique variant, line 11 triggers a JIT compilation within the WebAssembly engine. This step compiles the variant into machine code. The algorithm next assesses whether this machine code diverges from the original, thus confirming the actual diversity. If this condition is satisfied, the algorithm executes the variant to collect its low-level execution traces. The loop ends when a variant is found with new traces that are distinct from the original, as validated in line 15. The algorithm then returns the generated variant, which guarantees that both diversified machine code and traces are different from the original.

Algorithm 2 WASM-MUTATE in practice.

```

1: procedure DIVERSIFY(originalWasm, engine)
2: Input: ▷ A WebAssembly binary to diversify and a WebAssembly
   engine.
3: Output: ▷ A statically unique and behaviourally different
   WebAssembly variant.
4:
5:   originalTrace ← engine.execute(originalWasm)
6:   wasm ← originalWasm
7:   while true do
8:     variantWasm ← WASM-MUTATE(wasm)
9:     wasm ← variantWasm // we stack the transformation
10:    if variantWasm is unique then
11:      variantJIT ← engine.compile(variantWasm)
12:      if variantJIT is unique then
13:
14:        trace ← engine.execute(variantJIT)
15:        if trace ≠ originalTrace then
16:          return variantWasm

```

3.5. Implementation

WASM-MUTATE is implemented in Rust, comprising approximately, 10 thousands lines of Rust code. We leverage the capabilities of the wasm-tools project of the bytecodealliance for parsing and transforming WebAssembly binary code. Specifically, we utilize the wasmparser and wasm-encoder modules for parsing and encoding Wasm binaries, respectively. The implementation of WASM-MUTATE is publicly available for future research and can be found at <https://github.com/bytocodealliance/wasm-tools/tree/main/crates/wasm-mutate>.

Source	Program	RQ	#F	# Ins.	Attack
CROW [7]	303	RQ1, RQ2	7-103	170-36023	N/A
Swivel [36]	btb_breakout	RQ3	16	743	Spectre branch target buffer (btb)
Swivel [36]	btb_leakage	RQ3	16	297	Spectre branch target buffer (btb)
Safeside [36, 20]	ret2spec	RQ3	2977	378894	Spectre Return Stack Buffer (rsb)
Safeside [36, 20]	pht	RQ3	2978	379058	Spectre Pattern History Table (pht)

Table 1

WebAssembly dataset used to evaluate WASM-MUTATE. Each row in the table corresponds to programs, with the columns providing: where the program is sourced from, the number of programs, research question addressed, function count, the total number of instructions found in the original WebAssembly program and the type of attack that the original program was subjected to.

4. Evaluation

In this section, we outline our methodology for evaluating WASM-MUTATE. Initially, we introduce our research questions and the corpus of programs that we utilize for the assessment of WASM-MUTATE. Next, we elaborate on the methodology for each research question. For the sake of reproducibility, our data and experimenting pipeline are publicly available at <https://github.com/ASSERT-KTH/tawasco>. Our experiments are conducted in Standard F4s-v2(Skylake) Azure machines with 4 virtual cpus and 8GiB memory per instance.

RQ1: To what extent are the program variants generated by WASM-MUTATE statically different from the original programs? We check whether the WebAssembly binary variants rapidly produced by WASM-MUTATE are different from the original WebAssembly binary. Then, we assess whether the x86 machine code produced by wasmtime engine is also different.

RQ2: How fast can WASM-MUTATE generate program variants that exhibit different execution traces? To assess the versatility of WASM-MUTATE, we also examine the presence of different behaviors in the generated variants. Specifically, we measure the speed at which WASM-MUTATE generates variants with distinct machine code instruction traces and memory access patterns.

RQ3: To what extent does WASM-MUTATE prevent side-channel attacks on WebAssembly programs? Diversification being an option to prevent security issues, we assess the impact of WASM-MUTATE in preventing one class of attacks: cache attacks (Spectre).

4.1. Corpora

We answer our research questions with a corpus of 307 programs (303 + 4). These programs are summarized in Ta-




Figure 4: Protocol to answer RQ1 and RQ2

ble 1. Each row in the table corresponds to the used programs, with the columns providing: where the program is sourced from, the number of programs, research question addressed, function count, the total number of instructions found in the original WebAssembly program and the type of attack that the original program was subjected to.

We answer RQ1 and RQ2 with corpus of programs from Cabrera et.al. [7], it is shown in the first row of Table 1. The corpus contains 303. The corpus contains programs for a range of tasks, from simple ones, such as sorting, to complex algorithms like a compiler lexer. The number of functions for each program ranges from 7 to 103 and, the number of total instructions ranges from 170 to 36023. All programs in corpus: 1) do not require input from user, i.e., do not functions like `scanf`, 2) terminate, 3) are deterministic, i.e., given the same input, provide the same output and 4) compile to WebAssembly using `wasi-clang` to compile them.

We answer RQ3 with four WebAssembly programs and three Spectre attack scenarios, from the Swivel project [36]. These programs are summarized in the final four rows of our corpus table. The first two programs are manually crafted and contain 16 functions, with instruction counts of 743 and 297, respectively. These binaries are specifically designed to perform the Spectre branch target attack. The third and fourth programs, documented in rows four and five, come from the Safeside project [20]. Unlike the first two, these binaries are significantly larger, each containing nearly 3000 functions and more than 300000 instructions. They are utilized for conducting the Spectre Return Stack (RSB) and Spectre Pattern History (PHT) attacks [28].

There is a notable difference in the number of functions and instructions between the first pair of Swivel binaries and the latter pair. This disparity can be attributed to the varying compilation processes applied to these WebAssembly binaries. The three attack scenarios are described in details in subsection 4.4.

4.2. Protocol for RQ1

With RQ1, we assess the ability of WASM-MUTATE to generate WebAssembly binaries that are different from the original program, including after their compilation to x86 machine code. In Figure 4 we show the steps we follow to answer RQ1. We run WASM-MUTATE on our corpus of 303 original C programs (step ① in figure). To generate the variants: 1) we start with one original and pass it to WASM-MUTATE to generate a variant; 2) the variant and the original program form a population of programs; 3) we randomly select a program from this population and pass it to WASM-MUTATE to generate a variant, which we add to the population; 4) we then restart the process in the previous step. This procedure is carried out for a duration of 1 hour. The final outcome (step ② in figure) is a population with a number of stacked transformations, all starting from an original WebAssembly program. We then count the number of unique variants in the population. We compute the sha256 hash of each variant bytestream in order and define the population size metric as:

Metric 1. *Population_size(P): Given an original WebAssembly program P , a generated corpus of WebAssembly programs $V = \{v_1, v_2, \dots, v_N\}$ where v_i is a variant of P , the population size is defined as:*

$$|\{set(\{sha256(v_1), \dots, sha256(v_N)\})| \forall v_i \in V$$

Since WebAssembly binaries may be further transformed into machine code before they execute, we also check that this additional transformations preserve the difference introduced by WASM-MUTATE in the WebAssembly binary. We use the wasmtime JIT compiler, cranelift, with all available optimizations, to generate the x86 binaries for each WebAssembly program and its variants (step ③ in figure). Then, we calculate the number of unique variants machine code representation for wasmtime. Counting the number of unique machine code, we compute the diversification preservation ratio:

Metric 2. *Ratio of preserved variants: Given an original WebAssembly program P and its population size as defined in Metric 1 and the JIT compiler C , we defined the ratio of preserved variants as:*

$$\frac{|\{set(\{sha256(C(v_1)), \dots, sha256(C(v_N))\})|}{Population_size(P)} \forall v_i \in V$$

If $sha256(P_1) \neq sha256(P_2)$ and $sha256(C(P_1)) \neq sha256(C(P_2))$, this means that both programs are still different after being compiled to machine code, and this means that the cranelift compiler has not removed the transformations made by WASM-MUTATE.

Note that the protocol described earlier can be mapped to Algorithm 2. For instance, to measure population size for each tested program, one could measure how often the execution of Algorithm 2 reaches line 11. Similarly, to assess the level of preservation, one could track the frequency with which the algorithm arrives at line 13.

4.3. Protocol for RQ2

For RQ2, we evaluate how fast WASM-MUTATE can generate variants that offer distinct traces compared with the original program. We start by collecting the traces of the original program when executed in wasmtime. While continuously generating variants with random stacked transformations, we collect the execution traces of the variants as well. We record the time passed until we generate a variant that offers different execution traces, according to two types of traces: machine code instructions and memory accesses. This process can be seen in the enclosed square of Figure 4, annotated with RQ2.

We gather the instructions and memory traces utilizing IntelPIN [33, 16] (step ④ in the figure). To only collect the traces of the WebAssembly execution with a wasmtime engine, we pause and resume the collection as the execution leaves and re-enters the WebAssembly code, respectively. We implement this filtering with the built-in hooks of wasmtime. In addition, we disable ASLR on the machine where the variants are executed. This latter action ensures that the placement of the instructions in memory is deterministic. Examples of the traces we collect can be seen in Listing 7 and Listing 8 for memory and instruction traces, respectively.

```
[Writ] 0x555555ed1570 size=4 value=0x10dd0
[Read] 0x555555ed1570 size=4 value=0x10dd0
```

Listing 7: Memory trace with two events out of IntelPIN for the execution of a WebAssembly program with wasmtime. Trace events record: the type of the operation, read or write, the memory address, the number of bytes affected and the value read or written.

```
[I] mov rdx, qword ptr [r14+0x100]
[I] mov dword ptr [rdx+0xe64], ecx
```

Listing 8: Instructions trace with two events out of IntelPIN for the execution of a WebAssembly program with wasmtime. Each event records the corresponding machine code that executes.

In the text below, we outline the metric used to assess how fast WASM-MUTATE can generate variants that provide different execution traces.

Metric 3. *Time until different trace: Given an original WebAssembly program P , and an its execution trace T_1 , the time until different trace is defined as the time between the diversification process starts and the when the variant V is generated with execution trace T_2 , and $T_1 \neq T_2$.*

Notice that the previously defined metric is instantiated twice, for instructions and memory type of events.

Referring to Algorithm 2, we quantify the elapsed time between line 6 and line 16 to obtain the time it takes for WASM-MUTATE to generate a unique WebAssembly variant producing different execution traces.

4.4. Protocol for RQ3

To answer RQ3, we apply WASM-MUTATE to the same security WebAssembly programs used by Narayan et al. to evaluated Swivel's ability at protecting WebAssembly programs against side-channel attacks [36]. The four cache timing side-channel attacks are presented in detail in subsection 4.1. The specific binary and its corresponding attack can be appreciated in Table 1. We evaluate to what extent WASM-MUTATE can prevent such attacks. In the following text, we describe the attacks we replicate and evaluate in order of answering RQ3.

Narayan and colleagues successfully bypass the control flow integrity safeguards, using speculative code execution as detailed in [28]. Thus, we use the same three Spectre attacks from Swivel: 1) The Spectre Branch Target Buffer (btb) attack exploits the branch target buffer by predicting the target of an indirect jump, thereby rerouting speculative control flow to an arbitrary target. 2) The Spectre Pattern History Table (pht) takes advantage of the pattern history table to anticipate the direction of a conditional branch during the ongoing evaluation of a condition. 3) The Spectre Return Stack Buffer (ret2spec) attack exploits the return stack buffer that stores the locations of recently executed call instructions to predict the target of `ret` instructions. Each attack methodology relies on the extraction of memory bytes from another hosted WebAssembly binary that executes in parallel.

For each of the four WebAssembly binaries introduced in subsection 4.1, we generated a maximum of 1000 random stacked transformations utilizing 100 distinct seeds. This resulted in a total of 100,000 variants for each original WebAssembly binary. We then assess the success rate of attacks across these variants by measuring the bandwidth of the exfiltrated data, that is: the rate of correctly leaked bytes per unit of time. We then count the correctly exfiltrated bytes and divided them by the variant program's execution time.

Notice that, the bandwidth metric captures not only whether the attacks are successful or not, but also the degree to which the data exfiltration is hindered. For instance, a variant that continues to exfiltrate secret data but does so over an impractical duration would be deemed as having been hardened. For this, we state the bandwidth metric in the following definition :

Metric 4. Bandwidth: Given data $D = \{b_0, b_1, \dots, b_C\}$ being exfiltrated in time T and $K = k_1, k_2, \dots, k_N$ the collection of correct data bytes, the bandwidth metric is defined as:

$$\frac{|b_i \text{ such that } b_i \in K|}{T}$$

5. Experimental Results

5.1. To what extent are the program variants generated by WASM-MUTATE statically different from the original programs?

To address RQ1, we utilize WASM-MUTATE to process the original 303 programs from [7]. WASM-MUTATE is set




Figure 5: RQ1: Number of unique WebAssembly programs generated by WASM-MUTATE in 1 hour out of each program of the corpus.

to generate variants with a timeout of one hour for each individual program. Following this, we assess the sizes of their variant populations as well as their corresponding preservation ratio (Refer to Metric 1 and Metric 2 for more details).

In Figure 5, we show the distribution of the population size generated out of WASM-MUTATE. WASM-MUTATE successfully diversifies all 303 original programs, yielding a diversification rate of 100%. Within an hour, WASM-MUTATE demonstrates its impressive efficiency and effectiveness by producing a median of 9500 unique variants for the 303 original programs. The largest population size observed is 53816, while the smallest is 5716. There are several factors contributing to large population sizes.

WASM-MUTATE can diversify functions within WASI-libc. Despite the relatively low function count in the original source code, WASM-MUTATE creates thousands of distinct variants in the function of the incorporated libraries. This feature improves over methods that can only diversify the original source code processed through the LLVM compilation pipeline [7].

We have observed a significant variation in the population size out of WASM-MUTATE between different programs, ranging by several thousand variants (from a maximum of 53816 variants to a minimum of 5716 variants). This disparity is attributed to: the non-deterministic nature of WASM-MUTATE and 2) the characteristics of the program. WASM-MUTATE mutates a randomly selected portion of a program. If the selected instruction is determined to be non-deterministic, despite the transformation being semantically equivalent, WASM-MUTATE discards the variant and moves on to another random transformation. For instance, if the instruction targeted for mutation is a function call, WASM-MUTATE proceeds to the next one. This process, in conjunction with the unique characteristics of each program, results in a varying population size. For example, an input binary with a high number of function calls would lead to a greater number of trials and errors, slowing down the generation of variants, thereby resulting in a smaller overall population size for 1 hour of WASM-MUTATE execution.

As stated in subsection 4.2, we also assess static diver-




Figure 6: RQ1: Distribution of the ratio of wasmtime preserved variants.

sification with Metric 2 by calculating the preservation ratio of variant populations. Figure 6 presents the distribution of preservation ratios for the cranelift compiler of wasmtime. We have observed a median preservation ratio of 62%. On the one hand, we have observed that there is no correlation between population size and preservation ratio. In other words, having a larger population size does not necessarily lead to a higher preservation ratio. On the other hand, the phenomena of non-preserved variants can be explained as follows. Factors such as custom sections are often disregarded by compilers. Similarly, bloated code plays a role in this context. For instance, WASM-MUTATE generates certain variants with unused types or functions, which are then detected and eliminated by cranelift. Yet, note that even when working with the smallest population size and the lowest preservation percentage, the number of unique machine codes can still encompass thousands of variants.

Answer to RQ1: WASM-MUTATE generates WebAssembly variants for the 303 programs, which are different from the original program. Within a one-hour diversification budget, WASM-MUTATE synthesizes more than 9000 unique variants per program on average. 62% of the variants remain different after machine-code compilation. WASM-MUTATE is good at producing a large number of WebAssembly program variants.

5.2. How fast can WASM-MUTATE generate program variants that exhibit different execution traces?

To answer question RQ2, we measure how long it takes to generate one variant that exhibits execution traces that are different from the original. In Figure 7, we display a cumulative distribution plot showing the time required for WASM-MUTATE to generate variants with different traces, in blue for machine code instructions and green for memory traces. The X-axis marks time in minutes, and the Y-axis shows the ratio of programs from 303 for which WASM-MUTATE created a variant within that time. For all original program, WASM-MUTATE succeeds in generating one variant with different traces comparing to the original program, either in machine code instructions or memory access,




Figure 7: RQ2: Cumulative distribution for time until different trace. In blue for different machine code instructions, in green for different memory traces. The X-axis marks time in minutes, and the Y-axis shows the ratio of programs from 303 for which WASM-MUTATE created a variant within that time.

ie both cumulative distributions reach 100The shortest time to generate a variant with different machine code instruction traces is 0.12 seconds, and for different memory traces, it is 0.06 seconds. In the slowest scenarios, WASM-MUTATE takes under 1 minute for different machine code instruction traces and less than 3 minutes for different memory traces. Overall, WASM-MUTATE takes a median of 5.4 seconds and 12.6 seconds in generating variants with different machine code instructions and different memory instructions respectively.

The use an e-graph random traversal is the key factor for such a fast generation process. Once WASM-MUTATE locates a modifiable instruction within the binary and constructs its corresponding e-graph, traversal is virtually instantaneous. However, the time efficiency of variant generation is not consistent across all programs, as illustrated in Figure 7. This variation primarily stems from the varying complexities of the programs under analysis, as previously mentioned in subsection 5.1. Interestingly, WASM-MUTATE may attempt to build e-graphs from instructions that, while not inherently leading to undefined behavior, are part of a data flow graph that could. For example, the data flow graph might be dependent on a function call. Although transforming undefined behavioural instructions is deactivated by default in WASM-MUTATE to maintain functional equivalence with the original code, the process of attempting to construct such e-graphs can extend the duration of the diversification pass. As a result, WASM-MUTATE may require multiple attempts to successfully create and traverse an e-graph, impacting the rate at which it generates behaviorally distinct variants. This phenomenon is particularly noticeable in original programs that have a high frequency of function calls.

In average, WASM-MUTATE takes three times longer to synthesize unique memory traces than it does to generate different instruction traces (as it can be observed in how the green plot of the figure is skewed to the right). The main reason for this difference is the limited set of rewriting rules that specifically focus on memory operations. WASM-

MUTATE includes more rules for manipulating code, which increases the odds of generating a variant with diverse machine code instructions. Additionally, the variant creation process halts and restarts with alternative rewriting rules if WASM-MUTATE detects that the selected code for transformation could result in unpredictable behavior.

We have identified four primary factors explaining why execution traces differs overall. First, alterations to the binary layout inherently impact both machine code instruction traces and memory accesses within the program’s stack. In particular, WASM-MUTATE creates variants that change the return addresses of functions, leading to divergent execution traces, including those related to memory access. Second, our rewriting rules incorporate artificial global values into WebAssembly binaries. Since these global variables are inherently manipulated via the stack, their access inevitably generate divergent memory traces. Third, WASM-MUTATE injects ‘phantom’ instructions which do not aim to modify the outcome of a transformed function during execution. These intermediate calculations trigger the spill/reload component of the runtime, varying spill and reload operations. In the context of limited physical resources, these operations temporarily store values in memory for later retrieval and use, thus creating unique memory traces. Finally, certain rewriting rules implemented by WASM-MUTATE replicate fragments of code, e.g., performing commutative operations. These code segments may contain memory accesses, and while neither the memory addresses nor their values change, the frequency of these operations does. Overall, these findings influence the diversity of execution traces among the generated variants.

Answer to RQ2: WASM-MUTATE generates variants with distinct machine code instructions and memory traces for all tested programs. The quickest time for generating a variant with a unique machine code trace is 0.12 seconds, and for divergent memory traces, it’s best time is 0.06 seconds. On average, the median time required to produce a variant with distinct traces stands at 5.4 seconds for unique machine code traces and 16.2 seconds for different memory traces. These metrics indicate that WASM-MUTATE is suitable for fast-moving target defense strategies, capable of generating a new variant in well under a minute [6]. To the best of our knowledge, WASM-MUTATE is the fastest diversification engine for WebAssembly.

5.3. To what extent does WASM-MUTATE prevent side-channel attacks on WebAssembly programs?

To answer RQ3, we execute WASM-MUTATE on four distinct binaries WebAssembly susceptible to Spectre related attacks. Each of the four programs is transformed with one of four 100 different seeds and up to 1000 stacked transformations. We assess the resulting impact of the attacks as outlined in 4.4. The analysis encompasses a total of $4 \times 100 \times 1000$ binaries, which also includes the original four.

Figure 8 offers a graphical representation of WASM-MUTATE’s influence on the Swivel original programs and their attacks. Each plot corresponds to one original WebAssembly binary and the attack it undergoes: btb_breakout, btb_leakage, ret2spec, and pht. The Y-axis represents the exfiltration bandwidth (see Metric 4). The bandwidth of the original binary under attack is marked as a blue dashed horizontal line. In each plot, the variants are grouped in clusters of 100 stacked transformations. These are indicated by green dots and lines. The dot signifies the median bandwidth for the cluster, while the line represents the interquartile range of the group’s bandwidth.

For `btb_breakout` and `btb_leakage`, WASM-MUTATE demonstrates effectiveness, generating variants that leak less information than the original in 78% and 70% of the cases, respectively. For these particular binaries, a significant reduction in exfiltration bandwidth to zero is noted after 200 stacked transformations. This means that with a minimum of 200 stacked transformations, WASM-MUTATE can create variants that are completely resistant to the original attack. For the `ret2spec` and `pht` scenarios, the produced variants consistently exhibit lower bandwidth than the original in 76% and 71% of instances, respectively. As depicted in the plots, the exfiltration bandwidth diminishes following the application of at least 100 stacked transformations.

This success is explained by the fact that WASM-MUTATE synthesizes variants that effectively alter memory access patterns. Specifically, it does so by amplifying spill/reload operations, injecting artificial global variables, and changing the frequency of pre-existing memory accesses. These transformations influence the WebAssembly program’s memory, causing disruption to cache predictors. As a result, these alterations contribute to a reduction in exfiltration bandwidth.

Furthermore, many attacks rely on a timer component to measure cache access time for memory, and disrupting this component effectively impairs the attack’s effectiveness. This strategy of dynamic alteration has also been employed in other scenarios. For instance, to counter potential timing attacks, Firefox randomizes its built-in JavaScript timer [42]. WASM-MUTATE applies the same strategy by interspersing instructions within the timing steps of WebAssembly variants. In Listing 9 and Listing 10, we demonstrate WASM-MUTATE’s impact on time measurements. The former illustrates the original time measurement, while the latter presents a variant with WASM-MUTATE-inserted operations amid the timing.

```
;; Code from original btb_breakout
...
(call $readTimer)
(set_local $end_time)
... access to mem
(i64.sub (get_local $end_time) (get_local $start_time))
(set_local $duration)
...
```

Listing 9: Wasm timer used in `btb_breakout` program.




Figure 8: Visual representation of WASM-MUTATE’s impact on Swivel’s original programs. The Y-axis denotes exfiltration bandwidth, with the original binary’s bandwidth under attack highlighted by a blue marker and dashed line. Variants are clustered in groups of 100 stacked transformations, denoted by green dots (median bandwidth) and lines (interquartile bandwidth range). Overall, for all 100000 variants generated out of each original program, 70% have less data leakage bandwidth.

```
;; Variant code
...
(call $readTimer)
(set_local $end_time)
<inserted instructions>
... access to mem
<inserted instructions>
(i64.sub (get_local $end_time) (get_local $start_time))
(set_local $duration)
...
```

Listing 10: Variant of btibreakout with more instructions added in between time measurement.

```
;; Variant code
...
; train the code to jump here (index 1)
<inserted instructions>
(i32.load (i32.const 2000))
<inserted instructions>
(i32.store (i32.const 83)) ; just prevent optimization
...
; transiently jump here
<inserted instructions>
(i32.load (i32.const 339968)) ; "S"(83) is the secret
<inserted instructions>
(i32.store (i32.const 83)) ; just prevent optimization
...
```

Listing 12: Variant of btibreakout with more instructions added indindinctly between jump places.

WASM-MUTATE proves effective against cache access timers because the time measurement of single or a few instructions is inherently different. By introducing more instructions, this randomness is amplified, thereby reducing the timer’s accuracy.

Furthermore, CPUs have a maximum capacity for the number of instructions they can cache. WASM-MUTATE injects instructions in such a way that the vulnerable instruction may exceed this cacheable instruction limit, meaning that caching becomes disabled. This kind of transformation can be viewed as padding [15]. In Listing 11 and Listing 12, we illustrate the effect of WASM-MUTATE on padding instructions. Listing 11 presents the original code used for training the branch predictor, along with the expected speculated code.

```
;; Code from original btibreakout
...
; train the code to jump here (index 1)
(i32.load (i32.const 2000))
(i32.store (i32.const 83)) ; just prevent optimization
...
; transiently jump here
(i32.load (i32.const 339968)) ; S(83) is the secret
(i32.store (i32.const 83)) ; just prevent optimization
```

Listing 11: Two jump locations in btibreakout. The top one trains the branch predictor, the bottom one is the expected jump that exfiltrates the memory access.

The padding alters the arrangement of the binary code in memory, effectively impeding the attacker’s capacity to initiate speculative execution. Even when an attack is launched and the vulnerable code is “speculated”, the memory access is not impacted as planned.

In every program, we note that the exfiltration bandwidth tends to be greater than the original when the variants include a small number of transformations. This indicates that, although the transformations generally contribute to the reduction of data leakage, the initial few might not consistently contribute positively towards this objective. We have identified several fundamental reasons, which we discuss below.

Firstly, as emphasized in prior applications of WASM-MUTATE [8], uncontrolled diversification can be counterproductive if a specific objective, such as a cost function, is not established at the beginning of the diversification process. Secondly, while some transformations yield distinct WebAssembly binaries, their compilation produces identical machine code. Transformations that are not preserved undermine the effectiveness of diversification. For example, incorporating random `nop` operations directly into WebAssembly does not modify the final machine code as the `nop` operations are often removed by the compiler. The same phenomenon is observed with transformations to custom sections of WebAssembly binaries. Additionally, it is impor-

tant to note that transformed code doesn't always execute, i.e., WASM-MUTATE may generate dead code.

Finally, for ret2spec and pht, both programs are hardened with attack bandwidth reduction, but this does not materialize in a short-term timeframe (low count of stacked transformations). Furthermore, the exfiltration bandwidth is more dispersed for these two programs. Our analysis indicates a correlation between bandwidth reduction and the complexity of the binary subject to diversification. Ret2spec and pht are considerably larger than btb_breakout and btb_leakage. The former comprises more than 300k instructions, while the latter two include fewer than 800 instructions. Given that WASM-MUTATE applies precise, fine-grained transformations one at a time, the likelihood of impacting critical attack components, such as timing memory accesses, diminishes for larger binaries, particularly when limited to 1,000 transformations. Based on these observations, we believe that a greater number of stacked transformations would further contribute to eventually eliminating the attacks associated with ret2spec and pht.

Answer to RQ3: software diversification is effective at synthesizing WebAssembly binaries that are less susceptible to Spectre-like attacks. WASM-MUTATE generates variants of btb_breakout and btb_leakage that are totally protected and hardened variants of ret2spec and pht that are more resilient than the original program. In total, 70% of the diversified variants exhibit a reduced effectiveness (reduced data leakage bandwidth) compared to the original program. Larger programs require a greater number of transformations to effectively neutralize the attacks.

6. Discussion

Fuzzing WebAssembly compilers with WASM-MUTATE In fuzzing campaigns, selecting the appropriate starting inputs is both a significant challenge and essential for detecting bugs promptly [46]. This is particularly true with compilers, where the inputs should be well-formed yet intricate enough programs to probe various compiler components. WASM-MUTATE could address this challenge by generating semantically equivalent variants from an original WebAssembly binary, enhancing the scope and efficiency of the testing process. A practical example of this occurred in 2021, when this approach led to the discovery of a wasmtime security CVE [18]. Through the creation of semantically equivalent variants, the spill/reload component of cranelift was stressed, resulting in the discovering and subsequent resolution of the before-mentioned CVE.

Mitigating Port Contention Rokicki et al. [39] showed the practicality of a covert side-channel attack using port contention within WebAssembly code in the browser. This attack fundamentally relies on the precise prediction of Wasm instructions that trigger port contention on specific ports. To combat this security concern, we propose an man-in-the-middle mechanism, WASM-MUTATE, which could be conveniently implemented as a browser plugin. WASM-

MUTATE has the ability to replace the WebAssembly instructions used as port contention predictor with other random instructions. This will inevitably remove the port contention in the specific port used to conduct the attack, hardening browsers against such exploitative maneuvers.

7. Related Work

Static software diversification refers to the process of synthesizing, and distributing unique but functionally equivalent programs to end users. The implementation of this process can take place at any stage of software development and deployment - from the inception of source code, through the compilation phase, to the execution of the final binary [24, 34]. WASM-MUTATE, a static diversifier, can be placed at the final stage, keeping in mind that the code will subsequently undergo final compilation by JIT compilers. The concept of software diversification owes much to the pioneering work of Cohen [12]. His suite of code transformations aimed to increase complexity and thereby enhance the difficulty of executing a successful attack against a broad user base [12]. WASM-MUTATE's rewriting rules draw significantly from Cohen and Forrest seminal contributions [12, 19].

Jackson and colleagues [24] proposed that the compiler can play a pivotal role in promoting static software diversification. In the context of WebAssembly, CROW leverages compiler technology for diversification. It is a superdiversifier [25], for WebAssembly that is built in the LLVM compilation tool chain. However, integrating the diversifier directly into the LLVM compiler, restricts the tool's applicability to WebAssembly binaries generated through LLVM. This implies that any WebAssembly source code that lacks an LLVM frontend implementation cannot take advantage of CROW's capabilities. In contrast, WASM-MUTATE provides a more versatile and faster WebAssembly to WebAssembly diversification solution, maintaining compatibility with any compiler. Secondly, unlike CROW, WASM-MUTATE does not rely on an SMT solver to validate the generated variants. Instead, it guarantees semantic equivalence by design, resulting in greater efficiency in generating WebAssembly variants, as discussed in subsection 5.1. As a WebAssembly to WebAssembly diversification tool, WASM-MUTATE augments the range of tools capable of generating WebAssembly programs, a topic explored comprehensively throughout this work.

The process of diversifying a WebAssembly program can be conceptualized as a three-stage procedure: parsing the program, transforming it, and finally re-encoding it back into WebAssembly. Our review of the literature has revealed several studies that have employed parsing and encoding components for WebAssembly binaries across various domains. This indicates that these works accept a WebAssembly binary as an input and output a unique WebAssembly binary. These domains span optimization [47], control flow [2], and dynamic analysis [31, 43, 2, 3]. When the transformation stage introduces randomized mutations to

the original program, the aforementioned tools could potentially be construed as diversifiers. WASM-MUTATE is related to these previous works, as it can serve as an optimizer or a test case reducer due to the incorporation of an e-graph at the heart of its diversification process [44]. To the best of our knowledge, the introduction of an e-graph into WASM-MUTATE marks the first endeavor to integrate an e-graph into a WebAssembly to WebAssembly analysis tool.

BREWasm [10] offers a comprehensive static binary rewriting framework for WebAssembly and can be considered to be the most similar to WASM-MUTATE. For instance, it can be used to model a diversification engine. It parses a Wasm binary into objects, rewrites them using fine-grained APIs, integrates these APIs to provide high-level ones, and re-encodes the updated objects back into a valid Wasm binary. The effectiveness and efficiency of BREWasm have been demonstrated through various Wasm applications and case studies on code obfuscation, software testing, program repair, and software optimization. The implementation of BREWasm follows a completely different technical approach. In comparison with our work, the authors pointed out that our tool employs lazy parsing of Wasm. Although they perceived this as a limitation, it is eagerly implemented to accelerate the generation of WebAssembly binaries. Additionally, our tool leverages the parser and encoder of wasmtime, a standalone compiler and interpreter for Wasm, thereby boosting its reliability and lowering its error-prone nature.

Another similar work to WASM-MUTATE is WASMixer [11]. WASMixer focuses on three code obfuscation methods for WebAssembly binaries: memory access encryption, control flow flattening, and the insertion of opaque predicates. Their strategy is specifically designed for obfuscating Wasm binaries. In contrast, while WASM-MUTATE does not employ memory access encryption or control flow flattening, it can still function effectively as an obfuscator. Previous evaluations confirm that WASM-MUTATE has been successful in evading malware detection [8]. On the same topic, Madvex [32] also aims to modify Wasm binaries to achieve malware evasion, but their approach is principally driven by a generic reward function and is largely confined to altering only the code section of a Wasm binary. WASM-MUTATE, however, adopts a more flexible strategy by applying a broader array of transformations, which are not limited to the code section. Consequently, WASM-MUTATE is capable of generating malware variants without negatively affecting either their code or performance.

8. Conclusion

WASM-MUTATE is a fast and effective diversification tool for WebAssembly, with a 100% diversification rate across the 303 programs of the considered benchmark. With respect to speed, it creates over 9000 unique variants per hour. The WASM-MUTATE workflow ensures that all final variants offer different and unique execution traces. We have proven that WASM-MUTATE is able to mitigate Spectre at-

tacks in WebAssembly, producing fully protected variants of two versions of the btb attack, and variants of ret2spec and pht that leak less data than the original ones.

In future work, we aim to fine-tune the diversification process, balancing broad diversification with the needs of specific scenarios. Besides, the creation of rewriting rules for WASM-MUTATE is currently a manual task, yet we have identified potential for automation. For instance, WASM-MUTATE could be enhanced through data-driven methods such as rule mining. Furthermore, we have observed that the impact of WASM-MUTATE on ret2spec and pht attacks is considerably less compared to btb attacks. These attacks exploit the returning address of executed functions in the program stack. One mitigation of this would be multi-variant execution strategy, implemented on top of WASM-MUTATE. By offering different execution paths, the returning addresses on the stack at each function execution would vary, thereby improving the hardening of binaries against ret2spec attacks.

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CROW: CODE DIVERSIFICATION FOR WEBASSEMBLY

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Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS 2021), MADWeb

<https://doi.org/10.14722/madweb.2021.23004>

CROW: Code Diversification for WebAssembly

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Abstract—The adoption of WebAssembly increases rapidly, as it provides a fast and safe model for program execution in the browser. However, WebAssembly is not exempt from vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious observers. Code diversification can mitigate some of these attacks. In this paper, we present the first fully automated workflow for the diversification of WebAssembly binaries. We present CROW, an open-source tool implementing this workflow through enumerative synthesis of diverse code snippets expressed in the LLVM intermediate representation. We evaluate CROW’s capabilities on 303 C programs and study its use on a real-life security-sensitive program: libodium, a modern cryptographic library. Overall, CROW is able to generate diverse variants for 239 out of 303 (79%) small programs. Furthermore, our experiments show that our approach and tool is able to successfully diversify off-the-shelf cryptographic software (libodium).

I. INTRODUCTION

WebAssembly is the fourth official language of the Web [36]. The language provides low-level constructs enabling efficient execution times, much closer to native code than JavaScript. It constitutes a fast and safe platform to execute programs in the browser and embedded environments [21]. Consequently, the adoption of WebAssembly has been rapidly growing since its introduction in 2015. Nowadays, languages such as Rust and C/C++ can be compiled to WebAssembly using mature toolchains and can be executed in all notable browsers.

The WebAssembly execution model is designed to be secure and to prevent many memory and control flow attacks. Still, as its official documentation admits [11], WebAssembly is not exempt from vulnerabilities that could be exploited [30]. Code diversification [5], [28] is one additional protection that can harden the WebAssembly stack. This consists in synthesizing different variants of an original program that provide the same functionalities but exhibit different execution traces. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of diversifying WebAssembly code, which is, to the best of our knowledge, an unresearched area.

Our contribution is a workflow and a tool, called CROW, for automatic diversification of WebAssembly programs. It takes as input a C/C++ program and produces a set of diverse WebAssembly binaries as output. The workflow is based on enumerative code synthesis. First, CROW lists blocks that are potentially relevant for diversification, second, CROW enumerates alternative instruction sequences, and third, CROW checks that the new instruction sequences are functionally equivalent to the original block. CROW builds on the idea of superdiversification [25] and extends the concept to the enumeration of a set of variants instead of synthesizing only one solution. We also take into account the specificities of WebAssembly and the details of its execution.

We evaluate the diversification capabilities of CROW in two ways. First, we diversify 303 small C programs compiled to WebAssembly. Second, we run CROW to diversify a real-life cryptographic library that natively supports WebAssembly. In both cases, we measure the diversity among binary code variants, as well as the diversity of execution traces. When measuring the diversity in binary code, we compare the WebAssembly and the machine code variants. This way we assess the ability of CROW at synthesizing variations in WebAssembly, as well as the extent to which these variations are preserved when compiling WebAssembly to machine code. Our original experiments demonstrate the feasibility of diversifying WebAssembly code. CROW generates diverse variants for 239/303 (79%) C programs. TurboFan, the optimizing compiler used in the V8 engine, preserves 99.48% of these variants. CROW successfully synthesizes variants for the cryptographic library. The variants indeed yield either different execution traces. This is a promising milestone in getting a more secure Web environment through diversification.

To sum up, our contributions are:

- CROW: the first automated workflow and tool to diversify WebAssembly programs, it generates many diverse WebAssembly binaries from a single input program.
- A quantitative evaluation over 303 programs showing the capability of CROW to diversify WebAssembly binaries and measuring the impact of diversification on execution traces.
- A feasibility study of the diversification on a real-world WebAssembly program, demonstrating that CROW can handle libodium, a state-of-the-art cryptographic library.

II. BACKGROUND

A. WebAssembly

WebAssembly is a binary instruction format for a stack-based virtual machine. It is designed to address the problem of safe, fast, portable and compact low-level code on the Web. The language was first publicly announced in 2015 and since then, most major web browsers have implemented support for the standard. Besides the Web, WebAssembly is independent of any specific hardware or languages and can run in a standalone Virtual Machine (VM) or in other environments such as Arduino [20]. A paper by Haas et al. [21] formalizes the language and its type system, and explains the design rationale.

Listing 1 and 2 illustrate WebAssembly. Listing 1 presents the C code of two functions and Listing 2 shows the result of compiling these two functions into a WebAssembly module. The `type` directives at the top of the module declare the function: the types of its parameters and the type of the result. Then, the definitions for the function follow. These definitions are sequences of stack machine instructions. At the end, the `main` function is exported so that it can be called from outside this WebAssembly module, typically from JavaScript. WebAssembly has four primitive types: integers (`i32` and `i64`) and floats (`f32` and `f64`) and it includes structured instructions such as `block`, `loop` and `if`.

Listing 1: C function that calculates the quantity $2x + x$

```
int f(int x) { return 2 * x + x; }

int main(void) { return f(10); }
```

Listing 2: WebAssembly code for Listing 1.

```
(module
  (type ;0;) (func (param i32) (result i32))
  (type ;1;) (func (result i32))
  (func ;0;) (type 0) (param i32) (result i32)
    local.get 0
    local.get 0
    i32.const 2
    i32.mul
    i32.add)
  (func ;1;) (type 1) (result i32)
    i32.const 10
    call 0
  (export "main" (func 1)))
```

WebAssembly is characterized by an extensive security model [11] founded on a sandboxed execution environment that provides protection against common security issues such as data corruption, code injection and return oriented programming (ROP). However, WebAssembly is no silver bullet and is vulnerable under certain conditions [30]. This motivates our work on software diversification as one possible mitigation among the wide range of security counter-measures.

B. Motivation for Moving Target Defense in the Web

The distribution model for web computing is as follows: build one binary and distribute millions of copies, all over the world, which run on browsers. In this model an attacker has two key advantages over the developers: she has a runtime

environment that she fully controls and observes in any possible way. Consequently, when she finds a flaw in this virtually transparent environment, knowing that this flaw is present in the millions of copies that have been distributed over the world, she can exploit the flaw at scale.

The developers can never assume that they can control the web browser. Yet, they can challenge the second advantage of the attacker, known as the break-once-break-everywhere advantage. The developers can stop distributing clones of the binary and distribute diverse versions instead, as suggested by the pioneering software diversification works of Cohen [12] and Forrest et al. [19].

In the context of diversification, moving target defense [40] means distributing diverse variants constantly. In the context of the web, it means distributing a different variant at each HTTP request. Moving target defense is appropriate for mitigating yet unknown vulnerabilities. The diversification technique does not always remove the potential flaws, yet the vulnerabilities in the diversified binaries can be located in different places. With moving target defense, a successful attack on one browser cannot be performed on another browser with the same effectiveness. The diversified binaries that CROW outputs can be used interchangeably over the network, in a moving target defence choreographed over the web.

To sum up, by combining moving target defense deployment to diversification, we reduce the information asymmetry between the Web attacker and the defender, increasing the uncertainty and complexity of successful attacks over all client browsers [16], [42].

III. CROW'S DIVERSIFICATION TECHNIQUE

In this section we describe the workflow of CROW for diversifying WebAssembly programs. First we introduce the main concepts behind CROW. Then, we describe each stage of the workflow and we discuss the key implementation details.

A. Definitions

In this subsection we define the key concepts for CROW.

Definition 1: Block (based on Aho et al. [2]): Let P be a program. A block B is a grouping of declarations and statements in P inside a function F .

Definition 2: Program state (based on Mangpo et al. [35]): At any point in time, the program state S is defined as the collection of local and global variables, and, the program counter pointing to the next instruction.

Definition 3: Pure block: A block B is said to be pure if and only if, given the program state S_i , every execution of B produces the same state S_o .

Definition 4: Functional equivalence modulo program state (based on Le et al. [29]): Let B_1 and B_2 be two blocks. We consider the program state before the execution of the block, S_i , as the input and the program state after the execution of the block, S_o , as the output. B_1 and B_2 are functionally equivalent if given the same input S_i both codes produce the same output S_o .

Definition 5: Code replacement: Let P be a program and T a pair of blocks (B_1, B_2) . T is a candidate code replacement if B_1 and B_2 are both pure as defined in Definition 3 and functionally equivalent as defined in Definition 4. Applying T to P means replacing B_1 by B_2 . The application of T to P produces a program variant P' which consequently is functionally equivalent to P .

CROW generates new program variants by finding and applying code replacements as defined in Definition 5. A program variant could be produced by applying more than one candidate code replacement. For example, the tuple, composed by the code blocks in Listing 3 and Listing 4, is a code replacement for Listing 2.

Listing 3: WebAssembly pure code block from Listing 2.

```
local.get 0
i32.const 2
i32.mul ; 2 * x ;
```

Listing 4: Code block that is functionally equivalent to Listing 3

```
local.get 0
i32.const 1
i32.shl ; x << 1 ;
```

B. Overview

CROW synthesizes variants for WebAssembly programs. We assume that the programs are generated through the LLVM compilation pipeline. This assumption is motivated as follows: first, LLVM-based compilers are the most popular compilers to build WebAssembly programs [30]; second, the availability of source code (typically C/C++ for WebAssembly) provides a structure to perform code analysis and produce code replacements that is richer than the binary code.

CROW takes as input a C/C++ program and produces a set of unique, diversified WebAssembly binaries. Figure 1 shows the stages of this workflow. The workflow starts with compiling the input program into LLVM bitcode using clang. Then, CROW analyzes the bitcode to identify all pure blocks and to synthesize a set of candidate replacements for each pure block. This is what we call the *exploration* stage. In the *generation* stage, CROW combines the candidate code replacements to generate different LLVM bitcode variants. Finally, those bitcode variants are compiled to WebAssembly binaries that can be sent to web browsers.

Challenges. The concept of diversifying WebAssembly programs is novel and it is arguably hard for the following reasons. First, WebAssembly is a structured binary format, without goto-like instructions. This prevents the direct application of a wide range of diversification operators based on goto [41]. Second, the existing transformation and diversification tools target instruction sets larger than the one of WebAssembly [39]. This limits the efficiency of diversification, and the possibility of searching for a large number of equivalent code replacements. We address the former challenge using the LLVM intermediate representation as the target for diversification. We address the latter challenge by tailoring a superoptimizer for LLVM, using its subset of the LLVM intermediate representation. In particular, we prevent the superoptimizer from synthesizing instructions that have no correspondence in WebAssembly (for example, freeze instructions), which is an essential step to get executable diversified WebAssembly code.

C. Exploration stage

Given a program P for which we want to generate WebAssembly variants, the exploration stage of CROW identifies all pure blocks in the LLVM bitcode of P . CROW considers every directed acyclic graph contained in one function as a pure block. Then, CROW searches for code replacements for each one of them.

The generation of a code replacement consists of two steps. First, the synthesis of the new block, and, second, equivalence checking. Every variant block that passes the equivalence check is stored for use in diversification. The synthesis of block variants consists of enumerating all possible blocks that can be built as a combination of a given number of instructions, bounded by a maximum value to keep a tractable synthesis space.

There are two parameters to control the size of the search space and hence the time required to traverse it. On one hand, one can limit the size of the variants. In our experiments we limit the block variants to a maximum of 50 instructions. On the other hand, one can limit the set of instructions that are used for the synthesis. In our experiments, we use between 1 instruction (only additions) and 60 instructions (all supported instructions in the synthesizer). This configuration allows the user to find a trade-off between the amount of variants that are synthesized and the time taken to produce them.

Listing 5: Listing 1 in LLVM’s intermediate representation.

```
define i32 @f(i32) {
    %2 = mul nsw i32 %0,2
    %3 = add nsw i32 %0,%2

    ret i32 %3
}

define i32 @main() {
    %1 = tail call i32 @f(i32 10)
    ret i32 %1
}
```

define i32 @f(i32) { %2 = mul nsw i32 %0,2 %3 = add nsw i32 %0,%2 ret i32 %3 }	define i32 @main() { %1 = tail call i32 @f(i32 10) ret i32 %1 }
	Block A %2 = mul nsw i32 %0,2
	Block B %2 = mul nsw i32 %0,2 %3 = add nsw i32 %0,%2

In Listing 5 we illustrate the LLVM bitcode representation of Listing 1. In this bitcode, CROW identifies two pure blocks in function `f()`, which are displayed on the right part of the listing, in gray and green. The first pure block is composed of one single instruction (line 2) that performs the `2*x` multiplication. The second block has two instructions, one multiplication and one addition.

Using CROW, it is possible to diversify both blocks. For example, using a maximum of 1 instruction per replacement and searching over the complete bitcode instruction set, a potential replacement for Block A is: `%2 = shl nsw i32 %0,1 %`. This replacement calculates the same expression `2*x`, using a shift left operation.

To determine the equivalence between a pure block and a candidate replacement, we use an equivalence checker based on SMT [17]. In our example, the checker would prove that there cannot be a value of x such that $2 * x \neq x \ll 1$. In general, if no such counter-example exists, then the functional equivalence is assumed. On the other hand, if there exists an input resulting in different outputs for a block and a variant, then they are proven not equivalent and the variant is discarded.




Fig. 1: CROW’s workflow for diversifying WebAssembly programs.

D. Generation stage

In this stage, we select and combine code replacements that have been synthesized during the exploration stage, in order to generate WebAssembly binary variants. We apply each code replacement to the original program to produce a LLVM IR variant. Then, this IR is compiled into a WebAssembly binary. CROW generates WebAssembly binaries from all possible combinations of code replacements as the power set over all code replacements.

After the exploration phase, it is possible that two subsets of code replacements overlap, *i.e.*, they produce the same WebAssembly binary. The overlap between blocks is explained as follows: Let $S = \{(B_1, R_1), (B_1, R_2), \dots, (B_n, R_m)\}$ be a set of candidate replacements over a program P . If two blocks from the original program $B_i, B_j, j \neq i$, overlap, *i.e.*, the intersection of $\text{CFG}(B_i)$ ¹ and $\text{CFG}(B_j)$ is not empty, then only the replacements of the largest original block are preserved when combining blocks.

In this example, the exploration stage synthesizes $6 + 1$ bitcode variants for the considered blocks respectively, which results in 14 module variants (the power set combination size). Yet, the generation stage would eventually generate 7 variants from the original WebAssembly binary. This gap between the number of potential and the actual number of variants is a consequence of the redundancy among the bitcode variants when composing several variants into one.

E. Implementation

The majority of the WebAssembly applications are built from C/C++ source code using the LLVM toolchain. Consequently, the implementation of CROW is based on LLVM. Furthermore, CROW extends Souper [38], a superoptimizer for LLVM that aims to reduce the size of binary code. Souper has its own intermediate representation, which is a subset of the LLVM IR.

To extract code blocks, we scan LLVM modules, looking for instructions that return integer-typed values. Each such instruction is considered as the exit of a code block. Souper’s representation of a code block is built as a backward traversal process through the dependencies of the detected instruction.

If memory loads or function calls are found, the backward traversal process is stopped and the current instruction is considered as an input variable for the code block. Notice that, by construction, Souper’s translation is oblivious to the memory model, thus, it cannot infer string data types or other abstract data types. The translation from Souper IR to a BitVector SMT theory is done on the fly. Souper uses the $z3^2$ solver to check the equivalence between a code block original and a potential replacement for it.

We now summarize the main changes that we implement in Souper and in the LLVM backend in order to support diversification. Souper, as a superoptimizer, aims at generating a single variant that is smaller than the original, yet we want to obtain as many blocks as possible. To achieve automatic diversification, we modify Souper to disable the key cost restriction functions, data-flow pruning and peephole optimizations, all being detrimental for diversification. In order to increase the number of variants that CROW can generate, CROW parallelizes the process of replacement synthesis.

In addition, CROW orchestrates a series of Souper executions with various configurations (in particular the size of the replaced expression). Finally, we carefully fine-tune a set of 19 Souper options to ensure that the search is effective for diversification in feasible time.

In the generation stage of CROW, we also modify Souper to amplify the generation of WebAssembly binary diversity. Initially, Souper generates a single bitcode variant, inserting all replacements at once. We modify it so that we can obtain a combination of code replacements. Finally, on the LLVM side, we disable all peephole optimizations in the WebAssembly backend, in particular instructions merging and constant folding. This aims to preserve the variations introduced in the LLVM bitcode during the generation of binaries.

The implementation of CROW is publicly available for sake of open science and can be reviewed at <https://github.com/KTH/slumps/tree/master/crow>.

IV. EVALUATION PROTOCOL

To evaluate the capabilities of CROW to diversify WebAssembly programs, we formulate the following research

¹CFG(A) refers to backward Control Flow Graph starting at inst. A .

²<https://github.com/Z3Prover/z3>

questions:

- RQ1: **To what extent are the program variants generated by CROW statically different?** We check whether the WebAssembly binary variants produced by CROW are different from the original WebAssembly binary. Then, we assess whether the generation of x86 machine code performed by V8’s WebAssembly engine preserves CROW’s transformations.
- RQ2: **To what extent are the program variants generated by CROW dynamically different?** It is known that not all diversified programs produce distinguishable executions [15], sometimes it is impossible to observe different behaviors between variants. We check for the presence of different behaviors with a custom WebAssembly interpreter, characterizing the behavior of a WebAssembly program by its stack operation trace.
- RQ3: **To what extent can CROW be applied to diversify real-world security-sensitive software?** We assess the ability of CROW to diversify a state-of-the-art cryptographic library for WebAssembly, libodium [18].

A. Corpus

We answer RQ1 and RQ2 with a corpus of programs appropriate for our experiments. We take programs from the Rosetta Code project³. This website hosts a curated set of solutions for specific programming tasks in various programming languages. It contains a wide range of tasks, from simple ones, such as adding two numbers, to complex algorithms like a compiler lexer. We first collect all C programs from Rosetta Code, which represents 989 programs as of 01/26/2020. Next, we apply a number of filters. We discard 1) all programs that do not compile with clang, 2) all interactive programs requiring input from users *i.e.*, invoking functions like `scanf`, 3) all programs that contain more than 100 blocks, 4) all programs without termination, 5) all programs with non-deterministic operations, for example, programs working with time or random functions. This filter produces a final set of 303 programs.

The result is a corpus of 303 C programs. These programs range from 7 to 150 lines of code and solve a variety of problems, from the *Babbage* problem to *Convex Hull* calculation.

B. Protocol for RQ1

With RQ1, we assess the ability of CROW to generate WebAssembly binaries that are different from the original program. For this, we compute a distance metric between the original WebAssembly binary and each binary generated by CROW. Since WebAssembly binaries are further transformed into machine code before they execute, we also check that this additional transformation preserves the difference introduced by CROW in the WebAssembly binary. We use the Turbofan ahead-of-time compiler of V8, with all its possible optimizations, to generate a x86 binary for each WebAssembly binary. Then, we compare the x86 version of each variant against the x86 binary corresponding to the original WebAssembly binary.

We compare the WebAssembly and machine code of each program and its variant using Dynamic Time Warping (DTW)

[31]. DTW computes the global alignment between two sequences. It returns a value capturing the cost of this alignment, which is actually a distance metric, called DTW. The larger the DTW distance, the more different the two sequences are. In our case, we compare the sequence of instructions of each variant with the initial program and the other variants. We obtain two DTW distance values for each program-variant pair: one at the level of WebAssembly code and the another one at the level of x86 code. Metric 1 below defines these metrics.

Metric 1: dt_static: Given two programs P_X and V_X written in X code, $dt_{static}(P_X, V_X)$, computes the DTW distance between the corresponding program instructions for representation X ($X \in \{Wasm, x86\}$). A $dt_{static}(P_X, V_X)$ of 0 means that the code of both the original program and the variant is the same, *i.e.*, they are statically identical in the representation X . The higher the value of dt_{static} , the more different the programs are in representation X .

We run CROW on our corpus of 303 programs. We configure CROW to run with a diversification timeout of 6 hours per program. For each program, we collect the set of generated variants. For all pairs program, variant that are different, we compute both dt_{static} for WebAssembly and x86 representations.

The key property we consider is as follows: if $dt_{static}(P_{Wasm}, P'_{Wasm}) > 0$ and $dt_{static}(P_{x86}, P'_{x86}) > 0$, this means that both programs are still different when compiled to machine code, and we conclude that V8’s compiler does not remove the transformations made by CROW. Notice that, this property only makes sense between variants of the same program (including the original).

C. Protocol for RQ2

For RQ2, we compare the executions of a program and its variants for a given input. In this experiment, we characterize the execution of a WebAssembly binary according to its trace of stack operations.

This method of tracing allows us to evaluate CROW’s effect on program execution according to the WebAssembly specification, independently of any specific engine.

For each execution of a WebAssembly program, we collect a trace of stack operations. These traces are composed of stack-type instructions: `push <value>` and `pop <value>`. All traces are ordered with respect to the timestamp of the events. We compare the traces of the original program against those of the variants with DTW. DTW computes the global alignment between two traces and provides a value for the cost of this alignment.

Metric 2: dt_dyn: Given a program P and a CROW generated variant P' , $dt_{dyn}(P, P')$, computes the DTW distance between the corresponding stack operation traces collected during their execution. A dt_{dyn} of 0 means that both traces are identical. The higher the value, the more different the stack operation traces.

To answer RQ2 we compute Metric 2 for a study subject program and all the unique program variants generated by CROW in a pairwise comparison. The pairwise comparison

³http://www.rosettacode.org/wiki/Rosetta_Code

allows us to compare the diversity between variants as well. We use SWAM⁴ to collect the stack operation traces. SWAM is a WebAssembly interpreter that provides functionalities to capture the dynamic information of WebAssembly program executions including the stack operations. We compute the DTW distances with STRAC [10].

The builtin WebAssembly API for JavaScript is usually mutable, thus, the same model for traces collection can be implemented on top of V8. In other words, a custom interpreter can be implemented in order to collect the traces in the browser or standalone JavaScript engines. This validates the usage of SWAM to study the traces diversity.

D. Protocol for RQ3

In RQ3, we assess the ability of CROW to diversify a mature and complex software library related to security. We choose the libsodium [18] cryptographic library, which natively compiles to WebAssembly. With 3752 commits contributed by 96 developers, its API provides the basic blocks for encryption, decryption, signatures and password hashing. We experiment with code revision 2b5f8f2b, which contains 45232 lines of C code. Libsodium has 102 separate WebAssembly modules that we use as input for CROW. Each module corresponds to one C file that encompasses a set of related functions.

To answer RQ3, we run CROW on the libsodium bitcodes, generating a set of WebAssembly variants. Then, we assess both binary code diversity and behavioural diversity between the variants and the original libsodium, using the same techniques as in RQ1 and RQ2.

Collecting traces The libsodium repository includes an extensive test suite of 77 tests, where one test is one usage scenario. We use this test suite to measure the trace diversity among program variants. Since some test traces are larger than 1 GB each, we focus on reasonably sized tests: we select the 41/77 test cases that produce a trace containing less than 50 million events each.

To measure the relative trace diversification for each test, we normalize the dt_{dyn} used in RQ2 by dividing it with the length of the original trace. This allows us to compare the relative success of CROW's diversification technique across different tests.

Since libsodium uses a pseudo-number generator, we set a static seed when executing libsodium, so that the diversity observed in traces is only due to CROW's diversification. This seed is given to the `arc4random` API used by libsodium in WebAssembly. To quantify the effectiveness of our diversification technique, we compare the trace distance produced by our technique with the trace distance that occurs when the seed is changed (baseline).

V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

In this section we present the results for the research questions formulated in section IV.

⁴<https://github.com/satabin/swam>




Fig. 2: Cumulative distribution for all pairwise comparisons between a program and its variants. Each line corresponds to a different program representation.

A. To what extent are the program variants generated by CROW statically different?

We run CROW on 303 C programs compiled to WebAssembly. CROW produces at least one unique program variant for 239/303 programs. For the rest of the programs (64/303), the timeout is reached before CROW can find any valid variant.

We subsequently perform a manual analysis of the programs that yield more than 100 unique WebAssembly variants. This reveals one key reason that favors a large number of unique WebAssembly variants: the programs include bounded loops. In these cases CROW synthesizes variants for the loops by unrolling them. Every time a loop is unrolled, the loop body is copied and moved as part of the outer scope of the loop. This creates a new, statically different, program. The number of programs grows exponentially with nested loops.

A second key factor for the synthesis of many variants relates to the presence of arithmetic. Souper, the synthesis engine used by CROW, is effective in replacing arithmetic instructions by equivalent instructions that lead to the same result. For example, CROW generates unique variants by replacing multiplications with additions or shift left instructions (Listing 8). Also, logical comparisons are replaced, inverting the operation and the operands (Listing 9).

Listing 8: Diversification through arithmetic expression replacement.

```
local.get 0 local.get 0
i32.const 2 i32.const 1
i32.mul
```

```
local.get 0 i32.const 11
i32.const 10 local.get 0
i32.shl i32.gt_s
```

Listing 9: Diversification through inversion of comparison operations.

We now discuss the prevalence of the transformations made by CROW when the WebAssembly binaries are transformed to machine code, specifically with the V8's engine. In Figure 2 we plot the cumulative distribution of dt_{static} , comparing WebAssembly binaries (in blue) and x86 binaries (in orange). The figure plots a total of 103003 dt_{static} values for each representation, two values for each variant pair comparison (including original) for the 239 program. The value on the y-axis shows which percentage of the total comparisons lie

Listing 10: Excerpt of WebAssembly program p74: CROW replaces a loop by a constant.

```
local.set 1
loop ; label = @1
...
end
...
i32.store      i32.store
               local.get 0
               i32.const 25264
```

below the corresponding dt_static value on the x-axis. Since we measure the distances between original programs and WebAssembly variants, then 100% of these binaries have $dt_static > 0$. Let us consider the x86 variants: dt_static is strictly positive for 99.48% of variants. In all these cases, the V8 compilation phase does not undo the CROW diversification transformations. Also, we see that there is a gap between both distributions, the main reason is the natural inflation of machine code. For example, two variants that differ by one single instruction in WebAssembly, can be translated to machine code where the difference is increased by more than one machine code instruction.

The zoomed subplot focuses on the beginning of the distribution, it shows that the dt_static is zero for 0.52% of the x86 binaries. In these cases the V8 TurboFan compiler from WebAssembly to x86 reverts the CROW transformations. We find that CROW produces at least one of these reversible transformations for 34/239 programs. Listing 11 shows one of the most common transformations that is reversed by TurboFan, according to our experiments.

Listing 11: Replacement in WebAssembly that is translated to the same x86 code by V8-TurboFan.

```
i32.const <n>
i32.sub      i32.const <n>
               i32.add
```

We look at the cases that yield a small number of variants. There is no direct correlation between the number of identified blocks and the number of unique variants. We manually analyze programs that include a significant number of pure blocks, for which CROW generates few variants. We identify two main challenges for diversification.

1) Constant computation We have observed that Souper searches for a constant replacement for more than 45% of the blocks of each program while constant values cannot be inferred. For instance, constant values cannot be inferred for memory load operations because CROW is oblivious to a memory model.

2) Combination computation The overlap between code replacements, discussed in subsection III-D, is a second factor that limits the number of unique variants. CROW can generate a high number of variants, but not all replacement combinations are necessarily unique.

Regarding the potential size overhead of the generated variants, we have compared the WebAssembly binary size of

the 239 programs with their variants. The ratio of size change between the original program and the variants ranges from 82% (variants are smaller) to 125% (variants are larger) for all Rosetta programs. This limited impact on the binary size of the variants is good news because they are meant to be distributed to browsers over the network.

Answer to RQ1

CROW is able to generate diverse variants of WebAssembly programs for 239/303 (79%) programs in our corpus. We observe that programs that include bounded loops and arithmetic expressions are highly prone to diversification. V8’s TurboFan compilation to x86 code preserves 99.48% of the transformations performed by CROW. To our knowledge, this is the first ever realization of automated diversification for WebAssembly.

B. To what extent are the program variants generated by CROW dynamically different?

Now, we focus on the 41 programs that have at least 9 unique WebAssembly variants in order to study the diversity of execution traces. We apply the protocol described in subsection IV-C by executing the WebAssembly programs and their unique variants in order to collect the stack operation traces. Then, we compare the traces of each pair of original program and a variant. We run 1906 program executions and we perform 98774 trace pair comparisons.

Table I summarizes the observed trace diversity, as captured by dt_dyn (Metric 2), among each program and their variants. The table is structured as follows: the first, second and third columns contain the program id, the number of unique variants and the overall sum of all blocks replacements respectively. The table summarizes the distribution of distances between stack operation trace pairs: the minimum value, the maximum value, the median value, the percentage of values equal to zero and the percentage of values greater than zero. The programs are sorted with respect to the number of unique variants. The green highlight color in $> 0\%$ columns represents more than 50% of non-zero comparisons, *i.e.*, high diversification. For instance, the first row shows the trace diversity for p96, where 99.70% of the pairwise comparisons between all collected traces have a different dt_dyn .

For the stack operation traces, all programs have at least one variant that produces a trace different from the original. All but one (p81) programs have the majority of variants producing a different stack operation trace. This shows the real effectiveness of CROW for diversifying stack operation traces.

We manually analyze variants with high and low trace diversity. We observe that constant inferring is effective at changing the stack operation trace. For instance, for program p74 shown in Listing 10, CROW removes a loop by replacing it with a constant assignment. The execution of this variant produces traces that are different because the loop pattern is not visible anymore in the trace, and consequently, the distance between the original and the variant traces is large.

	NAME	#var	Σ	Min	Max	Median	0 %	> 0 %
1	p96	220	15	0	24062	820	0.30	99.70
2	p56	192	36	0	45420	1416	1.84	98.16
3	p78	159	35	0	20501	759	1.52	98.48
4	p111	144	45	0	2114	520	3.74	96.26
5	p166	101	152	0	44538	66	45.80	54.20
6	p122	91	34	0	46026	6434	0.24	99.76
7	p67	89	77	0	94036	85692	0.29	99.71
8	p68	85	10	0	10554	260	3.64	96.36
9	p80	78	9	0	17238	618	3.92	96.08
10	p204	77	42	0	36428	3356	0.33	99.67
11	p183	76	9	0	90628	84402	0.57	99.43
12	p136	62	70	0	62953	58028	0.60	99.40
13	p167	46	232	8	888	724	0.00	100.00
14	p226	42	13	0	90736	74476	8.26	91.74
15	p99	38	74	16	9936	5037	0.00	100.00
16	p18	36	7	0	15620	145	1.10	98.90
17	p140	29	17	0	13280	172	6.59	93.41
18	p59	27	6	0	85390	40	1.43	98.57
19	p199	21	87	0	27482	728	4.68	95.32
20	p91	21	21	0	50002	228	43.81	56.19
21	p223	21	115	16	40911	632	0.00	100.00

	NAME	#var	Σ	Min	Max	Median	0 %	> 0 %
22	p168	20	6	0	22200	18896	2.20	97.80
23	p174	18	40	6	6566	6395	0.00	100.00
24	p81	17	86	0	4419	0	84.62	15.38
25	p141	17	6	8	2894	132	0.00	100.00
26	p108	16	6	0	85168	79903	8.97	91.03
27	p98	15	4	0	33	25	6.06	93.94
28	p89	14	45	10	15952	89	0.00	100.00
29	p36	14	52	312	33266	30298	0.00	100.00
30	p135	13	5	0	20288	20163	3.57	96.43
31	p161	12	91	240	9792	1056	0.00	100.00
32	p147	12	32	0	54071	21274	7.14	92.86
33	p11	10	38	29798	51846	35119	0.00	100.00
34	p125	10	51	0	4399	4368	7.14	92.86
35	p131	9	4	140	1454	685	0.00	100.00
36	p69	9	48	28	29243	28956	0.00	100.00
37	p134	9	20	4	514	186	0.00	100.00
38	p74	9	19	126	8332	6727	0.00	100.00
39	p79	9	97	4	29	16	0.00	100.00
40	p33	9	52	4	2342	15	0.00	100.00
41	p157	9	64	36	242	166	0.00	100.00

TABLE I: Dynamic diversity for 41 diversified WASM programs. The dynamic diversity is captured by dt_dyn between traces. The rows are sorted by the number of unique variants per program. The table is structured as follows: the first, second and third columns contain the program id, the number of unique variants and the overall sum of all blocks replacements respectively. Following, the stats for the dt_dyn metric. The colorized cells in the $> 0\%$ column represent high diversification.

Listing 12: Statically different WebAssembly replacements with the same behavior, gray for the original code, green for the replacement.

```
(1) i32.lt_u i32.lt_s      (3) i32.ne      i32.lt_u
(2) i32.le_s i32.lt_u      (4) local.get 6  local.get 4
```

We note that there is no relation between the trace distance and the number of block replacements. A high trace distance does not necessarily imply a high number of replacements. For instance, program p135 has only 4 possible replacements overall its 5 identified blocks yet a median dt_dyn of 20163.

We subsequently analyze the cases where diversification is not reflected in stack operation traces. For example, more than 40% of the pairwise dt_dyn distances for p166, p91 and p81 are equal to zero. This indicates a lower diversity among the population of variants, than for all the other programs. This happens because some variants have two different bitcode instructions (original and replacement) that trigger the same stack operations. The instructions in Listing 12 are concrete cases of such kind of replacements. The four cases in Listing 12 leave the same value in the stack operation trace. For each case, the original instruction and the replacement are semantically equal in the program domain. The fourth case is a local variable index reallocation, this replacement only changes the index of the local variable but not the event in the stack operation trace. These replacements are sound,

produce statically diverse code, but they are not useful to dynamically diversify the original program. This confirms the complementary of using static and dynamic metrics to assess diversification.

The effectiveness of CROW on diversifying stack operation traces is significant. In a security context, such diverse stack operation traces are likely to mitigate potential side-channel attacks [30]. Notably, the attacks based on code profiling are affected when the executed opcodes and the corresponding profiles are different [37].

Answer to RQ2

CROW is successful at generating diverse WebAssembly variant programs, for which we are able to observe different stack operation traces. In other words, CROW generates dynamically different binaries, and ensures that variants of a given program yield different stack operation traces.

C. To what extent can CROW be applied to diversify real-world security-sensitive software?

We run CROW on each of the 102 modules of libodium with a 6-hour timeout. We find 45/102 modules that do not contain any pure block, so they are not amenable to our diversification technique. CROW produces at least one valid WebAssembly module variant for 15 of the remaining 57 modules.

Module & Description	#var	#func	Diversified Functions	#calls
argon2-core Core functions for the implementation of the Argon2 key derivation (hash) function [9].	17	6	argon2_finalize argon2_free_instance argon2_initialize	0 0 0
argon2-encoding Functions for encoding and decoding (including salting) Argon2 [9] hash strings.	11	2	argon2_decode_string argon2_encode_string	0 0
blake2b-ref Reference implementation for the BLAKE2 [4] hash function.	7	11	blake2b blake2b_salt_personal blake2b_update	0 1.46E+04 2.04E+04
chacha20_ref Reference implementation of the ChaCha20 stream cipher [6].	7	5	chacha20_encrypt_bytes stream_iext_ext_ref_xor_ic stream_ref stream_ref_xor_ic	3.51E+06 7.62E+03 1.14E+04 1.14E+05
codecs Implementations of commonly used codecs for conversions between binary formats like Base64 [26].	79	5	sodium_base64bin sodium_base64_encoded_len sodium_bin2base64 sodium_bin2hex sodium_hex2bin	0 0 0 2.57E+05 0
core_ed25519 Implementation of the Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm [8].	2	19	crypto_core_ed25519_is_valid_point	0
crypto_scrypt-common Utility and low-level API functions for the scrypt key derivation (hash) function [34].	5	5	escrypt_gensalt_r	0
pbkdf2-sha256 Implementation of the Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2 (PBKDF2) [27].	14	1	escrypt_PBKDF2_SHA256	0
pwhash_scryptsalsa208sha256 High-level API for the scrypt key derivation function [34].	8	19	crypto_pwhash_scryptsalsa208sha256	0
pwhash_scryptsalsa208sha256_nosse Same as above, but does not use Streaming SIMD Extensions (SSE).	32	3	escrypt_kdf_nosse salsa20_8	0 0
randombytes Pseudorandom number generators.	1	11	randombytes_uniform	5.61E+02
salsa20_ref Contains a reference implementation of the Salsa20 stream cipher [7].	12	2	stream_ref stream_ref_xor_ic	1.14E+04 1.14E+05
scalarmult_ristretto255_ref10 Implementation of the Ristretto255 prime order elliptic curve group [22].	29	4	scalarmult_ristretto255 scalarmult_ristretto255_base scalarmult_ristretto255_scalarbytes	0 0 0
stream_chacha20 High-level API for the ChaCha20 stream cipher [8].	2	15	crypto_stream_chacha20 crypto_stream_chacha20_iext crypto_stream_chacha20_iext_ext crypto_stream_chacha20_iext_ext_xor_ic crypto_stream_chacha20_iext_xor crypto_stream_chacha20_iext_xor_ic crypto_stream_chacha20_xor crypto_stream_chacha20_xor_ic	6.65E+02 3.19E+03 2.66E+03 1.68E+02 2.32E+03 0 1.68E+02
verify Functions used to compare secrets in constant time to avoid timing attacks.	7	6	crypto_verify_16 crypto_verify_32 crypto_verify_64	2.69E+05 3.40E+03 0
Total	256	114	40 functions	

TABLE II: Libsodium modules with at least one variant generated by CROW. The columns on the left include the facts about each module. The first column contains the name and the functional description of the modules. The second column, #var (highlighted) gives the number of unique variants generated by CROW. The third column, #func, lists the total amount of functions in each module. The remaining columns include a list of functions that CROW has successfully diversified and the number of calls per function in the test suite.

Table II presents the key results for these 15 successfully diversified modules. The first two columns contain the name and description of the diversified module, and, the number of unique static variants. The other columns show the total number of functions inside the module, the names of the diversified functions and the number of calls to each function in the considered tests.

Generation of WebAssembly library variants from WebAssembly module variants. The successfully diversified modules can be combined to obtain a large pool of different versions of the packaged libsodium WebAssembly library. The Cartesian product of all module variants produces in theory $1.66E+15$ unique libsodium variants. Yet, it is unpractical to store and execute this large number of variants. Thus, we sample the pool of possible variants to evaluate our generated variants. First, for each of the 256 modules, we rank each module variant with respect to the number of lines changed in the

final WebAssembly textual format. Then, to produce the i -th library variant, we combine the i -th variant for each module of libsodium, in order to produce maximally diversified library variants first. If a module has less than i variants, we use the original, non-diversified module. According to Table II, the maximum number of unique variants for a single module is 79 (codecs module). Thus, we sample 79 unique libsodium variants, ordered by the amount of diversification (the first variant contains the most changes, and so on). For each variant we execute the complete test suite to validate its correctness. All test cases successfully pass for all diversified library binaries.

Dynamic evaluation of libsodium variants. We compare the dynamic behaviour of the original libsodium and the 79 library variants. Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of dt_{dyn} of all collected traces for each libsodium test. The dt_{dyn} distance is calculated between each diversified trace




Fig. 3: Distribution of normalized dt_dyn distances over the set of libsodium variants covered by each test. The left Y axis lists the name of each test. The number of unique variants used per test is listed on the right Y axis. The black triangles point to the dt_dyn distance between two different stack operation traces of the original test with different random seeds.

and the corresponding original trace for the same test. Each horizontal bar gives the distribution of dt_dyn over the 79 diversified libraries per test. The black triangles show the dt_dyn distance between two different executions of the same test with different random seeds. They serve as a baseline to compare the artificial diversity introduced by CROW, against the natural trace diversity that appears because of random number generation.

For 18/19 tests, we observe that CROW’s diversified modules produce a different trace than the original. The wider violin plots that reach the right-hand side of the figure include variants that significantly diversify the test execution. We observe that 4/18 tests stand out as they include variants with at least 0.8 normalized dt_dyn distance. For 6/18 tests, there is a medium trace diversity as their dt_dyn distributions lie in the mid/left side of the plot. For the rest 8/18 tests we observe a significantly smaller dt_dyn distance.

This means that, in the context of this cryptographic library, CROW is able to find variants that have a huge impact on the dynamic stack behaviour of the program. Meanwhile, some other replacements can have only a marginal impact during the operation of the program. One factor that can affect this is the “centrality” of the code that is being replaced. Diversified code that is called often, potentially inside loops, will have a greater impact on the stack trace of a program compared to code that is only called, for example, only during the initialization of the program.

When we compare the trace diversity against the diversity

due to pseudo-number generation (black triangles in Figure 3), we observe that: for 2/18 tests CROW trace diversification is always larger than the one due to random number generation, for 11/18 tests there exist some variants that exhibit larger trace diversification than random number generation and for 5/18 tests CROW trace diversification is always smaller than the one due to random number generation.

Answer to RQ3

We have successfully applied CROW to libsodium, one of the leading WebAssembly cryptography libraries. We have shown that CROW is able to create statically different variants of this real-world library, all of which being distributable to users. Our original experiments to measure the trace diversity of libsodium have proven that the generated variants exhibit significantly different execution traces compared to the original non-diversified libsodium binary. The take-away of this experiment is that CROW works on complex code.

VI. THREATS TO VALIDITY

Internal: The timeout in the exploration stage is a determinate factor to generate unique variants. It is required to bound the experimental time. If the timeout is increased, the number of variants and unique variants might increase.

External: The 303 programs in our Rosetta corpus may not reflect the constructs used in the WebAssembly programs in the wild. Yet our experiment on libsodium shows that the results on the Rosetta corpus hold on real code. To increase external validity, we hope to see more benchmarks of WebAssembly programs published by the research community.

Scale: We measure behavioral diversity with DTW. We are aware that this behavioral diversity metric does not scale infinitely. To make comparisons between large execution traces, it may be necessary to use a more scalable metric. To mitigate this scale problem in future work, one option is to compare software traces using entropy analysis, as proposed by Miransky et al. [33].

VII. RELATED WORK

Program diversification approaches can be applied at different stages of the development pipeline.

Static diversification: This kind of diversification consists in synthesizing, building and distributing different, functionally equivalent, binaries to end users. This aims at increasing the complexity and applicability of an attack against a large population of users [12]. Jackson et al. [24] argue that the compiler can be placed at the heart of the solution for software diversification; they propose the use of multiple semantic-preserving transformations to implement massive-scale software diversity in which each user gets their own diversified variant. Dealing with code-reuse attacks, Homescu et al. [23] propose inserting NOP instruction directly in LLVM IR to generate a variant with different code layout at each compilation. In this area, Coppens et al. [13] use compiler transformations to iteratively diversify software. The aim of their work is to prevent reverse engineering of security patches for attackers targeting vulnerable programs. Their approach, continuously applies a random

selection of predefined transformations using a binary diffing tool as feedback. A downside of their method is that attackers are, in theory, able to identify the type of transformations applied and find a way to ignore or reverse them. Our work can be extended to address this issue, providing a synthesizing solution which is more general than specific transformations.

The work closest to ours is that by Jacob et al. [25]. These authors propose the use of a “superdiversification” technique, inspired by superoptimization [32], to synthesize individualized versions of programs. In the work of Massalin, a superoptimizer aims to synthesize the shortest instruction sequence that is equivalent to the original given sequence. On the contrary, the tool developed by Jacob et al. does not output only the shortest instruction sequence, but any sequences that implement the input function. This work focuses on a specific subset of X86 instructions. Meanwhile, our approach works directly with LLVM IR, enabling it to generalize to more languages and CPU architectures. Specifically, we apply our tool on WebAssembly, something not possible with the X86-specific approach of that paper.

Runtime diversification: Previous works have attempted to generate diversified variants that are alternated during execution. It has been shown to drastically increase the number of execution traces that a side-channel attack requires to succeed. Amarilli et al. [3] are the first to propose generation of code variants against side-channel attacks. Agosta et al. [1] and Crane et al. [15] modify the LLVM toolchain to compile multiple functionally equivalent variants to randomize the control flow of software, while Couroussé et al. [14] implement an assembly-like DSL to generate equivalent code at runtime in order to increase protection against side-channel attacks. CROW focuses on static diversification of software. However, because of the specificities of code execution in the browser, this is not far from being a dynamic approach. Since WebAssembly is served at each page refreshment, every time a user asks for a WebAssembly binary, she can be served a different variant provided by CROW.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Security has been a major driver for the design of WebAssembly. Diversification is one additional protection mechanism that has been not yet realized for it. In this paper, we have presented CROW, the first code diversification approach for WebAssembly. We have shown that CROW is able to generate variants for a large variety of programs, including a real-world cryptographic library. Our original experiments have comprehensively assessed the generated diversity: we have shown that CROW generates diversity both among the binary code variants as well as in the execution traces collected when executing the variants. Also, we have successfully observed diverse execution traces for the considered cryptographic library, which can protect it against a range of side channel attacks.

Future work includes increasing the number of unique variants that are generated, by working on block replacement overlapping detection. Also, the exploration stage and the identification of code replacements is a highly parallelizable process, this would increase diversification performance in order to meet the demands of the internet scale.

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MULTI-VARIANT EXECUTION AT THE EDGE

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Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS 2022), Moving Target Defense (MTD)

<https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3560828.3564007>

Multi-variant Execution at the Edge

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Edge-Cloud computing offloads parts of the computations that traditionally occurs in the cloud to edge nodes. The binary format WebAssembly is increasingly used to distribute and deploy services on such platforms. Edge-Cloud computing providers let their clients deploy stateless services in the form of WebAssembly binaries, which are then translated to machine code, sandboxed and executed at the edge. In this context, we propose a technique that (i) automatically diversifies WebAssembly binaries that are deployed to the edge and (ii) randomizes execution paths at runtime. Thus, an attacker cannot exploit all edge nodes with the same payload. Given a service, we automatically synthesize functionally equivalent variants for the functions providing the service. All the variants are then wrapped into a single multivariant WebAssembly binary. When the service endpoint is executed, every time a function is invoked, one of its variants is randomly selected. We implement this technique in the MEWE tool and we validate it with 7 services for which MEWE generates multivariant binaries that embed hundreds of function variants. We execute the multivariant binaries on the world-wide edge platform provided by Fastly, as part as a research collaboration. We show that multivariant binaries exhibit a real diversity of execution traces across the whole edge platform distributed around the globe.

Additional Key Words and Phrases: Diversification, Moving Target Defense, Edge-Cloud computing, Multivariant execution, WebAssembly.

ACM Reference Format:

Javier Cabrera-Arteaga, Pierre Laperdrix, Martin Monperrus, and Benoit Baudry. 2022. Multi-variant Execution at the Edge. 1, 1 (August 2022), 12 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1145/mnnnnnn.mnnnnnn>

1 INTRODUCTION

Edge-Cloud computing distributes a part of the data and computation to edge nodes [20, 56]. Edge nodes are servers located in many countries and regions so that Internet resources get closer to the end users, in order to reduce latency and save bandwidth. Video and music streaming services, mobile games, as well as e-commerce and news sites leverage this new type of cloud architecture to increase the quality of their services. For example, the New York Times website was able to serve more than 2 million concurrent visitors during the 2016 US presidential election with no difficulty thanks to Edge computing [4].

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XXXX-XXXX/2022/8-ART \$15.00

<https://doi.org/10.1145/mnnnnnn.mnnnnnn>

The state of the art of edge computing platforms like Cloudflare or Fastly use the binary format WebAssembly (aka Wasm) [28, 57] to deploy and execute on edge nodes. WebAssembly is a portable bytecode format designed to be lightweight, fast and safe [17, 27]. After compiling code to a WebAssembly binary, developers spawn an edge-enabled compute service by deploying the binary on all nodes in an Edge platform. Thanks to its simple memory and computation model, WebAssembly is considered safe [44], yet is not exempt of vulnerabilities either at the execution engine's level [54] or the binary itself [38]. Implementations in both, browsers and standalone runtimes [45], have been found to be vulnerable [38, 45]. This means that if one node in an Edge network is vulnerable, all the others are vulnerable in the exact same manner. In other words, the same attacker payload would break all edge nodes at once [46]. This illustrates how Edge computing is fragile with respect to systemic vulnerabilities for the whole network, like it happened on June 8, 2021 for Fastly [3].

In this work, we introduce Multivariant Execution for WebAssembly in the Edge (MEWE), a framework that generates diversified WebAssembly binaries so that no two executions in the edge network are identical. Our solution is inspired by N-variant systems [23] where diverse variants are assembled for secretless security. Here, our goal is to drastically increase the effort for exploitation through large-scale execution path randomization. MEWE operates in two distinct steps. At compile time, MEWE generates *variants* for different functions in the program. A function variant is semantically identical to the original function but structurally different, i.e., binary instructions are in different orders or have been replaced with equivalent ones. All the function variants for one service are then embedded in a single multivariant WebAssembly binary. At runtime, every time a function is invoked, one of its variant is randomly selected. This way, the actual execution path taken to provide the service is randomized each time the service is executed, hardening Break-Once-Break-Everywhere (BOBE) attacks.

We experiment MEWE with 7 services, composed of hundreds of functions. We successfully synthesize thousands of function variants, which create orders of magnitude more possible execution paths than in the original service. To determine the runtime randomness of the embedded paths, we deploy and run the multivariant binaries on the Fastly edge computing platform (leading CDN platform). We collaborated with Fastly to experiment MEWE on the actual production edge computing nodes that they provide to their clients. This means that all our experiments ran in a real-world setting. For this experiment, we execute each multivariant binary several times on every edge computing node provided by Fastly. Our experiment shows that the multivariant binaries render the same service as the original, yet with highly diverse execution traces.

The novelty of our contribution is as follows. First, we are the first to perform software diversification in the context of edge computing,

with experiments performed on a real-world, large-scale, commercial edge computing platform (Fastly). Second, very few works have looked at software diversity for WebAssembly [18, 45], our paper contributes to proving the feasibility of this challenging endeavour.

To sum up, our contributions are:

- MEWE: a framework that builds multivariant WebAssembly binaries for edge computing, combining the automatic synthesis of semantically equivalent function variants, with execution path randomization.
- Original results on the large-scale diversification of WebAssembly binaries, at the function and execution path levels.
- Empirical evidence of the feasibility of deploying our novel multivariant execution scheme on a real-world edge-computing platform.
- A publicly available prototype system, shared for future research on the topic: <https://github.com/Jacarte/MEWE>.

This work is structured as follows. First, Section 2 present a background on WebAssembly and its usage in an edge-cloud computing scenario. Section 3 introduces the architecture and foundation of MEWE while Section 4 and Section 5 present the different experiments we conducted to show the feasibility of our approach. Section 6 details the Related Work while Section 7 concludes this paper.

2 BACKGROUND

In this section we introduce WebAssembly, as well as the deployment model that edge-cloud platforms such as Fastly provide to their clients. This forms the technical context for our work.

2.1 WebAssembly

WebAssembly is a bytecode designed to bring safe, fast, portable and compact low-level code on the Web. The language was first publicly announced in 2015 and formalized by Haas et al. [27]. Since then, most major web browsers have implemented support for the standard. Besides the Web, WebAssembly is independent of any specific hardware, which means that it can run in standalone mode. This allows for the adoption of WebAssembly outside web browsers [17], e.g., for edge computing [45].

```
int f(int x) {
    return 2 * x + x;
}
```

Listing 1. C function that calculates the quantity $2x + x$

```
(module
  (type (;0;) (func (param i32) (result i32)))
  (func (;0;) (type 0) (param i32) (result i32)
    local.get 0
    local.get 0
    i32.const 2
    i32.mul
    i32.add)
  (export "f" (func 0)))
```

Listing 2. WebAssembly code for Listing 1.

WebAssembly binaries are usually compiled from source code like C/C++ or Rust. Listing 1 and 2 illustrate an example of a C function turned into WebAssembly. Listing 1 presents the C code of one function and Listing 2 shows the result of compiling this function into a WebAssembly module. The WebAssembly code is further interpreted or compiled ahead of time into machine code.

2.2 Web Assembly and Edge Computing

Using Wasm as an intermediate layer is better in terms of startup and memory usage, than containerization or virtualization [32, 44]. This has encouraged edge computing platforms like Cloudflare or Fastly to adopt WebAssembly to deploy client applications in a modular and sandboxed manner [28, 57]. In addition, WebAssembly is a compact representation of code, which saves bandwidth when transporting code over the network.

Client applications that are designed to be deployed on edge-cloud computing platforms are usually isolated services, having one single responsibility. This development model is known as serverless computing, or function-as-a-service [45, 53]. The developers of a client application implement the isolated services in a given programming language. The source code and the HTTP harness of the service are then compiled to WebAssembly. When client application developers deploy a WebAssembly binary, it is sent to all edge nodes in the platform. Then, the WebAssembly binary is compiled on each node to machine code. Each binary is compiled in a way that ensures that the code runs inside an isolated sandbox.

2.3 Multivariant Execution

In 2006, security researchers of University of Virginia have laid the foundations of a novel approach to security that consists in executing multiple variants of the same program. They called this “N-variant systems” [23]. This potent idea has been renamed soon after as “multivariant execution”.

There is a wide range of realizations of MVE in different contexts. Bruschi et al. [16] and Salamat et al. [50] pioneered the idea of executing the variants in parallel. Subsequent techniques focus on MVE for mitigating memory vulnerabilities [31, 41] and other specific security problems including return-oriented programming attacks [58] and code injection [52]. A key design decision of MVE is whether it is achieved in kernel space [47], in user-space [51], with exploiting hardware features [36], or even through code polymorphism [10]. Finally, one can neatly exploit the limit case of executing only two variants [35, 43]. The body of research on MVE in a distributed setting has been less researched. Notably, Voulimeneas et al. proposed a multivariant execution system by parallelizing the execution of the variants in different machines [59] for sake of efficiency.

In this paper, we propose an original kind of MVE in the context of edge computing. We generate multiple program variants, which we execute on edge computing nodes. We use the natural redundancy of Edge-Cloud computing architectures to deploy an internet-based MVE. Next section goes into the details of our procedure to generate variants and assemble them into multivariant binaries.

3 MEWE: MULTIVARIANT EXECUTION FOR EDGE COMPUTING

In this section we present MEWE, a novel technique to synthesize multivariant binaries and deploy them on an edge computing platform.

3.1 Overview

The goal of MEWE is to synthesize multivariant WebAssembly binaries, according to the threat model presented in Section 3.2.1. The tool generates application-level multivariant binaries, without any change to the operating system or WebAssembly runtime. The core idea of MEWE is to synthesize diversified function variants providing execution-path randomization, according to the diversity model presented in Section 3.2.2.

In Figure 1, we summarize the analysis and transformation pipeline of MEWE. We pass a bitcode to be diversified, as an input to MEWE. Analysis and transformations are performed at the level of LLVM’s intermediate representation (LLVM IR), as it is the best format for us to perform our modifications (see Section 3.2.3). LLVM binaries can be obtained from any language with an LLVM frontend such as C/C++, Rust or Go, and they can easily be compiled to WebAssembly. In Step ①, the binary is passed to CROW [18], which is a superdiversifier for Wasm that generates a set of variants for the functions in the binary. Step ② packages all the variants in one single multivariant LLVM binary. In Step ③, we use a special component, called a “mixer”, which augments the binary with two different components: an HTTP endpoint harness and a random generator, which are both required for executing Wasm at the edge. The harness is used to connect the program to its execution environment while the generator provides support for random execution path at runtime. The final output of Step ④ is a standalone multivariant WebAssembly binary that can be deployed on an edge-cloud computing platform. In the following sections, we describe in greater details the different stages of the workflow.

3.2 Key design choices

In this section, we introduce the main design decisions behind MEWE, starting from the threat model, to aligning the code analysis and transformation techniques.

3.2.1 Threat Model. As we describe in Section 2.2, to benefit from the performance improvements offered by edge computing, developers modularize their services into a set of WebAssembly functions. The binaries are then deployed on all the nodes provided by the edge computing platforms. However, this model of distributing the exact same WebAssembly binary on hundreds of computation nodes is a serious risk for the infrastructure: a malicious developer who manages to exploit one vulnerability in one edge location can exploit all the other locations with the same attack vector.

With MEWE, we aim to defend against an attacker that perform BOBE attacks. These attacks include but are not limited to timing specific operations [6, 11], counting register spill/reload operations to study and exploit memory [48] and performing call stack analysis. They can be performed either locally or remotely by finding a vulnerability or using shared resources in the case of a multi-tenant Edge computing server but the details of such exploitation are out of scope of this study.

3.2.2 Execution Diversification Model. MEWE is designed to randomize the execution of WebAssembly programs, via diversification transformations. Per Crane et al. those transformations are made to hinder side-channel attacks [24]. All programs are diversified with behavior preservation guarantees [18]. The core diversification strategies are: (1) *Constant Inferring*. MEWE identifies variables whose value can be computed at compile time and are used to control branches. This has an effect on program execution times [15]. (2) *Call Stack Randomization*. MEWE introduces equivalent synthetic functions that are called randomly. This results in randomized call stacks, which complicates attacks based on call stack analysis [40]. (3) *Inline Expansion*. MEWE inlines methods when appropriate. This also results in different call stacks, to hinder the same kind of attacks as for call stack randomization [40]. (4) *Spills/Reloads*. By performing semantically equivalent transformations for arithmetic expressions, the number of register spill/reload operations changes. Therefore, this changes the memory accesses in the machine code that is executed, affecting the measurement of memory side-channels [48].

3.2.3 Diversification at the LLVM level. MEWE diversifies programs at the LLVM level. Other solutions would have been to diversify at the source code level [8], or at the native binary level, e.g. x86 [22]. However, the former would limit the applicability of our work. The latter is not compatible with edge computing: the top edge computing execution platforms, e.g. Cloudflare and Fastly, mostly take WebAssembly binaries as input.

LLVM, on the contrary, does not suffer from those limitations: 1) it supports different languages, with a rich ecosystem of frontends 2) it can reliably be retargeted to WebAssembly, thanks to the corresponding mature component in the LLVM toolchain.

3.3 Variant generation

MEWE relies on the superdiversifier CROW [18] to automatically diversify each function in the input LLVM binary (Step ①). CROW receives an LLVM module, analyzes the binary at the function block level and generates semantically equivalent variants for each function, if they exist. A function variant for MEWE is semantically equivalent to the original (i.e., same input/output behavior), but exhibits a different internal behavior through tracing. Since the variants created by CROW are artificially synthesized from the original binary, after Step ①, they are necessarily equivalent to the original program.

3.4 Combining variants into multivariant functions

Step ② of MEWE consists in combining the variants generated for the original functions, into a single binary. The goal is to support execution-path randomization at runtime. The core idea is to introduce one dispatcher function per original function for which we generate variants. A dispatcher function is a synthetic function that is in charge of choosing a variant at random, every time the original function is invoked during the execution. The random invocation of different variants at runtime is a known randomization technique, for example used by Lettner et al. with sanitizers [39].

With the introduction of dispatcher function, MEWE turns the original call graph into a multivariant call graph, defined as follows.




Fig. 1. Overview of MEWE. It takes as input the LLVM binary representation of a service composed of multiple functions. It first generates a set of functionally equivalent variants for each function in the binary and then generates a LLVM multivariant binary composed of all the function variants as well as dispatcher functions in charge of selecting a variant when a function is invoked. The MEWE mixer composes the LLVM multivariant binary with a random number generation library and an edge specific HTTP harness, in order to produce a WebAssembly multivariant binary accessible through an HTTP endpoint and ready to be deployed to the edge.




Fig. 2. Example of two static call graphs for the bin2base64 endpoint of libodium. At the top, the original call graph, at the bottom, the multivariant call graph, which includes nodes that represent function variants (in grey), dispatchers (in green), and original functions (in yellow).

DEFINITION 1. Multivariant Call Graph (MCG): A multivariant call graph is a call graph (N, E) where the nodes in N represent all the functions in the binary and an edge $(f_1, f_2) \in E$ represents a possible invocation of f_2 by f_1 [49], where the nodes are typed. The nodes in N have three possible types: a function present in the original program, a generated function variant, or a dispatcher function.

In Figure 2, we show the original static call graph for program bin2base64 (top of the figure), as well as the multivariant call graph generated with MEWE (bottom of the figure). The grey nodes represent function variants, the green nodes function dispatchers and the yellow nodes are the original functions. The possible calls are represented by the directed edges. The original bin2base64 includes 3 functions. MEWE generates 43 variants for the first function, none for the second and three for the third function. MEWE introduces two dispatcher nodes, for the first and third functions. Each dispatcher is connected to the corresponding function variants, in order to invoke one variant randomly at runtime.

The right most green node of Figure 2 is a function constructed as follows (See code in Appendix A). The function body first calls the random generator, which returns a value that is then used to invoke a

specific function variant. It should be noted that the dispatcher function is constructed using the same signature as the original function.

We implement the dispatchers with a switch-case structure to avoid indirect calls that can be susceptible to speculative execution based attacks [45]. The choice of a switch-case also avoids having multiple function definitions with the same signature, which could increase the attack surface in case the function signature is vulnerable [33]. This also allows MEWE to inline function variants inside the dispatcher, instead of defining them again. Here we trade security over performance, since dispatchers that perform indirect calls, instead of a switch-case, could improve the performance of the dispatchers as indirect calls have constant time.

3.5 MEWE's Mixer

The MEWE mixer has four specific objectives: wrap functions as HTTP endpoints, link the LLVM multivariant binary, inject a random generator and merge all these components into a multivariant WebAssembly binary.

We use the Rust compiler¹ to orchestrate the mixing. For the generator, we rely on WASI's specification [5] for the random behavior of the dispatchers. Its exact implementation is dependent on the platform on which the binary is deployed. For the HTTP harnesses, since our edge computing use case is based on the Fastly infrastructure, we rely on the Fastly API² to transform our Wasm binaries into HTTP endpoints. The harness enables a function to be called as an HTTP request and to return a HTTP response. Throughout this paper, we refer to an endpoint as the closure of invoked functions when the entry point of the WebAssembly binary is executed.

3.6 Implementation

The multivariant combination (Step ②) is implemented in 942 lines of C++ code. Its uses the LLVM 12.0.0 libraries to extend the LLVM standard linker tool capability with the multivariant generation.

¹<https://doc.rust-lang.org/rustc/what-is-rustc.html>

²<https://docs.rs/crate/fastly/0.7.3>

MEWE’s Mixer (Step ③) is implemented as an orchestration of the rustc and the WebAssembly backend provided by CROW. An instantiation of how the multivariant binary works can be appreciated at Appendix B. For sake of open science and for fostering research on this important topic, the code of MEWE is made publicly available on GitHub: <https://github.com/Jacarte/MEWE>.

4 EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY

In this section we introduce our methodology to evaluate MEWE. First, we present our research questions and the services with which we experiment the generation and the execution of multivariant binaries. Then, we detail the methodology for each research question.

4.1 Research questions

To evaluate the capabilities of MEWE, we formulate the following research questions:

- RQ1: (Multivariant Generation) How much diversity can MEWE synthesize and embed in a multivariant binary?** MEWE packages function variants in multivariant binaries. With this first question, we aim at measuring the amount of diversity that MEWE can synthesize in the call graph of a program.
- RQ2: (Intra MVE) To what extent does MEWE achieve multivariant executions on an edge compute node?** With this question we assess the ability of MEWE to produce binaries that actually exhibit random execution paths when executed on one edge node.
- RQ3: (Internet MVE) To what extent does MEWE achieve multivariant execution over the worldwide Fastly infrastructure?** We check the diversity of execution traces gathered from the execution of a multivariant binary. The traces are collected from all edge nodes in order to assess MVE at a worldwide scale.
- RQ4: What is the impact of the proposed multi-version execution on timing side-channels?** MEWE generates binaries that embed a multivariant behavior. We measure to what extent MEWE generates different execution times on the edge. Then, we discuss how multivariant binaries contribute to less predictable timing side-channels.

The core of the validation methodology for our tool MEWE, consists in building multivariant binaries for several, relevant endpoints and to deploy and execute them on the Fastly edge-cloud platform.

4.2 Study subjects

We select two mature and typical edge-cloud computing projects to study the feasibility of MEWE. The projects are selected based on: suitability for diversity synthesis with CROW (the projects should have the ability to collect their modules in LLVM intermediate representation), suitability for deployment on the Fastly infrastructure (the project should be easily portable Wasm/WASI and compatible with the Rust Fastly API), low chances to hit execution paths with no dispatchers and possibility to collect their execution runtime information (the endpoints should execute in a reasonable time of maximum 1 second even with the overhead of instrumentation). The selected projects are: **libsodium**, an encryption, decryption, signature and

password hashing library which can be ported to WebAssembly and **qrcode-rust**, a QrCode and MicroQrCode generator written in Rust.

Name	#Endpoints	#Functions	#Instr.
libsodium https://github.com/jedisct1/libsodium	5	62	6187
qrcode-rust https://github.com/kennytm/qrcode-rust	2	1840	127700

Table 1. Selected projects to evaluate MEWE: project name; the number of endpoints in the project that we consider for our experiments, the total number of functions to implement the endpoints, and the total number of WebAssembly instructions in the original binaries.

In Table 1, we summarize some key metrics that capture the relevance of the selected projects. The table shows the project name with its repository address, the number of selected endpoints for which we build multivariant binaries, the total number of functions included in the endpoints and the total number of Wasm instructions in the original binary. Notice that, the metadata is extracted from the Wasm binaries before they are sent to the edge-cloud computing platform, thus, the number of functions might be not the same in the static analysis of the project source code

4.3 Experiment’s platform

We run all our experiments on the Fastly edge computing platform. We deploy and execute the original and the multivariant endpoints on 64 edge nodes located around the world³. These edge nodes usually have an arbitrary and heterogeneous composition in terms of architecture and CPU model. The deployment procedure is the same as the one described in Section 2.2. The developers implement and compile their services to WebAssembly. In the case of Fastly, the WebAssembly binaries need to be implemented with the Fastly platform API specification so they can properly deal with HTTP requests. When the compiled binary is transmitted to Fastly, it is translated to x86 machine code with Lucet, which ensures the isolation of the service.

4.4 RQ1 Multivariant diversity

We run MEWE on each endpoint function of our 7 endpoints. In this experiment, we bound the search for function variant with timeout of 5 minutes per function. This produces one multivariant binary for each endpoint. To answer RQ1, we measure the number of function variants embedded in each multivariant binary, as well as the number of execution paths that are added in the multivariant call graphs, thanks to the function variants.

4.5 RQ2 Intra MTD

We deploy the multivariant binaries of each of the 7 endpoints presented in Table 2, on the 64 edge nodes of Fastly. We execute each endpoint, multiple times on each node, to measure the diversity of execution traces that are exhibited by the multivariant binaries. We have a time budget of 48 hours for this experiment. Within this

³The number of nodes provided in the whole platform is 72, we decided to keep only the 64 nodes that remained stable during our experimentation.

timeframe, we can query each endpoint 100 times on each node. Each query on the same endpoint is performed with the same input value. This is to guarantee that, if we observe different traces for different executions, it is due to the presence of multiple function variants. The input values are available as part of our reproduction package.

For each query, we collect the execution trace, i.e., the sequence of function names that have been executed when triggering the query. To observe these traces, we instrument the multivariant binaries to record each function entrance.

To answer RQ2, we measure the number of unique execution traces exhibited by each multivariant binary, on each separate edge node. To compare the traces, we hash them with the sha256 function. We then calculate the number of unique hashes among the 100 traces collected for an endpoint on one edge node. We formulate the following definitions to construct the metric for RQ3.

Metric 1. Unique traces: $R(n, e)$. Let $S(n, e) = \{T_1, T_2, \dots, T_{100}\}$ be the collection of 100 traces collected for one endpoint e on an edge node n , $H(n, e)$ the collection of hashes of each trace and $U(n, e)$ the set of unique trace hashes in $H(n, e)$. The uniqueness ratio of traces collected for edge node n and endpoint e is defined as

$$R(n, e) = \frac{|U(n, e)|}{|H(n, e)|}$$

The inputs that we pass to execute the endpoints at the edge and the received output for all executions are available in the reproduction repository at <https://github.com/Jacarte/MEWE>.

4.6 RQ3 Inter MTD

We answer RQ3 by calculating the normalized Shannon entropy for all collected execution traces for each endpoint. We define the following metric.

Metric 2. Normalized Shannon entropy: $E(e)$. Let e be an endpoint, $C(e) = \bigcup_{n=0}^{64} H(n, e)$ be the union of all trace hashes for all edge nodes. The normalized Shannon Entropy for the endpoint e over the collected traces is defined as:

$$E(e) = -\sum p_x * \log(p_x) / \log(|C(e)|)$$

Where p_x is the discrete probability of the occurrence of the hash x over $C(e)$.

Notice that we normalize the standard definition of the Shannon Entropy by using the perfect case where all trace hashes are different. This normalization allows us to compare the calculated entropy between endpoints. The value of the metric can go from 0 to 1. The worst entropy, value 0, means that the endpoint always perform the same path independently of the edge node and the number of times the trace is collected for the same node. On the contrary, 1 for the best entropy, when each edge node executes a different path every time the endpoint is requested.

The Shannon Entropy gives the uncertainty in the outcome of a sampling process. If a specific trace has a high frequency of appearing in part of the sampling, then it is certain that this trace will appear in the other part of the sampling.

We calculate the metric for the 7 endpoints, for 100 traces collected from 64 edge nodes, for a total of 6400 collected traces per endpoint. Each trace is collected in a round robin strategy, i.e., the traces are collected from the 64 edge nodes sequentially. For example, we collect

the first trace from all nodes before continuing to the collection of the second trace. This process is followed until 100 traces are collected from all edge nodes.

4.7 RQ4 Timing side-channels

For each endpoint listed in Table 2, we measure the impact of MEWE on timing. For this, we use the following metric:

Metric 3. Execution time: For a deployed binary on the edge, the execution time is the time spent on the edge to execute the binary.

Note that edge-computing platforms are, by definition, reached from the Internet. Consequently, there may be latency in the timing measurement due to round-trip HTTP requests. This can bias the distribution of measured execution times for the multivariant binary. To avoid this bias, we instrument the code to only measure the execution on the edge nodes.

We collect 100k execution times for each binary, both the original and multivariant binaries. We perform a Mann-Whitney U test [42] to compare both execution time distributions. If the P-value is lower than 0.05, two compared distributions are different.

5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

5.1 RQ1 Results: Multivariant generation

We use MEWE to generate a multivariant binary for each of the 7 endpoints included in our 2 study subjects. We then calculate the number of diversified functions, in each endpoint, as well as how they combine to increase the number of possible execution paths in the static call graph for the original and the multivariant binaries.

The sections 'Original binary' and 'Multivariant WebAssembly binary' of Table 2 summarize the key data for RQ1. In the 'Original binary' section, the first column (#F) gives the number of functions in the original binary and the second column (#Paths) gives the number of possible execution paths in the original static call graph. The 'Multivariant WebAssembly binary' section first shows the number of each type of nodes in the multivariant call graph: #Non div. is the number of original functions that could not be diversified by MEWE, #D is the number of dispatcher nodes generated by MEWE for each function that was successfully diversified, and #V is the total number of function variants generated by MEWE. The last column of this section is the number of possible execution paths in the static multivariant call graph.

For all 7 endpoints, MEWE was able to diversify several functions and to combine them in order to increase the number of possible execution paths in several orders of magnitude. For example, in the case of the encrypt function of libodium, the original binary contains 23 functions that can be combined in 4 different paths. MEWE generated a total of 56 variants for 5 of the 23 functions. These variants, combined with the 18 original functions in the multivariant call graph, form 325 execution paths. In other words, the number of possible ways to achieve the same encryption function has increased from 4 to 325, including dispatcher nodes that are in charge of randomizing the choice of variants at 5 different locations of the call graph. This increased number of possible paths, combined with random choices, made at runtime, increases the effort a potential attacker needs to guess what variant is executed and hence what vulnerability she can exploit.

Endpoint	Original binary		Multivariant WebAssembly binary			
	#F	#Paths	#Non D	#D	#V	#Paths
libsodium						
encrypt	23	4	18	5	56	325
decrypt	20	3	16	5	49	84
random	8	2	6	2	238	12864
invert	8	2	6	2	125	2784
bin2base64	3	2	1	2	47	172
qrcode-rust						
qr_str	982	688×10^6	965	17	2092	97×10^{12}
qr_image	858	1.4×10^6	843	15	2063	3×10^9

Table 2. Static diversity generated by MEWE, measured on the static call graphs of the WebAssembly binaries, and the preservation of this diversity after translation to machine code. The table is structured as follows: Endpoint name; number of functions and numbers of possible paths in the original WebAssembly binary call graph; number of non diversified functions, number of created dispatchers (one per diversified functions), total number of function variants and number of execution paths in the multivariant WebAssembly binary call graph.

We have observed that there is no linear correlation between the number of diversified functions, the number of generated variants and the number of execution paths. We have manually analyzed the endpoint with the largest number of possible execution paths in the multivariant Wasm binary: qr_str of qrcode-rust. MEWE generated 2092 function variants for this endpoint. Moreover, MEWE inserted 17 dispatchers in the call graph of the endpoint. For each dispatcher, MEWE includes between 428 and 3 variants. If the original execution path contains function for which MEWE is able to generate variants, then, there is a combinatorial explosion in the number of execution paths for the generated Wasm multivariant module. The increase of the possible execution paths theoretically augments the uncertainty on which one to perform, in the latter case, approx. 140 000 times. As Cabrera and colleagues observed [18] for CROW, a large presence of loops and arithmetic operations in the original function code leverages to more diversification.

Looking at the #D (#Dispatchers) and #V (#Variants) columns of the ‘Multivariant WebAssembly binary’ section of Table 2, we notice that the number of variants generated per function greatly varies. For example, for both the invert and the bin2base64 functions of Libsodium, MEWE manages to diversify 2 functions (reflected by the presence of 2 dispatcher nodes in the multivariant call graph). Yet, MEWE generates a total of 125 variants for the 2 functions in invert, and only 47 variants for the 2 functions in bin2base64. The main reason for this is related to the complexity of the diversified functions, which impacts the opportunities for the synthesis of code variations.

Columns #Non D of the ‘Multivariant WebAssembly binary’ section of Table 2 indicates that, in each endpoint, there exists a number of functions for which MEWE did not manage to generate variants. We identify three reasons for this, related to the diversification procedure of CROW, used by MEWE to diversify individual functions. First, some functions cannot be diversified by CROW, e.g., functions that wrap only memory operations, which are oblivious to CROW diversification technique. Second, the complexity of the function directly affects the number of variants that CROW can generate. Third, the diversification procedure of CROW is essentially a search procedure, which results are directly impacted by the tie budget for the search. In all experiments we give CROW 5 minutes maximum to synthesize function variants, which is a low budget for many functions. It is important to notice that, the successful diversification of some functions in each endpoint, and their combination within the call

graph of the endpoint, dramatically increases the number of possible paths that can triggered for multivariant executions.

Answer to RQ1: MEWE dramatically increases the number of possible execution paths in the multivariant WebAssembly binary of each endpoint. The large number of possible execution paths, combined with multiple points of random choice in the multivariant call graph thwart the prediction of which path will be taken at runtime.

5.2 RQ2 Results: Intra MTD

To answer RQ2, we execute the multivariant binaries of each endpoint, on the Fastly edge-cloud infrastructure. We execute each endpoint 100 times on each of the 64 Fastly edge nodes. All the executions of a given endpoint are performed with the same input. This allows us to determine if the execution traces are different due to the injected dispatchers and their random behavior. After each execution of an endpoint, we collect the sequence of invoked functions, i.e., the execution trace. Our intuition is that the random dispatchers combined with the function variants embedded in a multivariant binary are very likely to trigger different traces for the same execution, i.e., when an endpoint is executed several times in a row with the same input and on the same edge node. The way both the function variants and the dispatchers contribute to exhibiting different execution traces is illustrated in Figure 6.

Figure 3 shows the ratio of unique traces exhibited by each endpoint, on each of the 64 separate edge nodes. The X corresponds to the edge nodes. The Y axis gives the name of the endpoint. In the plot, for a given (x,y) pair, there is blue point in the Z axis representing Metric 1 over 100 execution traces.

For all edge nodes, the ratio of unique traces is above 0.38. In 6 out of 7 cases, we have observed that the ratio is remarkably high, above 0.9. These results show that MEWE generates multivariant binaries that can randomize execution paths at runtime, in the context of an edge node. The randomization dispatchers, associated to a significant number of function variants greatly reduce the certainty about which computation is performed when running a specific input with a given input value.

Let’s illustrate the phenomenon with the endpoint invert. The endpoint invert receives a vector of integers and returns its inversion. Passing a vector of integers with 100 elements as input, $I = [100, \dots, 0]$, results in output $O = [0, \dots, 100]$. When the endpoint executes 100 times with the same input on the original binary, we observe 100 times the same execution trace. When the endpoint is executed 100 times with the same input I on the multivariant binary, we observe between 95 and 100 unique execution traces, depending on the edge node. Analyzing the traces we observe that they include only two invocations to a dispatcher, one at the start of the trace and one at the end. The remaining events in the trace are fixed each time the endpoint is executed with the same input I . Thus, the maximum number of possible unique traces is the multiplication of the number of variants for each dispatcher, in this case $29 \times 96 = 2784$. The probability of observing the same trace is $1/2784$.

For multivariant binaries that embed only a few variants, like in the case of the bin2base64 endpoint, the ratio of unique traces per node is lower than for the other endpoints. With the input we pass to




Fig. 3. Ratio of unique execution traces for each endpoint on each edge node. The X axis illustrates the edge nodes. The Y axis annotates the name of the endpoint. In the plot, for a given (x,y) pair, there is blue point representing the Metric 1 value in a set of 100 collected execution traces.

bin2base64, the execution trace includes 57 function calls. We have observed that, only one of these calls invokes a dispatcher, which can select among 41 variants. Thus, probability of having the same execution trace twice is 1/41.

Meanwhile, qr_str embeds thousands of variants, and the input we pass triggers the invocation of 3M functions, for which 210666 random choices are taken relying on 17 dispatchers. Consequently, the probability of observing the same trace twice is infinitesimal. Indeed, all the executions of qr_str are unique, on each separate edge node. This is shown in Figure 3, where the ratio of unique traces is 1 on all edge nodes.

Answer to RQ2: Repeated executions of a multivariant binary with the same input on an individual edge node exhibits diverse execution traces. MEWE successfully synthesizes multivariant binaries that trigger diverse execution paths at runtime, on individual edge nodes.

5.3 RQ3 Results: Internet MTD

To answer RQ3, we build the union of all the execution traces collected on all edge nodes for a given endpoint. Then, we compute the normalized Shannon Entropy over this set for each endpoint (Metric 2). Our goal is to determine whether the diversity of execution traces we observed on individual nodes in RQ3, actually generalizes to the whole edge-cloud infrastructure. Depending on many factors, such as the random number generator or a bug in the dispatcher, it could happen that we observe different traces on individual nodes, but that the set of traces is the same on all nodes. With RQ4 we assess the ability of MEWE to exhibit multivariant execution at a global scale.

Table 3 provides the data to answer RQ3. The second column gives the normalized Shannon Entropy value (Metric 2). Columns 3 and 4 give the median and the standard deviation for the length of the execution traces. Columns 5 and 6 give the number of dispatchers that are invoked during the execution of the endpoint (#ED) and the total number of invocations of these endpoints (#RCh). These last two columns indicate to what extent the execution paths are actually randomized at runtime. In the cases of invert and random, both have the same

Endpoint	Entropy	MTL	σ	#ED	#RCh
libodium					
encrypt	0.87	816	0	5	4M
decrypt	0.96	440	0	5	2M
random	0.98	15	5	2	12800
invert	0.87	7343	0	2	12800
bin2base64	0.42	57	0	1	6400
qrcode-rust					
qr_str	1.00	3045193	0	17	1348M
qr_image	1.00	3015450	0	15	1345M

Table 3. Execution trace diversity over the Fastly edge-cloud computing platform. The table is formed of 6 columns: the name of the endpoint, the normalized Shannon Entropy value (Metric 2), the median size of the execution traces (MTL), the standard deviation for the trace lengths the number of executed dispatchers (#ED) and the number of total random choices taken during all the 6400 executions (#RCh).

number of taken random choices. However, the number of variants to choose in random are larger, thus, the entropy, is larger than invert.

Overall, the normalized Shannon Entropy is above 42%. This is evidence that the multivariant binaries generated by MEWE can indeed exhibit a high degree of execution trace diversity, while keeping the same functionality. The number of randomization points along the execution paths (#Rch) is at the core of these high entropy values. For example, every execution of the encrypt endpoint triggers 4M random choices among the different function variants embedded in the multivariant binaries. Such a high degree of randomization is essential to generate very diverse execution traces.

The bin2base64 endpoint has the lowest level of diversity. As discussed in RQ2, this endpoint is the one that has the least variants and its execution path can be randomized only at one point. The low level of unique traces observed on individual nodes is reflected at the system wide scale with a globally low entropy.

For both qr_str and qr_image the entropy value is 1.0. This means that all the traces that we observe for all the executions of these endpoints are different from each other. In other words, someone who runs these services over and over with the same input cannot know exactly what code will be executed in the next execution. These very high entropy values are made possible by the millions of random choices that are made along the execution paths of these endpoints.

While there is a high degree of diversity among the traces exhibited by each endpoint, they all have the same length, except in the case of random. This means that the entropy is a direct consequence of the invocations of the dispatchers. In the case of random, it naturally has a non-deterministic behavior. Meanwhile, we observe several calls to dispatchers during the execution of the multivariant binary, which indicates that MEWE can amplify the natural diversity of traces exhibited by random. For each endpoint, we managed to trigger all dispatchers during its execution. There is a correlation between the entropy and the number of random choices (Column #RChs) taken during the execution of the endpoints. For a high number of dispatchers, and therefore random choices, the entropy is large, like the cases of qr_str and qr_image show. The contrary happens to bin2base64 where its multivariant binary contains only one dispatcher.

Endpoint	Original bin.		Multivariant Wasm	
	Median (μs)	σ	Median (μs)	σ
libsodium				
encrypt	7	5	217	43
decrypt	13	6	225	47
random	16	7	232	53
invert	119	34	341	65
bin2base64	10	5	215	35
qrcode-rust				
qr_str	3,117	418	492,606	36,864
qr_image	3,091	412	512,669	41,718

Table 4. Execution time distributions for 100k executions, for the original endpoints and their corresponding multivariants. The table is structured in two sections. The first section shows the endpoint name, the median execution time and its standard deviation for the original endpoint. The second section shows the median execution time and its standard deviation for the multivariant WebAssembly binary.

Answer to RQ3: At the internet scale of the Edge platform, the multivariant binaries synthesized by MEWE exhibit a massive diversity of execution traces, while still providing the original service. It is virtually impossible for an attacker to predict which is taken for a given query.

5.4 RQ4 Results: Timing side-channels

For each endpoint used in RQ1, we compare the execution time distributions for the original binary and the multivariant binary. All distributions are measured on 100k executions. In Table 4, we show the execution time for the original endpoints and their corresponding multivariant. The table is structured in two sections. The first section shows the endpoint name, the median and standard deviation of the original endpoint. The second section shows the median and the standard deviation for the execution time of the corresponding multivariant binary.

We also observe that the distributions for multivariant binaries have a higher standard deviation of execution time. A statistical comparison between the execution time distributions confirms the significance of this difference (P -value = 0.05 with a Mann-Withney U test). This hints at the fact that the execution time for multivariant binaries is more unpredictable than the time to execute the original binary.

In Figure 4, each subplot represents the distribution for a single endpoint, with the colors blue and green representing the original and multivariant binary respectively. These plots reveal that the execution times are indeed spread over a larger range of values compared to the original binary. This is evidence that execution time is less predictable for multivariant binaries than for the original ones.

We evaluate to what extent a specific variant can be detected by observing the execution time distribution. This evaluation is based on the measurement with one endpoint. For this, we choose endpoint bin2base64 because it is the end point that has the least variants and the least dispatchers, which is the most conservative assumption.

We dissect the collected execution times for the bin2base64 endpoint, grouping them by execution path. In Figure 5, each opaque curve represents a cumulative execution time distribution of a unique execution path out of the 41 observed. We observe that no specific distribution is remarkably different from another one. Thus, no specific variant can be inferred out of the projection of all execution times like the ones presented in Figure 4. Nevertheless, we calculate a Mann-Whitney

test for each pair of distributions, 41×41 pairs. For all cases, there is no statistical evidence that the distributions are different, $P > 0.05$.

Recall that the choice of function variant is randomized at each function invocation, and the variants have different execution times as a consequence of the code transformations, i.e., some variants execute more instructions than others. Consequently, attacks relying on measuring precise execution times of a function are made a lot harder to conduct as the distribution for the multivariant binary is different and even more spread than the original one.

We evaluate the impact of multivariant binaries on execution time. As a baseline, we consider the evaluation proposed by Fastly [1, 2]: a Markdown to HTML conversion service shall run on their edge platform and return a response in less than 100 ms, allowing one request for every single keystroke. In this context, all the multivariant binaries for Libsodium match the baseline and still support requests at the speed of keystrokes. The multivariant binaries for QR encoding respond in a reasonable time for end users, i.e., in less than half a second, but are below the baseline. In general, we note that the execution times are slower for multivariant binaries. Being under 500 ms in general, this does not represent a threat to the applicability of multivariant execution at the edge. Yet, it calls for future optimization research.

Answer to RQ4: The execution time distributions are significantly different between the original and the multivariant binary. Furthermore, no specific variant can be inferred from execution times gathered from the multivariant binary. MEWE contributes to mitigate potential attacks based on predictable execution times.

6 RELATED WORK

Our work is in the area of software diversification for security, a research field discovered by researchers Forrest [26] and Cohen [21]. We contribute a novel technique for multivariant execution, and discuss related work in Section 2. Here, we position our contribution with respect to previous work on randomization and security for WebAssembly.

6.1 Related Work on Randomization

A randomization technique creates a set of unique executions for the very same program [12]. Seminal works include instruction-set randomization [9, 34] to create a unique mapping between artificial CPU instructions and real ones. This makes it very hard for an attacker ignoring the key to inject executable code. Compiler-based techniques can randomly introduce NOP and padding to statically diversify programs. [30] have explored how to use NOP and it breaks the predictability of program execution, even mitigating certain exploits to an extent.

Chew and Song [19] target operating system randomization. They randomize the interface between the operating system and the user applications: the system call numbers, the library entry points (memory addresses) and the stack placement. All those techniques are dynamic, done at runtime using load-time preprocessing and rewriting. Bathkar et al. [12, 13] have proposed three kinds of randomization transformations: randomizing the base addresses of applications and libraries memory regions, random permutation of the order of variables and




Fig. 4. Execution time distributions. Each subplot represents the distribution for a single endpoint, blue for the original endpoint and green for the multivariant binary. The X axis shows the execution time in milliseconds and the Y axis shows the density distribution in logarithmic scale.




Fig. 5. Execution time distributions for the bin2base64 endpoint. Each opaque curve represents an execution time distribution of a unique execution path out of the 41 observed.

routines, and the random introduction of random gaps between objects. Dynamic randomization can address different kinds of problems. In particular, it mitigates a large range of memory error exploits. Recent work in this field include stack layout randomization against data-oriented programming [7] and memory safety violations [37], as well as a technique to reduce the exposure time of persistent memory objects to increase the frequency of address randomization [60].

We contribute to the field of randomization, at two stages. First, we automatically generate variants of a given program, which have different WebAssembly code and still behave the same. Second, we randomly select which variant is executed at runtime, creating a multivariant execution scheme that randomizes the observable execution trace at each run of the program.

Davi et al. proposed Isomeron [25], an approach for execution-path randomization. Isomeron simultaneously loads the original program and a variant. While the program is running, Isomeron continuously flips a coin to decide which copy of the program should be executed next at the level of function calls. With this strategy, a potential attacker cannot predict whether the original or the variant of a program will execute. MEWE proposes two key novel contributions. First, our code diversification step can generate variants of complex control flow structures by inferring constants or loop unrolling. Second, MEWE interconnects hundreds of variants and several randomization dispatchers in a single binary, increasing by orders of magnitude the runtime uncertainty about what code will actually run, compared to the choice among 2 variants proposed by Isomeron.

6.2 Related work on WebAssembly Security

The reference piece about WebAssembly security is by Lehmann et al. [38], which presents three attack primitives. Lehmann et al. have then followed up with a large-scale empirical study of WebAssembly binaries [29]. Narayan et al. [45] remark that the security model of WebAssembly is vulnerable to Spectre attacks. This means that WebAssembly sandboxes may be hijacked and leak memory. They

propose to modify the Lucet compiler used by Fastly to incorporate LLVM fence instructions⁴ in the machine code generation, trying to avoid speculative execution mistakes. Johnson et al. [33], on the other hand, propose fault isolation for WebAssembly binaries, a technique that can be applied before being deployed to the edge-cloud platforms. Stievenart et al. [55] design a static analysis dedicated to information flow problems. Bian et al. [14] performs runtime monitoring of WebAssembly to detect cryptojacking. The main difference with our work is that our defense mechanism is larger in scope, meant to tackle “yet unknown” vulnerabilities. Notably, MEWE is agnostic from the last-step compilation pass that translates Wasm to machine code, which means that the multivariant binaries can be deployed on any edge-cloud platform that can receive WebAssembly endpoints, regardless of the underlying hardware.

7 CONCLUSION

In this work we propose a novel technique to automatically synthesize multivariant binaries to be deployed on edge computing platforms. Our tool, MEWE, operates on a single service implemented as a WebAssembly binary. It automatically generates functionally equivalent variants for each function that implements the service, and combines all the variants in a single WebAssembly binary, which exact execution path is randomized at runtime. Our evaluation with 7 real-world cryptography and QR encoding services shows that MEWE can generate hundreds of function variants and combine them into binaries that include from thousands to millions of possible execution paths. The deployment and execution of the multivariant binaries on the Fastly cloud platform showed that they actually exhibit a very high diversity of execution at runtime, in single edge nodes, as well as Internet scale.

Future work with MEWE will address the trade-off between a large space for execution path randomization and the computation cost of large-scale runtime randomization. In addition, the synthesis of a large pool of variants supports the exploration of the concurrent execution of multiple variants to detect misbehaviors in services deployed at the edge. Besides, several components of MEWE are implemented to operate at the level of the LLVM intermediate language. These components are compatible with other LLVM workflows. We plan to extend MEWE for other LLVM workflows, such as Rust, a popular workflow for Wasm applications and libraries.

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A DISPATCHER FUNCTION CODE

```
define internal i32 @b64_byte2urlsafe_char(i32 %0) {
entry:
    %1 = call i32 @discriminate(i32 3)
    switch i32 %1, label %end [ i32 0, label %case_43_ i32 1, label
        %case_44_]
    case_43_: ; preds = %entry
        %2 = call i32 @b64_byte_to_urlsafe_char_43_(%0)
        ret i32 %2
    case_44_: ; preds = %entry
        %3 = <body of b64_byte_to_urlsafe_char_44_>
        ret i32 %3
    end: ; preds = %entry
    %4 = call i32 @b64_byte2urlsafe_char_original(%0)
    ret i32 %4
}
```

Listing 3. Dispatcher function embedded in the multivariant binary of the bin2base64 endpoint of libsodium, which corresponds to the rightmost green node in Figure 2.

B MULTIVARIANT BINARY EXECUTION AT THE EDGE

When a WebAssembly binary is deployed on an edge platform, it is translated to machine code on the fly. For our experiment, we deploy on the production edge nodes of Fastly. This edge computing platform uses Lucet, a native WebAssembly compiler and runtime, to compile and run the deployed Wasm binary⁵. Lucet generates x86 machine code and ensures that the generated machine code executes inside a secure sandbox, controlling memory isolation.

Figure 6 illustrates the runtime behavior of the original and the multivariant binary, when deployed on an Edge node. The top most diagram illustrates the execution trace for the original of the endpoint bin2base64. When the HTTP request with the input "HelloWorld!" is received, it invokes functions f1, f2 followed by 27 recursive calls of function f3. Then, the endpoint sends the result

"0x000xccv0x10x00b3Jsx130x000x00 0x00xpAHrvdGE=" of its base64 encoding in an HTTP response.

⁵<https://github.com/bytocodealliance/lucet>




Fig. 6. Top: an execution trace for the bin2base64 endpoint. Middle and bottom: two different execution traces for the multivariant bin2base64, exhibited by two different requests with exactly the same input.

The two diagrams at the bottom of Figure 6 illustrate two executions traces observed through two different requests to the endpoint bin2base64. In the first case, the request first triggers the invocation of dispatcher d1, which randomly decides to invoke the variant f1₂; then f2, which has not been diversified by MEWE, is invoked; then the recursive invocations to f3 are replaced by iterations over the execution of dispatcher d2 followed by a random choice of variants of f3. Eventually the result is computed and sent back as an HTTP response. The second execution trace of the multivariant binary shows the same sequence of dispatcher and function calls as the previous trace, and also shows that for a different requests, the variants of f1 and f3 are different.

The key insights from these figures are as follows. First, from a client's point of view, a request to the original or to a multivariant endpoint, is completely transparent. Clients send the same data, receive the same result, through the same protocol, in both cases. Second, this figure shows that, at runtime, the execution paths for the same endpoint are different from one execution to another, and that this randomization process results from multiple random choices among function variants, made through the execution of the endpoint.

C VARIANTS PRESERVATION

During our experiments, we checked for code diversity preservation after compilation. In this work, diversity is introduced through transformation on WebAssembly code, which is then compiled by the Lucet compiler. Compilation might perform some normalization and optimization passes when translating from WebAssembly to machine code. Thus, some variants synthesized by MEWE might not be preserved, i.e., Lucet could generate the same machine code for two WebAssembly variants. To assess this potential effect, we compare the level of code diversity among the WebAssembly variants and among the machine code variants produced by Lucet. This experiment reveals that the translation to machine code preserves a high ratio of function variants, i.e., approx 96% of the generated variants are preserved. This result also indicates that the machine code variants preserve the potential for large numbers of possible execution paths.

SUPEROPTIMIZATION OF WEBASSEMBLY BYTECODE

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Conference Companion of the 4th International Conference on Art, Science, and Engineering of Programming (Programming 2021), MoreVMs

<https://doi.org/10.1145/3397537.3397567>

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ABSTRACT

Motivated by the fast adoption of WebAssembly, we propose the first functional pipeline to support the superoptimization of WebAssembly bytecode. Our pipeline works over LLVM and Souper. We evaluate our superoptimization pipeline with 12 programs from the Rosetta code project. Our pipeline improves the code section size of 8 out of 12 programs. We discuss the challenges faced in superoptimization of WebAssembly with two case studies.

CCS CONCEPTS

• Software and its engineering → Source code generation; Retargetable compilers; Software implementation planning.

KEYWORDS

superoptimization, webassembly, web, optimization, llvm

ACM Reference Format:

Javier Cabrera Arteaga, Shrinish Donde, Jian Gu, Orestis Floros, Lucas Satabin, Benoit Baudry, and Martin Monperrus. 2020. Superoptimization of WebAssembly Bytecode. In *Companion Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on the Art, Science, and Engineering of Programming (<Programming'20> Companion), March 23–26, 2020, Porto, Portugal*. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 5 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3397537.3397567>

1 INTRODUCTION

After HTML, CSS, and JavaScript, WebAssembly (WASM) has become the fourth standard language for web development [7]. This new language has been designed to be fast, platform-independent, and experiments have shown that WebAssembly can have an overhead as low as 10% compared to native code [11]. Notably, WebAssembly is developed as a collaboration between vendors and has been supported in all major browsers since 2017.

The state-of-art compilation frameworks for WASM are Emscripten and LLVM [5, 6], they generate WASM bytecode from

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<Programming'20> Companion, March 23–26, 2020, Porto, Portugal
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ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-7507-8/20/03...\$15.00
<https://doi.org/10.1145/3397537.3397567>

high-level languages (e.g. C, C++, Rust). These frameworks can apply a sequence of optimization passes to deliver smaller and faster binaries. In the web context, having smaller binaries is important, because they are delivered to the clients over the network, hence smaller binaries means reduced latency and page load time. Having smaller WASM binaries to reduce the web experience is the core motivation of this paper.

To reach this goal, we propose to use superoptimization. Superoptimization consists of synthesizing code replacements in order to further improve binaries, typically in a way better than the best optimized output from standard compilers [4, 15]. Given a program, superoptimization searches for alternate and semantically equivalent programs with fewer instructions [12]. In this paper, we consider the superoptimization problem stated as finding an equivalent WebAssembly binary such that the size of the binary code is reduced compared to the default one.

This paper presents a study on the feasibility of superoptimization of WebAssembly bytecode. We have designed a pipeline for WASM superoptimization, done by tailoring and integrating open-source tools. Our work is evaluated by building a benchmark of 12 programs and applying superoptimization on them. The pipeline achieves a median size reduction of 0.33% in the total number of WASM instructions.

To summarize, our contributions are:

- The design and implementation of a functional pipeline for the superoptimization of WASM.
- Original experimental results on superoptimizing 12 C programs from the Rosetta Code corpus.

2 BACKGROUND

2.1 WebAssembly

WebAssembly is a binary instruction format for a stack-based virtual machine. As described in the WebAssembly Core Specification [7], WebAssembly is a portable, low-level code format designed for efficient execution and compact representation. WebAssembly has been first announced publicly in 2015. Since 2017, it has been implemented by four major web browsers (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, and Safari). A paper by Haas et al. [11] formalizes the language and its type system, and explains the design rationale.

The main goal of WebAssembly is to enable high performance applications on the web. WebAssembly can run as a standalone VM or in other environments such as Arduino [10]. It is independent of any specific hardware or languages and can be compiled for

modern architectures or devices, from a wide variety of high-level languages. In addition, WebAssembly introduces a memory-safe, sand-boxed execution environment to prevent common security issues, such as data corruption and security breaches.

Since version 8, the LLVM compiler framework supports the WebAssembly compilation target by default [6]. This means that all languages that have an LLVM front end can be directly compiled to WebAssembly. Binaryen [14], a compiler and toolchain infrastructure library for WebAssembly, supports compilation to WebAssembly as well. Once compiled, WASM programs can run within a web browser or in a standalone runtime [10].

2.2 Superoptimization

Given an input program, code superoptimization focuses on *searching* for a new program variant which is faster or smaller than the original code, while preserving its correctness [2]. The concept of superoptimizing a program dates back to 1987, with the seminal work of Massalin [12] which proposes an exhaustive exploration of the solution space. The search space is defined by choosing a subset of the machine's instruction set and generating combinations of optimized programs, sorted by length in ascending order. If any of these programs are found to perform the same function as the source program, the search halts. However, for larger instruction sets, the exhaustive exploration approach becomes virtually impossible. Because of this, the paper proposes a pruning method over the search space and a fast probabilistic test to check programs equivalence.

State of the art superoptimizers such as STOKE [16] and Souper [15] make modifications to the code and generate code rewrites. A cost function evaluates the correctness and performance of the rewrites. Correctness is generally estimated by running the code against test cases (either provided by the user or generated automatically, e.g. symbolic evaluation on both original and replacement code).

2.3 Souper

Souper is a superoptimizer for LLVM [15]. It enumerates a set of several optimization candidates to be replaced. An example of such a replacement is the following, replacing two instructions by a constant value:

```
%0:i32 = var (range=[1,0))
%1:i1 = ne 0:i32, %
cand %1 1:i1
```

In this case, Souper finds the replacement for the variable %1 as a constant value (in the bottom part of the listing) instead of the two instructions above.

Souper is based on a Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solver. SMT solvers are useful for both verification and synthesis of programs [8]. With the emergence of fast and reliable solvers, program alternatives can be efficiently checked, replacing the probabilistic test of Massalin [12] as mentioned in [subsection 2.2](#).

In the code to be optimized, Souper refers to the optimization candidates as *left-hand side* (LHS). Each LHS is a fragment of code that returns an integer and is a target for optimization. Two different




Figure 1: Superoptimization pipeline for WebAssembly based on Souper.

LHS candidates may overlap. For each candidate, Souper tries to find a *right-hand side* (RHS), which is a fragment of code that is combined with the LHS to generate a replacement. In the original paper's benchmarks [15], Souper optimization passes were found to further improve the top level compiler optimizations (-O3 for clang, for example) for some programs.

Souper is a platform-independent superoptimizer. The cost function is evaluated on an intermediate representation and not on the code generated for the final platform. Thus, the tool may miss optimizations that make sense for the target instruction set.

3 WASM SUPEROPTIMIZATION PIPELINE

The key contribution of our work is a superoptimization pipeline for WebAssembly. We faced two challenges while developing this pipeline: the need for a correct WASM generator, and the usage of a full-fledged superoptimizer. The combination of the LLVM WebAssembly backend and Souper provides the solution to tackle both challenges.

3.1 Steps

Our pipeline is a tool designed to output a superoptimized WebAssembly binary file for a given C/C++ program that can be compiled to WASM. With our pipeline, users write a high level source program and get a superoptimized WebAssembly version.

The pipeline (illustrated in [Figure 1](#)) first converts a high-level source language (e.g. C/C++) to the LLVM intermediate representation (LLVM IR) using the Clang compiler (Step 1). We use the code generation options in clang in particular the -O3 level of optimization which enables aggressive optimizations. In this step, we make use of the LLVM compilation target for WebAssembly 'wasm32-unknown-unknown'. This flag can be read as follows: wasm32 means that we target the 32 bits address space in WebAssembly; the second and third options set the compilation to any machine and performs inline optimizations with no specific strategy. LLVM IR is emitted as output.

Secondly, we use the LLVM assembler tool (llvm-as) to convert the generated LLVM IR to the LLVM bitcode file (Step 2). This LLVM assembler reads the file containing LLVM IR language, translates it to LLVM bitcode, and writes the result into a file. Thus, we make use of the optimizations from clang and the LLVM support for WebAssembly before applying superoptimization to the generated code.

Next, we use Souper, discussed in subsection 2.3, to add further superoptimization passes. Step 3 generates a set of optimized candidates, where a candidate is a code fragment that can be optimized by Souper. From this, Souper carries out a search to get shorter instruction sequences and uses an SMT solver to test the semantic equivalence between the original code snippet and the optimized one [15].

Step 4 produces a superoptimized LLVM bitcode file. The **opt** command is the LLVM analyzer that is shipped with recent LLVM versions. The purpose of the **opt** tool is to provide the capability of adding third party optimizations (plugins) to LLVM. It takes LLVM source files and the optimization library as inputs, runs the specified optimizations and outputs the optimized file or the analysis results. Souper is integrated as a specific pass for LLVM **opt**.

The last step of our pipeline consists of compiling the generated superoptimized LLVM bitcode file to a WASM program (Step 5). This final conversion is supported by the WebAssembly linker (wasm-ld) from the LLD project [13]. wasm-ld receives the object format (bitcode) that LLVM produces when run with the ‘wasm32-unknown-unknown’ target and produces WASM bytecode.

To our knowledge, this is the first successful integration of those tools into a working pipeline for superoptimizing WebAssembly code.

3.2 Insights

We note that Souper has been primarily designed with the LLVM IR in mind and requires a well-formed SSA representation of the program under superoptimization. The biggest challenge with WebAssembly is that there no complete transformation from WASM to SSA. In our pipeline, we work around this by assuming we have access to source code, this alternative path may be valid for plugging other binary format into Souper.

4 EXPERIMENTS

To study the effects and feasibility of applying superoptimization to WASM code, we run the superoptimization pipeline on a benchmark of programs.

The benchmark is based on the Rosetta Code corpus¹. We have selected 12 C language programs that compile to WASM. Our selection of the programs is based on the following criteria:

- (1) The programs can be successfully compiled to LLVM IR.
- (2) They are diverse in terms of application domain.
- (3) The programs are small to medium sized: between 15 and 200 lines of C code each.
- (4) They have no dependencies to external libraries.

The code of each program is available as part of our experimental package².

¹<http://rosettacode.org>

²https://github.com/KTH/slumps/tree/master/utils/pipeline/benchmark4pipeline_c




Figure 2: Vertical bars show the relative binary size in # of instructions. The smaller, the better.

4.1 Methodology

To evaluate our superoptimization pipeline, we run it on each program with four Souper configurations:

- (1) Inferring only replacements for constant values
- (2) Inferring replacements with no more than 2 instructions, i.e. a new replacement is composed by no more than two instructions
- (3) CEGIS (Counter Example Guided Inductive Synthesis, algorithm developed by Gulwani et al. [9])
- (4) Enumerative synthesis with no replacement size limit

In the rest of the paper, we report on the best configuration per program. Our appendix website contains the results for all configurations and all programs.

With respect to correctness, we rely on Souper’s verification to check that every replacement on each program is correct. That means that the superoptimized programs are semantically equivalent. Every candidate search is done with a 300 seconds timeout. For each program, we report the best optimized case over all mentioned configurations. To discuss the results, we report the relative instruction count before and after superoptimization.

For the baseline program, we ask LLVM to generate WASM programs based on the ‘wasm32-unknown-unknown’ target with the -O3 optimization level. Our experiments run on an Azure machine with 8 cores (16 virtual CPUs) at 3.20GHz and 64GB of RAM.

4.2 Results

Figure 2 shows the relative size improvement with superoptimization. The median size reduction is 0.33% of the original instruction count over the tested programs. From the 12 tested programs, 8 have been improved using our pipeline whereas 3 have no changes and 1 is bigger (**Bitwise IO**). The most superoptimized program is **Babbage problem**, for which the resulting code after superoptimization is 46.67% smaller than the baseline version.

We now discuss the **Babbage problem** program, originally written in 15 lines of C code³. The pipeline found 3 successful code replacements for superoptimization out of 7 candidates. The best

³http://www.rosettacode.org/wiki/Babbage_problem#C

superoptimized version contains 21 instructions, which is much less than the original which has 45 instructions. The superoptimization code difference program is shown in [Figure 3](#). Our pipeline, using Souper, finds that the loop inside the program can be replaced with a **const** value in the top of the stack, see lines 8 and 12 in [Figure 3](#). The value, 25264, is the solution to the Babbage problem. In other terms, the superoptimization pipeline has successfully symbolically executed the problem.

The **Babbage problem** code is composed of a loop which stops when it discovers the smaller number that fits with the Babbage condition below.

```
while((n * n) % 1000000 != 269696) n++;
```

In theory, this value can also be inferred by unrolling the loop the correct number of times with llvm-opt. However, llvm-opt cannot unroll a **while**-loop because the loop count is not known at compile time. Additionally, this is a specific optimization that does not generalize well when optimizing for code size and requires a significant amount of time per loop.

On the other hand, Souper can deal with this case. The variable that fits the Babbage condition is inferred and verified in the SMT solver. Therefore the condition in the loop will always be false, resulting in dead code that can be removed in the final stage that generates WASM from bitcode.

In the case of the **Bitwise IO** program, we observe an increase in the number of instructions after superoptimization. From the original number of 875 instructions, the resulting count after the Souper pass is increased to 903 instructions. In this case, Souper finds 4 successful replacements out of 207 possible ones. Looking at the changes, it turns out that the LLVM IR code costs less than the original following the Souper cost function. However, the WebAssembly LLVM backend (wasm-ld tool) that transforms LLVM to WASM creates a longer WASM version. This is a consequence of the discussion on Souper in [subsection 2.3](#). In practice, it is straightforward to detect and discard those cases.

4.3 Correctness Checking

To validate the correctness of the superoptimized program we perform a comparison of the output of the non-superoptimized program and the superoptimized one. For 7/12 programs, both versions, non-superoptimized and superoptimized, behave equally and return the expected output. For 5/12 programs we cannot run them because the code generated for the target WASM architecture lacks required runtime primitives.

5 RELATED WORK

Our work spans the areas of compilation, transformation, optimization and web programming. Here we discuss three of the most relevant works that investigate superoptimization and web technologies.

Churchill et al. [4] use STOKE [1] to superoptimize loops in large programs such as the Google Native Client [3]. They use a bounded verifier to make sure that every generated optimization goes through all the checks for semantic equivalence. We apply the concept of superoptimization to the same context, but with a different stack, WebAssembly. Also, our work offloads the problem

<pre> 1 (func \$__original_main (type 2) (result i32) 2 - (local i32 i32 i32 i32) 3 + (local i32) 4 global.get 0 5 i32.const 16 6 i32.sub 7 local.tee 0 8 - (..Removed code..) 9 global.set 0 10 local.get 0 11 - local.get 1 12 + i32.const 25264 13 i32.store 14 i32.const 1024 15 local.get 0 16 call sprintf 17 drop 18 local.get 0 19 i32.const 16 20 i32.add 21 global.set 0 22 i32.const 0 </pre>	<pre> 1 - i32.const -1 2 - local.set 1 3 - block ;; label = @1 4 - loop ;; label = @2 5 - local.get 1 6 - i32.const 1 7 - i32.add 8 - local.tee 1 9 - local.get 1 10 - i32.mul 11 - local.tee 2 12 - i32.const 1000000 13 - i32.rem_u 14 - local.set 3 15 - local.get 2 16 - i32.const 2147483647 17 - i32.eq 18 - br_if 1 (=@1) 19 - local.get 3 20 - i32.const 269696 21 - i32.ne 22 - br_if 0 (=@2) 23 - end 24 - end </pre>
--	--

Figure 3: Output of superoptimization WASM bytecode for the Babbage problem program.

of semantic checking to an SMT solver, included in the Souper internals.

Emscripten is an open source tool for compiling C/C++ to the Web Context. Emscripten provides both, the WASM program and the JavaScript glue code. It uses LLVM to create WASM but it provides support for faster linking to the object files. Instead of all the IR being compiled by LLVM, the object file is pre-linked with WASM, which is faster. The last version of Emscripten also uses the WASM LLVM backend as the target for the input code.

To our knowledge, at the time of writing, the closest related work is the “sooperify” pass of Binaryen [14]. It is implemented as an additional analysis on top of the existing ones. Compared to our pipeline, Binaryen does not synthesize WASM code from the Souper output.

6 CONCLUSION

We propose a pipeline for superoptimizing WebAssembly. It is a principled integration of two existing tools, LLVM and Souper, that provides equivalent and smaller WASM programs.

We have shown that the superoptimization pipeline works on a benchmark of 12 WASM programs. As for other binary formats, superoptimization of WebAssembly can be seen as complementary to standard optimization techniques. Our future work will focus on extending the pipeline to source languages that are not handled, such as TypeScript and WebAssembly itself.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This work has been partially supported by WASP program and by the TrustFull project financed by the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research. We thank John Regehr and the Souper team for their support.

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SCALABLE COMPARISON OF JAVASCRIPT V8 BYTECODE TRACES

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11th ACM SIGPLAN International Workshop on Virtual Machines and Intermediate Languages (SPLASH 2019)

<https://doi.org/10.1145/3358504.3361228>

Scalable Comparison of JavaScript V8 Bytecode Traces

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Abstract

The comparison and alignment of runtime traces are essential, e.g., for semantic analysis or debugging. However, naive sequence alignment algorithms cannot address the needs of the modern web: (i) the bytecode generation process of V8 is not deterministic; (ii) bytecode traces are large.

We present STRAC, a scalable and extensible tool tailored to compare bytecode traces generated by the V8 JavaScript engine. Given two V8 bytecode traces and a distance function between trace events, STRAC computes and provides the best alignment. The key insight is to split access between memory and disk. STRAC can identify semantically equivalent web pages and is capable of processing huge V8 bytecode traces whose order of magnitude matches today's web like <https://2019.splashcon.org>, which generates approx. 150k of V8 bytecode instructions.

CCS Concepts • Information systems → World Wide Web; • Theory of computation → Program semantics; • Software and its engineering → Interpreters; Source code generation; Designing software.

Keywords V8, Sequence alignment, JavaScript, Bytecode, Similarity measurement

ACM Reference Format:

Javier Cabrera Arteaga, Martin Monperrus, and Benoit Baudry. 2019. Scalable Comparison of JavaScript V8 Bytecode Traces. In *Proceedings of the 11th ACM SIGPLAN International Workshop on Virtual Machines and Intermediate Languages (VMIL '19), October 22, 2019, Athens, Greece*. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 10 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3358504.3361228>

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ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-6987-9/19/10...\$15.00
<https://doi.org/10.1145/3358504.3361228>

1 Introduction

Runtime traces record the execution of programs. This information captures the dynamics of programs and can be used to determine semantic similarity [29], to detect abnormal program behavior [8], to check refactoring correctness [22] or to infer execution models [1]. In many cases, this is achieved by comparing execution traces, e.g. comparing the traces of the original program and the refactored one. The comparison of program traces can be based on information retrieval [17], tree differencing [9, 27] and sequence alignment [2, 11]. In this paper, we focus on the latter, in order to compare sequences of V8 bytecode instructions resulting from the execution of JavaScript code.

V8 is an open source, high-performance JavaScript engine. For debugging purposes, it provides powerful facilities to export page execution information [21], including intermediate internal bytecode called the V8 bytecode [4].

Due to the dynamic nature of the Web, we observe that the bytecode generation process of V8 is not deterministic. For example, visiting the same page several times results in different V8 bytecode traces every time. This non-determinism is a key challenge for sequence alignment approaches, even if they perform well on deterministic program traces [10]. Besides, V8 bytecode traces are large. Naive sequence alignment algorithms are time and space quadratic on trace sizes and do not scale to V8 bytecode traces. To illustrate this scaling problem, let us consider a simple query to <https://2019.splashcon.org>; it generates between 139555 and 162558 V8 bytecode instructions, and aligning two traces of such size, requires approximately 150GB of memory¹. This memory requirement is not realistic for trace analysis tasks on developer's personal computers or servers. The key challenge that we address in this work is to provide a trace comparison tool that scales to V8 bytecode traces.

In this paper, we present STRAC (Scalable Trace Comparison), a scalable and extensible tool tailored to compare bytecode traces from the V8 JavaScript engine. STRAC implements an optimized version of the DTW algorithm [18]. Given two V8 bytecode traces and a distance function between trace events, STRAC computes and provides the best alignment. The key insight is to split access between memory and disk.

Our experiments compare STRAC with 6 other publicly-available implementations of DTW. The comparison involves

¹In this paper, memory means RAM.

100 pairs of V8 bytecode traces collected over 6 websites. Our experimental results show that 1) STRAC can identify semantically equivalent web pages and 2) STRAC is capable of processing big V8 bytecode traces whose order of magnitude matches today's web.

To sum up, our contributions are:

- An analysis of the challenges for analyzing browser traces, due to the JavaScript engine internals and the randomness of the environment. We explain and show examples of how the same browser query can generate two different V8 bytecode traces.
- A tool called STRAC that implements the popular alignment algorithm DTW in a scalable way, publicly available at <https://github.com/KTH/STRAC>.
- A set of experiments comparing 100 V8 bytecode traces collected over 6 real world websites: google.com, kth.se, github.com, wikipedia.org, 2019.splashcon.org and youtube.com. Our experiments show that STRAC copes with the non-deterministic traces and is significantly faster than state-of-the-art tools.

The paper is structured as follows. First we introduce a background of V8 bytecode generation non-determinism and the formalisms used in our work (Section 2). Then follows with technical insights to implement STRAC (Section 3), research question formulation, experimental results with a discussion about them (Section 4). We then present related work (Section 5) and conclude (Section 6).

2 Background

In this section we discuss the key insights behind the non-determinism of the V8 bytecode generation process, as well as the foundations of the DTW alignment algorithm.

2.1 Browser Traces

Our dynamic analysis technique is evaluated with V8 bytecode [19]. In this subsection, we describe how the V8 engine generates bytecode trace. We collect such traces to evaluate our trace comparison tool. In this work, we use the term "V8 bytecode trace" to refer to the result of executing V8 with the `-print-bytecode` flag [21].

2.1.1 V8 Bytecode Generation

The V8 engine compiles JavaScript source code to an intermediate representation called "V8 bytecode". This is done to increase execution performance. The V8 engine parses and compiles every JavaScript code declaration present in HTML pages into a bytecode representation, composed by function declarations, like the one shown in Figure 1. These function declarations came from V8 builtin JavaScript code and external JavaScripts.

V8's bytecode interpreter is a register machine [16]. Figure 1 shows a JavaScript code and its bytecode translation.

Each bytecode operator specifies its inputs and outputs as register operands. V8 has 180 different bytecode operators.

The bytecode translation is lazy, i.e. V8 tries to avoid generating code it "thinks" might not be executed. Consequently, a function that is not called will not be compiled [28]. For example, removing line 2 in the top listing of Figure 1 would prevent the compilation of bytecode for the function declared in line 1. This behavior has an impact on the collected traces.

```

1   function plusOne(a){ return a.value + 1; }
2   plusOne( {value : 2018} );
_____
1   [generated bytecode for function: plusOne]
2   Parameter count 2
3   Register count 0
4   Frame size 0
5   30 E> 0x1373c709b6 @ 0 : a5 00 00 00 StackCheck
6   56 S> 0x1373c709b7 @ 1 : 28 02 00 01
    ↢ LdaNamedProperty a0, [0], [1]
7   62 E> 0x1373c709bb @ 5 : 40 01 00 00 AddSmi [1],
    ↢ [0]
8   66 S> 0x1373c709be @ 8 : a9 00 00 00 Return

```

Figure 1. Example of a JavaScript function and its corresponding V8 bytecode instructions.

We have observed that V8 bytecode is resilient to script minification and static code-obfuscation techniques. Therefore, we believe that aligning such low-level representations could prove to be a useful aid in many program analysis tasks, such as code similarity study and malware analysis.

2.1.2 Non-Determinism in Browser Traces




Figure 2. Illustration of two different script fetching and compiling traces for the same browser query.

Interestingly, browsers are fundamentally non deterministic, depending on web server availability, current workload,

and DNS caches through the network. Let us look at the example illustrated in Figure 2. It shows what happens when fetching a web page, which contains 3 scripts. The top and bottom parts illustrate, for the same page, two different executions. Dashed border rectangles represent complete bytecode generation traces. The blue spaces in the bar are V8 common builtin bytecode, which is systematically generated in all browser requests. Orange rectangles illustrate declared page scripts compilations. The complete bytecode trace is the union of both generated bytecodes, builtin V8 and page declared scripts. In the first case at the top of Figure 2, the scripts are fetched and compiled in the same order they are declared. In the second case, at the bottom, **p3.js** is carried and compiled first, before **p2.js** due to a possible network delay. However, V8's compiler will put all scripts compilations in the same order they are declared in the HTML page. The final result is two semantically equivalent bytecode compilations, where script blocks may not be strictly placed in the same position.

The slight differences that occur in the final bytecode for same browser queries motivate us to provide an efficient tool for traces alignment: traces where events occur in different orders but that have the same semantics must be considered as equivalent. The order of events should not confuse the trace comparison tool.

2.1.3 DTW Algorithm

The DTW algorithm has been introduced by Needleman and Wunsch for protein global alignment [18]. Global alignment means trace heads and tails are constrained to match each other in position. DTW is a popular technique for comparing traces in different domains, incl. software traces [14]. DTW finds the best global alignment between two traces, based on a generic similarity function between trace events and gaps.

Definition (Trace) A trace X is defined as a sequence of events. $X = x_1, x_2, \dots, x_N$ represents a trace of size N where each x_i is the event happening at the i th position.

Definition (Cost Matrix) D is a cost matrix for two traces X and Y of size n and m . D_{ij} stores the optimal cost alignment value for X and Y considered from the start up to the i th and j th positions respectively, that is the minimal cost of aligning x_i and y_j events at the same position in the final alignment.

The cost matrix is defined according to a distance function d and a gap cost γ as follows:

$$D_{0i} = \gamma * i$$

$$D_{j0} = \gamma * j$$

$$D_{ij} = \min \begin{cases} D_{i-1,j} + \gamma, \\ D_{i,j-1} + \gamma \\ D_{i-1,j-1} + d(x_i, y_j) \end{cases}$$

In every cell, the value D_{ij} is the minimum cost between putting a gap in one trace and the result of evaluating the distance function between events x_i and y_j .

Definition (Alignment Cost) Given two traces X and Y with sizes N and M respectively, the alignment cost is the value stored in D_{NM} .

Definition (Alignment Difficulty) Given two traces X and Y with sizes N and M respectively, the alignment difficulty is simply the multiplication of both sizes $N \times M$.

Definition (Warp Path) The warp path is the path to go from D_{NM} to the first element D_{00} minimizing the cumulative cost. In general more than one path may exist. Size of warp path is $O(N + M)$.

Definition (Aligned Trace) An aligned trace is a trace where the warp path is applied, i.e. some gaps have been put between some events in one of both traces.

In Figure 3 we illustrate the alignment between traces **abcababc** and **aabaca** with $\gamma = 1$, $d(x_i, y_j) = 2$ if $x_i \neq y_j$ and $d(x_i, y_j) = 0$ if $x_i = y_j$. The warp path is represented as the blue and orange lines going across the matrix from the top left corner to the bottom right corner. In this example, alignment cost is 4, as we can see in bottom right corner cell in Figure 3.




Figure 3. Cost matrix, warp path and applied alignment for **abcababc** and **aabaca** example traces.

3 STRAC: Trace Comparison Tool for V8

STRAC is an approach to compare large traces, tailored to bytecode traces of the V8 JavaScript engine. STRAC takes as input a trace of JavaScript V8 bytecode traces collected in the browser. It produces as output, a trace alignment, and a distance measure between the two traces. STRAC implements the DTW algorithm presented in Subsection 2.1.3. It is an open-source project publicly-available on <https://github.com/KTH/STRAC>. In this section, we explain the

key components and insights of STRAC to achieve scalable trace comparison.

3.1 Challenges Addressed by STRAC

Non-Determinism As shown in [Subsection 2.1.2](#), V8 can provide two different bytecode traces for the same web page. In this case, both traces are semantically equivalent, but the global position of code modules can vary. These variations occur as a consequence of resource management, interpreter optimizations and JavaScript code fetching from the network. It is challenging because it can provide 1) false positives: two traces may be considered different even when they come from the same pages; 2) false negatives: two traces may be considered the same even when they come from two different pages.

Size Browser traces are huge and naive trace comparison fails on such traces because of memory requirements. For instance, aligning two traces of size 63137 and 58265 events requires a DTW cost matrix, represented as a bidimensional integer matrix, of 14.72 GB of memory. The challenge is to make trace comparison at the scale of browser traces, with tractable memory requirements.

3.2 DTW Distance Functions

The DTW algorithm has two main parameters: a distance function and a gap cost as explained in [Subsection 2.1.3](#). The distance function between events affects the global alignment result, as we show in [Subsection 4.5](#). It defines the matching of two different trace instructions if these instructions have a certain level of similarity. For example, when comparing '*AddSmi [0], [1]*' and '*AddSmi [1], [0]*' instructions, they can be considered as similar because the *AddSmi* operator is in both.

In STRAC, we define two distance functions for bytecode instructions.

$$d_{Sen}(x_i, y_j) = \begin{cases} s & \text{if } x_i \text{ and } y_j \text{ events are exactly} \\ & \text{the same bytecode instruction} \\ c & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$d_{Inst}(x_i, y_j) = \begin{cases} s & \text{if } x_i \text{ and } y_j \text{ bytecode instructions} \\ & \text{share the same bytecode operator} \\ c & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Both require the identity relationship of the bytecode instruction. For V8 bytecode, based on our results ([Subsection 4.5](#)), it seems incoherent to accept an alignment match with two different elements instead of introducing the gap.

We now discuss the value of y , s and c . The cost of introducing a gap, intuitively, must be less than the cost of matching two different events, i.e. $y < s$. c is the value of matching two equal events, 0. The default values are based on our experience, $s = 5$, $y = 1$ and $c = 0$. The three are configurable.

3.3 Buffering the Cost Matrix

The key limitation of DTW is the need for a large cost matrix to retrieve the warp path. Recall our example requiring 14.72 GB in [Subsection 3.1](#). This means that a naive implementation can only compare small traces due to memory explosion.

In STRAC, we solve this problem by storing the cost matrix both in memory and disk. Only the appropriate values are kept in memory. Our key insight is that the current value D_{ij} in the cost matrix is calculated with the previous row and column, consequently, only $O(N)$ memory space is needed to compute D_{NM} . Thus, STRAC only maintains the current and previous row in memory for each DTW iteration. After processing a row, it is saved to disk. STRAC eventually saves the complete cost matrix to disk.

For traces with lengths 63137 and 58265, instead of 14.72 GB, STRAC requires no more than 86MB of memory for the trace alignment, which represents an improvement of 99.5% in memory consumption.

3.4 Retrieving the Warp Path

In addition to the alignment cost, it is necessary to obtain the warp path in order to create and analyze the aligned traces. Recall that the aligned traces are obtained by applying the warp path on both initial traces, as we mentioned in [Subsection 2.1.3](#).

To retrieve the warp path from the final cost matrix, one goes backward and starts from the trace tail positions (D_{NM}). Cost matrix in D_{ij} depends on three neighbors D_{i-1j} , D_{ij-1} and D_{i-1j-1} . The backtracking process finishes when the trace start is reached, i.e. when the left top corner D_{00} is reached in the matrix. In the warp path construction process, trace indices are always decreasing by one, i.e. trace events are visited only once. Therefore, in STRAC, backtracking over the final cost matrix requires only $O(N + M)$ read operations on disk, which is scalable.

3.5 DTW Approximations

Due to the quadratic time and space complexity of DTW, previous work has proposed approximations to speed up the alignment process. STRAC also implements two state-of-the-art DTW approximations. We now mention these two approximations.

Fixed Regions Using fixed regions is a technique only to evaluate a specified region in the cost matrix [[7](#), [12](#), [13](#), [24](#)]. Consequently, the globally optimal warp path will not be found if it is not entirely in the window. This improvement speeds up DTW by a constant factor, but the execution time is still $O(NM)$. STRAC provides support for fixed regions.

FastDTW² [25] is an approximation of DTW that has a linear time and space complexity. It combines data abstraction and constraint search in the solution space. STRAC implements FastDTW. Note that, for DTW and its approximations, the default mode is the buffering mode presented in Subsection 3.3.

3.6 Recapitulation

To sum up, STRAC is an optimized implementation of DTW and two approximations with distance functions dedicated to V8 bytecode traces and with neat handling of the cost matrix over memory and disk in order to scale.

4 Experimental Evaluation

We assess the scalability of STRAC for V8 bytecode trace comparison with the following research questions:

- RQ1 (Scalability): To what extent does STRAC scale to traces of real-world web pages?
- RQ2 (Consistency): To what extent does STRAC identify similarity in semantically-equivalent traces?
- RQ3 (Distance Functions): What is the effectiveness of STRAC support of different distance functions?

4.1 Study Subjects

Our experiment is based on tracing the home page of the following sites; google.com, github.com, wikipedia.org, youtube.com, four of the most visited websites, according to Alexa. We also add two sites based on personal interest: 2019.splashcon.org and kth.se, the homepage of our University. All those pages use JavaScript code. The traces were generated just opening the page without any other further action. Since the traces are non-deterministic, we collect 100 traces for the same page. This means we collect 600 traces in total.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics of our benchmark. The 6 sites are sorted by popularity according to the Alexa index. Example bytecodes are available in <https://github.com/KTH/STRAC/tree/master/STRACAlign/src/test/resources/bytēcodes>.

Site	No. scripts	Bytecode size
google.com	5	85768
youtube.com	15	166626
wikipedia.org	4	48260
github.com	3	59384
kth.se	9	64178
2019.splashcon.org	17	147196

Table 1 gives an overview of the collected traces. The first column shows the real world website names. The second

²The implementation mentioned in the original paper (<https://cs.fit.edu/~pkc/FastDTW/>) was not available at the moment of this work.

and third columns indicate the number of declared scripts and the bytecode size mean value (orange dots in Figure 4) respectively. For instance, Wikipedia loads 4 scripts and produces bytecode traces of 48260 bytecode instructions. This value is the lowest of our benchmark. On the contrary, for YouTube, the page declares 15 JavaScript scripts, and V8 generates traces of 166626 bytecode instructions, and this is due to the richer features of YouTube compared to Wikipedia. In our benchmark, the bytecode traces are in the range of 48k-166k instructions.

Recall that the bytecode traces are non-deterministic even for the same page (see Subsection 2.1.2). We measure how many instructions are contained in each V8 bytecode trace. Figure 4 illustrates the distribution of trace sizes as violin plots. This figure shows that there is a variance of bytecode traces for all pages (Wikipedia also has some variance but this is not shown in the figure because of the scale). This variance is a consequence of several stacked factors: resource management, interpreter optimization and JavaScript code fetching from the network. To our knowledge, this non-determinism in web traces is overlooked by research.




Figure 4. Variance of V8 bytecode trace size for 100 repetitions of the same query.

4.2 Experimental Methodology

Every trace is collected using a non-cached browser session, without plugins. This choice is motivated by two main reasons: 1) we have observed that cached scripts do not affect bytecode generation as direct network fetching does;

2) browser plugins are compiled to the same bytecode trace and in the scope of this work we are interested only in V8 bytecode traces directly generated from web page scripts.

To answer **RQ1**, we align 12 trace pairs randomly taken from the initial set of all possible trace pairs (600×600). We compare STRAC with different implementations of DTW 1) From public github repositories: rmaestre³, dtaidistance⁴ and pierre-rouanet⁵; 2) From R's dtw package [6]; 3) The DTW implementation used in [15], slaypni⁶. For each comparison, we compute the average wall-clock execution time.

RQ2 is answered as follows. We select a random sample of 100 pairs from all possible trace pairs (600×600). We select 35 pairs of traces extracted from the same pages and 65 pairs of traces extracted from different pages. Alignment cost is measured for each pair using gap cost $\gamma = 1$ and event distance function d_{Sen} (defined in Subsection 3.2), with parameters: $s = 5$ and $c = 0$. We group and plot each pair alignment cost per site.

We answer **RQ3** using the same traces as *RQ2*. We compute DTW on each one of the 100 sampled pairs. We use the same gap cost $\gamma = 1$, but we compare the two distance functions d_{Sen} and d_{Inst} (defined in Subsection 3.2), with parameters: $s = 5$ and $c = 0$. We measure the alignment cost for each pair and compare the results with the ones obtained in *RQ2*.

The STRAC experimentation has been made on a PC with Intel Core i7 CPU and 16Gb DDR3 of RAM. We extract all traces from Chrome version 74.0.3729.169 (Official Build) (64-bit).

4.3 Answer to RQ1: Scalability

Figure 5 shows the execution time of 6 different alignment tools on 12 trace pairs. The X axis gives the size of the alignment problem, which is the multiplication of the size of both traces in number of bytecode instructions. The Y axis represents the execution time in seconds with a logarithmic scale.

First, we observe that four tools get out of memory for all the considered trace pairs: R-dtw, cpy-wannesm, rmaestre, cpy-slaypul (see the red dot in Figure 5). The main reason for this failure is that those tools need to store the cost matrix in memory. The least difficult trace comparison in the plot is a pair of traces of 48k instructions each. Finding the best alignment for this pair consists in analyzing an eight-bytes integer matrix of approx. 20GB (exactly 18632 millions of bytes). This memory requirement is almost the full memory of modern personal computers and it causes memory explosion at runtime. Applying the same analysis to the most difficult alignment in the plot shows requires 200GB of memory.

³<https://github.com/rmaestre/FastDTW>
⁴<https://github.com/wannesm/dtайдistance>
⁵<https://github.com/pierre-rouanet/dtw>
⁶<https://github.com/slaypni/fastdtw>

Second, py-wannesm and py-pierre-rouanet calculate the best alignment cost for the first 10 pairs, without any memory issue, even for problems in the order of magnitude close to 1.5×10^{10} in alignment difficulty. After this value, these tools also start to get memory issues for the same reason as the other tools. Yet, these successfully align the 10 pairs (orange and green curves in Figure 5) thanks to an efficient use of Numpy [3] arrays to store cost matrix. Numpy arrays in Python are tailored to efficiently deal with arrays up to 20GB of memory in x64 architectures. We also observe that py-wannesm is always slower than py-pierre-rouanet. The main reason for this time difference is that py-wannesm does an extra pass through the cost matrix and py-pierre-rouanet does not do it.

Third, STRAC successfully find the best alignment cost for all pairs in the benchmark, even for trace pairs that require memory beyond Numpy capabilities (the last two blue dots in Figure 5). The key insight behind is that STRAC implements the cost matrix data structure as a hybrid between memory and disk, i.e. moving such memory needs to disk.

Both Python implementations (py-wannesm and py-pierre-rouanet) systematically take at least one order of magnitude longer to run, compared to STRAC. The main reason behind this is that Python usually compiles code at runtime, while Java compiles it in advance, making a faster program. Besides, most JVMs perform Just-In-Time compilation to all or part of programs to native code, which significantly improves performance, but mainstream Python does not do this.

Recall that best alignment calculation using naive DTW implementation is non-scalable by its space-time quadratic nature, any implementation of DTW (even the one included in STRAC) eventually will run out of space (in memory or disk) and execution time will be near to impossible. However, STRAC can deal with all trace pairs of our benchmark thanks to its hybrid strategy that leverages both the disk and the memory. To align an average trace of 100k instructions, STRAC takes approx. 14 minutes in a PC like the one mentioned in Subsection 4.2.

4.4 Answer to RQ2: Consistency

In Figure 6, we plot the alignment cost for 100 trace pairs, the blue dots represent pairs extracted from the same page, the orange dots illustrate trace pairs taken from two different pages. Each column corresponds to a given web page. Green dots represent pairs with the maximum alignment cost for each site: an alignment of the web page treated in the column with a trace from the site cited above the dot. For example, the green dot in the first column is an alignment of a trace pair (2019.splashcon, youtube).

In Figure 6, we observe that, for each site, traces from the same page have a lower alignment cost. This is consistent with the fact that in these cases, the majority of both traces




Figure 5. Execution time for 12 trace pair comparisons by 7 tools incl. STRAC. Y axis is in logarithmic scale. Four tools fail even on the smallest traces.

in the pair are the same. On the contrary, the alignment cost between traces from different pages is higher.

Some cases show blue dots with sparsely high values. This occurs when external scripts, declared in some pages, present a high variance in fetching process time. Also, it sometimes happens that for one script declared in a page, the remote servers send different JavaScript code at each every request. Therefore, the generated bytecode varies more from one load to another, and the alignment cost is increased, showing a small margin between orange dots and the blue ones. However, we observe two scenarios when these phenomena are mitigated. First, when the bytecode generated from the external declaration is larger than the builtin bytecode (2019.splashcon, UNIV, and Youtube cases present a clear separation between clusters). Second, when the fetching process time is stable, as Wikipedia and Github cases show.

In the case of Google, we observe the worst possible scenario. This site has 5 external declared scripts (see Table 1), 3 of them have variable fetching time and their content varies at each load. These 3 scripts integrate Google Analytics features to the site. On the contrary, in the case of Wikipedia,

external declared JavaScripts always provide the same code in almost constant time. As a result, the generated bytecode is more deterministic and alignment cost decreases for traces from the same site. In the case of Wikipedia, alignment costs for pairs of traces collected from the same page vary between 1926 and 2652. These values are the lowest alignment costs in the benchmark, and they differ from others in more than 2× in order of magnitude.

Overall, the traces from the same (resp. different) page are located in separated clusters. In all cases, we also observe groups of orange dots that can be easily separated from other orange clusters. This separation is a consequence of semantic differences between sites and the increase of JavaScript declarations. For instance, in the first column of Figure 6, trace pairs from 2019.splashcon and Youtube home pages have higher alignment costs. This is a consequence of that Youtube is a richer feature site as 2019.splashcon is, but they semantically differ. We also observe this behavior in the case of Kth and Youtube trace pairs.

V8 compiles builtin JavaScript code to the same bytecode trace, as we discussed in Subsection 2.1.1. This bytecode generation is included in all collected traces. To validate this, we computed the V8 bytecode trace of an empty page: it contains 40k bytecode instructions on average. This also represents a constant noise in the alignment computation.

As Figure 6 illustrates, given the alignment cost of two semantically equivalent traces (blue dots) as a reference, STRAC is capable of identifying similarity with other page traces. However, we want to remark that STRAC accuracy gets improved when JavaScript declarations increase in the compared sites.

4.5 Answer to RQ3: Distance Functions

In Figure 7, we plot the alignment cost using distance d_{Ins} . Recall that d_{Ins} is less restrictive than d_{Sen} , the distance used to answer RQ2. By comparing Figure 7 and Figure 6, we observe interesting phenomena. First, changing the distance function breaks the clustering breakdown for Github, Google and Kth (some blue points get mixed with orange points). Second, the maximum alignment cost is lower than in Figure 6 for all sites. These phenomena are consequences of using a less restrictive distance function, i.e. with d_{Ins} , only the operator is analyzed in the bytecode instructions comparison. Overall, the choice of distance function matters. STRAC can be extended with new distance functions and provides d_{Sen} by default for properly aligning V8 bytecode traces.

We notice that the impact of the distance function is bigger for sites with less JavaScript. For Google, Github and Wikipedia, using d_{Ins} is bad because it breaks the clustering. For the remaining three websites, which involve more JavaScript features, while the alignment changes, the core property of the alignment of identifying semantically equivalent traces still holds.




Figure 6. Alignment costs for 100 trace pair comparisons using d_{Sen} as distance function.

5 Related Work

DTW is memory greedy on trace size, a similar problem arises when dealing with streaming traces. Oregi et al. [20] and Martins et al. [15] present a generalization of DTW for large streaming data. They propose the use of incremental computation of the cost matrix complemented with a weighted event distance function adding event positions. However, their results may differ from the original DTW warp path. On the contrary, STRAC also computes the exact alignment cost without approximations.

Kargen et al. [10] propose a combination of data abstraction and FastDTW to align two program traces at the binary level. They record and analyze read and write operations to memory and x86 registers. Also, they argue and they show that their method scales to large traces. STRAC is also capable of analyzing such traces, but targets different kinds of traces: V8 bytecode traces, which are not handled by Kargen et al.

Ratanaworabhan et al. [23] instrument Internet Explorer to measure JavaScript runtime and static behavior in function calls and event handlers on real-world websites. By doing so, they show that common benchmarks, like SpiderMonkey and

V8-Suite, are not representative of real application behavior. We could use STRAC to perform a similar analysis on modern browsers.

With JALANGI, Sen et al. [26] provide a framework to dynamically analyze JavaScript. The framework works through source code instrumentation. JALANGI associates shadow values to variables and objects in the instrumented code. Sen et al. argue that most of state-of-the-art dynamic analysis techniques can be implemented, like concolic evaluation and taint analysis. However, JALANGI has several limitations dealing with builtin code and instrumentation can decrease instrumented code execution performance. With STRAC, we propose to use V8 bytecode traces to compare JavaScript semantic similarity without JavaScript instrumentation.

Fang et al. [5] propose a JavaScript malicious code detection model based on neural networks. To mitigate the obfuscation techniques used in malicious code, they analyze the dynamic information recorded in V8 bytecode traces. Both STRAC and Fang et al. consider V8 bytecode traces, yet the usages are different: they do anomaly detection while we do trace comparison.




Figure 7. Alignment cost for 100 trace pair comparisons using d_{Ins} as distance function.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we presented a tool, called STRAC, for aligning execution traces. STRAC is tailored to traces of the JavaScript V8 engine. STRAC implements an optimized version of the DTW algorithm and two of its approximations. Our experiments show that STRAC scales to real-world JavaScript traces consisting of V8 bytecodes. STRAC provides two distance functions for trace event comparison and can be configured with any arbitrary distance function. Our evaluation indicates that STRAC performs better than state of the art DTW implementations, for 6 representative web sites.

We have shown that V8 bytecode contains redundancy and that an empty page includes more than 40k trace instructions. By removing this redundant and useless trace instructions, the alignment would get better. In our future work, we will study how to remove redundancy in V8 bytecode traces, for providing a better behavioral similarity measure for modern web pages full of JavaScript code.

Acknowledgments

This material is based upon work supported by the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research under the Trustfull project

and by the Wallenberg Autonomous Systems and Software Program (WASP).

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