

Software Diversification for WebAssembly

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Abstract

WebAssembly, now the fourth officially recognized web language, enables web browsers to port native applications for the Web. Furthermore, WebAssembly has evolved into an essential element for backend scenarios such as cloud computing and edge computing. Therefore, WebAssembly finds use in a plethora of applications, including but not limited to, web browsers, blockchain, and cloud computing. Despite the emphasis on security since its design and specification, WebAssembly remains susceptible to various forms of attacks, including memory corruption and side-channels. Furthermore, WebAssembly has been manipulated to disseminate malware, particularly in cases of browser cryptojacking.

Web page resources, including those containing WebAssembly binaries, are predominantly served from centralized data centers in the modern digital landscape. Thousands of edge devices, in conjunction with browser clients, operate millions of identical WebAssembly instantiations every second. This phenomenon creates a highly predictable ecosystem, wherein potential attackers can anticipate behavior either in browsers or backend nodes. Such predictability escalates the potential impact of vulnerabilities within these ecosystems, paving the way for high-impact side-channel and memory attacks. For instance, a flaw in a web browser, instigated by a defective WebAssembly program, holds the potential to affect millions of users.

This thesis aims to bolster the security within the WebAssembly ecosystem through the introduction of Software Diversification methods and tools. Software Diversification is a strategy designed to augment the costs of exploiting vulnerabilities by making software unpredictable. The unpredictability within ecosystems can be diminished by automatically generating various program variants. These variants strengthen observable properties that are typically used to launch attacks, and in many instances, can completely eliminate such vulnerabilities.

This work introduces three tools: CROW, MEWE, and WASM-MUTATE. Each tool has been specifically designed to tackle a unique facet of Software Diversification. We present empirical evidence demonstrating the potential application of our Software Diversification methods to WebAssembly programs in two distinct ways: Offensive and Defensive Software Diversification. Our research into Offensive Software Diversification in WebAssembly unveils potential paths for enhancing the detection of WebAssembly malware. On the other hand, our experiments in Defensive Software Diversification show that WebAssembly programs can be hardened against side-channel attacks, specifically the Spectre attack.

Keywords: WebAssembly, Software Diversification, Side-Channels

Sammanfattning

LIST OF PAPERS

WebAssembly Diversification for Malware Evasion
 Javier Cabrera-Arteaga, Tim Toady, Martin Monperrus, Benoit Baudry
 Computers & Security, Volume 131, 2023, 17 pages
 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S01674048230
 02067

2. Wasm-mutate: Fast and Effective Binary Diversification for WebAssembly

Javier Cabrera-Arteaga, Nicholas Fitzgerald, Martin Monperrus, Benoit Baudry

Submitted to Computers & Security, under revision, 20 pages https://arxiv.org/pdf/2309.07638.pdf

3. Multi-Variant Execution at the Edge

Javier Cabrera-Arteaga, Pierre Laperdrix, Martin Monperrus, Benoit Baudry

Moving Target Defense (MTD 2022), 12 pages https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3560828.3564007

4. CROW: Code Diversification for WebAssembly

Javier Cabrera-Arteaga, Orestis Floros, Oscar Vera-Pérez, Benoit Baudry, Martin Monperrus

Measurements, Attacks, and Defenses for the Web (MADWeb 2021), 12 pages https://doi.org/10.14722/madweb.2021.23004

 $5. \ Superoptimization \ of \ Web Assembly \ Bytecode$

Javier Cabrera-Arteaga, Shrinish Donde, Jian Gu, Orestis Floros, Lucas Satabin, Benoit Baudry, Martin Monperrus

Conference Companion of the 4th International Conference on Art, Science, and Engineering of Programming (Programming 2021), MoreVMs, 4 pages https://doi.org/10.1145/3397537.3397567

Scalable Comparison of JavaScript V8 Bytecode Traces
 Javier Cabrera-Arteaga, Martin Monperrus, Benoit Baudry
 11th ACM SIGPLAN International Workshop on Virtual Machines and
 Intermediate Languages (SPLASH 2019), 10 pages
 https://doi.org/10.1145/3358504.3361228

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Part I

Thesis