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AUTOMATIC SOFTWARE DIVERSIFICATION FOR WEBASSEMBLY

THE process of generating WebAssembly binaries starts with the original source code, which is then processed by a compiler to produce a WebAssembly binary. This compiler is generally divided into three main components: a frontend that converts the source code into an intermediate representation, an optimizer/transformer that modifies this representation usually for performance, and a backend that compiles the final WebAssembly binary. This architecture is illustrated in the left most part of Figure 3.1.




Figure 3.1: Approach landscape containing our three technical contributions: CROW squared in red, MEWE squared in green and WASM-MUTATE squared in blue. We annotate where our contributions, compiler-based and binary-based, stand in the landscape of generating WebAssembly programs.

⁰Compilation probe time 2023/10/23 12:36:46

Software Diversification, a preemptive security measure, can be integrated at various stages of this compilation process. However, applying diversification at the front-end has its limitations, as it would need a unique diversification mechanism for each language compatible with the frontend component. Conversely, diversification at later compiler stages, such as the optimizer or backend, offers a more practical alternative. This makes the latter stages of the compilers an ideal point for introducing practical Wasm diversification techniques. Our compiler-based strategies, represented in red and green in Figure 3.1, introduce a diversifier component into the optimizer/transformer and backend stages. This optimization/transformer component generates variants in the intermediate representation of a compiler, thereby creating artificial software diversity for WebAssembly. The variants are then compiled into WebAssembly binaries by the backend component of the compiler. Specifically, we propose two tools: CROW, which generates WebAssembly program variants, and MEWE, which packages these variants to enable multivariant execution [?]. Alternatively, diversification can be directly applied to the WebAssembly binary, offering a language and compiler-agnostic approach. Our binary-based strategy, WASM-MUTATE, represented in blue in Figure 3.1, employs rewriting rules on an e-graph data structure to generate a variety of WebAssembly program variants.

This dissertation contributes to the field of Software Diversification for WebAssembly by presenting two primary strategies: compiler-based and binary-based. Within this chapter, we introduce three technical contributions: CROW, MEWE, and WASM-MUTATE. We also compare these contributions, highlighting their complementary nature. Additionally, we provide the artifacts for our contributions to promote open research and reproducibility of our main takeaways.

3.1 CROW: Code Randomization of WebAssembly

This section details CROW [?], represented as the red squared tooling in Figure 3.1. CROW is designed to produce functionally equivalent Wasm variants from the output of an LLVM front-end, utilizing a custom Wasm LLVM backend.

Figure 3.2 illustrates CROW’s workflow in generating program variants, a process compound of two core stages: *exploration* and *combination*. During the *exploration* stage, CROW processes every instruction within each function of the LLVM input, creating a set of functionally equivalent code variants. This process ensures a rich pool of options for the subsequent stage. In the *combination* stage, these alternatives are assembled to form diverse LLVM IR variants, a task achieved through the exhaustive traversal of the power set of all potential combinations of code replacements. The final step involves the custom Wasm LLVM backend, which compiles the crafted LLVM IR variants into Wasm binaries.



Figure 3.2: CROW components following the diagram in Figure 3.1. CROW takes LLVM IR to generate functionally equivalent code replacements. Then, CROW assembles program variants by combining them. Figure taken from [?].

3.1.1 Enumerative synthesis

The cornerstone of CROW’s exploration mechanism is its code replacement generation strategy, which is inspired by the superdiversifier methodology proposed by Jacob et al. [?]. The search space for generating variants is delineated through an enumerative synthesis process, which systematically produces all possible code replacements for each instruction and its data flow graph in the original program. If a code replacement is identified to perform identically to the original program, it is reported as a functionally equivalent variant. This equivalence is confirmed using a theorem solver for rigorous verification.

Concretely, CROW is developed by extending the enumerative synthesis implementation found in Souper [?], an LLVM-based superoptimizer. Specifically, CROW constructs a Data Flow Graph for each LLVM instruction that returns an integer. Subsequently, it generates all viable expressions derived from a selected subset of the LLVM Intermediate Representation language for each DFG. The enumerative synthesis process incrementally generates code replacements, starting with the simplest expressions (those composed of a single instruction) and gradually increasing in complexity. The exploration process continues either until a timeout occurs or the size of the generated replacements exceeds a predefined threshold.

Notice that the search space increases exponentially with the size of the language used for enumerative synthesis. To mitigate this issue, we prevent CROW from synthesizing instructions without correspondence in the Wasm backend, effectively reducing the searching space. For example, creating an expression having the `freeze` LLVM instructions will increase the searching space for instruction without a Wasm’s opcode in the end.

CROW is carefully designed to boost the generation of variants as much as possible. First, we disable the majority of the pruning strategies. Instead of preventing the generation of commutative operations during the searching, CROW still uses such transformation as a strategy to generate program variants. Second, CROW applies code transformations independently. For instance, if a suitable replacement is identified that can be applied at N different locations in the original program, CROW will generate 2^N distinct program variants, i.e., the power set of applying the transformation or not to each location. This approach leads to a combinatorial explosion in the number of available program variants, especially as the number of possible replacements increases.

Leveraging the ascending nature of its enumerative synthesis process, CROW is capable of creating variants that may outperform the original program in both size and efficiency. For instance, the first functionally equivalent transformation identified is typically the most optimal in terms of code size. This approach offers developers a range of performance options, allowing them to balance between diversification and performance without compromising the latter.

The last stage at CROW involves a custom Wasm LLVM backend, which generates the Wasm programs. For it, we remove all built-in optimizations in the LLVM backend that could reverse Wasm variants, i.e., we disable all optimizations in the Wasm backend that could reverse the CROW transformations.

3.1.2 Constant inferring

CROW inherently introduces a novel transformation strategy called *constant inferring*, which significantly expands the variety of WebAssembly program variants. Specifically, CROW identifies segments of code that can be simplified into a single constant assignment, with a particular focus on variables that control branching logic. After applying this *constant inferring* technique, the resulting program diverges substantially from the original program structure. This is crucial for diversification efforts, as one of the primary objectives is to create variants that are as distinct as possible from the original source code [?]. In essence, the more divergent the variant, the more challenging it becomes to trace it back to its original form.

Let us illustrate the case with an example. The Babbage problem code in Listing 3.1 is composed of a loop that stops when it discovers the smallest number that fits with the Babbage condition in Line 4.

```

1   int babbage() {
2       int current = 0,
3           square;
4       while ((square=current*current) %
5              ↪ 1000000 != 269696) {
6           current++;
7       }
8       printf ("The number is %d\n",
9              ↪ current);
10      return 0 ;
11  }
```

Listing 3.1: Babbage problem. Taken from [?].

```

int babbage() {
    int current = 25264;
    printf ("The number is %d\n", current)
    ↪ ;
    return 0 ;
}
```

Listing 3.2: Constant inferring transformation over the original Babbage problem in Listing 3.1. Taken from [?].

CROW deals with this case, generating the program in Listing 3.2. It infers the value of `current` in Line 2 such that the Babbage condition is reached¹. Therefore, the condition in the loop will always be false. Then, the loop is dead code and is removed in the final compilation. The new program in Listing 3.2 is remarkably smaller and faster than the original code. Therefore, it offers differences both statically and at runtime²

3.1.3 Exemplifying CROW

Let us illustrate how CROW works with the example code in Listing 3.3. The `f` function calculates the value of $2 * x + x$ where `x` is the input for the function. CROW compiles this source code and generates the intermediate LLVM bitcode in the left most part of Listing 3.4. CROW potentially finds two integer returning instructions to look for variants, as the right-most part of Listing 3.4 shows.

```

1   int f(int x) {
2       return 2 * x + x;
3   }
```

Listing 3.3: C function that calculates the quantity $2x + x$.

¹In theory, this value can also be inferred by unrolling the loop the correct number of times with the LLVM toolchain. However, standard LLVM tools cannot unroll the `while`-loop because the loop count is too large.

²Notice that for the sake of illustration, we show both codes in C language, this process inside CROW is performed directly in LLVM IR.

```

define i32 @f(i32) {           Replacement candidates      Replacement candidates for
                                for code_1                code_2
    %2 = mul nsw i32 %0,2
    %3 = add nsw i32 %0,%2    %2 = mul nsw i32 %0,2      %3 = add nsw i32 %0,%2
                                %2 = add nsw i32 %0,%0    %3 = mul nsw %0, 3:i32
                                ret i32 %3
                                %2 = shl nsw i32 %0, 1:i32
}
define i32 @main() {
    %1 = tail call i32 @f(
        i32 10)
    ret i32 %1
}

```

Listing 3.4: LLVM’s intermediate representation program, its extracted instructions and replacement candidates. Gray highlighted lines represent original code, green for code replacements.

<pre>%2 = mul nsw i32 %0,2 %3 = add nsw i32 %0,%2</pre>	<pre>%2 = mul nsw i32 %0,2 %3 = mul nsw %0, 3:i32</pre>
<pre>%2 = add nsw i32 %0,%0 %3 = add nsw i32 %0,%2</pre>	<pre>%2 = add nsw i32 %0,%0 %3 = mul nsw %0, 3:i32</pre>
<pre>%2 = shl nsw i32 %0, 1:i32 %3 = add nsw i32 %0,%2</pre>	<pre>%2 = shl nsw i32 %0, 1:i32 %3 = mul nsw %0, 3:i32</pre>

Listing 3.5: Candidate code replacements combination. Orange highlighted code illustrate replacement candidate overlapping.

CROW, detects `code_1` and `code_2` as the enclosing boxes in the left most part of Listing 3.4 shows. CROW synthesizes $2 + 1$ candidate code replacements for each code respectively as the green highlighted lines show in the right most parts of Listing 3.4. The baseline strategy of CROW is to generate variants out of all possible combinations of the candidate code replacements, *i.e.*, uses the power set of all candidate code replacements.

In the example, the power set is the cartesian product of the found candidate code replacements for each code block, including the original ones, as Listing 3.5 shows. The power set size results in 6 potential function variants. Yet, the generation stage would eventually generate 4 variants from the original program. CROW generated 4 statically different Wasm files, as Listing 3.6 illustrates. This gap between the potential and the actual number of variants is a consequence of the redundancy among the bitcode variants when composed into one. In other words, if the replaced code removes other code blocks, all possible combinations having it will be in the end the same program. In the example case, replacing `code_2` by `mul nsw %0, 3`, turns `code_1` into dead code, thus, later replacements generate the same program variants. The rightmost part of Listing 3.5 illustrates how for three different combinations, CROW produces the same variant. We call this phenomenon a *code replacement overlapping*.

```

func $f (param i32) (result i32)
    local.get 0
    i32.const 2
    i32.mul
    local.get 0
    i32.add

func $f (param i32) (result i32)
    local.get 0
    local.get 0
    i32.add
    local.get 0
    i32.add

func $f (param i32) (result i32)
    local.get 0
    i32.const 1
    i32.shl
    local.get 0
    i32.add

func $f (param i32) (result i32)
    local.get 0
    i32.const 3
    i32.mul

```

Listing 3.6: Wasm program variants generated from program Listing 3.3.

Contribution paper and artifact

CROW is a compiler-based approach. It leverages enumerative synthesis to generate functionally equivalent code replacements and assembles them into diverse Wasm program variants. CROW uses SMT solvers to guarantee functional equivalence.

CROW is fully presented in Cabrera-Arteaga et al. "CROW: Code Randomization of WebAssembly" at *proceedings of Measurements, Attacks, and Defenses for the Web (MADWeb)*, NDSS 2021 <https://doi.org/10.14722/madweb.2021.23004>.

CROW source code is available at <https://github.com/ASSERT-KTH/slumps>

3.2 MEWE: Multi-variant Execution for WebAssembly

This section describes MEWE [?]. MEWE synthesizes diversified function variants by using CROW. It then provides execution-path randomization in a Multivariant Execution (MVE) [?]. Execution path randomization is a technique that randomizes the execution path of a program at runtime, i.e. at each invocation of a function, a different variant is executed [?]. MEWE generates application-level multivariant binaries without changing the operating system or Wasm runtime. It creates an MVE by intermixing functions for which CROW generates variants, as illustrated by the green square in Figure 3.1. MEWE inlines function variants when appropriate, resulting in call stack diversification at runtime.

As illustrated in Figure 3.3, MEWE takes the LLVM IR variants generated by CROW’s diversifier. It then merges LLVM IR variants into a Wasm multivariant. In the figure, we highlight the two components of MEWE, *Multivariant Generation* and the *Mixer*. In the *Multivariant Generation* process, MEWE gathers the LLVM IR variants created by CROW. The Mixer component, on the other hand, links the multivariant binary and creates a new entrypoint for the binary called *entrypoint tampering*. The tampering is needed in case the output of CROW are variants of the original entrypoint, e.g. the *main* function. Concretely, it wraps the dispatcher for the entrypoint variants as a new function for the final Wasm binary and is declared as the application entrypoint. The random generator is needed to perform the execution-path randomization. For the random generator, we rely on WASI’s specification [?] for the random behavior of the dispatchers. However, its exact implementation is dependent on the platform on which the binary is deployed. Finally, using the same custom Wasm LLVM backend as CROW, we generate a standalone multivariant Wasm binary. Once generated, the multivariant Wasm binary can be deployed to any Wasm engine.

3.2.1 Multivariant call graph

The key component of MEWE consists of combining the variants into a single binary. The core idea is to introduce one dispatcher function per original function with variants. A dispatcher function is a synthetic function in charge of choosing a variant at random when the original function is called. With the introduction of the dispatcher function, MEWE turns the original call graph into a multivariant call graph, defined as follows.

Definition 1. *Multivariant Call Graph (MCG):* A multivariant call graph is a call graph $\langle N, E \rangle$ where the nodes in N represent all the functions in the binary and an edge $(f_1, f_2) \in E$ represents a possible invocation of f_2 by f_1 [?]. The nodes in N have three possible types: a function present in the original program, a generated function variant, or a dispatcher function.

3.2.2 Exemplifying a Multivariant binary

In Figure 3.4, we show the original static call graph for an original program (top of the figure), as well as the multivariant call graph generated with MEWE (bottom of the figure). The gray nodes represent function variants, the green nodes function dispatchers, and the yellow nodes are the original functions. The directed edges represent the possible calls. The original program includes three functions. MEWE generates 43 variants for the first function, none for the second, and three for the third. MEWE introduces two dispatcher nodes for the first and third functions. Each dispatcher is connected to the corresponding function variants to invoke one variant randomly at runtime.



Figure 3.3: Overview of MEWE workflow. It takes as input an LLVM binary. It first generates a set of functionally equivalent variants for each function in the binary using CROW. Then, MEWE generates an LLVM multivariant binary composed of all the function variants. Finally, the Mixer includes the behavior in charge of selecting a variant when a function is invoked. Finally, the MEWE mixer composes the LLVM multivariant binary with a random number generation library and tampers the original application entrypoint. The final process produces a Wasm multivariant binary ready to be deployed. Figure partially taken from [?].

In Listing 3.7, we demonstrate how MEWE constructs the function dispatcher, corresponding to the rightmost green node in Figure 3.4, which handles three created variants including the original. The dispatcher function retains the same signature as the original function. Initially, the dispatcher invokes a random number generator, the output of which is used to select a specific function variant for execution (as seen on line 6 in Listing 3.7). To enhance security, we employ a switch-case structure within the dispatcher, mitigating vulnerabilities associated with speculative execution-based attacks [?] (refer to lines 12 to 19 in Listing 3.7). This approach also eliminates the need for multiple function definitions with identical signatures, thereby reducing the potential attack surface in cases where the function signature itself is vulnerable [?]. Additionally, MEWE can inline function variants directly into the dispatcher, obviating the need for redundant definitions (as illustrated on line 16 in Listing 3.7). Remarkably, we prioritize security over performance, i.e., while using indirect



Figure 3.4: Example of two static call graphs. At the top, is the original call graph, and at the bottom, is the multivariant call graph, which includes nodes that represent function variants (in gray), dispatchers (in green), and original functions (in yellow). Figure taken from [?].

calls in place of a switch-case could offer constant-time performance benefits, we implement switch-case structures.

```

2 ; Multivariant foo wrapping ;
3 define internal i32 @foo(i32 %0) {
4     entry:
5         ; It first calls the dispatcher to discriminate between the created
       variants ;
6         %1 = call i32 @discriminate(i32 3)
7         switch i32 %1, label %end [
8             i32 0, label %case_43_
9             i32 1, label %case_44_
10            ]
11        ;One case for each generated variant of foo ;
12        case_43_:
13            %2 = call i32 @foo_43_(%0)
14            ret i32 %2
15        case_44_:
16            ; MEWE can inline the body of the a function variant ;
17            %3 = <body of foo_44_ inlined>
18            ret i32 %3
19        end:
20            ; The original is also included ;
21            %4 = call i32 @foo_original(%0)
22            ret i32 %4
23    }

```

Listing 3.7: Dispatcher function embedded in the multivariant binary of the original function in the rightmost green node in Figure 3.4. The code is commented for the sake of understanding.

In Listing 3.7, we illustrate the LLVM construction for the function dispatcher corresponding to the right most green node of Figure 3.4. Notice that, the dispatcher function is constructed using the same signature as the original function. It first calls the random generator, which returns a value used to invoke a specific function variant (see line 6 in Listing 3.7). We utilize a switch-case structure in the dispatchers to prevent indirect calls, which are vulnerable to speculative execution-based attacks [?] (see lines 12 to 19 in Listing 3.7), i.e., the choice of a switch-case also avoids having multiple function definitions with the same signature, which could increase the attack surface in case the function signature is vulnerable [?]. In addition, MEWE can inline function variants inside the dispatcher instead of defining them again (see line 16 in Listing 3.7). Remarkably, we trade security over performance since dispatcher functions that perform indirect calls, instead of a switch-case, could improve the performance of the dispatchers as indirect calls have constant time.

Contribution paper and artifact

MEWE provides dynamic execution path randomization by packaging variants generated out of CROW.

MEWE is fully presented in Cabrera-Arteaga et al. "Multi-Variant Execution at the Edge" *Proceedings of Moving Target Defense, 2022, ACM* <https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3560828.3564007>

MEWE is also available as an open-source tool at <https://github.com/ASSERT-KTH/MEWE>

3.3 WASM-MUTATE: Fast and Effective Binary for WebAssembly

In this section, we introduce our third technical contribution, WASM-MUTATE [?], a tool that generates thousands of functionally equivalent variants out from a WebAssembly binary input. Leveraging rewriting rules and e-graphs [?] for software diversification, WASM-MUTATE synthesizes program variants by transforming parts of the original binary. In Figure 3.1, we highlight WASM-MUTATE as the blue squared tooling.




Figure 3.5: WASM-MUTATE high-level architecture. It generates functionally equivalent variants from a given WebAssembly binary input. Its central approach involves synthesizing these variants by substituting parts of the original binary using rewriting rules, boosted by diversification space traversals using e-graphs.

Figure 3.5 illustrates the workflow of WASM-MUTATE, which initiates with a WebAssembly binary as its input. The first step involves parsing this binary to create suitable abstractions, e.g. an intermediate representation. Subsequently, WASM-MUTATE utilizes predefined rewriting rules to construct an e-graph for the initial program, encapsulating all potential equivalent codes derived from the rewriting rules. The assurance of functional equivalence is rooted in the inherent

properties of the individual rewrite rules employed. Then, pieces of the original program are randomly substituted by the result of random e-graph traversals, resulting in a variant that maintains functional equivalence to the original binary.

WASM-MUTATE applies one transformation at a time. Notice that, the output of one applied transformation can be chained again as an input WebAssembly binary, enabling the generation of many variants, leading us to enunciate the notion of *Stacked transformation*

Definition 2. *Stacked transformation:* Given an original input WebAssembly binary I and a diversifier D , stacked transformations are defined as the application of D over the binary I multiple times, i.e., $D(D(D(\dots(I))))$. Notice that, the number of stacked transformations are the number of times the diversifier D is applied.

3.3.1 WebAssembly Rewriting Rules

WASM-MUTATE contains a comprehensive set of 135 rewriting rules. In this context, a rewriting rule is a tuple $(\text{LHS}, \text{RHS}, \text{Cond})$ where LHS specifies the segment of binary targeted for replacement, RHS describes its functionally equivalent substitute, and Cond outlines the conditions that must be met for the replacement to take place, e.g. enhancing type constraints. WASM-MUTATE groups these rewriting rules into meta-rules depending on their target inside a Wasm binary, ranging from high-level changes affecting binary section structure to low-level modifications within the code section. This section focuses on the biggest meta-rule implemented in WASM-MUTATE, the `Peephole` meta-rule³.

Rewriting rules inside the `Peephole` meta-rule, operate over the data flow graph of instructions within a function body, representing the lowest level of rewriting. In WASM-MUTATE, we have implemented 125 rewriting rules specifically for this category, each one avoiding targeting instructions that might induce undefined behavior, e.g., function calls.

Moreover, we augment the internal representation of a Wasm program to bolster WASM-MUTATE’s transformation capabilities through the `Peephole` meta-rule. Concretely, we augment the parsing stage in WASM-MUTATE by including custom operator instructions. These custom operator instructions are designed to use well-established code diversification techniques through rewriting rules. When converting back to the WebAssembly binary format from the intermediate representation, custom instructions are meticulously handled to retain the original functionality of the WebAssembly program.

In the following example, we demonstrate a rewriting rule within the `Peephole` meta-rule that utilizes a custom `rand` operator to expand statically declared constants within any WebAssembly program function body. The unfold rewriting rule, as the name suggests, transforms statically declared constants into the sum

³For an in-depth explanation of the remaining meta-rules, refer to [?].

of two random numbers. During the generation of the WebAssembly variant, the custom `rand` operator is substituted with a randomly chosen static constant. Notice that the condition specified in the last part of the rewriting rule ensures that this predicate is satisfied.

```

LHS i32.const x

RHS (i32.add (i32.rand i32.const y))

Cond y = x - i32.rand

```

Although this rewriting approach may appear simplistic, especially because compilers often eliminate it through *Constant Folding* optimization [?], it stresses on the spill/reload component of the compiler when the WebAssembly binary is transpiled to machine code. Spill/reloads occur when the compiler runs out of physical registers to store intermediate calculations, resorting to specific memory locations for temporary storage. The unfold rewriting rule indirectly stresses this segment of memory. Notably, with this specific rewriting rule, we have found a CVE in the wasmtime standalone engine [?].

3.3.2 E-Graphs traversals

We developed WASM-MUTATE leveraging e-graphs, a specific graph data structure for representing and applying rewriting rules [?]. In the context of WASM-MUTATE, e-graphs are constructed from the input WebAssembly program and the implemented rewriting rules (we detail the e-graph construction process in Section 3 of [?]).

Willsey et al. highlight the potential for high flexibility in extracting code fragments from e-graphs, a process that can be recursively orchestrated through a cost function applied to e-nodes and their respective operands. This methodology ensures the functional equivalence of the derived code [?]. For instance, e-graphs solve the problem of providing the best code out of several optimization rules [?]. To extract the "optimal" code from an e-graph, one might commence the extraction at a specific e-node, subsequently selecting the AST with the minimal size from the available options within the corresponding e-class's operands. In omitting the cost function from the extraction strategy leads us to a significant property: *any path navigated through the e-graph yields a functionally equivalent code variant*.

We exploit such property to fastly generate diverse WebAssembly variants. We propose and implement an algorithm that facilitates the random traversal of an e-graph to yield functionally equivalent program variants, as detailed in Algorithm 1. This algorithm operates by taking an e-graph, an e-class node (starting with the root's e-class), and a parameter specifying the maximum extraction depth of the expression, to prevent infinite recursion. Within the

algorithm, a random e-node is chosen from the e-class (as seen in lines 5 and 6), setting the stage for a recursive continuation with the offspring of the selected e-node (refer to line 8). Once the depth parameter reaches zero, the algorithm extracts the most concise expression available within the current e-class (line 3). Following this, the subexpressions are built (line 10) for each child node, culminating in the return of the complete expression (line 11).

Algorithm 1 e-graph traversal algorithm taken from [?].

```

1: procedure TRAVERSE(egraph, eclass, depth)
2:   if depth = 0 then
3:     return smallest_tree_from(egraph, eclass)
4:   else
5:     nodes  $\leftarrow$  egraph[eclass]
6:     node  $\leftarrow$  random_choice(nodes)
7:     expr  $\leftarrow$  (node, operands = [])
8:     for each child  $\in$  node.children do
9:       subexpr  $\leftarrow$  TRAVERSE(egraph, child, depth - 1)
10:      expr.operands  $\leftarrow$  expr.operands  $\cup$  {subexpr}
11:   return expr
```

3.3.3 Exemplifying WASM-MUTATE

Let us illustrate how WASM-MUTATE generates variant programs by using the before enunciated algorithm. Here, we use Algorithm 1 with a maximum depth of 1. In Listing 3.8 a hypothetical original Wasm binary is illustrated. In this context, a potential user has set two pivotal rewriting rules: `(x, container (x nop),)` and `(x, x i32.add 0, x instanceof i32)`. The former rule, grants the ability to append a `nop` instruction to any subexpression, a well-known low-level diversification strategy [?]. Conversely, the latter rule adds zero to any numeric value.



Figure 3.6: e-graph built for rewriting the first instruction of Listing 3.8.

```
(module
  (type (;0;) (func (param i32 f32) (result i64)))
  (func (;0;) (type 0) (param i32 f32) (result i64)
    i64.const 1)
)
```

Listing 3.8: Wasm function.

```
(module
  (type (;0;) (func (param i32 f32) (result i64)))
  (func (;0;) (type 0) (param i32 f32) (result i64)
    (i64.add (
      i64.const 0
      i64.const 1
      nop
    )))
)
```

Listing 3.9: Random peephole mutation using egraph traversal for Listing 3.8 over e-graph Figure 3.6. The textual format is folded for better understanding.

Leveraging the code presented in Listing 3.8 alongside the defined rewriting rules, we build the e-graph, simplified in Figure 3.6. In the figure, we highlight various stages of Algorithm 1 in the context of the scenario previously described. The algorithm initiates at the e-class with the instruction `i64.const 1`, as seen in Listing 3.8. At ②, it randomly selects an equivalent node within the e-class, in this instance taking the `i64.add` node, resulting: `expr`

`= i64.add 1 r.` As the traversal advances, it follows on the left operand of the previously chosen node, settling on the `i64.const 0` node within the same e-class ③. Then, the right operand of the `i64.add` node is chosen, selecting the `container` ④ operator yielding: `expr = i64.or (i64.const 0 container (r nop))`. The algorithm chooses the right operand of the `container` ⑤, which correlates to the initial instruction e-node highlighted in ⑥, culminating in the final expression: `expr = i64.or (i64.const 0 container(i64.const 1 nop)) i64.const 1.` As we proceed to the encoding phases, the `container` operator is ignored as a real Wasm instruction, finally resulting in the program in Listing 3.9.

Notice that, within the e-graph showcased in Figure 3.6, the container node maintains equivalence across all e-classes. Consequently, increasing the depth parameter in Algorithm 1 would potentially escalate the number of viable variants infinitely.

Contribution paper and artifact

WASM-MUTATE uses hand-made rewriting rules and random traversals over e-graphs to provide a binary-based solution for WebAssembly diversification.

WASM-MUTATE is fully presented in Cabrera-Arteaga et al. "WASM-MUTATE: Fast and Effective Binary Diversification for WebAssembly" *Under review at Computers & Security* <https://arxiv.org/pdf/2309.07638.pdf>.

WASM-MUTATE is available at <https://github.com/bytocodealliance/wasm-tools/tree/main/crates/wasm-mutate> as a contribution to the Bytecode Alliance organization ^a. The Bytecode Alliance is dedicated to creating secure new software foundations, building on standards such as WebAssembly and WASI.

^a<https://bytocodealliance.org/>

3.4 Comparing CROW, MEWE, and WASM-MUTATE

In this section, we compare CROW, MEWE, and WASM-MUTATE, highlighting their key differences. These distinctions are summarized in Table 3.1. The table is organized into columns that represent attributes of each tool: the tool's name, input format, core diversification strategy, number of variants generated within an hour, targeted sections of the WebAssembly binary for diversification, strength of the generated variants, and the security applications of these variants. Each row in the table corresponds to a specific tool. The *Variant strength* accounts for the capability of each tool on generating variants that are preserved after the JIT

compilation of V8 and wasmtime in average. For example, a higher value of the *Variant strength* indicates that the generated variants are not reversed by JIT compilers, ensuring that the diversification is preserved in an end-to-end scenario of a WebAssembly program, i.e. from the source code to its final execution. Notice that, the data and insights presented in the table are sourced from the respective papers of each tool and, from the previous discussion in this chapter.

CROW is a compiler-based strategy, needing access to the source code or its LLVM IR representation to work. Its core is an enumerative synthesis implementation with functionality verification using SMT solvers, ensuring the functional equivalence of the generated variants. In addition, MEWE extends the capabilities of CROW, utilizing the same underlying technology to create program variants. It goes a step further by packaging the LLVM IR variants into a Wasm multivariant, providing MVE through execution path randomization. Both CROW and MEWE are fully automated, requiring no user intervention besides the input source code. WASM-MUTATE, on the other hand, is a binary-based tool. It uses a set of rewriting rules and the input Wasm binary to generate program variants, centralizing its core around random e-graph traversals. Remarkably, WASM-MUTATE removes the need for compiler adjustments, offering compatibility with any existing WebAssembly binary.

We have observed several interesting phenomena when aggregating the empirical data presented in the corresponding papers of CROW, MEWE and WASM-MUTATE [? ? ?]. This can be appreciated in the fourth, fifth and sixth columns of Table 3.1. We have observed that WASM-MUTATE generates more unique variants in one hour than CROW and MEWE in at least one order of magnitude. This is mainly because of three reasons. First, CROW and MEWE rely on SMT solvers to prove functionally equivalence, placing a bottleneck when generating variants. Second, CROW and MEWE generation capabilities are limited by the *overlapping* phenomenon discussed in Section 3.1.3. Third, WASM-MUTATE can generate variants in any part of the Wasm binary, while CROW and MEWE are limited to the code and function sections.

On the other hand, CROW and MEWE, by using enumerative synthesis, ensure that the generated variants are preserved. In other words, the transformations generated out of CROW and MEWE are virtually irreversible by JIT compilers, such as V8 and wasmtime. This phenomenon is highlighted in the *Variants strength* column of Table 3.1, where we show that CROW and MEWE generate variants with 96% of preservation against 75% of WASM-MUTATE. High preservation is especially important where the preservation of the diversification is crucial, e.g. to hinder reverse engineering.

Tool	Input	Core	Variants in 1h	Target	Variants Strength	Security applications
CROW	Source code or LLVM Ir	Enumerative synthesis with functional equivalence proved through SMT solvers	> 1k	Code section	96%	Hinders static analysis and reverse engineering.
MEWE	Source code or LL VM Ir	CROW, Multivariate execution	> 1k	Code and Function sections	96%	Hinders static and dynamic analysis, reverse engineering and, web timing-based attacks.
WASM-MUTATE	Wasm binary	hand-made rewriting rules, e-graph random traversals	> 10k	Any Wasm section	76%	Hinders signature-based identification, and cache timing side-channel attacks.

Table 3.1: Comparing CROW, MEWE and WASM-MUTATE. The table columns are: the tool’s name, input format, core diversification strategy, number of variants generated within an hour, targeted sections of the WebAssembly binary, strength of the generated variants, and the security applications of these variants. The Variant strength accounts for the capability of each tool on generating variants that are preserved after the JIT compilation of V8 and wasmtime in average. Our three technical contributions are complementary tools that can be combined.

Takeaway

Our three technical contributions serve as complementary tools that can be combined. For instance, when the source code for a WebAssembly binary is either non-existent or inaccessible, WASM-MUTATE offers a viable solution for generating code variants. On the other hand, CROW and MEWE excel in scenarios where high preservation is crucial.

3.4.1 Security applications

The final column of Table 3.1 emphasizes the security benefits derived from the variants produced by our three key technical contributions. One immediate advantage of altering the structure of WebAssembly binaries across different variants is the mitigation of signature-based identification, thereby enhancing resistance to static reverse engineering. Additionally, our tools generate a diverse array of code variants that are highly preserved. This implies that these variants, each with their unique WebAssembly code, retain their distinct characteristics even after being translated into machine code by JIT compilers. This high level of preservation significantly mitigates the risks associated with side-channel attacks that target specific machine code instructions, such as port contention attacks [?]. For instance, if a WebAssembly binary is transformed in such a manner that its resulting machine code instructions differ from the original, it becomes more challenging for a side-channel attack. Conversely, if the compiler translates the variant into machine code that closely resembles the original, the side-channel attack could still exploit those instructions to extract information about the original WebAssembly binary.

Altering the layout of a WebAssembly program inherently influences its managed memory during runtime (see ??). This phenomenon is especially important for CROW and MEWE, given that they do not directly address the WebAssembly memory model. Significantly, CROW and MEWE considerably alter the managed memory by modifying the layout of the WebAssembly program. For example, the *constant inferring* transformations significantly alter the layout of program variants, affecting unmanaged memory elements such as the returning address of a function. Furthermore, WASM-MUTATE not only affects managed memory through changes in the WebAssembly program layout. It also adds rewriting rules to transform unmanaged memory instructions. Memory alterations, either to the unmanaged or managed memories, have substantial security implications, by eliminating potential cache timing side-channels [?].

Last but not least, our technical contributions enhance security against web timing-based attacks [?] by creating variants that exhibit a wide range of execution times, including faster variants compared to the original program. This strategy is especially prominent in MEWE’s approach, which develops

multivariants functioning on randomizing execution paths, thereby thwarting attempts at timing-based inference attacks [?]. Adding another layer benefit from MEWE, the integration of diverse variants into multivariants can potentially disrupt dynamic reverse engineering tools such as symbolic executors [?]. Concretely, different control flows through a random discriminator, exponentially increase the number of possible execution paths, making multivariant binaries virtually unexplorable.

Takeaway

CROW, MEWE and WASM-MUTATE generate WebAssembly variants that can be used to enhance security. Overall, they generate variants that are suitable for hardening static and dynamic analysis, side-channel attacks, and, to thwart signature-based identification.

■ Conclusions

In this chapter, we discuss the technical specifics underlying our primary technical contributions. We elucidate the mechanisms through which CROW generates program variants. Subsequently, we discuss MEWE, offering a detailed examination of its role in forging MVE for WebAssembly. We also explore the details of WASM-MUTATE, proposing a novel e-graph traversal algorithm to fast spawn Wasm program variants. Remarkably, we undertake a comparative analysis of the three tools, highlighting their respective benefits and limitations, alongside the potential security applications of the generated Wasm variants.

In Chapter 4, we present two use cases that support the exploitation of these tools. Chapter 4 serves to bridge theory with practice, showcasing the tangible impacts and benefits realized through the deployment of CROW, MEWE, and WASM-MUTATE.

