CSE 120, UCSD

CSE 120: Principles of Operating Systems Lecture 13: Protection

Prof. Joseph Pasquale
University of California, San Diego
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Protection

- Processes access resources
- Resources are shared, need to be protected
 - from processes without permission
 - from improper access by a process
- What is the right protection model?
- What are the mechanisms?

The Kernel Enforces Protection

- To protect resources, have kernel "own" them
 - kernel can then allow access (temporarily)
- To access a resource, a process must ask for it
 - kernel can test whether access should be given
- Once a process is given access
 - kernel can prevent others for gaining access
 - kernel may/may not be able to take away access
- This assumes the kernel operates correctly


Protecting the Kernel

- The kernel itself must be protected!
- Mechanisms
 - Memory protection
 - Protected mode of operation: kernel vs. user
 - Clock interrupt, so kernel eventually gets control
- Notice, mechanisms are hardware supported
- Protected kernel can protect other resources

Goals Supported by Kernel

- Allow range of permissions
- Allow user to set/get them
- Be fast/simple for common case
- Support user expressing complex permissions

A Formal Model of Protection



- Protection: how to limit access to a resource
- Resource: object that requires protection
- Domain: set of (resource, permission) pairs
- Process: accesses resources within domain

Protection Matrix

Resources


 X
 Y
 A
 B

 SUBBUSH
 A
 r, w
 r, w

 B
 W
 r
 s


- Can describe all domains as a matrix
 - Rows are domains
 - Columns are resources
 - Matrix entry [d, r] contains permissions/rights


Efficient Representations



- Access Control Lists
 - For each resource, list (domain, permissions) pairs
- Capability Lists
 - For each domain, list (resource, permissions) pairs


Access Control Lists





- ACL is associated with resource
- Like a registry: if name is on list, ok to access
- Can be inefficient: must lookup on each access
- Revocation is easy; just remove from list

Capability Lists








- Capability list associated with each domain
- Like key/ticket: if you have it, you get access
- Efficient: on access, just produce capability
- Hard to revoke

UNIX Protection


- Associated with each file is set of permissions
 - Permission bits r/w/x for owner, group, world
 - Limited form of access control list
- Protection domain: UID (user account ID) + ...
 - A process is always in some domain
- When process opens file, check permission
- If ok, provide process with a capability
 - Future operations then carried out efficiently

Extending Protection in UNIX


- For common case, r/w/x for o/g/w adequate
- For special cases, can extend via user program
- SETUID mechanism: causes domain switch
- If executable file has SETUID bit set
 - Process runs in domain of owner (of executable)
 - Therefore, it runs with all the rights of the owner




- Pat has a file "Bib" of bibliographic references
- Chris wants to read and add entries
- But, Chris lacks permissions (only Pat can r/w)
- Pat wishes to allow append access, but how?



- Pat can set permissions so Chris can r/w
- But this gives Chris too much power
 - Chris can modify the file arbitrarily
 - Pat would like to give Chris only append access



- Pat provides program: only reads/appends
- Sets permissions
 - of program: execute (for Chris), and SETUID on
 - of Bib file: read/write only for Pat, not Chris



- When Chris executes EditBib, runs as Pat
 - SETUID causes a domain switch to Pat's domain
- Since Pat has r/w access, file can be modified
- Limited to what program does: read/append

Summary

- Protection
- Formal Model
- Access Control Lists
- Capability Lists

Textbook

- Chapter 17 (on Protection)
 - Lecture-related: 17.1-17.2, 17.4-17.7, 17.13
 - Recommended: 17.3, 17.8-17.12

Review & Research

- What is meant by "protection" in operating systems?*
- What are the reasons require protection?*
- In what way does the kernel enforce protection?**
- How is the kernel itself protected?**
- Why is hardware support needed to protect the kernel?**

- What are the goals for the kernel to support protection?*
- In the formal model of protection, what is the definition of each of the following: protection, resource, domain, process?

- What is a protection matrix?*
- What is represented by the matrix rows?
- What is represented by the matrix columns?
- What is contained in a matrix cell?
- What is the "s" right/permission?*
- Why is the protection matrix inefficient to represent as full matrix?**

- What is an access control list (ACL)?
- In what way is an ACL like a registry?*
- In what way is inefficiency a disadvantage of ACLs?*
- What is revocation, and why is it an advantage of ACLs?*

- What is a capability list?
- In what way is a capability like a key/ticket?*
- In what way is efficiency an advantage of a capability?*
- Why is revocation difficult when using capability lists?*

- What is the design for protection in UNIX?
- What is a protection domain in UNIX?*
- How is the protection model integrated with the UNIX file system?**
- How does UNIX use ACLs and capabilities?**
- What is the SETUID mechanism in UNIX?**

- If an executable file has the SETUID bit set, how does this affect a process that executes that file?**
- On slide 13, what happens if Chris tries to read the Bib file, and why?*
- What would happen if Pat sets the permission bits to rw-rw-rw, how would it affect your previous answer?*

- On slide 15, what is the purpose of the EditBib program?*
- Why is it that Pat would be the owner of this file (rather than Chris)?**
- Why is it that the SETUID bit must be set for this file (and not for the Bib file)?**
- Why would it not be good to change the permissions of Bib to rw-rw-rw-?*

- When Chris's process executes the EditBib file, what does it mean for the process to run in Pat's domain?*
- By running in Pat's domain, doesn't this mean that Chris can now impersonate Pat: why or why not?**