

Science of Logic

a new English translation

Book I: Doctrine of Being

General Division of Being

Being is *first* determined against another. [i.e. top-level division into being and essence]

Second, it is determining itself inside itself [innerhalb seiner selbst bestimmend].
[i.e. the sphere of being]

Third, as this preliminary division is cast off, it is the abstract immediacy and indeterminacy in which it must be the beginning. [i.e. pure being]

According to the *first* determination, being partitions itself off from essence, because, in the further development of its totality, it turns out to be only one sphere of the concept, and to this sphere as a moment, another sphere is opposed.

According to the *second* it is the sphere in which fall the determinations of its reflection as well as their whole movement. In this sphere, being posits itself in three determinations:

- I. as determinacy as such, quality;
- II. as sublated determinacy: magnitude, quantity;
- II. as qualitatively determinate quantity: measure.

This division is, as was remarked in the introduction regarding such divisions in general, a preliminary allegation. Its determinations must first be developed from the movement of being itself, and thereby define and justify themselves. Regarding the deviation of this division from the usual listing of categories, namely as quantity, quality, relation, and modality – for Kant, incidentally, these are supposed to be only titles for his categories, but are in fact categories themselves, only more general ones – this is irrelevant here, because the entire execution will diverge from the usual order and meaning of the categories at every point.

Only this can perhaps be remarked: that *quantity* is usually listed ahead of *quality* – and mostly this is done for no further reason. It was just shown that the beginning must be made with being *as such*, and thus with qualitative being. It is quite clear, from the comparison of quality and quantity, that the former is by nature first. For

quantity is quality which has already become negative; *magnitude* is the determinacy which is no longer one with being, but is already differentiated [unterschieden] from it, is sublated quality which has become indifferent [gleichgültig]. It includes the alterability of being in it, but in such a way that the thing itself [die Sache selbst], namely being, whose determination it is, is not altered thereby. But on the contrary, qualitative determinacy is one with its being, it neither goes beyond it nor stays within it, but is its immediate limitedness. Quality is thus, as the *immediate* determinacy, the first, and the beginning is to be made with it.

Measure is a *relation* [Relation], not relation in general but specifically [bestimmt] of quality and quantity to each other; the categories which Kant dealt with under relation will assume an entirely different position in the whole. Measure can also be seen as a modality, if one wishes; but since with Kant these [modalities] no longer constitute a determination of the content, but only concern the relation [Beziehung] of the content to thinking, to the subjective, this relation is totally heterogeneous and does not belong here.

The *third* determination of *being* falls within the section on quality, inasmuch as it lowers itself, as abstract immediacy, down to the status of a single determinacy against the others within its sphere.

Section 1: Determinacy (Quality)

Being is the indeterminate immediate; it is free from determinacy against essence, as well as from any determinacy it can receive from any other. This reflectionless being is being as it immediately is merely in itself [an ihm selber].

Because it is indeterminate, it is unqualified being. But *in itself* [an sich], the character of indeterminacy comes to it [zukommt] only in opposition to the *determinate* or qualitative. Being in general, however, is confronted by *determinate* being as such, and thereby its own indeterminacy constitutes [ausmacht] its quality. It will therefore be shown, that the *first* being is in-itself [an sich] determinate; and *secondly* that it transitions into *there-being* [Dasein], is *there-being*; but that this, as finite being, sublates itself, and thus *thirdly* transitions into the infinite self-relation of being, i.e. into *for-itself-being* [Fürsichsein].

Chapter 1: Being

A. Being

Being, pure being – without any further determination. In its indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to itself, and also not unequal to another, has no diversity [Verschiedenheit] inside itself, nor outside. If any determination or content were to be differentiated [unterschieden] in it, or to posit it as differentiated from another, it would not retain its purity. It is pure indeterminacy and emptiness [Leere]. – There is *nothing* to be intuited [anzuschauen] in it, if intuiting can be spoken of here; or it is this pure, empty intuition itself. There is just as little to be thought in it, or it is just as much only this empty thinking. Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact *nothing*, and neither more nor less than nothing.

B. Nothing

Nothing, pure nothing; it is simply equality with itself, complete emptiness, complete lack of determination and content; inwardly [in ihm selbst] undifferentiated. – Insofar as intuition or thinking can be mentioned here, it counts as a difference [Unterschied] whether something or *nothing* gets intuited or thought. To intuit or to think nothing thus has a meaning; both get differentiated, and thus nothing *is* (exists [existiert]) in our intuiting or thinking; or rather it is the empty intuiting or thinking itself; and the same empty intuiting or thinking as pure being. – Nothing is consequently the same determination, or rather lack of determination, and thereby in general the same as what pure *being* is.

C. Becoming

1. Unity of Being and Nothing

Pure being and pure nothing are therefore the same. What the truth is, is neither being nor nothing, but rather that being – does not pass over but has passed over – into nothing, and nothing into being. But just as much, the truth is not their lack of differentiation [Ununterschiedenheit], but rather that they are *not the same*, that they are *absolutely different*, though unseparated and inseparable, and that each immediately *vanishes into its opposite*. Their truth is thus this *movement* of the immediate vanishing of the one into the other: *becoming*, a movement in which both

are differentiated, but through a difference [Unterschied] which has just as immediately cancelled [aufgelöst] itself.

2. Moments of Becoming

Becoming – coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be – is the unseparatedness [Ungetrenntheit] of being and nothing. It is not the unity that abstracts from being and nothing. Rather, as the unity *of being and nothing*, becoming is this *determinate* unity, or one in which both being and nothing *are*. But inasmuch as being and nothing are each unseparated from each other, *each is not*. They *are* in this unity, but only as vanishednesses, only as *sublated*. They subside [herabsinken] from their initially represented *independence* [vorgestellten Selbstständigkeit] into *moments* which are *still different* [noch unterschiedenen], but at the same time sublated.

Grasped according their differentiation, each is in it as unity with the *other*. Becoming thus contains being and nothing as *two such unities*, each of which is itself a unity of being and nothing; the one is being as immediate and as relation to nothing; the other is nothing as immediate and as relation to being; the determinations are of unequal value in these unities.

Becoming is in this way in a double determination: in the one determination, nothing is immediate, i.e. it starts from nothing and relates to being, that is, transitions into it; in the other determination, being is immediate, i.e. it starts from being and transitions into nothing – coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.

Both are the same: becoming. And although they are different directions, they interpenetrate and paralyze each other. The one is *ceasing-to-be*: being transitions into nothing. But nothing is just as much the opposite of itself, transition into being, coming-to-be. This coming-to-be is the other direction: nothing turns into being, but being sublates itself and is rather the transition into nothing, is ceasing-to-be. – They do not sublata each other reciprocally [gegenseitig], the one does not sublata the other externally; rather, each sublates itself in itself [an sich selbst] and is on itself [an ihm selbst] its own opposite.

3. Sublation of Becoming

The equilibrium in which coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be are posited, is in the first place becoming itself. But this merges [zusammengeht] into a restful unity. Being

and nothing are within it [in ihm] only as vanishednesses; but becoming *is* only through their differentiation. Their vanishing is therefore the vanishing of becoming, or the vanishing of the vanishing itself. Becoming is an unstable unrest that settles into a restful [ruhiges] result.

This could also be expressed thus: becoming is the vanishing of being into nothing, and of nothing into being, and the vanishing of being and nothing generally. But at the same time it rests on the difference [Unterschiede] between them. It thus contradicts itself within itself [in sich selbst], because what it unites within itself [in sich vereint] are contrary to each other; but such a union destroys itself.

This result is vanishedness [Verschwundensein], but not as *nothing*. Then it would only be a relapse [Rückfall] into one of the already sublated determinations, not the result of nothing *and being*. It is the unity of being and nothing that has become restful simplicity. But the restful simplicity is *being*, no longer for itself [für sich] but as a determination of the whole.

Becoming, thus passing into the unity of being and nothing, which is this unity as *being* [als *seiend*], or has the form of the one-sided *immediate* unity of these moments, is *there-being* [Dasein].

Chapter 2: There-being

There-being is *determinate* being; its determinacy is *being* determinacy [seiende Bestimmtheit], *quality*. Through its quality, *something* is against an *other*, is *alterable* and *finite*, not only contra another, but in it absolutely [schlechthin] negatively determined. This negation [seine Negation] of the finite something is the *infinite*. The abstract opposition in which these determinations appear resolves itself into oppositionless infinity, into for-itself-being [Fürsichsein].

The treatment of there-being thus has these three divisions:

- A. there-being as such,
- B. something and other, finitude,
- C. qualitative infinity.

A. There-being as Such

In there-being

- a. *as such*, its determinacy is first
- b. to be distinguished [unterscheiden] as *quality*. The latter, however, is to be taken equally in the one as in the other determination of there-being, as *reality* [Realität] and as *negation* [Negation]. But in these determinacies, there-being is equally reflected-into-itself [in sich reflectirt]. And posited as such it is
- c. *something*, the therebeing [Daseiendes].

a. There-being in General

There-being goes forth [geht hervor] from becoming. It is the simple one-being [Einssein] of being and nothing. On account of this simplicity, it has the form of an *immediate*. Its mediation, becoming, lies behind it; it has sublated it, and there-being thus appears as a first from which one starts [von dem ausgegangen werde]. There-being is initially in the one-sided determination of *being*. The other determination it contains, *nothing*, will likewise come forth against the first [an ihm hervorthun, gegen jene].

It is not mere being, but *there-being* [Dasein]. Etymologically taken, it is being [Sein] in a certain *place* [da]. But the spatial representation does not belong here. There-

being is, according to its becoming, in general *being* with a *nonbeing* in such a way that this nonbeing is taken up into simple unity with being. *Nonbeing* taken up into being in such a way that the concrete whole is in the form of being, of immediacy, constitutes *determinacy* as such. [Translator's note: the emphasis on *nonbeing* makes this sentence comprehensible.]

The *whole* is likewise in the form, i.e. the *determinacy*, of being. For in becoming, being has likewise shown itself to be only a moment – a sublated, negatively determined one. But it is so *for us in our reflection*, not yet *posited* in it itself [*gesetzt an ihm selbst*]. But what *is* posited, is the determinacy as such of there-being, which is expressed in the 'there' of 'there-being' [the 'da' of 'Dasein']. – The two are always to be clearly differentiated. Only that which is *posited* in a concept belongs to its developmental consideration, to its content. Any determination which is not yet posited in it itself [*an ihm selbst gesetzte*] rather belongs to our reflection, whether it pertains to the nature of the concept itself or is an external comparison. To draw attention to a determinacy of the latter kind can only serve to elucidate or indicate in advance the course which will be displayed in the development itself. That the whole, the unity of being and nothing, is in the *one-sided determinacy* of being, is an external reflection. But in the negation, in *something* and *other* and so on, it will become *posited*. – It was necessary here to call attention to the aforementioned distinction [Unterschied]. But to give an account of everything that may be prompted by reflection would lead us into a prolixity of what must be allowed to transpire in the matter itself. If such reflections facilitate an overview and thereby aid comprehension, they also have the drawback of appearing as unjustified assertions, grounds and foundations of what is to follow. They should be taken for no more than what they are supposed to be, and should be differentiated from what is a moment in the development of the thing itself [*der Sache selbst*].

There-being corresponds to the *being* of the previous sphere. Being, however, is indeterminate and therefore no determinations emerge [*ergeben*] in it. But there-being is determinate being, a *concrete* being. Consequently, several determinations, differentiated relations [*Verhältnisse*] of its moments, immediately arise in it.

b. Quality

Due to the immediacy in which being and nothing are one in there-being, neither oversteps the other. So far as there-being is being [*seiend ist*], so far is it nonbeing, is it determinate. Being is not the *universal*, determinacy not the *particular*.

Determinacy has *not yet detached* itself from being, nor will it ever detach itself. Because the henceforth underlying [zum Grunde liegende] truth is the unity of nothing and being. All further determinations will transpire on this basis [Grunde]. But the relation in which determinacy here stands with being is the immediate unity of both, so that as yet no distinction between them is posited.

The determinacy thus isolated for itself [für sich], as *being* determinacy [*seiende* Bestimmtheit], is *quality* – a very simple, immediate [being?] [ein ganz einfaches, unmittelbares]. *Determinacy* in general is the more universal term which, when it is further determined, can be just as much be quantitative determinacy. Due to this simplicity, there is nothing more to be said about quality.

But there-being, which contains being as much as nothing, is itself the measure [Maßstab] of the one-sidedness of quality as only *immediate* or *being* determinacy [*unmittelbarer* oder *seiender* Bestimmtheit]. It is equally to be posited in the determination of nothing, whereby the immediate or the *being* determinacy [unmittelbare oder die *seiende* Bestimmtheit] is posited as a differentiated, reflected one; the nothing, as the determinate moment of a determinacy [bestimmte einer Bestimmtheit], is equally a reflected one, i.e. a *denial* [Verneinung]. Quality, insofar as it is distinguished as *being* [unterschieden als *seiende* gelte], is *reality* [Realität]; as burdened by a denial [Verneinung], it is *negation* [Negation] in general, still a quality but one that counts as a lack [Mangel] and, further determined, as limit [Grenze], restriction [Schranke].

Both are a there-being [sind ein Dasein], but in *reality*, as quality with the accent of being one that is *being* [eine *seiende* zu sein], the fact is concealed that it contains determinacy and therefore also negation. *Reality* is thus only regarded as something positive [Positives], from which denial [Verneinung], restriction [Beschränktheit], lack [Mangel], are excluded. Negation, taken as bare lack, would be what nothing is; but it is a there-being [ein Dasein], a quality, only determined with a nonbeing.

c. Something

There-being's determinacy has been distinguished as quality. In this quality [an dieser], as there-being quality [als daseiender], the difference *is* [*ist* der Unterschied] – the difference of reality and negation. So far as these differences [Unterschiede] are present [vorhanden] in there-being, so far are they null [nichtig] and sublated [aufgehoben]. Reality itself contains negation, is there-being, not

indeterminate, abstract being. Negation is likewise there-being, not abstract nothing which only ought-to-be [abstract- seynsollende Nichts], but here posited as it is in itself [an sich], as being [als seiend], as belonging to there-being [dem Dasein angehörig]. Thus quality in general is not separate from there-being, which is just determinate, qualitative being.

The sublation of the differentiation [Unterscheidung] is more than a mere withdrawal [Zurücknehmen] and external relinquishment [äusseres Wieder-Weglassen] of it, or more than a simple return [Zurückkehren] to the simple beginning, to there-being as such. The difference [Unterschied] must not be omitted [weggelassen]; for it *is*. The fact of the matter [das Factiche], what is thus present [vorhanden], is there-being in general, the difference in it, and the sublating of this difference. There-being, not differenceless [unterschiedlos] as in the beginning, but as *again* equal to itself *through the sublating of the difference*, the simplicity of there-being *mediated* through this sublating. This sublated-being [Aufgehobensein] of the difference is there-being's own [eigne] determinacy. Therefore it is *within-itself-being* [Insichsein]: there-being is *the therebeing* [Dasein ist Daseiendes], *something* [Etwas].

Something is the *first negation of negation*, as simple being relation-to-self [einfache seiende Beziehung auf sich]. There-being, life, thought, [Dasein, Leben, Denken] and so forth essentially determine themselves as *the therebeing, the living, the thinking* ('I') [zum Daseienden, Lebendigen, Denkenden], and so on. This determination is of the highest importance, if we are not to stop at there-being, life, thought, etc. as generalities – also not at mere *Godhood* (instead of God). In ordinary representation [Vorstellung], *something* rightly counts as *a real* [ein Reelles]. However, *something* is still a very superficial determination. Likewise, *reality* and *negation*, there-being and its determinacy, though no longer the empty being and nothing, still are quite abstract determinations. For this reason they are also the most common expressions, and it is the most philosophically uneducated reflection which makes the most use of them, casts its distinctions in them, and thinks that it thereby has hold of something really good and firm. The negative of the negative is, as *something*, only the very beginning of the subject [Subjects]; – within-itself-being [Insichsein], only as yet quite indeterminate. It determines itself further on, first as a for-itself-being [Fürsichseiendes], and so on, until in the concept [Begriff] it finally obtains the intensity of the subject. At the ground of all these determinations lies the negative unity with itself. In all this, however, care must be taken to distinguish the *first* negation, as negation *in general*, from the second

negation, the negation of the negation, which is concrete, *absolute* negativity, just as the first by contrast is only *abstract* negativity.

Something is *being* [Etwas ist seiend] as the negation of negation; for this is the restoration of the simple relation-to-self; – but the something is thereby just as much the *mediation of itself with itself*. The mediation-of-self-with-self [Vermittlung seiner mit sich selbst] is already present [vorhanden] in the simplicity of something, then even more determinately in for-itself-being [Fürsichsein], subject, etc., and also already in becoming as the quite abstract mediation. Mediation-with-self is *posited* in something insofar as it is determined as the simple *identical* [als einfaches *Identisches*]. – Attention can be drawn to the present-being [Vorhandensein] of mediation in general against the principle of the asserted sheer immediacy of knowledge [Wissens], from which mediation is supposed to be excluded [ausgeschlossen]. But this is not especially necessary, since the moment of mediation is found anywhere and everywhere, in every concept.

This mediation-with-self, which something is *in itself* [an sich], taken only as negation of negation, has no concrete determinations for its sides. Therefore the mediation collapses [fällt zusammen] into the simple unity that is *being*. Something *is*, and *is* therefore also a there-being [ist Daseiendes]. Further, it is *in itself* [an sich] also *becoming*, which, however, no longer has only being and nothing for its moments. One of them, being, is now there-being, and further, a there-being [ist Daseiendes]. The second is likewise also *a* there-being [ein Daseiendes], but determined as the negative of the something – an *other* [Anderes]. The something as becoming is a passing over [übergehen] whose moments are themselves somethings, which therefore is *change* [Veränderung] – a becoming that has already become *concrete*. – The something, however, initially changes only in its concept [in seinem Begriffe]; it is not yet *posited* as mediating and mediated; at first it is only posited as simply preserving [erhaltend] itself in its relation-to-itself, and its negative as an equally qualitative something, just an *other* in general.

B. Finitude

a. Something and other. At first they are mutually indifferent [gleichgültig]; an other is also an immediate there-being [ein unmittelbar Daseiendes], a something. The negation therefore falls outside both. Something is *in itself* [an sich] against [gegen] its *being-for-another* [Sein-für anderes]. But the determinacy also belongs to its *in-itself* [gehört auch seinem Ansich an], and is

b. its *determination*, which equally passes over into *constitution* [Beschaffenheit], which, identical to the determination, constitutes the immanent and at the same time negated being-for-another [Sein-für-anders], the *limit* of the something, which is

c. the immanent determination [immanente Bestimmung] of the something itself, and the something is thus the *finite*.

In the first section, where *there-being* in general was considered, it had, as initially taken up [aufgenommen], the determination of *that which is* [des Seienden; the being]. The moments of its development, quality and something, are therefore of equally affirmative determination. In this section, on the other hand, the negative determination that lies in there-being develops itself, the one which at first was only negation in general, the *first* negation, but is now determined to the point of the *within-itself-being* [In-sichseins] of the something, to the negation of the negation.

a. Something and an Other

1. Something and other are, *first*, both there-beings [Daseiende] or *somethings* [Etwas].

Second, each is equally an *other*. It is indifferent [gleichgültig] which is named first, i.e. which is the *something*. (In Latin, when they occur in a proposition, both are called ‘aliud’, or ‘the one, the other’, *alius alium*; in the case of mutuality, the analogous expression is: *alter alterum*.) If we call one of the there-beings A and the other B, the B is the one initially determined as other. But the A is just as much the other of B. Both are in the same way *other*. The word ‘this’ [Dies] serves to fix the difference [Unterschied], and to fix the something which is to be taken as affirmative. But the ‘this’ also expresses the fact that the differentiating [Unterscheiden] and singling out of the something is a subjective indicating [Bezeichnen], i.e. one that falls outside of the something itself. The whole determinacy falls within this external pointing out [Monstrieren]. Likewise, the expression ‘this’ contains no difference; each and every something is just as much a ‘this’ as any other. We *mean*, with the ‘this’, to express something completely determinate. What gets overlooked is that language, as a work of the intellect, only pronounces universals, but in the form of the *naming* of a single object [Gegenstand]. But the individual [individuelle] name is meaningless in the sense

that it does not express a universal, and for the same reason appears as a merely posited, arbitrary one, just as proper names can be arbitrarily assumed, given, or changed.

The other-being [Anderssein; otherness] therefore appears as a determination foreign to one of the so determined entities [eine dem so bestimmten Dasein], or the other appears *outside* of the one there-being [einen Dasein]. Partly because a there-being [ein Dasein] is first determined as other only through the comparison of a third party; and partly because it is determined to be other only for the sake of the other which is outside it, but is not so for itself [nicht für sich so sey]. At the same time, as has been remarked, it is the case that every there-being [jedes Dasein] determines itself, even for representation [auch für die Vorstellung], equally as an other there-being [ein anderes Dasein], such that there is not one there-being [nicht ein Dasein bleibt] which is determined only as a there-being [ein Dasein] and would thus not be outside of a there-being [ausserhalb eines Daseins] and thus not itself be an other [nicht selbst ein Anderes wäre].

Each of the two is determined as something as well as other, and hereby they are *the same*, and there is still no difference between them at hand [vorhanden]. This *self-sameness* [Diesselbigkeit] of the determinations [Bestimmungen] equally falls only in external reflection, in the *comparison* of both. But as the *other* is first posited, at the same time it is indeed for-itself [für sich] in relation to the something, and yet also *for-itself outside it* [für sich ausserhalb desselben].

Third, the *other* is therefore to be taken as isolated, in relation to itself; is to be taken *abstractly* as other, as the τὸ ἕτερον of Plato, who opposes it to the One [dem Einen] as a moment of totality, and in this way ascribes to *the other* a *nature* of its own. Thus the *other*, taken solely as such, is not other to something else, but other in itself [an ihm selbst], i.e. it is the other of itself [seiner selbst]. – Such an other, so determined, is *physical nature*. It is the *other of spirit* [Geist]. This its determination is at first a sheer relativity, through which is expressed, not a quality of nature itself, but rather only an external relation. But because spirit is the true something, and nature therefore in its self [an ihr selbst] is what it is only in relation to spirit, then, the quality of nature, insofar as it is taken for-itself [für sich], is just this: to be the other in itself [an ihr selbst], i.e. to be being-self-external [Ausser-sich-seiende] (in the determinations of space, time, and matter).

The other for itself [für sich] is the other in itself [an ihm selbst], hence it is the other of itself [seiner selbst] and thus the other of the other. – It is therefore that which is inwardly utterly dissimilar [in sich schlechthin Ungleiche], i.e. that which negates itself, *changes* itself [sich Verändernde]. But in so doing it remains identical to itself, for that into which it changes is *the other*, which has no further determination. But that which changes itself is not determined in any other way than this: to be an other. In this latter, therefore, it *coincides only with itself* [geht nur mit sich zusammen]. It is thus posited as reflected-into-itself with the sublation of other-being, as something *identical* to itself, from which the other-being, which is at the same time a moment of it, is a distinct being that does not come to [zukommendes] to the something itself.

2. The something *preserves* [erhält] itself in its not-there-being [Nichtdasein]. It is essentially *one* with it, and essentially *not one* with it. It thus stands in *relation* to its other-being; it is not purely its other-being. The other-being is at once contained within it and at once *separated* from it; it is *being-for-another* [Sein-für-Anderes].

There-being as such is immediate, relationless; or it is in the determination of *being*. But as including non-being within itself, there-being is *determinate*, inwardly denied being [in sich verneintes Sein], and then firstly an other. – But because it simultaneously maintains itself in its denial, it is only *being-for-another* [Sein-für-Anderes].

It maintains itself in its not-there-being [Nichtdasein], and is being. Not being in general however, but being as relation-to-self *contra* its relation-to-another, as self-equality in contrast to inequality. Such being is *in-itself-being* [Ansichsein].

Being-for-another [Sein-für-Anderes] and in-itself-being [Ansichsein] constitute the *two moments* of something. We have here *two pairs* of determinations: 1) *something* and *other*. 2) *being-for-another* and *in-itself-being*. The former contain the relationlessness of their determinacy: something and other fall outside each other [fallen auseinander]. But their truth is their relation. Being-for-another and in-itself-being are therefore those determinations posited as *moments* of one and the same, as determinations which are relations and remain in their unity, in the unity of there-being. Each thus contains in it, at the same time, also the moment which is diverse from it.

Being and nothing, in their unity which is there-being, are no longer being and nothing – these they are only outside their unity. And thus in their restless unity, in becoming, they are coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. – In something, being is in-itself-being. Being, self-relation, self-equality [Gleichheit mit sich], is now no longer immediate, but is rather self-relation only as the nonbeing [Nichtsein] of other-being [Nichtsein des Andersseins] (as into-itself-reflected there-being [in sich reflectirtes Dasein]). – Likewise with non-being: as a moment of the something, in this unity of being and nonbeing, nonbeing is not not-there-being [Nichtdasein] in general, but an other; and more specifically, seeing as being is *differentiated* from it at the same time, it is *relation* to its not-there-being, being-for-another.

Hence *in-itself-being* is, firstly, negative relation to not-there-being. It has other-being outside it and is contrary [entgegen] to it. Insofar as something is *in-itself* [an sich], it is withdrawn [entnommen] from other-being and being-for-another. But secondly, it also has nonbeing in it; since it is *the nonbeing* of being-for-another.

But being-for-another is, first, negation of the simple relation of being to itself. The latter relation is initially supposed to be [soll] there-being and something. Insofar as something is in-another [in einem Andern] or for-another [für ein Anderes], it dispenses [entbehrt] with its own being. But second, being-for-another is not not-there-being as pure nothing; it is not-there-being that points [hinweist] to in-itself-being as to its inwardly reflected being [in sich reflectirtes Sein]. Just as, conversely, in-itself-being points to being-for-another.

3. Both moments are determinations of one and the same, namely of something. Something is *in itself* [Ansich ist Etwas] insofar as it has turned back [zurückgekehrt] into itself from out of being-for-another. But something also has a determination or circumstance [Umstand] *in itself* [an sich] (here the accent falls on the ‘an’) or *in it* [an ihm] insofar as this circumstance is externally *on it* [äusserlich an ihm], is a being-for-another.

This leads to a further determination. *In-itself-being* and being-for-another are initially diverse [verschieden]. But that something has the same thing *on it* [an ihm] as *what it is in itself* [an sich], and conversely, that what it is as being-for-another [als Sein-für-Anderes], it also is in itself [an sich] – this is the identity of in-itself-being and being-for-another according to the determination that the something itself is one and the same somethings of both moments, and that they are therefore

unseparated within it [in ihm]. – Formally, this identity already arises in the sphere of there-being [Sphäre des Daseins], but more expressly [ausdrücklicher] in the consideration of essence and then in the relation [Verhältnisses] of *internality* and *externality*, and then most determinately in the consideration of the idea, as the unity of the concept [Begriff] and actuality [Wirklichkeit]. – With the expression *in-itself* [Ansich], one means to say something lofty, as with the *inner*; but what something is *only in-itself* [nur ansich ist], is also *only in it* [nur an ihm]. In itself is an only abstract, and therefore external determination. The expressions: there is nothing *in it* [es ist nichts an ihm] or there is something *in that* [es ist etwas daran] imply, though somewhat obscurely, that what is *in something* [was an einem ist] also belongs to its *in-itself-being* [Ansichsein], its inner, true worth.

It may be remarked that we have here the meaning of the *thing-in-itself* [Dings-ansich]. It is a very simple abstraction, though one which for a while was considered a very important determination, something noble as it were, just as the proposition that we do not know what the things in themselves are counted as a valuable piece of wisdom. – Things are called ‘in-themselves’ insofar as all being-for-another has been abstracted from them. In general that means that all determination is thought as nothing. In this sense, one can clearly never know what the thing-in-itself is. For the question *what?* calls for *determinations* to be given. But since the things which are to be specified [anzugeben] are at once supposed to be *things-in-themselves*, and that just means without determination, the question is thus thoughtlessly made impossible to answer, or one can only give an absurd answer. – The thing-in-itself is the same as that absolute of which one knows nothing except that all is one in it. One knows very well, therefore, what is *in* [an] these things-in-themselves: they are nothing but truthless, empty abstractions. But what the thing-in-itself is in truth, what is truly in itself, of this logic is the exposition [Darstellung]. However, in logic the ‘in-itself’ [Ansich] is understood as something better than abstraction, namely what something is in its concept [Begriff]. But this is internally [in sich] concrete; as concept, it is generally comprehensible; and as determined and as connected with its determinations, it is internally [in sich] cognizable [erkennbar].

In-itself-being [Ansichsein; also in this context: implicitness] initially has being-for-another as its contrastive moment, but it is also opposed to posited-being [Gesetztsein; also means: explicitness]. Posited-being also contains being-for-another, but it more specifically contains the accomplished bending-back [geschehene Zurückbeugung] of what is not-in-itself into its in-itself, wherein the not-in-itself is *positive* [positiv]. *In-itself-being* is usually taken as an abstract way of

expressing the concept; *positing* [Setzen] properly falls in the sphere of essence, of objective reflection; the ground *posits* that which is grounded by it; even more, the cause [Ursache] *begets* [hervorbringen] an effect [Wirkung], a there-being [ein Dasein] whose independence [Selbstständigkeit] is *immediately* negated and which has in it [an ihm] the sense of having its being in another *thing* [Sache]. In the sphere of being, there-being *proceeds* [hervorgehen] from becoming; or along with the something an other is posited [gesetzt], along with the finite the infinite is posited. But the finite does not *beget* [hervorbringen] the infinite, the finite does not itself *posit* the infinite. In the sphere of being the *self-determination* of the concept is itself merely *in-itself*, and thus it is called a passing over [Übergehen]. And the reflecting determinations of being, e.g. something and other, or finite and infinite, although they essentially refer [hinweisen] to each other or are as being-for-another, they nevertheless also count as subsisting [bestehend] *qualitatively* for-themselves [für sich]. The other *is*; likewise, the finite also counts as *immediately being* [als unmittelbar seiend] and as for-itself persistent [feststehend], just like the infinite. The meaning of each thus appears to be complete even without its other. In contrast to that, the positive and negative, cause and effect, if they are taken as having being in isolation from each other, at once have no meaning at all without the other. Their seeming-in-each-other [Scheinen in einander], the seeming-of-its-other-in-each [Scheinen seines Andern in jedem], is present [vorhanden] in each of them *in themselves* [an ihnen selbst]. – In the various circles of determination and especially in the progress of the exposition, or more precisely in the progress of the concept's self-exhibition, it is of capital importance to differentiate between what is *in-itself* [an sich] and what is *posited* [gesetzt], between how the determinations are as in-concept and how they are as posited or as being-for-another [seiend-für-anderes]. Such a distinction belongs to dialectical development alone, and is wholly unknown to metaphysical philosophizing, which also includes the critical philosophy. As is the case with their presuppositions, the definitions of metaphysics, their differentiations and what follows from them [Folgerungen], are only intended to assert and beget [hervorbringen] *a being* [Seiendes] and indeed an *in-itself being* [Ansichseiendes].

Being-for-another is, in the unity of something with itself, identical [identisch] with its *in-itself* [seinem Ansich]. The being-for-another is in this way *in* [am] the something. The determinacy thus reflected into itself is therefore once again *simply being* [einfache seiende], and hence again a quality, – the *determination* [die Bestimmung].

b. Determination, Constitution, and Limit

The *in-itself*, into which the something is intro-reflected [in sich reflectiert] from out of its being-for-another [Seins-für-anderes], is no longer the abstract in-itself, but as the negation of its being-for-another it is mediated through this latter, which is thus its moment. It is not only the immediate identity [Identität] of the something with itself, but rather the identity through which what something is *in itself* [an sich] is also *on it* [an ihm; overtly in it]. Being-for-another is *on it* [i.e. on the something overtly] because the *in-itself* [das Ansich] is the sublation of being-for-another, is within itself [in sich] from out of being-for-another. But because it is still abstract and essentially burdened with negation, therefore it is also burdened with being-for-another. We have here not only quality and reality, being determinacy [seiende Bestimmtheit], but rather in-itself-being determinacy [an-sich-seiende Bestimmtheit]. And the development consists in this: to *posit* the determinacy as this intro-reflected determinacy [in sich reflectierte Bestimmtheit].

1. The quality – which in the simple something is the in-itself that is essentially in unity with its other moment, the *on-it-being* [An-ihm-sein] – can be called its *determination* [Bestimmung] so long as this word is precisely distinguished from *determinacy* [Bestimmtheit]. Determination is affirmative determinacy as the in-itself-being [Ansichsein] with which something in its there-being remains in accordance even as it becomes entangled [Verwicklung] with another which would determine it; i.e. maintains itself in its self-equality, prevails [geltend macht] in its being-for-another. It *fulfills* [erfüllt] its determination insofar as the further determinacy – which accrues to it manifoldly through its comportment towards others – becomes its inner fullness [Fülle] in accordance with its in-itself-being. Determination implies [enthält] this: that what something is in itself, is likewise unto it.

The *determination of man* is thinking reason [denkende Vernunft]: thinking in general is its simple *determinacy*, through which man is distinguished from animal. Man has his rational determination *in himself* [an sich] insofar as this determination is differentiated from his being-for-another, his own naturalness and sensuality through which he is in immediate connection [zusammenhängt] with others. But he also has this thinking reason *on him* [an ihm]: man himself is thinking, he *is* there [ist da; is there] as what thinks [als denkend]; thinking is his existence [Existenz] and actuality [Wirklichkeit]. Moreover, since thinking is in his there-being [Dasein], and his there-being is in thinking, thus thinking is *concrete*, i.e. is to be

taken as having inner content [Inhalt] and fulfillment [Erfüllung]. It is thinking reason, and thus is the *determination* of man. But even this determination is again only *in-itself*, as an *ought-to-be* [Sollen]; i.e. the determination, with the fulfillment incorporated [einverleibt] in its in-itself, in the form of the in-itself in general, in contrast [gegen] the there-being which is not incorporated [nicht einverleibt] into it, which at the same time still externally opposed immediate sensuousness and nature.

2. The fulfillment of the in-itself with determinacy is also differentiated from the determinacy [Bestimmtheit] which is only for-another and remains outside the determination [Bestimmung]. For in the field of the qualitative, the differences, in their sublatedness, still retain immediate, qualitative being in contrast to each other. That which the something has *on it* [an ihm] thus partitions [teilt] itself, and on this side is the external there-being of the something, which is also *its* there-being, but which does not belong to its *in-itself-being* [seinem Ansichsein]. – The determination is therefore *constitution* [Beschaffenheit; e.g. Luftbeschaffenheit is air quality, i.e. the constitution of the air; cf. Aristotle's Categories: διάθεσις, disposition or condition; also related: ἕξις, habit, which is a condition that lasts longer and thus has become intrinsic, but that is something more actual than what comes in here; although Hegel does translate ἕξις as Beschaffenheit in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, section on Aristotle's Categories].

Constituted [beschaffen] in such and such a way, something is grasped as subject to external influences and relations [Verhältnissen]. This external relation [Beziehung] – on which the constitution depends, and whereby it becomes determined through another – appears as something accidental [Zufälliges]. But in fact, it is precisely the quality of something, to be exposed [preisgegeben] to this externality, and to have a *constitution*.

Insofar as something changes [sich verändert], the change [Veränderung] thus falls in the constitution. The constitution is that which, *in* [am] the something, becomes other. Something preserves itself in the change; the latter encounters only this unstable surface [unstäte Oberfläche] of its other-being, not its determination.

Determination and constitution are distinguished from each other. Something is indifferent to its constitution according to [nach] its determination. But what something has *on it* [an ihm] is the middle which brings both of these into a syllogism. *In-something* being [Das *Am Etwas* sein], however, shows itself to rather

fall apart into both extremes. The simple middle is the *determinacy* as such, its identity [Identität] belongs as much to determination as to constitution. But the determination all by itself [für sich selbst] passes over into constitution, and constitution into determination. This is implied in what has been said. The connection [Zusammenhang] is more precisely this: insofar as what something is *in itself* is also *in it*, to that extent it is burdened with being-for-another; the determination [Bestimmung] is thus as such open to relation to others [offen dem Verhältniß zu Anderem]. The determinacy [Bestimmtheit] is simultaneously moment, but at once contains qualitative difference of being distinguished from in-itself-being [Ansichsein], the negative of something, of being another being there [ein anderes Dasein]. The determinacy which in this way comprehends the other within itself [in sich fassende] unites with the in-itself-being, brings other-being into the in-itself-being or into the determination [Bestimmung], which is thereby reduced to a constitution. – Conversely, the being-for-another as a constitution isolated and posited for itself [für sich] is on it the same [an ihm dasselbe] as what the other is as such (the other on itself [an ihm selbst], i.e. the other of itself [d.i. seiner selbst]). But in this way it is *self-to-self-relating* there-being [sich auf sich beziehende Dasein], thus in-itself-being with a determinacy, hence *determination*. – Insofar as both are to be held apart, the constitution which appears to be grounded [gegründet] in an externality, in an other in general, also *depends* on the determination [hängt...von der Bestimmung ab], and the foreign determining [Bestimmen] is at the same time determined [bestimmt] by the something's own [eigene], immanent [immanente] determining. But further, the constitution belongs to what the something is in itself [an sich]: something alters [ändert] with its constitution.

This alteration [Aenderung] of the something is no longer the initial change [Veränderung] according to the something's being-for-another. That was only the in-itself-being change [an sich seiende], the change that belongs to inner concepts. Change [Veränderung] is from now on also the change that is posited in the something. – The something itself is determined further, and the negation is posited as immanent to it, as its developed within-itself-being [entwickeltes Insichsein].

The transition of determination and constitution into each other is initially the sublation of their difference, and there-being or something in general is thereby posited. Moreover, since it results from that difference which involves qualitative other-being within itself [in sich], the result is two somethings. But these are not

just others of each other in general, such that the negation would still be abstract and fall in a comparison; rather it is now *immanent* to the something. As *there-being* [daseiend], the somethings are indifferent with respect to each other; but this, their affirmation, is no longer immediate: each relates [bezieht] itself to itself [sich auf sich] *by means of* [vermittelt] the sublation of other-being, which in determination is reflected into the in-itself-being.

In this way, something *from itself* [sich so aus sich] comports [verhält] itself to the other, because other-being is posited in it [an ihm] as its own moment. Its within-itself-being [Insichsein] grasps [befaßt] negation within itself [in sich], by means of which alone it now has its affirmative there-being. But the other is also qualitatively differentiated from the latter, and is thus posited outside the something. The negation of its other is only the quality of the something, because it is something only as the sublation of its other. In this way the other rather confronts a there-being [einem Dasein] itself. The other confronts the first something only externally; or, because they are in fact absolutely [schlechthin] (i.e. in their concepts) connected, therefore their connection is this: that the there-being [das Dasein] *has passed over* into other-being [Anderssein], something passed over into another; the something is just as much an other as the other. Now insofar as within-itself-being is the nonbeing of other-being – which it contains within itself but which is simultaneously differentiated from it – to that extent the something is negation, i.e. the *termination* [Aufhören] *of the other on it* [an ihm]. It is thus posited as negatively related to that other, and thereby preserving [erhaltend] itself. – This other, the internal being [Insichsein] of the something as negation of negation, is its in-itself-being [Ansichsein]. And this sublation is at the same time *in it* [an ihm] as simple negation, namely as its negation of the other, external something. It is *one* [Eine] determinacy of the same, which on the one hand is identical with the within-itself-being of the something, as negation of negation, and on the other hand, since these negations are both other somethings in relation to each other, it consolidates [zusammenschließt] them from out of their mutual other-being, and equally separates [abscheidet] them from each other, each negating the other – the *limit* [Grenze].

3. Being-for-another [Sein-für-anderes] is the indeterminate, affirmative community [Gemeinschaft] of something with its other. In limit, the not-being-for-another [Nichtsein-für-Anderes] is foregrounded, the qualitative negation of the other which is thereby held apart from the into-self-reflected something. The development of this concept is to be seen, a development which shows itself rather

as entanglement and contradiction [als Verwicklung und Widerspruch zeigt]. This is readily present in it because, seeing that it is the intro-reflected negation of the something, the limit *ideally* contains the moment of something and other, and these distinguished moments are at the same time posited in the sphere of there-being as *real* [reell], *qualitatively different*.

α. Something is therefore immediate self-to-self-relating there-being [unmittelbares sich auf sich beziehendes Dasein], and has a limit initially in contrast to an other; this limit is the nonbeing of the other, not the nonbeing of the something itself: something limits its other within itself [es begrenzt in ihr sein Anderes]. – But the other is itself a something in general. Thus, the limit which the something has against the other is also the limit of the other against the something, the limit of the other through which it holds the first something away from itself as *its* other, or it is a *nonbeing of that something*. Limit is therefore not only the nonbeing of the other, but of the something just as much as the other, and thus of *something* in general.

But the limit is essentially just as much nonbeing of the other; thus, through its limit, the something at the same time *is*. Through its limiting, the something is indeed thereby subjected to being limit itself. But its limit, as the termination of the other on it [an ihm], is at once only the being of something. This something *is what it is through the limit, has the quality through its limit*. – This relation [Verhältnis] is the external appearance of the fact that the limit is simple negation, or the *first* negation, and the other is at once the negation of negation, the within-itself-being of the something.

Something is thus, as immediate there-being [als unmittelbares Dasein], the limit in contrast to another something. But it itself has the limit *in its self* [an ihm selbst], and it only is something through the mediation of that limit, which is equally its nonbeing. The limit is the mediation [Vermittlung] through which something and other *are* as well as *are not*.

β. Now insofar as something, in its limit, both *is* and *is not*, and these moments are an immediate, qualitative difference, to that extent the there-being and not-there-being of the something fall outside each other. Something has its there-being *outside* (or as one also imagines it, *inside*) its limit. In the same way, the other, too, because it is something, has its limit outside it. The limit is the *middle between* the

two, wherein they terminate. They have *there-being* in the *beyond* of each other, in the beyond of *their limit*. The limit as the nonbeing of each is the other of both.

– According to this differentiation of the something from its limit, the *line* appears as line only outside its limit, the point; the *plane* appears as plane only outside the line; the *solid* [Körper, body] as solid only outside its limiting plane. – This is the aspect [Seite] of limit that first occurs [fällt] to representation – representation is the outside-itself-being of the concept – and likewise how it is usually taken with respect to spatial objects.

γ. Furthermore, the something as it is outside the limit is the unlimited something, which is just there-being in general. Thus it is not distinguished from its other; it is only there-being and thus it and its other have the same determination [Bestimmung]; each is only something in general or each is only other; and thus both are the *the same*. But this, their initially immediate there-being, is now posited with the determinacy as limit, in which both of them are what they are, distinct from each other. The limit is thus their *common* [gemeinschaftliche] differentiation, the unity and the differentiation of them, as with there-being. This double identity of the two, there-being and limit, contains this: that something has its there-being only in its limit; and because the limit and the immediate there-being are both simultaneously the negative of each other, the something which now only is in its limit equally partitions [trennt] itself from itself, points beyond itself to its nonbeing and declares [ausspricht] that as its being; and in doing so it passes over into it. To apply this to the preceding example: the one designation is that something is what it is only through its limit. – Therefore, the *point* is not just the limit of the *line* in such a way that the line terminates in the point and has there-being outside it; – the *line* is not just the limit of the *plane* such that the plane just terminates in the line; and the same holds for the *plane* as limit of the *solid*. Rather, the line also *begins* in the point; the latter is its absolute beginning. And if the line is represented as unlimited on both sides or, as is said, extends to infinity, the point still constitutes its *element* [Element], as the line is the element of the plane, and the plane of the solid. These *limits* are *principles* of that which they limit; just as the one [das Eins], e.g., is, as the hundredth, the limit but also the element of the whole hundred.

The other determination [Bestimmung] is the unrest of the something in its limit in which it is immanent, the *contradiction* that propels [hinausschickt] it beyond itself. Likewise, the point is the dialectic of itself becoming line; the line the dialectic of

becoming plane; the plane, of becoming total space. A second definition of line, plane, and total space is given, such that the line comes to be [entsteht] through the *movement* of the point, the plane through the movement of the line, etc. This *movement* of point, line, etc., is, however, viewed as something only accidental or only represented. This view, however, is retracted [zurückgenommen] by the fact that the designations from which line, etc. are supposed to originate, are their *elements* and *principles*. And these are, at the same time, nothing else but their limits; the coming-to-be is not considered as accidental or merely represented. The fact that point, line, plane, are for-self self-contradictory [für sich, sich widersprechend] beginnings, which repel themselves from themselves, and the point thus passes over from itself into the line through its own concept, *moves itself in itself* [sich an sich bewegt] and makes the line come to be, etc. – all this lies in the concept of the limit which is immanent to the something. The application itself, however, belongs to the treatment of space. As an indication of it here, we may say that the point is the totally abstract limit, but *within a there-being* [in einem Dasein]; this there-being is still taken as utterly indeterminate; it is the so-called absolute – that is, abstract – *space*, the utterly continuous outside-each-other-being [Aussereinandersein]. Inasmuch as the limit is not abstract negation but is rather *within this there-being* [in diesem Dasein], inasmuch as the limit is *spatial* determinacy, to that extent the point is spatial, is the contradiction of abstract negation and continuity, as is for that reason the transition as it occurs, and has already occurred, into the line and so forth. And so there *is* no point, just as there is no line or plane.

Something, posited with its immanent limit, as the contradiction of itself, through which it is pointed and driven beyond itself, is the *finite*.

c. Finitude

There-being is determinate. Something has a quality, and in this quality it not only determinate, but limited. Its quality is its limit, burdened with which it initially remains affirmative, restful there-being. But this negation develops in such a way that the opposition between its there-being and the negation as limit immanent in it, is itself the inwardness [Insichsein] of the something, and this is therefore only becoming in the thing itself [Werden an ihm selbst sei], constitutes its finitude.

When we say of things, *that they are finite*, it is understood that they not only have a determinacy; that their quality is not only reality and in-itself-being

[ansichseiende] determination; that they are not merely limited and thus would still have there-being outside their limits, – but rather that nonbeing thoroughly constitutes their nature, their being [ihr Sein]. Finite things *are*, but their relation to themselves is that they related themselves negatively to themselves, though in this self-relation they send [hinauszuschicken] themselves beyond themselves, beyond their being [ihr Sein]. They *are*, but the truth of this being is their *end* [Ende]. The finite [Das Endliche] does not merely change [verändert sich] like the something in general, but rather it *perishes* [vergeht; also: ceases-to-be]. And its perishing is not a bare possibility, so that it could be that it does not perish. Rather, the being of finite things as such is that they have the germ [Keim] of perishing [Vergehens] as their inward being [Insichsein]. The hour of their birth is the hour of their death.

α. The Immediacy of Finitude

The thought of the finitude of things brings with it this sorrow, because finitude is qualitative negation driven to its apex; and in the simplicity of such determination [Bestimmung] there *is* no longer left to things an affirmative being *distinct* from their determination [Bestimmung] as destined to ruin [Untergange]. Finitude is the most stubborn category of the intellect due to this qualitative simplicity of negation, which has returned to the abstract opposition of nothingness [Nichts] and transience [Vergehen] to being. Negation in general, constitution, limit, are tolerant [vertragen] of their other, of there-being. Even the abstract nothingness is for-itself [für sich] abandoned as an abstraction. But finitude is *intrinsically fixed* [an sich fixiert] negation, and thus stands in stark contrast to its affirmative. The finite can be brought into flux [Fluß] in this way; it is this: to be destined to its end, but only to its end. – It is rather the refusal to affirmatively bring itself to its affirmative, the infinite, to let itself be connected [verbinden] with it. It is thus posited as inseparable from its nothing, and thereby cut off from all atonement [Versöhnung] with its other, the affirmative. The determination [Bestimmung] of finite things does not go past their *end*. The intellect perseveres [verharret] in this sorrow [Trauer] of finitude by making nonbeing into the determination of things, making nonbeing *imperishable* and *absolute* [unvergänglich und absolut]. The perishability [Vergänglichkeit] of things can only perish [vergehen] in other if then, in the affirmative. So their finitude is separated from them. But is their unchanging quality, i.e. the quality which does not go over into their other, into their affirmative. *So finitude is eternal.*

This is a very important consideration. But that the finite is absolute is definitely not a standpoint that any philosophy, outlook [Ansicht], or understanding [Verstand] would willingly impose on itself. Rather, the opposite [Gegenteil] is expressly present in the assertion [Behauptung] of finitude: the finite is restricted, transient; the finite is *only* the finite, not the everlasting. This lies immediately in its determination and expression. But it all depends on whether one insists on *the being of finitude* [in der Ansicht *beym Sein der Endlichkeit* beharrt wird], i.e. that *transience* [Vergänglichkeit] persists [bestehen bleibt]; or whether *transience* and *perishing* [Vergehen] themselves *perish*? The fact that this perishing of the perishing does not happen, is precisely the view of the finite which makes *perishing* the *finality* [Letzten, as in Letztes Gericht, 'last judgment'] of the finite. The emphatic contention is that the finite and the infinite are incompatible [unverträglich] and disparate [unvereinbar], that finite and infinite are utterly opposed. To the infinite is ascribed being, absolute being; over against it the finite is retained as its negative. Disparate with the infinite, the finite thus remains absolute on its own side. If it received affirmation from the infinite it would thus perish. But such a union is precisely what is professed to be impossible. If it is supposed not to persist in the face of the infinite, but to perish, then as we said before its very perishing is the finality [das Letzte], not the affirmative which would only be the perishing of the perishing. But if the finite were to not perish [vergehen] in the infinite, if its end [Ende] were to be grasped as *nothingness* [Nichts], we would then be back at that first abstract nothing which has itself long ago passed away [vergangen].

However, with this nothingness – which is supposed to be *merely* nothingness and to which an existence [Existenz] in thinking, representing, or speaking, is simultaneously granted – this same contradiction comes up [kommt vor] as was just stated with the finite; except that there the contradiction just *comes up* [vorkommt], whereas in the finite it is *explicit* [ausdrücklich ist]. There it appears as subjective; here it is asserted that the finite is *perpetually opposed* to the infinite [*stehe perennirend dem Unendlichen entgegen*], that it *is* in itself null and void, and that it is *as* in itself null and void. This is to be brought to consciousness. And the development of the finite shows that it collapses in itself [an ihm] as this contradiction, but actually resolves it [wirklich auflöst] to the point that it is not only transient [vergänglich] and perishes [vergeht], but rather that transience [Vergehen], nothingness, is not final [nicht das Letzte ist] but rather perishes [vergeht].

ß. Restriction and the Ought

This contradiction is indeed abstractly present in the fact that the *something* is finite, or that the finite *is*. But *something* or being is no longer posited as abstract, but rather intro-reflected and developed as inner being [Insichsein], which has a determination [Bestimmung] and a constitution [Beschaffenheit] in it [an ihm], and then more determinately that it has a limit in it [an ihm] which, *qua* immanent to the something and constituting [ausmachend] the quality of its internality [Insichseins], is the finite. Now it is to be seen what sort of moments are contained in this concept of the finite something.

Determination and constitution offered themselves as *sides* for external reflection. The former, however, already contained other-being as belonging to the *in-itself* of the something. On the one hand, the externality of other-being is within [in] the something's own inwardness [Innerlichkeit]; on the other hand, it remains as an externality which is differentiated from inwardness, is still externality as such yet is *in* [an] the something. Furthermore, since other-being is determined as *limit*, and limit as negation of negation, the other-being immanent in the something is posited as the relation [Beziehung] of the two sides, and the unity of the something with itself (to which the determination and the constitution both belong) is its relation turned back on itself [seine gegen sich selbst gekehrte Beziehung], the relation of its in-itself-being determination [an sich seienden Bestimmung] to the limit immanent in the something, a relation in which this immanent limit is negated. The self-identical inner being [Insichsein] relates itself to itself as to its own nonbeing, but as negation of negation, as negating the nonbeing which simultaneously retains there-being within it [Dasein in ihm behält], for it is the quality of its inner being [Insichseins]. The something's own limit, thus posited by it as a negative which is at once essential [wesentlich], is not merely limit [Grenze] as such, but *restriction* [Schranke]. But restriction is not the only thing posited as negative: negation is double-edged [zweischneidig] in that what it posits as negated is *limit*. Namely, this is in general the commonality [das Gemeinschaftliche] of the something and the other, and also the determinacy [Bestimmtheit] of the in-itself-being [Ansichsein] of determination [Bestimmung] as such. This in-itself-being [Ansichsein], therefore, as the negative relation to its limit (which is also distinguished from it), to itself as restriction, is the *ought* [Sollen].

In order for the limit, which is in every something, to be a restriction, the something must simultaneously *transcend* it within itself [in sich] – the something must in itself [an ihm selbst] relate to its limit *as to a nonbeing*. The there-being of something lies restfully indifferent, as it were, *alongside* [neben] its limit.

But something only transcends its limit insofar as it is the sublatedness of the limit, the negative in-itself-being in contrast to it. And inasmuch as the limit is as a restriction in the *determination* itself, the something thereby *transcends itself*.

The ought thus contains the double determination [Bestimmung]: *at one time*, as an in-itself-being determination [ansichseiende Bestimmung] contra the negation; *at the other time*, as a nonbeing which as restriction is differentiated from the determination, but is at the same time an intrinsic determination.

The finite has thus determined itself as the relation of its determination to its limit. In this relation, the former is the *ought* and the limit is the *restriction*. Thus, both are moments of the finite, and thus both are finite, ought as well as restriction. But restriction alone is the finite as *posited*; the ought is only in-itself, and thus for-us, restricted. It is restricted by virtue of its relation to its already immanent limit, but this its restriction [Beschränkung] is enveloped [eingehüllt] in the in-itself [Ansichsein], for according its there-being [Dasein] (i.e. according to its determinacy against the restriction) it is posited as in-itself-being [Ansichsein].

What ought to be *is*, and at the same time *is not*. If it *were*, then it would not be what merely *ought to be*. Thus the ought essentially [wesentlich] has a restriction. This restriction is not foreign to it; *what merely* ought-to-be is the *determination* [Bestimmung] which is now posited as it is in fact, as at the same time only a determinacy.

The in-itself of the something in its determination thus reduces itself to the *ought* because the very thing that constitutes its in-itself is in one and the same respect a *nonbeing*; and indeed in such a way that in the inner-being [Insichsein] (the negation of negation) the aforementioned in-itself [Ansichsein], as one of the negations (the one that negates), is a unity with the other, which at the same time, as qualitatively other, is a limit by virtue of which that unity is a *relation* to it [the negation?]. The restriction of the finite is not something external [ein Äußeres]; rather, the finite's own determination [Bestimmung] is also its restriction; and this restriction is both itself and the ought; the restriction is that which is common to both, or rather that in which the two are identical [identisch].

As an ought, however, the finite now *transcends* its restriction [geht über hinaus]; the same determinacy which is its negation is also sublated, and is thus its in-itself-being [Ansichsein]; its limit is also not its limit.

As an ought, the something is thus *elevated* [erhaben] *above its restriction*, but conversely it only has its *restriction* as an *ought*. Both are inseparable. Something has a restriction insofar as it has negation in its determination, and the determination is also the sublated being [Aufgehobensein] of the restriction.

γ. Transition of the Finite into the Infinite

The ought contains, for-itself, restriction; and restriction contains the ought. Their relation to each other is the finite itself, which contains both of them in its inner being [Insichsein]. These moments of its determination are themselves qualitatively opposed. Restriction is determined as the negative of the ought, and the ought equally as the negative of the restriction. The finite is thus internally [in sich] the contradiction of itself. It sublates itself [hebt sich auf], perishes [vergeht]. But this its result, the negative in general, is α) its very *determination*; for it is the negative of the negative. Thus, in perishing, the finite has not perished in the perishing: it has initially become only *another* finite, which however is likewise perishing [Vergehen] as transition [Übergehen] into another finite, and so on to *infinity* [ins Unendliche]. But β) if this result is considered more closely, the finite has, in its perishing [Vergehen], in the negation of itself, obtained its in-itself-being [sein Ansichsein erreicht]. And therein it has *coincided with itself* [mit sich selbst zusammengegangen]. Each of its moments contains this result: the ought transcends its restriction, transcends itself; but its beyond or other is only the restriction itself. The restriction, however, immediately points beyond itself to its other, which is the ought; this, however, is the same diremption [Entzweyung] of *in-itself-being* [Ansichseins] and *there-being* [Daseins] as is the restriction. In going beyond itself it simply coincides with itself. This *self-identity*, the negation of negation, is affirmative being [affirmatives Sein], thus the other of the finite, which is supposed to have the first negation for its determinacy. – This other is *the infinite*.

C. Infinity

Infinity in its simple concept can in the first place be regarded as a new definition of the absolute. It is determinationless relation-to-self posited as *being* and *becoming*. The forms of *there-being* fall outside the series of determinations [Bestimmungen] that can be regarded as definitions of the absolute, since the forms of that sphere are for themselves [für sich] immediately posited only as determinacies [Bestimmtheiten], as finite determinacies in general. But the infinite surely counts

as absolute, since it is expressly [ausdrücklich] determined as the negation of the finite. And hence the restrictedness [Beschränktheit] – to which being and becoming could still be susceptible [fähig] even if in themselves [an ihnen] they do not have or show the restrictedness – is both expressly related to the restrictedness, and also negated in it [an ihm].

But this does not mean that the infinite is in fact already removed [entnommen] from limitation and finitude. The main thing is to distinguish the true concept of infinity from that of spurious [schlechten] infinity, i.e. the infinite of reason from that of the intellect. The latter is in fact a *finitized* [verendlichte] infinite. And, as we shall see, in trying to keep the infinite pure and distant from the finite, the infinite is by that very fact finitized.

The infinite is

- a. in its *simple determination* [Bestimmung], the affirmative as negation of the finite;
- b. but thereby in *reciprocal determination* [Wechselbestimmung] with the finite, and is the abstract, *one-sided infinite*;
- c. the self-sublation of this infinite and of the finite in *one process* [Ein Proceß], – is the *true infinite*.

a. Infinity in General

Infinity is the negation of negation, the affirmative, the *being*, which has again restored itself from out of restrictedness. The infinite *is*, and in a more intense [intensiverem] sense than the first, immediate being. It is the true being; the elevation [Erhebung] out of restriction. At the name of the infinite, the light of the mind [Gemüt] and spirit [Geist] *dawns* [geht auf], for in the infinite, spirit no longer abstractly *is* with itself [*ist* darin nicht nur abstract bey sich], but rather elevates [erhebt] itself up to itself, to the light of its thinking, its universality, its freedom.

What is first given for the concept of infinity is this: that there-being in its in-itself-being [Ansichsein] is determined as finite, and goes beyond [hinausgeht] restriction. It is the nature of the finite to transcend itself, to negate its negation and become infinite. Consequently, the infinite does not stand as something for-itself ready [für sich fertiges] *above* [über] the finite, as if the finite lingered [sein Bleiben hätte] *outside* or *under* it. Nor is it *we* only who, as subjective reason, go beyond the finite to the infinite. As if, when one says that the infinite is a concept of reason

[Vernunftbegriff] and that we elevate ourselves beyond the temporal through reason, we did this without prejudice to the finite, which has nothing to do with this elevation that remains external to it. On the contrary, insofar as the finite elevates itself up to the infinite, it is for that reason not an alien force [Gewalt] that does this; it is rather the nature of the finite itself to relate itself to itself as restriction (as well as restriction as such and the ought) and to transcend beyond this; or rather, as self-relation, to have negated it to be beyond it. It is not in the abrogation [Aufheben] of finitude in general that the infinite in general comes to be; rather, finitude is just this: to become infinite by its very nature. The infinite is its *affirmative determination* [affirmative Bestimmung], that which is in-itself true.

The finite has thus vanished into the infinite and what *is*, is only the infinite.

b. Reciprocal Determination [Wechselbestimmung] of Finite and Infinite

The infinite *is*; in this immediacy it is at once the *negation* of an *other*, the finite. Thus, as *being* [seiende] and at the same time as the *nonbeing* of another, the infinite has relapsed [zurückgefallen] into the category [Kategorie] of something as a determinate in general, more precisely because it is intro-reflected there-being, or there-being resulting from the sublation of determinacy in general, and hence is *posited* as there-being that is distinguished from its determinacy – infinity has relapsed into the category of something with a limit. According to this determination, the finite stands over against the infinite as *real there-being* [reales Dasein]. They thus stand in qualitative *relation* as remaining separate from each other. The *immediate being* of the infinite reawakens [wieder erweckt] the *being* [Sein] of its negation, the finite, which at first seemed to have vanished in the infinite.

But the infinite and finite are not only these relational categories. The two sides are determined further than the point of their being bare *others* with respect to each other. The finite is namely the restriction posited as restriction; it is there-being posited with the *determination* [Bestimmung] to transition [überzugehen] into its *in-itself-being* [Ansichsein], to *become* infinite. Infinity is the nothingness [Nichts] of the finite, finitude's *in-itself-being* [Ansichsein] and *ought* [Sollen], but this simultaneously as intro-reflected, as the executed [ausgeführte] ought, the entirely affirmative being [ganz affirmatives Seyn] that refers itself only to itself. In infinity we have the satisfaction that all determinacy, change [Veränderung], restriction, and along with it the ought, have disappeared, are sublated, and the nothingness of

the finite is posited. Intrinsicity [Ansichsein] is determined as this negation of the finite, which as the negation of negation is thus inwardly [in sich] affirmative. This affirmation, however, is qualitative *immediate* self-relation: *being*; thereby, infinity is reduced [zurückgeführt] to the category [Kategorie] that it has finitude as an other in opposition to itself. Its negative nature is posited as the *being* negation [die *seiende*], and hence as the first and immediate negation. Infinity is thus burdened with opposition to the finite, which, as other, remains the determinate, real there-being even though in its in-itself-being [Ansichsein], in the infinite, it is posited as sublated. This infinite is the not-finite; – a being [ein Sein] in the determinacy of negation. Contrasted with the finite, with the circle [Kreis] of being [seienden] determinacies, of realities [Realitäten], the infinite is the indeterminate emptiness, the beyond [Jenseits] of the finite, which does not have its in-itself-being [Ansichsein] in its there-being [Dasein], which is a determinate one [das ein bestimmtes ist].

As thus posited in contrast to the finite (the two connected as qualitatively related others), the infinite is called the *bad infinity* (Schlecht-Unendliche), the infinity of the *intellect*, for which it counts as the highest, as absolute truth. The task is to bring the intellect to consciousness of the fact that, though it believes it has attained satisfaction [Befriedigung] and the atonement of truth [Versöhnung der Wahrheit] in this kind of infinity, it has rather found itself in the unatoned [unversöhnten], unresolved [unaufgelösten], absolute contradiction; and this consciousness must be effectuated [bewirken] in the intellect by these contradictions themselves, the very same that the intellect encounters on all sides whenever it embarks on the application and explication of these categories that belong to it.

This contradiction is readily present in the fact that, opposite the infinite, the finite remains standing as there-being. There are therefore two determinacies [Bestimmtheiten]: there are two worlds, an infinite one and a finite one, and in their relationship the infinite is merely the limit of the finite, and is therefore only a determinate *and thus finite infinite*.

This contradiction develops its content into more explicit forms [ausdrücklichem Formen]. – The finite is the real [reale] there-being which persists as such even when it has passed over [übergegangen] into its nonbeing, the infinite. – As we have seen, this infinite has for its determinacy, in relation to the finite, only the first, immediate negation; just as the finite, as negated, has in relation to this negation only the meaning of an *other* and is, therefore, still a something. When the intellect,

which rises from this finite world, ascends [aufsteigt] to its highest, to the infinite, thus the finite world remains for it as a this-side [Disseits]; and, thus posited only *above* [über] the finite, the infinite is *separated* [abgesondert] from the finite and the finite from the infinite. Each is *placed in a difference location* [an einen verschiedenen Platz gestellt]; – the finite as local there-being [hiesige Dasein], but the infinite indeed as the *in-itself* [das Ansich] of the finite, though as a beyond [Jenseits], in the obscure, unreachable distance [trübe, unerreichbare Ferne], *outside* which there is located the remaining finite.

Separated in this way, they are just as essentially *related* [bezogen] to each other through the very negation that separates [abscheidende] them. This negation that relates them (the intro-reflected somethings) is the mutual limit of the one against the other; and indeed in such a way that each of them not only has it against the other *on it* [an ihm], but the negation is rather the *in-itself-being* [Ansichsein] of each. Each thus has the limit in itself [an ihm selbst] for itself [für sich] in its separation from the other. But the limit is just the first negation; both are thus limited, intrinsically finite [an sich selbst]. Yet, as each affirmatively relates itself to itself, each is also the negation of its limit. Each thus immediately repels the negation from itself as its non-being; and, qualitatively separated [getrennt] from it, posits it as an *other being* [ein anderes Sein] outside it: the finite posits its nonbeing as this infinite; and likewise the finite. It will be readily conceded that the finite transitions to the infinite necessarily (i.e. through its determination [Bestimmung]), and is thereby elevated [erhoben] to in-itself-being [Ansichsein], because while the finite is indeed determined as subsisting there-being [bestehendes Dasein], yet it is *also* the *in itself* null [das an sich nichtige] and therefore determined [Bestimmung] to dissolution [auflösende]; whereas the infinite, though burdened with negation and limit, is at once also determined as being *in itself* [als das Ansich seiende], such that this abstraction of self-relating affirmation constitutes its determination [Bestimmung], and hence finite there-being is not in it [nicht in ihr liege]. But it has already been shown that the infinite itself results in affirmative being only *through mediation with* [vermittelt] negation, as the negation of negation, and that when this affirmation is taken as simple qualitative being, the negation contained in it is debased [herabsetzt] to simple immediate negation, and therefore to determinacy and limit. And then these are posited as excluded from it because contradicting its in-itself-being [Ansichsein], as not belonging to it but rather as opposed to its in-itself-being [Ansichsein], as the finite. Since each is – in itself and out of its determination [an ihm selbst und aus seiner Bestimmung] – the positing of its other, they are *inseparable*. But this their unity is *concealed* [verborgen] in their

qualitative *other-being*; it is the *inner* [innerliche] unity, one which is *only lies their ground* [nur zu Grunde liegt].

The manner [Weise] of the appearance of this unity has thus been determined. The unity is posited in *there-being* as a turning over [Umschlagen] or transition of the finite into the infinite, and vice-versa; and this such that the infinite only *emerges* [hervortrete] in the finite, and the finite in the infinite, the other in the other. That is, each has its own immediate arising [Entstehen] in [an] the other immediately, and their relation is only an external one.

The process of their transformation has the following, detailed shape [Gestalt]. The finite has transcended [hinausgegangen] into the infinite. This transcending appears as an external deed [Thun]. In this emptiness beyond the finite, what arises [entsteht]? What is the positive in it? By virtue of the inseparability of the infinite and the finite (or because this infinite, which stands on its own side, is itself restricted), the limit arises [entsteht]. The infinite has disappeared and the other, the finite, has entered [eingetreten]. But this entrance [Eintreten] of the finite appears as something happening external to the infinite, and the new limit appears as some such that does not come to be out of the infinite itself, but is rather discovered [vorgefunden]. We have thus relapsed [Rückfall] into the previous determination [Bestimmung], which has been sublated in vain. But this new limit is itself only such as to be sublated or transcended. And so there arises another emptiness, the nothing, in which just as equally the same determination, another limit, is encountered – *and so on to infinity*.

What is present here is the *reciprocal determination of finite and infinite*. The finite is finite only in relation to the ought or the infinite; and the infinite is only infinite in relation to the finite. They are inseparable and at once utterly other to each other. Each has the other of itself in it [an ihm]; and thus each is the unity of itself and its other; and each in its determinacy is there-being – *not to be* what it is itself and what its other is.

It is this reciprocal determination which negates itself and its negation, and which appears [auftritt] as the *progress to infinity*, which in so many forms and applications [Gestalten und Anwendungen] is accepted [gilt] as an *ultimate* [Letztes] at which thought, having reached this ‘and so on to infinity’, has usually achieved its end. – This progress appears [tritt] everywhere that *relative* determinations [Bestimmungen] are driven into opposition, so that, though they are in inseparable

unity, each is nevertheless assigned an independent [selbstständiges] there-being against the other. This progress is therefore the *contradiction* which is not resolved but is rather always pronounced as *present* [vorhanden].

We have an abstract transcendence at hand, which remains incomplete because *this transcendence* is itself *not transcended*. The infinite is present. Of course, this infinite is transcended, for another limit is posited, but just for that reason a reversion [zurückgekehrt] to the finite is made. The spurious infinite is intrinsically [an sich] the same as the perennial *ought*: it is indeed the negation of the finite, but in truth it is unable to free itself from it; the finite constantly reemerges *in it itself* [an ihm selbst] as its other because this infinite only is *in relation to* the finite, its other. The progress to infinity is thus only a repetitive monotony, one and the same boring *alternation* [Abwechslung] of finite and infinite.

The infinity of the infinite progress remains burdened with the finite as such, and is thereby limited, and thus *finite*. In fact, however, it is thereby posited as the unity of the finite and the infinite. Only, this unity is not reflected upon. And yet it alone elicits [hervorruft] the finite in the infinite and the infinite in the finite; it is so to speak driving impulse [Triebfeder] of the infinite progress. This progress is the *outside* of this unity, at which representation remains fixed, at that perennial repetition [Wiederholung] of one and the same alternation; at the empty unrest of the continuation over and beyond the limit into infinity, which *finds* a new limit in it but is just as unable to stop at it as at the infinite. This infinite has the firm determination [Determination] of a *beyond* [Jenseits; that-side], which cannot be reached, because it is not *supposed* to be reached, because the determinacy of the beyond, the *being* negation [seienden Negation] is not relinquished [abgelassen]. According to this determination [Bestimmung], the infinite has the finite as a *this-side* [Diesseits] over against it; a finite which is likewise unable to raise itself up to the infinite because it has the determination of an *other*, of a *there-being* [erzeugenden Dasein] that perennially regenerates itself in its beyond, a beyond from which it is distinct.

c. Affirmative Infinity

In this reciprocal determination of the finite and the infinite which has just been indicated, in the passing back and forth of one into the other, the truth of them is already implicitly [an sich] *present* [vorhanden]; and all that is needed is to take up what is there. This reciprocal transition constitutes the external realization [äussere

Realisation] of the concept. In this realization the concept's content is *posited*, but *externally*, as falling *asunder*. All that is needed is to compare these two different moments in which the *unity* is produced [ergibt], which the concept gives itself. – The *unity* of the finite and the infinite – as has often been remarked already but is especially to be borne in mind here – is the skewed [schieffe] expression for the unity as it is in truth. But the elimination, too, of this skewed determination [Bestimmung] must lie in the externalization of the concept that is now before us.

Taken in its first, most immediate determination [Bestimmung], the infinite is the *transcending* of the *finite*. According to its determination, it is the negation of the finite. The finite is therefore only that which must be transcended, the negation of it in itself [an ihm selbst], which is infinity. Thus, in *each one* lies the *determinacy* of the *other*, whereas according to the view of infinite progress the two are supposed to be excluded from each other, and thus would follow each other alternately [abwechselnd]. Neither can be posited and grasped [gefaßt] without the other, the infinite not without the finite, and that not without the infinite. When it is *said* what the infinite is, namely the negation of the *finite*, so the finite is at the same time *enunciated* [ausgesprochen]; it cannot be *dispensed with* [entbehrt] in the determination of the infinite. One need only *to know what is being said* in order to find the designation of the finite in the infinite. For its part, the finite is readily conceded to be null, but even its nothingness is infinite, which is inseparable from it. – Grasped in this way, they may seem to be taken according to how each *relates* to its *other*. But if they are taken as *without relation* to each other, so that they are only connected [verbunden] by 'and', they each thus stand independently confronting each other. It is to be seen how they are constituted [beschaffen] in this way. The infinite thus placed is *one of the two*; but, as *only one* of the two it is therefore itself finite, i.e. not the whole but only a single side; it has its limit in that which confronts it. It is thus the *finite infinite*. There are only *two finites* present. It is precisely this *detachment* [abgesondert] of the infinite from the finite, its placement on *one side*, that makes the infinite finite and thus also unites it with the finite. – The finite, for its part, placed for-itself as removed [entfernt] from the infinite, is *this relation-to-self* in which relativity, dependence [Abhängigkeit], and transience are removed. It is the same independence [Selbstständigkeit] and affirmation of itself which the infinite is supposed to be.

Both paths of consideration – though they at first seem to have divergent determinacies for their starting points, insofar as the first is a *relation* of the infinite and finite to each other, each to the other, and the second, their complete

detachment [Abgesonderung] from each other – nevertheless yield one and the same result. The infinite and the finite – according to their mutual *relation* which would be external but is in fact essential to them (for without it, neither is what it is) – each contains its other in its own determination [Bestimmung]; just as each, when each is taken for-itself, considered *unto it*, each has its other within it [in ihm] as its own moment.

This yields the – scandalous [verruffene] – unity of the finite and infinite. The unity which is itself infinite, which grasps together both itself and the finite. The infinite therefore, understood in a sense other than when the finite is severed [abgetrennt] from it and placed on the other side. Since they must now be also distinguished, each is, as shown, in-it [an ihm] the unity of both; this thus yields two such unities. The common element [Gemeinschaftliche], as the unity of both determinacies, posits them at first as negated, for each is what it is by being differentiated. In their unity, therefore, they lose their qualitative nature – an important reflection for countering the incorrigible [die sich nicht davon losmachenwill] habit of representing the infinite and finite, in their unity, as still retaining the quality they would have if held separately; of seeing in that unity nothing but contradiction, and thus also not the resolution of the contradiction through the negation of their qualitative determinacy. And thus is the initially simple and universal unity of the infinite and finite, falsified [verfälscht].

Furthermore, since the two are now to be taken as distinguished, thus the unity of the infinite, which is itself both of these moments, is determined in a different mode [Weise] in each. The infinite, according to its determination, has in it [an ihm] the differentiated finite; in this unity the infinite is the *in-itself* [das Ansich] while the finite is only determinacy, limit in the infinite. But such a limit is the absolute other of the infinite, its opposite. The infinite's determination, which is intrinsic-being [An-sich-sein] as such, is corrupted [verdorben] by being saddled [Beyschlag] with a quality of this sort. It is thus a *finitized infinite*. Likewise, since the finite is as such merely the not-intrinsic-being [Nicht-ansichsein], but according to this unity at once has its opposite in it, it is thus elevated above its worth and, so to speak, infinitely elevated. It is thus posited as the *infinite* finite.

In the same way as the simple unity before, the intellect also falsifies the double unity of the infinite and finite. This happens here too because the infinite is taken in one of the two unities not as negated but rather as intrinsic-being [An-sich-sein], and therefore in which determinacy and restriction should not be posited, for these

would corrupt and degrade the intrinsic-being. Conversely, the finite is likewise held firm and not negated, though it is in itself [an sich] null; and this such that in its connection with the infinite, it is elevated to what it *is* not; and thereby it is infinitized in contrast to its determination [Bestimmung], which does not disappear but is rather perpetuating [perennirende].

The falsification [Verfälschung] that the intellect perpetrates with respect to the finite and infinite, namely of holding their reciprocal relation fixed as qualitative differentiation, of maintaining that their determination [Bestimmung] is separate and indeed absolutely separate, is grounded [gründet] in the forgetting [Vergessen] of what, for the intellect itself [für ihn selbst], is the concept [Begriff] of these moments. According to this concept, the unity of finite and infinite is not an external bringing-together [Zusammenbringen] of them, nor is it an incongruous connection [ungehörige Verbindung] that goes against their determination [Bestimmung], wherein they would be intrinsically [an sich] separated and opposed – independent beings [Seiende] in contrast to each other – and consequently the connection would be an incompatible concatenation [unverträgliche verknüpft]. Rather, each is this unity unto itself [an ihm selbst], and this only as the *sublating* of itself, in which neither would have an advantage [Vorzug] over the other in terms of in-itself-being [Ansichsein] and affirmative there-being [affirmativen Dasein]. As has earlier been shown, finitude only is as a transcending of itself; it is therefore within it [in ihr] that the infinite, the other of itself, is contained. Similarly, the infinite only is as the transcending of the finite; it thus essentially contains its other, and is thus unto it [an ihr] the other of itself. The finite is not sublated by the infinite as by a power [Macht] outside it: its infinity rather consists in self-sublation.

This sublating is consequently not change or other-being in general, not the sublation of *something*. That into which the finite is sublated, is the infinite as the negating of finitude. But finitude itself has been long since determined as *non-being* in there-being. It is thus only the *negation* which *sublates* itself in the *negation*. Infinity is thus determined on its side as the negative of the finite, and thereby of determinacy in general, as the empty beyond. Its self-sublation in finitude is a reversion [Zurückkehren] from an empty escape [Flucht], *negation* of the beyond [Jenseits], which the *negative* is in itself [an ihm].

What is thus present in both is the same negation of negation. But this latter is *in itself* [an sich] self-relation: affirmation, but as reversion to itself [Rückkehr zu sich selbst]; i.e. through the *mediation* which is the negation of negation. These are the

determinations [Bestimmungen] which are essential to bring into view. The second thing, however, is that they are posited in the infinite progress, and how they are posited in it – namely not yet in their ultimate [letzten] truth.

First, both are negated in that progression, the infinite as well as the finite; – both are transcended in the same manner. *Second*, they are also posited as distinct, one after the other, each for-itself positive. We thus comparatively grasp [fassen... vergleichend] the two determinations, just as in comparison [Vergleichung] (in external comparing) we separate the two ways of considering them: the finite and infinite as relating to each other, each taken for-itself. The infinite progress, however, says more than this. Also posited in it [in ihm], though at first still only as transition and alternation [Abwechslung], is the *connection* [Zusammenhang] of what is distinguished. We now only need to see, in a simple reflection, what in fact is present therein.

First of all, the negation of the finite and infinite, which is posited in the infinite progression, can be taken as simple, and thus as separate and merely successive. Starting from the finite, the limit is transcended, the finite negated. We now have its beyond, the infinite, but in this the limit *arises* again; thus we have the transcending of the finite. This twofold [zweifache] sublation is nonetheless in part only an external occurrence, and an alternating of moments in general, and in part not yet posited as *one unity*. Each of these transcendings [Hinaus] is its own projection [Ansatz], a new act [Act], such that they fall outside each other. – But, moreover, their *relation* is also present in the infinite progress. The *finite is first; then* there is the transcending of it; and this negative, this beyond of the finite, is the infinite; *third*, this negation is transcended and a new new limit arises [entsteht], another *finite*. – This is the complete, self-closing movement which has arrived that from which the beginning was made. What comes up is the *same thing* as what was departed from; i.e., the finite is restored. The latter has therefore *coincided with itself* [mit sich selbst zusammengegangen]; in *its beyond* it has only *rediscovered* [wiedergefunden] itself.

The same is the case with respect to the infinite. In the finite, beyond the limit, only a new one arises, which however shares the same fate of having to be negated as something finite. Thus, what is again present is thus the *same* infinite that previously disappeared in the new limit. The infinite is therefore does not advance one bit through its sublation: rather, it has distanced itself neither from the finite (for the latter is only this passing over into the infinite) nor from itself, for it has *arrived at itself* [bei sich angekommen].

So both the finite and the infinite are this movement of turning back to themselves [zurückzukehren] through their negation. They only *are* [translator's emphasis] as internal mediation [Vermittlung in sich], and the affirmation of both contains the negation of both, and is the negation of negation. – They are thus *results*, and therefore not what they are in the determination of their beginning [in der Bestimmung ihres Anfangs]. – the finite not a *there-being* [ein Dasein] in its own right, and the infinite is not a *there-being* or *in-itself being* [Ansichsein] beyond that there-being [des Dasein], that is, beyond there-being determined as finitude. Intellect squirms [sträubt] so much at the unity of the finite and infinite only because it presupposes the limit and the finite, like in-itself-being [Ansichsein], as *permanent* [perennierend]. In so doing it *overlooks* the negation of both, which in the infinite progress is factually present [factisch vorhanden ist]; just as it overlooks the fact that the two appear in the progression only as moments of a whole – that each emerges only through the mediation of its opposite, but also, essentially, equally through the sublation of its opposite.

If this reversion-into-self [Rückkehr in sich] was first considered to be just as much a reversion of the finite to itself as of the infinite to itself, then this very result reveals an error [Unrichtigkeit] which is connected with the lopsidedness [Schieffheit] just criticized: first the finite, and then the infinite, is taken as the *starting point* [Ausgangspunkt], and only this gives rise to *two* results. However, it is a matter of complete indifference, which is taken as the beginning [Anfang], and thus the distinction which occasioned the *double* result disappears by itself [für sich]. This is likewise posited in the bidirectionally unlimited line [beyden Seiten unbegrenzten Linie] of the infinite progress, wherein each moment occurs [Vorkommen] in equal alternation [abwechselnden]; and it is totally extraneous [äusserlich] which point one fixes on or takes as the beginning. – The moments are distinguished in the progression, but in the same way, each is only a moment of the other. Since both the finite and the infinite are themselves moments of this process, they are *collectively the finite* [gemeinschaftlich das Endliche], and since they are equally negated within it [in ihm] and in the result, the result as the negation of their finitude is with truth called the infinite. Their differentiation is thus a *double meaning* that both have. The finite has the double meaning, first of being the finite *contra* the infinite, and second of being the finite and *at the same time* the infinite opposed to it. The infinite also has a double meaning, namely of being *one* of these two moments – in this it is the bad infinite – as well as being the infinite in which both, the infinite and its other, are only moments. Therefore, the infinite that is in

fact present, is thus the process in which it lowers itself [herabsetzt] to the state of being only *one* of its determinations [Bestimmungen] over against the finite, and therefore itself only one of the finites, and sublates [aufzuheben] this difference of itself from itself into affirmation, and through this mediation it is the *true infinity*.

This determination [Bestimmung] of the true infinite cannot be grasped by the already criticized *formula* of the *unity* of the finite and infinite. *Unity* is an abstract, static [bewegungslose] self-equality, and the moments are likewise unmoved beings [unbewegte Seiende]. But, like its two moments, the infinite is rather essentially only as *becoming*, though a becoming now *further determined* in its moments. Becoming has for its determinations [Bestimmungen], abstract being and nothing; as change [Veränderung], it has there-being, something and other; now as the infinite, it has finite and infinite, these two as themselves becomings [als Werdende].

This infinite, as into-itself-reverted being [In-sich-Zurückgekehrtsein], as relation to itself, is *being* [Sein]. But not indeterminate, abstract being, for it is now posited as negating the negation; consequently it is also *there-being*, for it contains negation in general as well as determinacy. It *is*, and *is there*, present [present], presently [gegenwärtig]. Only the bad infinite is the *beyond*, since it is *merely* the negation of the finite posited as *real* [reale], – thus it is the abstract, first negation. Thus determined *merely* as negative, it does not have the affirmation of *there-being* within it [in ihm]. Held fast only as negative, it *ought not to be* at all, it ought to be unattainable. But this unattainability is not its highness [Hoheit], but rather its poverty [Mangel], which has its ultimate ground [Grund] in the fact that the finite is held fixed as *being* [als seiend]. The untrue is the unattainable [Das Unwahre ist das Unerreichbare], and it is apprehended [einzusehen] that such an infinite is the untrue. – The image of the progression to infinity is the *straight line*; the infinite only *is* [translator's emphasis] as the two limits of this line, and always only is where the latter (which is there-being) *is not*, but rather *transcends itself*, into its not-there-being, i.e. into the indeterminate. As true infinity, bent back into itself [in sich zurückgebogen], this image becomes the *circle*, the line that has attained [erreicht] itself, closed and wholly present [geschlossen und ganz gegenwärtig], without *beginning* and *end* [Anfangspunkt und Ende].

The true infinite in general, taken thus as *there-being* which is posited as *affirmative* in contrast to abstract negation, is *reality* [Realität], but in a higher meaning than it had earlier as *simply* determined. It now has obtained a concrete content. It is not

the finite which is the real [das Reale], but rather the infinite. Thus, reality gets further determined as essence [Wesen], concept [Begriff], idea [Idee], etc. However, it is superfluous to repeat such earlier, more abstract categories as reality [Realität], and use them for determinations more concrete than they are by themselves. Such repetitions [Wiederholen], such as saying that the essence or the idea is the real, is due to the fact that the most abstract categories, like being, there-being, reality, finite, etc. are the ones most familiar to uneducated thought [ungebildeten Denken].

But the more immediate occasion for recalling [Zurückrufung] the category of reality is because negation, against which reality is the affirmative, is here the negation of negation, and consequently is itself posited over against that reality which is finite there-being. – Negation is thus determined as ideality [Idealität]. The ideal [das Ideelle; meaning here ‘non-material’] is the finite as it is in the true infinite, – as a determination [Bestimmung], a content, which is distinct but is not an *independently being* [selbstständig seiend], but only a *moment*. Ideality has this concrete meaning [Bedeutung] which is not fully expressed by the negation of finite there-being. – In relation to reality and ideality, however, the opposition of finite and infinite is grasped in such a way that the finite counts as the real [Reale], and the infinite rather for the ideal [Ideelle]. In the same way that further on the concept, too, is regarded as an ideal [Ideelles], that is as a *mere* ideal in contrast to there-being in general, which is regarded as the real. In this way it is clearly of no help, to have reserved the expression ‘ideal’ for the previously mentioned concrete determination [Bestimmung] of negation. In that opposition of finite and infinite, we have relapsed [zurückgegangen] to the one-sided-ness of the abstract negative which characterized bad infinity, and persist [beharrt] with the affirmative there-being of the finite.

Transition

Ideality can be called the *quality* of the infinite; but it is essentially the process of *becoming* and hence a transition – like the transition of becoming into there-being which is now to be indicated. As a sublation of finitude – i.e. of finitude as such and equally of the negative finitude that merely stands opposite it, is merely negative – this reversion-into-self [Rückkehr in sich] is *relation-to-self* [Beziehung auf sich selbst], *being*. Because this being has negation in it, it is *there-being*; but further, since this negation is essentially negation of negation, is self-to-self-relating negation, thus it is the there-being which is called *for-itself-being*.

Chapter 3: For-itself-being

In *for-itself-being* [Fürsichsein], *qualitative being* is brought to *completion*. It is infinite being. The being of the beginning is determinationless. There-being is sublated, but only immediately sublated being. It thus contains, initially, only the first negation which is itself immediate. Being is indeed preserved, and both are united in there-being in a simple unity. But for that reason they are still intrinsically [an sich] *unequal* to each other, and their unity is *not yet posited* [gesetzt]. There-being is the sphere of difference [Differenz], dualism, the field of finitude. The determinacy is determinacy as such: a relatively, not absolutely determinate being [absolutes Bestimmtsein]. In for-itself-being, the distinction between being and determinacy or negation is posited and equalized. Quality, other-being [Anderssein], limit, as much as reality [Realität], intrinsicality [Ansichsein], ought [Sollen], and so forth – are the imperfect configurations [unvollkommene Einbildungen] of the negation in being, in which the difference [Differenz] of the two still lies at the ground [zu Grunde liegt; i.e. subject, hypokeimenon]. But inasmuch as in finitude the negation has passed over into infinity, into the posited negation of negation, to that extent it is simple self-relation, and is thus in itself [an ihr selbst] the equalization with being; – *absolutely determinate being* [absolutes Bestimmtsein].

For-itself-being is *first* an immediate for-itself being [unmittelbar Fürsichseiendes], *one* [Eins].

Second, the one passes over into the *multiplicity of ones* – *repulsion* [Repulsion]; or the other-being of the one which sublates itself into its ideality [Idealität], *attraction* [Attraction].

Third, the reciprocal determination of repulsion and attraction, in which the two sink down into a state of equilibrium; and quality, which reaches its apex in for-itself-being, passes over into *quantity*.

A. For-itself-being as such

The general concept of for-itself-being [Fürsichsein] has emerged. In order to justify using the expression ‘for-itself-being’, it would only be a matter of proving that the representation we associate with it does correspond to the general concept of for-itself-being. And so it seems to: we say that something is ‘for itself’ insofar as it sublates other-being [Anderssein], sublates its relationships and community with others, repels them [sie zurückgestoßen], has abstracted from them. The other is

within it [in ihm] only *as* something sublated, as *its moment*. For-itself-being consists in having gone beyond restriction, beyond its other-being, such that this negation is the infinite *reversion* [Rückkehr] into itself. – Consciousness [Bewußtsein] as such already in itself [an sich] contains the determination of for-itself-being, because it *represents* [vorstellt, places before itself] an object [Gegenstand] that it senses [empfindet], intuitively [anschaut], and so on. That is, it has the content of the object *within it* [in ihm], and in this way it is as something *ideal* [als *ideelles* ist]. Consciousness is, in its intuiting – and in general in its entanglement [Verwicklung] with its negative, with the other – *at home with itself* [bey sich selbst]. For-itself-being is the polemical, negative comportment [Verhalten] to the limiting [begrenzende] other, and through this negation it is into-self-reflected-being [In-sich-reflectirt-sein] – albeit, *alongside* [neben] this reversion of consciousness into itself and the ideality [Idealität] of the object, the *reality* of the object is *also* preserved, because the object is *at the same time* known as an external there-being [ein äusseres Dasein]. Consciousness is therefore *phenomenal* [erscheinend], or it is this dualism: on the one hand, it knows about an other, an object that is external to it; and on the other hand, to be for itself [für sich zu sein], it has the object in it ideally, so that it is not only being with another [nicht nur bey solchem Andern], but rather in this other it is also at home with itself [sondern darin auch bey sich selbst zu sein]. *Self-consciousness*, however, is *for-itself-being* as *consummated* [vollbracht] and *posited*. The side of relation to *another*, to an external object, is eliminated. Self-consciousness is thus the nearest example of the presence [Präsenz] of infinity; – granted, of an infinity which is still abstract, but one which is of an entirely different, more concrete determination than for-itself-being in general, whose infinity still has only a quite qualitative determinateness.

a. There-being and For-itself-being

As already recalled, for-itself-being is infinity that has collapsed [zusammengesunkene] into simple being. It is *there-being*, insofar as the negative nature of infinity (negation of negation) is only negation in general, simple qualitative determinacy – and this in the henceforth posited form of the *immediacy* of being [Seins]. But being [Sein] in such determinacy in which it is there-being is at once [sogleich] also distinguished from for-itself-being, which only is for-itself-being insofar as its determinacy is that infinite one. However, there-being is at the same time a moment of for-itself-being, for the latter certainly contains being burdened by negation. Thus the determinacy, which in there-being as such is an *other* and *being-for-another*, is bent back [zurückgebogen] into the infinite unity of

for-itself-being, and the moment of there-being is present [vorhanden] in for-itself-being as *being-for-one*.

b. Being-for-one

This moment expresses how the finite is in its unity with the infinite, or is ideal. For-itself-being does not have negation *in it* [an ihm] as a determinacy or limit, and thus also not as a relation to a there-being other than itself [von ihm anderes Dasein]. Now since this moment has been designated as being-for-one, there is not yet anything present for which it would be – not even the one whose moment it is supposed to be. In fact, nothing of the kind is as yet fixed in for-itself-being. That for which something [Etwas] (and here there is no something) would be, which the other side should be in general, is likewise a moment, itself only being-for-one, not yet a one. – Thus there is still present an indistinction [Ununterschiedenheit] of the two sides which can be envisioned [vorschweben] in for-itself-being. There is only *one* being-for-another [nur Ein Sein-für-anderes], and because there is only *one* being-for-another, there is also only being-for-one. There is only the one ideality [die Eine Idealität] of that for which or in which there is supposed to be a determination as a moment, and of what is supposed to be a moment in it. In this way, *being-for-one* [Für-eines-sein] and *for-itself-being* do not constitute two genuinely contrastive determinacies [Bestimmtheiten]. Insofar as the difference is momentarily assumed, and here it is spoken of a *for-itself being* [Fürsichseienden], then it is this being [das Fürsichseiende] which, as the sublated-being of other-being, relates itself to itself as the sublated other and is therefore *for-one* [für-eines]. It relates itself in its other only to itself. The ideal [Ideelle] is necessarily for-one, but it is not for-another: the one for which it is, is just itself. – Thus the 'I', spirit in general, or God, are idealities [Ideelle], because they are infinite. But they are not, ideally, as for-themselves, differentiated from that which is for-one. For then they would be only immediate (or more precisely, there-being and a being-for-another), because that which would be for them, would not be themselves but another if the moment of being-for-one did not belong to them [nicht ihnen zukommen sollte]. God is therefore for himself insofar as he himself is that which is for him.

For-itself-being and being-for-one are thus not two different meanings of ideality, but rather are essential [wesentlich], inseparable moments of it.

c. One

For-itself-being is the simple unity of itself and its moment, of being-for-one. There is only one determination present: the relation-to-self of the sublating. The *moments* of for-itself-being have collapsed [zusammengesunken] into *indistinction* [Unterschiedlosigkeit], which is immediacy or being, but an *immediacy* that is grounded in negating [auf das Negieren gründet], and this negating is posited as immediacy's determination. For-itself-being is in this way *something that is for-itself* [Das Fürsichsein ist so, Fürsichseiendes], and since in this immediacy its inner meaning disappears, for-itself-being is the totally abstract limit [ganz abstracte Grenze] of itself – *the one*.

Attention may be drawn in advance to the difficulty that lies in the following presentation of the *development* of the one, and to the reason for this difficulty. The *moments* which constitute the *concept* of the one as for-itself-being are separated in it: they are 1) negation in general, 2) *two* negations, 3) therefore two that are *the same*, 4) which are utterly oppositional; 5) self-relation, identity as such, 6) *negative* relation yet still *self-relation*. These moments are disaggregated [treten auseinander] here by the fact that the form of immediacy, of being, enters into for-itself-being as something that is for-itself [am Fürsichseyn als Fürsichseiendem hereinkommt]. Through this immediacy each moment is posited as *a separate, subsistent determination* [als eine eigene, seiende Bestimmung gesetzt]. And yet they are just as much *inseparable*. Thus for every determination the opposite must also be asserted [gesagt]. It is this contradiction [Widerspruch] which, given the abstract constitution [Beschaffenheit] of the moments, causes the difficulty.

B. One and Many

The one is the simple relation of for-itself-being to itself, in which its moments have collapsed into themselves, in which it therefore has the form [Form] of *immediacy*, and its moments have therefore become *there-being* moments [seine Momente daher nun *daseiende* werden.].

As relation of the *negative* to itself, the one is a determining [Bestimmen], – and as relation *to itself*, it is infinite *self-determining* [Selbstbestimmen]. But on account of the prevailing [nunmehrigen] immediacy, these *differences* are no longer only as moments of one and the same self-determination [Selbstbestimmung], but rather simultaneously posited as *beings* [Seiende]. The *ideality* [Idealität] of for-itself-being as totality thus turns, for the time being, into reality, and indeed into the firmest, most abstract reality, into *one*. In the *one*, for-itself-being is the *posited* unity of being

and there-being, as the absolute unification [Vereinigung] of relation-to-other and relation-to-self. But then the determinacy of being also comes into play *against* the determination of the *infinite negation*, against the self-determination, so that what a one is *in itself* [an sich] is now merely *in it* [an ihm]; and thus the negative is an other which is differentiated from the one. What shows itself to be *present*, as distinct from the one, is the one's own self-determining; its unity with itself, as thus distinct from itself, is reduced [herabgesetzt] to a *relation* [Beziehung], and, as a negative unity, it is the negation of itself as an *other*, the *excluding* of the one as an *other* from itself, from the one.

a. The One in Itself [an ihm selbst]

By itself [an ihm selbst], the one *is* in general. This, its being, is not a there-being, not a determination as relation-to-another, not a constitution [Beschaffenheit]. It is this: to have negated this circle of categories. The one is thus not capable of becoming an other [Anderswerdens]. It is *unchanging* [unveränderlich].

It is indeterminate [unbestimmt], but not more so than being. Its indeterminacy [Unbestimmtheit] is the determinacy, which is relation-to-self, absolute determinate being [absolutes Bestimmtsein]: *posited* within-itself-being [Insichsein]. As a negation which, according to its concept, relates itself to itself, it has the difference [Unterschied] inside it, – a direction away from and beyond itself towards another, which however is immediately reversed [umgewendet] because (according to this moment of self-determining) there is no other towards which it goes [aufgehen], and so the direction turns back into upon itself.

In this simple immediacy, the mediation of there-being and the ideality [Idealität] itself, and with it all diversity and manifoldness, has disappeared. There is nothing [nichts] inside it [the one]. This *nothingness* [Nichts], the abstraction of the relation-to-itself, is here distinguished from the inner being [Insichsein] itself: it is a *posited* nothingness [ein gesetztes], because this inner being [Insichsein] is no longer the simple being of something, but rather *as mediation* has the determination of being concrete. As abstract, however, it is indeed identical with the one, but different from its determination. Posited in this way, nothingness [Nichts], as *inside the one*, is nothingness as *void* [Leeres, emptiness]. – The void is in this way the *quality* of the one in [in] its immediacy.

b. The One and the Void

The one is the void as the abstract relation of the negative to itself. But the void as nothingness is utterly diverse [verschieden] from the simple immediacy, and since they stand in one relation [in Einer Beziehung] (namely of the one itself) their diversity [Verschiedenheit] is posited. But what is diverse from the being [Seienden], is nothingness as void external to the being one [außer dem seienden Eins].

Since it determines itself in this way as one and void, for-itself-being has once again acquired a *there-being* [ein *Dasein* erlangt]. – The one and the void have negative relation-to-self as their common, simple basis [Boden]. The moments of for-itself-being emerge from this unity, become self-external, in that the determination of *being* [Bestimmung des Seins] enters in through the *simple* unity of the moments; in this way it places itself to *one* side and thereby degrades [herabsetzt] itself to there-being; and in this, its other determination, negation in general, likewise places itself [stellt sich] as the there-being of nothingness, as the void.

c. Many Ones. Repulsion.

The one and the void constitute for-itself-being in its immediate there-being. Each of these moments has negation for its determination [Bestimmung], and is at the same time posited as a there-being [ein *Dasein*]. According to the former [having negation for their determination], the one and the void are the relation of negation to negation as of an other to its other. The one is the negation in the determination of being, the void is the negation in the determination nonbeing. But the one is essentially only relation-to-self as relational *negation* [beziehende *Negation*], i.e. it is itself that which the void outside it is supposed to be. But both are also *posited* as an affirmative there-being [Dasein], the first one [das eine] as for-itself-being as such, the other one as indeterminate there-being in general, and these relate to each other as to *other entities*. The for-itself-being of the one is, however, essentially the ideality of there-being and of the other. It does not relate as to an other, but rather only *to itself*. But since for-itself-being is fixed as one [als Eins], as for-itself-being that has for-itself-being [als für sich seiendes], as for-itself-being that is immediately present [unmittelbar vorhandenes], its *negative* relation *to itself* is at the same time relation to a *being* [ein *Seiendes*]. And since it is just as much negative, that to which it relates remains determined as a *there-being* and an *other* [ein *Dasein* und ein *Anderes*]. As essential relation *to itself*, the other is not indeterminate negation, as void, but is likewise *one*. The one is thus the *becoming of many ones*.

But in fact, this is not so much a *becoming*, for becoming is a transition from *being* to *nothing*. *One*, by contrast, only becomes *one*. One, the related, contains the negative as a relation, and thus has the same *in* itself [*an ihm*]. Instead of becoming, the one's own immanent relation is in the first place present; and secondly, insofar as this relation is negative, and the one is being [*seiendes*] at the same time, thus the one repels itself *from itself* [*stößt sich von sich ab*]. The negative relation of the one to itself is *repulsion*.

This repulsion, as the positing of the *many ones* but through the one itself, is the one's own externalization [*Außersichkommen*], but what is outside it are just many ones. This is repulsion according to the *concept*, in-itself-being repulsion [*die an sich seiende*]. The second repulsion is different from this, and is the one that first comes to mind for the representation of external reflection, not as the generation of the one but only a mutual [*gegenseitiges*] deterring [*Abhalten*] of presupposed [*vorausgesetzter*], already *present* [*vorhandener*] ones. It is now to be seen how the intrinsically subsistent repulsion [*an sich seiende Repulsion*] determines itself into the second, extrinsic [*äusserlichen*] one.

First of all, it must be established [*festzusetzen*] which determinations the many ones have as such. The becoming-many [*Werden zu Vielen*] or getting-produced of the many [*Producirtwerden der Vielen*] disappears immediately as getting-positing [*Gesetztwerden*]. What gets produced [*die Producirten*] are ones, not as are for others but rather infinitely relating to themselves. The one repels only *itself* from itself, and thus does not become but rather *already is*. That which gets represented as the repelled one [*das repellirte*], is likewise a *one*, a *being* [*Seiendes*]. Repelling and getting-repelled [*Repellirt-werden*] apply to both in the same way, and makes no difference [*macht keinen Unterschied*].

The ones are thus *presupposed* [*vorausgesetzte*; posited beforehand] against each other. That is – they are *posited* [*gesetzt*] through the repulsion of the one from itself; and posited *beforehand* [*Voraus*], i.e. posited as *not* posited, their posited-being is sublated, they are *beings* [*Seiende*] against each other, relating only to themselves.

Multiplicity [*Vielheit*] thus appears not as an *other-being* [*Anderssein*], but rather as a determination that is completely external to the one. The one, by repelling itself from itself, remains a relation to itself, as well as that which was initially taken as

repelled. The fact that the ones are *other* to each other, combined in the determinacy of multiplicity [Vielheit], therefore does not concern the one. If multiplicity [Vielheit] were a relation of the ones themselves to each other, then they would limit each other, and would hold an affirmative being-for-another in themselves [an ihnen]. Their relation – and this they have through their in-itself-being unity [*an sich* seiende Einheit] – as it is *posited* here, is determined as no relation [als keine bestimmt]. It is again the previously posited [vorhingesetzte] *void*. It is their external limit, however, in which they are not supposed to be *for each other* [nicht für einander seyn sollen]. The limit is that in which the limited *are* just as much as they *are not*. But the void is determined as pure nonbeing, and this alone constitutes their limit.

The repulsion of the one from itself is the explication [Explication] of what the one is in itself [an sich]. Infinity as *externally* laid out [auseinander gelegt] is here *infinity that has externalized itself*. It has externalized itself through the immediacy of the infinite, of the one. The infinite is just as much simple relation of one to one as it is the absolute lack of relation of the one. The former according to the simple affirmative relation of the one to itself; the latter according to the same relation as negative. Or the multiplicity of the one [Vielheit der Eins] is the one's own positing. The one is nothing but the *negative* relation of the one to itself; and this relation, and thus the one itself, is the many ones. But in the same way, the multiplicity [Vielheit] is utterly external to the one, for the one is precisely the sublation of other-being, the repulsion is its relation to itself and simple equality with itself. The multiplicity of the one [Vielheit der Eins] is infinity as an impartial self-begetting contradiction [unbefangen sich hervorbringender Widerspruch].

C. Repulsion and Attraction

a. Exclusion of the One

The many ones are beings [Seiende]. Their there-being or relation to each other is non-relation [Nicht-Beziehung], is external to them. – the abstract void. But they themselves are this negative relation to themselves as to others that are being [*seiende* Andere]; – the exhibited [aufgezeigt] contradiction, the infinite, posited in the immediacy of being. Thus the repulsion now *finds, immediately before it* [vor], that which is repelled by it. In this determination, repulsion is *exclusion* [Ausschließen]. The one only repels the many ones that are not generated

[unerzeugten] by it, not posited by it. This repelling is, mutually [gegenseitig] or on all sides [allseitig] – relative, limited by the being of the ones.

Multiplicity [Vielheit] is not, in the first place, posited other-being. The limit is only the void, only that in which the ones *are not*. But they also *are* in their limit; they are in the void, or their repulsion is their *common relation*.

This mutual repulsion is the posited there-being of the many ones. It is not their for-itself-being according to which they would be differentiated as many in a third, but rather their own distinction which sustains [erhaltendes] them. – They mutually negate each other, posit each other as ones which only are *for-one* [für-eines]. But at the same time they just as much *negate* this fact, *that they are only for-one*. The *repel* this, their *ideality* [Idealität], and *are*. – Thus the moments are separated, which in their ideality are utterly united. The one, in its for-itself-being, is also *for-one*. But this one, for which it is, is itself. Its difference from itself is immediately sublated. But in multiplicity the distinguished one [das unterschiedne Eins] has a being. Being-for-one, as it is determined in the excluding [Ausschließen], is therefore a being-for-another [ein Seyn-für-Anderes]. Each is thus repelled by another, sublated and made into one which is not for-itself but for-one, and indeed it is made into another one.

The for-itself-being of the many ones shows itself as their self-preservation [Selbsterhaltung], through the mediation of their repulsion against one another, in which they cancel one another out [gegenseitig aufheben] and posit the others as a mere being-for-another. But at the same time it consists in repelling this ideality and positing the one as not being for an other [nicht für-ein-Anderes zu seyn]. This self-preservation of the ones through their negative relation to each other is, however, rather their dissolution [Auflösung].

The ones not only *are*, but they preserve themselves through their mutual exclusion. Firstly, that by which they should have the firm hold of their difference against their getting-negated [Negirtwerden] is their *being*, and indeed their *in-itself-being* [Ansichsein] against their relation to others. This in-itself-being [Ansichsein] is that they are *one*. But they *all are this*. In their in-itself-being, they are *the same*, as opposed to having the fixed point of their diversity [Verschiedenheit] therein. Second, their there-being and their conduct [Verhalten] towards each other (i.e. their *positing themselves as one* [ihr Sich selbst als Eins setzen]) is mutual negating. But this is likewise *one and the same* determination of all of them, through which

they posit themselves as identical [identisch]. Just as, by being intrinsically [an sich] the same, their ideality, which is to be posited by others, is their own, and which they therefore do not repel. – In this respect, according to their being and positing, they are only one affirmative unity.

This consideration of the ones, that according to their two determinations (insofar as they are and insofar as they relate to each other) they show themselves to be one and the same, indistinguishable, this is our own comparison [Vergleichung]. – Also to be seen, however, is what is *posited* in them in their *relation* to each other. – The ones *are*, this is presupposed in their relation, – and are only insofar as they are mutually negating and at the same time hold this ideality, their negated-being [Negirtseyn], away from themselves; i.e., they negate the mutual negating. But they only are insofar as they negate, so that when their negating is negated, their being is negated. Indeed, insofar as they *are*, they would not be negated by this negating, it is only external to them. This negating of others ricochets off them [prallt an ihnen ab], it only strikes their surface [Oberfläche]. Only through the negating of others do they revert into themselves [kehren sie in sich selbst zurück]. They only are as this mediation. This reversion of theirs is their self-preservation [Selbsterhaltung] and their for-itself-being [Fürsichsein]. Since their negating is non-effectual, through the resistance offered by beings [Seienden] as such or as negating, they do not revert into themselves, do not preserve themselves, and do not subsist [und sind nicht].

The observation was made earlier that the ones are the same, each of them is the same *one* as the others. This is not only our relating, an external bringing together; rather, the repulsion is itself relating [Beziehen]. The one that excludes ones relates itself to them, to the ones, i.e. to itself. The negative conduct [Verhalten] of the ones to each other is only their *coalescing with themselves* [Mit-sich-zusammengehen]. This identity, into which their repelling passes over, is the sublating of their diversity and externality, which they rather ought to assert against each other as exclusive.

This positing-ones-into-one of the many ones is *attraction*.

b. The One One of Attraction [Das Eine Eins der Attraction.]

Repulsion is the self-fragmentation of the one, initially into many. Their negative conduct [Verhalten] is impotent [unmächtig] because they presuppose each other as beings [Seiende]. They are only the *ought* of ideality; but this is realized

[realisiert] in attraction. Repulsion passes over into attraction, the many ones into the one one [in Ein Eins]. Both of them, repulsion and attraction, are initially different, the former as the reality of the ones and the latter as their posited ideality. Attraction relates to repulsion in such a way that it has it as its presupposition. Repulsion provides [liefert] the material for attraction. If there were no ones, there would be nothing to attract. The representation [Vorstellung] of continuous [fortdauernder] attraction, the consumption of the ones [Consumtion der Eins], presupposes an equally continuous generation [Erzeugen] of ones. The sensuous representation of spatial attraction allows for the continuation of the stream of ones that become attracted. In place of the atoms [Atome] that disappear into the point of attraction, another multitude [Menge] appears [tritt ein] out of the void, to infinity if one wishes. If the attraction were to be carried out [vollführt], i.e. if the many were brought to the point of the one one, then the result would be a one that is inert [ein träges Eins], no more attraction would be present [vorhanden]. The ideality that is there-being in the attraction [Die in der Attraction daseiende Idealität] still also has in it [an ihr] the determination of the negation of itself, the many ones to which it relates, and the attraction is inseparable from repulsion.

The attracting [Attrahiren] initially applies [zukommt] to each of the many *immediately* present ones in the same way. None has an advantage [Vorzug] over the other; thus there would be present an equilibrium [Gleichgewicht] in the attracting, in fact an equilibrium of attraction and repulsion themselves, and so there would be an inert quiescence [träge Ruhe] without there-being ideality [dasyende Idealität]. But here we cannot speak of an advantage of such a one over the other, which would presuppose a determinate difference [bestimmten Unterschied] between them; rather, the attraction is the positing of the present undifferentiation [Ununterschiedenheit] of the ones. Initially, attraction itself is the positing of a one which is distinguished [unterschiedenen] from the others; they are only the immediate ones which are supposed to be preserved through the repulsion. Through their posited negation, however, the one of attraction emerges [geht hervor], which is therefore determined as the mediated [das Vermittelte], the *one posited as one* [das als Eins gesetzte Eins]. The first ones, as immediate, do not return into themselves in their ideality, but have it in another.

The one one, however, is the realized ideality that is posited in the one. It attracts through the mediation of repulsion. It contains this mediation within itself [in sich] as a determination. Therefore it does not gobble up [verschlingt] the attracted ones into itself as in a point, i.e. it does not abrogate [hebt auf] them abstractly. Since it

contains repulsion in its determination, this at once preserves the ones as many within it. In its attracting it summons something unto itself [bringt etwas vor sich] so to speak, it gains a circumference [Umfang: coverage, breadth, volume] or fulfillment [Erfüllung]. It is thus within itself [in ihm] the unity of repulsion and attraction in general.

c. The Relation of Repulsion and Attraction

The difference between *one* [Einem] and *many* [Vielen] has determined itself into the difference of their *relation* to each other, which is disassembled into two relations: repulsion and attraction, each of which initially stands independently [selbstständig] outside the other, but in such a way that they are essentially connected [wesentlich zusammenhängen]. The still indeterminate unity of them must be more closely revealed.

Repulsion, as the foundational determination [Grundbestimmung] of the one, appears in the first place as an *immediate*, like the ones that it generates but at once posits as immediate. Repulsion is therefore indifferent to the attraction which is added to it [hinzukommt] externally as thus presupposed [vorausgesetzte]. On the other hand, attraction is not presupposed by repulsion: it is not supposed to have any part in the latter's positing and being, that is, as if repulsion were not already in itself [an ihr] the negation of itself, as if the ones were not already in themselves negated [an ihnen Negierte]. In this way we have the repulsion abstractly for itself [abstract für sich], just as attraction has the side of an immediate there-being against the ones as beings [als Seiende], and arrives at them from itself [von sich] as an other.

If we take sheer repulsion in this way for itself [für sich], then it is the dispersal [Zerstreuung] of the many ones into the indeterminate [ins unbestimmte ?], outside the sphere of repulsion itself. For repulsion is this: to negate the relation of the many to one another. Their relationlessness is their determination, taken abstractly. But repulsion is not merely the void [das Leere], the ones as relationless are not repelling, not excluding, which is what constitutes their determination. Albeit negative, repulsion is nevertheless essentially a *relation*; the mutual deterring [Abhalten] and fleeing [Fliehen] is not a liberation [Befreiung] from what is deterred or fled from. That which *excludes* [das ausschliessende] still stands in *relation* to what gets excluded. But this moment of relation is attraction, and therefore is within the repulsion itself. It is the negating of that abstract repulsion

according to which the ones would be only self-relating beings [auf sich beziehende Seiende], not excluding [nicht ausschliessende].

But since we have started from the repulsion of the there-being ones [der daseienden Eins], and thus with attraction posited as externally approaching it [als äusserlich an sie tretend gesetzt], the two are still held apart as diverse determinations despite their inseparability. However, it has turned out that not only is repulsion presupposed by attraction, but the repulsion is also just as much related to attraction, and the former has its presupposition in the latter.

According to this determination they are inseparable, and at the same time each is determined in contrast to the other as an ought [Sollen] and a restriction [Schranke]. Their ought is their abstract determinateness, as *intrinsically being* [als *an sich seiender*], but this is thereby utterly pointed beyond itself, relating itself to the *other* [determination]. Thus each is *other* through mediation of the *other*; their independence consists in that in this mediation each is posited for the other as an *other* determining. – Repulsion as the positing of the many, attraction as the positing of the one; this latter is at the same time the negation of the many, and the former the negation of the ideality of the many in the one. Such that attraction is attraction only *through the mediation* of repulsion, just as repulsion is repulsion through the mediation of attraction. In all this, however, the mediation of each through the *other* is in fact negated, and each of these determinations is the mediation of itself with itself. This follows from their closer consideration, and leads them back to the unity of their concept.

First, the fact that each presupposes *itself*, that in their presupposing each relates only to itself [nur sich auf sich bezieht], this is already present [vorhanden] in the conduct of the still relative repulsion and attraction.

The relative repulsion is the mutual deterring [Abhalten] of the many ones that are present [vorhandenen], which are supposed to be discovered [vorfinden] as immediate ones. But the fact there are many ones [daß viele Eins seyen], this is the repulsion itself. The presupposition [Voraussetzung] that it would have is only its own positing. Furthermore, the determination of *being* [des Seins] that would belong to [zukäme] the ones in addition to their being posited [gesetzte] – whereby they would be *beforehand* [wodurch sie *voraus* wären; ‘voraus’ as in ‘Voraussetzung’] – belongs likewise to repulsion. Repelling is that through which the ones manifest themselves and preserve themselves as ones, through which they *are*

as such. Their being [Ihr Sein] is the repulsion itself, which is not a relative there-being against another there-being, but relates [verhält] entirely only to itself.

Attraction is the positing of the one as such, the real [reellen] one, in relation to which the many are determined in their there-being as only ideal [ideell] and vanishing. Attraction thus instantly [sogleich] presupposes itself [setzt sich voraus] to be idea, namely in the determination of the other ones, which are otherwise supposed to be being for themselves [für sich seiende] and be repulsive *for others* [für andere], and thus also for something that attracts [für irgend ein Attrahirendes]. Against this determination of repulsion they do not obtain [erhalten] ideality only through relation to attraction. On the contrary, ideality is presupposed. It is the ideality of the in-themselves-being ones [*an sich* seiende Idealität der Eins], in that as ones – including the one represented as attracting – they are one and the same, undistinguished from each other.

This self-presupposing of the two determinations [repulsion and attraction], each for itself, is further this: that each contains the other within itself as a moment. *Self-presupposing* in general is the positing of itself in the one as the *negative* of itself – repulsion. And what is therein presupposed, is *the same* as what does the presupposing – attraction. That each is *in itself* [*an sich*] only a moment is the transition of each from itself into the other, negating itself in the other and positing itself as the other of itself. Since the one as such is externalization [Aussersichkommen], it is itself only this: to posit itself as its other, as the many; and the many is likewise this: to collapse into itself [*in sich zusammenzufallen*] and posit itself as its other, as the one. And in this, it just relates itself to itself, each continuing [continuierten] itself in its other. – Thus, the externalization (the repulsion) and positing-itself-as-one (the attraction) are already intrinsically [*an sich*] present [vorhanden] as undivided. But in the relative repulsion and attraction – i.e. which presuppose immediate, there-being ones [unmittelbare, daseiende Eins] – it is *posited* that each of them is in itself [*an ihr selbst*] the negation of itself, and consequently also the continuity of itself into its other. The *repulsion* of the there-being ones [dasyender Eins] is the self-preservation [Selbsterhaltung] of the one through the mutual deterring [Abhaltung] of the others, so that 1) the other ones are negated *in it* [*in ihm*], this is the side of its there-being [Daseins] or its being-for-another [Seins-für-anderes]; but this is therefore attraction, as the ideality of the one; – and that 2) the one is *in itself* [das Eins *an sich* sey], i.e. without the relation to another; but not only has the in-itself in general [das Ansich überhaupt] long ago passed over into for-itself-being [Fürsichsein], but *in itself* [*an*

sich], according to its determination, the one is that becoming of the many [Werden zu Vielen]. – The *attraction* of there-being ones is the ideality of them, and the positing of the one, in which it thus sublates itself as the negating and begetting [Hervorbringen] of the one, as the positing in it of the one as the negative of itself [Setzen des Eins das Negative ihrer selbst an ihr], this is repulsion.

With this the development of for-itself-being is completed and its result has been attained. The one as *infinite* (i.e. as posited negation of negation) *self*-relation is the mediation that repels [abstößt] itself from itself as its absolute (i.e. abstract) other-being (the many), and in thus negatively relating itself to its non-being, it sublates it and is now therein [darin] only as relation-to-itself; and the one is only this becoming in which the following determination has disappeared: that it *begins* [daß es *anfängt*,], i.e. is posited as immediate, as being [seiendes] and at once as a result, which would have restored itself to the one, that is, to the equally *immediate*, excluding one. The process, which it is itself, posits and contains it everywhere only as something sublated. Sublation, initially determined only as relative sublation, as sublation of the *relation* to other entities [Daseiendes] (which is thereby itself a different [eine *differente*] repulsion and attraction) equally proves itself to pass over into the infinite relation of mediation through negation of the external relations of the immediate [Unmittelbaren] and the there-being [Daseienden], and to have as its result precisely that becoming which, in the instability [Haltungslosigkeit] of its moments, is the collapse, or rather the coalescence-with-itself [Mit-Sich-Zusammengehen] in simple immediacy. This being [Sein], according to the determination it now *obtains*, is *quantity*.

Let us briefly survey the moments of this *transition of quality into quantity*. The qualitative has for its foundational determination, being [Sein] and immediacy [Unmittelbarkeit], in which the limit and the determinacy are so identical with the being of the something, that with its change [Veränderung] the something disappears. Thusly *posited* it [the something] is determined as the finite. On account of the immediacy of this unity in which the *difference* [Unterschied] has disappeared (though it is *intrinsically* [an sich] present [vorhanden] in the unity of *being* and *nothing*) the difference falls *outside* that unity, as *other-being* in general. This relation to another contradicts the immediacy in which the qualitative determinacy is relation-to-self [Beziehung auf sich ist]. This other-being sublates itself [hebt sich auf] into the infinity of for-itself-being [Fürsichsein], which realizes [realisiert] the difference [Unterschied] which it has *in* and *within itself* [an und in ihm selbst] in the negation of negation: the distinction is realized as the one and the many and

their relations, and has elevated [erhoben] the qualitative to veritable unity (i.e. unity which is no longer immediate but posited as concordant [übereinstimmend] with itself).

This unity is therefore: α) *being*, but as affirmative, i.e. *immediacy* self-mediated through [durch] the negation of negation; being is posited as a unity that *continues through* [hindurchgehende] its determinacies [Bestimmtheiten], limits, etc., which are posited within it [being] as sublated; – β) *there-being*: according to this determination, it is negation or determinacy as a moment of affirmative being; yet this determinacy is no longer immediate but reflected into itself; it relates itself not to another but to itself; the absolute [das Schlechthin] – intrinsically-determined being [An-sich-bestimmtsein] – the one; the other-being [Anderssein] as such is for-itself-being; – γ) *for-itself-being*, as that being [Sein] which continues through the determinateness, in which the one and even the intrinsically-determined being are posited as sublated. The one is simultaneously determined as having transcended itself and as *unity*; the one, the absolutely determined limit, is consequently posited as the limit which is no limit, a limit which is in being, but is indifferent to it.

Section 2: Magnitude (Quantity)

The difference between quantity and quality has been indicated. Quality is the first, immediate determinacy, quantity is the determinacy which has become indifferent [gleichgültig] to being, a limit which is not a limit at all. For-itself-being [Fürsichsein] which is utterly [schlechthin] identical with being-for-another [Sein-für-anderes] – the repulsion of many ones which is immediately non-repulsion, the continuity of them.

Because for-itself-being is now posited in such a way that it does not exclude its other but rather affirmatively continues [fortzusetzen] into it, therefore *simultaneously* other-being too (insofar as *there-being* reemerges in this continuity) and its determinacy, is no longer as a simple relation-to-self, is no longer an immediate determinacy of the there-being [daseienden] something, but is rather posited as repelling-itself-from-itself, the relation-to-self rather posited as having determinacy rather in another there-being [einem andern Dasein] (one that is for-itself-being [einem fürsichseienden]). And since they are *at the same time* indifferent, intro-reflected, relation-less limits [gleichgültige in sich reflectirte, beziehungslose Grenzen], therefore the determinacy is in general *outside itself* [außer sich], an utterly *self-external* determinacy and a something that is equally external [Etwas ebenso äusserliches]. Such a limit, the intrinsic indifference of the latter [Gleichgültigkeit derselben an ihr selbst] and of the something to it, constitutes the *quantitative* determinacy of the something.

In the first place, *pure quantity* is to be distinguished from *determinate* quantity, from *quantum*. The former is *firstly* the real, intro-reverted for-itself-being [das in sich zurückgekehrte, reale Fürsichseyn], which as yet has no determinateness in it [an ihm]: a compact [gediegene] infinite unity that continues itself into itself.

Second, this quantity goes out [geht fort] into determinacy that is posited in-itself as such, but which is simultaneously is not a determinacy at all, is only external. Quantity becomes *quantum*. Quantum is indifferent determinacy, i.e. one that transcends itself and negates itself; it falls [verfällt], as this other-being of other-being, into the *infinite* progress. Infinite quantum however is sublated, indifferent determinacy, it is the restoration of quality.

Third, quantum in qualitative form [Form] is the quantitative *ratio* [Verhältnis]. Quantum in general transcends only itself; but in the ratio it transcends itself into its other-being in such a way that this other-being, in which it has its determinacy, is simultaneously posited as another quantum. Thusly, quantum's returned-into-itself-being [In-sich-zurückgekehrtsein] and its relation-to-itself is present in its other-being.

This ratio [Verhältnisse] is still grounded [liegt zu Grunde; i.e. has its hypokeimenon] in the externality of quantum. It is *indifferent* quanta which relate [verhalten] themselves to each other; i.e., have their relation-to-themselves in such self-external-being [in solchem Aussersichsein]. – The ratio is thus only a formal unity of quality and quantity. The dialectic of ratio is its transition into the absolute unity of quality and quantity, into *measure* [Maß].

Chapter 1: Quantity

A. Pure Quantity

Quantity is sublated for-itself-being [aufgehobene Fürsichsein]. The repelling one, which behaved [verhielt] only negatively towards the excluded one, has passed over into *relation* [Beziehung] with it, behaves identically towards the other, and therefore has lost its determinacy. For-itself-being has passed over into attraction. The absolute brittleness [Sprödigkeit] of the repelling *one* has dissolved [zerflossen] into this *unity* which however, because it contains that one, is simultaneously determined by [durch] the indwelling [innwohnende] repulsion as *unity of external being* [Aussersichseins], as *unity with itself*. Attraction is, in this way, the moment of *continuity* in quantity.

Continuity is thus simple, self-equal relation-to-self, which is uninterrupted [unterbrochen] by any limit or exclusion; it is *not*, however, *immediate* unity, but rather the unity of ones that subsist for themselves [fürsichseienden Eins]. It still contains the *asunderness* [Aussereinander] of *multiplicity*, but at the same time as one that is undifferentiated, *uninterrupted*. Multiplicity is thus posited in continuity as it is in itself [an sich]. The many are each what the others are, they are all alike [gleich], and the multiplicity is thus simple indistinct equality [unterschiedslose Gleichheit]. Continuity is this moment of the *self-equality* [Sichselbstgleichheit] of being-apart [Aussereinanderseins], the self-continuing [Sich-Fortsetzen] of the differentiated ones into those from which they are differentiated [in ihre von ihnen Unterschiedene].

Therefore, in continuity, magnitude has the moment of *discreteness* – repulsion only as a moment within [in] quantity. – The constancy [Stätigkeit] is the self-equality [Sich-selbstgleichheit], but of the many, which however do not become exclusionary [Ausschliessenden]. It is repulsion which first extends [dehnt aus] self-equality into continuity. Discreteness is thus in turn convergent [zusammenfliessende] discreteness, whose ones do not have the void [das Leere], the negative, for their relation, but rather their own constancy, and does not interrupt this equality-with-itself in the many.

Quantity is the unity of these moments, continuity and discreteness; but it is first of all in the *form* of one of them, namely *continuity*; this is a result of the dialectic of

for-itself-being [Fürischseins], which has collapsed [zusammengefallen] into self-equal immediacy. Quantity is as such this simple result, insofar as it has not yet developed its moments and posited them in itself [an ihm gesetzt]. Quantity *contains* these moments to begin with as for-itself-being posited in its truth. It was its [for-itself-being's] determination to be self-sublating self-relation, perennial externalization [Ausersichkommen]. But what it repels [das Abgestossene] is its own self. Repulsion is therefore the generative outflow [Fortfliessen] of itself. Due to the self-sameness [Dieselbigkeit; from the translation of Locke into German: identity] of what has been repelled, this discernment [Discernieren] is uninterrupted continuity; and due to the externalization, this continuity is, without being interrupted, at once a multiplicity – one which remains just as immediate in its equality-with-itself.

B. Continuous and Discrete Magnitude

1. Quantity contains the two moments of continuity and discreteness. It is to be posited in both of them as its determinations. – Quantity is at once the *immediate* unity of both, i.e. it is initially to be posited only in one of its two determinations, continuity, and so it is *continuous magnitude*.

Or continuity is indeed one of the moments of quantity, which is only completed with the other, discreteness. But quantity is concrete unity only insofar as it is the unity of *different* moments. These are therefore also to be taken as different, but not to be dissolved [aufzulösen] again in attraction and repulsion, but rather according to their truth, each as in its unity with the other, i.e. remaining *the whole*. Continuity is only the contiguous [zusammenhängende] pure [gediegene] unity; as the unity of discreteness it is *posited* no longer only as a moment, but rather the whole of quantity: *continuous magnitude*.

2. *Immediate* quantity is continuous magnitude. But quantity is in general not something immediate; immediacy is a determinacy whose sublatedness is itself [deren Aufgehobenseyn sie selbst ist]. It is therefore to be posited in its immanent determinacy, which is the one. Quantity is *discrete magnitude*.

Discreteness is, like continuity, a moment of quantity; but it is itself also the whole of quantity, precisely because it is a moment in it, in the whole, and therefore as distinct does not emerge from it, from its unity with any other moment. – Quantity is being-separate as such [Aussereinandersein an sich], and continuous magnitude

is this being-separate, as self-continuous [sich fortsetzend] without negation, as an internally equal connection [in sich selbst gleicher Zusammenhang]. Discrete magnitude, however, is this being-separate as not-continuous, as interrupted. However, with this mass of ones, the mass of atoms and the void, repulsion in general, is not once again present. Because discrete magnitude is quantity, even its discreteness is continuous. This continuity-in-the-discrete [Continuität am Discreten] consists in that the ones are equal to one another, of that they have the same *unity*. Discrete magnitude is therefore the separation [Aussereinander] of the many ones, *as of what is the same* [des Gleichen], not the many ones in general but posited as the *many of a unity*.

C. Limitation of Quantity

Discrete magnitude has, firstly, the one as its principle and, secondly, is the multiplicity of ones; thirdly it is essentially constant [stätig]. Discrete magnitude is the one simultaneously as sublated, as *unity*, the continuation of itself as such in the discreteness of the ones. It is therefore posited as *one* magnitude [als *Eine* Größe], and its determinacy is the one, which is, in this posited-being [Gesetztsein] and there-being, the *excluding* one, the limit of unity. Discrete magnitude as such is not supposed to be immediately limited. But as distinguished from continuous magnitude, it is as [als] a there-being [als ein Dasein] and a something whose determinacy is the one and, as in a there-being [in einem Dasein], is also the first negation and limit.

This limit, apart from being related to the unity and the negation *in it* [an derselben], is also *related to itself* as a one [als Eins]. It *is* thus an enclosing [umschliessende], encompassing [befassende] limit. The limit here does not at first distinguish itself from the something of its there-being, but as one is immediately this negative point itself. But being [das Sein], which is here limited, is essentially as continuity, by virtue of which [vermöge der] it transcends the limit and this one, and is indifferent to it. Real [reale], discrete quantity is in this way *a* quantity, or quantum – quantity as a there-being and a something [als ein Dasein und Etwas].

Because the one, which is limit, grasps [befaßt] the many ones of discrete quantity within itself, it posits them as equally sublated in it [in ihm]. It is the limit in continuity in general as such, and therefore the difference between continuous and discrete magnitude is irrelevant [gleichgültig] here. Or more correctly, it is the limit in the continuity of the one as much as the other; both pass over into being quanta.

Chapter 2: Quantum

Quantum – which is *first of all* quantity with a determinacy or limit in general – is in its completed determinacy *number*.

Secondly quantum differentiates itself into *extensive* quantum, in which the limit is in the form of [als] a restriction on the there-being multiplicity, and then, as this passes over into for-itself-being, into *intensive* quantum, degree [Grad], which, as *for-itself* [fürsich] and therein as an *indifferent* [gleichgültige] *limit* is just as immediately *outside-itself* [aussersich], has its determinacy in another quantum.

Thirdly, as this posited contradiction of being so simply determined within, and of having its determinacy outside it and referring outside itself for it [und für sie ausser sich zu weisen], quantum, as that which is in itself externally posited, passes over into quantitative infinity.

A. Number

Quantity is quantum, or has a limit; both as a continuous and as a discrete quantity. The difference of these kinds [Arten] has here initially no significance.

Quantity, as sublated for-itself-being, is already in and for itself [an und für sich selbst] indifferent to its limit. But this does not mean that the limit, or being a quantum, is indifferent to it; for it contains the one, the absolute determinate being [Bestimmtsein], within itself as its own moment, which is therefore, as posited in its continuity or unity, its limit, which however remains the one what it has become in general.

This one is thus the principle [Princip] of quantum, but the one *as of quantity* [als der Quantität]. *Firstly*, it is continuous, it is unity; *secondly*, it is the discrete, in-itself-being [an sich seiende] (as in continuous magnitude) or posited (as in discrete magnitude) multiplicity of ones which have equality with each other, that continuity, the same unity. *Thirdly*, this one is also the negation of the many ones as a simple limit, an exclusion of its other-being from itself, a determination of its being in contrast to [gegen] *other* quanta. The one is in this respect α) *self-relating*, β) *enclosing*, and γ) *other-excluding* limit.

Quantum, completely posited in these determinations, is *number*. The complete posited-being [Gesetztsein] lies in the there-being of the limit as *multiplicity* and thereby its being differentiated [Unterschiedensein] from unity. Number therefore appears as a discrete magnitude, but it equally has continuity in unity. It is therefore also quantum in perfect determinacy, since in it the limit is the determinate *multiplicity* that has the one, the absolutely [schlechthin] determinate, for its principle. Continuity, in which the one is only in itself [an sich], as sublated – posited as unity – is the form of indeterminacy.

Quantum only as such is limited in general, its limit is its abstract, simple determinacy. But since it is number, this limit is posited as manifold within itself. It contains the many ones that constitute [ausmachen] its there-being [Dasein], yet does not contain them in an indeterminate manner; rather, the determinacy of the limit falls within it. The limit excludes other entities [anderes Dasein], i.e. many other ones [andere Viele], and the ones enclosed by it [umschlossenen] are a specific amount [bestimmte Menge] – the *count* [Anzahl] with the respect to which, taken as discreteness in the way it is in number, the other is the *unity* [Einheit], the continuity of the same. *Count* and *unity* constitute the *moments* of number.

With respect to count it is to be seen more closely how the many ones of which it *consists* [besteht] are in the limit; with respect to count, the expression that it *consists* [besteht aus] of many is correct, for the ones are not in it as abrogated [aufgehoben], but are posited in it only with the excluding limit, to [gegen] which they are indifferent. But it is not this way towards them. In the case of there-being, the relation [Verhältniß] of the limit to it was at first placed [gestellt] in such a way that there-being remained as the affirmative on the this-side of its limit [das affirmative diesseits seiner Grenze], and this, the negation, was located [befand] outside its margin [Rande]. In the same way, the interruption [Abbrechen] of the many ones and the exclusion of other ones appears [erscheint] as a determination that falls outside the enclosed ones. But there it has already been shown [sich ergeben] that the limit penetrates [durchdringt; pervades] there-being, that it goes as far as there-being does, and that the something is thereby limited by its negation, i.e. is finite. – Thus, in the quantitative aspect [Quantitativen] of number, one imagines a hundred in such a way that the hundredth one alone limits the many so that they are a hundred. On the one hand, this is correct; but on the other hand, among the hundred ones, none has an advantage [Vorzug], since they are only equal; each is equally the hundredth; so they all belong to the limit through which the number is a hundred; for its determinacy it cannot do without any; the others

therefore do not constitute a there-being [machen kein Dasein aus] contra the hundredth one that is outside the limit or only within it, or in general diverse [verschieden] from it. The count [Anzahl] is therefore not a multiplicity in contrast to [gegen] the enclosing, limiting one, but itself constitutes this limitation which is a determinate quantum; the *many* constitute a *number* [Zahl], *one two* [Ein Zwei], one ten [Ein Zehn], one hundred [Ein Hundert], etc.

The limiting one is now the determinate being against [gegen] others, the distinguishing [Unterscheidung] of the number from others. But this distinguishing does not become qualitative determinacy, but remains quantitative, falling only within comparative *external* reflection [vergleichende äusserliche Reflexion]. The number remains as one, intro-reverted [in sich zurückgekehrt] and indifferent to [gegen] others. This *indifference* of the number to others is its essential determination; it constitutes its *intrinsic determinate being* [An-sich-bestimmtseyn], but at the same time *its own externality*. – It is thus a numerical one, as the absolutely determinate, which simultaneously has the form of simple immediacy, and to which the relation to others is completely external. Further, as *number* [Zahl], the one has the determinacy (insofar as it is *relation-to-another*) as a moment in it, in its *distinction of unity and count*, and the count is itself the multiplicity *of ones*, i.e. it is within itself [in ihm selbst] this absolute externality. – This contradiction of number or of quantum in general within itself is the quality of quantum, in whose broad determinations this contradiction develops itself.

B. Extensive and Intensive Quantum

Section 3: Measure

[to be continued]

Chapter 3: The Becoming of Essence

A. Absolute Indifference [Absolute Indifferenz]

Being is abstract indifference [Gleichgültigkeit]; and since it is supposed to be thought of for-itself as being [da sie für sich als Sein gedacht werden soll], we have employed the expression *indifference* [Indifferenz] for it – in which there is not supposed to be any kind [Art] of determinacy. Pure quantity is indifference as capable [fähig] of all determinations, but in such a way that the latter are external to it, and quantity from itself [sie aus sich] has no connection [Zusammenhang] with them. But indifference which can be called absolute is the one which, *through the negation* of all determinacies of being (quality and quantity and their first [zunächst] immediate unity, measure), *mediates itself with itself* into simple unity [sich mit sich zur einfachen Einheit vermittelt]. The determinacy is in the indifference only in the form of [als] a state [Zustand], i.e. something *qualitatively externality* [ein qualitatives Aeusserliches], which has the indifference for its *substrate* [as die Indifferenz zum *Substrate* hat].

But what has been thus determined as qualitative externality, is only something that disappears [ein Verschwindendes]. Since it is external in contrast to being [äusserlich gegen das Sein], it is the qualitative, since it is the opposite of itself, is only that which sublates itself [das sich aufhebende; what cancels itself out]. In this way, the determinacy is only posited in [an] the substrate as an empty differing [Unterscheiden]. But it is precisely this empty differing that is the indifference itself as result. And indeed, this indifference is the concrete [das Concrete], which mediates itself within itself [in ihm selbst...mit sich vermittelte] through the negation of all the determinations of being. As this mediation, it contains negation and relation [Verhältniß], and what was called ‘state’ is its immanent, self-to-self-relating differing [sich auf sich beziehendes Unterscheiden]. It is precisely the externality and its disappearing [Verschwinden] which makes the unity of being into indifference. Consequently, they are *inside* this indifference, which thereby ceases to be mere substrate and *in-it* [an ihr selbst] merely abstract.

B. Indifference as Inverse Ratio [Verhältniss] of Its Factors

Now we have to see how this determination that indifference has in-it [an ihr selbst] gets posited as being *for-itself* [fürsichseiend].

1. The reduction [Reduction] of proportions [Maaßverhältnisse], which were initially regarded as independent, founds [begründet] their *one substrate* [Ein Substrat]. This is their continuation [Continuirung] into each other, hence the one inseparable independent measure [das untrennbare Selbstständige] which is *wholly* present [ganz vorhanden] in its difference [Unterschieden]. Present [vorhanden] for this difference [Unterschied] are the determinations contained within it [the measure]: quality and quantity; and everything depends on how these are posited in it [an ihm]. But this is determined by the fact that the substrate is initially posited as a *result*, and *in-itself* [an sich] the mediation, but this is not yet posited *in-it* [an ihm] as such. For this reason, it is in the first place substrate and with respect to the determinacy, it is *indifference*.

Book II: Doctrine of Essence

The *truth* of *being* is *essence*.

Being is the immediate. Because knowledge [Wissen] wants to cognize [erkennen] the truth, what being is *in and for itself*, therefore it does not stop at immediacy and its determinations, but rather penetrates through it on the presupposition [Voraussetzung] that *behind* this being there is still something else than being itself, that this background constitutes the truth of being. This cognition [Erkenntnis] is a mediated knowledge [Wissen], for it is not to be found with and in essence immediately, but starts from an other, from being, and has a prior way to make, the way that leads beyond being [Hinausgehens über das Sein] or rather penetrates into it [Hineingehens in dasselbe]. First, only insofar as knowledge *recollects* [erinnert] itself from out of immediate being, only through this mediation does it find the essence. – Language has retained the connection to essence [German: Wesen, Old English: *wesan*, PIE: *h₂wes-] in the past tense [German: *gewesen*, *war*, *waren*, *wären*, etc., English: *was*, *were*] form of the verb ‘being’ [German: *sein*, English: *beon*, PIE: *bheue-]: *gewesen*. For essence is past – but timelessly past – being.

When this movement is represented as the path of knowledge, the beginning with being and the subsequent advance [Fortgang] which sublates it and arrives at essence as something mediated appears to be an operation [Tätigkeit] of cognition which is external to being and not concerning its own nature.

But this course is the movement of being itself. In [the theory of] being it was shown that it is in being’s own nature to recollect [erinnert] itself, to become essence by going-into-itself [Insichgehen].

If the absolute was first determined as *being*, now it is determined as *essence*. Cognition [Erkennen] cannot stop at the manifold of *there-being* [Dasein], nor with *being*, *pure being*. Immediately one is forced to the reflection, that this *pure being*, the *negation* [Negation] of all that is finite, presupposes a *recollecting* and a movement, which has purified [gereinigt] immediate there-being [Dasein] into pure being. Being is hereafter determined as essence, as such being in which everything determinate and finite is negated. Thus it is simple *determination-less* unity, from which the determinate has been taken away [hinweggenommen] in an *external* manner. This unity was something external to the determinate itself, and after this taking-away it still remains there as confronting it. Because it was not sublated in

itself, but only relatively, only in relation to this unity. – It was already recalled above, that if pure being is determined as the *epitome of all realities* [Inbegriff aller Realitäten], these realities are equally subject [unterliegen] to the nature of determinateness and abstract reflection, and this epitome [Inbegriff] is thus reduced to empty simplicity. Essence is in this manner only a product, an artifact [ein Gemachtes]. The *external* negation, which is abstraction, only lifts [hebt] the determinations of being *away* [hinweg] from what is left over as the essence. It deposits them, as it were, in a different place, leaving them being as before [läßt sie als seiende vor wie nach]. In this way, however, essence is neither *in itself* nor *for itself*; it is *through another*, through external abstractive reflection, and is *for another*, namely for abstraction, and in general for the being that remains opposed to it [das ihm gegenüberstehenbleibende Seiende]. Therefore in its determination it [the essence] is in itself dead, empty indeterminacy [Bestimmungslosigkeit].

As it has come to be here, however, essence is what it is, not through a foreign negativity, but through one which is its own: the infinite movement of being. It is *in-and-for-itself-being*: – absolute *in-itself-being* [absolutes Ansichsein]. Because it is indifferent to all determinateness of being, other-being [Anderssein] and relation-to-another have been absolutely [schlechthin] sublated. But neither is it only this in-itself-being [Ansichsein]; as sheer in-itself-being it would be only the abstraction of pure essence. Rather, it is just as essentially *for-itself-being* [Fürsichsein], it is itself this negativity, the self-sublation [das sich Aufheben] of other-being [Andersseins] and determinateness.

Essence, as the complete reversion [Rückkehr] of being into itself, is thus at first the indeterminate essence. The determinations of being are sublated in it; it contains them *in itself* [an sich], although not as posited *in it* [an ihm gesetzt sind]. The absolute essence in this simplicity with itself, has *no there-being*. But it must pass over [übergehen] into there-being, for it is *in-and-for-itself-being*; that means, it *distinguishes* the determinations that it contains *in itself*. Because it is self-repulsion [Abstoßen seiner von sich] or indifference-towards-itself [Gleichgültigkeit gegen sich], *negative* self-relation, it thus opposes itself to itself [setzt es sich somit sich selbst gegenüber], and is the infinite for-itself-being [Fürsichsein] only insofar as, in distinguishing itself from itself, it is in unity with itself. – This determining is of a different nature from the determining in the sphere of being, and the determinations of essence have a different character from the determinations of being. Essence is the absolute unity of in-and-for-itself-being; consequently its determining remains inside its unity and is neither becoming nor transition

[Übergehen], just as the determinations themselves are neither an *other* as other nor relation *to another*. They are self-subsistent [Selbständige], but therefore only as such, as are in unity with each other. – Because essence is first *simple* negativity, in order to give itself there-being [Dasein] and then for-itself-being [Fürsichsein], it now has to posit, in *its* sphere, the determinateness which it contains *only in itself* [i.e. implicitly].

Essence is in the *whole* what *quantity* was in the sphere of being: absolute indifference [Gleichgültigkeit] to limit. But quantity is this indifference in *immediate* determination, and the limit is in it as immediate external determinateness; quantity *passes over* into quantum; the external limit is necessary to quantity and is in it in the form of *being*. In essence, by contrast, the determinateness *is* not; it is only *posited* through the essence itself, not free, but only in *relation* to the unity of essence. – The negativity of essence is *reflection*, and determinations are *reflected* – posited by the essence itself and remaining in it as sublated.

Essence stands between *being* and *concept* and constitutes the middle itself and its movement is the *transition* from being into concept. Essence is *in-and-for-itself-being*, but in the determination of *in-itself-being* [i.e. implicitness], because its general determination is to come out of being, or to be the *first negation of being*. Its movement consists in positing negation or determination in being, thereby giving itself *there-being* [Dasein] and thus becoming as infinite for-itself-being, what it is in itself [was es an sich ist]. It thus gives itself its *there-being* [Dasein], which is the *same* [gleich] as its in-itself-being, and becomes the *concept*. For the concept is the absolute as it is absolutely, or in and for itself, in its there-being. But the there-being which essence gives itself is not yet there-being [Dasein] as it is in and for itself, but rather as the essence *gives* it to itself or as it gets *posited*, and thereby it is yet distinct from the there-being of the concept [Dasein des Begriffs].

First, essence *seems within itself* [scheint in sich selbst] or is *reflection*. Second, it *appears* [erscheint]. Third, it *manifests* itself [offenbart es sich]. In its movement it posits itself in the following determinations:

- I. as *simple*, in-itself-being [ansichseiendes] essence in its determinations inside it;
- II. as stepping forth into there-being [Dasein] or according to its existence [Existenz] and *appearance*;
- III. as essence which is one with its appearance, as *actuality*.

Section 1: Essence as Reflection Within Itself

Essence comes forth [herauskommen] from being. To that extent it is not immediately in and for itself but rather is a *result* of that movement. Or essence is in the first place taken as immediate, so it is a determinate there-being [Dasein] with another standing over against it. It is only *essential* there-being as against the *inessential*. But essence is in-and-for-itself-sublated being; what stands over against it is only *seeming* [es ist nur *Schein*]. Seeming, however, is essence's own positing [Allein der Schein ist das eigene Setzen des Wesens].

First, essence is *reflection*. Reflection determines itself; its determinations are a posited-being [Gesetztsein], which is at the same time reflection-into-self [Reflexion in sich].

Secondly, these reflection-determinations or *essentialities* are to be considered.

Thirdly, the essence, as the reflection of the determining into itself, makes itself into the *ground* and passes over into existence [Existenz].

Chapter 1: Seeming

Essence comes forth from being and seems [scheint] to stand over against the latter. *In the first place* this immediate being is *the inessential*.

However, *secondly*, it is more than the inessential, it is essenceless being, it is *seeming* [Schein].

Thirdly, this seeming is not an externality, an other to essence, but rather it is essence's own seeming [eigener Schein]. The seeming [Scheinen] of essence within itself is *reflection*.

A. The Essential and the Inessential

Essence is *sublated* being. It is simple equality with itself, but as the *negation* of the sphere of being in general. Thus it has immediacy over against it, as such from which it has *come to be* and which has preserved and maintained itself in this sublating. Essence itself is, in this determination, *being* essence, immediate essence [seiendes, unmittelbares Wesen]. And being is only negative relation to the essence, not in and for itself, and essence is a *determinate* negation. In this way, being and essence relate to each other as *others* in general, because *each has a being, an immediacy*, which are both indifferent [gleichgültig] to each other, and according to this being they stand in equal value.

But at the same time, being is, in opposition to essence, the *inessential*. And in contrast to essence it has the determination of something sublated. However, insofar as it comports itself to essence as an other in general, to this extent essence is not properly speaking [eigentlich] essence, but only a determine there-being [bestimmtes Dasein], *the essential*.

The distinction of essential and inessential has let essence relapse [zurückfallen] into the sphere of *there-being*; because the essence, as it is initially, is contrasted with being [das Sein] as an immediate being essence [als unmittelbares seiendes] and thus is determined only as an *other*. The sphere of there-being [Daseins] is thus taken what lies at the ground [zugrunde gelegt; i.e. hypokeimenon, subject]. And the fact that being is in this there-being as in-and-for-itself-being is a further determination external to there-being itself; just as, conversely, essence is indeed in-and-for-itself-being, but only in contrast to an other, in a *determinate* respect. – Insofar as, in a there-being [an einem Dasein], an *essential* and *inessential* element

are distinguished from each other, to that extent the distinction is an external positing, a dissociation [Absonderung] of one part from another part that does not affect the there-being itself [eine das Dasein selbst nicht berührende Absonderung]: a separation that falls in a *third*. It is therefore indeterminate, what belongs to the essential and what belongs to the inessential. It is some or other external respect and consideration which makes the distinction, and therefore the same content is seen sometimes as essential and other times as inessential.

If we look more closely, essence becomes something only essential as contrasted with an inessential because essence is only taken as sublated being or there-being. In this way essence is only the *first* negation, or the negation which *determinateness* is, the one through which being becomes only there-being, or there-being only an other. But essence is the absolute negativity of being; it is being itself, but not only determined as an *other*. It is rather being that has sublated itself both as immediate being and also as immediate negation, as negation that is afflicted with an other-being [Anderssein]. Being or there-being therefore has not preserved itself as something other than the essence is [Das Sein oder Dasein hat sich somit nicht als Anderes, denn das Wesen ist, erhalten]; and the immediate which is distinguished from essence is not a bare inessential there-being, but the immediacy which is null *in and for itself*; it is only a *nuisance* [Unwesen]: *seeming*.

B. Seeming [Schein]

1. Being is seeming. The being of seeming consists solely in the sublatedness [Aufgehobensein] of being, in its nullity. Seeming has this nullity in the essence, and outside its nullity, outside of essence, it *is not* [translator's emphasis]. Seeming is the negative posited as negative.

Seeming is all that remains of the sphere of being. But it still seems [scheint] to have an immediate side that is independent of essence, and to be an other of it in general. The *other* contains generally the two moments of there-being and not-there-being [Nichtdaseins]. The inessential, since it no longer has a being, what is left to it of other-being is only the *pure moment of not-there-being*; seeming is this *immediate* not-there-being, is in the determinateness of being in such a way that it only has there-being in relation to another, in its not-there-being. It is the non-self-subsistent [Unselbständige] which only *is* [translator's emphasis] in its negation. What is left to it is only the pure determinateness of *immediacy*; it is as the *reflected* immediacy, that is, which only is *mediately* through its negation, and which, over against this

mediation, is nothing other than the empty determination of the immediateness of not-there-being [Nichtdeseins].

– Thus is *seeming* the phenomenon [Phänomen] of skepticism, and also the appearance [Erscheinung] of idealism, is thus an *immediacy* which is neither a something [Etwas] nor a thing [Ding], and in general not an indifferent being [ein gleichgültiges Sein] that would be [wäre] apart from apart from its determinateness and relation to the subject. Skepticism did not allow itself to say, “*it is*.” And the modern idealism did not allow itself to regard cognitions [Erkenntnisse] as a knowledge of the thing-in-itself [Ding-an-sich]. Every seeming was in general supposed not to have any foundation [Grundlage] in being. The thing-in-itself was not allowed to enter into these cognitions. At the same time, however, skepticism admitted of manifold determinations for its seeming, or rather its seeming turned out to have the manifold richness of the world for its content. Likewise, idealism comprehends in itself [in sich] the full extent of these manifold determinations. That seeming and this appearance are *immediately* determined as manifold. This content, therefore, may well have no being, no thing, or thing-in-itself for its foundation; it remains for itself as it is; it has simply been transposed [übersetzt] from being to seeming, so that seeming has within itself those manifold determinations, which are being [seiende], are immediate, and are related to others [andere gegeneinander sind]. Seeming is thus itself something *immediately* determinate. It can have this or that content, but the content it has is not posited through itself, but rather has it immediately. The Leibnizian, or the Kantian or Fichtean idealism, or any other form – these have hardly advanced beyond skepticism, because they get no further than being as determinateness, as immediacy. *Skepticism* allows itself to be *given* the content of its seeming; it is *immediate* for it, what content it should have. The *Leibnizian monad* develops its representations out of itself, but it is not the generative and connective force, rather they rise up in it like bubbles; they are indifferent [gleichgültig], immediate in contrast to each other and therefore in contrast to the monad itself. Likewise, the *Kantian* appearance [Erscheinung] is a *given* [gegebener] content of perception [Wahrnehmung], it presupposes affections, determinations of the subject, which are immediate to each other and to the subject. The infinite ‘check’ [Anstoß] of *Fichtean* idealism may well have no thing-in-itself for its foundation, so that it is purely a determinateness of the ‘I’. But this determinateness is one which the ‘I’ makes its own, sublating its externality, and thus is at the same time an *immediate* determinateness, a *restriction* on the ‘I’, which the latter can transcend, but which

contains a side of indifference, such that although the restriction is in the 'I', nonetheless contains the latter's *immediate* non-being.

2. Seeming thus contains an immediate presupposition, an independent [unabhängige] side against the essence. But it does not have to be shown that seeming, insofar as it is distinguished from essence, sublates itself and goes back [zurückgeht] into essence; for being has gone back [zurückgegangen] into essence in its totality. Seeming is the in itself null [das an sich Nichtige]. It is only to be shown that the determinations which are distinguished from essence as determinations of essence itself, and further, that this *determinacy of essence*, which seeming is, is sublated in essence itself.

Seeming is constituted by the immediacy of *non-being*. But this non-being is not other than the negativity of essence in itself [an ihm selbst]. In essence, being is non-being. Its *nullity* in itself [an sich] is *the negative nature of essence itself*. But the immediacy or indifference [Gleichgültigkeit], which this non-being contains, is essence's own [eigene] absolute in-itself-being [Ansichsein]. The negativity of essence is its own self-equality or its simple immediacy and indifference. Being has preserved itself in essence, inasmuch as the latter has, in its infinite negativity, self-equality. Through this, essence itself is being. The immediacy that the determinateness has in seeming in contrast to essence is thus nothing other than essence's own immediacy; but not the being immediacy [nicht die seiende Unmittelbarkeit], but the absolutely mediated [schlechthin vermittelte] or reflected immediacy, which is seeming: – being, not as being but only as the determinateness of being in contrast to the mediation: being as moment.

These two moments: the nothingness [Nichtigkeit] but as persisting, and the being but as moment. Or: in-itself-being negativity [an sich seiende Negativität], and reflected immediacy. These constitute the *moments of seeming*; and hence the *moments of essence itself*. What is available [vorhanden] is not a seeming of being *in* essence, or a seeming of essence *in* being. The seeming in essence is not the seeming of another, rather it is *seeming in itself* [Schein an sich], *the seeming of essence itself*.

Seeming is essence itself in the determination of being. Essence has a seeming because it is internally *determinate* [bestimmt in sich], and thus is differentiated from its absolute unity. But this determinacy is equally absolutely sublated in itself [an ihm selbst]. For essence is the self-subsistent which *is* as self-mediated via its negation, which is itself. It is thus the identical [identische] unity of absolute negativity and

immediacy. – The negativity is negativity in itself [Negativität an sich], it is its self-relation, and thus the negativity is intrinsic immediacy [so ist sie an sich Unmittelbarkeit]. But the negativity is negative self-relation, self-repelling negating [abstoßendes Negieren ihrer selbst]; thus in-itself-being immediacy [an sich seiende Unmittelbarkeit] is the negative or *determinate* in contrast to it [the negativity]. But this determinacy is itself the absolute negativity, and this determining (which as determining is immediately the sublation of itself) is a reversion-into-itself [Rückkehr in sich ist].

Seeming is the negative which has a being, but in another, in its negation. It is the dependency [Unselbständigkeit], which is in itself [an ihr selbst] sublated and null. Thus it is the negative that goes back into itself [das in sich zurückgehende Negative], dependency as in itself dependent [an ihm selbst Unselbständige]. This *relation* of the negative or the dependency *to itself* is its *immediacy*; it is *other* than it; it is its determinacy against itself, or the negation contra the negative [Negation gegen das Negative]. But the negation contra the negative is as such only as self-relating negativity that relates only to itself [sich nur auf sich beziehende Negativität], the absolute sublation of determinacy itself.

Therefore *determinacy* – which in [the sphere of] essence is seeming – is infinite determinacy. Determinacy is merely the *self-coincident* negative [nur das *mit sich* zusammengehende Negative]. It is thus the determinacy which is, as such, independence, and is not determinate. – Conversely, independence as self-to-self-relating immediacy [sich auf sich beziehende Unmittelbarkeit] is likewise absolute determinacy and moment only as self-to-self-relating negativity. – This negativity, which is identical with immediacy, and thus the immediacy which is identical with negativity, is *essence*. Seeming is thus essence itself, but essence in a determinacy, but in such a way that it [the determinacy] is only a moment, and *essence* is the seeming of itself within itself [das *Wesen* ist das Scheinen seiner in sich selbst].

In the sphere of being, non-being *arises* [entsteht] as an *immediate* vis-à-vis [gegenüber] being which is likewise *immediate*, and their truth is becoming. In the sphere of essence there is first the essential and the inessential, and then essence and seeming. The inessential and seeming are the remnants of being. But these two, as well as the distinction of essence from them, consists solely in this: that essence is first taken as an *immediate*, i.e. not as it is in itself [an sich], namely not as the immediacy which is immediacy as pure mediation or as absolute negativity. That first immediacy is thus only the *determinacy* of immediacy. The sublation of this

determinateness of essence consists in nothing more than showing that the inessential is only seeming, and that the essence rather contains the seeming within itself [in sich selbst] as the infinite movement within itself [in sich], which determines its immediacy as negativity and its negativity as immediacy, and is thus the seeming [Scheinen] of itself in itself. Essence, in this its self-movement, is *reflection*.

C. Reflection

Seeming is the same as what *reflection* is, but it is reflection as *immediate*. For the seeming that has gone into itself [in sich gegangen] and is thus alienated from its immediacy, we have a word from an alien language: *reflection*.

Essence is reflection: the movement of becoming and transition, which remains within itself [in sich selbst bleibt], in which what is differentiated is absolutely determined as the in itself [an sich] negative, as seeming. – In the becoming of being, being lies at the ground of determinateness, and the determinateness is relation to *another*. The reflective movement by contrast is the other as *negation in itself* [Negation an sich], which only has a being as a self-relating negation. Or since this self-relation is just this negating of the negation [Negieren der Negation], thus what is present is *negation as negation*, as such a negation that has its being in its negatedness [Negiertsein], as seeming. The other is thus here not the *being with negation* or *limit*, but rather *negation with negation*. But the *first* which is against this other, the immediate or being, is only this very equality of the negation with itself, the negated negation, absolute negativity. This self-equality or *immediacy* is therefore not a *first* from which the beginning is made, and which would transition into its negation; nor is it a being substrate [ein seiendes Substrat], one that moves through the reflection; rather, the immediacy is just this movement itself.

The becoming in essence, its reflective movement, is thus the *movement from nothing to nothing and thereby back to itself*. Transitioning or becoming sublate themselves [hebt sich auf] in their transitioning; the other, which becomes in this transition, is not the non-being of a being, but the nothing of a nothing. And this, to be the negation of nothing, constitutes being [macht das Sein aus]. – Being is only as the movement of nothing to nothing, so it is essence. And essence does not *have* this movement *within itself* [in sich]; rather, the movement is absolute seeming itself [der absolute Schein selbst], the pure negativity, which has nothing outside it which it

would negate, but rather negates *only* its negative, a negative which *is* [translator's emphasis] only in this negating.

This pure absolute reflection, which is the movement of nothing to nothing, determines itself further.

It is *first, positing reflection*;

Secondly, it makes the beginning [macht den Anfang] of the *presupposed immediate* and is thus *external* reflection;

Third, however, it lifts this presupposition up [hebt sie auf], and because in the lifting-up of the presupposition it *simultaneously* presupposes as well, it is *determining* reflection.

1. Posing Reflection

Seeming is the null [nichtige] or essenceless; but the null or essenceless does not have its being an *other*, in which it seems; rather its being is its own equality with itself. This switching [Wechsel] of the negative with itself has determined itself as the absolute reflection of essence.

This self-to-self-relating negativity [sich auf sich beziehende Negativität] is thus the negating of itself. Hence it is in general just as much a *sublated* negativity as it is negativity. Or it is itself the negative and the simple equality with itself or immediacy. It consists, therefore, in being *itself* and *not itself*, and these indeed in one unity.

In the first place, reflection is the movement of nothing to nothing, and thus the negation that coincides with itself. This self-coincidence [Zusammengehen mit sich] is in general simple self-equality, immediacy. But this coincidence [Zusammenfallen, collapse] is not the transition of negation into self-equality as into its *other-being*; rather, reflection is the transition as sublation of transition; for it is the immediate coincidence of the negative *with itself*. Thus this coinciding [Zusammengehen] is *first* self-equality or immediacy. But *second* this immediacy is the equality of the *negative* with itself, and consequently self-negating equality: the immediacy, which is in itself [an sich] negative, the negative of itself, is to be this: what it is not.

The self-relation of the negative is therefore its reversion into itself [Rückkehr in sich]. It is the immediacy as the sublation of the negative, but immediacy which is

only this relation, or *reversion from a negative* [Rückkehr aus einem], and hence self-sublating immediacy. – This is *posited-being* [das Gesetztsein], immediacy purely as *determinacy* or as self-reflecting [sich reflectierend]. This immediacy, which is only the *reversion* of the negative into itself, – is that immediacy which constitutes the determinateness of seeming, from which the reflective movement previously seemed to begin [anzufangen schien]. Far from being able to start from this immediacy, the latter *is* rather *only as* [erst als; translator's emphasis] the reversion or as the reflection itself. Reflection is thus the movement which, by being reversion [Rückkehr], only therein is that which does the starting out [anfängt] or turning back [zurückkehrt].

It [reflection] is *positing* insofar as it is immediacy in the form of a reverting [die Unmittelbarkeit als ein Rückkehren ist]. For there is no other available [vorhanden], neither one from which it reverts nor into which it reverts [zurückkehrte]. It is, therefore, only as reverting or as the negative of itself. But further, this immediacy is sublated negation and sublated reversion into itself. Reflection, as the sublating of the negative, is the sublating *of its other*, the immediacy. Since it is the immediacy as a reverting, as a coinciding of the negative with itself, thus it is equally the negation of the negative as negative. Thus it is *presupposing*. – Or the immediacy is, as reverting, only the negative of itself; i.e. it is to be this: to be not immediacy. But the reflection is the sublating of the negative of itself, it is self-coinciding [Zusammengehen mit sich]. Reflection thus sublates its positing, and since it is, in its positing, the sublation of positing, therefore it is presupposing. – In presupposing, reflection determines the reversion-into-self [Rückkehr in sich] as the negative of itself, as that whose sublation is essence. It is its comportment towards itself [Verhalten zu sich selbst], but to itself as its own negative. Only in this way is it the self-to-self-relating negativity that abides in itself [insichbleibende]. Immediacy emerges generally only as reversion, and is that negative which is the seeming of the beginning [der Schein des Anfangs], the seeming which gets negated by the reversion. The reversion of essence is thus its self-repulsion. Or the reflection-into-self [Reflexion in sich] is essentially the presupposition of that from which it is the reversion.

It only by virtue of sublating its self-equality that essence is self-equality. It posits itself in advance of itself [setzt sich selbst voraus], and the sublation of this presupposing [Voraussetzung] is essence itself. Conversely, this sublation of its presupposing is the presupposing itself [die Voraussetzung selbst]. – Reflection thus *finds* [findet] an immediate *already there before it* [vor], beyond which it

transcends [überhinausgeht], and from which is the reversion. But this reversion is just the presupposing of what was discovered [Vorgefundenen]. This, what is discovered [Vorgefundene, the discovered thing], only *comes to be* by getting *left behind* [wird nur darin, daß es verlassen wird]. Its immediacy is sublated immediacy. – The sublated immediacy is, conversely, the reversion-into-itself [Rückkehr in sich], the *arrival* [Ankommen] of essence at itself [bei sich], at simple self-equal being. Therefore, this arrival-at-itself is the sublation of itself and the self-repelling presupposing reflection [sich von sich selbst abstoßende, voraussetzende Reflexion]; and its repulsion from itself is the arrival at itself.

Thus, according to the foregoing considerations, the reflective movement is to be taken as *absolute recoil* upon itself [absoluter Gegenstoß in sich selbst]. For the presupposition of the reversion-into-self [Rückkehr in sich], – that from which the essence comes to be [herkommt] and which *is* only as this recurrence [Zurückkommen] – is only in the reversion [Rückkehr] itself. The transcendence [Hinausgehen] of the immediate, which begins from the reflection, is rather only through this transcending, and the transcending of the immediate is the arrival at it. The movement, as a departure, turns itself around [wendet sich um] immediately into itself, and so is only self-movement – movement which comes from itself insofar as the *posited* reflection is *presupposing*, yet as *presupposing* reflection, is absolutely *positing* reflection.

Thus, reflection is itself and its non-being, and is only itself in that it is the negative of itself. For only in this way can the sublation [Aufheben] of the negative be at the same time a self-coincidence.

The immediacy which reflection, as sublation, presupposes for itself, is simply and solely a *posited-being*, something *in itself* [an sich] sublated, which is not diverse [verschieden] from the reversion-into-itself and is itself only this reverting. But it is at the same determined as a *negative*, as immediately contra [gegen] something, and thus contra another. In this way reflection is *determined*. Since, according to this determinateness, it *has* a presupposition and takes its start from the immediate as its other; it is *external reflection*.

2. External Reflection

Reflection as absolute reflection is the essence that seems within itself [das in ihm selbst scheinende Wesen], essence that posits only seeming, only posited-being,

prior to itself [setzt...voraus, presupposes]. As presupposing reflection it is immediately only positing reflection. But external or real [reale] reflection presupposes itself as sublated, as the negative of itself. It is, in this determination, doubled. At one time it is that which is presupposed [das Vorausgesetzte], or the reflection-into-itself [Reflexion in sich] which is immediate. At the other time, it is the negatively self-relating reflection. It relates itself to itself as to its non-being.

Thus, external reflection *posits* a being *prior* to itself [setzt also ein Sein voraus], *at first* not in the sense that the being's immediacy is only posited-being or moment. Rather in the sense that this immediacy is self-relation and the determinateness is only as moment. External reflection relates itself to its presupposition in such a way that this latter is the negative of reflection, but such that this negative is sublated as negative. – Reflection, in its positing, immediately sublates its positing; thus it has an *immediate presupposition*. Reflection thus *finds* this presupposition before it [vor], as something from which it starts, and from which it is the receding-into-itself [Zurückgehen in sich], the negating of its negative. But the fact that this, what gets presupposed [Vorausgesetzte], is something negative or posited – this is none of its business. That determinateness belongs only to positing reflection; whereas in the presupposing reflection, the posited-being only is something sublated. What the external reflection determines and posits in the immediate are determinations which are to that extent external to it. – In the sphere of being, external reflection was the infinite. The finite is regarded as the first, as the real, as the underlying subject [zugrunde Liegenden], and as abiding-subject [zugrunde Liegenbleibenden], which forms the starting point; and the infinite is the reflection-into-itself vis-à-vis the finite.

This external reflection is the syllogism [Schluß] in which the two extremes are the immediate and the reflection-into-itself. The middle term is the relationship between the two, the determinate immediate, such that the one part of the relation, the immediacy, only accords [zukommt] to one extreme; and the other part, the determinateness or negation, only accords to the other extreme.

But if we look more closely at the operation [Tun] of external reflection, it is *secondly* the positing of the immediate, which in this respect becomes the negative or the determinate. But external reflection is immediately also the sublating of this its positing. For it posits the immediate as *prior* to it [setzt das Unmittelbare voraus; presupposes it]. In negating, external reflection is the negating of its negating. But thereby it is just as much immediately *positing*, the sublating of the immediate

which is its negative. And this negative, from which it seemed to begin as from something foreign, only is in this beginning. In this way, the immediate is not only *in itself* [an sich] (i.e. for us or in our external reflection) *the same* as what the reflection is. Rather it is *posited* as the same. That is to say, the immediate is, through reflection, determined as the negative or other of reflection. But it is reflection itself which negates this determining. – The externality of reflection *vis-à-vis* [gegen] the immediate is consequently sublated. Its self-negating positing is the coinciding [Zusammengehen] of itself with its negative, with the immediate; and this coinciding is the essential immediacy itself [die wesentliche Unmittelbarkeit selbst]. – It is thus at hand [vorhanden], that external reflection is not merely external, but is equally the immanent reflection of immediacy itself. Or that that through which positing reflection is, is in-and-for-itself-being essence [was durch die setzende Reflexion ist, das an und für sich seiende Wesen ist]. In this way, external reflection is *determining reflection*.

3. Determining Reflection

Determining reflection is in general the unity of *positing* and *external* reflection. This is now to be considered more closely. –

1. External reflection begins from immediate being. *Positing* reflection begins from nothing. External reflection, which becomes determining, posits another in place of the sublated being, but this other is the essence. *Positing* [reflection] does not posit its determination in place of another; it has no presupposition. But just for this reason, it is not the completed, determining reflection. The determination which it [the positing reflection] posits is consequently *only* something posited. It is an immediate, but not equal to itself; rather, it is self-negating; it has absolute relation to the reversion-into-self [Rückkehr in sich], it is only in the reflection-into-self [Reflexion in sich], but it is not this reflection itself.

The posited [Das Gesetzte], is therefore an *other*, but in such a way that the self-equality of reflection is absolutely preserved. For the posited thing is only as something sublated, as relation to the reversion-into-itself. – In the *sphere of being*, *there-being* was being that had negation in it [an ihm], and being was the immediate base [Boden] and element [Element] of this negation, which was itself consequently immediate. In the *sphere of essence*, *there-being* corresponds to *posited-being* [Gesetztsein]. It is equally a *there-being* [ein Dasein], but its base is being as essence or as pure negativity. It [posited-being] is a determinateness or negation not as

being [als seiend], but rather as immediately sublated. *There-being* [Dasein] is *only posited-being*: this is essence's proposition about there-being [dies ist der Satz des Wesens vom Dasein]. On the one hand, posited-being stands in contrast to there-being, on the other hand to essence; and it is to be regarded as the middle which integrates [zusammenschließt] there-being with essence, and conversely, essence with there-being. – When one says, a determination is *only* a posited-being [or: only a proposition?], this can also have a double meaning: it is such in opposition either to there-being or to essence. In either case, there-being is taken as something higher than posited-being, and this latter is attributed [zugeschrieben] to external reflection, to the subjective. But in fact, posited-being is what is higher, because as posited, there-being is what it is in itself [an sich], as something negative, something referred absolutely only to the reversion-into-self. For this reason posited-being is *only* a posited-being in respect to the essence, as the negation of being-reverted-into-itself [Zurückgekehrtseins in sich selbst].

2. Posited-being is not yet a reflection-determination. It is only determinateness as negation in general. But positing is now in unity with external reflection. And in this unity the latter is absolute presupposing: i.e., the repulsion of reflection from itself or the positing of the determinateness *as its own*. Thusly, posited-being is, as such, negation. But as presupposed, it is also as reflected into itself. Posited-being is thus a *reflection-determination* [Reflexionsbestimmung].

The reflection-determination is differentiated from the determinateness of being, from quality. The latter is immediate relation to another in general. Posited-being is also relation to another, but to intro-reflectedness [Reflektiertsein in sich]. Negation as quality is negation as *being* [als seiend]. Being constitutes its ground and element. The reflection-determination by contrast has, for this ground, intro-reflectedness [hat zu diesem Grunde das Reflektiertsein in sich selbst]. Posited-being fixes itself for determination precisely because reflection is equality with itself in its negatedness [Negiertsein]. Its negatedness is therefore itself reflection-into-self. Determinations persists here not through being, but through its [the determination's] equality with itself. Because the being that bears [trägt] the quality is unequal to the negation, thus the quality is unequal in itself, and thus is a moment that passes over, disappears in another. By contrast, the reflection-determination is the posited-being as negation, negation which has negatedness for its ground, and is therefore within itself not unequal [in sich selbst nicht ungleich], and is therefore *essential*, non-transient determinateness. What gives consistence

[Bestehen] to it is the *self-equality of reflection*, which has the negative only as negative, as something sublated or posited.

On account of this reflection-into-itself, the reflection-determinations appear as free [erscheinen als freie] *essentialities* [Wesenheiten], floating [schwebende] in the void without mutual attraction or repulsion. In them, determinateness has become established and infinitely fixed [befestigt und unendlich fixiert] through the self-relation. It is the determinate that has subjugated [unterworfen] its transience [Übergehen] and its bare posited-being, or has bent its reflection-into-another round into reflection-into-itself [seine Reflexion in Anderes in Reflexion in sich umgebogen hat]. These determinations thereby constitute the determinate seeming as it is in essence, the essential seeming. For this reason [Grunde], determining reflection is the reflection that has come out of itself [außer sich gekommene Reflexion]. The self-equality of essence is lost [verloren] in the negation, and the negation is the predominant [die das Herrschende ist].

There are thus two sides to the reflection-determination, which are first of all to be distinguished. *Firstly*, reflection is posited-being, the negation as such. *Secondly*, it is reflection-into-self. According to posited-being, it is negation as negation, and this is already its unity with itself. But it is this unity only *in itself* [an sich], or it is the immediate as in itself sublative [an ihm aufhebend], as the other of itself. – To this extent, reflection is a determining that remains within itself [in sich]. Therein, essence does not exit from itself [geht darin nicht außer sich]. The distinctions are utterly [schlechthin] *posited*, taken back into essence. But according to the other side, they are not posited but rather reflected into themselves. Negation *as* negation is reflected into self-equality, not into its other, not into its non-being [Die Negation als Negation ist in Gleichheit mit ihr selbst, nicht in ihr Anderes, nicht in ihr Nichtsein reflektiert].

3. Now if we keep in mind that the reflection-determination is both inwardly reflected relation [reflektierte Beziehung in sich selbst] as well as posited-being, its nature is immediately illuminated. As posited-being, it is negation as such, a non-being in contrast to another, namely, to absolute reflection-into-self, i.e. to essence. But as self-relation it is reflected into itself. – This its reflection and that posited-being are distinguished. Its posited-being is rather its sublatedness. But its into-self reflectedness [Reflektiertsein in sich] is its persistence. Now insofar as the posited-being is simultaneously reflection-into-self, to that extent the reflection-determinateness is *relation to its other-being in itself* [die Beziehung auf ihr Anderssein

an ihr selbst]. – It is not as a being determinacy, a restful determinacy [seiende, ruhende Bestimmtheit], one which would be related [bezogen] to another in such a way that the relatum [Bezogene] and its relation [Beziehung] would be distinguished from one another, each a within-itself-being [ein Insichseiendes], a something [Etwas], which excludes from itself its other and its relation to this other. Rather, the reflection-determination is in itself [an ihr selbst] the *determinate side* and the *relation* of this determinate side as determinate, i.e., relation to its negation. – Quality, through its relation, passes over into another. Its alteration [Veränderung] begins in its relation [Beziehung]. The reflection-determination by contrast has taken its other-being back into itself [in sich]. It is *posited-being*, negation, but one which bends the relation to another back into itself [in sich zurückbeugt]; and negation which, equal to itself, is unity with itself and its other and thereby is *essentiality* [Wesenheit]. Thus it is posited-being, negation, but as reflection-into-itself it is simultaneously the sublatedness of this posited-being, infinite self-relation.

Chapter 2: Essentialities or Reflection-Determinations

Reflection is determinate reflection; thus, essence is determinate essence, or it is *essentiality*.

Reflection is the *seeming of essence within itself*. Essence as infinite reversion-into-itself is not immediate, but negative simplicity. It is a movement through distinct moments, absolute self-mediation. But in these moments it seems. The moments themselves are therefore into-self reflected determinations.

Essence is *first* simple self-relation: pure *identity*. This is its determination according to which it is rather lack of determination [Bestimmungslosigkeit].

Second, the real [eigentliche] determination is *difference* [Unterschied] – partly as external or indifferent distinction [gleichgültiger Unterschied], *diversity* [Verschiedenheit] in general, but partly as opposed [entgegengesetzte] diversity or as *opposition* [Gegensatz].

Third, as *contradiction* [Widerspruch], opposition is reflected into itself and withdraws into its *ground* [geht in seinen Grund zurück].

A. Identity

1. Essence is simple immediacy as sublated immediacy. Its negativity is its being [sein Sein]; it is self-equal in its absolute negativity, through which other-being and relation to another have vanished in themselves [an sich selbst] utterly vanished into pure self-equality. Essence is thus simple *identity* with itself.

This self-identity is the *immediacy* of reflection. It is not that self-equality which *being* is, nor which *nothing* is as well. Rather, it is the self-equality which has made itself into unity [welche als sich zur Einheit herstellende ist]; not a re-making [Wiederherstellen] from out of another, but rather this pure making [Herstellen] from and into itself [aus und in sich selbst]: the *essential* identity. It is in this respect not *abstract* identity, not one which has come into being [entstanden] through a relative negating that would have taken place outside it and would have merely separated off [abgetrennt] what it distinguishes from it, but otherwise leaving it as

simply *being* [seiend] outside it, same as before. Being, and all determinateness of being, has sublated itself, not relatively but in itself [an sich selbst].

[to be continued]

Chapter 3: Ground

Essence determines itself as ground.

Just as *nothing* was first in simple immediate unity with being, so also here the simple identity of essence is in immediate unity with its absolute negativity. Essence is only this its negativity, which is the pure reflection. It is this pure negativity as the reversion of being into itself. So it is *determinate, implicitly* [an sich] or for us, as the ground into which being dissolves itself. But this determinateness is not posited *through essence itself*. Or essence is not ground to the extent that it has not *itself* [translator's emphasis] posited its determinateness. But the reflection of essence consists in that it *posits* and *determines* itself as what it is *implicitly*, as a negative. The positive and negative constitute the essential determination [wesenhafte Bestimmung] in which essence is lost in its negation. These self-subsistent reflection-determinations sublate themselves [heben sich auf], and the determination which has fallen to the ground [zugrunde gegangene] is the true determination of essence.

Ground is thus itself *one of the determinations* of essence, but it is the last, rather only the sublated determination. In falling to the ground, the reflection-determination receives its true meaning: that it is the absolute recoil [absolute Gegenstoß] of itself into itself. Or that the posited-being which comes to [zukommt] essence, is only sublated posited-being, and conversely, that the posited-being of essence is only the self-sublated posited-being. Because it determines itself as ground, essence determines itself as not-determined [Nichtbestimmte], and only the sublating of its being-determined [Bestimmtseins] is its determining. – In this being-determined as the self-sublated [sich selbst aufhebenden], it is not something that has originated [herkommendes] from another, but rather is essence which is identical with itself in its negativity.

Insofar as one proceeds to the ground starting from determination, as from an immediate first (through the nature of the determination itself, which itself falls to the ground [zugrunde geht, perishes]), then the ground is initially something determined by that immediate first. But this determination is, on the one hand, as the sublating of the determining, the merely restored [wiederhergestellte], purified, or revealed [geoffenbarte] identity of essence, which the reflection-determination is *implicitly* [an sich]. On the other hand, as determining, this negating movement is

first the positing of that reflection-determinateness which appeared as the immediate, but which is only posited by the self-excluding reflection of ground, and therein only posited as something posited or sublated. – Thus essence, determining itself as ground, emerges only from itself. As *ground* therefore, it posits itself *as essence*. And insofar as it determines itself as essence, therein consists its determining. This positing is the reflection of essence, which *sublates* itself in its *determining*, on that side as *positing*, on this side as *positing of essence*, hence both in one operation [Tun].

Reflection is *pure mediation* in general. Ground is the *real mediation* of essence with itself. The former, the movement of nothing through nothing back to itself, is the reflection of *itself* in *another*. But because the opposition in this reflection does not yet have self-subsistence, thus the first which does the seeming [das Scheinende] is not a positive; nor is the *other*, in which it seems, a negative. Both are substrates, in fact [eigentlich] only of the imagination [Einbildungskraft]; they are not yet self-related. The pure mediation is only *pure relation*, without any relata [Bezogene]. Determining reflection indeed posits relata which are self-identical, but at the same time they are only *determinate relations*. Ground, by contrast, is real mediation, because it contains the reflection as sublated reflection. It is the essence that is *reverting-into-itself through its non-being* and *self-positing*. According to this moment of sublated reflection, what is posited receives the determination of *immediacy*, such immediacy as is self-identical outside the relation or outside its seeming. This immediacy is *being* as restored through essence: the non-being of reflection through which essence mediates itself. Essence reverts into itself as something that negates [als negierendes]. Therefore, in its reversion into itself, it gives itself the determinateness that, just for this reason, is the self-identical negative, the sublated posited-being. Consequently it is equally *being* [seiendes] as the identity of essence with itself as ground.

Ground is, *first, absolute ground*, in which essence is initially the foundation [Grundlage] in general for the ground-relation [Grundbeziehung]. But it more precisely determines itself as *form* [Form] and *matter* [Materie] and gives itself a *content* [Inhalt].

Second, ground is *determinate ground* as ground of a determinate content. Since the ground-relation externalizes itself in its realization, it passes over into *conditioning* mediation.

Third, ground posits a condition before it [setzt eine Bedingung voraus; i.e. presupposes]. But the condition equally posits the ground as prior [setzt...voraus].

The unconditioned [das Unbedingte] is their unity, *the cause in itself* [Sache an sich] which, through the mediation of the conditioning relation, passes over into existence [Existenz].

A. Absolute Ground

a. Form and Essence

Insofar as it recedes into the ground, the reflection-determination is a first, an immediate there-being [Dasein] in general from which the beginning is made. But there-being still has the meaning of posited-being and essentially *presupposes* a ground *before it*, in the sense that it rather does not really *posit* its ground, that this positing is a sublation of itself, and that the immediate is rather what is posited [Gesetzte] and the ground is the not-posed [Nichtgesetzte]. As we have seen, this presupposing is the positing that retrogresses back to what does the positing [das auf das Setzende rückschlagende Setzen]. As sublated determinate being [Bestimmtsein], the ground is not indeterminate. It is rather the self-determinate essence, but *determined as undetermined* or as sublated posited-being. *It is the essence which is identical with itself in its negativity.*

The *determinateness* of essence as ground is therefore double: it is the *ground* and the *grounded* [Begründeten]. The determinateness is *firstly* the essence as ground, determined as essence in contrast to posited-being, i.e. determined as *non-posed-being*. *Secondly*, it is the *grounded*, the immediate which however is not in and for itself: it is posited-being as posited-being. Consequently, this posited-being is likewise identical with itself, but the identity of the negative with itself. The self-identical negative and the self-identical positive are *now one and the same identity*. For the ground is the self-identity of the positive, or even the self-identity of the posited-being too. The grounded is the posited-being as posited-being, but this its reflection-into-itself is the identity of the ground. – This simple identity, therefore, not itself the ground, for the ground is the essence *posited* as the not-posed *in contrast to posited-being*. As the unity of this determinate identity (the ground) and the negative identity (the grounded), it is *essence in general* distinct from its *mediation*.

This mediation, compared with the foregoing reflections from which it derives, is first of all not pure reflection. Pure reflection is not distinguished from essence itself, and does not yet have the negative in it, and consequently also does not

contain the self-subsistence of the determinations. In ground as the sublated reflection, however, they do persist [Bestehen]. – Nor is it the determining reflection, whose determinations have essential self-subsistence [Selbständigkeit], for determining reflection has gone to the ground [im Grunde zugrunde gegangen], and in the unity of ground these determinations are only posited ones. – This mediation of the ground is thus the unity of pure reflection and determining reflection. Their determinations or positeds [das Gesetzte] have persistence [Bestehen], and conversely the persistence of the determinations is a posited persistence. Because its persistence likewise is something posited, or has determinateness, thus the determinations are distinguished from their simple identity, and constitute *form* in contrast to essence.

Essence *has* a form, and the determinations of this form. First, as ground, essence a firm [feste] immediacy or is *substrate*. Essence as such is one with its reflection and is indistinguishable from its movement. It is not essence, therefore, through which this movement runs [durchläuft]; nor is essence that from which the movement begins as from a first. This circumstance considerably complicates the exposition [Darstellung] of reflection in general; for one cannot properly say, that *essence* goes back into itself [geht in sich selbst zurück], that *essence* seems within itself [scheint in sich], because essence is neither *before* [vor] nor *within* [in] its movement. This movement has no foundation [Grundlage] on which it proceeds [an der sie sich verläuft]. A relatum [Bezogenes] first emerges in the ground following on the moment of sublated reflection. Essence as the related-to substrate [bezogene Substrat] is, however, determinate essence; and by virtue of this posited-being it has the form essentially in it [hat es wesentlich die Form an ihm]. – The form-determinations by contrast are now determinations *as in the essence* [als an dem Wesen]; *essence underlies them* [es liegt ihnen zugrunde] as the indeterminate, which in its determination is indifferent to the form-determinations; in the essence the form-determinations have their inward reflection [sie haben an ihm ihre Reflexion in sich]. The reflection-determinations ought to have their persistence [Bestehen] in themselves [an ihnen selbst] and be self-subsistent [selbständig]; but their self-subsistence is their dissolution [Auflösung]; they have their subsistence [dieselbe] in another; but this dissolution is itself this self-identity or the ground of the persistence, which they have given themselves.

In general, everything *determinate* belongs to form. The determinate is a form-determination to the extent that it is something posited and consequently distinguished from *that of which it is the form*. The determinateness as *quality* is one

with its substrate [Substrat], being [sein]. Being is the immediately determinate, which is not yet distinguished from its determinateness – or which in it is not yet reflected into itself, such that this is only one that is being [eine seiende], not yet something posited [eine gesetzte]. Further, the form-determinations of essence, as the reflection-determinacies [Reflexionsbestimmtheiten], are in their more precise determination, the previously considered moments of reflection: *identity* and *difference*, the latter partly as diversity [Verschiedenheit], partly as *opposition* [Gegensatz]. But further, the *ground-relation* also belongs to it [the form-determinations of essence], because through it, though it is indeed the sublated reflection-determination, essence becomes at the same time something posited [zugleich als Gesetztes ist]. On the other hand, the identity that ground has within it [in sich] does not belong to form, because the posited-being as sublated and the and the posited-being as such – ground and grounded – is a single reflection that constitutes *essence as the simple foundation* [Grundlage], which is the *persistence* of form. But this persistence is *posited* in ground; or this essence is essentially determinate and thus once again the moment of ground-relation and form. – This is the absolute reciprocal-relation [Wechselbeziehung] of and essence, that essence is the simple unity of ground and grounded, but in which the essence is itself determined or negative, and distinguishes [unterscheidet] itself as foundation [Grundlage] from the form, but at once itself becomes ground and moment of the form.

Form is therefore the completed whole of reflection. It also contains this determination of reflection: to be sublated. Therefore, just as much as it is a unity of its determining, it is to that extent *related* [bezogen] to its sublatedness [Aufgehobensein], *to another*, which is not itself form, but rather form is *in it* [sondern an dem sie sei]. As the *essential* self-relating negativity in contrast to that simple negative, form is *positing* and *determining*. The simple essence on the other hand is the indeterminate and *inoperative* [untätige] foundation, in [an] which the form-determinations have consistence [Bestehen] or reflection-into-self. – External reflection tends to stop at this distinction between essence and form; it [the distinction] is necessary, but the distinguishing itself is their unity, just as this unity of ground is essence repelling itself from itself and the making of itself into a posited-being. Form is the absolute negativity itself, or the negative absolute self-identity, by virtue of which essence is not being, but essence. This identity, abstractly taken, is essence in contrast to form; just as the negativity, taken abstractly as posited-being, is the sole form-determination. But the determination, as we have seen, is in its truth the total self-to-self-relating negativity, which as this

identity is thus intrinsically the simple essence [das einfache Wesen an ihr selbst]. Thus, form has essence in its own identity [an ihrer], as essence has absolute form in its [an seiner] negative nature. Therefore one cannot ask, *how form comes to essence* [zum Wesen hinzukomme], because form is only the seeming of essence within itself [in sich selbst], its own indwelling [inwohnende] reflection. Thus, form is intrinsically [an ihr selbst] the into-self-reverting reflection [in sich zurückkehrende Reflexion] or the identical essence. In its determining, form makes the determination into posited-being as posited-being. – Therefore, form does not determine essence, as if it were truly presupposed, separated from essence; for then it would be the inessential, restless [rastlos] reflection-determination that has gone to the ground [zugrunde gehende]. Hence it is rather itself the ground of its sublating, or the identical relation of its determinations. That form determines essence thus means that, in its distinguishing [Unterscheiden], form sublates this distinguishing, and is the self-identity that essence is as the persistence of determination. Form is the contradiction of being sublated in its posited-being and in this sublatedness having its persistence. It is accordingly ground as the essence that, in being determined or negated, is self-identical.

These distinctions of form and essence are therefore only *moments* of the simple form-relation itself. They are now to be considered more closely and firmly fixed [festzuhalten]. Determining form [bestimmende Form] relates itself to itself as sublated posited-being; it thereby relates itself to its identity as to another. Form posits itself as sublated; it therefore posits its identity *before it* [setzt...voraus]. According to this moment, essence is the indeterminate, to which form is another. It is thus not essence which is absolute intrinsic reflection [So ist es nicht das Wesen, das die absolute Reflexion an ihm selbst ist], but rather essence *determined* [bestimmt] as formless identity: it is *matter* [Materie].

Section 2: Appearance

[to be continued]

Chapter 1: Existence [Existenz]

The proposition of ground expresses: *everything that is has a ground, or is something posited, mediated*. Likewise, the proposition of existence is to be established and expressed thusly: *everything that is, exists* [existiert]. The truth of being is not a first immediate something [ein erstes Unmittelbares], but rather the essence [Wesen] that has emerged into immediacy.

But further, if it is said that *whatever exists has a ground, and is conditioned*, then it must equally be said: *what exists has no ground, and is unconditioned*. For existence is the immediacy which has emerged from the sublating of the mediation that results from the relation of ground and condition, and which in emerging sublates this emerging itself.

Insofar as the *proofs of the existence of God* can be mentioned here, it should be remembered in advance [voraus zu erinnern] that, in addition to immediate being, as well as existence [Existenz] which is being that proceeds [hervorgeht] from essence, there is yet another form of being [ein fernerer Sein], the one that proceeds [hervorgeht] from the concept, namely *objectivity*. – Proof in general is *mediated cognition* [vermittelte Erkenntnis]. The various forms of being [Arten des Seins] call for [fordern] or contain their own form of mediation, and so will the nature of proof vary accordingly. The *ontological proof* wants to depart [ausgehen] from the concept, it lays for its ground the epitome of all realities [Inbegriff aller Realitäten], wherein under reality [Realität] existence [Existenz] is also subsumed. Its mediation is therefore that of the syllogism, which is not yet under consideration here. We already commented above on Kant's objection to the ontological proof; it was noted that by *existence* [Existenz], Kant understands *determinate* there-being [*bestimmte* Dasein], through which something [etwas] enters into the context of aggregate experience [gesamten Erfahrung]. That means: into the determination of an *other-being* [Andersseins] and into relation to *another*. Thus, some existent [Existierendes etwas] is mediated through an other existent [durch anderes], and existence in general [Existenz überhaupt] is thus the side of its mediation. But its mediation does not lie in what Kant calls the concept [Begriff], namely in what is taken as simply *self-relating*. In the abstract self-identity, the opposition [Entgegensetzung] is omitted [weggelassen]. Now the ontological proof would have to show [darzustellen] that the absolute concept, that is the concept of God, comes to determinate existence [bestimmten Dasein], to mediation [Vermittlung]; or how

the simple essence [einfache Wesen] mediated itself with the mediation [sich mit der Vermittlung vermitteln]. This occurs through the aforementioned subsumption [Subsumtion] of existence [Existenz] under its universal, namely reality [Realität] which is supposed [angenommen] to

[to be continued]

Section 3: Actuality

Actuality is *unity of essence and existence* [Existenz]; in it, *formless* essence [gestaltlose Wesen; form is here meant in the sense of visible shape, appearance] and *baseless* appearance [haltlose Erscheinung] – or indetermination subsistence [bestimmungslose Bestehen] and insubstantial manifoldness [bestandlose Mannigfaltigkeit] – have their truth. *Existence* is indeed immediacy which has proceeded [hervorgegangene] from ground; but it has not yet posited the form in it [sie hat die Form noch nicht an ihr gesetzt]; in determining and forming [formiert] itself, it is *appearance*. And in further forming [fortbildet] this subsistence [Bestehen], determined only as reflection-in-another [Reflexion-in-anderes], into reflection-into-self [Reflexion-in-sich], it [the subsistence, i.e. the essence] becomes *two worlds* [Welten], two *totalities of content*, of which the one is determined as reflected into itself, the other as reflected in another. The essential correlation [Verhältnis], however, exhibits [stellt dar] their *form-relation* [Formbeziehung],

Book III: Doctrine of Concept

Of the Concept in General

What the *nature of the concept* [Nature des Begriffs] is, cannot be stated [angegeben] immediately any more than the concept of any other object [Gegenstand] can be put forth [aufgestellt] immediately. It might seem that in order to state the concept of an object, the logical [das Logische] is presupposed [vorausgesetzt], and that this therefore cannot have something else prior to [zu seinem Voraus] and cannot itself be a derivative [ein Abgeleitetes sein], just as logical propositions in geometry, when they are applied to magnitudes [Größe] and used in that science, are premised [vorangeschickt] in the form of *axioms* [Axiomen], *undervived* [unabgeleiteten] and *undervivable* cognition-determinations [Erkenntnisbestimmungen]. Now although the concept is to be view not only as a subjective presupposition [Voraussetzung] but rather as *absolute foundation*, it can only be this insofar as it has *made* itself the foundation. The abstract immediate is indeed a *first* [ein Erstes]; but as this abstraction [Abstrakte] it is in fact a mediacy [ein Vermitteltes], whose foundation, if it is to be grasped [gefaßt] in its truth, is therefore first to be sought. This must indeed be an immediate, but one that has made itself immediate through [aus; out of] the sublation of mediation.

From this side, the concept is to be regarded initially and in general as *the third to being and essence*, to *immediacy and reflection*. Being and essence are in this respect the moments of its *becoming*. The concept however is their *foundation and truth* as the identity in which they are submerged [untergegangen] and contained. Because the concept is their *result*, they are contained in it, but not longer as *being* and as *essence*. These determinations they are only insofar as they have not yet gone back [zurückgegangen] into this [the concept] their unity.

The *objective logic*, which considered *being and essence*, in fact [eigentlich] constitutes the *genetic exposition of the concept*. More precisely, *substance* [Substanz] is already the *real essence* [reale Wesen] or the essence insofar as it is united [vereinigt] to being and entered [getreten] into actuality [Wirklichkeit]. Concept thus has substance as its immediate presupposition; substance is *in-itself* [an sich] what the concept is as *manifestation* [Manifestiertes]. The *dialectical movement of substance* through causality and reciprocity is hence the immediate *genesis of the concept* through which its

becoming is exhibited [dargestellt]. But the *becoming* of the concept, like becoming everywhere, has the meaning, that it is the reflection of what passes over into its *ground*, and that what immediately appears [anscheinend] to be *other*, into which the first has passed over, constitutes its *truth*. Concept is thus the *truth* of substance, and since *necessity* is the specific mode of relation of substance [Verhältnisweise der Substanz], thus *freedom* shows itself to be the *truth of necessity* and the *mode of relation of the concept*.

The proper [eigene], necessary further determination [Fortbestimmung] of substance is the *positing* [Setzen] of that which is *in-and-for-itself*[?]. Now the *concept* is this absolute unity of being and reflection, that the *in-and-for-itself-being* [das An-und-für-sich-sein] only is [erst dadurch ist; translator's emphasis] through the fact that it is just as much *reflection* or *posited-being*, and that *posited-being* is *in-and-for-itself-being*. – This abstract result is elucidated through the exhibition of its concrete genesis; it contains the nature of the concept; but it had to precede its treatment [Abhandlung]. The main moments of that exposition may be briefly summarized here:

Substance is the *absolute*, the *in-and-for-itself-being* actual [das an-und-für-sich-seiende Wirkliche]. *In-itself*[an sich] as the simple identity of possibility and actuality; absolute essence [absolutes Wesen] that contains all actuality and possibility *within it* [in sich]. *For-itself*[für sich] [it is] this identity as absolute *power* [Macht] or utterly self-to-self-relating *negativity*. – The movement of substantiality [Substantialität] which gets posited through these moments, consists in the following,

1) That substance, as absolute power or self-to-self-relating *negativity*, differentiates [unterscheidet] itself into a ratio [Verhältnis], in which those initially simple moments are in the form of [als] *substances* and originary *presuppositions*. – The specific ratio [bestimmte Verhältnis] itself is that of a *passive* substance – the originariness [Ursprünglichkeit] of simple *in-itself-being* [An-sich-seins] which, powerless and non-self-positing, is merely originary [ursprüngliches] *posited-being* – and an *active* substance, the *self-to-self-relating* negativity, which as such has posited itself as another and relates itself *to this other*. This other is precisely the passive substance, which the active substance, in the originariness of its power, has *presupposed* [vorausgesetzt; i.e. set forth as prior to itself] in the form of [als] a condition [Bedingung]. – This presupposing [Voraussetzen] is to be grasped [fassen] in the sense that the movement of the substance itself is initially in the

form [unter der Form] of one of the moments of its concept, namely the *in-itself-being* [An-sich-seins]; that the determinacy of one of the *substances* of the ratio [im Verhältnis stehenden Substanzen] is also the determinacy of this *ratio* itself.

2) The other moment is the *for-itself-being*, or power [oder daß die Macht] positing *itself* [sich...setzt] as *self-to-self-relating* negativity, whereby it once again abrogates [wieder aufhebt] *what was presupposed* [das Vorausgesetzte wieder aufhebt]. – The active substance is the *cause* [Ursache]. The cause *acts* [wirkt]. That means it is now the *positing*, whereas before it was the *presupposing*, that a) power is also given the *seeming* of power, and posited-being is also given the *seeming* of posited-being. What in the presupposition was the *originary* [Ursprüngliches], becomes in causality, *through the relation to another*, what it is in-itself [was es an sich ist]. The cause begets [hervorbringt] an effect, and indeed in [an] another substance. It [the cause] is henceforth power *in relation to another*, it *appears* [erscheint] as cause, but *is* cause only through this *appearing*. b) The effect encounters [tritt an] the passive substance, through which the latter now also appears as *posited-being*, but only *is* [translator's emphasis] passive substance therein [i.e. in the appearance].

3) But there is more present here than just this *appearance*, namely a) the cause acts on [wirkt an; could also be 'affects'] the passive substance, the former changes the latter's vocation [Bestimmung]; but this is the posited-being, otherwise there is nothing in it [an ihr] to change. But the other vocation [Bestimmung] which it receives is causality [Ursächlichkeit]. Passive substance therefore becomes the cause, power, and operation [Tätigkeit]. b) The effect [Wirkung] is posited in it [an ihr] by the cause. But what is posited by the cause is the cause itself, which is self-identical in the effectivity [Wirken]. It is this which posits itself in the place of the passive substance [sich an die Stelle...setzt]. – Likewise with regard to active substance, a) the effectivity [Wirken] is the translation [Übersetzen] of the cause into the effect, into its other, the posited-being, and b) in the effect the cause shows [zeigt] itself as what it is. The effect is identical with the cause, it is not an other. In the effectivity [Wirken], the cause thus shows the posited-being to be what it [the cause] essentially is. – Thus on both sides, the identical side as well as the negative *relation of the other to it*, each becomes the *opposite* of itself. But each becomes this opposite so that the other, and thus also each, *remains self-identical*. – But both, the identical and the negative relation, are one and the same. The substance is only self-identical in its opposite, and this constitutes the absolute identity of the substances which are posited as two [der als zwei gesetzten Substanzen]. The active substance is manifested as cause or original [ursprüngliche] substantiality through its action,

i.e. by positing itself as the opposite of itself, which is at the same time the sublation of its *presupposed other-being*, the passive substance. Conversely, through the exertion [Einwirken], the posited-being is manifested *as* posited-being, the negative *as* negative, thus the passive substance as *self-to-self-relating* negativity, and the cause simply merges [zusammengehen] with itself in this other of itself. Through this positing, the originariness [Ursprünglichkeit] that is *presupposed* or is *in-itself-being* [an sich seiende] becomes *for-itself*. But this in-and-for-itself-being [An-und-für-sich-sein] is only possible because this positing is just as much a *sublation* of what is presupposed [Vorausgesetzten], or the absolute substance has returned [zurückgekommen] to itself only *from* and *in its posited-being* and therefore is absolute. This reciprocity [Wechselwirkung; or: interaction] is hereby the appearance that sublates itself again: the revelation [Offenbarung] of the *seeming* of causality, in which the cause is *as* cause, that *it is seeming* [worin die Ursache *als* Ursache ist, daß *er Schein ist*]. This infinite reflection-within-self [Reflexion in sich selbst], that the in-and-for-itself-being only is because it is a posited-being [daß das An-und-Fürsich-sein erst dadurch ist, daß es Gesetztsein ist], is the *completion of substance*. But this completion is no longer *substance* itself, but rather something higher, the *concept*, the *subject*. The transition of the ratio of substantiality [Substantialitätsverhältnisses] happens through its own immanent necessity and is nothing more than the manifestation of itself, that the concept is its truth and freedom is the truth of necessity.

Division

According to the foregoing considerations, concept shows itself to be the unity of *being* and *essence*. Essence is the *first negation* of being, which thereby became *seeming*. Concept is the *second*, the negation of this negation, and therefore the restoration of being, but as the infinite mediation and negativity of being within itself [desselben in sich selbst]. – In the concept, therefore, *being* and *essence* no longer have the determination in which they are as *being* and *essence*, nor are they only in this unity in such a way that each *seems* in the other. Consequently, concept does not differentiate [unterscheidet] itself into these determinations. It is the truth of the substantial ratio [substantiellen Verhältnisses] in which being and essence achieve their fulfilled self-subsistence [Selbständigkeit] and determination through each other. The truth of substantiality [Substantialität] proved itself to be *substantial identity* [substantielle Identität], which is equally and only as *posited-being*. Posited-

being is *there-being* [Dasein] and *distinction* [Unterschieden]. In the concept, in-and-for-itself-being has thus obtained an appropriate and true there-being [ein sich gemäßes und wahres Dasein erreicht]. For that posited-being [Gesetztsein] is itself in-and-for-itself-being. This posited-being constitutes the distinction of the concept within itself [in ihm selbst]. And because it *is* immediately in-and-for-itself-being, its *distinctions* are each of them *the whole concept; universal* [allgemeine] *in their determinateness and identical* [identisch] *with their negation*.

This is now the concept of the concept. But it is *at first only* its concept – or it is itself at first *merely concept*. Because it is in-and-for-itself-being insofar as it is posited-being, or because it is absolute substance insofar as it reveals [offenbart] the *necessity* of distinct substances as *identity*, therefore this identity must itself posit what it is. The moments of the movement of the correlation of substantiality ratio [Substantialitätsverhältnisses], through which the concept has *come to be* [geworden ist], and the reality thereby exhibited [die dadurch dargestellte Realität], are only in transition to the concept. That reality is not yet *the concept's own* determination, one that has emerged [hervorgegangene] from it. That reality fell into the sphere of necessity, whereas the concept's own [reality] can only be its free determination, an existence with which it [the concept] is identical with itself, whose the moments are themselves concepts, and *posited* by the concept itself.

At first, therefore, the concept is only *implicitly* [an sich] the truth. Because it is *only something inner*, it is equally *only something outer*. It is *first* in general an *immediate*, and in this shape [Gestalt] its moments have the form [Form] of *immediate, fixed* [feste] *determinations*. It appears as the *determinate concept*, as the sphere of the bare *intellect* [Verstandes]. – Because this form [Form] of immediacy is a there-being [Dasein] which is not yet adequate [angemessenes] to the nature [Natur] of the concept, because the latter is the freedom [das Freie] that relates itself only to itself [sich nur auf sich selbst beziehende]. It [the form of immediacy] is therefore an *external* form, in which the concept is not as a being in-and-for-itself [als An-und-für-sich Seiendes], but rather can *only* count as something *posited*, something *subjective*. – The shape of the *immediate* concept constitutes the standpoint, according to which the concept is a subjective thinking, an external reflection on the thing itself [der Sache]. This stage [Stufe] thus constitutes *subjectivity* or the *formal concept*. Its externality appears [erscheint] in the *fixed being* [festen Sein] of its determinations, whereby each arises separately [für sich] an isolated, qualitative something, which only *is* [translator's emphasis] in external relation to its other. But the *identity* of the concept, which is precisely the *inner* or *subjective* essence of its determinations, sets

them in dialectical motion, through which their isolation [Vereinzelung] is sublated, and with it also the separation of the concept from the thing itself [Sache] is sublated, and what emerges as their truth is *totality*, which is the *objective concept*.

Second, the concept in its *objectivity* is the in-and-for-itself-being cause itself [die an- und- für-sichseiende Sache selbst]. Through its necessary further determination [Fortbestimmung], the *formal* concept makes itself into the thing itself and thereby loses the correlation [Verhältnis] of subjectivity and externality that it had to it. Or, conversely, objectivity is the *real concept* [reelle Begriff] that has *emerged* from its *inwardness* and transitioned [übergegangen] into there-being [Dasein]. – In this identity with the thing, the concept thus has a there-being that is *its own* and *free*. But this is still an *immediate*, not yet *negative* freedom. United with the thing [Eins mit der Sache], the concept is *submerged* in it; its distinctions are objective existences [Existenzen], in which the concept itself is again the *inner*. As the soul of objective there-being [Daseins], the concept must give itself the form of subjectivity that it had immediately as *formal* concept. Therefore, now *in the form* of freedom [des Freien] which it lacked in objectivity, the concept confronts objectivity and in so doing it makes the identity, the one that it has with it *in and for itself as objective concept*, into a *posited* identity.

In this consumation [Vollendung], wherein the concept has the form of freedom even in its objectivity, the concept is the *adequate concept* [adäquate Begriff], the *idea*. *Reason* [Die Vernunft], which is the sphere of the idea, is self-uncovered truth [sich selbst enthüllte Wahrheit], in which the concept has its absolutely adequate realization [schlechthin ihm angemessene Realisation], and is free insofar as it recognizes [erkennt] its objective world in its subjectivity, and its subjectivity in that objective world.

Section 1: Subjectivity

Concept is at first the formal concept, the concept in the beginning or as the immediate concept. – In the immediate unity its difference or posited being [Gesetztsein] is *first* simple and only a *seeming* [Schein], so that the moments of the difference are immediately the totality of the concept and are simply the *concept as such*.

But *second*, because it is absolute negativity, it thus dirempts [dirimiert] itself and posits itself as the *negative* or *other* of itself; and indeed, because it is at first the immediate concept, this positing or differentiating [Unterscheiden] has the determination [Bestimmung] that the moments are indifferent to each other and each is for itself; its unity in this *division* [Teilung] is still only external *relation*. Thus, as the *relation* of its moments posited as independent and indifferent, it is *judgment*.

Third, although the judgment contains the unity of the concept that was lost in its independent moments, this unity is not *posited*. It becomes so through the dialectical movement of the judgment, which thereby becomes *inference* [Schluss], and this is the fully posited concept because in the inference, its moments as *independent* extremes are posited as well as [ebensowohl] their *mediating unity* [vermittelnde Einheit].

But since this unity itself, as the unifying middle [Mitte] and the moments as independent extremes, are at first immediately opposed to each other [gegenüberstehen], therefore this contradictory relation [Verhältnis] which takes places in the *formal inference*, sublates itself, and the *completion* [Vollständigkeit] of the concept passes over into the unity of *totality*, the *subjectivity* of the concept into its *objectivity*.

Chapter 1: Concept

The faculty of concepts [Vermögen der Begriffe] is usually expressed [ausgedrückt] as the *intellect* [Verstand]. Intellect is in that respect distinguished from the power of *judgment* and the faculty of inference, which is formal *reason* [formellen Vernunft]. But it is with *reason* especially that intellect is contrasted; in that case, however, it does not mean the faculty of the concept in general, but rather of *determinate* concepts, whereby the view prevails that the concept *only* something *determinate* [nur ein Bestimmtes]. If intellect in this sense is distinguished from the formal power of judgment and formal reason, then it is to be taken as the faculty of the *singular* [einzelnen] determinate concept. For judgment and inference or reason are themselves, as formal, only a *thing of the intellect* [nur ein Verständiges] since they stand under the form of abstract conceptual determinacy [abstrakten Begriffsbestimmtheit]. Here, however, the concept is not at all to be regarded as merely abstract and determinate [bloß Abstrakt-Bestimmtes]. The intellect [Verstand] is therefore to be distinguished from reason [Vernunft], only in that it is the faculty of the concept in general.

This universal concept, which is now to be considered here, contains the three moments of *universality*, *particularity*, and *singularity*. The difference and the determinations which the concept gives itself in the differentiating [Unterscheiden] constitute the side [machen die Seite aus] which was previously called *posited being* [Gesetztsein]. Since in the concept this posited being is identical with in-and-for-itself-being [An-und-Für-sichsein]

Section 3: The Idea

The idea is the *adequate* [adäquate] concept, the objectively *true* or the *true as such*. If anything has truth, it has its through its idea, *something has truth only insofar as it is idea*. – The expression: ‘idea’ has often been used otherwise in the philosophy, and in ordinary life, for ‘concept’, indeed for a bare *representation* [Vorstellung]. “I have no idea about this lawsuit, this building, this neighborhood,” expresses nothing more than the *representation*. Kant was the one who liberated [vindiziert] the expression ‘idea’ to mean ‘concept of reason’ [Vernunftbegriff]. – Now according to Kant the concept of reason is supposed to be the concept of the *unconditioned* [Unbedingten], but *transcendent* [transzendent] with regard to appearances [Erscheinungen]; that is, *no adequate empirical use* [Gebrauch] can be made of it. Concepts of reason are supposed to serve for *comprehension* [Begreifen] of perceptions [Wahrnehmungen], those of the intellect [Verstandesbegriffe] for the *intellection* [Verstehen] of them. – In fact, however, if these latter really are *concepts*, then they are *concepts* – things will get comprehended [begriffen] by them; and an *intellection* [Verstehen] of perceptions will be a *comprehending* [ein Begreifen sein]. But if intellect is only a determining of perceptions through such determinations as, e.g., whole and part, force [Kraft], cause [Ursache], and so on, then this means only a determining by means of reflection, just as by *intellect* [Verstand] only can only mean the determinate *representation* of a fully determinate sensuous [Sinnlichen] content. As when someone is being shown the way, that at the end of the forest he must turn left, he replies: “I understand [Ich verstehe].” Then *intellect* means only a grasp [Fassen] in representation [Vorstellung] and memory [Gedächtnis]. Also, ‘concept of reason’ is a somewhat awkward expression, for the concept is in general something rational [Vernünftiges]. And insofar as reason is distinguished from intellect and from the concept as such, so it is the totality of the concept and objectivity. – In this sense the idea is the *rational*. It is the unconditioned, because only that has conditions which essentially refers to an objectivity, but not an objectivity that it has itself determined, but one which still confronts it in the form [Form] of indifference [Gleichgültigkeit] and externality, just as external purpose [Zweck] still had conditions.

Now if we reserve the expression ‘idea’ for the objective or real [realen] concept, and we distinguish it from the concept itself, and even more from mere representation, then it is still more necessary to reject that estimation of the idea according to which it is taken for something unactual [Unwirkliches], and of truth

thoughts it is said that *they are only ideas*. If *thoughts* are something merely *subjective* and contingent, then they certainly have no further value. But in this they are not inferior to temporal and contingent [zufälligen] actualities, which likewise have no further value than that of contingencies and appearances. But if, on the contrary, the idea is not supposed to have the value of truth, because it is *transcendent* [transzendent] with respect to appearances, because no object [Gegenstand] in the sensuous world can be found that is congruent to it, then this is a peculiar misunderstanding, since objective validity [objektive Gültigkeit] is being denied to it on the basis that it lacks precisely what makes of appearances the *untrue being* of the objective world [objektiven Welt]. In regard to practical ideas, Kant does recognize that “nothing can be more harmful and unworthy of a philosopher than the *plebian* [pöbelhafte] appeal to *experience* which allegedly contradicts the idea. Such contradiction would not exist [existieren] at all if, e.g., political institutions [Staatsanstalten] were set up at the right time in accordance with ideas, and if *crude concepts*, crude because they were drawn [geschöpft] from experience, had not usurped the place of ideas thus thwarting all good intentions.” Kant regards the idea as something necessary, as the goal [Ziel], which must be set up as the *archetype* [Urbild] for a maximum, and to which the state [Zustand] of actuality [Wirklichkeit] must be brought ever nearer.

But since the result has been yielded, that the idea is the unity of concept and object, the true, thus it is not to be considered only as a *goal* to be approximated, but which itself always remains a kind of *beyond*. Rather, everything actual [Wirkliche] only *is* insofar as it has the idea in it [in sich] and expresses [ausdrückt] it. The object [Gegenstand], the objective [objektive] and subjective world in general, is not such that it only *ought to be congruent* with the idea [sollen mit der Idee nicht bloß kongruieren]. Rather, it is itself the congruence [Kongruenz] of the concept and reality [Realität]. A reality that does not correspond to the concept is mere *appearance*, the subjective, the contingent, the arbitrary, which is not the truth. When it is said that there is no object [Gegenstand] in experience that is completely congruent to the *idea*, the latter is opposed to the actual as a subjective standard. But what an actual thing is truly supposed to *be*, if its concept is not in it and its objectivity is not at all appropriate to this concept, this is impossible to say, for it would be nothing. Indeed, the mechanical and chemical object [Objekt], like the spiritless subject, and the spirit conscious only of finitude and not of its essence, do not, according to their differentiated natures, have their concept existing [existierend] in them *in its own free form*. But they can *be* [translator's emphasis] something true in general only insofar as they are the unity of their concept and

reality [Realität], of their soul and their body. Likewise with the state, the church, etc., when the unity of their concept and their reality is dissolved, they cease to exist [existieren]. The human being [Mensch], the living thing, is dead when soul and body separate in them [in ihm trennen].

[to be continued]

Chapter 1: Life

The idea of life concerns such a concrete and, if you will, real object [Gegenstand] that, according to the ordinary view [Vorstellung] of logic, we seem to have overstepped its bounds entirely. If logic were to contain nothing but empty, dead thought-forms, then there could be no question of logic having such content as the idea or life. But if absolute truth is the object [Gegenstand] of logic, and *truth as such* is essentially *in cognition* [im Erkennen], then *cognition* must at least be dealt with.

Chapter 3: The Absolute Idea

The absolute idea, as it has arisen here, is the identity of the theoretical and the practical idea [der theoretischen und der praktischen], each of which is for-itself one-sided, the idea itself only as a sought-for beyond and an unattained goal – each is therefore a synthesis of striving [Synthese des Strebens], each having as well as not having the idea within it [in sich], each passing from one to the other without bringing the two thoughts [Gedanken] together, but rather remaining [stehenbleibt] at the point of their contradiction. As the rational [vernünftige] concept which in its reality [Realität] only coincides with itself [mit sich selbst zusammengeht], the absolute idea is (on account of this immediacy of its objective identity) on the one hand a return [Rückkehr] back to *life*. On the other hand, it has just as much sublated this form of its immediacy and contains within itself [in sich] the highest opposition [Gegensatz]. Concept is not only *soul*, but rather free, subjective concept which is for-itself and therefore has *personality* [Persönlichkeit] – the practical in-and-for-itself-determined objective concept, which as person is inscrutable [undurchdringliche], atomic subjectivity – but which is not, all the same, exclusive singularity [ausschließende Einzelheit], but rather for-itself *universality* and *cognition* [Erkennen], and in its other [in seinem Anderen] has *its own* objectivity [Objektivität; i.e. goal, purpose, telos] for an object [Gegenstand; i.e. thing, res, etc., standing over against it]. All else is error [Irrtum], obscurity [Trübheit], opinion [Meinung], striving [Streben], caprice [Willkür], and perishability [Vergänglichkeit]. The absolute idea alone is *being*, imperishable *life*, *self-knowing truth*, and is *all truth*.

The absolute idea is the sole object [Gegenstand] and content [Inhalt] of philosophy. Since it contains *all determinacy* within itself, and since its essence is to return to itself [zu sich zurückzukehren] through its self-determination [Selbstbestimmung] or particularization [Besonderung], it thus has various shapes [Gestaltungen], and the business of philosophy is to recognize it [the absolute idea] in them. Nature and Spirit are in general different modes [Weisen] of exhibiting [darzustellen] *its there-being* [ihr Dasein]; art and religion are its diverse modes of apprehending itself [sich zu erfassen] and giving itself an appropriate there-being [angemessenes Dasein]. Philosophy has the same content and purpose as art and religion, but it is the highest mode of apprehending [erfassen] the absolute idea, because its mode, the concept, is the higher. It therefore grasps [faßt] the shapes of real and ideal finitude as well as of infinity and holiness [Heiligkeit] and

comprehends them and [sic] itself. The deduction [Ableitung] and knowledge [Erkenntnis] of these particular [besonderen] modes is now the further business of the particular philosophical sciences. The *logicality* [das Logische] of the absolute idea can also be called a *mode* of it; but *mode* designates [bezeichnet] a *particular* variety [Art], a *determinacy* of form, whereas logicality [das Logische] is the universal mode [allgemeine Weise], in which all particular modes are sublated and enveloped [eingehüllt]. The logical idea [logische Idee] is the idea itself in its pure essence [reinen Wesen], as it is in simple identity, shut up [eingeschlossen] in its concept, and not yet entered into *seeming* [Scheinen] in a form-determination. Logic thus exhibits the self-movement of the absolute idea only as the originary [ursprüngliche] *word*, which is an *utterance* [Äußerung; also: expression], but one which, because it is, has immediately vanished again as an external [die als Äußeres unmittelbar wieder verschwunden ist, indem sie ist]. The idea is thus only in this self-determination: *to examine itself* [sich zu vernehmen]. The idea is in pure *thought*, wherein difference is not yet *other-being*, but is and remains perfectly transparent to itself. – The logical ideal thus has for its content its own self as *infinite form: form* which rather constitutes the opposite of *content*, inasmuch as the latter is form-determination which has gone into itself [in sich gegangene] and been sublated in identity in such a way that this concrete identity stands opposed to the identity which has been explicated [entwickelten; unfolded, developed] as form; content has the shape of an other and a givenness [Gegebenen] against the form, which as such stands simply in *relation*, and whose determinacy is at the same time posited as seeming [als Schein gesetzt]. – The absolute idea itself has more precisely this for its content: that the form-determination is its own complete totality, the pure concept. Now the *determinacy* of the idea and the whole progression [Verlauf] traversed by it, has constituted the object [Gegenstand] of logical science; and from this progression [Verlauf] the absolute idea has proceeded [hervorgegangen] *for-itself*. But the absolute idea has for-itself shown itself to be this: that the determinacy does not have the shape of a *content*, but simply [schlechthin] as *form*; that the idea is hereafter the utterly [schlechthin] *universal idea*. What is left to be considered here, therefore, is not a content as such, but rather the universal aspect [das Allgemeine] of its form – that is, the *method*.

Method can initially appear to be merely the *manner* [Art und Weise] of cognition [Erkennens], and this is in fact its nature. But as method, the manner is not only an *in-and-for-itself-determined* modality of *being* [Modalität des Seins]; rather, as a modality of cognition it is posited as determined through the *concept* and as form, insofar as form is the soul of all objectivity [Objektivität] and all otherwise

determined content has its truth in form alone. If the content is again taken as given to the method and as being of its own peculiar nature, then in such a determination method is – like the logical realm [das Logische] in general – a merely *external* [äußerliche] form. But against this assumption appeal can be made not only to the ground-concept of the logical [Grundbegriff vom Logischen] but also to the entire progression [Verlauf] itself, in which all the shapes of a given content [gegebenen Inhaltes] and of objects [Objekte] came up in it, and had their transition [Übergang] and untruth [Unwahrheit] shown. It was also shown that no given object [Objekt] is capable of being the foundation [Grundlage] to which absolute form would relate [verhielte] as only an external and accidental determination [Bestimmung]; and that on the contrary the absolute form has proven [erwiesen] itself to be the absolute foundation [Grundlage] and ultimate truth [letzte Wahrheit]. From this progression method has come forth [hervorgegangen] as the *self-knowing concept* that has *itself* (being the absolute, both subjective and objective) for its object [Gegenstand], and consequently it has come forth as the pure correspondence [Entsprechen] of concept and reality, as an existence [Existenz] which is its [the concept's] own self [eine Existenz, die er selbst ist].

What is to be considered as method here is only the movement of the *concept* itself, whose nature has already been cognized [erkannt]; but it now has *firstly* the additional *meaning* that the *concept is all* [alles], and its movement is the *universal absolute operation* [allgemeine absolute Tätigkeit], the self-determining and self-realizing movement. The method is therefore to be recognized [anzuerkennen] as the unconstrained [ohne Einschränkung], universal, internal and external way [Weise], and as the utterly infinite power [Kraft], which no object (insofar as it presents [präsentiert] itself as external to, distant from, and independent of reason [Vernunft]) could offer resistance, or be of a particular nature [besonderen Natur] opposed to it, and could not be penetrated [durchdrungen] by it. It [method] is therefore *soul and substance*, and something is only comprehended and known [gewußt] in its truth when it is *completely subjugated to the method*. It is the method proper to each and every subject matter [Sache], because its operation [Tätigkeit] is the concept. This is also the truer meaning [Sinn] of its *universality*; according to reflection-universality [Reflexions-allgemeinheit] it is only taken as the method for *all*; whereas according to universality of the idea it is also the manner [Art und Weise] of cognition [Erkennens] the *subjectively* self-knowing [sich wissenden] concept, as the *objective* manner or rather the *substantiality of things* [Substantialität der Dinge], i.e. of concepts insofar as they initially appear as *others* to *representation* and *reflection*. It [method] is therefore not only the highest *power* [Kraft] of reason

[Vernunft] (or rather the *only* and absolute *power* of reason) but also reason's highest and sole *drive* [Trieb]: namely to find [finden] and recognize [erkennen] itself *through itself in everything*. – Hence, *secondly*, we have the *difference of the method from the concept as such*, the *particularity* [Besondere] of the method. As the concept was considered for-itself, it appeared in its immediacy; the *reflection* or *the concept doing the considering* [der ihn betrachtende Begriff] fell on the side of *our* knowing [Wissen]. Method is this knowing [Wissen] itself, for which the concept is not only object [Gegenstand] but as its own subjective deed [Tun], as the *instrument* [Instrument] and means [Mittel] of the cognizing operation [erkennenden Tätigkeit], distinct from this operation and yet as its own essentiality [Wesenheit]. In enquiring cognition [suchenden Erkennen] the method likewise occupies the position of a *tool* [Werkzeug], as a means [Mittel] that stands on the side of the subject, relating it to the object [Objekt]. The subject is in this syllogism the one extreme and the object is the other extreme, and through its method the subject consolidates [schließt...zusammen; also: amalgamate, synergize, bind together] itself with the object, without however consolidating itself *with itself*. The extremes remain diverse because subject, method, and object are not posited as the *one identical concept*. The syllogism is therefore only formal; the premise in which the subject posits the form on its own side as its method is an *immediate* determination and therefore contains the determinations of the form – as we have seen, of definition, division, and so forth – as matters of fact [Tatsachen] *discovered* [vorgefundene] *in the subject*. In true cognition [Erkennen] by contrast, method is not only a mass [Menge] of certain [gewisser] determinations, but rather the in-and-for-itself-determinateness [An-und-für-sich-Bestimmtsein] of the concept, and the concept is the middle term [Mitte] only because it equally has the significance [Bedeutung] of the objective [Objektiven], which thus in the conclusion [Schlußsatz] does not only acquire [erlangt] an external determinacy through the method, but is rather posited in its identity with the subjective concept.

1. What constitutes the method are the determinations of the concept itself and their relations, which are now to be considered in their significance [Bedeutung] as determinations of the method. – To do this we must *first* begin from the *beginning*. We have already spoken of it [the beginning] at the very beginning of the logic, and also in the context of subjective cognition [subjektiven Erkennen]; we showed that, when not made capriciously [willkürlich] and with categorical unconsciousness [kategorischen Bewußtlosigkeit], and though it indeed seems to present many difficulties, it is nevertheless of a very simple nature. Because it is the beginning its content is an *immediate*, but one which has the meaning [Sinn] and form [Form] of

abstract universality. Whether it is a content of *being* or of *essence* or of the *concept*, inasmuch as it is an *immediate* it is thereby something *assumed* [Aufgenommenes], *discovered* [Vorgefundenes], *assertoric* [Assertorisches]. But first of all it is not an immediate of *sensuous intuition* or *representation*, but of *thinking*, which due to its immediacy can also be called a *supersensory* [übersinnliches], *inner intuition*. The immediate of sensuous intuition is a *manifold* [Mannigfaltiges] and a *singular* [Einzelnes]. Cognition [Erkennen] is, however, conceptual thinking [begreifendes Denken], its beginning is thus *only in the element of thought*, a *simple* and *universal*. – This form has been discussed already in the context of [the topic of] definition. At the beginning of finite cognition, universality was likewise recognized as an essential determination, but only as thought- and concept-determination in opposition to being. In fact, this *first* universality is an *immediate* universality and thus likewise has the meaning of *being*, for being is precisely this abstract self-relation. Being requires no further derivation [Ableitung], as if it belonged to the abstraction of definition only because it has been taken out of sensuous intuition or elsewhere, and insofar as it can be pointed at [monstriert]. This pointing and deducing [Herleiten] involve a *mediation* that is more than a mere beginning, and is a kind of mediation that does not belong to thinking conceptuality [denkenden Begreifen], but is rather the elevation [Erhebung] of representation, of empirical and ratiocinative [räsonierenden] consciousness to the standpoint of thinking. According to the prevailing opposition of thought or concept [Gedanken oder Begriff] and being [Sein], it is regarded as an important truth that being does not belong to thinking on its own [jenem für sich noch kein Sein zukomme], and that being has ground of its own independent of thought. But the simple determination of *being* is in-itself so poor [so arm an sich] that, if only for that reason, there is no need to make much fuss [Aufhebens] about it; the universal is immediately itself this immediate [ist unmittelbar selbst dieses Unmittelbare], because as abstract it is also only abstract self-relation, which is being. In fact, the demand that being be exhibited has a further, inner meaning, which involves more than just this abstract determination: it is the demand for the *realization of the concept* [Realisierung des Begriffs] in general, which is not contained in the *beginning* but is rather the purpose and business of the entire subsequent development of cognition. Moreover, inasmuch as the *content* of the beginning is to be justified [gerechtfertigt] and verified [beglaubigt] as true [Wahres] or correct [Richtiges] through a pointing out [Monstrieren] in inner or outer perception [Wahrnehmung], to that extent it is no longer the *form* [Form] of universality which is meant, but rather its *determinacy* [Bestimmtheit], about which more in a moment. The verification [Beglaubigung] of the *determinate content*, with which the beginning is made, seems to lie *behind* it. But

in fact it is to be regarded as an advance [Vorwärtsgehen] if it is to belong to conceptual cognition [begreifenden Erkennen].

The beginning [Anfang] thus has, for the method, no other determinacy than this: to be simple and universal. This is precisely the *determinacy* that makes it deficient. Universality is the pure, simple concept, and the method, as the consciousness of this concept, knows that universality is only a moment and that in it the concept is not yet determined in-and-for-itself. But with this consciousness that would want to carry the beginning further only for the sake of the method, the method would be a formal affair [ein formelles], posited in external reflection. But since it [the method] is the objective [objektive], immanent form [Form], thus the immediacy of the beginning must be a lack [Mangelhafte] *in the beginning itself* [an ihm selbst], endowed [begabt] with a *drive* [Triebe] to carry itself further [weiterzuführen]. But in the absolute method the universal has the value not of a mere abstraction but of the objective-universal [Objektiv-Allgemeine], i.e. the *in-itself concrete totality*, but which is not yet *posited*, not yet *for-itself*. Even the abstract universal as such is, in the concept (i.e., considered in its truth), not only the *simple*, but as *abstract* it is already *posited* burdened with a *negation*. For this reason, *there is* [es gibt] nothing so simple and abstract, neither in *actuality* [Wirklichkeit] nor in *thought* [Gedanken], as one commonly imagines [vorstellt]. Such simplicity is a mere *intention* [Meinung], that has its ground solely in the unconsciousness [Bewußtlosigkeit] of what is in fact present [vorhanden]. – Earlier we determined the beginning as immediate. The *immediacy of the universal* is the same as what is here expressed as *in-itself-being* without *for-itself-being* [Ansichsein ohne Fürsichsein]. – One may well say, therefore, that every beginning must be made with the *absolute*, just as every advance is only the exhibition [Darstellung] of it insofar as the *in-itself-being* [i.e. the implicitness] is the concept. But because the absolute is at first only *in-itself* [i.e. implicit], it is equally *not* the absolute, nor is it the posited concept, and also not the idea; because these are precisely this [denn diese sind eben dies]: that the *in-itself-being* is only an abstract, one-sided moment. The advance is therefore not a kind of *overflow* [Überfluß]; this is what it would be if the beginning were in truth already the absolute. The advance rather consists in that the universal determines itself and is *for-itself* the universal, i.e. equally a singular and a subject. Only in its completion [Vollendung] is it the absolute.

It can also be recalled here that the beginning, which is *in-itself* a concrete totality, as such can also be *free* and its immediacy can have the determination [Bestimmung] of an *external there-being* [äußerlichen Daseins]. The *germ of living things* [Keim des

Lebendigen] and the *subjective purpose* [subjektive Zweck] in general, have shown themselves to be such beginnings; hence both are themselves *drives* [Triebe]. The non-spiritual and non-living by contrast are concrete concepts only as *real possibilities* [reale Möglichkeit]. *Cause* [Ursache] is the highest stage [Stufe] in which the concrete concept, as the beginning [als Anfang] in the sphere of necessity, has an immediate there-being [Dasein]. But this is not yet a subject, which as such maintains [erhält] itself in its actual realization [wirklichen Realisierung]. The *sun*, for example, and in general all non-living things, are determinate existences [bestimmte Existenzen], in which the real possibility remains an *inner* totality whose moments are not *posited* in them in subjective form and, insofar as they are realized, they attain an existence [Existenz] through *other* corporeal individuals [Körperindividuen].

2. The concrete totality which makes the beginning, contains within itself [in ihr selbst] the beginning of the advance [Fortgehens] and the development [Entwicklung]. As concrete, the totality is *differentiated* [unterschieden] within itself [in sich]; but because of its *initial immediacy*, this differentiation is at first a *diversity* [Verschiedene]. However, as self-to-self-relating universality, as subject, the immediate is also the *unity* of this diversity. – This reflection is the first stage of the further progression [Weitergehens] – the emergence [Hervortreten] of *difference* [Differenz], *judgment* [Urteil], *determining* in general [das Bestimmen überhaupt]. What is essential is that the absolute method finds and recognizes [erkennt] the *determination* [Bestimmung] of the universal within the latter itself [in ihm selbst]. The procedure [verfährt] of the intellectual finite cognition [verständige endliche Erkennen] here is to take up again, equally externally, what it had left out in the generation [Erzeugen] of the universal by a process of abstraction. The absolute method, by contrast, does not behave like external reflection, but gets the determine element [das Bestimmte] from its own object [ihrem Gegenstand selbst], for the method is itself the object's immanent principle and soul. – This is what Plato demanded of cognition [Erkennen], *that it think* [betrachten] *things in and for themselves*. This means, on the one hand, that it should thinking things in their universality, but on the other hand also that it should not wander away from them, and grasp instead only circumstances [Umständen], examples [Exempeln], and comparisons [Vergleichungen], and so forth; rather, thinking should keep the things themselves in view, and it should bring to consciousness solely what is immanent in them. – The method of absolute cognition [absoluten Erkennens] is to this extent *analytic*. The fact that the method *finds* the further determinations of its initial universal [ihres anfänglichen Allgemeinen] within the latter itself [in ihm],

this is the absolute objectivity [Objektivität] of the concept, of which the method is the certainty [Gewißheit]. – Equally so, the method is *synthetic* because its object [Gegenstand], though immediately determined as *simple universal*, nevertheless shows itself to be an *other* by virtue of the determinacy that it has in its very immediacy and universality. However, this relation of diverse elements [Beziehung eines Verschiedenen], which the object [Gegenstand] thus is in-itself, is no longer the a synthesis as this is understood [gemeint] with regard to finite cognition [endlichen Erkennen]. It is completely distinguished from this synthetic element [diesem Synthetischen] on account of its no less thoroughly analytic determination in general, the fact that the relation is one within the *concept*.

This no less synthetic than analytic moment of *judgment*, through which the initial universal [anfängliche Allgemeine] determines from itself as the *other of itself*, is to be called *the dialectical moment* [das Dialektische]. *Dialectic* is one of those ancient sciences that has been the most misunderstood [verkannt] by modern metaphysics, and also in general by popular philosophy both ancient and modern. Diogenes Laërtius said of *Plato* that, just as *Thales* was the father [Urheber] of natural philosophy and *Socrates* of moral philosophy, so *Plato* was the father of the third science belonging to philosophy, of *dialectic* – a contribution for which he was highly esteemed by the ancients, but one which is often disregarded by those who talk about him the most. Dialectic has often been regarded as an *art*, as if it rested on a subjective *talent* and did not belong to the objectivity [Objektivität] of the concept. The shape it obtains in the Kantian philosophy, and with what result, has already been shown in determinate examples of that philosophy's view. It must be regarded as an infinitely important step that dialectic is once more being recognized as necessary to reason [Vernunft], although the result to be drawn from this is the opposite of what emerged from Kant's philosophy.

Besides the fact that dialectic usually appears as something accidental, it usually takes the following more precise form. Some object – e.g. the world [Welt], motion [Bewegung], point [Punkt], etc. – is shown to have some determination – e.g. according to the other of objects [Gegenstände] mentioned: finitude in space or time, being in this place [an diesem Orte sein], absolute negation of space – but then further it is shown to have the opposite determination – e.g., infinite in space and time, not being in this place, relation to space and hence spatiality. The older Eleatic school primarily employed its dialectic against motion [Bewegung]; *Plato* often against the representations and concepts of his time, especially against those of the Sophists, but also against the pure categories and reflection-determinations

[Reflexionsbestimmungen]. The later, educated [gebildete] skepticism extended it not only to the immediate so-called matters-of-fact of consciousness [Tatsachen des Bewußtseins] and the maxims of ordinary life, but also to all scientific concepts. Now the conclusion drawn from dialectic of this kind is in general the *contradiction* and *nullity* of the asserted claims. This, however, can have a double meaning: it can be taken in the objective [objektiven] sense that the *object* [Gegenstand] that contradicts itself in this way cancels itself out and is null [sich aufhebe und nichtig sei] – this was, for example, the conclusion [Folgerung] of the Eleatics, according to whom e.g. the world, motion, the point, etc. are denied *truth* [Wahrheit abgesprochen]. – Or it could be taken in the subjective sense, that *cognition is deficient* [Erkennen mangelhaft sei]. Now this latter conclusion can likewise be taken in two ways: it can either mean that it is only this dialectic that performs the stunt of a false seeming [das Kunststück eines falschen Scheines vormache]. This is the usual view of the so-called healthy common sense [gesunden Menschenverstandes], which clings to *sensuous* evidence [sinnliche Evidenz] and *customary representations* and *dictums* [gewohnten Vorstellungen und Aussprüche] – at times quietly, as when Diogenes the Cynic demonstrated the vacuity [Blöße] of the dialectic of motion by silently walking up and down; but often by getting itself all worked up, declaring that the dialectic is mere folly or, when it concerns ethically important objects [sittlich wichtige Gegenstände], declaring the dialectic to be a sacrilege [Frevel] that unsettles [wankend] what is essentially firm and teaches how to supply excuses for vice [dem Laster Gründe an die Hand zu geben lehre] – a view which we see directed in the Socratic dialectic against that of the Sophists, and an indignation which, turned around on itself, even cost Socrates his life. The vulgar refutation which, like Diogenes, opposes *sensuous consciousness* to thinking and believes that in the former it possess the truth, one must leave this to itself [muß man sich selbst überlassen]. But insofar as the dialectic sublates ethical [sittliche] determinations, we must trust in reason [Vernunft] that it will know how to reinstate them, but in their truth and in the consciousness of their right [Bewußtsein ihres Rechtes], though also of their limitations. – Or again, the result of subjective nullity can be understood such that it does not affect the dialectic itself, but rather affects the cognition [Erkennen] against which it is directed and, in the view of skepticism and likewise of the Kantian philosophy, *cognition in general* [Erkennen überhaupt].

The fundamental prejudice [Grundvorurteil] here is that the dialectic has *only a negative result*, a point about which more in a moment. First of all, regarding the aforementioned *form* in which dialectic dialectic is usually presented [scheinen

pflegt], it is to be noted that according to that form the dialectic and its result affect the *object* [Gegenstand] under consideration, or else subjective *cognition*, and declare [erklärt] either the latter or the object to be null, whereas by contrast no attention is paid to the *determinations* which are demonstrated [aufgezeigt] in the object as in a *third*, determinations which are presupposed [vorausgesetzt] as for-themselves [für sich] valid. It is an infinite merit [Verdienst] of the Kantian philosophy that it drew attention to this uncritical procedure, and thereby gave impetus [Anstoß] to the restoration of logic and dialectic understood as the examination of *thought-determinations in-and-for-themselves*. The object [Gegenstand], as it is apart from thought and concept, is a representation or also a name. The thought- and concept-determinations are that in which the object *is* what it *is*. In fact, therefore, everything resets on these determinations; they are the true object and content of reason, and what is otherwise understood by object and content as distinct from them only applies through them and in them. Therefore, it must not be assumed to be the fault of the object or of cognition that these determinations, through their constitution [Beschaffenheit] and an external entanglement [Verknüpfung], prove to be dialectical. On this assumption, the one and the other are represented as a subject [Subjekt] in which the *determinations* are introduced – in the form of predicates, properties [Eigenschaften], and independent universals – as fixed and for-themselves correct, such that these determinations are posited into dialectical correlation [Verhältnisse] and contradiction only through a foreign and contingent [zufällige] connection [Verbindung], only in and by a third thing. Such an external and fixed subject of representation and of intellect (as well as of the abstract determinations) cannot be viewed as an *ultimate*, secure, abiding-subject [*letzte, sicher zugrunde Liegenbleibende*]. On the contrary, it is itself to be regarded as an immediate, as precisely the kind of presupposition [Vorausgesetztes] and beginning [Anfangendes] that, as we showed above, must in-and-for-itself succumb to the dialectic, because it is to be taken as the concept *in-itself* [i.e. as implicit]. Thus, all oppositions that are assumed to be fixed, such as the finite and infinite, the singular and universal, are not in contradiction through an external entanglement [Verknüpfung], but rather are, as the consideration [Betrachtung] of their nature shows, in-and-for-themselves the transition. The synthesis and the subject in which they appear [erscheinen] is the product of their concept's own reflection. If conceptless consideration stops at their external correlation [Verhältnis], isolates them and leaves them as fixed presuppositions, then it is rather the concept that keeps them firmly in view, moves them as their soul and brings out their dialectic.

Now this is the standpoint mentioned above, according to which a universal *first* [Erstes], *considered in-and-for-itself*, shows itself to be the other of itself. Considered quite generally, this determination can be taken to mean that what is initially *immediate* is hereby posited as something *mediated* [Vermitteltes], *related* to an other, or that the universal is posited as a particular. This *second* [Zweites] that has thereby arisen is thus the *negative* of the first and (seen from the perspective of subsequent developments) the *first negative*. According to this negative side, the immediate has *perished* [untergegangen] in the other; but the is essentially not the *empty negative* [leere Negative], the *nothing* [Nichts], which is what is usually assumed to be the result of the dialectic. Rather, it is the *other of the first*, the *negative of the immediate*; thus it is determined as *mediated* – it *contains* in general the *determination of the first* [Bestimmung des Ersten]. The first is thus essentially *preserved* [aufbewahrt] and *contained* [erhalten] in the other. – To hold on to the positive in *its* negative, to the content of the presupposition in the result, this is what is most important in rational cognition [vernünftigen Erkennen]. At the same time, it takes only the simplest reflection to become convinced of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement [Erfordernisses]. And as for *examples* of proofs that testify to this, the whole Logic consists in them.

So what is now present is the mediated [Vermittelte], taken initially or likewise immediately it is also a *simple* determination; for since the first has perished into it the second alone is present. Now since the first is *contained* in the second, and this second is the truth of the first, this unity can be expressed as a proposition in which the immediate is placed in the position [Satz] of the subject but the mediated as its predicate. For example: *the finite is infinite, one is many, the singular is the universal*. However, the inadequate form of such propositions and judgements at once occurs to us. With the *judgment* it was shown that its form in general, and most of the all the immediate form of the *positive* judgment, is incapable of holding within itself [in sich zu fassen] the speculative and the true. Its closest complement [Ergänzung], the *negative* judgment, would at least have to be added [beigefügt] as well. In judgment, the first [Erste], as subject, has the seeming [Schein] of an independent consistence [selbständigen Bestehens], though it is in fact sublated in its predicate as in its other. This negation is indeed contained in the content of the above propositions, but their positive form contradicts their content. Consequently, what is contained in them is not posited; but this was precisely the intention of employing the propositional form.

The second determination, the *negative* or the *mediated* one [vermittelte], is moreover also the *mediating* determination [vermittelnde]. Initially it can be taken as a simple determination, but its truth is rather that it is a *relation* [Beziehung] or *correlation* [Verhältnis]; for it is the negative, but the negative of *the positive*, and includes [schließt] the latter within itself [in sich]. It is thus the *other*, not of one to which it is indifferent – then it would be neither and other nor a relation or connection – but rather the *other-in-itself* [Andere an sich selbst], the *other of an other* [Andere eines Anderen]. Hence it includes *its* own other within itself and therefore, *as the contradiction, it is the posited dialectic of itself*. – Because the first or the immediate is the concept *in-itself* [an sich], and therefore is the negative also only *in-itself* [i.e. implicitly], thus the dialectical moment in it consists in that the *difference* [Unterschied] which it contained *in-itself* [an sich] gets posited within it [in ihm gesetzt wird]. The second [Zweite], on the other hand, is itself the *determinate*, the *difference* or correlation [Verhältnis]. Therefore, with respect to it [the second], the dialectical moment consists in positing the *unity* that is contained within it [in ihm]. – For this reason, if the negative, the determinate, the correlation [Verhältnis], the judgment, and all other such determinations falling under the secondary [zweite] moment, do not appear for-themselves already as contradictory, as dialectical, therefore it is purely a defect on the part of thinking, that it does not bring its thoughts together. For the material [Material], the *oppositional* determinations in *one relation* [einer Beziehung], are already *posited* and present for thinking. Formal thinking, however, makes identity its law, allows the contradictory content which it has before it to fall [herabfallen] into the sphere of representation, into space and time, where the contradictories are held *asunder* [außereinander] in juxtaposition and succession [Neben- und Nach-einander] and so come before [vortreten] consciousness without reciprocal contact [gegenseitige Berührung]. The determinate maxim [Grundsatz] that formal thinking lays down for itself is that contradiction is unthinkable. In fact, the thinking of contradiction is the essential moment of the concept. Formal thought does in fact think contradiction, but it at once looks away from it and, in accordance with its maxim, passes from it over into abstract negation.

Now the negativity just considered constitutes the *inflection point* [Wendungspunkt] of the movement of the concept. It is *simple point of the negative self-relation*, the innermost source [Quelle] of all operation [Tätigkeit], living- and spiritual- self-movement; it is the dialectical soul which everything true has in itself [an ihm selbst], and through which alone it is true. For on this subjectivity alone rests the sublation of the opposition between concept and reality, and the unity which is the

truth. – The *second* negative to which we now come, the negative of the negative, is the sublation of the contradiction; but this negative is just as little as the contradiction an *operation* [Tun] of *external reflection*; for it is on the contrary the *innermost, objective moment* of life and spirit, through which a *subject, a person*, is *free*. – The *relation of the negative to itself* is to be regarded as the *second premise* of the entire syllogism. If the terms *analytic* and *synthetic* are employed as opposites, the *first* premise can be seen as the *analytic* moment, since in it the immediate comports [verhält] itself *immediately* to its other and thus *passes over*, or rather has passed over, into it – though this relation, as we discussed, is for that reason also synthetic, precisely because that into which it passes over is its *other*. The here-considered second premise can be determined as the *synthetic*, because it is the relation of the *differentiated as such* to *that from which it is differentiated*. – Just as the first premise is the moment of *universality* and *communication* [Mitteilung], so the second premise is determined by *singularity*, which is initially exclusive [ausschließend] and for-itself and diverse as it relates to the other. The negative appears as *what does the mediating* [Vermittelnde], because it includes [schließt] both itself and the immediate too (of which it is the negation) within itself [in sich]. Insofar as these two determinations are taken as externally related [bezogen] to each other in a correlation [Verhältnis], the negative is only the *formal* mediating element [das vermittelnde Formelle]. But as absolute negativity the negative moment of absolute mediation is the unity which is subjectivity and soul.

In this inflection point [Wendepunkt] of the method, the progression of cognition turns [kehrt] at the same time back into itself. This negativity is, as self-sublating contradiction, the *restoration* [Herstellung] of the *first immediacy*, of the simple universal; for the other of the other, the negative of the negative, is immediately the *positive*, the *identical*, the *universal*. In view of the entire progression [Verlauf], this second immediacy is (if one insists on *counting* them) the *third* to the first immediate [Unmittelbaren] and to the mediated [Vermittelten]. But it is also the third to the first or formal negative and to the absolute negativity or second negative. Now insofar as the first negative is already the second term [Terminus], thus the *third* can also be counted as *fourth*, and instead of *triplicity* the abstract form can also be taken as *quadruplicity*. The negative or the *difference* [Unterschied] is in this way counted as a duality [Zweiheit]. – The third or fourth is in general the unity of the first and second moments, the immediate and the mediated. – The fact that this *unity* and entire form of the method is a *triplicity*, is of course only the superficial and external side of the way [Weise] of cognition [Erkennen]. – But to have demonstrated even this, and in a more specific application [Anwendung]

(because, as is well known, the abstract number-form [Zahlform] itself was known early on, but without concept and therefore without any result [Folge]) is also to be seen as an infinite merit of the Kantian philosophy. The *inference* [Schluß], also the threefold [Dreifache], has always been known [erkannt] as the universal form of reason [Vernunft]. But on the one hand it was considered as an entirely external form that does not determinate the nature of the content; and on the other hand because progresses in the formal sense in the intelligent [verständigen] determination of *identity*, it lacks the essential, *dialectical* moment, the *negativity*. And yet this moment enters into the triplicity of determinations, since this third term is the unity of the two first determinations; but these, since they are diverse, can be in unity only *as sublated*. – Formalism [Formalismus] has indeed taken possession [bemächtigt] of the triplicity, clinging to its empty *schema* [Schema]; the shallow nonsense [Unfug] and barrenness of the so-called *construction* [Konstruierens] of modern philosophy, which consists in nothing but foisting [anzuhängen] this formal schema on everything without concept and immanent determination [immanente Bestimmung], and employing it for the purpose of an external ordering [Ordnen] – this modern construction has made the form tedious, given it a bad name [übel berüchtigt]. Yet the vapidness [Schalheit] of this employment cannot rob it of its inner worth, and the fact that the shape of reason was discovered, albeit without concept, is still to be highly esteemed [hoch zu schätzen].

Now, more closely considered, the *third* is the immediate, but it is so *through sublation of the mediation* [durch Aufhebung der Vermittlung], it is the simple [Einfache] through the *sublating of difference* [Aufheben des Unterschieds], it is the positive through the sublating of the negative; it is the concept that has realized [realisiert] itself through its other-being, and through the sublating of this reality [Realität] it has rejoined [zusammengegangen] itself, and has established [hergestellt] its absolute reality [absolute Realität], its *simple* self-relation. This *result* is therefore the *truth*. It is *just as much* immediacy as it is mediation. However, these forms of judgment: ‘the third *is* immediacy and mediation’, or ‘it *is the unity* of the two’, are not able to capture it, for it is not a static third [ein ruhendes Drittes], but rather like this unity, it is self-mediating movement and operation [Tätigkeit]. – Just as that with which we began was the *universal*, likewise the result is the *singular*, the *concrete*, the *subject*; what the former is *in-itself*, the latter now is equally *for-itself*, the universal is *posited* in the subject [das Allgemeine ist im Subjekt gesetzt]. The first two moments of triplicity are *abstract*, untrue moments that are dialectical for that reason, and through this their negativity they make themselves into subjects.

Initially, *for-us* [für uns], the concept is *both* the universal that is in-itself *as well as* the negative that is for-itself *and also* the third that is *in-and-for-itself*, the *universal* that runs through all the moments of the syllogism. But the third is the conclusion [Schlußsatz] in which it [the concept] mediates itself with itself through its negativity, and hence is posited *for-itself* as the *universal* and the *identity of its moments* [Identische seiner Momente].