Comparing John Buridan and Pseudo-Scotus' accounts of consequence

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First criterion for formal consequence

BURIDAN

Of two propositions, that is antecedent to the other which <u>is impossible to be true with the other **not being true**</u>.

PSEUDO-SCOTUS

For the goodness of a consequence it is required and sufficient that it is <u>impossible for the antecedent to be true and the consequent **false**</u>

1ˢᵗ counterexample

BURIDAN

Every man runs, therefore some man runs.

PSEUDO-SCOTUS

Every proposition is affirmative, therefore no proposition is negative.

Buridan's 2nd criterion [Pseudo-Scotus' 3rd]

BURIDAN

That proposition is antecedent to the other which <u>is impossible to be true the other **not being true**</u>, both being formed.

PSEUDO-SCOTUS

For the goodness of a consequence it is required and suffices that <u>it is impossible, the antecedent and consequent both being formed, that the antecedent be true and the consequent **false**</u>.

2ⁿᵈ [3ʳᵈ] counterexample

BURIDAN

No proposition is negative. Therefore no ass is running

PSEUDO-SCOTUS

God exists. Therefore, this consequence is invalid.

Buridan's 3rd [Pseudo-Scotus' 2nd] criterion

BURIDAN

That proposition is antecedent to the other which is related to the other such <u>that it is impossible that things are however it signifies without being however the other signifies,</u> both being formed together.

PSEUDO-SCOTUS

For the goodness of a consequence it is required and sufficient <u>that it is impossible that things are as are signified by the antecedent without being as is signified by the consequent.</u>

3rd [2nd] counterexample

BURIDAN

[not every proposition is true because things are as it signifies]

PSEUDO-SCOTUS

No chimera is a goat-stag; therefore a man is an ass

Definitions of consequence

BURIDAN

A consequence is a hypothetical proposition composed of an antecedent and a consequent, designating the antecedent to be antecedent and the consequent to be consequent.

PSEUDO-SCOTUS

A consequence is a hypothetical proposition composed of an antecedent and a consequent, with a conditional or rational connective mediating, which denotes that it is impossible for them, namely the antecedent and the consequent formed together, that the antecedent be true and the consequent false.

Formal consequence

BURIDAN

A consequence is called formal <u>which is valid in all terms, retaining a similar form</u>.

PSEUDO-SCOTUS

A formal consequence is that <u>which is valid in all terms, maintaining a similar **disposition and** form of terms</u>

Material consequence

BURIDAN

A material consequence is that to which not every proposition similar in form would be good, or as is commonly said, <u>which does not hold in all terms, retaining a similar form</u>

PSEUDO-SCOTUS

A material consequence is that <u>which does not hold in all terms, retaining a similar **disposition and** form.</u>

Simple consequence

BURIDAN

Some consequences are called simple, since they are good consequences simply speaking, since it is not possible for the antecedent to be true with the consequence being false, or to be such that...etc.

...by the addition of some necessary proposition or some necessary propositions whose placement in the antecedent assumed leads to a formal consequence.

PSEUDO-SCOTUS

A simply true consequence is that which can be reduced to a formal one by the assumption of one necessary proposition.

As-of-now consequence

BURIDAN

[Ut nunc consequences are those] which are not simply speaking good, since it is possible for the antecedent to be true without the consequent.

PSEUDO-SCOTUS

A good material as-of-now material consequence is that which can be reduced to a formal one by the assumption of some contingently true proposition.

Divided modality

JOHN BURIDAN

A divided proposition of possibility has a <u>subject</u> ampliated by the mode following it <u>so that it supposits **not only for** those which are **but also** for those which can be</u> though they are not. – TC II.4

PSEUDO-SCOTUS

One [view] posits that a <u>subject</u> in an indefinite proposition with respect to a verb of possibility <u>supposits **disjunctively** for those which are **or** for this which can be</u>; and in a universal, whether affirmative or negative, supposits conjunctively for this which are and for those which can be. Q. 26, p. 143.

Conversions of divided modals of possibility

BURIDAN

The fifth conclusion is: from every affirmative of possibility there follows by conversion in particular terms an affirmative particular of possibility...

The first part is shown by expository syllogism. For if B can be A, designate that B as C. Then thus: this C is or can be B and itself can be A; therefore what can be A is or can be B. From this it follows that the same can be B, since from being B being able to be B follows by the previous conclusion. From this it follows: What can be A can be B; therefore A can be B.

PSEUDO-SCOTUS

From here we must say of modals of possibility that they are converted like assertoric ones inasmuch as a universal affirmative converts into a particular affirmative; and likewise a particular affirmative ... just as some B can be A, therefore some A is or can be B follows, and the predicate ought to be a disjunct, for the reason that the subject in the antecedent supposits disjunctively for this whare are or for this which can be.