

Text of consequences

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Abstract

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1.1 Definition of consequences

1. Concerning the knowledge of consequences, certain prerequisites must be prefaced.¹ To be set forth in the first place is the definition of consequences; in the second, their division, and then some conclusions to be included under them.
2. Concerning the definition, note that a consequence is an argumentation composed out of an antecedent and consequent. ‘Argumentation’ is put in the definition of consequence, because every consequence is taken up for establishing² some argument. It is called ‘composite’ because nothing incomplex is a consequence. ‘from an antecedent and consequent’ is added, because in every consequence at least two categorical propositions are required.
3. Indeed, from this definition it follows that every argumentation generally can be called a consequence, whether it be syllogistic or inductive or by example or enthymematic, because whatever precedes a final proposition brought forth can be called antecedent; specifically, though, no argumentation regulated by mood and figure is called a consequence.

1.2 Division of consequences

4. The division of consequence: one is necessary and formal, another is necessary and non-formal. Necessary and non-formal is that when the antecedent cannot be true without the consequence, retaining the proper³ signification of words, holding not by an intrinsic middle, but by some

¹put forth L.

²producing V.

³retaining the proper: retaining the same L.

other necessary proposition.⁴ Hence, an intrinsic middle is a proposition composed from the subject of the antecedent and the subject of the consequent. For instance: this consequence is necessary and non-formal: ‘the stick stands in the corner, therefore God exists’, since this consequent does not follow formally from the antecedent, and /f. 118ra/ still it is impossible for the antecedent to be true without the consequent; and it holds by the necessity by the general name: *if the first cause does not exist, then it is impossible for another to exist*. A formal consequence is nearly [the same] as the aforementioned, but that such⁵ holds through an intrinsic middle, of which sort is ‘a man runs, therefore an animal runs’, which holds through this middle ‘man is an animal’.

5. Another division of consequences is put forth by some, which is this: of consequences one [is] simple,⁶ another⁷ as-of-now. A simple one, according to them, is when it is impossible for the antecedent to be true with the consequent being false, and this retaining the primary⁸ signification of the words. But they call a consequence ‘as-of-now’ when the antecedent for now can[not] be true [unless] the consequent be true, though it can be true at some time when the consequent is not true.
6. But this division does not hold (*non valet*), which is established so: if there were such a consequence, then from the merely possible the impossible would follow, namely, such as would be impossible with respect to whatever its significate. The consequent is false. Therefore. The falsehood is evident from Aristotle: positing the possible to be, nothing impossible follows,⁹ since just as from the true nothing follows except the true, so from the possible, etc. [i.e. nothing follows except the possible]. And this is established more clearly in that place by [this] reason: since positing only an ass runs, then so ‘Every running is an ass; every man is running; therefore, every man is an ass’. Taken for now, it is impossible for the antecedent to be true unless the consequent be true, since it holds by this true proposition: ‘every running is an ass’, which is true by the case. But the antecedent is possible and the consequent impossible. It follows, then, that an as-of-now consequence is not valid, since [then] the impossible follows simply from the possible, which is against Aristotle.

1.3 Conclusions

7. These things set forth, some conclusions follow. First, that every consequence good simply is necessary. It is established: every simply true conditional is necessary. Every consequence good simply¹⁰ is equivalent

⁴rule L.

⁵nearly-such: that which

⁶and necessary *add.* L.

⁷necessary *add.* L.

⁸*om.* L.

⁹*Aristot. Anal. prior.* I,13,32a 19-20.

¹⁰*om.* L.

to one true conditional. Therefore, every consequence is necessary.¹¹ The antecedent¹² is granted by all good logicians, both ancients and moderns, since ‘a man is, therefore an animal is’ is equivalent to ‘if a man is, an animal is’.

8. Second: every good consequence is either a consequence as-of-now, or is a consequence necessary simply. But nothing¹³ is a consequence as-of-now. Therefore, every consequence is necessary simply. The antecedent¹⁴ is evident by exhaustive disiunction¹⁵ and¹⁶ division. The minor is established from the aforementioned.
9. Against the conclusion: nothing that can be or not be is simply necessary. Every consequence is of this sort. Therefore. The antecedent¹⁷ can be garnered from the words of Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I: those are called ‘necessary’ which cannot have themselves otherwise.¹⁸ The minor is established, because every consequence is mental, spoken, or written. But every such can be or not be.
10. It is replied: I deny the consequence ‘nothing that can’ etc., especially speaking of the necessity of the proposition, since that some proposition be necessary, it is not prevented¹⁹ that it could not be or be,²⁰ but suffices that it could not be unless it be true, no change of terms being made. And so to Aristotle’s ‘those are called ‘necessary’, etc., I say that Aristotle understands that some such proposition is necessary /f. 118rb/ which when it is true cannot be false except making a change of terms.
11. Against this solution it is argued, and established that it is necessary for every proposition to be: everything that is when it is, it is necessary for it to be. Every proposition is when it is. Therefore, etc. The antecedent is evident from Aristotle, *On interpretation* I.²¹ The minor is established, because otherwise a plain contradiction would follow, namely that something would be when it would not be, which is impossible. The sequence is clear, since it is in the first mood of the first figure, etc.
12. One replies by distinguishing the antecedent²² according to composition and division. In the composite sense, the antecedent is false.²³ And

¹¹simply *add.* L.

¹²major L.

¹³no good consequence L.

¹⁴major L.

¹⁵*om.* L.

¹⁶*om.* L.

¹⁷major L.

¹⁸*Aristot. Anal. post.* I,6, 74b 5-6.

¹⁹reading *obstat* for *oportet*.

²⁰or be *om.* L.

²¹*Aristot. De interp.* 9, 19a 23-24.

²²major L.

²³major L.

so the ‘while it is’ is added on the part of the subject, and expressed thus: ‘everything that is when it is, it is necessary for it to be’. In the divided sense it is true, and with the aforementioned addition added to the predicate: ‘everything that is, it is necessary for it to be while it is’, then the antecedent is true. And the previous sequence does not hold, since more is predicated in the minor than is subjected in the major.

13. The second conclusion: that in every good consequence the antecedent can be true though the consequent is not true: Proof: sometimes the antecedent can be when²⁴ the consequent is not, the antecedent can be true, though the consequent is not true. But the antecedent of any consequence can be though the consequent not be. Therefore. The antecedent is evident, since every truth presupposes being. The minor is evident, since²⁵ when some are such that one is not part of the other, nor something which is part of the first part of the other, nor one of them the cause or effect²⁶ of the other, one can be with the other not existing. But the antecedent and consequent of any consequence are this way. Therefore.
14. Against that conclusion it is argued: when two propositions are such that one can be true without the other, the truth of the one does not follow from the truth of the other.²⁷ If, then, in every good consequence the antecedent can be true such that the consequent not be true, from the truth of the antecedent the truth of the consequent does not follow. The antecedent²⁸ is established, since the truth of the antecedent is related to the truth of the consequent just as the antecedent is related to the consequent. Therefore, it so happens that this²⁹ rule, most common among all logicians, is proven to be false:³⁰ the consequence is good, and the antecedent is true, therefore the consequence is true.³¹
15. One responds, conceding that the truth of the consequent does not follow from the truth of the antecedent. But still for juniors,³² one should distinguish that something follows from another in two ways: either absolutely or conditionally. Absolutely, the truth of the consequent no more follows from the truth of the antecedent than the being of the consequent follows from the being of the antecedent, or conversely.³³ But conditionally it does follow, as if it is stated: ‘if³⁴ this is true “man runs”, then³⁵ this

²⁴though L.

²⁵The minor...since: the second(?) V.

²⁶or accident or subject *add.* L.

²⁷The consequence holds *add.* V.

²⁸major L.

²⁹the aforementioned V.

³⁰namely *add.* L.

³¹Therefore *add.* V.

³²those coming into their third year L.

³³or conversely: *om.* L.

³⁴*om.* L.

³⁵therefore L.

is true “an animal runs”’. Furthermore, I say that the rule³⁶ ‘the consequence is good and the antecedent is true, therefore the consequent is true’ is most necessary,³⁷ since it is impossible in a good consequence that the antecedent be true unless the consequent be true, since the antecedent and consequent are relatives, which posited, posit each other, and taken away, take away each other. Therefore, it is not necessary that one adds the condition. But still, with this it holds good that the antecedent may be true though the consequent may not be true. But when it is so that the antecedent is true without /f. 118va/ the consequent, then the antecedent is not.

16. From these conclusions the falsehood of that saying of Ockham on consequences in the first chapter is evident, where he says that ‘Socrates does not run, therefore a man does not run’ is formal, and holds by the intrinsic middle ‘Socrates is a man’.³⁸
17. Against this: If that were good, it would be possible for two contradictories to be true with respect to the same significate. The consequent is false.³⁹ Therefore. The consequence is established, and I posit the case that every man runs and Socrates does not run. Then according to him, the consequence ‘Socrates does not run, therefore a man does not run’, is good, and the antecedent is true, therefore also the consequent. And furthermore, ‘therefore some man does not run’, since an indefinite and particular⁴⁰ convert. But this is true by the case ‘every man runs’. Those two ‘every man runs’ and ‘some man does not run’⁴¹ will stand together. And if it is said that this consequence is formal⁴², then this is refuted above by the first conclusion.

2 General rules

18. These things being held, some general rules pertaining to all consequences are to be set forth, of which the first is this: *whatever follows from the consequent follows from the antecedent*. And this rule is taken from the words of Aristotle in the *Categories*, where he says: when one is predicated of another, whatever is affirmed of the predicate, also [affirmed] of⁴³ the subject.⁴⁴ It is established by reason thus: if something follows from the consequence ‘an animal is a substance’ which does not follow from the antecedent ‘man is a substance’, then the same proposition would be true

³⁶ *om.* L.

³⁷ most necessary: good L.

³⁸ *Guil. Ockham, SL III-3, c. 1, 50-54; cf. 23-28.*

³⁹ impossible L.

⁴⁰ singular V.

⁴¹ therefore *add.* L.

⁴² as-of-now and not simply *add.* L.

⁴³ *om.* V, *defecit* L.

⁴⁴ *Aristot. Categoriae 3, 1b 10-11.*

and false with respect to the same significate. The consequent is impossible. Therefore. The consequence is established: Let *a* be the proposition which follows from the consequent⁴⁵ ‘an animal is a substance’ and not from the antecedent⁴⁶ ‘a man is a substance’. Then this: *a* does not follow from man being a substance, therefore man being a substance can be true without *a*. Therefore *a* does not follow from an animal being a substance. And before, it was stated that *a* does follow from an animal being a substance. Therefore the proposition ‘*a* follows from an animal being a substance’ is both true and false with respect to the same significate.

19. Against this one argues in three ways: whenever any two are such that one of them can be true without the other, the truth of the one does not follow from the truth of the other. But the antecedent⁴⁷ and consequent⁴⁸ are of this type. Therefore.
20. Second: if the rule were true, it would follow that whoever would state a man to be an ass would state a truth. The consequent is false. The consequence is established: whosoever states a man to be an ass states a man to be an animal. Therefore this consequence is good: ‘Plato states a man to be an ass, therefore he states a man to be an animal. But whoever states a man to be an animal states a truth. Therefore, whoever states a man to be an ass states a truth.’
21. Third: if the rule were good, then from one contradictory the other would follow. The consequent is impossible. Therefore. The consequence is established, and argued by the previously stated rule: ‘if no time is, it is not day. And if it is not day, it is night. And if it is night, some time is’. Therefore, from the first to the last: if no time is, some time is’.
22. To the first one responds by conceding the proposition that the consequent⁴⁹ can be without the antecedent.⁵⁰ And furthermore, the truth of the consequent does not follow absolutely from the truth of the antecedent, but conditionally.
23. To the second: both the antecedent and consequent are denied, since /f. 118vb/ ‘whosoever’ etc. is false, since there is not an indicative proposition. ‘Whoever states a man’ etc., is also false, since the two statements⁵¹ are distinct, and one can be true without the other; and if the statements of the propositions supposit for propositions, then the falsehood of the argument is more clearly evident, since it need not be that one saying the proposition ‘a man is an ass’ says ‘a man is an animal’.

⁴⁵consequent V, *om.* L.

⁴⁶the antecedent *add.* L.

⁴⁷antecedent *add.* L.

⁴⁸consequent *add.* L.

⁴⁹consequent V, *om.* L.

⁵⁰antecedent *add.* L.

⁵¹two statements *om.* V.

24. To the third, one responds by conceding the consequence ‘if no time’ etc., since from the impossible anything follows, since⁵² it is impossible, following the statement of Aristotle, that no time be. And consequently, anything⁵³ follows from it, whether it be true or false. In a like way from ‘the heaven is not’ follows ‘a star is not, nor an ass’. Again, ‘A man is an ass’ follows by the same rule.⁵⁴
25. Another rule: *whatever entails (antecedit) the antecedent entails the consequent*. This rule follows from the preceding, for if the consequent ‘a man is’ follows from the antecedent ‘Socrates is’, and the consequent ‘an animal is’ follows likewise from the same antecedent ‘Socrates is’; so that the consequence ‘Socrates is, therefore a man is’ is good, so also ‘Socrates is, therefore an animal is’.
26. One can argue against this rule just as [against] the preceding, which⁵⁵ converts with it, and in a like manner the arguments are resolved.
27. But against this: arguing thus - ‘If Socrates is,⁵⁶ a man is’ - here, nothing comes before the antecedent. Therefore the rule is false. item[28.] Second: Let it be posited in the case that all beings of the world are a substance or an accident. Then one argues so: ‘an accident is inhering, therefore a substance is’. Here nothing comes before the antecedent, from which nothing is in the world besides these two.
29. One responds: ‘If Socrates is’, I say that the rule ought to be restricted and understood conditionally, and in a good consequence where the antecedent of the antecedent is given. And it is not so here. The second reason is resolved from the same root.⁵⁷
30. Another rule: *from the opposite of the consequent follows the opposite of the antecedent*; as ‘if a man is, then an animal is; if an animal is not, then a man is not’.
31. Against this: if so, then this would be good⁵⁸ - ‘every man runs, therefore every animal runs’. For ‘no animal runs, therefore no man runs’ follows, from which the falsehood of the consequence⁵⁹ appears.
32. One responds that the rule ought to be understood of the contradictory opposite, and not the contrary. Hence it is generally true, whether one argues the affirmatively or negatively, the contradictory opposite of the consequent always⁶⁰ conflicts with the antecedent.

⁵²but L.

⁵³anything: any proposition L.

⁵⁴In-rule: *om.* L.

⁵⁵so it V.

⁵⁶therefore *add.* V.

⁵⁷But-root: *om.* V.

⁵⁸*om.* V.

⁵⁹consequent *ed.*

⁶⁰*uncertain reading* V, *mut.* L.

33. From this rule follows⁶¹ another rule convertible⁶² with it, that in no good consequence does the contradictory opposite of the consequent stand with the antecedent in truth, nor can it stand without a new assignment of terms.
34. Another rule following from these: whatever stands in truth with the antecedent stands, too, in truth with the consequent, just as whatever stands with the proposition ‘a man runs’ stands with ‘an animal runs’.
35. But against this:⁶³ ‘Socrates is’ stands with the proposition ‘a singular is’, and ‘man is’ does not stand with this, since ‘man’ is a universal term, and not particular.
36. One responds that the rule is understood of terms suppositing subordinately with the same supposition. But in the reasoning, there is a difference in supposition.⁶⁴
37. The final general rule: what conflicts with the consequent conflicts with the antecedent, just as whatever conflicts with the proposition ‘an animal runs’ conflicts with ‘a man runs’.
38. Against this: if the defined is, the the definition is. But to have only one term conflicts /f. 119ra/ with the consequent, therefore it conflicts with the antecedent; which is false, since every defined is only one term, and a definition includes several terms.
39. One responds: the rule ought to be understood of terms suppositing uniformly, or being taken significatively.⁶⁵
And these are the general rules by which all consequences are established.⁶⁶

3 Special rules

3.1 Rules by which an affirmative follows from an affirmative

40. Seeing these things, we should continue to special rules, the first chapter on which contains rules by which an affirmative follows from an affirmative.
The first is that from a distributed superior to a distributed inferior is a good consequence, as ‘every animal runs,’⁶⁷ therefore every man runs’⁶⁸.

⁶¹is V.

⁶²which is converted L, conditional V.

⁶³if *add.* V, *defecit* L.

⁶⁴But-supposition: *om.* L.

⁶⁵Against-significatively: *om.* L.

⁶⁶establish V.

⁶⁷is a substance L.

⁶⁸is a substance L.- *Cf. Guill. Ockham, SL III-3, c.2, 9-11.*

41. But against this rule: it follows that this would be a good consequence: ‘every man runs, therefore every white man runs’. The consequent is false. The falsehood is evident, for the antecedent ‘every man runs’ can be true without a new assignment of terms⁶⁹ apart from it that the consequent ‘every white man runs’ be true. For positing that all men are black and none white, and that every man runs, the rule doesn’t hold then. That last consequence is established by the general rule accepted above, namely that in no⁷⁰ good consequence does the opposite of the consequent stand with the antecedent.

42. Second: if the rule were true, it follows that the consequence ‘every animal besides man runs, therefore every man runs’ would be good. The consequent is false, therefore that from which it follows [is false]. The consequence holds, since here one argues *from a distributed superior to an inferior* etc. The falsehood of the consequent is evident, since if it were good, contraries would stand together, namely⁷¹ ‘man runs’ and ‘man does not run’.

43. Third, it seems that the aforementioned rule holds in no matter, for if it were to hold in any matter, it would especially in this: ‘every animal runs, therefore every man runs’. But in that consequence it is not valid. Proof: positing the antecedent and consequent in the nature of things without a new assignment of terms, the antecedent can be true without the consequent. Therefore the consequence is not valid. The consequence is established, since positing that no man is, and that every animal runs, then the antecedent is true and⁷² the consequent false. And this is strengthened by that instance ‘every man runs, therefore whatever is Socrates runs’. Here, one argues *from a distributed superior* etc., and yet it is evident that the consequence is not valid, since⁷³ when Socrates does not exist, the antecedent is true and the consequent false.

44. To these,⁷⁴ Ockham⁷⁵ says that the previously stated propositions are good as-of-now, just as ‘every man runs, therefore every white man runs’.

45. Against those statements it is argued: no consequence is good as-of-now which is not good simply. Therefore, the aforementioned consequences are not good as-of-now. The consequence holds⁷⁶ in itself. The antecedent is held from things stated above.

46. Second: no consequence necessary simply is as-of-now. But the consequence ‘every animal runs, therefore every man runs’ is necessary simply.

⁶⁹of terms: of signification V.

⁷⁰every V.

⁷¹every *add.* L.

⁷²*om.* V.

⁷³*om.* V.

⁷⁴this V.

⁷⁵*Guill. Ockham, SL III-3, c.2,33-36.*

⁷⁶is evident L.

Therefore it is not as-of-now. The antecedent⁷⁷ is granted by all. The minor is established, since in no way could the aforementioned consequence be bad unless it could happen that no man existed. But this is impossible. Therefore, etc. That this is impossible philosophically speaking is evident⁷⁸ following the path of Aristotle, as shown in *De Caelo* I: the world was from eternity,⁷⁹ and so every man is preceded by some man, and after every man is some man. It also is evident theologically, for God could not destroy himself, but he himself is a man, and consequently could not make it, /f.119rb/ retaining the same signification of words, that no man existed.

47. Here it is said that by his absolute power he could remove⁸⁰ his human nature, and so would no longer be human⁸¹, just as separating whiteness from Socrates in some way, Socrates is not white, for just as Socrates is not white except by reason of whiteness, so God is not man except by reason of the human nature united to him.
48. Against this: it follows that a blessed⁸² could become not blessed⁸³, and consequently that this proposition would be possible ‘what was blessed is not blessed’. This includes a contradiction, since perpetuity of duration is of the essence of blessedness. The consequence is established, since by the same reason by which the assumed nature could become not assumed, by that same reason a blessed nature could become not blessed; and it follows that God could bring all the saints to nothing, including the Blessed Virgin. All these things are absurd. It is evident, then, both philosophically and theologically speaking, that the consequence ‘every animal runs, therefore every man runs’ is necessary.
49. Therefore,⁸⁴ one should say that the rule ought to be understood of an inferior *per se*, since though white man is inferior to man, this still is not *per se*, but *per accidens*.
50. Furthermore: the rule ought to be understood in strictly affirmative categorical propositions, and not hypotheticals, nor those equivalent to hypotheticals.

By this the resolution of the argument ‘every animal besides man runs, therefore every man runs’ is shown, since ‘every animal besides man runs’ is exceptive, and equivalent to a hypothetical, since⁸⁵ it is equivalent to

⁷⁷major L.

⁷⁸in itself and *add.* L.

⁷⁹*Cf. Arist. De caelo* I,3, 270a 12-14.

⁸⁰leave behind L.

⁸¹by nature *add.* V.

⁸²a blessed: from a good V.

⁸³become not good: come a non-good V.

⁸⁴To the other argument L.

⁸⁵‘every...since *om.* V.

the conjunction ‘every animal other than man runs, and man does not run’.

51. From the aforementioned it is clear that consequences like [this] are good: ‘every man is a being *per se*, and every white man is a man, therefore every white man is a being *per se*’; ‘every man is⁸⁶ a genus *per se*, and a white man is a man, therefore white man⁸⁷ is in a genus *per se*’; And if the premises are true, a true conclusion necessarily follows. And they can be reduced to the syllogistic form: ‘every man is in a genus *per se*,⁸⁸ white man is a man, therefore⁸⁹ white man is in a genus *per se*’. Therefore.
52. The second rule: from a convertible distributed to its convertible distributed is a good consequence, just as ‘every man runs, therefore every risible runs’ follows, and conversely.⁹⁰
53. Against this: it follows that a man who is not would be a man. Which is established so: ‘every risible is a man; everything⁹¹ which can laugh is risible; therefore everything that can laugh is a man’. Then so: ‘Everything that can laugh is a man; but the Antichrist⁹² can laugh; therefore’. And consequently, a non-being would be a man.
54. Second: it follows that the consequence ‘that every man is a mortal rational animal is *per se* in the first mode,⁹³ therefore that every risible is a mortal rational [animal] is⁹⁴ *per se* in the first mode⁹⁵ would be good. The consequent is false. The consequence is granted, since it is established that the rule holds.
1. [55.] Following Ockham,⁹⁶ it is responded that a proper passion can be taken in two ways: broadly, inasmuch as it extends itself both to being and to non-being; and so it can supposit for non-being, just as for being. And taking it so, /f. 119 va/ then the consequence from a distributed subject to its distributed proper passion is not valid. In another way, it is taken properly⁹⁷ inasmuch as it extends itself to beings only, and so the consequence is valid.
56. But that statement of Ockham⁹⁸ is not valid. Proof: since nothing can supposit for non-being, because such a term suppositing such either supposits materially, simply, or personally. Not materially or simply, such as

⁸⁶i

⁸⁷is-man: *om.* V.

⁸⁸every *add.* L.

⁸⁹every *add.* L.

⁹⁰*Cf. Guill. Ockham, SL III-3, c.2, 69-71.*

⁹¹risible-man: *om.* V.

⁹²the Antichrist: A man who is not L.

⁹³*om.* V.

⁹⁴true *add.* V.

⁹⁵*om.* V.

⁹⁶*Guill. Ockham, SL III-3, c.2, 74-92.*

⁹⁷it is taken properly: ‘proper passion’ is taken strictly L.

⁹⁸of Ockham: simply L.

is granted by all. Nor personally, since no non-being is the significate of any term, since sign and significate, and all things of this sort, are relatives, and posited, posit each other, etc. And the whole of that is granted in the treatise on supposition.

57. Besides, a proper passion does not extend itself further than that of which it is the proper passion. But risible is a proper passion of man. The major and minor are granted by Porphyry.⁹⁹
58. So¹⁰⁰ one speaks to the argument in another way, denying the proposition ‘everything which can laugh is risible’ but only that which is born apt to laughing - as Porphyry states plainly, not what actually laughs, but what has an aptitude toward laughing, is risible.¹⁰¹ And so that which is not is not risible. But risible is sometimes taken so broadly that it is equivalent to the term ‘what can laugh’; [taken] so, it is not a proper passion of man, and so not convertible with man.

⁹⁹ *Porphyry, Isagoge* 12.13-22.

¹⁰⁰ *om. V.*

¹⁰¹ *Porphyry, Isagoge* 12.18-19.