

Introduction

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Abstract

1 Introduction

2 Biographical introduction

3 Logic and semantics

The breadth of Klima's scholarship stretches from debates on identity, categories, and causation in metaphysics, on skepticism in epistemology and theories of mental content in philosophy of mind, to others too numerous to mention; from some of philosophy's best-known figures in Anselm, Aquinas, Ockham and Descartes to lesser-known figures including Thomas of Sutton and Henry of Ghent, to Frege, Geach, Kenny, and others who have produced some of the most impactful scholarship in the analytic tradition.

Klima's most widely recognized contributions come in his research on John Buridan - which has helped elevate Buridan from a lesser-known figure to one whose stature is closer to that of an Ockham, arguably surpassing the Franciscan in his logic - and in the field of semantics.

3.1 Buridan

3.2 Semantics

From his earliest work in semantics, Klima recognized that classical logic, being primarily interested in developing an account of the semantics of propositions as a precondition for the development of a theory of consequence, affords much less attention to its account of the components of propositions themselves, namely names and n-ary predicate relations. Klima fills this lacuna by providing a theory not only of simple, but also of complex terms. Klima provides some of the earliest and most ambitious applications of restricted quantification in the history and philosophy of logic, using it both to formalize the medieval theory of supposition and to provide a general account of quantitatively ambiguous

natural language sentences (Klima 1988, 1990, 1991a; Klima and Sandu 1990). Expansions on the same theme - namely, formalizations of supposition theory specifically and medieval semantics more broadly as a means to resolve apparently intractable interpretative problems in historical scholarship and debates in contemporary philosophy - provide us with an account of the semantics of intensional verbs (Klima 1991b), a semantic foundation for Aquinas' theory of the analogy of being in his theory of the copula (Klima 1996, 2002a), and a clean resolution of the problem of existential import in the Aristotelian square of opposition (Klima 2001).

Elsewhere, Klima's work decouples *via antiqua* and *via moderna* semantics from the realist and anti-realist metaphysics with which they are most commonly paired, contending that neither semantics by itself strictly entails its associated metaphysics (Klima 1999, 2011). Rather, archtypical realists were required to adopt non-straightforward semantic accounts of the meanings of terms in at least some cases by their antecedent metaphysical commitments (e.g. to divine simplicity) (Klima 2002b). Conversely, some of the best known nominalist logicians incorporated what today would be regarded as 'realist' elements in their logic (Klima 2005).

For Klima, the *via antiqua* and *via moderna* traditions of medieval logic aren't semantic frameworks that differ in their quantity of ontological commitments, but distinct frameworks differing in the kind of tools they provide for handling ontological commitments, which in turn differ from the model-theoretic framework dominant today. In particular, the dominant semantic framework post-Ockham takes an affirmative statement to be true when its subject and predicate term refer to the same object, with modifications as appropriate for quantified, negated, and modal propositions. Within this framework, terms predicating common natures or accidental features of a subject need not be taken to ultimately refer to different types of objects such as abstract genera or relations, but may instead be taken to refer to *familiar* objects *differently*. For example, the truth of 'Socrates is a father' does not require commitment to an abstract fatherhood. Instead, the sentence's predicate may be taken to (non-rigidly) refer to Socrates himself, albeit connoting his fatherhood, and hence refer to the *same* object as that rigidly referred to by the proper name 'Socrates', albeit in a different way. Allowing some exception for intensional contexts,¹ the verb 'is' or 'exists' in *via moderna* semantics is equally ontologically committing in its various uses, but *what* one is committed to by its uses need not be immediately apparent.

Both frameworks would reject the object-language metalanguage distinction taken for granted since Tarski.

Where analytic metaphysics distinguishes between object language and metalanguage, adhering to Quine's *dictum* that 'to be is to be the value of a bound variable',

possibilist quantifiers substitutional quantification

None of this means that there is *no* relationship between an author's po-

¹See (Klima 2005).

sitions in metaphysics and his semantics: rather, the semantic framework an author adopts conditions what options that author has in metaphysics without fully determining them. For example, extreme realism in metaphysics doesn't follow strictly from the *via antiqua*'s inherence theory of predication, but it is easily the most natural fit for that theory if one accepts the view that terms signifying accidental being denote their referents rigidly while rejecting that framework's insistence on multiple, analogically related senses of 'being' (Klima 1999). Conversely, the broad outlines of Ockham's account of the relation between language, thought, and reality serves not only as a foundation for Ockham's own metaphysical reductionism, but also for the realism of a Descartes, Malebranche, Putnam or a Leibniz (Klima 1991b). In a particularly drastic example, the choice of a mistaken semantic framework may inhibit the speaker from constitutively referring to, and thus believing in, an actually existing God whose existence is only adequately assertable in an alternate framework (Klima 2008a, p. 74).

In (Klima 2008b), Klima recognizes that representing *via antiqua* semantics would require substantial modifications to modern quantification theory, while representing *via moderna* semantics requires fewer modifications 1) *Via antiqua* semantics requires a different account of predication, and multiple copula to be introduced to represent the different senses of being 2) *Via moderna* semantics requires the introduction of restricted quantifiers. 3) both require the rejection of the object-metalanguage distinction.

Klima agrees with Buridan that the notion of truth is not strictly needed for a semantics concerned with formal validity, but it is needed to explain the semantics of sentences that themselves predicate that notion. Analogy: nobody complains that we don't have a formal definition of the term 'red' in our logic, even though a basic grasp of the semantics of that term is needed for using the term in sentences about red things.

Two uses for semantics of truth: 1) as part of a theory of validity, 2) for its own sake. In 'Logic without truth', Klima rejects Buridan's solution to the liar paradox.

'Buridan's nominalism is obtainable by the adverbialization of Peter of Spain's semantics.' 'Nominalism is obtainable by the adverbialization of realist semantics.' 'Medieval realism and nominalism are just different versions of conceptualism, differing especially in how they handle the problems of describing and identifying mental content.' (Klima 2011, p. 110)

why the study of Buridan (or the history of philosophy in general) can be philosophically so rewarding: this study can put our own philosophical problems in an entirely different light, providing us with such theoretical perspectives that otherwise might entirely escape us as we are working in our set ways determined by the intellectual habits of our philosophical period, which in modern times tends to stretch to a mere couple of decades. - Klima2005b - Quine, Wyman, Buridan, p. 17.

their disagreements, trying to establish those primary logical-semantic differences that may have motivated their conflicting intuitions concerning these metaphysical principles. - Thomas of Sutton v. Henry of Ghent in a weaker

sense on the basis of, semantic principles. Metaphysical principles, being first principles using the most general terms, such as the transcendentals and the categories, cannot be derived from prior principles, and their terms cannot be defined on the basis of more general terms. What semantics can do, however, is that it can provide the principles of interpretation of metaphysical principles. On the basis of these principles of interpretation the implications of metaphysical principles are more clearly delineated, which then can be used in their evaluation in dialectical disputations concerning their acceptability in the interpretations thus clarified. Furthermore, if the semantic principles of interpretation are made explicit, they can also be subject to further evaluation, in a disputation on a different level, the sort appropriate to the comparison of different logical theories.

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are supposed to be fundamentally different from the laws of psychology. For while the former are the laws of the logical relations among objective concepts, the latter are the laws of the causal relations among formal concepts. - The problem of universals and the subject matter of logic, Klima 2014, p. 173.

These different theories can be arranged on a ‘theoretical scale’, ranging from extreme realism to extreme nominalism, meaning maximal semantic uniformity along with maximal ontological diversity on the realist end [...], and maximal ontological uniformity with maximal semantic diversity on the nominalist end.- The problem of universals and the subject matter of logic, Klima 2014, p. 176.

Well, conceptual diversity is obviously a great hindrance to understanding: if we don’t have the same concepts, we can- not have the same thoughts, which means we are doomed to talking past each other all the time - Klima 2021 Words and what is beyond, p. 36.

So, what should be our guiding light, in this rational discourse? In one word: rationality, which is love or goodwill on its active side, on the part of the will, and understanding on its receptive, theoretical side, on the part of the intellect. -Klima 2021, p. 41 (Parsons 2014; Read 2015)

3.2.1 inference

‘The primary purpose of a logical semantic theory is to define logical consequence in terms of the truth values of propositions in different interpretations’ (Klima 1991a, p. 79).

(1) Natural languages are semantically closed (2) Natural language inference has to be token-based. Both Klima/Buridan and Tarski come to the conclusion that defining consequence in terms of truth and falsity doesn’t work from similar considerations: Tarski’s consideration is related to superenumerable domains and the possibility that a language may simply an appropriate selection of denoting terms; Klima/Buridan’s considerations come from the possibility that a claim may be not exist to even be true or false, or it may be self-falsifying while nevertheless describing a possible state of affairs (Klima 2004, p. 96).

The primary impetus behind Klima’s work is one of charity. Examples: Positive: 1. His analysis of parasitic reference in his work on Anselm 2. His attempts to translate between *via antiqua* and *via moderna* semantics 3. The

entirety of his body of work on John Buridan Negative: 1. The infrequency with which Klima actually reveals his own philosophical positions in his work (exceptions: Aquinas' hylomorphism and proof of immortality, Anselm's proof, Per Buridan, the semantic closure and token-based character of natural language inference) 2. His adopting semantics that build on classical logic while rejecting non-classical semantics.

3.2.2 Why semantics?

Semantics: 1) a theory of meaning broadly construed 2) Tarskian/Montaguean mathy stuff a semantics is almost never actually this, given that most semantics have a canonical interpretation and a domain to which they are expected to apply (e.g. Model theory handles solids better than liquids or gases). 3) e.g. a dictionary 4) e.g. proof-theoretic semantics 5) a philosophy of language 6) a theory of language, thought, and reality

4 Philosophy of mind and epistemology

4.1 *Via antiqua* and *via moderna* cognizers

5 Metaphysics

5.1 Hylomorphism, personal identity and immortality

5.2 Causation

6 Overview of the articles

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