

Garson, James (2006). *Modal Logic for Philosophers*, ch. 5.

Exercise 5.1

Define validity in the case where $\langle \mathbf{W}, \mathbf{R} \rangle$ is dense, transitive, and serial. What system do you think is adequate with respect to this notion of satisfiability?

1. Let a C4-D4 model be any K-model $\langle \mathbf{W}, \mathbf{R}, \mathbf{a} \rangle$ where \mathbf{R} is dense, transitive, and serial. Then:
2. An argument H/C is C4-D4 valid iff it has no C4-D4 counterexample
3. Iff it is not the case that $H/\sim C$ is C4-D4 satisfiable
4. If for no model $\langle \mathbf{W}, \mathbf{R}, \mathbf{a} \rangle$ such that $\langle \mathbf{W}, \mathbf{R} \rangle$ is dense, transitive, and serial, $H/\sim C$ is satisfiable
5. The system adequate for this notion of satisfiability is that which results from adding the (C4), (D), and (4) axioms to K

Exercise 5.2

Invent two more conditions that could plausibly hold given \mathbf{R} is **earlier than**.

1. *Linearity*: if \mathbf{wRv} and \mathbf{wRu} , then either \mathbf{vRu} or \mathbf{uRv} or $\mathbf{v=u}$
2. *Beginning time*: $\exists w \forall v \forall u (((v \in W \ \& \ v \neq w) \supset wRv) \ \& \ (((v \in W \ \& \ v \neq w) \supset uRv) \supset u = w))$

Exercise 5.3

Give the truth condition for D

$\mathbf{a_w(DA)}=T$ iff for all \mathbf{v} in \mathbf{W} , if \mathbf{wRv} , then $\mathbf{a_v(A)}=T$

Exercise 5.4

In a situation of eternal recurrence, there are numerically distinct times that are identical with respect to all propositions that hold at them. But in a possible worlds interpretation, one might think that something like the identity of indiscernibles holds, i.e. worlds with exactly the same propositions holding at them are identical.

Exercise 5.5

Show that (\Box_5) is equivalent to (\Box) when \mathbf{R} is universal

1. Let $\langle \mathbf{W}, \mathbf{R} \rangle$ be a universal frame, i.e. for all \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{v} in \mathbf{W} , \mathbf{wRv} . And let $\langle \mathbf{W}, \mathbf{R}, \mathbf{a} \rangle$ be a model on that frame, \mathbf{w} an arbitrarily chosen world in \mathbf{W} , and \mathbf{A} a formula evaluated on the model. Then $\mathbf{a_w(\Box_5 A)}=T$ iff $\mathbf{a_w(\Box A)}$.
2. First, presume $\mathbf{a_w(\Box_5 A)}=T$
3. Then for all \mathbf{v} in \mathbf{W} , $\mathbf{a_v(A)}=T$
4. So for all \mathbf{v} in \mathbf{W} , if \mathbf{wRv} , then $\mathbf{a_v(A)}=T$
5. i.e. $\mathbf{a_w(\Box A)}=T$
6. Next, presume $\mathbf{a_w(\Box A)}=T$
7. Then for all \mathbf{v} in \mathbf{W} , if \mathbf{wRv} , then $\mathbf{a_v(A)}=T$
8. And since \mathbf{R} is universal, for all \mathbf{v} in \mathbf{W} , \mathbf{wRv} .
9. Therefore, by *modus ponens*, for all \mathbf{v} in \mathbf{W} , $\mathbf{a_v(A)}=T$,
10. i.e. $\mathbf{a_w(\Box_5 A)}=T$

Exercise 5.6

Invent another reading of \Box for which the accessibility relation is neither transitive nor symmetric

1. Let $\mathbf{a_w(\Box A)}=T$ iff for all worlds \mathbf{v} such that \mathbf{v} *resembles* \mathbf{w} , $\mathbf{a_v(A)}=T$

2. Resemblance is not transitive, since a world \mathbf{v} accessing \mathbf{u} and accessed by \mathbf{w} could resemble \mathbf{w} in different respects than that in which it resembles \mathbf{u}
3. And resemblance is not symmetric, since for any two things in a resemblance relation, one is usually given priority. For instance, a son may resemble his father, and a painting may resemble what it depicts, but not vice versa.

Exercise 5.7

Given that \mathbf{wRv} iff \mathbf{v} is in M , show that (O) is equivalent to (OM).

- (O) $\mathbf{a_w(OA)} = \mathbf{T}$ iff for all \mathbf{v} , if \mathbf{wRv} then $\mathbf{a_v(A)} = \mathbf{T}$
1. $\mathbf{a_w(OA)} = \mathbf{T}$ iff for all \mathbf{v} , if \mathbf{wRv} then $\mathbf{a_v(A)} = \mathbf{T}$
 2. But \mathbf{wRv} iff \mathbf{v} is in M .
 3. So $\mathbf{a_w(OA)} = \mathbf{T}$ iff for all \mathbf{v} , if \mathbf{v} is in M , then $\mathbf{a_v(A)} = \mathbf{T}$

Exercise 5.8

Show that any \mathbf{R} such that \mathbf{wRv} iff \mathbf{v} is in M is serial, dense, transitive, and shift reflexive. Show that such an \mathbf{R} need not be reflexive or symmetric.

1. Let $\langle \mathbf{W}, \mathbf{R} \rangle$ be a frame, and M non-empty subset of \mathbf{W} , and \mathbf{R} a binary relation on \mathbf{W} such that for all \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{v} , in \mathbf{W} , \mathbf{wRv} iff \mathbf{v} is in M . We show for each condition on \mathbf{R} that if \mathbf{wRv} iff \mathbf{v} is in M , then that condition holds on \mathbf{R} . Then we show that \mathbf{R} need not be reflexive or symmetric.
2. Presume that \mathbf{wRv} iff \mathbf{v} is in M for some arbitrarily chosen \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{v}
3. Then, since M is non-empty, there is some \mathbf{v} such that \mathbf{wRv} , i.e. \mathbf{R} is serial.
4. And since \mathbf{v} is in M , \mathbf{vRv} . i.e., \mathbf{R} is shift reflexive
5. Third, presume that there is some world \mathbf{u} such that \mathbf{vRu} .

6. Then \mathbf{v} is in M .
7. So \mathbf{wRu} , i.e., \mathbf{R} is transitive
8. Now, since \mathbf{R} is shift reflexive, there is at least one \mathbf{u} – namely \mathbf{v} – such that \mathbf{wRu} and \mathbf{uRv} . i.e., \mathbf{R} is dense.
9. Next, we show that \mathbf{R} need not be reflexive or symmetric.
10. Countermodel for reflexivity and symmetry: $\mathbf{W} = \{\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{u}\}$, $\mathbf{M} = \{\mathbf{u}\}$. $\mathbf{R} = \{\langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{u} \rangle, \langle \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{u} \rangle\}$
11. Since only \mathbf{u} is in M , and all worlds in \mathbf{W} \mathbf{Ru} , \mathbf{wRv} iff \mathbf{v} is in M .
12. But it is not the case that \mathbf{wRw} . So \mathbf{R} is not reflexive
13. Further, \mathbf{wRu} , but it is not the case that \mathbf{uRw} . So \mathbf{R} is not symmetric.

Exercise 5.9

Show that given (OM), O is not world relative, that is, show that for any two \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{u} in \mathbf{W} , $\mathbf{a_w(OA)}$ is $\mathbf{a_u(OA)}$.

1. Let $\langle \mathbf{W}, \mathbf{R}, \mathbf{a} \rangle$ be a model with a non-empty subset M satisfying the conditions stated in Exercise 5.8. Then for any \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{u} in \mathbf{W} , $\mathbf{a_w(OA)} = \mathbf{a_u(OA)}$
2. Presume $\mathbf{a_w(OA)} = \mathbf{T}$
3. $\mathbf{a_w(OA)} = \mathbf{T}$ iff for all \mathbf{v} in M , $\mathbf{a_v(A)} = \mathbf{T}$
4. And $\mathbf{a_u(OA)} = \mathbf{T}$ iff for all \mathbf{v} in M , $\mathbf{a_v(A)} = \mathbf{T}$
5. So $\mathbf{a_w(OA)} = \mathbf{T}$ iff $\mathbf{a_u(OA)} = \mathbf{T}$
6. Next, presume $\mathbf{a_w(OA)} = \mathbf{F}$
7. $\mathbf{a_w(OA)} = \mathbf{F}$ iff for some \mathbf{v} in M , $\mathbf{a_v(A)} = \mathbf{F}$
8. $\mathbf{a_u(OA)} = \mathbf{F}$ iff for some \mathbf{v} in M , $\mathbf{a_v(A)} = \mathbf{F}$
9. So $\mathbf{a_w(OA)} = \mathbf{F}$ iff $\mathbf{a_u(OA)} = \mathbf{F}$
10. Since \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{u} were arbitrarily chosen, it follows that for any \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{u} in \mathbf{W} , $\mathbf{a_w(OA)} = \mathbf{a_u(OA)}$

Exercise 5.10

Show that (T) and (Tf) are equivalent when f is the function defined from a serial and unique R by $f(w)=v$ iff wRv .

1. $A_w(TnA)=T$ iff for all v , if wRv , then $a_v(A)=T$ (T)
2. ...iff for all v , if $f(w)=v$, then $a_v(A)=T$ (Deff)
3. ...iff if $f(w)=v$, then $a_v(A)=T$ (Uniqueness)
4. ...iff $a_{f(w)}(A)=T$ (Tf)

Exercise 5.11

Show that (TT) is valid in a semantics where a model $\langle W, F, a \rangle$ contains a set F of constant functions from W into W , where a assigns to each term n a member $a(n)$ of F , and (Tn) is used as the truth clause for Tn

(Tn) $a_w TnA=T$ iff $a_{a(n)(w)}(A)=T$

1. $TnA \leftrightarrow TmTnA$ fails...
2. ...iff for some model $\langle W, F, a \rangle$ and some world w in W , $a_w(TnA \leftrightarrow TmTnA)=F$
5. ...iff $a_w(TnA) \neq a_w(TmTnA)$
6. ...iff $a_{a(n)(w)}(A) \neq a_w(TmTnA)=$
7. ...iff $a_{a(n)(w)}(A) \neq a_{a(m)(w)}(TnA)$
8. ...iff $a_{a(n)(w)}(A) \neq a_{a(n)(a(m)(w))}(A)$
9. But since $a(n)$ is a constant function, $a(n)(w)=a(n)((a(m)(w)))$.
10. So $TnA \leftrightarrow TmTnA$ fails iff $a_{a(n)(w)}(A) \neq a_{a(n)(w)}(A)$.
11. Since the consequent is impossible, $TnA \leftrightarrow TmTnA$ is valid.

Exercise 5.12

Show that the semantics of Exercise 5.11 is equivalent to one where the truth clause reads: $a_w(TnA)=T$ iff $a_{a(n)}(A)=T$, and a model is such that $a(n)$ is not a function from W into W , but instead a member of W .

1. Let $M = \langle W, F, a \rangle$ be a model where W is a set of worlds, F a set of constant functions from W into W , and a an assignment of propositions at worlds to truth values, and function symbols to members of F . Then we define another model $M' = \langle W', a' \rangle$, exactly like M , except for each function symbol n assigned to a member of F by a , a' assigns n directly to the output of n . We prove that $a_w(A)=T$ in M iff $a_w(A)=T$ in M' .
2. Since M' is exactly like M except with respect to F , all formulae not depending on F will have equivalent assignments. In particular, atomic and truth functional valuations will be identical. Hence, it is only necessary to show that valuations whose truth value depends on F in M remain the same in M' , i.e. those involving locative operators.
3. So let TnA be an arbitrary formula. Then $a_w(TnA)=T$ in M iff $a_{a(n)(w)}(A)=T$
4. But since n is a constant function, there is some world w' such that for any world w , $n(w)=w'$.
5. But by construction, $a'(n)=w'$ in M'
6. So $a_w(TnA)=T$ in M iff $a'_{a'(n)}(A)=T$ in M'
7. i.e. $a_w(TnA)=T$ in M iff $a'(TnA)=T$ in M'

Exercise 5.13

Show that the above three formulas are provable from (\leftrightarrow) in M , assuming that \leftrightarrow is identified with $>$.

Transitivity: $((A>B) \& (B>C)) > (A>C)$

1. First, we translate the formula:
 $(\Box(\Box(A \rightarrow B) \& \Box(B \rightarrow C)) \rightarrow \Box(A \rightarrow C))$.
2. Next, we show that the formula is valid in M .
3. Assume it isn't.

4. Then for some model $M = \langle W, R, a \rangle$, and some world u in W , $a_u(\Box(\Box(A \rightarrow B) \& \Box(B \rightarrow C)) \rightarrow \Box(A \rightarrow C)) = 0$
5. i.e. for some world w in W , uRw and $a_w(\Box(A \rightarrow B) \& \Box(B \rightarrow C)) \rightarrow \Box(A \rightarrow C) = 0$
6. So $a_w(\Box(A \rightarrow B) \& \Box(B \rightarrow C)) = 1$, and $a_w \Box(A \rightarrow C) = 0$.
7. So $a_w(\Box(A \rightarrow B)) = a_w(\Box(B \rightarrow C)) = 1$, and $a_w \Box(A \rightarrow C) = 0$.
8. So $a_w(\Box(A \rightarrow B)) = a_w(\Box(B \rightarrow C)) = 1$, and for some v in W , wRv and $a_v(A \rightarrow C) = 0$.
9. So $a_w(\Box(A \rightarrow B)) = a_w(\Box(B \rightarrow C)) = 1$, and for some v in W , wRv and $a_v(A) = 1$ and $a_v(C) = 0$.
10. And for all u in W , if wRu , then $a_u(A \rightarrow B) = a_u(B \rightarrow C) = 1$.
11. So in particular, $a_v(A \rightarrow B) = a_v(B \rightarrow C) = 1$.
12. I.e. $a_v(A) = 0$ or $a_v(B) = 1$, and $a_v(B) = 0$ or $a_v(C) = 1$.
13. Since $a_v(A) = 1$, $a_v(B) = 1$.
14. But since $a_v(C) = 0$, $a_v(B) = 0$.
15. So $a_v(B) = 0 = 1$.
16. \perp
17. Therefore, there is no such world w or model M , i.e. $((A > B) \& (B > C)) > (A > C)$ is valid.

Contraposition: $(A > \sim B) > (B > \sim A)$

1. Assume $(A > \sim B) > (B > \sim A)$, i.e. $\Box(\Box(A \rightarrow \sim B) \rightarrow \Box(B \rightarrow \sim A))$ isn't valid.
2. Then for some model $M = \langle W, R, a \rangle$ and some w in W , $a_w(\Box(\Box(A \rightarrow \sim B) \rightarrow \Box(B \rightarrow \sim A))) = 0$.
3. So for some world v in W , wRv and $a_v(\Box(A \rightarrow \sim B) \rightarrow \Box(B \rightarrow \sim A)) = 0$.
4. So $a_v(\Box(A \rightarrow \sim B)) = 1$ and $a_v(\Box(B \rightarrow \sim A)) = 0$.
5. So for some u in W , vRu and $a_u(B \rightarrow \sim A) = 0$.
6. i.e. $a_u(B) = 1$ and $a_u(\sim A) = 0$
7. i.e. $a_u(B) = a_u(A) = 1$.
8. And for all w' in W , if vRw' , then $a_{w'}(A \rightarrow \sim B) = 1$.

9. So in particular, $a_u(A \rightarrow \sim B) = 1$.
10. i.e. $a_u(A) = 0$ or $a_u(\sim B) = 1$.
11. i.e. $a_u(A) = 0$ or $a_u(B) = 0$.
12. Since $a_u(A) = 1$, $a_u(B) = 0$.
13. But $a_u(B) = 1$.
14. \perp
15. Therefore, $(A > \sim B) > (B > \sim A)$ is valid in M

Strengthening Antecedents: $(A > B) > ((A \& C) > B)$

1. Assume $(A > B) > ((A \& C) > B)$, i.e. $\Box(\Box(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow \Box((A \& C) \rightarrow B))$ isn't valid.
2. Then for some model $\langle W, R, a \rangle$ and world w in W , $a_w(\Box(\Box(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow \Box((A \& C) \rightarrow B))) = 0$.
3. So for some world v in W , wRv and $a_v(\Box(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow \Box((A \& C) \rightarrow B)) = 0$
4. So $a_v(\Box(A \rightarrow B)) = 1$ and $a_v(\Box((A \& C) \rightarrow B)) = 0$.
5. So $a_v(\Box(A \rightarrow B)) = 1$ and for some u in W , vRu and $a_u((A \& C) \rightarrow B) = 0$.
6. So $a_u((A \& C)) = 1$, i.e. $a_u(A) = a_u(C) = 1$, and $a_u(B) = 0$.
7. And for all v' in W , if vRv' , then $a_{v'}(A \rightarrow B) = 1$.
8. So in particular, $a_u(A \rightarrow B) = 1$.
9. So $a_u(A) = 0$ or $a_u(B) = 1$.
10. But $a_u(A) = 1$, so $a_u(B) = 1$.
11. But $a_u(B) = 0$.
12. \perp
13. Therefore, $(A > B) > ((A \& C) > B)$ is valid in M .


Exercise 5.14

If I flip the switch, the light will turn on. So if I flip the switch and the circuit is shorted, the light will turn on.


Exercise 5.15

We have not discussed two conditions that appear on this list: the euclidean condition and convergence. Draw diagrams for these conditions. Then consider which of them holds when **R** is **earlier than** for various structures of time.

Euclidean condition: $wRv \& wRu \rightarrow vRu$



Convergence: $wRv \& wRu \rightarrow \exists x(vRx \& uRx)$



If **R** is **earlier than**, then it is transitive, and arguably connected and dense.