Mapping Populist Parties in Europe and the Americas*

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Abstract

In this paper we use holistic grading to measure the level of populism found in political parties' discourse during electoral campaigns. The technique is applied to leaders' speeches and electoral manifestos from 136 parties in 26 countries, from Western Europe and the Americas. We describe our results, which indicate that populism is stronger in Latin America than in Europe, and that the level of populism among some European parties typically considered as examples of radical right populism might be overstated when compared with Latin American counterparts. We also introduce ways of implementing automated text analysis to classify manifestos as populist, and discuss potential reasons why, in this sample, results were not satisfactory.

1 Introduction

One of the main challenges in studying populism in comparative perspective is defining which political actors deserve this label. Because it is such a controversial concept, most comparative studies classify cases by *fiat*, based either on literature reviews, or relying on country specialists to decide on each case (see, for example,

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Doyle, 2011; Levitsky and Loxton, 2013; Bustikova, 2014; Mudde, 2007, 2014). The problem with the first approach is that it often relies on second-hand literature instead of primary sources, and has little room for testing reliability. The problem with the second is that it depends on the different conceptions of populism experts might have, and how their perceptions are driven by the cases they know well. While it gives an idea of how populist are parties within one political system in relation to one another, the scale is not absolute across countries and renders a comparison virtually impossible. While specialists in Sweden may consider, for example, that the Sweden Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna*) are extremely populist in that country's context, this does not mean that it is also very populist in comparison to parties in other countries.

In this paper we use a tested and validated approach to measuring populism – holistic grading (Hawkins, 2009) – and apply it to 136 parties from 26 countries in Europe and the Americas, creating the first comprehensive data set classifying entire party systems according to the level of populism in parties' discourse. By looking at campaign documents – electoral manifestos and speeches by party leaders –, from all main parties in a political system, we are able to observe how populist each actor is, and compare that to a range of international cases. With these data in hand, we first observe how populism is distributed across the regions in this study, and which specific parties have been classified as such. Next, we introduce supervised learning methods for automated text analysis that can, theoretically, generate a model capable of classifying these texts but which, given the limitations of the data at hand, have not yielded satisfactory results.

2 Populism and its measurement

We consider populism to be in the realm of ideas, a perspective that has become prominent in recent years (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013, 497). It is a discourse which sees politics as divided in moral terms, where the good is identified with "the people" and the evil is embodied by an "elite". This "people" encompasses the majority of the population and is a homogeneous, unified body that has an identifiable *will* – the General Will or *volonté générale* –, which should be guiding all decision-making in politics. The elite, on the other side, is a minority who is in power (or in risk of imminent return to), who uses its resources to exploit the people. It is morally evil, and to blame for all bad things that befall the country. Because of this division, populist discourse calls for a "systemic change", or liberation of the people from the grip of the elites. It charges the whole political system of being corrupted by a small ruling group, and pleads that overthrowing this group is the only way to enforce democratic rule by the people. Undemocratic means may be accepted to achieve this goal since, in this framing, the elites are thieves who do not deserve a fair treatment, and the enforcement of the people's will should not be blocked by formalities and institutions.

An ideational approach along these lines lends itself to operationalization and measurement, since it identifies elements that should be present in a discourse for it to be populist. Following it, researchers have used different content analysis methods to measure populism in recent years. Jagers and Walgrave (2007) test a dictionary-based content analysis to classify populist parties in Flanders, which is extended in Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) to three more countries. It consists in

defining a dictionary of "populist" terms and classifying documents based on their frequency. Rooduijn et al. (2014) use quantitative human-based content analysis of party manifestos from five European countries. This approach has paragraphs as units of analysis, and uses trained coders to classify each one as populist or not, with the aggregated proportion of populist paragraphs being the party score. A third comparative approach has been put forward in Hawkins (2009), and consists of holistic grading. There, chief executives' speeches are coded as a whole, without breaking them down into words or paragraphs. [1]

From these alternatives, this paper uses the third. The dictionary-based technique demands a high knowledge of each specific country for the selection of relevant terms. It may be feasible in single case studies or small-n comparisons, but becomes much less so when a larger number of cases are included. Of the other two, both depart from a similar definition of populism and could potentially be used for the purposes of this study. Hawkins' approach has the upper-hand, however, for having been tested and validated across a large number of countries and time-periods. The original study (Hawkins, 2009) included 40 contemporary and historical presidents and prime-ministers from Latin America, Europe, and Asia, while a second round was done with chief executives from Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Hawkins, 2013). The technique by Rooduijn et al. (2014) has not yet been applied outside of France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

Holistic grading was developed in educational psychology for assessing students' writing (White, 1985; Sudweeks et al., 2004). It is a human-based coding approach

[1] For a review of content analysis methods measuring populism, see Poblete (2015).

that evaluates the text as a whole. Graders are trained to allocate scores based on the elements of the concept and a set of anchor texts defined as examples for the lowest, intermediate, and highest boundaries. In this case, coders are trained in English on the concept of populism, and the set of training documents are in English as well – but come from a variety of regions. Anchors texts include, for example, speeches by politicians as diverse as Robert Mugabe, Evo Morales, Barack Obama, Tony Blair, Sarah Palin, and Stephen Harper. The training emphasizes that the most important dimension of populism is the notion of a unified, homogeneous people, or the "will of the people", and that this people has to be defined in opposition to an "elite", who is powerful and oppressive. Therefore, even if there is much anti-elitism in the text, if there is no general will of the people, coders are instructed to assign a low score. As in Hawkins (2009, 1062), grades range from 0 to 2, where 0, 1 and 2 are categories defined as follows:

- 0 A speech in this category uses few if any populist elements. Note that even if a manifesto expresses a Manichaean worldview, it is not considered populist if it lacks some notion of a popular will.

- 1 A speech in this category includes strong, clearly populist elements but either does not use them consistently or tempers them by including non-populist elements. Thus, the discourse may have a romanticized notion of the people and the idea of a unified popular will (indeed, it must in order to be considered populist), but it avoids bellicose language or references to cosmic proportions or any particular enemy.

- 2 A speech in this category is extremely populist and comes very close to the ideal populist discourse. Specifically, the speech expresses all or nearly all of the elements of ideal populist discourse, and has few elements that would be considered non-populist.

Because graders in earlier studies reported that it was often difficult to choose between the blunt categories, this time they were instructed to give decimal scores, and told that 0.5 rounds up to a categorical 1, and 1.5 rounds up to a categorical 2, so they should consider the qualitative difference between the categories when assigning decimal points. After the training, coders are given the texts – speeches or manifestos – in their original language. One rubric is filled for each document, and each one is discussed with the other coders and the coordinator to clarify questions and check for possible misunderstandings.

2.1 Sampling

Two innovations were introduced in this study in relation to the previous uses of holistic grading: first, it has been expanded from chief executives to candidates of most parties to the highest executive office. The second change is that party manifestos are also coded, instead of only speeches. The option for including manifestos is that these documents help to explore a party's discourse as an institution, which may be distinct from that of its candidate. Also, speeches and manifestos are the documents most comparable across countries: almost everywhere parties produce some kind of election program and party candidates deliver speeches. This means we are looking for populist discourse in documents that are produced and made public with

similar purposes across cases. Speeches used are all from national election campaigns – this means that it is possible to find texts for all parties of interest. [2] While for the manifesto we effectively use a census sample (there is usually only one manifesto), for speeches we use a quota sample that selects one speech from the beginning of the campaign and one from the end. The one from the beginning is ideally the one where the candidate is announced by the party, or confirms her candidacy, frequently done in a large party event with significant media coverage. The second speech comes from the end of the race, a few days before the election, often given in the context of a large rally closing the campaign that also has significant media coverage. The reasoning behind these choices is to, first, capture the discourse in distinct moments in the race. Also, if it is possible to have speeches from events that received large coverage, we are looking at those which have the most potential to be heard by the largest number of voters. If a politician is to use a populist discourse, these are the moments when she would most likely have been heard. Furthermore, while not all countries have a tradition of parties holding large rallies to end the campaign, most hold party conventions where the leading candidate is acclaimed. Limiting the number of speeches to two is dictated by a practical reason: it is very difficult to find more than two campaign speeches for several candidates. [3]

In terms of coverage, the sample includes 136 parties from 26 countries in the Americas and Western Europe. The selection of countries was partly dictated by

[2] If we used speeches in parliament, for example, new parties would be excluded.

[3] In Hawkins (2009) it was suggested that three to four speeches were enough for a reliable grade. However, there a politician's discourse was studied for all her time in office. Because we are limiting it to how populist are political campaigns – shorter in time –, it may be expected that there is less variance, and fewer speeches may be needed.

convenience: we had to include those for which there were coders who spoke the language. This was less of a problem in the Americas: most of South America plus the whole North America were included. In Western Europe the sample is more limited, but we could not identify any evident biases: the sample includes countries where populism is often said to be high, and others where it is usually off the radar. Also, there are both Southern and Northern countries. What are completely absent, though, are post-socialist Central and Eastern European cases. For half the countries in our sample, parties were included if they got more than 1% of the vote in the national election of interest. In the other half, the cutoff was 5%. The reasons were practical: first the availability of documents, which in some cases could not be found for the smallest parties; and second, the amount of resources and the number of coders. For instance, a 5% line in Sweden already included seven parties. [4] The manifestos and speeches all come from the most recent national elections up to March 2015 in which the chief executive was defined. [5]

[4]Countries where the 1% rule applied: Belgium (vote shares considered for each electoral college), Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Germany (Pirates, with two percent of list votes, were not included), Mexico, Peru, Spain, United Kingdom, Uruguay, United States, and Venezuela. Countries with a 5% cutoff: Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, France, Italy, Netherlands, Paraguay, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland. In some of these, one or more smaller parties were still included, when sources were available. From Norway, only the three largest parties are present in the sample.

[5]With the exception of Canada, where documents from 2006 were used, and Austria, where we coded the 2008 legislative election.

3 Description of results

3.1 Manifestos versus speeches

This is the first time that holistic grading has been applied on such a large scale to party manifestos, and some issues of adapting it to this kind of document emerged. First, as coders started to report results, many indicated that there were two very different tones in some manifestos, where the preamble, or introduction, contained high levels of populism, while the rest (always a list of policy proposals) had a more pragmatic or technical feel. We decided to ask coders to give separate scores for the preamble/introduction, where it existed, and the list of policy positions. The mean level of populism in preambles is 0.32, while that of the list of positions is 0.26. The scores for all parties coded are found in Appendix A, in Table 4. In it, the Manifesto column is a simple mean of the preamble and the list of issues scores. [6] Because the preamble is always shorter than the list of positions [7], the net result is to weight the preamble more heavily.

The results confirm an intuitive expectation: manifestos are less populist than speeches. Given their nature as formal party documents for elite consumption, it is not surprising that the tone is more sober. The mean grade for manifestos is 0.29, while that of speeches is 0.44, with no difference between speeches from the beginning and end of the campaign. In categorical terms, this means the average campaign

[6] This issue also emerged in Rooduijn et al. (2014), and the authors decided to count each paragraph of the preamble twice.

[7] The length of manifestos ranged from 4 pages, from the German *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD), to 810, from the Walloon *Ecolo*. The length of preambles span from two paragraphs to five pages.

speech is almost at the 0.5 threshold that indicates the presence of necessary elements of populism, but weak or used inconsistently throughout the speech. This shows that populism in political campaigns might not be dominant, but still has a non-negligible presence.

The correlation between speeches' and manifestos' final scores is presented in Figure 1, on the left-hand side. It is 0.54, and there were only two cases of parties where one kind of document received a categorical 2 (a decimal score equal or above 1.5) and the other a categorical 0 (a decimal equal or below 0.5). These are the *Rivoluzione Civile* (RCI), in Italy, with an average for speeches of its leader, Antonio Ingroia, of 1.5, while the manifesto scored 0.4, and the *Solidaridad Nacional* (SN), from Peru, whose manifesto received a 0.0 and the candidate's speech 1.6 [8]. These results indicate that, when possible, it is ideal to have both manifestos and speeches coded to give a more complete picture of how populist a party is but, in the absence of speeches, manifestos still give a reasonable approximation.

The right-hand side of Figure 1 has the same plot with logged scores for speeches and manifestos. Looking at the figure on the left, with original scores, it is possible to see that there are a few parties close to the top, some more or less scattered in the middle, and many in the lower-left corner. Focusing on the specific parties, we see that those on the top are PSUV[9] – Chávez' party in Venezuela –, and other

[8]Both might be explained by two shortcomings in the data available from these parties. The RCI manifesto was one of the few that had no preamble, only a list of policy positions, what may have contributed to its lower score. For the SN, only one speech from its presidential candidate, Luis "Lucho" Castañeda Lossio, was found and coded, and the version of the speech had been edited before it was made available. This score, therefore, is more sensitive to the possibility of a single non-representative speech or of non-representative fragments that have been kept.

[9]The list of abbreviations may be found in Appendix B

Figure 1: Speeches and manifestos scores



Latin American ones that closely follow his discourse – Alianza PAIS, in Ecuador, and Partido Igualdad, in Chile. While it is important to find that very few parties, especially out of Latin America, are as populist as some of the prime examples of populism in the region, it blurs what can also be of interest: the variation in populism among all other parties that are not led by Hugo Chávez. For this reason, the plot with logged scores is presented, where it is possible to observe more clearly how levels of populism vary in the sample. [10]

3.2 Intercoder reliability

After the coding efforts in Hawkins (2009, 2013) showed high intercoder reliability, it seemed possible to have only one coder doing some cases, in order to increase the

[10] For the transformation, all original scores were multiplied by 10 and a constant value of 1 added, since many had an original final score of 0. The logarithm was taken from the resulting values.

Figure 2: Correlation between coders' scores



number of countries and parties covered. Part of this sample, therefore, is based on the grades assigned by only one coder. For the other part (64 documents in total), two were kept, and the results of intercoder reliability checks confirm that the method is reliable. Krippendorff's alpha is high, 0.87, showing that using only one coder for part of the sample should not bring major measurement errors. Figure 2 shows the correlations between scores assigned by two coders to each document, with dot sizes representing the number of documents in each point coordinate.

3.3 Aggregation

The first step in aggregating scores is to calculate one for each party. Here are two possibilities. The first is to assign half of the weight to manifesto, and half to the average of the speech scores. The reasoning behind this aggregation is that the manifesto represents the discourse of the party as a whole, while the speeches are an indication of the leaders' own discourse. Thus, both receive the same weight in defining the party final score.[11] The second is to assign the same weight for every document coded, which doubles the weight given to speeches in relation to the manifesto.[12] For the analyses and descriptions in the rest of the paper, we use the first.

A second aggregation step is to calculate the average level of populism in a country, which allows for some regional comparisons. The proposed formula for this sums the products between each party populism score and its vote share, following Equation 1, where Pc is the country populism score, p_i the populism final score of party

[11] These results are under "Party score" in Table 4.
[12] Under "Party score 2" in Table 4.

i, and v_i the vote-share of party i. Since the populism scale ranges from 0 to 2, and vote-shares from 0 to 100, results are divided by 2 to create a 0-100 scale.

$$Pc = \frac{\sum(p_i \times v_i)}{2} \tag{1}$$

Figure 3 presents the aggregate country scores. The graph shows that in Venezuela, in the 2013 elections, populism was the common currency of the two candidates. Nicolas Maduro, successor to Hugo Chávez and elected with 51% of the votes, has a score of 1.73, while Henrique Capriles, who got 49% of the vote, had an average populism of 1.35. This sums up to a country score of almost 78. In a high position are also Bolivia and Ecuador, where the two very populist candidates, Evo Morales and Rafael Correa respectively, had excellent performances in their reelection campaigns, driving most of the high scores. Behind these, and confirming that the three South American countries have today exceptionally high levels of populism, come the others.

4 Comparing results

4.1 Regional differences

Table 1 indicates all parties that surpassed the categorical threshold of 0.5, indicating there is a non-negligible component of populism in their discourse, even if not consistently used. The three most populist parties identified, all of which received a grade above 1.5, are from Latin America. They are the *Partido Socialista*

Figure 3: Aggregate country populism scores



Table 1: Populist parties in Europe and Americas

	Americas	**Europe**
Party score ≥ 1.5	Partido Igualdad, Chile (2.0) Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela, Venezuela (1.725) Movimiento al Socialismo, Bolivia (1.55)	
Party score ≥ 1.0	Alianza Patria Altiva i Soberana, Ecuador (1.43) Partido Socialismo e Liberdade, Brazil (1.38) Mesa de la Unidad Democrática, Venezuela (1.35)	Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, Germany (1.4) Die Linke, Germany (1.3) Partij voor de Vrijheid, Netherlands (1.25) Izquierda Unida, Spain (1.0) Schweizerische Volkspartei, Switzerland (1.0) Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, Austria (1.0)
Party score ≥ 0.5	Partido Nacionalista Peruano, Peru (0.925) Concertación Avanza Pais, Paraguay (0.8) Conservative Party, Canada (0.8) Solidariedad Nacional, Peru (0.8) Polo Democrático Alternativo, Colombia (0.78) Bloc Québécois, Canada (0.75) Partido de la Revolución Democrática, Mexico (0.75) Unión Cívica Radical, Argentina (0.75) Partido Progressista, Chile (0.73) Unidad Popular, Uruguay (0.73) Alianza Compromiso Federal, Argentina (0.55)	Rivoluzione Civile, Italy (0.95) British National Party, UK (0.95) Partido Comunista Português, Portugal (0.7) Scottish National Party, UK (0.65) Front National, France (0.58) Front de Gauche, France (0.58) Parti Populaire, Belgium-WAL (0.55)

Party score refers to the average between the average speeches score and the manifesto score for each party. Values for each party indicated in parenthesis.

Unido de Venezuela (PSUV), founded by the late Hugo Chávez; the *Movimiento al Socialismo*, Evo Morales' party in Bolivia; and a small party from Chile, *Partido Igualdad*, whose leader in the 2013 presidential campaign, Roxana Miranda, followed closely the radical-left ideology of the previous two. Bolivarianism is found here to be strongly associated with populism: of the three Latin American parties that have scores between 1.0 and 1.5, two hold a similar ideology as well. The one (perhaps surprising) exception was the *Mesa de la Unidad Democrática*, the center-right opposition in Venezuela, with a 1.35 populism score.

As the absence of cases in the top-right box hints, populism is stronger in Latin America than in Europe. While we identified 15 parties with a grade higher than 0.5 in Latin America, meaning 33.3% of the regional sample, there were only 13 European ones in this range, out of 76, or 17.1%. Furthermore, not only are there more highly populist parties in Latin America, but the aggregate country scores are higher than in Europe. This point is made in Figure 3 and again in Figure 4, which compares the means of populism in parties in the two regions. The dark blue bars are unweighted mean scores of populism, while the lighter blue present scores weighed by parties' vote-share. As the two panels indicate, results are similar if we use the combination of manifestos and speeches or only manifestos. What the figures also show is that, not only are Latin American parties on average more populist than Europeans, but populism in Latin America is used by electorally stronger parties – when we weigh in the vote-shares, the level of populism goes up. In other words, populism is a more mainstream discourse in Latin America.

This pattern is an important finding in itself. While this has not been openly ex-

Figure 4: Levels of populism by region



pressed or argued for, the common assumption in studies comparing populist parties in both regions is that they are populist to the same extent. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012), for example, study the difference between left and right populism, concluding that one is inclusionary (left) while the other is exclusionary (right). They select typical cases of each, which are the French National Front and the Freedom Party of Austria for right-wing populism, and Evo Morales and Hugo Chávez for left-wing. The underlying assumption is that the only thing that differentiates these movements, at least in terms of their ideas, is their "thick" ideology – populism is treated as a constant. What we see here, however, is that the National Front, with a final score of 0.58, is not nearly as populist as Morales' MAS (1.55) or Chávez's PSUV (1.73), while the Freedom Party of Austria might come closer (1.0) but is still one category below the two Latin American ones.

5 A note on automation

With the arrival of Big Data and its methods into the social sciences, automated content analysis has been gaining traction in the field, to measure the most varied concepts with the assistance of modeling methods and large bodies of data. Considering that what we present in this paper is, to date, the largest classification of political documents on how populist they are, it seemed appropriate to test whether it is possible to train a model that is able to reproduce the results we obtained with human coding.

In the attempt of capturing populism through computerized content analysis, we used a range of machine learning techniques to perform supervised classification of documents.[13] Each one follows the same steps: first, document scores are converted to categories; next, the sample is split into a training and a testing sets. The training set is used to generate a model that predicts classification into the categories, and this model is then applied to the sample of testing documents. The result in the testing sample is compared to these documents' original categories from the human coding, to judge the validity of the models. The varying techniques used are simply different ways of generating the model based on the training set.

5.1 Preparing the data

We report here the application of these models to manifestos alone. A large part of the speeches used for coding in this paper is not available in text, but only in video

[13] See Grimmer and Stewart (2013) for a comprehensive assessment of automated text analysis methods.

or audio. We had only 72 transcripts, a majority of which (57) categorical 0's with no populism in them, and this number turned out to be too small for the methods applied here. [14] For the manifestos analysis, we include also the anchor documents used in the training of coders. Our total sample size is 142.[15]

The corpus was prepared in the following way: first, all documents that were in pdf format – most manifestos – were automatically converted to plain text files. A review of the results shows that formatting was obviously lost, and in some cases the order of pages was shuffled. However, this is not a problem because the methods applied here use the "bag of words" assumption, meaning that the order of words in a text is not taken into consideration, but only their individual frequency. [16] The texts were then translated into English with Google Translator, and an inspection of the output shows satisfactory results. [17]

After that, the documents are pre-processed to make them more practical for computerized text analysis. The procedures applied are standard: turning all words to lower case, removing punctuation, numbers, and stopwords (such as prepositions and articles), stemming words, and removing unnecessary space (meaning, all else than a single space between each word). The documents are then transformed into

[14] We did perform all the same analyses as those reported for the manifestos, but results showed no method that classified speeches much better than a coin toss would. At this point, all that can be said is that more coded speeches would be necessary before judging any results of automation to classifying them.

[15] Manifestos from Flanders and Austria are not yet included in this part of the analysis, because coders were not yet done with them by the time these models were run.

[16] Issues identified with the conversion were: words divided at the end of lines were not rejoined; in some cases titles and graphical words/sentences were not properly recognized. These problems, however, were few and there is no reason to expect them to be systematic and bias our results.

[17] This choice is due to the fact that automatic translators are usually considered to work better with English as a target, one of the reasons being that for many pairs of languages the translation is not done directly, but through English.

a document-term matrix, where each row is one document, and each column is one *unigram* (a word or stem) that appears at least once in the whole corpus. Cells are filled with the number of times that the unigram i appeared in text t. Sparse terms are then removed with a .75 cutoff, meaning that words present in less than 25% of the texts were removed, and common terms, present in more than 90% of the texts, were also cut. This reduces the demand for computational power and reduces noise, by removing information that is unlikely to help in classifying. In fact, we tested different levels of ratios for sparsity – including no removal of common or sparse words –, and the models' performances get worse when sparse terms are still present. All transformations were done using the 'tm' package for R (Feinerer et al., 2008; Feinerer and Hornik, 2015).

5.2 Methods

Following the saying that in automated text classification no model is good, but some work, we apply eight classifiers to our data: support vector machine (SVM) (Karatzoglou et al., 2006), boosting (Friedman et al., 2000), multinomial logistic regression/maximum entropy (maxent) (Jurka, 2012), random forest (Liaw and Wiener, 2002), classification and regression tree (Ripley, 2015), scaled linear discriminant analysis (Läuter et al., 1998; Peters and Hothorn, 2015), lasso regression and naïve Bayes (Hastie et al., 2009).[18] We use Krippendorff's alpha (Krippendorff, 2004) between each individual classifier and the manual code to evaluate the quality of results. Similar to evaluating intercoder reliability, there is not a consensual critical value,

[18] All analyses conducted in R, with the packages 'RTextTools' (Jurka et al., 2014), 'glmnet' (Friedman et al., 2010), and 'e1071' (Meyer et al., 2015).

but alphas around or above 0.8 are safely considered to indicate a reliable coding, and higher than 0.7 could be accepted. In this case we should look for something similar: if there is a high alpha, it means that the agreement between the automated method and the manual scores is comparable to the agreement level we would consider acceptable if two human coders were doing it. Jurafsky and Martin (2009) point that the combined results of different classifiers can lead to higher accuracy than any of them reaches individually. Therefore, we also look at the accuracy of consensus scores for better performing classifiers.

Our sample presents a couple of major challenges for these methods: first, it is relatively small, compared to common applications of these classifiers to Big Data. Second, the distribution is very skewed towards low populism. Only four of the manifestos coded for this paper received a categorical 2 – meaning high and consistent populism –, and there were four more 2's in the training set. 26 of the 142 are categorical 1's, and all the rest, close to 75% of the sample, is composed of 0's. For this reason, we coupled 1's and 2's into the same category, making populism a binary variable, what may give the models more information to identify populist texts. To maximize the probability of correct classification, we go through the entire sample picking two manifestos at a time for testing, and using the remaining 140 texts to train the model.[19]

Figure 5: Krippendorff's alpha for each individual classifier



5.3 Results

Figure 5 shows the value for Krippendorff's alpha calculated between each classifier's result and the manual code. The two best performing algorithms are lasso regression and maximum entropy (maxent), with alphas of 0.54 and 0.5, respectively. These values are below the limits usually considered acceptable – even at a lower bound of 0.7. The other six had bad – or very bad – performances: a Krippendorff's alpha of 0 indicates that the classification could as well be the result of a coin toss, while negative values mean that there is a structural problem leading results to be even worse than what would be expected with random classification. For example, the naive Bayes classifier coded a large majority of documents as 1, while the manual coding had given 0 to three-quarters of the total.

The two methods that performed better, however, deserve further attention. While the result means that they should not be used for classification right now, it is still high enough that we can say they are on the right track, and could potentially deliver a satisfactory performance with some improvements. Looking at the 2×3 tables of their classification, in Table 2, we see that both performed well on the most populist texts – those that originally had a categorical score of 2. The maximum entropy algorithm classified all eight as populist in its binary sorting, while the lasso regression missed one, but got the other seven right. There are not that many problems with the clearly non-populist manifestos either: the lasso regression cor-

[19] We have also used as training sets the original documents used for practice in coders' training, and repeated random samples of 30, 60, and 90 texts. Results remained on average stable across distinct sample sizes, but overall less accurate than what is obtained when training the model using the entire sample minus two.

Table 2: Accuracy of lasso regression and maximum entropy classifications

		Lasso	
		0	1
Manual	0	101	7
	1	14	12
	2	1	7

		Maxent	
		0	1
Manual	0	95	13
	1	13	13
	2	0	8

rectly identified them as such 93.5% of the time: only seven out of 108 non-populist speeches were deemed populist by it. The maxent classifier did worse, but still correctly classified 88% of the non-populist manifestos. Most errors were with those that originally received a categorical 1, meaning that populism was present but not consistently used throughout the text. There, both methods were split, getting only around half of the sample right.

A further check is to see if the combination of these two classifiers produces better results than their use alone. Table 3 shows the classification results for all documents that both lasso regression and maximum entropy gave the same score (consensus). These were 118 documents, meaning 83% of the total of manifestos. Krippendorff's alpha between the consensus scores and manual scores is higher than for each individual method: 0.64. However, we can observe that the difficulty with in-between cases persists: of the 26 manifestos originally coded as categorical one, they agreed in 15 grades, but were right in only seven.

5.4 An automated future in sight?

The results observed with lasso regression and maximum entropy should be enough to give a moderate optimism on the possibility of automating the coding of manifestos

Table 3: Consensus results of lasso regression and maximum entropy classifiers

		Consensus	
		0	1
Manual	0	92	4
	1	8	7
	2	0	7

Krippendorff's alpha: 0.64
Coverage: 0.83

for populism. The sample we had was not one where classifiers would be expected to excel: there were relatively few documents, these were long – sometimes a few hundred pages –, from a variety of countries and languages, all converted automatically into English. Moreover, the concept we are trying to capture is known to be elusive and subtle. To make matters more complicated, when applying holistic grading to manifestos, it is often the case that populism can be found only in a few important paragraphs. That, for a human coder interpreting the context, would be enough to say that the text has indeed elements of populism (and code as a 1). However, for an algorithm looking for words with which to do the classification, that is just a small fraction of the total amount of information and may easily go unnoticed.

Given these difficulties, lasso regression and maximum entropy might be said to have gone beyond expectations, showing an ability to reliably recognize manifestos that are clearly non-populist or clearly populist. Where they did not perform so well were those in which human coders saw the necessary elements of populism, but used inconsistently and not so strongly. At this point, there are two ways of explaining the inaccuracy of classifiers with this category. First, it may be that this is the limit of automated classification: populism in these texts is such a subtle topic that it

requires human interpretation and contextual information to be identified, and there is no counting of words that can replace that. Or second, it might just be a matter of adding more data. With a large enough sample of manifestos, the training models would be able to capture the small differences that make for a 1 manifesto. However, knowing which one of the two is correct is beyond the possibilities in this paper.

6 Discussion

This paper started by introducing what is, up to date, the most comprehensive data set of political parties classified by how populist their discourses are. We applied a technique of holistic grading to party manifestos and to candidate speeches from Western Europe and the Americas, to see how much populism they displayed in these texts. From the methodological perspective, it was shown that the method can transition to manifestos – a novelty in its application – and that it is possible to use only one coder if resources are scarce, since intercoder reliability proved to be high. We also have presented results on automated classification of these documents, and shown that computerized text analysis could potentially be successful in identifying populism if there is enough data for training models.

The classification data on their own are a relevant contribution that may be used for a wide array of future research. Models trying to explain support for populist parties, for instance, have up to now mostly relied on dichotomous divisions based on literature reviews or experts' classifications of parties (see, for instance, Bustikova, 2014; Doyle, 2011; Remmer, 2011). It is now possible to model these preferences

based on data on parties' levels of populism in comparative perspective, across different regions, derived directly from party communication and coded using a single definition of the term. This reduces measurement error, increases precision (by using a continuous measurement instead of a dichotomous one), and increases the comparability of results. If country experts overestimate the level of populism in parties they know well, as do those who include the Sweden Democrats in lists of populists, for example, this may now be corrected by having a scale that puts parties into fully comparative perspective.

A clear regional cut stands out from the results. While there are populists in both regions, the level of populist discourse found among Latin American parties and politicians is much higher than that found among their European counterparts. A prototypical European populist, the National Front, had a score of 0.4 for their manifesto, and Marine Le Pen's 2012 campaign speeches received an average of 0.75 out of 2. Other typical European populists did not fare much higher – Beppe Grillo's speeches averaged 0.65, Berlusconi's 0.35, and Nigel Farage's a round zero. The Sweden Democrats's score, whose recent electoral success has spurred much debate in Europe about the rise of yet another radical right populist party, shows that it might be radical right, but it is definitely not populist – it is not even the most populist party in Sweden. This does not mean populism is not found in all cases expected. Nick Griffin and the British National Party do get moderately high scores, as does the German extreme-right NPD, and Geert Wilders' PVV in the Netherlands. However, if we isolate only the populist portion of their discourse, they are still not as radically populist as a couple of Latin American examples.

A skeptical reader might say that low scores for some parties may be a result of poor selection of texts, rather than parties' lack of populism. It is possible to find quotes by Nigel Farage, for example, which sound very populist. Two counterarguments may be offered to this. First, while three documents might not be ideal, and there may be large variation in a politician's discourse, the odds of all three being the few non-populist exceptions from a very populist candidate are quite small. As we have seen, strongly populist actors have this discourse even in the list of policy proposals of their party manifestos. Second, our selection of speeches has a partial bias for high profile speeches: the opening and closing of campaigns. The simple fact that speeches were available online often indicates that they received at least some attention, and were not obscure talks to small audiences. Therefore, we are capturing political discourse in moments when it has a better chance of being heard by the public. If populism is to matter in a politician's discourse, those are the right times. It might be that a politician's tone is more populist to her partisans than to the general public, but then the question goes to another level: is intra-party populism more relevant than the part of the party's discourse made for mass consumption? If our larger concern is with the causes of support for, and consequences of populism at the society in which it is embedded, the answer is probably negative.

These findings have important consequences for future research comparing populist experiences in the two regions, a topic which is currently flourishing. Knowing that Latin American populists are more radical in their populism than Europeans may have implications for explaining their support, as well as for the parties' and politicians' actions in office. For example, this might be one of the keys for explain-

ing the openly anti-democratic actions taken by some Latin American populists in recent years (see Levitsky and Loxton, 2013; Huber and Schimpf, 2015). Such a high degree of populism comes together, by definition, with a high level of demonization of the opposition, which is used to justify their persecution as illegitimate actors. At the same time, it reinforces the argument made by Mudde and others (Mudde, 2013, 2014) that public fears about the rise of radical right populism in Europe may be exaggerated. Not only they have not been as successful as one might think from reading the news but, in general, they are not as populist as generally thought. While concerns may be raised over their radical ideology, their populism may not be as important an issue.

If these findings may call for a change in how we see populism in Europe, they are also of practical concern for the state of Latin American politics. While for some it is sobering to see that Marine Le Pen is far from being as populist as Evo Morales or Nicolas Maduro, the fact that her score is similar to that of moderate Latin American leaders, who are not usually associated with populism, shows just how deeply ingrained into the region's political culture this kind of discourse is. In this paper, the European "surprises" were mostly cases that were expected to be very populist and turned out not to be. In Latin America, the "surprises" were rather parties that unexpectedly had moderate or high levels of populism (even rising above prime European examples) and are commonly not thought to be so. For example, the Peruvian President, Ollanta Humala, who is usually seen as having dramatically moderated his tone during his successful electoral bid in 2011. Or Henrique Capriles, leader of the opposition to Chavismo in Venezuela and who, as our findings indicate,

has adopted much of his opponent's populist discourse for his own campaign in 2013. This observation, coupled with the finding that populism today, in Latin America, is the language of stronger parties, gives cause for concerns over how its developing democracies will keep on dealing with the divisive and anti-conciliatory aspects of such a discourse.

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Appendix A Complete coding results

Table 4: Populism in party manifestos and candidates' speeches

Country	Year	Party	Manifesto	Speeches	Party score	Party score 2
Argentina	2011	FAP	0.2	0.25	0.225	0.23
Argentina	2011	FpV	0.5	0.25	0.375	0.33
Argentina	2011	FP	0.25	0.7	0.475	0.55
Argentina	2011	UCR	1.3	0.2	0.75	0.57
Argentina	2011	CF	0.1	1	0.55	0.7
Austria	2008	BZÖ	0.2		0.2	0.2
Austria	2008	FPÖ	1		1	1
Austria	2008	Grünen	0.1		0.1	0.1
Austria	2008	ÖVP	0		0	0
Austria	2008	SPÖ	0.1		0.1	0.1
Belgium-WAL	2014	cdH	0.05		0.05	0.05
Belgium-WAL	2014	Ecolo	0		0	0
Belgium-WAL	2014	FDF	0		0	0
Belgium-WAL	2014	MR	0		0	0
Belgium-WAL	2014	PP	0.55		0.55	0.55
Belgium-WAL	2014	PS	0.15		0.15	0.15
Bolivia	2014	MAS	1.55		1.55	1.55
Bolivia	2014	PDC	0.3		0.3	0.3
Bolivia	2014	UD	0.25		0.25	0.25
Brazil	2014	PSDB	0	0.15	0.075	0.1
Brazil	2014	PSB	0.075	0.15	0.1125	0.125
Brazil	2014	PSOL	1.1	1.65	1.375	1.47
Brazil	2014	PT	0	0.65	0.325	0.43
Canada	2006	BQ	0.75		0.75	0.75
Canada	2006	Cons	0.8		0.8	0.8
Canada	2006	Green	0.2		0.2	0.2
Canada	2006	Lib	0		0	0
Canada	2006	NDP	0.3		0.3	0.3
Chile	2013	PS	0.7	0.15	0.425	0.33
Chile	2013	UDI	0	0.025	0.0125	0.017

Table 4: Populism in party manifestos and candidates' speeches

Country	**Year**	**Party**	**Manifesto**	**Speeches**	**Party score**	**Party score 2**
Chile	2013	PRO	0.3	1.15	0.725	0.87
Chile	2013	Parisi	0	0.45	0.225	0.3
Chile	2013	IGUAL	2	2	2	2
Colombia	2014	CD	0.35	0.15	0.25	0.22
Colombia	2014	C	0	0.1	0.05	0.07
Colombia	2014	PDA	0.1	1.45	0.775	1.0
Colombia	2014	PVC	0.1	0.2	0.15	0.17
Colombia	2014	U	0	0.1	0.05	0.07
Ecuador	2013	CREO	0.6	0.08	0.34	0.25
Ecuador	2013	Pais	1.7	1.15	1.425	1.33
Ecuador	2013	PRIAN	0.2	0.35	0.28	0.3
Ecuador	2013	PSP	0.1	0.475	0.29	0.35
France	2012	FG	0.9	0.25	0.575	0.47
France	2012	FN	0.4	0.75	0.575	0.63
France	2012	MoDem	0		0	0
France	2012	PS	0.1	0	0.05	0.03
France	2012	UMP	0	0.25	0.125	0.17
France	2012	Verts	0.15		0.15	0.15
Germany	2013	CDU	0		0	0
Germany	2013	Grüne	0.2		0.2	0.2
Germany	2013	FDP	0		0	0
Germany	2013	SPD	0		0	0
Germany	2013	AfD	0		0	0
Germany	2013	CSU	0		0	0
Germany	2013	Linke	1.3		1.3	1.3
Germany	2013	NPD	1.4		1.4	1.4
Ireland	2011	FF	0.025		0.025	0.025
Ireland	2011	FG	0.25		0.25	0.25
Ireland	2011	Lab	0.3		0.3	0.3
Ireland	2011	SF	0.325		0.325	0.325
Italy	2013	M5S	0.1	0.65	0.375	0.47
Italy	2013	LN	0.1	0	0.05	0.05
Italy	2013	PD	0.6	0.3	0.45	0.45

Table 4: Populism in party manifestos and candidates' speeches

Country	**Year**	**Party**	**Manifesto**	**Speeches**	**Party score**	**Party score 2**
Italy	2013	PdL	0	0.35	0.175	0.23
Italy	2013	SC	0	0	0	0
Italy	2013	RC	0.4	1.5	0.95	1.13
Italy	2013	SEL	0.1	0.35	0.23	0.27
Mexico	2012	PAN	0.1	0.05	0.08	0.067
Mexico	2012	PRI	0.05	0.18	0.11	0.13
Mexico	2012	PRD	0.95	0.55	0.75	0.68
Mexico	2012	PNA	0.05		0.05	0.05
Netherlands	2012	CDA	0.05		0.05	0.05
Netherlands	2012	D66	0		0	0
Netherlands	2012	PvdA	0		0	0
Netherlands	2012	PVV	1.25		1.25	1.25
Netherlands	2012	SP	0.2		0.2	0.2
Netherlands	2012	VVD	0		0	0
Norway	2013	A	0		0	0
Norway	2013	FrP	0		0	0
Norway	2013	H	0		0	0
Paraguay	2013	APA		0.1	0.1	0.1
Paraguay	2013	AP		0.8	0.8	0.8
Paraguay	2013	ANR-PC		0.05	0.05	0.05
Peru	2011	AGC	0	0.1	0.05	0.067
Peru	2011	F11	0	0.05	0.025	0.034
Peru	2011	PNP	0.55	1.3	0.925	1.05
Peru	2011	PP	0	0.1	0.05	0.07
Peru	2011	SN	0	1.6	0.8	0.8
Portugal	2011	BE	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.267
Portugal	2011	CDS-PP	0.05		0.05	0.05
Portugal	2011	PCP	0.7	0.65	0.675	0.667
Portugal	2011	PS	0	0.05	0.025	0.033
Portugal	2011	PSD	0.05	0.1	0.075	0.083
Spain	2011	CiU	0.25		0.25	0.25
Spain	2011	IU	1		1	1
Spain	2011	PNV	0.25		0.25	0.25

Table 4: Populism in party manifestos and candidates' speeches

Country	**Year**	**Party**	**Manifesto**	**Speeches**	**Party score**	**Party score 2**
Spain	2011	PP	0.4		0.4	0.4
Spain	2011	PSOE	0		0	0
Spain	2011	UPyD	0.1		0.1	0.1
Sweden	2014	M	0	0.1	0.05	0.05
Sweden	2014	C	0	0.1	0.05	0.07
Sweden	2014	FP	0.05	0.1	0.075	0.075
Sweden	2014	KD	0	0.1	0.05	0.07
Sweden	2014	MP	0	0.65	0.325	0.4
Sweden	2014	SAP	0	0.25	0.125	0.13
Sweden	2014	SD	0.1	0.15	0.125	0.17
Sweden	2014	V	0.2	0.45	0.325	0.37
Switzerland	2011	BDP	0.05		0.05	0.05
Switzerland	2011	CVP	0.1		0.1	0.1
Switzerland	2011	FDP	0.1		0.1	0.1
Switzerland	2011	GPS	0		0	0
Switzerland	2011	SP	0.3		0.3	0.3
Switzerland	2011	SVP	1		1	1
UK	2010	BNP	0.5	1.4	0.95	0.95
UK	2010	Lab	0.25	0.05	0.15	0.117
UK	2010	LibDem	0	0	0	0
UK	2010	C	0.05	0	0.025	0.017
UK	2010	UKIP	0.15	0	0.075	0.075
Uruguay	2014	FA	0.05	0.2	0.125	0.15
Uruguay	2014	PC	0	0.15	0.075	0.1
Uruguay	2014	PI	0.15	0.3	0.225	0.25
Uruguay	2014	PN	0	0.1	0.05	0.07
Uruguay	2014	UP	1.2	0.25	0.725	0.57
United States	2012	D	0.45	0.3	0.375	0.32
United States	2012	R	0.25	0.05	0.15	0.12
Venezuela	2013	PSUV	1.85	1.6	1.725	1.68
Venezuela	2013	MUD	0.8	1.9	1.35	1.53

Notes: **Manifesto** refers to the average between the preamble's and list of issues' grades in all countries except for Chile, Germany, Spain, and UK, where coders still gave one score for the whole document. **Party score** is the average between the manifesto and the mean of speeches; **Party score 2** is the average of all documents.

Appendix B

List of Abbreviations

A Arbeiderpartiet – Labour Party

AfD Alternative für Deutschland – Alternative for Germany

AGC Alianza por el Gran Cambio – Alliance for the Great Change

ANR-PC Asociación Nacional Republicana – Partido Colorado – National Republican Association – Colorado Party

APA Alianza Paraguay Alegre – Partido Liberal Radical Autêntico – Paraguay Alegre Alliance – Authentic Radical Liberal Party

AP Concertación Avanza Pais – Coalition 'Forward, Country'

BDP-PBD Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei Schweiz/Parti bourgeois démocratique suisse – Conservative Democratic Party of Switzerland

BE Bloco de Esquerda – Left Bloc

BNP British National Party

BQ Bloc Québécois

BZÖ Bündnis Zukunft Österreich – Alliance for the Future of Austria

C-Ca Conservative Party of Canada

C-Sw Centerpartiet – Centre Party (Sweden)

C-UK Conservative Party (United Kingdom)

C-Co Partido Conservador Colombiano – Colombian Conservative Party

CDA Christen-Democratisch Appèl – Christian Democratic Appeal

CD Centro Democrático – Democratic Centre

cdH Centre démocrate humaniste – Humanist Democratic Centre

CDS-PP CDS–Partido Popular – CDS–Popular Party

CDU Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands – Christian Democratic Union of Germany

CF Alianza Compromiso Federal – Federal Commitment Alliance

CiU Convergència i Unió – Convergence and Union

CREO Creando Oportunidades – Creating Opportunities

CSU Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern – Christian Social Union in Bavaria

CVP-PDC Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei der Schweiz/ Parti Démocrate-Chrétien – Christian Democratic Party of Switzerland

D66 Democraten 66 – Democrats 66

Ecolo Écologistes confédérés pour l'organisation de luttes originales – Confederated ecologistes for the organization of original struggles

F11 Fuerza 2011 – Force 2011

FA Frente Amplio – Broad Front

FAP Frente Amplio Progresista – Progressive Broad Front

FDF Fédéralistes Démocrates Francophones – Francophone Democratic Federalists

FDP Freie Demokratische Partei – Free Democratic Party

FDP-PLR FDP.Die Liberalen/PLR. Les Liberaux-Radicaux – The Liberals

FF Fianna Fail

FG-Ir Fine Gael

FG-Fr Front de Gauche – Left Front

FN Front National – National Front

FP-Ar Frente Popular – Popular Front

FP-Se Folkpartiet Liberalerna – Liberal People's Party of Sweden

FPÖ Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs – Freedom Party of Austria

FpV Frente para la Victoria – Front for Victory

FrP Fremskrittspartiet – Progress Party (Norway)

GPS-PES Grüne Partei der Schweiz/Les verts – Parti écologiste suisse – Green Party of Switzerland

Green Green Party (Canada)

Grüne Die Grünen – The Greens

Grünen Die Grünen – The Greens

H Høyre – Conservative Party (Norway)

I Partido Igualdad – Equality Party

IU Izquierda Unida – United Left

KD Kristdemokraterna – Christian Democrats (Sweden)

Lab-Ir Labour (Ireland)

Lab-UK Labour Party (United Kingdom)

LibDem Liberal Democrats

Lib Liberal Party of Canada

Linke Die Linke – The Left

LN Lega Nord – Northern League

M5S Movimento Cinque Stelle – Five Star Movement

MAS Movimiento al Socialismo – Movement Towards Socialism

M Moderaterna – Moderates

MoDem Mouvement Démocrate – Democratic Movement (France)

MP Miljöpartiet de Gröna – Environment Party–The Greens

MR Mouvement Réformateur – Reformist Movement

MUD Mesa de la Unidad Democrática – Democratic Union Roundtable

NDP New Democratic Party

NPD Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands – National Democratic Party of Germany

ÖVP Österreichische Volkspartei – Austrian People's Party

PAIS Patria Altiva i Soberana – Sovereign and Proud Fatherland

PAN Partido Acción Nacional – Party of National Action

Parisi Franco Parisi – Independent candidate

PC Partido Colorado – Colorado (Red) Party

PCP Partido Comunista Português – Portuguese Communist Party

PDA Polo Democrático Alternativo – Alternative Democratic Pole

PDC Partido Demócrata Cristiano – Christian Democratic Party

PdL Il Poppolo della Libertà – The People of Freedom

PD Partito Democratico – Democratic Party

PI Partido Independiente – Independent Party

PNA Partido Nueva Alianza – New Alliance Party

PN Partido Nacional – National Party

PNP Partido Nacionalista Peruano – Peruvian Nationalist Party

PNV Partido Nacionalista Vasco – Basque Nationalist Party

PP-Be Parti Populaire – People's Party (Belgium)

PP-Es Partido Popular – People's Party (Spain)

PP-Pe Perú Posible – Possible Peru

PRD Partido de la Revolución Democrática – Party of the Democratic Revolution

PRIAN Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional – Institutional Renewal Party of National Action

PRI Partido Revolucionario Institucional – Institutional Revolutionary Party

PRO Partido Progresista – Progressive Party

PS-Be Parti Socialiste – Socialist Party (Belgium)

PS-Ch Partido Socialista de Chile – Socialist Party of Chile

PS-Fr Parti Socialiste – Socialist Party (France)

PS-Pt Partido Socialista – Socialist Party (Portugal)

PSB Partido Socialista Brasileiro – Brazilian Socialist Party

PSDB Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira – Party of Brazilian Social Democracy

PSD Partido Social Democrata – Social Democratic Party

PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Español – Spanish Socialist Workers' Party

PSOL Partido Socialismo e Liberdade – Socialism and Freedom Party

PSP Partido Sociedad Patriótica

PSUV Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela – United Socialist Party of Venezuela

PT Partido dos Trabalhadores – Workers' Party

PVC Partido Verde Colombiano – Colombian Green Party

PvdA Partij van de Arbeid – Labour Party

PVV Partij voor de Vrijheid – Party for Freedom

RC Rivoluzione Civile – Civil Revolution

SAP Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti – Swedish Social Democratic Party

SC Scelta Civica – Civic Choice

SD Sverigedemokraterna – Sweden Democrats

SEL Sinistra Ecologia Libertà – Left Ecology Freedom

SF Sinn Féin

SN Solidaridad Nacional – National Solidarity

SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands – Social Democratic Party of Germany

SP Socialistische Partij – Socialist Party (Netherlands)

SPÖ Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs – Social Democratic Party of Austria

SP-PS Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz/Parti socialiste suisse – Social Democratic Party of Switzerland

SVP-UDC Schweizerische Volkspartei/Union démocratique du centre – Swiss People's Party

UCR Unión Cívica Radical – Radical Civic Union

UDI Unión Demócrata Independiente – Independent Democratic Union

UD Unidad Demócrata – Democratic Union

UKIP UK Independence Party

UMP Union pour un Mouvement Populaire – Union for a Popular Movement

UP Unidad Popular – Popular Unity

UPyD Unión, Progreso y Democracia – Union, Progress and Democracy

U Partido de la U – Social Party of National Unity

Verts Europe Écologie – Les Verts – Europe Ecology – The Greens

V Vänsterpartiet – Left Party

VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie – People's Party for Freedom and Democracy