

# Monopsony Power and Firm Organization\*

Álvaro Jáñez    Lukas Delgado-Prieto

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

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## Abstract

This paper studies the welfare effects of monopsony power and minimum wage policies using a general equilibrium model where firms organize production in hierarchies. Using Portuguese administrative data, we find that monopsony power reduces the managerial wage premium by 11.8% and production workers' and managers' welfare by 5.7% and 23.1%. Ignoring that monopsony power incentivizes managerial delegation contributes to overestimating these losses by 0.6 and 2.1 percentage points. Recent statutory rises in the minimum wage lower overall welfare and affect managers through worker reallocation and delegation decisions. Moving to an optimal occupation-based minimum wage leads to welfare gains of nearly 0.2% for both occupations.

**Keywords:** Monopsony power, firm organization, welfare, minimum wages.

**JEL:** D21, J21, J31, J42, O40

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*Email addresses:* ajanez@eco.uc3m.es (Álvaro Jáñez), ludelgad@eco.uc3m.es (Lukas Delgado-Prieto).

# 1 Introduction

Limited competition in the labor market carries adverse economic implications, among them lower wages.<sup>1</sup> Considering the number of competing firms, there exist drastic differences in competition across markets of distinct occupations. For instance, in Portugal, the average number of firms across local labor markets is twice as high for production workers than for managers, as only some firms delegate decision-making to managers. Thus, wage disparities between both worker types may reflect not only productivity heterogeneity but also differences in competition. The same data shows that firms are more likely to expand and delegate tasks to managers when they face fewer competitors, suggesting that labor market competition affects their organizational structure. This paper shows that understanding the interaction between firm organization and monopsony power helps us to explain wages across distinct types of workers, managerial delegation choices, and the optimal design of policies that tackle monopsony power.

To that end, we develop a general equilibrium model where the wage distribution of production workers and managers stems from heterogeneous wage markdowns and firm organizational choices. Quantifying the model to Portuguese administrative data, we show that monopsony power reduces the managerial wage premium by 11.8 percent and incentivizes managerial delegation in relatively less productive firms. We estimate consumption equivalent welfare losses of 5.7 and 23.1 percent for production workers and managers, respectively. Ignoring that monopsony power boosts managerial delegation contributes to overestimating these welfare losses by 0.6 and 2.1 percentage points (pp, henceforth). Recent statutory rises in the minimum wage lower the welfare of production workers and also negatively affect managerial wages through firms' delegation choices. Moving to an optimal occupation-based minimum wage would provide welfare gains for both occupations of about 0.20 percent.

To arrive at these conclusions, we first use data from an annual census that covers the

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<sup>1</sup>See, for instance, [Staiger et al. \(2010\)](#); [Card et al. \(2018\)](#); [Kline et al. \(2019\)](#); [Azar et al. \(2022\)](#); [Berger et al. \(2022\)](#); [Lamadon et al. \(2022\)](#).

universe of private firms in Portugal. We compute market concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for each occupation-based local labor market. We document two stylized facts. First, we show that the average production worker and manager work in a market with an HHI equal to 0.19 and 0.27, respectively. One would observe a similar concentration level with five and three identical firms, respectively. Markets for managers are more concentrated because the average number of active firms across markets is only half of those for production workers and because a higher proportion of managers sort into markets with high concentration levels. Second, highly concentrated production workers' local labor markets have a higher share of employees under the supervision of managers. In particular, an increase of 10 percentage points in the HHI is associated with an increase of 2.8 percentage points in the share of production workers at multi-layer firms.

To quantify the distribution of wage markdowns across occupations and perform counterfactual simulations, we develop a general equilibrium model that incorporates firm organization, oligopsony competition, and minimum wages. The economy features a representative household for each occupation and a continuum of local labor markets, each with a finite number of firms. Households choose the measure of workers to supply to each firm for their respective occupations. They view firms and local labor markets as imperfect substitutes, where the degree of substitutability is exogenously specific to each occupation. Firms exogenously differ in terms of productivity and the local labor market they inhabit. A firm's organizational decisions involve adopting a single- or multi-layer organizational structure. Single-layer firms decide how many production workers to hire. Multi-layer firms include an additional managerial layer and choose how many managers and production workers to hire. In the model, managers enable firms to direct a larger workforce, yet it comes at higher overhead costs, and thus, only the most productive firms adopt a multi-layer structure. Regarding monopsony power, imperfect firm substitutability and firm granularity imply that firms face upward-sloping labor supply curves and make employment choices under strategic competition, i.e., internalizing the employment policies of their competitors in the same local labor market, which leads to firm and occupation-specific markdowns. Moreover, this

framework implies that greater market concentration incentivizes firms to adopt a multi-layer organization because it enables them to hire a large workforce at relatively low wages.

We estimate the model using the Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) to fit moments of firm organization, wages, and market concentration. We exploit within market-year correlation between employment and wages to calibrate the within-market elasticities. Moreover, we adopt an indirect inference approach to estimate the across-market elasticities from plausibly exogenous labor demand changes at the municipality level, which we generate with a Bartik-type instrument that exploits national sector employment trends interacted with baseline exposure shares. The model reproduces the empirical distribution of wages across workers and the distribution of employment across markets for both occupations. Moreover, it fits average levels of market concentration, firm organization, as well as the positive relationship between market concentration and the share of production workers at multi-layer firms. In addition, we perform an event study analysis that quantifies the effect of mass-layoff shocks on employment and wages at the municipality level. For each occupation, our model captures that mass layoffs have a small negative impact on the municipality’s average wages and explains one-fourth of the negative change in the municipality’s employment.

To quantify the effect of monopsony power on aggregate outcomes, we compare the benchmark equilibrium with a counterfactual efficient economy where wages are equal to the marginal product of labor. In the benchmark economy, we estimate that the average manager and production worker bear a wage markdown of 23.1 and 10.6 percent, respectively. Firms generally exert wider wage markdowns on managers because managers (i) often work in markets with fewer competing firms, (ii) have lower across and within market elasticities, and (iii) the minimum wage is more likely to be binding for production workers. Comparing the benchmark and efficient economy, we show three main results. First, the efficient economy increases the managerial wage premium by 11.8 percent. Second, we find that the share of multi-layer firms decreases by 11.2 percent in the efficient economy due to the decrease of relatively unproductive multi-layer firms. Among the low to medium productivity types, the

share of multi-layer firms decreases by 12.6 to 44.4 percent. We show that accounting for this result explains between 10 to 30 percent of the increase in average market concentration in the efficient economy. Third, we estimate a consumption-equivalent welfare gain of 5.7 percent for production workers and 23.1 percent for managers in the efficient economy, as both benefit from the efficiency gains and the redistribution of firm profits to labor income. We show that ignoring the endogenous decrease in managerial delegation contributes to overestimating the welfare gains of both worker types by 0.6 and 2.1 pp, respectively, because it neglects the reduction in the demand of managers and part of worker reallocation.

To assess the effectiveness of minimum wage policies in improving the welfare of households, we start analyzing the Portuguese reforms that increased the real minimum wage by ten percent between 2016 and 2019. We estimate these reforms deteriorate production workers' welfare while maintaining managers' welfare. Besides the effect on low-wage managers, raising the minimum wage also affects managers who earn high wages because it induces worker reallocation and decreases the share of multi-layer firms. Some countries, e.g., Australia, implement occupation-based minimum wages to overcome the heterogeneous effect of the minimum wage across occupations. We find that this policy improves upon the aforementioned reforms and the benchmark economy. We start showing that the welfare gain of managers is hump-shaped relative to a policy that increases the minimum wage just for managers while keeping the baseline minimum wage for production workers. At most, this policy brings about a welfare gain for managers of about 0.5 percent when their minimum wage is 56 percent of their mean wage (900€). However, this policy decreases the welfare of production workers, as it reduces their employment level and increases their disutility of labor by inducing worker reallocation. Finally, we estimate the Pareto optimal combination of occupation-based minimum wages that provides welfare gains for both worker types. We estimate that setting the minimum wage of production workers at 63 percent of their mean wage (460€) and the one of managers at 50 percent of their mean wage (790€) increases their welfare level by 0.25 and 0.17 percent, respectively. That is, even an optimal occupation-based minimum wage recovers only between 1 to 4 percent of the corresponding welfare loss

from monopsony power for each occupation.

**Literature.** This paper contributes to the literature on oligopsonistic labor markets and how this affects the overall economy (Bhaskar et al., 2002; MacKenzie, 2021; Berger et al., 2022, 2023a; Jarosch et al., 2023). Using models where labor market power arises from firm granularity and imperfect firm substitutability, they study the effect of labor market power on wages, efficiency, and welfare. Our main theoretical contribution to this literature is to study the effect of monopsony power on these outcomes through the organization of work within firms. The distinctive mechanism in our model involves non-atomistic firms making organizational decisions that contribute to markdown heterogeneity for production workers and managers. Moreover, our production technology is not additively separable in labor, which allows for studying the productivity interplay between occupations and its effect on employment and wages. Lastly, we also add to this literature that the heterogeneity in wage markdowns between managers and production workers is quantitatively important and explains a meaningful share of the managerial wage premium.

We connect to the literature that studies the effect of minimum wage policies in models with imperfect labor market competition (Bamford, 2021; Ahlfeldt et al., 2022; Hurst et al., 2022; Karabarbounis et al., 2022; Drechsel-Grau, 2023). We build our framework on Berger et al. (2023b), which studies the effect of minimum wages on efficiency and welfare in an oligopsonistic environment with firm and worker heterogeneity. By considering firm organizational decisions, we add two contributions to this literature. First, we show that raising the minimum wage decreases the share of firms that delegate to managers, which is crucial to explain the reallocation of managers towards high productivity firms. Second, we show that adopting an occupation-based minimum wage can provide welfare gains.

This paper also contributes to the literature on production organization (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006; Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012). Several studies build on this model to analyze firm-size distortions (Garicano et al., 2016; Tamkoç, 2022), the adoption of information and technological capital (Mariscal, 2020), the misallocation of labor in developing

countries (Grobovsek, 2020), and technological adoptions across urban areas (Santamaria, 2023). Contemporaneously to our work, Lawson et al. (2023) studies the impact of minimum wages on productivity through firm organization in a perfectly competitive framework. We contribute in two dimensions by incorporating monopsony power in a general equilibrium model with endogenous managerial delegation choices. First, delegation choices endogenize differences in labor market competition across worker types. Second, lower competition in production workers’ markets incentivizes firms to delegate tasks to managers.

We also contribute to the literature that studies the misallocation of labor across firms (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Bartelsman et al., 2013; Davis et al., 2014; Garcia-Santana and Pijoan-Mas, 2014; Heise and Porzio, 2023). We show that large firms mainly restrict managerial employment relative to the efficient level in Portugal, which leads to an inefficiently high share of multi-layer firms and inefficiently high managerial span of control.

Lastly, we relate to the empirical literature on monopsony and labor market concentration (Martins, 2018; Azar et al., 2020; Benmelech et al., 2020; Rinz, 2022; Azar et al., 2022; Bassanini et al., 2023; Dodini et al., 2023). We bring two new stylized facts to this literature. First, we document that managerial markets display higher levels of market payroll concentration relative to the markets of production workers. Second, we highlight that this heterogeneity stems from managerial markets having fewer firms and because managers sort into more concentrated markets.

## 2 Stylized Facts

This section documents two stylized facts that motivate the relationship between firms’ organizational decisions and labor market concentration. First, the average manager works in a local labor market with an HHI that is 8 percentage points greater than the market of the average production worker. Second, the share of production workers that work in multi-layer establishments, i.e., establishments that add a management layer to their hierarchy, is higher when their local labor market is more concentrated.

## 2.1 Data

Our main data source is *Quadros de Pessoal* (QP), an annual census of private sector employees conducted by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment. This census provides matched employer-employee data with information on employment, monthly wages, occupation, industry, and municipality for all private firms based in Portugal with at least one worker. Our sample period covers from 2010 to 2016. We explain here the main aspects of the sample and relegate the details to Appendix B.

We define two broad occupations: managers and production workers. For each occupation, we classify labor markets based on their geography (municipality) and industry (2-digit NACE). This classification stems from the fact that workers are more attached to their current labor market because of the imperfect substitutability of skills across jobs and sectors, as well as imperfect geographical mobility (Neal, 1995; Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009; Sullivan, 2010; Kennan and Walker, 2011; Monte et al., 2018).

We assign workers to each occupation following a hierarchical classification similar to Caliendo et al. (2020). Particularly, we partition professional categories into two layers. We consider top executives, intermediary executives, supervisors, and team leaders as managers, while we group the remaining categories as production workers.<sup>2</sup> In the data, the main difference between both occupations is that managers are responsible for the organizational policies of the firm and their adaptation, which require a high degree of qualification in terms of direction, guidance, and coordination of the firm fundamental activities.

## 2.2 Payroll Concentration and Firm Organization

The level of market payroll concentration in a local labor market, which represents how much of the total market payroll belongs to a few establishments, is a standard proxy for

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<sup>2</sup>According to occupation transitions, these broad categories represent a persistent occupational state. Figure A.5 shows that most workers remain within the same category after changing to another establishment.



Table 1: Market Concentration by Occupation

	Managers	Production Workers
	Mean	Mean
Max $s_{ij}$	0.38	0.30
HHI <sub><math>j</math></sub>	0.27	0.19

Source: Elaboration based on Quadros de Pessoa.

Note: The first row reports the employment-weighted mean of the maximum payroll share across local labor markets. The second row of the Table reports the employment-weighted mean of the HHI across local labor markets.

the degree of monopsony power that establishments hold in such a market<sup>3</sup>. We measure payroll concentration in each local labor market using the HHI. This index equals a weighted average payroll share of establishments within the market. Thus, an increase in the HHI reflects higher market concentration because fewer establishments accumulate a greater share of the market payroll.


**Fact #1: Managers work in more concentrated markets.** In Table 1, we document that the average manager works in a market whose HHI is eight percentage points higher than the average production worker<sup>4</sup>. Specifically, the employment-weighted average HHI is 0.27 for managers and 0.19 for production workers. To provide context for these numbers, one would observe a similar concentration level with three and five equally-sized establishments, respectively. Table 1 also reports the employment-weighted average of the maximum payroll share across local labor markets. The average largest establishment in a local labor market accumulates about eight percentage points more market payroll in the market of managers than in the market of production workers.

There are two underlying forces that determine the heterogeneity in market concentration

<sup>3</sup>This measure is broadly used in the literature (Azar et al., 2020; Jarosch et al., 2023; Berger et al., 2022; Azkarate-Askasua and Zerecero, 2023), and it is the baseline measure of the U.S. Department of Justice to evaluate the competitive effect of mergers.

<sup>4</sup>This observation is robust to measuring HHI with the employment share rather the payroll share.

Figure 1: Distribution of HHI by Occupation



Source: Elaboration based on QP.

Note: The Graph plots the kernel density of the payroll HHI across local labor markets for managers (dashed line) and production workers (solid line). Moreover, the graph plots the cumulative share of employment with respect to the payroll HHI.

between both occupations. First, the heterogeneity in the distribution of payroll concentration across markets. Second, the heterogeneity in employment sorting across these market types. We display both channels in Figure 1, which plots the estimated kernel density of the market level HHI for each occupation and their respective cumulative share of employment.

First, we find that managers work in more concentrated markets because the market-concentration distribution for managers is shifted to the right relative to production workers (see Figure 1a). We use a standard decomposition that breaks the HHI into two elements to understand what makes managerial markets more likely to be concentrated (see Appendix B.4). The first element involves the *number of establishments* in each market. All else being constant, increasing the number of establishments lowers the average establishment size in the market. The second element entails the *dispersion level of payroll shares* across establishments relative to the case in which they hold identical shares. All else being constant, increasing the dispersion in payroll shares leads to greater payroll concentration. Table 2 re-

Table 2: Decomposition of the Average HHI across Occupations

	Component: N <sup>o</sup> establishments	Component: Dispersion in shares	Mean HHI
(1) Managers	0.57	0.08	0.65
(2) Production Workers	0.47	0.09	0.56
(1)-(2) Gap	0.10	-0.01	0.09

Note: The Table reports the contribution of each channel to the unweighted average HHI level across local labor markets for each occupation. The first column reports the contribution of the number of establishments ( $1/M$ ). In contrast, the second column shows the contribution of the dispersion in payroll shares relative to the symmetric case  $\left(\sum_{i=1}^M \left(s_i - \frac{1}{M}\right)^2\right)$ .


ports the results from decomposing the unweighted average of the HHI for both occupations.<sup>5</sup> We find that the entire gap of nine percentage points stems from the fact that managerial markets have fewer establishments. In particular, the markets of production workers tend to have almost two times as many establishments as the markets of managers (see Table A.4). This fact emphasizes the importance of modeling establishments' decision-making regarding managerial delegation, as only some establishments choose to hire managers leading to more concentration in their labor markets.

Second, we find that managers are more likely to sort into highly-concentrated markets (see Figure 1b). For instance, nearly 70 percent of production workers are in markets with an HHI below 0.20, whereas only 60 percent of managers work in such markets. Different sorting patterns emphasizes the need to model labor allocation across markets. Overall, most employees in both occupations work in a handful of markets with relatively low concentration levels. However, the proportion of managers in those markets is comparatively smaller.

**Fact #2: A higher share of production workers work in multi-layer firms when their markets are more concentrated.** Figure 2 displays the average share of multi-layer establishments across the markets of production workers where we rank these markets by their HHI. We weigh each establishment by its number of employees to understand the contribution of multi-layer firms to markets' employment. When market concentration rises,

<sup>5</sup>We do not weigh each market by employment size to isolate the decomposition from employment sorting.

Figure 2: Market Concentration and Multi-layer Firms



Source: Elaboration based on QP.

Note: The Figure plots the employment-weighted average share of multi-layer firms across local labor markets that differ in the level of HHI. In particular, we compute the share of multi-layer firms and the HHI for each local labor market of production workers. We split the distribution of the HHI into 20 cells of length 0.05. In each cell, we take the employment-weighted mean of the share of multi-layer firms across markets.

the share of production workers who work in multi-layer firms increases<sup>6</sup>. Raising the HHI by 10 percentage points is associated with an increase of 2.8 percentage points in the share of production workers who work in multi-layer firms. This suggests a tight relationship between the internal organization of firms and the level of payroll concentration in the labor markets where they operate. Two complementary stories, which have different economic implications, may explain this result. On the one hand, this relationship may reflect the tendency of high-productivity firms to adopt a multi-layer structure as they expand, consequently contributing to increased market concentration. On the other hand, it may reflect that small markets with low competition allow firms, even when their productivity is low, to easily attract workers and expand their organization because mobility frictions prevent production workers from relocating to other firms.

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<sup>6</sup>In Figure A.4, we also show that this positive relationship hold when we take the unweighted average of the share of multi-layer firms across local labor markets. That is, the share of multi-layer firms is also higher when payroll concentration increases in the markets of production workers.

### 3 Model

This section presents a general equilibrium model that incorporates managerial delegation, oligopsonistic labor markets, and minimum wages. The model considers two occupations, managers and production workers, each with exogenously heterogeneous labor disutility costs and firm substitutability parameters. For each occupation, there is a household that makes consumption choices and decides the labor supply to each firm. Firms are exogenously heterogeneous in productivity and the local labor market they inhabit. Regarding their internal organization, firms have a layer of production workers and choose whether to add a management layer. Conditional on the organization structure, they choose the number of workers in each occupation. Firms have monopsony power and face a minimum wage when making employment choices. The oligopsony structure implies that unconstrained firms exert occupation-based wage markdowns, which depend on their market payroll share and parameters determining firm substitutability from the worker perspective.

#### 3.1 Environment

The internal organization of firms is closely related to market concentration and, potentially, to monopsony power. We stand out two reasons to analyze this relationship through the lens of a general equilibrium model. First, the fact that managerial markets are more concentrated suggests that firms have greater monopsony power over managerial wages. Yet, these market categorizations do not capture the entire set of potential employers, as workers flow across industries and regions. Thus, to quantify monopsony power, it is necessary to measure the extent to which workers find it costly to switch firms both within the same and across different markets. Second, the fact that multi-layer firms contribute more to production workers' employment when their markets are more concentrated suggests that monopsony power affects managerial delegation choices. Modeling the relationship between both variables and performing counterfactual simulations solve the identification problem that arises from the confounding that delegation may also contribute to market concentration, as multi-layer firms are usually bigger. Next, we describe the environment of the model in detail.

**Agents.** The economy is populated by two households, indexed by their permanent occupation type  $o \in \{w, m\}$ , and a continuum of firms. The two households differ in how substitutable they view different firms within the same and across different markets, as well as in terms of disutility costs for each unit of work. Firms are exogenously heterogeneous in two dimensions. First, they belong to a continuum of local labor markets  $j \in [0, 1]$ , i.e., intersections between region and industry, where each local labor market contains a finite number of firms indexed by  $i \in \{1, \dots, M_j\}$ . Second, firms differ in productivity  $z_{ij}$ , drawn from a standard log-normal distribution with standard deviation  $\sigma_z$ .

**Goods and Technology.** Firms use labor to produce a tradable good in a perfectly competitive national market whose price we normalize to one. We assume that there are two types of labor: production workers and managers. Production workers are essential for production, while managers are optional. We assume each firm chooses between two types of organizations which vary in the number of layers,  $\ell \in \{1, 2\}$ .

The first type of firm organization is the single-layer firm ( $\ell = 1$ ). Single-layer firms use  $n_w$  units of labor of production workers to produce according to the following technology:

$$y(z, 1) = z \varphi_w n_w^{1-\alpha}. \quad (1)$$

The parameter  $\varphi_w$  stands for the efficiency of labor of production workers. This technological specification includes the essential features of the production technology in the standard model of Lucas (1978). Namely, firms are heterogeneous in productivity and face diminishing returns to scale. The parameter  $1 - \alpha \in (0, 1)$  determines the strength of diminishing returns and, thus, limits the number of production workers of single-layer firms.

Alternatively, firms may choose to be multi-layer organizations ( $\ell = 2$ ) to manage a larger workforce. In this case, firms additionally include a managerial layer and use the labor of both managers  $n_m$  and production workers  $n_w$  to produce output. The technology of multi-layer firms is given by:

$$y(z, 2) = z \varphi_m n_m^{(1-\alpha)\alpha} n_w^{1-\alpha}. \quad (2)$$

The parameter  $\varphi_m$  reflects how much managers enhance the productivity of production workers relative to the single-layer organization. Under this technological specification, managerial delegation allows firms to increase their workforce by dampening the diminishing returns to labor of production workers. In addition, the parameter  $\alpha$  embeds in a simple manner all the technical reasons that influence the span of control of managers, as it is the only technological parameter that is informative of the ratio of the marginal labor productivity between the two occupations.

Overall, this technological specification abstracts from the micro-foundations in the theory of firm organization, such as those of the knowledge-based hierarchy literature (Garicano, 2000; Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006). Nevertheless, it facilitates the quantification of the model and considers the main organizational trade-off. That is, adding a managerial layer permits the firm to manage a larger workforce, but it comes at the expense of higher costs.

**Households.** Each household type  $o \in \{w, m\}$  chooses the measure of workers to supply to each firm  $n_{ijo}$  and consumption of each good  $c_{ijo}$  to maximize their utility:

$$\mathcal{U}_o = \max_{n_{ijo}, c_{ijo}} \mathbf{C}_o - \phi_o \frac{\mathbf{N}_o^{1+\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{1+\frac{1}{\gamma}}, \quad (3)$$

subject to the household's budget constraint:

$$\mathbf{C}_o = \int_0^1 \sum_{i=1}^{M_j} w_{ijo} n_{ijo} dj, \quad (4)$$

where we define the aggregate consumption and labor supply indexes as

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{C}_o &:= \int_0^1 \sum_{i=1}^{M_j} c_{ijo} dj \\ \mathbf{N}_o &:= \left[ \int_0^1 \left( \frac{\mathbf{n}_{jo}}{B_{jo}} \right)^{\frac{\theta_o+1}{\theta_o}} dj \right]^{\frac{\theta_o}{\theta_o+1}} \quad \mathbf{n}_{jo} := \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{M_j} n_{ijo}^{\frac{\eta_o+1}{\eta_o}} \right]^{\frac{\eta_o}{\eta_o+1}}, \quad \eta_o > \theta_o > 0. \end{aligned}$$

The parameter  $\gamma$  stands for the aggregate Frisch elasticity of households,  $\phi_o$  is a labor disutility shifter that is specific to each occupation, and  $B_{jo}$  is a market amenity shifter. We follow closely the consumption and labor supply structure of [Berger et al. \(2022\)](#). That is, we assume that consumption goods are perfectly substitutable, but households view firms as imperfect substitutes in terms of non-wage characteristics. In particular, each firm faces an occupation-based upward-sloping labor supply curve with two elasticities of substitution  $\theta_o > 0$  and  $\eta_o > 0$ . The parameter  $\theta_o$  regulates the degree of substitutability of firms in distinct markets and, thus, captures the costs of moving across markets or idiosyncratic tastes for the market. If these costs decrease ( $\theta_o \uparrow$ ), workers find it easier to substitute firms across markets and become more responsive to market wage differentials. The parameter  $\eta_o$  regulates the degree of substitutability of firms within the same market, thus capturing features such as commuting costs, search costs, or idiosyncratic tastes for the firm. As these costs decrease ( $\eta_o \uparrow$ ), workers find within-market, across-firm substitutability easier and become more responsive to wage differentials across firms in the same market. We refer to  $\eta_o$  and  $\theta_o$  as the within- and across-market firm substitutability parameters. Critical to the main conclusions of the theory, we impose the following assumption:

**Assumption 1.** Across-market mobility costs are higher than within-market mobility costs:

$$\eta_o \geq \theta_o, \forall o \in \{0, 1\} \quad (5)$$

In other words, we assume that both household types find firms within the same market as closer substitutes than firms in different markets. Under this assumption, larger firms hinder the reallocation of their workers to other firms because their workers have fewer alternatives within the same market and, thus, need to move to other markets to find more potential employers. As a result, employees become less responsive to the wage policy of the firm, which in turn provides greater monopsony power to larger firms.

Linear utility in consumption implies that the aggregate disutility of labor supply in occu-



pation  $o$  is:

$$\mathbf{N}_o = \left( \frac{\mathbf{W}_o}{\phi_o} \right)^\gamma, \quad (6)$$

and the labor supply curve of occupation  $o$  to firm  $i$  in market  $j$  is:

$$n_{ijo} = B_{jo}^{1+\theta_o} \left( \frac{w_{ijo}}{\mathbf{w}_{jo}} \right)^{\eta_o} \left( \frac{\mathbf{w}_{jo}}{\mathbf{W}_o} \right)^{\theta_o} \mathbf{N}_o \quad \longleftrightarrow \quad \underbrace{w_{ijo} = \left( \frac{1}{B_{jo}} \right)^{\frac{1+\theta_o}{\theta_o}} \left( \frac{n_{ijo}}{\mathbf{n}_{jo}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta_o}} \left( \frac{\mathbf{n}_{jo}}{\mathbf{N}_o} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta_o}} \mathbf{W}_o}_{\text{Inverse labor supply curve } \forall ijo}, \quad (7)$$

where we define the market wage index  $\mathbf{w}_{jo}$  and the aggregate wage index  $\mathbf{W}_o$  as

$$\mathbf{w}_{jo} := \left[ \sum_{i \in j} w_{ijo}^{1+\eta_o} \right]^{\frac{1}{1+\eta_o}} \quad \mathbf{W}_o := \left[ \int_0^1 (B_{jo} \mathbf{w}_{jo})^{1+\theta_o} dj \right]^{\frac{1}{1+\theta_o}}. \quad (8)$$

We derive the labor supply system of equations given by (6) and (7) in Appendix C.1.

**Firms.** Firms choose the organizational structure to maximize profits, which consists of choosing whether to add a management layer:

$$\pi(z) = \max_{\ell} \{ \pi(z, \ell) \}_{\ell=1}^2, \quad (9)$$

In addition, firms make employment choices given upward-sloping labor supply curves and oligopsonistic competition for labor. We assume firms are constrained by a minimum wage. Infinitesimal with respect to the economy, firms take the aggregate disutility of labor supply  $\mathbf{N}_o$  and aggregate wages  $\mathbf{W}_o$  as given. However, non-atomistic with respect to the local market, each firm internalizes the impact of the employment decisions of all firms in the market, including itself, on the labor supply curve it faces.

When firms adopt a single-layer structure, they also choose the measure of production workers  $n_{ijw}$  to maximize profits, given the employment policies of their local competitors,  $n_{-ijw}^*$ . In particular, they solve:

$$\pi(z, 1) = \max_{n_{ijw}} y(z, 1) - w_{ijw} \left( n_{ijw}, n_{-ijw}^*, \mathbf{N}_w, \mathbf{W}_w \right) n_{ijw}, \quad (10)$$

subject to the inverse labor supply curve of production workers and minimum wages:

$$w_{ijw}(n_{ijw}, n_{-ijw}^*, \mathbf{N}_w, \mathbf{W}_w) = \left( \frac{1}{B_{jw}} \right)^{\frac{1+\theta_o}{\theta_o}} \left( \frac{n_{ijw}}{\mathbf{n}_{jw}(n_{ijw}, n_{-ijw}^*)} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta_w}} \left( \frac{\mathbf{n}_{jw}(n_{ijw}, n_{-ijw}^*)}{\mathbf{N}_w} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta_w}} \mathbf{W}_w,$$

$$\mathbf{n}_{jw}(n_{ijw}, n_{-ijw}^*) = \left[ n_{ijw}^{\frac{1+\eta_w}{\eta_w}} + \sum_{k \neq i} n_{k jw}^* \frac{1+\eta_w}{\eta_w} \right]^{\frac{\eta_w}{1+\eta_w}},$$

$$w_{ijw} \geq \underline{w}$$

When firms adopt a multi-layer structure, they also choose the measure of production workers  $n_{ijw}$  and managers  $n_{ijm}$  to maximize profits, given the employment policies of their local competitors,  $(n_{-ijw}^*, n_{-ijm}^*)$ . Their maximization problem is:

$$\pi(z, 2) = \max_{n_{ijw}, n_{ijm}} y(z, 2) - \sum_{o \in \{w, m\}} w_{ijo}(n_{ijo}, n_{-ijo}^*, \mathbf{N}_o, \mathbf{W}_o) n_{ijo}, \quad (11)$$

subject to the inverse labor supply curve of both occupations:

$$w_{ijo}(n_{ijo}, n_{-ijo}^*, \mathbf{N}_o, \mathbf{W}_o) = \left( \frac{1}{B_{jo}} \right)^{\frac{1+\theta_o}{\theta_o}} \left( \frac{n_{ijo}}{\mathbf{n}_{jo}(n_{ijo}, n_{-ijo}^*)} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta_o}} \left( \frac{\mathbf{n}_{jo}(n_{ijo}, n_{-ijo}^*)}{\mathbf{N}_o} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta_o}} \mathbf{W}_o,$$

$$\mathbf{n}_{jo}(n_{ijo}, n_{-ijo}^*) = \left[ n_{ijo}^{\frac{1+\eta_o}{\eta_o}} + \sum_{k \neq i} n_{k jo}^* \frac{1+\eta_o}{\eta_o} \right]^{\frac{\eta_o}{1+\eta_o}},$$

$$w_{ijw} \geq \underline{w}, \quad \forall o \in \{w, m\}.$$

Given the occupation  $o \in \{w, m\}$  and the number of layers  $\ell \in \{1, 2\}$ , the solution to the firm's problem has three cases. First, the minimum wage is not binding. Second, the minimum wage is binding, and labor demand is on the labor supply curve. In the aforementioned two cases, labor demand equals labor supply. Third, the minimum wage is binding and labor supply exceeds labor demand. We summarize the system of first-order conditions for each case as follows.

*Case I: The minimum wage is not binding.* Firms choose the level of employment in occupation  $o \in \{w, m\}$  for which the marginal cost of labor equals its marginal product (see Figure A.1).

$$w_{ijo}^* = \mu_{ijo} \frac{\partial y(z, \ell)}{\partial n_{ijo}} \Big|_{n_{ijo}^*}, \quad \mu_{ijo} = \frac{\varepsilon_{ijo}}{\varepsilon_{ijo} + 1} \in (0, 1), \quad \varepsilon_{ijo} = \left[ \frac{\partial \log w_{ijo}}{\partial \log n_{ijo}} \right]^{-1}. \quad (12)$$

Equation (12) determines that the marginal productivity of labor is higher than the wage payment for each occupation (see Appendix C.2 for complete derivations). As in the classical monopsony environment (Manning, 2013), the marginal cost of labor is equal to both the wage and the additional cost of increasing wages because firms internalize upward-sloping labor supply curves. Hence, there is a wedge between wages and the marginal product of labor  $\mu_{ijo} < 1$ . In addition, firm granularity within each local labor market implies that wage markdowns and the labor supply elasticity are firm specific because firms internalize the impact of their relative market size on the labor supply curve they face. In particular, the structural labor supply elasticity has a closed-form solution and is given by:

$$\varepsilon_{ijo}(s_{ijo}) = \left[ \frac{1}{\eta_o} + \left( \frac{1}{\theta_o} - \frac{1}{\eta_o} \right) \frac{\partial \log \mathbf{n}_{jo}}{\partial \log n_{ijo}} \right]^{-1} = \left[ \frac{1}{\eta_o} + \left( \frac{1}{\theta_o} - \frac{1}{\eta_o} \right) s_{ijo} \right]^{-1}, \quad (13)$$

where  $s_{ijo}$  stands for the payroll share of firm  $i$  in market  $j$ :

$$s_{ijo} := \frac{w_{ijo} n_{ijo}}{\sum_{i \in j} w_{ijo} n_{ijo}}. \quad (14)$$

Note that firms face an elasticity that is a function of their payroll share for each occupation. Since we assume  $\eta_o \geq \theta_o$ , larger firms face lower labor supply elasticities and exert wider markdowns. On the one hand, consider the monopsony case with only one firm in the market, i.e.,  $s_{ijo} = 1$ . If a monopsonist makes an additional hire, it understands that it has to attract workers from other markets. Hence, it faces the across-market labor supply elasticity  $\theta_{ijo}$ . On the other hand, consider an atomistic firm ( $s_{ijo} \simeq 0$ ). This firm internalizes that a marginal hire attracts workers from the same market, as its decision has a negligible effect on market employment. Therefore, it faces the within-market labor supply elasticity  $\eta_{ijo}$ .

The model explicitly tells apart the forces shaping wage dispersion across occupations. The first source of dispersion comes from differences in marginal productivity, which depends on organizational choices. The second source of dispersion comes from differences in markdowns. Firms have occupational-based monopsony power because they may have different sizes in each local labor market ( $s_{ijo}$ ) and because firm substitutability may differ across occupations ( $\eta_o, \theta_o$ ).

*Case II: The minimum wage is binding, and labor supply equals labor demand.* The minimum wage is binding and is below the efficient wage level where the labor supply curve intersects the marginal product curve. In this case, firms pay the minimum wage, the markdown is the ratio between the minimum wage and the marginal product, and the level of employment is given by the labor supply curve evaluated at the minimum wage (see Figure A.2).

$$w_{ijo}^* = \underline{w}, \quad \mu_{ijo} = \frac{\underline{w}}{\left. \frac{\partial y(z, \ell)}{\partial n_{ijo}} \right|_{n_{ijo}^*}}, \quad n_{ijo}^* = \left( \frac{\underline{w}}{\mathbf{w}_{jo}} \right)^{\eta_o} \left( \frac{\mathbf{w}_{jo}}{\mathbf{W}_o} \right)^{\theta_o} \mathbf{N}_o. \quad (15)$$

In this region, firms pay higher wages and hire more workers than they had done without the minimum wage.

*Case III: The minimum wage is binding, and labor supply excess labor demand.* The minimum wage is binding and is above the efficient wage level where the labor supply curve intersects the marginal product curve. In this case, firms pay a wage that is equal to both the minimum wage and marginal product, the employment level is given by the marginal product, and firms face an excess of labor supply (see Figure A.3).

$$w_{ijo}^* = \underline{w} = \left. \frac{\partial y(z, \ell)}{\partial n_{ijo}} \right|_{n_{ijo}^*}, \quad \mu_{ijo} = 1, \quad n_{ijo}^* < \left( \frac{\underline{w}}{\mathbf{w}_{jo}} \right)^{\eta_o} \left( \frac{\mathbf{w}_{jo}}{\mathbf{W}_o} \right)^{\theta_o} \mathbf{N}_o. \quad (16)$$

In this region, firms pay higher wages and hire fewer workers than they had done without the minimum wage.

**Equilibrium.** Given a minimum wage  $\underline{w}$ , the general equilibrium of this economy is a

set of organizational structures  $\{\ell_{ij}^*\}$ , aggregate disutilities of labor supply  $(N_w^*, N_m^*)$ , and employment levels  $\{n_{ijw}^*, n_{ijm}^*\}$  such that:

1. *Labor supply*: Households choose aggregate disutility  $N_o^*$  and labor supply to each firm  $\{n_{ijo}^*\}$  to maximize utility. That is, Equation (6) and Equation (7) hold  $\forall o \in \{w, m\}$ .
2. *Firm organization*: Firms optimally choose the organizational structure:  $\ell_{ij}^*$ . That is, Equation (9) holds  $\forall j \in [0, 1]$ ,  $\forall i = \{1, \dots, M_j\}$ .
3. *Labor Demand*: Firms optimally choose employment  $(n_{ijw}^*, n_{ijm}^*)$ . That is, Equations (12)-(16) hold  $\forall j \in [0, 1]$ ,  $\forall i = \{1, \dots, M_j\}$ .
4. *Market Clearing*: Labor supply and demand are given by Equations (12) and (15) for firms in Cases I and II. For firms in Case III, households supply the labor demand  $n_{ijo}^*$  given by Equation (16).


Note that the equilibrium considers market clearing in the presence of minimum wages. To handle non-market-clearing wages, we solve the equilibrium using a shadow wages approach as in Berger et al. (2023b). This approach considers that households perceive a lower wage than the minimum wage for firms in Case III, which implies that the excess labor supply at the minimum wage is reallocated towards other firms (see Appendix D).

### 3.2 Market Characterization


Before presenting the quantification of model parameters, we show the interaction between firm organization, market concentration, and wage markdowns in equilibrium. Figure 3 plots the equilibrium level of employment, wages, and wage markdowns in a market with three firms. The numerical example displays the equilibrium in the model under the benchmark quantification of parameters.

Consider first the top left panel, which displays the employment level of production workers (blue) and managers (green) across firms. All firms hire production workers, as they are


Figure 3: Oligopsonistic Market with Firm Organization



(a) Employment



(b) Wages



(c) Markdown

Note: Figures constructed from the model under the estimated parameters in Table 3.

essential for production. However, only relatively high-productivity firms find it optimal to hire managers. These firms have more incentives to produce at large scales and hiring managers enable them to manage a larger workforce. As a result, they use managerial delegation to dampen the diminishing marginal returns to the labor of production workers. The top right panel shows the wage level across firms for each occupation. Both managers and production workers earn wages close to the minimum wage when they work at low-

productivity firms. If the minimum wage is not binding, managers earn substantially higher wages than production workers. This occurs because the ratio of production workers to managers is sufficiently high, which drives up the marginal productivity of the latter with respect to that of the former. Moreover, the model captures the fact that wage dispersion between both occupations increases with firm size. This result stems from the fact that the ratio of production workers to managers increases with firm size and, therefore, also the ratio of their marginal productivity.

Lastly, the bottom panel of Figure 3 plots wage markdowns across firms as the ratio between wages and the marginal product of labor for each occupation. Overall, wage markdowns are wider for managers than for production workers for three reasons. First, minimum wages are more likely to be binding for production workers. Second, managers have a lower degree of firm-substitutability. If firms had the same payroll share in both markets, they would exert a wider markdown over managerial wages because they would internalize that managers bear higher across-firm mobility costs, which makes them less responsive to labor demand changes. Third, market payroll concentration is also higher for managers. If both occupations had the same degree of firm-substitutability, firms would exert a wider markdown over managerial wages because the labor supply elasticity of managers that firms face would be closer to the across-market elasticity than that of production workers.

## 4 Quantification of the Model

The quantification of the model parameters proceeds in two steps. First, we exogenously calibrate the aggregate Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Secondly, we estimate the remaining model parameters using the Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) approach. The quantification of the parameters targets moments of the firm organization, such as the average firm size or span of control. Together these moments determine the characteristics of the average firm across markets. Then, we target observed market differences in wages, employment, number of firms, and payroll concentration. Moreover, we estimate the within-market

elasticity parameters from the correlation between wages and employment, and we use an indirect inference approach to estimate the across-market elasticity from plausibly exogenous changes in firms’ labor demand. Finally, we compare the model simulated moments and their data counterparts to assess the model predictions, and we exploit mass-layoff shocks to analyze the performance of the model equilibrium responses.

## 4.1 Estimation

Table 3 summarizes the model parameters. We calibrate outside the model the aggregate Frisch elasticity. We follow Berger et al. (2022) by setting  $\gamma = 0.5$ , which is within the range that the Congressional Budget Office considers for policy evaluation. We endogenously calibrate the within-market elasticities to match the correlation between firm wages and employment after controlling for municipality-year fixed effects. Then, we estimate the remaining parameters by the SMM approach. In particular, we set the parameter values to minimize the percentage difference with equal weighting between the vector of model moments and its data counterpart. Appendix E.1 shows the fit of our targeted parameters. Next, we describe each parameter and its most informative moment in detail.

**Labor disutility shifter** ( $\phi_w, \phi_m$ ). The moment most closely associated with the labor disutility shifter of production workers  $\phi_w$  is the average firm size in terms of production workers. In the data, the average firm hires 5.3 production workers. For the labor disutility shifter of managers  $\phi_m$ , we include as the most linked moment that about 19 percent of all employees are managers.

**Span of control** ( $\alpha$ ). The ratio of production workers to managers partially depends on the span of control parameter. When this parameter increases, the technology converges towards a production function with constant marginal returns to labor, thus decreasing the incentives for managerial delegation. The closest moment we use for this parameter is that the median multi-layer firm has 3.1 workers per manager.

**Efficiency of labor** ( $\varphi_w, \varphi_m$ ). The efficiency of labor parameters is informative of wages.



Table 3: Parameterization

Parameter	Value	Description	Value	Moment
<i>Panel I: Exogenous Calibration</i>				
$\gamma$		Aggregate Frisch elasticity	0.50	<a href="#">Berger et al. (2022)</a>
<i>Panel II: SMM Estimation</i>				
<i>A: Preferences</i>				
$\phi_w$		Labor disutility shifter: workers	$1.67 \times 10^{-4}$	Average firm size
$\phi_m$		Labor disutility shifter: managers	0.13	Share managers
<i>B: Firm Organization</i>				
$\alpha$		Span of control	0.76	Median span of control
$\varphi_w$		Worker efficiency	4,356	Mean wage of prod. workers
$\varphi_m/\varphi_w$		Managerial efficiency	1.13	Wage gap managers and prod. workers
$\sigma_z$		Std. Dev. firm TFP	1.11	Weighted Mean HHI prod. workers
<i>C: Market Characteristics</i>				
$B_{ijw}$		Amenities in small markets	0.46	Share workers in markets $M_j \leq 10$
$G(\cdot)$		Firm distribution		Mean, variance, and mass single-firm
<i>D: Firm Substitutability</i>				
$(\theta_w, \theta_m)$		Across-market firm substitutability	(1.52, 0.95)	Across-municipality labor supply elasticity
<i>Panel III: Endogenous Calibration</i>				
$(\eta_w, \eta_m)$		Within-market firm substitutability	(19.97, 6.10)	Within-market labor supply elasticity

Source: The Table reports the quantification of model parameters. Panel I reports the parameters that we calibrate outside the model. Panel II reports the estimated parameters using the SMM approach.

Thus, we include as targets the mean monthly wage of 717€ for production workers and the wage gap in mean wages between managers and production workers, which is equal to 0.73 log points.

**Dispersion in firm productivity ( $\sigma_z$ ).** The most associated moment to the standard deviation of firm productivity is the employment-weighted average HHI across local labor markets of production workers, which equals 0.19.

**Market Amenities ( $B_{ijw}$ ).** Regarding market amenities, we note that only 12 percent

of production workers belong to markets with less than ten firms, despite these markets representing nearly 65 percent of the total. We set a common market amenity for production workers in markets with less than ten firms. Then, our approach includes as the most related moment the share of production workers in those markets. The rationale for using amenities rather than productivity differences is that we would require too low productivity in small markets, which would highly overestimate the share of minimum wage earners in such places.

**Firm Distribution ( $G$ ).** The distribution of the number of firms across markets,  $M_j \sim G(\cdot)$ , combines a discrete mass at  $m_j = 1$  with a Pareto distribution. To estimate these parameters, the most associated targeted moments include that 29 percent of markets have just one firm, the average market has 17.4 firms, and the standard deviation in the number of firms equals 59.9.

**Across-market substitutability ( $\theta_w, \theta_m$ ).** The across-market firm substitutability parameters govern how greater market productivity translates into higher wages. When firm substitutability is high, total employment in a particular market is highly responsive to increased market productivity. We use an indirect-inference approach for each occupation to match the reduced-form inverse labor supply elasticity from a municipality-level regression. We estimate the following equation:

$$\text{Log } w_{m,o,t} = \gamma \text{Log } L_{m,o,t} + \alpha_{m,o} + e_{m,o,t}, \quad (17)$$

where  $w_{m,o,t}$  is the mean wage in municipality  $m$  for occupation  $o$  in period  $t$ ,  $L_{m,o,t}$  is total employment in that municipality, and  $\alpha_{m,o}$  are municipality fixed effects. In the model, the municipality is a collection of local labor markets. We use a municipality-level regression, instead of a market-level regression, to use the standard formulation of the shift-share instrument for employment (Blanchard et al., 1992):

$$\hat{L}_{m,o,t} = \sum_s \left( \underbrace{\frac{L_{i,m,s,o,2007}}{\sum_i L_{i,m,s,o,2007}}}_{\text{Industry-Municipality Share}} \times \underbrace{\sum_i L_{i,s,o,t}}_{\text{National Employment in Sector } s} \right). \quad (18)$$

This instrument predicts employment in each municipality as the exposure-weighted average of national sector employment, where the weights are the employment shares of each sector in the municipality in the initial period. With this approach, we estimate the coefficient  $\gamma$  from within-municipality, across-time variation in wages and employment that arises from national sector employment shocks and the municipality’s initial exposure to them, which plausibly represent exogenous changes in the municipality’s labor demand. We also restrict the sample to municipalities with a mean wage higher than 25 percent of the minimum wage in the reference year. We impose this restriction to exclude municipalities where a high share of firms pay wages close to the minimum wage, as the labor supply elasticity of these firms is not informative of the across-market elasticity because they may pay the minimum wage either before or after the labor demand shock. Table E.2 reports the IV results for each occupation. The implied coefficients are 1.5 for production workers and 0.92 for managers.

To replicate this regression in the model, we randomly assign markets to each municipality to approximate the number of markets that the average municipality has in the data while keeping a reasonable sample size of municipalities. Then, we simulate two periods, where the second period involves random productivity shocks at the municipality level from a standard log-normal distribution with  $\sigma = 0.05$ . Moreover, we restrict the sample of municipalities to those with a mean wage higher than 25 percent of the model minimum wage in both periods. Finally, we choose  $(\theta_w, \theta_m)$  to target the inverse labor supply elasticity  $\gamma$  that results from estimating the regression in Equation (17) with the simulated sample. We infer an across-market elasticity of 1.5 for production workers and 0.95 for managers.

**Within-market substitutability** ( $\eta_w, \eta_m$ ). Lastly, we calibrate the within-market elasticity parameters, which are informative of the relationship between firms’ productivity and wages for the sub-sample of unconstrained firms in each market. In particular, the inverse labor supply curve in Equation (7) delivers the following equilibrium relationship between

(log) wages and (log) employment:

$$\log(w_{ijo}^*) = \frac{1}{\eta_o} \log(n_{ijo}^*) + \underbrace{\left( \frac{1}{\theta_o} - \frac{1}{\eta_o} \right) \log(\mathbf{n}_{jo}(n_{ijo}^*, n_{-ijo}^*))}_{\text{Effect of payroll share on wages stems from } \mathbf{n}_{jo}} + \frac{1}{\theta_o} \log(\mathbf{N}_o) + \log(\mathbf{W}_o).$$

Common across firms in a market  $jo$

Note that, conditional on common market features, all firms face the same labor supply elasticity  $\eta_o$  for each occupation. This occurs because the effect of the payroll share on the labor supply elasticity shuts down when we control for market employment. We use this insight to obtain a theory-consistent estimate of the within-market elasticity for each occupation. In particular, the previous equation implies the following empirical reduced-form relationship for the inverse labor supply curve:

$$\log(w_{ijo,t}) = \beta_o \log(n_{ijo,t}) + \mu_{jo,t} + \nu_{ijo,t}, \quad (19)$$

where  $\mu_{jo,t}$  stands for the market-year fixed effects that empirically control for common labor demand and supply shocks across firms in the same market year. Our coefficient of interest is  $\beta_o$ . In the model, conditional on the sub-sample of unconstrained firms, the OLS regression of Equation (19) separately for each occupation identifies the within-market elasticity as  $\hat{\eta}_o = 1/\hat{\beta}_o$ . This regression exploits the cross-sectional variation in employment and wages that uniquely stems from labor demand differences across firms in the same market while keeping their labor supply curve fixed. The intuition is as follows. Firms pay different wages and hire a different number of workers because they are heterogeneous in productivity. Increasing the productivity of a firm has two equilibrium effects. First, the labor demand curve shifts to the right because the marginal productivity rises. Second, the labor supply curve shifts to the right because the strategic complementarities from Cournot's competition imply that competitors restrict employment. The coefficient  $\beta_o$  absorbs the first effect while market-fixed effects absorb the second effect.

In our baseline specification, we separately estimate Equation (19) by OLS for each occupation. Regarding the sample selection, we restrict to firms paying wages at least one percent higher than the minimum wage each year. This regression implies a within-market labor

supply elasticity of 19.9 for production workers and 6.1 for managers (see Table E.3). In addition, since the error may capture firm-specific labor supply considerations that threaten identification, we also provide the results from an IV regression that uses a traditional Bartik instrument to predict firms' employment from national sector employment trends and initial shares (see Appendix E.2). This alternative specification provides similar results. Overall, we estimate that production workers are three times as responsive to changes in labor demand as managers.

## 4.2 Discussion on the Estimation of Labor Supply Elasticities

Given the importance of the firm-substitutability parameters in estimating wage markdowns, we provide additional evidence on mobility measures that support our findings and compare our estimates with the literature.

The main finding from our estimates is that production workers are significantly more responsive to changes in labor demand than managers. Panel A of Table A.3 shows that production workers have two relevant characteristics, which suggest that they face lower mobility costs and search frictions. This result is consistent with their higher labor supply elasticity. First, young workers are significantly more likely to migrate (Molloy et al., 2011; Kennan and Walker, 2011) and make greater job search efforts (Faberman et al., 2022). About 13 percent of production workers are younger than 25, while only 4 percent of managers are below that age (see Figure A.6). Second, workers in temporary contracts search harder than workers in permanent contracts (Kahn, 2012). Notably, the share of production workers with temporary contracts is 31 percent, twice that of managers with temporary contracts. In addition, since the labor supply elasticity of production workers is higher, one would expect that they are also more mobile across markets and firms. Panel B of Table A.3 reports that production workers are more likely to change firm, municipality, and sector relative to managers.


Comparing our estimates with the literature, we focus on the estimates from three papers

that also estimate the firm-substitutability parameters using a general equilibrium model of oligopsony. [Berger et al. \(2022\)](#) estimate the firm-substitutability parameters using an indirect inference approach to replicate size-dependent labor supply elasticities at the firm level, which they estimate using U.S. microdata and exploiting changes in state corporate taxes. Abstracting from different occupations, they define the local labor market as the combination of a three-digit industry and a commuting zone. They estimate  $\theta = 0.42$  and  $\eta = 10.85$ . [Shubhdeep et al. \(2023\)](#) also estimates the firm substitutability parameters from U.S. microdata and exploits changes in state corporate taxes. However, they estimate skill-specific parameters and use a stochastic market definition that is a subset of 6-digit industries. For low-skilled workers, they estimate  $\theta_L = 1.85$  and  $\eta_L = 2.42$ , and for high-skilled workers, they find  $\theta_H = 2.02$  and  $\eta_H = 2.53$ . Using French data, [Azkarate-Askasua and Zerecero \(2023\)](#) define a local labor market as the intersection between a commuting zone, three-digit industry, and occupation. Nonetheless, they assume the firm-substitutability parameters to be common across occupations. They find an across-market elasticity  $\theta = 0.42$  and industry-specific within-market elasticities that range within  $\eta \in \{1.22, 4.05\}$ . Despite using a different methodology, we find our estimates reasonably close to their results. Our estimates of the within-market elasticities are within the range of their results for managers but somewhat higher for production workers. We attribute this to Portuguese-specific factors such as the high rate of temporary contracts. Our estimates of the across-market elasticities are also within the range of their results. They are higher than [Berger et al. \(2022\)](#) and [Azkarate-Askasua and Zerecero \(2023\)](#), which is consistent with Portuguese municipalities being smaller than U.S. and French commuting zones.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Comparing mobility rates, nearly 10 percent of workers change municipality in Portugal yearly. Instead, the yearly migration rate across U.S. counties, subsets of commuting zones, ranges between 3 to 6 percent in the same period ([Molloy et al., 2011](#)).

Figure 4: Wage Distribution across Occupations




Note: The Figures show the wage distribution in the model and data for production workers (left) and managers (right).

### 4.3 Model Fit

Before turning to the counterfactual analysis, we discuss how the model captures untargeted moments of employment, wages, firm organization, and market concentration. In addition, we exploit large mass-layoff shocks to assess the model's generated employment and wage responses relative to the ones in the data.

**Moments pertaining the minimum wage.** We start analyzing the wage distribution, which is key to quantifying wage dispersion and the repercussions of minimum wage policies. Figure 4 displays the occupation wage distribution in the model and data. The model fits most of the wage distribution for both occupations. Importantly, it replicates the wage distribution at the bottom deciles. This is key for two reasons. First, minimum wage policies primarily affect workers whose wage is close to the statutory minimum. Second, low-paid employees are the most susceptible to monopsony power because they primarily work in small markets. Since we assume that workers are homogeneous in talent within occupations,

Figure 5: Distribution of Employment across Markets



Note: The Figures show the cumulative fraction of employment across local labor markets ranked by their level of concentration in the model and data for production workers (left) and managers (right).

the model underestimates wages in the upper deciles. However, high-wage workers typically work in markets with many firms, where firms have low monopsony power, and their wages are well above the minimum wage.

Panel A in Table 4 displays how the model fits moments related to the share of workers whose wages are close to the minimum wage. The model somewhat overvalues the share of minimum wage earners for both occupations, but it reflects that managers are significantly less likely to earn the minimum wage than production workers. Moreover, the model gets right the share of workers in each occupation conditional on being a minimum wage earner. That is, the model matches that more than 90 percent of employees are production workers. Furthermore, the model matches that most production workers earn less than 30 percent of the minimum wage (700€), whereas this proportion falls to around 15 percent for managers. Hence, the model captures that minimum wage policies mainly affect production workers.

**Moments pertaining firm organization.** The distribution of firm wages, the degree of



Table 4: Untargeted Moments

	Production Workers		Managers	
	Model	Data	Model	Data
<i>Panel A: Minimum Wage</i>				
Share minimum wage earners	0.31	0.22	0.12	0.04
Share   Minimum wage earner	0.91	0.96	0.09	0.04
Share wage $\leq 700$	0.55	0.69	0.15	0.12
<i>Panel B: Firm Organization</i>				
Share multi-layer	0.33	0.33		
Share workers in multi-layer	0.36	0.43		
Share workers in multi-layer   $\text{HHI}_j \leq 0.20$	0.31	0.37		
Share workers in multi-layer   $\text{HHI}_j > 0.20$	0.49	0.55		
P25 firm size	1	1	2	1
P50 firm size	2	2	3	1
P90 firm size	14	9	9	5
P99 firm size	52	59	15	34
<i>Panel D: Market Concentration</i>				
Weighted mean HHI			0.29	0.27
Weighted mean Max $s_{ij}$	0.28	0.30	0.38	0.38

Note: The Table reports untargeted moments of the distributions of wages, firm size, firm organization, and market payroll concentration. For each occupation, we report the statistic from the data and baseline model.

firm substitutability, and local amenities determine the firm size distribution in the model. This distribution is important to understand the misallocation of labor across firms that results from high-productivity firms exerting wider markdowns. Panel B in Table 4 shows that the distribution in the model is somewhat similar to that of the data for production workers. Most firms are small and hire less than two employees, whereas a few firms are relatively large and hire more than 60 workers.

The share of multi-layer firms is key for explaining the differences in market concentration in the markets of production workers and managers, as it determines the relative number of competing firms across these markets. Panel C shows that one-third of firms hire managers in both the model and data. Moreover, these firms hire nearly 40 percent of production workers, which is also relevant because multi-layer firms are on average bigger and increase market concentration. The model can also explain our motivational fact relating the employment share of multi-layer firms to market concentration. In particular, the share of production workers employed in multi-layer firms is about 20 pp higher in relatively high-concentrated local labor markets. The model rationalizes this fact because the few firms that usually compete in these markets are able to attract many production workers and managers at relatively low wages due to the low degree of substitutability across markets. As a result, they produce at large scales and find managerial delegation profitable.

**Moments pertaining market concentration.** Next, consider the distribution of employment across markets that differ in the level of payroll concentration, which is endogenous in the model due to the agents' labor demand and supply decisions. This distribution is fundamental to measuring the wage markdown of the average employee. Figure 5 shows that the model closely matches the distribution of employment across markets that differ in terms of the HHI. Two features stand out. First, the model rationalizes that most workers sort into a handful of relatively low-concentrated labor markets. These markets attract most workers because they have many firms that pay higher wages due to the relatively high degree of competition. These markets are also more attractive for production workers

because they have relatively higher local amenities. Second, managers are more likely to belong to a market with higher levels of concentration relative to production workers. This heterogeneity occurs because there is a higher proportion of managerial markets with higher concentration levels, and managers face higher across-market mobility costs, discouraging them from leaving markets that pay relatively low wages.

Lastly, consider how the model fits two statistics of market concentration. Panel C in Table 4 shows that the model replicates that the average manager works in a market with an HHI of around one-third; the same one would observe with three equally sized firms. In addition to aggregate concentration measures, the model establishes a direct relationship between a wage markdown and the firm’s market payroll share. As a result, it is important for the model to predict realistic payroll shares for the biggest firms. The last row in Panel D of Table 4 shows that the model captures that the average production worker works for a firm with nearly one-third of the market payroll, whereas the average manager works for a firm with about 40 percent of the market payroll.

**Simulating mass-layoff shocks.** Mass-layoff shocks are relevant to assess the performance of employment and wage equilibrium responses in the model. The model incorporates two main channels through which areas adjust to this shock: (i) outflows to non-employment and (ii) worker reallocation to other firms, either in the same or a different area. The empirical evidence suggests that most of the impact of mass-layoff shocks on regional employment depends on the degree of worker reallocation across regions (Foote et al., 2019; Gathmann et al., 2020).<sup>8</sup> Therefore, we use this simulation as a validation exercise of the across- and within-market firm substitutability estimates, which are the key drivers of the allocation of workers across and within markets.

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<sup>8</sup>These papers find that geographic mobility accounts for most of the regional employment change. For instance, Gathmann et al. (2020) finds that outflows to non-employment account for only 20 percent of the overall employment decline in German regions following a mass layoff. They also find that geographic mobility protects workers below 50 from suffering employment losses.

Table 5: Estimates of Mass Layoff Shocks on Municipalities

	Production Workers		Managers	
	Model	Data	Model	Data
<i>Panel A: Log Wages</i>				
Event Region	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.006 (0.010)
<i>Panel B: Log Employment</i>				
Event Region	-0.017*** (0.001)	-0.061*** (0.013)	-0.011** (0.005)	-0.040** (0.019)
Observations	200	3,084	200	3,084

Note: The Table reports the empirical (Data) and simulated (Model) results from exploiting mass-layoff shocks. For the Data, we show the average treatment effect of mass-layoff shocks on average municipality wages (Panel A) and total municipality employment (Panel B). The dependent variable is the log municipality's employment and wages. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Next, we show the results from this exercise and relegate the details of the methodology to the Appendix E.3. Table 5 reports the empirical and simulated results of the impact of mass-layoff shocks on average municipality wages and total municipality employment. Our empirical results show that municipalities with at least one mass-layoff event experience an average decrease of 6.1 percent in the local employment of production workers and 4 percent in the local employment of managers compared to municipalities without mass layoffs. We do not find a significant impact of mass layoffs on average municipality wages. These results align with Gathmann et al. (2020) for Germany, which find a drop of 3.7 percent in local employment and an insignificant response in wages following a mass layoff.

Regarding the results in the simulated data, the model reproduces that mass layoffs have a small effect on average municipality wages for production workers. For managers, the point estimate is twice more negative in the model, but it is in the range of the confidence interval of the data. In the model, wages decrease for two reasons. First, the shocked firm becomes less

productive. Second, the non-affected firms also decrease wages because their employment share increase. At the same time, wages do not fall much due to the downward rigidity in wages stemming from minimum wages. In terms of employment, the model accounts for nearly one-fourth of the decrease in employment of managers and production workers. Overall, the model explains a substantial portion of the observed employment decline and attribute the residual to the lack of factors such as agglomeration economies, input-output linkages, or firm exit.


## 5 Implications of Monopsony Power

In this section, we quantify the distribution of wage markdowns for both occupations and the effect of monopsony power on wage dispersion, firm organization, and welfare. We estimate a markdown of 10.4 percent for the average production worker and 23.1 percent for the average manager. Relative to the efficient economy, monopsony power reduces the managerial wage premium by 11.8 percent and increases the share of multi-layer firms by 11.3 percent because it incentivizes less productive firms to delegate tasks to managers. Overall, monopsony power leads to a welfare loss of 5.7 and 23.1 percent for production workers and managers, respectively. Understanding firms' managerial delegation choices is crucial to explain the reallocation of managers towards more productive firms and accounts between 10 to 30 percent of the change in average market concentration in the efficient economy. Moreover, ignoring that monopsony power incentivizes delegation leads to overestimating the welfare loss of production workers and managers by 0.6 and 2.1 pp, respectively.

### 5.1 Measuring Monopsony Power

This section shows the distribution of wage markdowns across firms for production workers and managers. In the benchmark economy, wage markdowns are below one due to imperfect firm substitutability and firm granularity, implying that wages are below the marginal revenue product of labor. This wedge represents the efficiency loss from monopsony power,

Figure 6: Distribution of Wage Markdowns



Note: The Figure plots the distribution of wage markdowns ( $\mu_{ij}$ ) across firms for production workers and managers. The wage markdown is the wedge between the wage and the marginal productivity of labor. Dashed lines display the weighted mean of each variable, where the weight of each firm is its employment size.

as workers would earn the entire marginal product in an efficient economy.

Figure 10 displays the distribution of wage markdowns for both occupations. We estimate an employment-weighted markdown of 10.4 percent over the wage of the average production worker and a markdown of 23.1 percent over the wage of the average manager. Therefore, the interaction between monopsony power and firm organization reduces the wage dispersion between both occupations. There are three reasons for this fact. First, both the upper ( $\eta_o$ ) and lower bounds ( $\theta_o$ ) of the structural elasticities are lower for managers. That is, we estimate that managers bear greater mobility costs of moving to a firm in another region or industry and greater mobility costs of changing firms within the same region-industry. Second, firms tend to have higher managers' payroll shares than production workers. Thus, the labor supply elasticity of managers is closer to the across-market elasticity than that of production workers. In other words, managers find it harder to reallocate toward other firms because more of their alternatives are outside of their current local market. Third, minimum wages constrain low-productivity firms from exercising monopsony power. Relative to the

efficient economy, this heterogeneity in wage markdowns implies a higher distortion in the allocation of managers across firms than production workers. For policy evaluation, this suggests that additional policies targeting the reduction of monopsony power among low-wage workers, such as an increase in the minimum wage, may not effectively mitigate the welfare losses from monopsony power.

## 5.2 Welfare and Efficiency Losses from Monopsony Power

We now study the effect of monopsony power on firm organization, wage dispersion, efficiency, and welfare. Moreover, we estimate the extent to which the impact of monopsony power on these outcomes is attributable to the endogenous organizational choices of firms. We compute the efficient allocation by setting wage markdowns to one, i.e., equalizing wages to the marginal product of labor for all firms. The left column in Table 6 summarizes the results by comparing the aggregate outcomes in the efficient relative to the benchmark economy.

Panel A in Table 6 shows the change in employment across occupations. When firms have monopsony power, they internalize that a higher level of employment also involves higher wages, i.e., they internalize an upward-sloping labor supply curve. Then, firms find it optimal to restrict employment relative to the efficient allocation to reduce labor costs. We find that employment would rise by 5.6 and 9.3 percent for production workers and managers in an efficient economy, respectively. Managers' employment response is higher because firms exert wider markdowns over their wages. Besides changes in aggregate employment, monopsony power also distorts labor allocation across firms because high-productivity firms restrict employment the most, as they set the widest markdowns. The top panels in Figure 7 show the reallocation of employees from less to more productive firms. We observe that firms in the top decile of productivity raise the number of production workers and managers by about 12 and 21 percent, respectively. The increase in employment and the reallocation of workers leads to an increase of 3.3 percent in aggregate output.

Regarding the impact of monopsony power on wages, the top panels in Figure 8 show how


Table 6: Change in Counterfactual Relative to Benchmark

	Efficient Economy	Minimum Wage Reform
<b>Panel A: Employment &amp; Output</b>	% Change	% Change
Production workers	5.57	-1.28
Managers	9.29	-0.99
Aggregate Employment	6.33	-1.21
Output	3.25	-0.04
<b>Panel B: Wages</b>		
Mean: Production workers	10.04	2.06
Mean: Managers	23.02	0.94
Ratio	11.79	-0.87
<b>Panel C: Firm Organization</b>		
Share multi-layer firms	-11.27	-0.56
Median span of control	-3.64	-0.48
Mean HHI: Production Workers	5.00	0.63
Mean HHI: Managers	7.95	0.07
<b>Panel D: Welfare</b>		
Welfare: Production workers	5.73	-0.72
Welfare: Managers	23.13	-0.01


Note: The Table reports the percent change in aggregate outcomes in the counterfactual relative to the benchmark economy. In the first column, the counterfactual consists of an efficient economy where wage markdowns equal one. In the second column, the counterfactual consists of an economy with a ten percent higher minimum wage than the benchmark economy.




Figure 7: Effect of Monopsony Power on Employment Reallocation



(a) Production Workers




(b) Managers




(c) Managers: Exogenous Delegation Choice

Note: The top panels in the Figure plot the percent change in employment of production workers (left) and managers (right) across firms in the efficient relative to the benchmark economy. The bottom panel shows the reallocation of managers in an efficient economy where firms exogenously keep the organizational structure of the benchmark economy. Both counterfactual simulations represent an efficient economy where wages are equal to the marginal product of labor. We classify firms into ten bins according to their productivity, where a higher bin implies higher productivity.


Figure 8: Effect of Monopsony Power on Wages



(a) Production Workers




(b) Managers



(c) Managers: Exogenous Delegation Choice

Note: The top panels of the Figure plot the percent change in mean wages relative to the benchmark for production workers (left top) and managers (right top). The bottom panel shows the change in mean wages of managers in an efficient economy where firms exogenously keep the organizational structure of the benchmark economy. Both counterfactual simulations represent an efficient economy where wages are equal to the marginal product of labor. We classify firms into ten bins according to their productivity, where a higher bin implies higher productivity.

Figure 9: Effect of Monopsony Power on the Share of Multi-layer Firms



(a) Over Total Firms in Productivity Bin

(b) Over Total Firms

Note: The Figure plots the percent change in the share of multi-layer firms, where we express the change as a fraction over the total number of firms (right) and over the total number of firms in the same productivity bin (left). The counterfactual simulation represents an efficient economy where wages are equal to the marginal product of labor. We classify firms into ten bins according to their productivity, where a higher bin implies higher productivity.

mean wages change across the firm productivity distribution. In an efficient economy, wages especially increase at high-productivity firms, which exert the widest markdowns. As a result, wage dispersion within occupations also increases. Since managers bear wider markdowns, the wage increase is greater for managers. In particular, Panel B shows that the mean wage of production workers and managers increase by 10 and 23 percent, respectively. As a result, dispersion in mean wages across occupations rises by 11.8 percent.

To understand why managerial employment and wages drop at middle-productivity firms, we need to analyze the effect of monopsony power on the internal organization of firms. Panel C shows, in line with the empirical evidence, that more firms adopt a multi-layer structure when they have monopsony power. In particular, we estimate that the proportion of firms that delegate to managers falls by 11.3 percent, from 33 to 29 percent of all firms. Furthermore, the share of multi-layer firms especially decreases at medium-productivity firms, as


we observe in Figure 9. The reason is that monopsony power enables medium-productivity firms to attract employees at relatively low wages, incentivizing them to be multi-layer organizations. This result implies that managers at medium-productivity firms experience the most substantial decline in employment and even a decrease in wages. Notably, when we get rid of the effect of multi-layer firm exit on these outcomes, i.e., we analyze what happens to employment and wages in a counterfactual efficient economy where firms exogenously choose the benchmark organizational structure, we observe that managers at middle-productivity firms would get employment and wage gains due to the reallocation of production workers (see the bottom panels of Figure 7 and Figure 8). Regarding managers' span of control, we estimate that it decreases by almost 3.6 percent because firms increase their managerial workforce. We also find that the average HHI in the market of production workers and managers increases by 5 and 7.9 percent, respectively, due to the reallocation of labor towards high-productivity firms and the decrease in the number of firms that hire managers.

Panel D reports the welfare losses from monopsony power. The welfare gain in the efficient economy is substantially higher than the output gain because there is a redistribution channel that increases labor income at the expense of profits in addition to the efficiency gain. Measuring welfare as the consumption equivalent that would make households indifferent between the efficient and benchmark economy, we estimate that welfare increases by 5.7 and 23.1 percent for production workers and managers, respectively.

### 5.3 Firm organization channel

Our structural model allows us to quantify the extent to which changes in economic outcomes in the efficient economy stem from the endogenous organizational choices of firms. To isolate this channel, we simulate a counterfactual efficient economy where firms exogenously keep the same number of layers they choose in the benchmark economy. Then, we compute the change in each economic outcome between this counterfactual and the benchmark economy. This change is attributable to all the mechanisms included in the model except for the firm organization channel. Hence, we attribute to firm organizational choices the difference in the

Figure 10: Firm Organization Channel



Note: The Figures display how much the firm organization channel, i.e., the endogenous firms' choice of layers, accounts for the percent change between the efficient and benchmark economies in several outcomes of production workers (left) and managers (right). For instance, the endogenous organizational choice of firms explains about 30 percent of the change in the average level of payroll concentration in managerial markets between the efficient and benchmark economy.

changes between the efficient counterfactual economy, where the layer structure is endogenous, and the efficient counterfactual economy, where this choice is exogenous. Figure 10 shows how much firm organization accounts for changes in the market structure and welfare of production workers and managers. Two results stand out.

Firstly, the firm organization channel explains about 30 percent of the change in the average concentration level of managerial markets. In particular, the average HHI of managerial markets increases by 7.7 percent in the efficient economy. Out of this increase, 2.3 percentage points are attributable to delegation decisions. The reason is that the number of multi-layer firms decreases when firm organization is endogenous, further contributing to increased market concentration because fewer firms participate in managerial markets. Moreover, the firm organization channel also explains nearly 10 percent of the change in the average concentration level in production worker markets. This result stems from the technological

reciprocity between worker types, which implies that organizational decisions also affect the distribution of production workers across firms.

Secondly, ignoring firm organization contributes to overestimating the welfare gains of both worker types in the efficient economy by about 9.1 percent. Regarding the welfare of managers, we overestimate it by about 2 pp when the organization of firms is exogenous (25.2%) relative to endogenous (23.1%). That is, the endogenous organizational response of firms in an efficient economy reduces the welfare of managers. Since fewer firms adopt a multi-layer structure in an efficient economy, the demand for managers falls, and so does their consumption level. Moreover, their disutility of labor decreases because their aggregate labor supply falls. Regarding the welfare of production workers, we overestimate it by 0.6 percentage points when the organization of firms is exogenous (6.3%) relative to endogenous (5.7%). In this case, almost the entire negative effect of firm organization on production workers' welfare stems from an increase in their disutility of labor supply, as the decrease in the share of multi-layer firms also induces the reallocation of some production workers.

To sum up, we show the impact of monopsony power on firm organization, efficiency, and welfare in the Portuguese economy. Regarding the importance of the firm organization channel, we emphasize that it is informative of the impact of monopsony power on employment at middle-productivity firms, welfare, and the market structure. Regarding the policies that aim to reduce the welfare losses from monopsony power, our results point out that the success of these policies especially relies on their ability to reduce the markdowns over managerial wages. In the following section, we assess the effectiveness of Portuguese minimum wage policies in reducing the monopsony power of firms.

## 6 Minimum Wage Policies

Minimum wage policies aim to improve the well-being of low-income workers by reducing the wage-setting power of firms. We estimate that recent Portuguese minimum wage reforms deteriorated production workers' welfare and do not improve managers' welfare. We assess

occupation-based minimum wages as an alternative. Increasing only the minimum wage for managers gives them up to a 0.5 percent welfare gain but slightly decreases production workers' welfare. We find a Pareto optimal combination of occupation-based minimum wages that brings about a welfare gain of 0.25 and 0.17 for production workers and managers, respectively. Thus, this optimal policy recovers 0.7 and 5 percent of their welfare losses from monopsony power.

## 6.1 Minimum Wage Reforms Implemented in Portugal


Portuguese reforms raised the real minimum wage by ten percent between 2016 and 2019.<sup>9</sup> We focus on this period because it involves a meaningful and permanent minimum wage increase, and it coincides right after our calibration period and before the COVID-19 crisis. The rightmost column in Table 6 reports the percent change in aggregate outcomes in the minimum wage counterfactual relative to the benchmark economy.

Panel A in Table 6 shows that the increase in the minimum wage reduces aggregate employment by about 1.3 percent. Although employment falls for both occupations, the employment decline is larger for production workers, who are more likely to work at firms that exert narrow markdowns and pay low wages. The negative effect on employment does not generate large efficiency losses, as output almost remains unchanged. The reason is that the minimum wage reform also induces workers to relocate to high-productivity firms, reducing the misallocation of labor. There is a reallocation effect because the rise in the minimum wage leads to employment losses at unproductive firms, part of which relocates to more productive firms. Figure 11 shows the reallocation of both worker types towards high-productivity firms. Note that even a slight employment increase at high-productivity firms crowds out most of the employment drop at low-productivity firms, as high-productivity firms account for most of aggregate employment (see Figure A.7).

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<sup>9</sup>In nominal terms, the Portuguese minimum wage increased from 530€ to 600€. Adjusting for the CPI, where we set the base year to 2010, it implies an increase of 10 percent from 525€ to 578€. See <https://www.dgert.gov.pt/evolucao-da-remuneracao-minima-mensal-garantida-rmmg>.

Figure 11: Effect the of Minimum Wage Reform on Employment Reallocation




Note: The Figure plots the percent change in employment of production workers (left) and managers (right) across firms in the minimum wage counterfactual relative to the benchmark economy. In the counterfactual economy, the minimum wage is ten percent higher than in the benchmark. We classify firms into ten bins according to their productivity, where a higher bin implies higher productivity.

Regarding the impact of the minimum wage reform on wages, Figure 12 shows that the reform increases wages at low-productivity firms, which have to pay higher wages. In contrast, when labor relocates towards high-productivity firms, it increases labor supply in those firms, leading to downward pressure on wages. As a result, wage dispersion decreases within occupations. Since the wage change is more intense for production workers, wage dispersion also decreases across occupations. In particular, Panel B shows that the minimum wage reform reduces mean wage dispersion across occupations by 0.9 percent. Lastly, we estimate the own-wage employment elasticity by occupations to find that for production workers, it is -0.62, and for managers, it is -1.05.<sup>10</sup> The managers' elasticity indicates that the wage gains from the minimum wage cancel out with the job losses, while for production workers, the wage gains are larger than the job losses. These elasticities are in the range of other estimates from the minimum wage literature (Dube, 2019).

<sup>10</sup>We estimate the elasticity as  $OWE_o = \frac{\% \Delta Employment_o}{\% \Delta Minimum Wage} * \frac{\% \Delta Mean Wage_o}{\% \Delta Minimum Wage}^{-1}$ .



Figure 12: Effect of the Minimum Wage Reform on Wages




Note: The Figure plots the percent change in mean wages of production workers (left) and managers (right) across firms in the minimum wage counterfactual relative to the benchmark economy. In the counterfactual economy, the minimum wage is ten percent higher than in the benchmark. We classify firms into ten bins according to their productivity, where a higher bin implies higher productivity.

Next, Panel C reports the effect of the reform on firm organization, which is a novel mechanism in our model. We estimate a decrease of almost 0.6 percent in the share of multi-layer firms. Figure 13 shows that this happens at medium productivity bins, even though managers in these firms earn wages well above the baseline minimum wage (see Figure A.8). The reform makes their production workers, who earn wages close to the minimum wage, more expensive. Therefore, they have incentives to reduce their workforce and, consequently, the number of layers because a multi-layer organization especially provides advantages when producing at large scales. The median span of control of managers decreases by 0.48 percent because the cost of production workers relative to managers increases. Regarding the effect on the market structure, we find that the reform induces an increase in market concentration for both occupations due to the reallocation effect and the drop of the managerial layer of firms.

Lastly, consider the effect of the minimum wage reform on welfare in Panel D. The reform reduces the welfare of production workers by 0.7 percent. Despite a slight increase in con-

Figure 13: Effect of the Minimum Wage Reform on the Share of Multi-layer Firms




Note: The Figure plots the percent change in the share of multi-layer firms, where we compare the change over the total number of firms (right) and the total number of firms in the same productivity bin (left).

sumption, welfare decreases because the reform induces a reallocation of labor across firms that significantly raises their disutility of labor supply. We interpret this last finding as a situation wherein the reallocation of labor across firms involves substantial search costs, increases commuting costs, and diminishes the idiosyncratic taste of production workers toward firms, all in an effort for workers to remain employed. The reform has a negligible effect on the welfare of managers, as their wages and employment levels change less prominently.

## 6.2 Occupation-based Minimum Wage

The heterogeneity in the distribution of wage markdowns across occupations suggests that designing a minimum wage for each occupation could be more effective at tackling the welfare losses from monopsony power. It is natural to ask whether a different minimum wage for managers would improve upon the implemented Portuguese minimum wage reforms, as managers tend to earn wages above the minimum wage and bear wider markdowns than production workers. For this reason, we simulate different scenarios where we set a specific minimum wage for managers while keeping the benchmark minimum wage for production

Figure 14: Welfare Effect of Occupation-based Minimum Wage



Note: The Figure plots the percent change in the welfare of both managers and production workers in the counterfactual where the minimum wage of managers changes relative to the benchmark economy. We keep the benchmark minimum wage for production workers.

workers. Figure 14 depicts the welfare change of production workers and managers in each counterfactual relative to the benchmark.

Designing an occupation-based minimum wage improves welfare relative to the implemented Portuguese minimum wage reforms. In particular, the welfare change of both worker types is higher when the minimum wage of managers ranges between approximately 43 percent (695€) and 64 percent (1025€) of their mean wage. As expected, the welfare of managers is hump-shaped relative to their minimum wage. We calculate that the welfare gain of managers attains its maximum at 0.5 percent when their minimum wage equals 56 percent of the mean managerial wage (900€). It is worth noting that even a specific minimum wage for managers does not recover more than 2 percent of their total welfare loss from monopsony power.

Regarding production workers, their welfare level is decreasing in the minimum wage of

managers due to a consumption drop. Raising the minimum wage of managers diminishes the consumption level of production workers, as firing managers decreases the marginal productivity of the incumbent production workers and incentivizes firms to fire production workers. Hence, occupation-based minimum wages raise welfare inequality between occupations. Nonetheless, the total effect of this policy on the welfare level of production workers is close to zero.

Lastly, we estimate the Pareto optimal combination of occupation-based minimum wages that provides welfare gains for both worker types relative to the benchmark economy. We find that this combination of occupation-based minimum wages provides a welfare gain relative to the benchmark of 0.25 percent for production workers and 0.17 percent for managers when the minimum wage of production workers is about 63 percent of their mean wage (460€) and the minimum wage of managers is about 50 percent of their mean wage (790€). Therefore, our results show that there exist reforms that make both worker types better off in comparison to the current situation. Moreover, our findings indicate that an optimal occupation-based minimum wage policy mitigates between 0.7 and 4.3 percent of the managers' and production workers' welfare loss from monopsony power, respectively.

## 7 Conclusion

We show that studying monopsony power and minimum wage policies in an environment where firms organize their production in hierarchies leads to economic implications in terms of wage dispersion, managerial delegation, and the optimal design of policies that address monopsony power. We estimate that firms exert a markdown of 23.1 and 10.6 percent over the average manager and production worker, respectively. As a result, the managerial wage premium would increase by 11.8 percent in an efficient economy where wages equal the marginal product of labor. Furthermore, monopsony power incentivizes managerial delegation in less productive firms, as it distorts the allocation of managers and production workers across firms. The efficient economy provides a consumption equivalent welfare gain

of 5.7 and 23.1 percent for production workers and managers, respectively, which stem from efficiency gains and redistribution of firm profits to labor income. Ignoring that monopsony power incentivizes managerial delegation leads to overestimating these welfare gains by 0.6 and 2.1 percentage points. Finally, we study whether minimum wage policies address the welfare losses from monopsony power. Recent statutory rises in the Portuguese minimum wage lower overall welfare. Designing optimal occupation-based minimum wages provides welfare gains for both occupations relative to the benchmark, but recovers less than 5 percent of the welfare losses from monopsony power.

We consider two valuable extensions for future research. Empirically, we think that market concentration and mobility costs may also show a systematic relationship with other important market characteristics. For instance, the skill level required in the job, the age of workers, or whether the market is formal or not in developing countries. Theoretically, future model extensions may consider worker heterogeneity in productivity and across-occupation mobility.

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# Appendix

## A Appendix: Additional Figures and Tables

Table A.1: Classification of Occupations

Level	Tasks	Skills
Top Management	Definition of the firm general policy or consulting on the organization of the firm; strategic planning; creation or adaptation of technical, scientific and administrative methods or processes	Knowledge of management and coordination of firms fundamental activities; knowledge of management and coordination of the fundamental activities in the field to which the individual is assigned and that requires the study and research of high responsibility and technical level problems
Middle Management	Organization and adaptation of the guidelines established by the superiors and directly linked with the executive work	Technical and professional qualifications directed to executive, research, and management work
Supervisors	Orientation of teams, as directed by the superiors, but requiring the knowledge of action processes	Complete professional qualification with a specialization
Higher-skilled Professionals	Tasks requiring a high technical value and defined in general terms by the superiors	Complete professional qualification with a specialization adding to theoretical and applied knowledge
Skilled Professionals	Complex or delicate tasks, usually not repetitive, and defined by the superiors	Complete professional qualification implying theoretical and applied knowledge
Semi-skilled Professionals	Well defined tasks, mainly manual or mechanical (no intellectual work) with low complexity, usually routine and sometimes repetitive	Professional qualification in a limited field or practical and elementary professional knowledge
Non-skilled Professionals	Simple tasks and totally determined	Practical knowledge and easily acquired in a short time

Sources: (i) *Decreto-Lei n.º. 121/78 de 2 de Junho, Ministério do Trabalho*, (ii) [Caliendo et al. \(2020\)](#).

Table A.2: Share of Occupations

Level	Share (%)	Share Hierarchy (%)	Mean Wage	Std. dev. Wage
<b>Managers</b>	19.19	100	1,850	1,398
<i>Top Management</i>	7.97	41.55	2,226	1,778
<i>Middle Management</i>	5.96	31.08	1,658	1,033
<i>Supervisors and Team Leaders</i>	5.25	27.37	1,498	862
<b>Workers</b>	80.81	100	808	842
<i>Higher-skilled Professionals</i>	8.07	9.98	1,367	2,318
<i>Skilled Professionals</i>	40.44	50.04	841	443
<i>Semi-skilled Professionals</i>	21.48	26.58	661	281
<i>Non-skilled Professionals</i>	10.83	13.40	565	241

Source: Elaboration based on QP.

Table A.3: Mobility and Sample Characteristics

	(1)	(2)
	<b>Production Workers</b>	<b>Managers</b>
	Mean	Mean
Share Age $\leq$ 25	0.13	0.04
Share Age $\leq$ 30	0.28	0.19
Share Temporary	0.31	0.16
Share Change Firm	0.24	0.20
Share Change Municipality	0.11	0.10
Share Change Sector	0.20	0.17
Observations	24,362,091	5,128,131

Source: Elaboration based on QP.

Table A.4: Distribution of Number of Establishments across Local Markets ( $M_j$ )

	Mean	P25	P50	P75	P95
<b>Markets of Managers</b>					
Nº Establishments	120	3	11	39	156
<b>Markets of Production Workers</b>					
Nº Establishments	227	5	16	65	241

Source: Elaboration based on QP.

Note: The Table reports the (employment weighted) mean, the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentile of the number of establishments across local labor markets by occupation.

Figure A.1: Unbinding Minimum Wage in Partial Equilibrium Analysis




Figure A.2: Binding Minimum Wage on the Labor Supply Curve




Figure A.3: Binding Minimum Wage off the Labor Supply Curve





Figure A.4: Market Concentration and Multi-layer Firms: Unweighted



Source: Elaboration based on QP.

Note: The Figure plots the average share of multi-layer firms across local labor markets that differ in the level of HHI. In particular, we compute the share of multi-layer firms and the HHI for each local labor market of production workers. We split the distribution of the HHI into 20 cells of length 0.05. In each cell, we take the unweighted mean of the share of multi-layer firms across markets.



Figure A.5: Transition Probabilities




(a) Unconditional

(b) Conditional

Source: Elaboration based on QP.

Note: The Figures display the transition probabilities of changing sub-occupation. The vertical axis represents the sub-occupation before the transition, and the horizontal axis the sub-occupation afterward. The left panel shows the unconditional transition probability, whereas the right panel shows the transition probability conditional on changing firms. The black lines delimit the quadrants of moving across or within the two broad occupation categories (managers and production workers), where the top left and right bottom quadrants represent within-occupation transitions.


Figure A.6: Age Distribution across Occupations



Source: Elaboration based on QP.

Note: The Figure displays the age distribution across occupations.

Figure A.7: Employment Share in the Benchmark Economy




(a) Production Workers

(b) Managers

Source: Simulations from the model.

Note: The Figure plots the employment share of production workers (left) and managers (right) across firms in the benchmark economy. We classify firms into ten bins according to their productivity, where a higher bin implies higher productivity.

Figure A.8: Mean Wages in the Benchmark Economy



Source: Simulations from the model.

Note: The Figure plots the employment-weighted mean wage of production workers (left) and managers (right) across firms in the benchmark economy. We classify firms into ten bins according to their productivity, where a higher bin implies higher productivity.

## B Appendix: Data

This section provides a detailed description of the data, the occupation and the market definition, as well as the methodology to measure market concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).

### B.1 Quadros de Pessoal

Our primary data source is *Quadros de Pessoal* (QP), an annual census of private sector employees conducted by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment. This census provides matched employer-employee data on all firms based in Portugal with at least one worker, except those related to public administration and non-market services. The database incorporates unique time-invariant identifiers for each firm, establishment, and worker entering the report, which allows tracking them over time. Our sample covers the period from 2010 to 2016 for all results except for estimating the firm-substitutability parameters, which covers 2002 to 2016 because we require more observations.

The worker-level data contains information on each firm’s employees as of the October reference week. The variables include age, occupation, monthly earnings, and hours worked. At the firm level, we have information on the industry, the headquarters location, and all its establishments.

Regarding the sample selection, we exclude workers younger than 18 or older than 64, those working outside of continental Portugal, and those working in agriculture, forestry, fishing, or mining industries. We also exclude apprentices, workers with missing information on earnings or occupation, and workers with misreported identifiers. Most workers with missing earnings include unpaid family members and owners of the firm. In addition, workers with misreported identifiers (e.g., duplicated) account for about 2% of the sample. Finally, we drop chief executive officers because their market is not local, which is a core feature of the theory in this paper. This selection results in 3,243,966 workers and 12,073,646 worker-year observations.

## B.2 Market Definition

We classify labor markets based on three observable characteristics of the job: geography, industry, and occupation. This classification stems from the fact that workers are more attached to their current labor market because of imperfect geographical mobility and imperfect substitutability of skills across jobs and sectors (Neal, 1995; Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009; Sullivan, 2010; Monte et al., 2018). In particular, we define two broad occupations, i.e., managers and production workers, and define a local labor market for each occupation as the intersection of the geography (Municipality) and industry (2-digit NACE). This selection results in 13,832 and 11,677 local labor markets for workers and managers, respectively.

We use the municipality or *concelho* administrative division as the benchmark geographic unit, which splits the country into 278 areas of an average of 320 square kilometers. We use the 2-digit NACE classification of industries as a baseline measure. This includes 78 different economic sectors such as *Manufacture of food products* or *Accommodation and food service activities*. Given that our model does not distinguish between across-industry and across-region mobility, we use these baseline definitions because worker transitions are similar in both cases. In particular, the unconditional across-municipality and across-industry annual transition probabilities are 9.8 percent.

Regarding the occupational definition, the Portuguese law obliges firms to assign their workers to an occupational category based on tasks performed and skills required so that each category considers the level of the worker within the firm’s hierarchy in terms of increasing responsibility and task complexity. We follow a hierarchical classification similar to Caliendo et al. (2020). In particular, we partition professional categories into two layers. We assign top executives, intermediary executives, supervisors, and team leaders to the management layer. In addition, we assign higher-skilled professionals, skilled professionals, skilled professionals, semi-skilled professionals, and non-skilled professionals to the bottom layer. To distinguish between managers and other occupations, the critical difference is that managers are responsible for the organizational policies of the firm and their adaptation, which require

Table B.1: Summary Statistics at the Establishment Level

	Mean	P10	P25	P50	P75	P90
<b>Production Workers</b>						
Monthly Wage	718	518	588	756	1,082	2,159
<b>Managers</b>						
Monthly Wage	1,698	937	1,346	2,059	3,065	6,441
Span of Control	8	1	3	8	17	70

Source: Elaboration based on Quadros de Pessoal.

Note: The Table reports the mean, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile of the individual distribution of wages for managers and non-managers. Wages are base wages (excluding supplementary payments) expressed in full-time equivalent units. In addition, it reports the same distributional moments for the span of control, which we define as the ratio of non-managers to managers within an establishment.

a high degree of qualification in terms of direction, guidance, and coordination of the firm fundamental activities.<sup>11</sup>

### B.3 Summary Statistics

Our classification of occupations implies that 19 percent of workers are managers, while the remaining 81 percent are production workers. Table B.1 reports summary statistics of the wage distribution for each occupation. Along the distribution, managers earn higher wages than production workers, and this gap particularly widens for high-paid workers. Managers earn around twice as much in the bottom quartile as production workers. In the top quartile, managers earn nearly three times as much as production workers.

This wage gap arises even though about two-thirds of managers are not top executives but supervisors, team leaders, or intermediary executives (see Table A.2). We measure the number of workers a manager has under his charge (the span of control) with the ratio of

<sup>11</sup>See Table A.1 for further information about the categories of the occupational classification, which is based on *Decreto-Lei n.º 121/78 de 2 de Junho, Ministério do Trabalho*.

non-managers to managers in each establishment. In half of the establishments, managers have a span of control lower than eight workers, and only one-fourth of establishments have managers with a span of control greater than seventeen workers. These results highlight that most establishments assign a small span of control to their managers.

To sum up, we find substantial wage dispersion between managers and production workers. The literature on income inequality mainly attributes wage differences between groups to productivity-enhancing forces such as skill-biased technologies (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Autor, 2014), task-biased technologies (David et al., 2006), and trade specialization (Chetverikov et al., 2016). In this paper, we explore an additional force behind the wage dispersion between these occupations: heterogeneity in market competition.

## B.4 Measuring Market Payroll Concentration

Our baseline measure of market concentration is the HHI. Given the employment  $n_{ijo}$  and wage  $w_{ijo}$  level at firm  $i$  in a local labor market  $j$  for occupation  $o$ , we define the HHI in the market as:

$$\text{HHI}_{jo} := \sum_{i=1}^{M_{jo}} s_{ijo}^2 = \frac{1}{M_{jo}} + \sum_{i=1}^{M_{jo}} \left( s_{ijo} - \frac{1}{M_{jo}} \right)^2, \quad (20)$$

$$s_{ijo} := \frac{w_{ijo}n_{ijo}}{\sum_{i=1}^{M_{jo}} w_{ijo}n_{ijo}}. \quad (21)$$

Here,  $M_{jo}$  is the number of establishments in market  $j$  that hire workers in occupation  $o$ , and  $s_{ijo}$  stands for the payroll share of the firm  $i$ . The HHI equals the average payroll market share weighted by the payroll share itself. The index ranges from  $\frac{1}{M}$  to 1, where a low value reflects low concentration or many firms having similar payroll shares. Note that this index gives more weight to larger establishments, especially penalizing markets where a few firms have a large share of the market payroll. The rightmost equality of Equation (20) shows that the HHI has an economically meaningful decomposition into two concentration sources. The first element involves the *number of establishments* in each market. All else being constant, increasing the number of establishments lowers the average establishment size in the market.

The second element entails the *dispersion level of payroll shares* across establishments relative to the case in which they hold identical shares. All else being constant, increasing the dispersion in payroll shares leads to greater payroll concentration.

## C Appendix: Derivations

### C.1 Labor Supply

#### Microfoundations of the Nested CES Labor Supply

Closely following [Berger et al. \(2022\)](#), we provide a microfoundation of the labor supply curves in Equation (7). In particular, we show that this specification arises from a model in which individuals have heterogeneous idiosyncratic preferences for firms.

Consider a unit measure of ex-ante identical individuals indexed by  $l \in [0, 1]$  and a finite set of  $J$  local labor markets each populated by  $M_j$  firms. Suppose that workers derive utility according to the following specification:

$$U_{lij} = \log w_{ij} - \log y_{lij} + \log B_j + \zeta_{lij},$$

where  $\zeta_{lij}$  is the idiosyncratic amenity that agent  $l$  derives from working at firm  $ij$ ,  $w_{ij}$  stands for the wage that the agent earns by working  $h_{lij}$  hours at firm  $ij$ , the parameter  $B_j$  represents an amenity from working in market  $j$ , and  $y_{lij} = w_{ij}h_{lij}$  represents earnings. Given a parameter  $\theta > 0$ , the following utility function represents the same preferences:

$$\tilde{U}_{lij} = (1 + \theta)U_{lij} = (1 + \theta)(\log w_{ij} - \log y_{lij} + \log B_j) + \tilde{\zeta}_{lij},$$

where the idiosyncratic amenity  $\tilde{\zeta}_{lij}$  is distributed according to a multi-variate Gumbel distribution:

$$F(\tilde{\zeta}_{i1}, \dots, \tilde{\zeta}_{iJ}) = \exp \left[ - \sum_{j=1}^J \left( \sum_{i=1}^{M_j} e^{-\frac{\tilde{\zeta}_{ij}}{\rho}} \right)^\rho \right] = \exp \left[ - \sum_{j=1}^J \left( \sum_{i=1}^{M_j} e^{-(1+\eta)\zeta_{ij}} \right)^{\frac{1+\theta}{1+\eta}} \right],$$

$$\rho = \frac{1 + \theta}{1 + \eta}.$$



The parameter  $\rho$  is a function of the correlation between the idiosyncratic amenities within each market  $j$ . Since the joint distribution of idiosyncratic amenities is a Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) distribution, then the probability that a worker  $l$  chooses firm  $ij$  has a closed-form solution equal to:<sup>12</sup>

$$\pi_{ij} = \underbrace{\frac{w_{ij}^{1+\eta}}{\sum_{i \in j} w_{ij}^{1+\eta}}}_{\text{Prob. worker chooses } i|j} \cdot \frac{\left[ \sum_{i \in j} (B_j w_{ij})^{1+\eta} \right]^{\frac{1+\theta}{1+\eta}}}{\underbrace{\sum_{j=1}^J \left[ \sum_{i \in j} (B_j w_{ij})^{1+\eta} \right]^{\frac{1+\theta}{1+\eta}}}_{\text{Prob. worker chooses } j}}.$$

Using the previous equation, we derive the firm-level labor supply:

$$\begin{aligned} n_{ij} &= \int_0^1 \pi_{ij} h_{lij} dF(y_l) = \frac{w_{ij}^\eta}{\sum_{i \in j} w_{ij}^{1+\eta}} \cdot \frac{\left[ \sum_{i \in j} (B_j w_{ij})^{1+\eta} \right]^{\frac{1+\theta}{1+\eta}}}{\sum_{j=1}^J \left[ \sum_{i \in j} (B_j w_{ij})^{1+\eta} \right]^{\frac{1+\theta}{1+\eta}}} \cdot \underbrace{\int_0^1 w_{ij} h_{lij} dF(y_l)}_{=Y}, \\ \Rightarrow n_{ij} &= \frac{w_{ij}^\eta}{\sum_{i \in j} w_{ij}^{1+\eta}} \cdot \frac{\left[ \sum_{i \in j} (B_j w_{ij})^{1+\eta} \right]^{\frac{1+\theta}{1+\eta}}}{\sum_{j=1}^J \left[ \sum_{i \in j} (B_j w_{ij})^{1+\eta} \right]^{\frac{1+\theta}{1+\eta}}} \cdot Y. \end{aligned}$$

To derive the expression of Equation (7), we first define the following wage and employment indexes:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{w}_j &= \left[ \sum_{i \in j} w_{ij}^{1+\eta} \right]^{\frac{1}{1+\eta}}, & \mathbf{n}_j &= \left[ \sum_{i \in j} n_{ij}^{\frac{1+\eta}{\eta}} \right]^{\frac{\eta}{1+\eta}}, \\ \mathbf{W} &= \left[ \sum_{j=1}^J (B_j \mathbf{w}_j)^{1+\theta} \right]^{\frac{1}{1+\theta}}, & \mathbf{N} &= \left[ \sum_{j=1}^J \left( \frac{\mathbf{n}_j}{B_j} \right)^{\frac{1+\theta}{\theta}} \right]^{\frac{\theta}{1+\theta}}. \end{aligned}$$

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<sup>12</sup>For a comprehensive guide to additive random utility and nested models, see Chapter 15 in [Cameron and Trivedi \(2005\)](#).

Using these definitions and the previous labor supply curve, we show that  $\mathbf{w}_j \mathbf{n}_j = \sum_{i \in j} w_{ij} n_{ij}$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
\sum_{i \in j} w_{ij} n_{ij} &= \frac{\left[ \sum_{i \in j} (B_j w_{ij})^{1+\eta} \right]^{\frac{1+\theta}{1+\eta}}}{\sum_{j=1}^J \left[ \sum_{i \in j} (B_j w_{ij})^{1+\eta} \right]^{\frac{1+\theta}{1+\eta}}} \cdot Y, \\
&= \underbrace{\left[ \sum_{i \in j} w_{ij}^{1+\eta} \right]^{\frac{1}{1+\eta}} \cdot \frac{\left[ \sum_{i \in j} w_{ij}^{1+\eta} \right]^{\frac{\eta}{1+\eta}}}{\sum_{i \in j} w_{ij}^{1+\eta}}}_{=1} \cdot \frac{\left[ \sum_{i \in j} (B_j w_{ij})^{1+\eta} \right]^{\frac{1+\theta}{1+\eta}}}{\sum_{j=1}^J \left[ \sum_{i \in j} (B_j w_{ij})^{1+\eta} \right]^{\frac{1+\theta}{1+\eta}}} \cdot Y, \\
&= \left[ \sum_{i \in j} w_{ij}^{1+\eta} \right]^{\frac{1}{1+\eta}} \cdot \left[ \frac{\sum_{i \in j} w_{ij}^{1+\eta}}{\left[ \sum_{i \in j} w_{ij}^{1+\eta} \right]^{\frac{1+\eta}{\eta}}} \cdot \frac{\left[ \sum_{i \in j} (B_j w_{ij})^{1+\eta} \right]^{\frac{1+\theta}{\eta}}}{\left( \sum_{j=1}^J \left[ \sum_{i \in j} (B_j w_{ij})^{1+\eta} \right]^{\frac{1+\theta}{1+\eta}} \right)^{\frac{1+\eta}{\eta}}} \cdot Y^{\frac{1+\eta}{\eta}} \right]^{\frac{\eta}{1+\eta}}, \\
&= \left[ \sum_{i \in j} w_{ij}^{1+\eta} \right]^{\frac{1}{1+\eta}} \cdot \left[ \sum_{i \in j} \left( \frac{w_{ij}^{\eta}}{\sum_{i \in j} w_{ij}^{1+\eta}} \cdot \frac{\left[ \sum_{i \in j} (B_j w_{ij})^{1+\eta} \right]^{\frac{1+\theta}{1+\eta}}}{\sum_{j=1}^J \left[ \sum_{i \in j} (B_j w_{ij})^{1+\eta} \right]^{\frac{1+\theta}{1+\eta}}} \cdot Y \right)^{\frac{1+\eta}{\eta}} \right]^{\frac{\eta}{1+\eta}}, \\
&= \mathbf{w}_j \mathbf{n}_j.
\end{aligned}$$

Next, we define  $\tilde{w}_{ij} := B_j w_{ij}$  and show that  $Y := \sum_j \mathbf{w}_j \mathbf{n}_j = \mathbf{W} \mathbf{N}$

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{W} \mathbf{N} &= \left[ \sum_{j=1}^J (B_j \mathbf{w}_j)^{1+\theta} \right]^{\frac{1}{1+\theta}} \cdot \left[ \sum_{j=1}^J \left( \frac{\mathbf{n}_j}{B_j} \right)^{\frac{1+\theta}{\theta}} \right]^{\frac{\theta}{1+\theta}}, \\
&= \left[ \sum_{j=1}^J B_j^{1+\theta} \underbrace{\left( \sum_{i \in j} w_{ij}^{1+\eta} \right)^{\frac{1+\theta}{1+\eta}}}_{=\mathbf{w}_j^{1+\theta}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1+\theta}} \cdot \underbrace{\left[ \sum_{j=1}^J \left( \frac{1}{B_j} \cdot \frac{1}{\left[ \sum_{i \in j} w_{ij}^{1+\eta} \right]^{\frac{1}{1+\eta}}} \cdot \frac{\left[ \sum_{i \in j} \tilde{w}_{ij}^{1+\eta} \right]^{\frac{1+\theta}{1+\eta}}}{\sum_{j=1}^J \left[ \sum_{i \in j} \tilde{w}_{ij}^{1+\eta} \right]^{\frac{1+\theta}{1+\eta}}} \cdot Y \right)^{\frac{1+\theta}{\theta}} \right]^{\frac{\theta}{1+\theta}}}_{=\mathbf{n}_j}, \\
&= \frac{\left[ \sum_{j=1}^J \left( \sum_{i \in j} \tilde{w}_{ij}^{1+\eta} \right)^{\frac{1+\theta}{1+\eta}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1+\theta}} \cdot \left[ \sum_{j=1}^J \left( \sum_{i \in j} \tilde{w}_{ij}^{1+\eta} \right)^{\frac{1+\theta}{1+\eta}} \right]^{\frac{\theta}{1+\theta}}}{\sum_{j=1}^J \left( \sum_{i \in j} \tilde{w}_{ij}^{1+\eta} \right)^{\frac{1+\theta}{1+\eta}}} \cdot Y, \\
&= Y := \sum_j \mathbf{w}_j \mathbf{n}_j.
\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, plugging the aforementioned two expressions into the firms' labor supply equation

yields the final expression in Equation (7):

$$\begin{aligned}
n_{ij} &= \frac{w_{ij}^\eta}{\sum_{i \in j} w_{ij}^{1+\eta}} \cdot \frac{\left[ \sum_{i \in j} (B_j w_{ij})^{1+\eta} \right]^{\frac{1+\theta}{1+\eta}}}{\sum_{j=1}^J \left[ \sum_{i \in j} (B_j w_{ij})^{1+\eta} \right]^{\frac{1+\theta}{1+\eta}}} \cdot \mathbf{W} \mathbf{N}, \\
&= \frac{w_{ij}^\eta}{\mathbf{w}_j^{1+\eta}} \cdot \frac{B_j^{1+\theta} \mathbf{w}_j^{1+\theta}}{\sum_{j=1}^J B_j^{1+\theta} \mathbf{w}_j^{1+\theta}} \cdot \mathbf{W} \mathbf{N}, \\
&= \left( \frac{w_{ij}}{\mathbf{w}_j} \right)^\eta \cdot \frac{B_j^{1+\theta} \mathbf{w}_j^\theta}{\mathbf{W}^{1+\theta}} \cdot \mathbf{W} \mathbf{N}, \\
\Rightarrow n_{ij} &= B_j^{1+\theta} \cdot \left( \frac{w_{ij}}{\mathbf{w}_j} \right)^\eta \cdot \left( \frac{\mathbf{w}_j}{\mathbf{W}} \right)^\theta \cdot \mathbf{N}.
\end{aligned}$$

To get the expression for the inverse labor supply curve, we first need to compute the market-level supply curve:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{n}_j &= \left[ \sum_{i \in j} n_{ij}^{\frac{1+\eta}{\eta}} \right]^{\frac{\eta}{1+\eta}}, \\
&= \left[ \sum_{i \in j} \left( \left( \frac{w_{ij}}{\mathbf{w}_j} \right)^\eta \cdot \left( \frac{\mathbf{w}_j}{\mathbf{W}} \right)^\theta \cdot B_j^{1+\theta} \cdot \mathbf{N} \right)^{\frac{1+\eta}{\eta}} \right]^{\frac{\eta}{1+\eta}}, \\
&= \left[ \sum_{i \in j} w_{ij}^{1+\eta} \right]^{\frac{\eta}{1+\eta}} \cdot \frac{\mathbf{w}_j^\theta}{\mathbf{w}_j^\eta \mathbf{W}^\theta} \cdot \mathbf{N} B_j^{1+\theta}, \\
\Rightarrow \mathbf{n}_j &= \left( \frac{\mathbf{w}_j}{\mathbf{W}} \right)^\theta \cdot \mathbf{N} B_j^{1+\theta}.
\end{aligned}$$

Then, we rearrange the market-level and the firms' labor supply curves:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{w}_j &= \left( \frac{\mathbf{n}_j}{\mathbf{N}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \cdot \frac{\mathbf{W}}{B_j^{\frac{1+\theta}{\theta}}}, \\
w_{ij} &= \left( \frac{n_{ij}}{\mathbf{n}_j} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} \cdot \mathbf{w}_j.
\end{aligned}$$

Lastly, plugging the inverse market-level supply curve into the inverse labor supply curve yields the final expression in Equation (7):

$$w_{ij} = \frac{1}{B_j^{\frac{1+\theta}{\theta}}} \cdot \left( \frac{n_{ij}}{\mathbf{n}_j} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} \cdot \left( \frac{\mathbf{n}_j}{\mathbf{N}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \cdot \mathbf{W}.$$

## Solving the Household Problem

This section solves the household problem of Section 3. Each household type  $o \in \{w, m\}$  choose consumption  $\{c_{ijo}\}$  and the amount of labor supply  $\{n_{ijo}\}$  to each firm to maximize their utility, taking as given wages:

$$\mathcal{U}_o = \max_{n_{ijo}, c_{ijo}} \quad \mathbf{C}_o - \phi_o \frac{\mathbf{N}_o^{1+\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{1+\frac{1}{\gamma}},$$

subject to the household's budget constraint.<sup>13</sup>

$$\mathbf{C}_o = \int_0^1 \sum_{i=1}^{M_j} w_{ijo} n_{ijo} dj,$$

where we define the aggregate consumption and labor supply indexes as

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{C}_o &:= \int_0^1 \sum_{i=1}^{M_j} c_{ijo} dj \\ \mathbf{N}_o &:= \left[ \int_0^1 \left( \frac{\mathbf{n}_{jo}}{B_{jo}} \right)^{\frac{\theta_o+1}{\theta_o}} dj \right]^{\frac{\theta_o}{\theta_o+1}} \quad \mathbf{n}_{jo} := \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{M_j} n_{ijo}^{\frac{\eta_o+1}{\eta_o}} \right]^{\frac{\eta_o}{\eta_o+1}}, \quad \eta_o > \theta_o > 0. \end{aligned}$$

The Lagrangian of this maximization problem is:

$$\mathcal{L}(\{c_{ijo}\}, \{n_{ijo}\}, \lambda) = U_o(\{c_{ijo}\}, \{n_{ijo}\}) + \lambda \left( \int_0^1 \sum_{i=1}^{M_j} w_{ijo} n_{ijo} dj - \mathbf{C}_o \right).$$

The first-order conditions associated with this problem are:

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial c_{ijo}} = 0 \iff \lambda = \frac{\partial U_o}{\partial \mathbf{C}_o} \cdot \frac{\partial \mathbf{C}_o}{\partial c_{ijo}} \iff \lambda = 1 \quad \forall ijo, \quad (\text{C.1})$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial n_{ijo}} = 0 \iff \lambda w_{ijo} = \frac{\partial U_o}{\partial \mathbf{N}_o} \cdot \frac{\partial \mathbf{N}_o}{\partial \mathbf{n}_{jo}} \cdot \frac{\partial \mathbf{n}_{jo}}{\partial n_{ijo}} \quad \forall ijo. \quad (\text{C.2})$$

Substituting Equation (C.1) into Equation (C.2) implies:

$$w_{ijo} = - \frac{\partial U_o}{\partial \mathbf{N}_o} \cdot \frac{\partial \mathbf{N}_o}{\partial \mathbf{n}_{jo}} \cdot \frac{\partial \mathbf{n}_{jo}}{\partial n_{ijo}}, \quad (\text{C.3})$$

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<sup>13</sup>For simplicity, we omit the non-negativity constraints associated with consumption and labor supply. In the unconstrained solution, we will observe that such values also satisfy the constrained solution because they are always greater than or equal to zero.

where each component of the last equation is equal to:

$$-\frac{\partial U_o}{\partial \mathbf{N}_o} = \phi_o \mathbf{N}_o^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}, \quad (\text{C.4})$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathbf{N}_o}{\partial \mathbf{n}_{jo}} = \left( \frac{\mathbf{n}_{jo}}{\mathbf{N}_o} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \cdot \frac{1}{B_j^{\frac{1+\theta}{\theta}}}, \quad (\text{C.5})$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathbf{n}_{jo}}{\partial n_{ijo}} = \left( \frac{n_{ijo}}{\mathbf{n}_{jo}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}}. \quad (\text{C.6})$$

Therefore, plugging the previous expressions into Equation (C.3):

$$w_{ijo} = \left( \frac{n_{ijo}}{\mathbf{n}_{jo}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} \cdot \left( \frac{\mathbf{n}_{jo}}{\mathbf{N}_o} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \cdot \frac{1}{B_j^{\frac{1+\theta}{\theta}}} \cdot \left( -\frac{\partial U_o}{\partial \mathbf{N}_o} \right). \quad (\text{C.7})$$

To get the final expression of the firms' labor supply curve, we need to show that under optimality the aggregate wage is equal to the marginal disutility of aggregate labor supply.

First, we define the market and aggregate wage indexes as follows:

$$\mathbf{w}_{jo} = \left[ \sum_{i \in j} w_{ij}^\eta \right]^{\frac{1}{1+\eta}}, \quad (\text{C.8})$$

$$\mathbf{W}_o = \left[ \sum_{j=1}^J \left( B_j \mathbf{w}_j \right)^{1+\theta} \right]^{\frac{1}{1+\theta}}. \quad (\text{C.9})$$

Substituting Equation (C.7) into Equation (C.8) implies:

$$\mathbf{w}_{jo} = \left( \frac{\mathbf{n}_{jo}}{\mathbf{N}_o} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \cdot \frac{1}{B_j^{\frac{1+\theta}{\theta}}} \cdot \left( -\frac{\partial U_o}{\partial \mathbf{N}_o} \right). \quad (\text{C.10})$$

Then, substituting the last equation into Equation (C.9) yields the desired result:

$$\mathbf{W}_o = -\frac{\partial U_o}{\partial \mathbf{N}_o}. \quad (\text{C.11})$$

Moreover, we derive the expression for the aggregate labor supply disutility in Equation (6) by plugging Equation (C.4) into Equation (C.11) and rearranging:

$$\mathbf{N}_o = \left( \frac{\mathbf{W}_o}{\phi_o} \right)^\gamma.$$

Finally, we get the final expression for the firms' labor supply curve. Note that Equation (C.7) and Equation (C.11) imply the inverse firms' labor supply curve in Equation (7):

$$w_{ijo} = \frac{1}{B_j^{\frac{1+\theta}{\theta}}} \cdot \left( \frac{n_{ijo}}{\mathbf{n}_{jo}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} \cdot \left( \frac{\mathbf{n}_{jo}}{\mathbf{N}_o} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \cdot \mathbf{W}_o.$$

Moreover, substituting Equation (C.11) into Equation (C.10) and rearranging imply:

$$\mathbf{n}_j = \left( \frac{\mathbf{w}_j}{\mathbf{W}} \right)^\theta \cdot \mathbf{N} B_j^{1+\theta},$$

and substituting Equation (C.10) into Equation (C.7) and rearranging imply:

$$n_{ijo} = \left( \frac{w_{ijo}}{\mathbf{w}_j} \right)^\eta \cdot \mathbf{n}_j.$$

Hence, using the last two equations yields the expression for the firms' labor supply curve in Equation (7):

$$n_{ij} = B_j^{1+\theta} \cdot \left( \frac{w_{ij}}{\mathbf{w}_j} \right)^\eta \cdot \left( \frac{\mathbf{w}_j}{\mathbf{W}} \right)^\theta \cdot \mathbf{N}.$$

## C.2 Labor Demand

This section solves the firm problem of Section (3) for single-layer firms. Since we solve the organizational problem of choosing the number of layers numerically, we proceed to analytically solve the profit maximization problem subsequent to adopting the organizational structure. Moreover, we omit the problem for multi-layer firms for illustrative purposes, as the additional complexity added by this problem compared to the problem of single-layer firms only involves an expanded set of scenarios to analyze.

When firms adopt a single-layer structure, they also choose the measure of production workers  $n_{ijw}$  to maximize profits, given the employment policies of their local competitors,  $n_{-ijw}^*$ . In particular, they solve:

$$\pi(z, 1) = \max_{n_{ijw}} y(z, 1) - w_{ijw} (n_{ijw}, n_{-ijw}^*, \mathbf{N}_w, \mathbf{W}_w) n_{ijw},$$

subject to the inverse labor supply curve of production workers and minimum wages:

$$w_{ijw} (n_{ijw}, n_{-ijw}^*, \mathbf{N}_w, \mathbf{W}_w) = \left( \frac{1}{B_{jw}} \right)^{\frac{1+\theta_o}{\theta_o}} \left( \frac{n_{ijw}}{\mathbf{n}_{jw}(n_{ijw}, n_{-ijw}^*)} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta_w}} \left( \frac{\mathbf{n}_{jw}(n_{ijw}, n_{-ijw}^*)}{\mathbf{N}_w} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta_w}} \mathbf{W}_w,$$

$$\mathbf{n}_{jw}(n_{ijw}, n_{-ijw}^*) = \left[ n_{ijw}^{\frac{1+\eta_w}{\eta_w}} + \sum_{k \neq i} n_{kjw}^* \frac{1+\eta_w}{\eta_w} \right]^{\frac{\eta_w}{1+\eta_w}},$$

$$w_{ijw} \geq \underline{w}$$

The associated Lagrangian function is:

$$\mathcal{L}(n_{ijw}, \mu) = y(z, 1) - w_{ijw}n_{ijw} + \nu \cdot (w_{ijw} - \underline{w}).$$

To ease notation, we omit that the following conditions hold when employment is optimal and that the firm internalizes an inverse labor supply that is a function of the labor supply of all competitors within the market. The system of Kuhn-Tucker conditions is given by:

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial n_{ijw}} = 0 \iff \frac{\partial y(z, 1)}{\partial n_{ijw}} + \nu = \frac{\partial w_{ijw}}{\partial n_{ijw}} \cdot n_{ijw} + w_{ijw}, \quad (\text{C.12})$$

$$\nu \cdot (w_{ijw} - \underline{w}) = 0, \quad (\text{C.13})$$

$$\nu \geq 0, \quad (\text{C.14})$$

$$w_{ijw} = \max \left( \underline{w}, \underbrace{\left( \frac{1}{B_{jw}} \right)^{\frac{1+\theta_o}{\theta_o}} \left( \frac{n_{ijw}}{\mathbf{n}_{jw}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta_w}} \left( \frac{\mathbf{n}_{jw}}{\mathbf{N}_w} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta_w}} \mathbf{W}_w}_{=\tilde{w}_{ijw} \text{ , i.e., unconstrained labor supply curve}} \right), \quad (\text{C.15})$$

$$\mathbf{n}_{jw} = \left[ n_{ijw}^{\frac{1+\eta_w}{\eta_w}} + \sum_{k \neq i} n_{kjw}^* \frac{1+\eta_w}{\eta_w} \right]^{\frac{\eta_w}{1+\eta_w}}. \quad (\text{C.16})$$

To solve the maximization problem, we break the problem into three different cases.

*Case I: The minimum wage is not binding.* Suppose the case when the minimum wage is not binding  $w_{ijw}^* > \underline{w}$ . Then, Equation (C.13) implies that  $\nu = 0$ , and Equation (C.12) is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \left. \frac{\partial y(z, 1)}{\partial n_{ijw}} \right|_{n_{ijw}^*} &= n_{ijw}^* \cdot \left. \frac{\partial w_{ijw}}{\partial n_{ijw}} \right|_{n_{ijw}^*} + w_{ijw}^*, \\ \left. \frac{\partial y(z, 1)}{\partial n_{ijw}} \right|_{n_{ijw}^*} &= \frac{w_{ijw}^*}{\varepsilon_{ijw}^*} + w_{ijw}^*, \\ \Rightarrow w_{ijw}^* &= \mu_{ijw}^* \cdot \left. \frac{\partial y(z, 1)}{\partial n_{ijw}} \right|_{n_{ijw}^*}. \end{aligned}$$

where  $\varepsilon_{ijw}$  is the structural elasticity of labor supply and  $\mu_{ijw}$  represents the wage markdown:

$$\begin{aligned} \varepsilon_{ijw} &= \left[ \frac{\partial \log w_{ijw}}{\partial \log n_{ijw}} \right]^{-1}, \\ \mu_{ijw} &= \frac{\varepsilon_{ijw}}{\varepsilon_{ijw} + 1} \in [0, 1]. \end{aligned}$$

In Appendix C.3 we show that the structural elasticity of labor supply has a closed-form solution given by:

$$\varepsilon_{ijo}(s_{ijo}) = \left[ \frac{1}{\eta_o} + \left( \frac{1}{\theta_o} - \frac{1}{\eta_o} \right) \frac{\partial \log \mathbf{n}_{jo}}{\partial \log n_{ijo}} \right]^{-1} = \left[ \frac{1}{\eta_o} + \left( \frac{1}{\theta_o} - \frac{1}{\eta_o} \right) s_{ijo} \right]^{-1}, \quad (\text{C.17})$$

where  $s_{ijo}$  is the payroll share of firm  $i$  in market  $j$ :

$$s_{ijo} := \frac{w_{ijo} n_{ijo}}{\sum_{i \in j} w_{ijo} n_{ijo}}. \quad (\text{C.18})$$

*Case II: The minimum wage is binding, and labor supply equals labor demand.* Suppose the case when the minimum wage is binding  $w_{ijw}^* = \underline{w}$  and labor supply equals labor demand, that is, Equation (C.15) satisfies:

$$w_{ijw}^* = \underline{w} = \left( \frac{1}{B_{jw}} \right)^{\frac{1+\theta_o}{\theta_o}} \left( \frac{n_{ijw}^*}{\mathbf{n}_{jw}^*} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta_w}} \left( \frac{\mathbf{n}_{jw}^*}{\mathbf{N}_w} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta_w}} \mathbf{W}_w \quad (\text{C.19})$$

Then, the optimal level of employment is given by Equation (C.19). Moreover, the Lagrange multiplier associated with the inequality constraint may not be binding, i.e.,  $\nu \geq 0$ . Thus, Equation (C.12) implies that the marginal revenue must be smaller or equal than the marginal cost. In contrast, the marginal revenue must be greater or equal than the minimum wage. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose  $\underline{w} > \text{mrpl}(n_{ijw}^*)$ . Since the unconstrained labor supply curve is strictly increasing in labor, then Equation (C.15) implies that  $w(n_{ijw}) = \underline{w} \quad \forall n_{ijw} < n_{ijw}^*$ . Thus, the marginal cost is also equal to the minimum wage within this employment range:  $\text{mc}(n_{ijw}) = \underline{w} \quad \forall n_{ijw} < n_{ijw}^*$ . Moreover, since the marginal revenue of labor is strictly decreasing in labor units, then there exists a threshold  $n'_{ijw} < n_{ijw}^*$  for which  $\text{mrpl}(n'_{ijw}) = \underline{w}$  and  $\text{mrpl}(n_{ijw}) < \underline{w} \quad \forall n_{ijw} \in (n'_{ijw}, n_{ijw}^*]$ . However, this implies that  $n'_{ijw}$  is feasible and more profitable than  $n_{ijw}^*$  because any unit between them yields negative profits, i.e., their marginal cost is higher than their marginal revenue, which contradicts that  $n_{ijw}^*$  is optimal. Hence, it must be the case that  $\underline{w} \leq \text{mrpl}(n_{ijw}^*)$ .



Overall, the previous results imply that:

$$w_{ijw}^* = \underline{w}, \quad (\text{C.20})$$

$$\frac{\partial y(z, 1)}{\partial n_{ijw}} \Big|_{n_{ijw}^*} \leq \frac{\partial w_{ijw}}{\partial n_{ijw}} \Big|_{n_{ijw}^*} + \underline{w}, \quad (\text{C.21})$$

$$\frac{\partial y(z, 1)}{\partial n_{ijw}} \Big|_{n_{ijw}^*} \geq \underline{w}. \quad (\text{C.22})$$

Here, the markdown does not have a closed-form solution but is given by:

$$\mu_{ijw} = \frac{\underline{w}}{\frac{\partial y(z, 1)}{\partial n_{ijw}} \Big|_{n_{ijw}^*}} \in [0, 1]. \quad (\text{C.23})$$

*Case III: The minimum wage is binding, and labor supply exceeds labor demand.* Suppose the case when the minimum wage is binding  $w_{ijw}^* = \underline{w}$  and labor supply excess labor demand, that is, Equation (C.15) satisfies:

$$w_{ijw}^* = \underline{w} > \left( \frac{1}{B_{jw}} \right)^{\frac{1+\theta_o}{\theta_o}} \left( \frac{n_{ijw}^*}{\mathbf{n}_{jw}^*} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta_w}} \left( \frac{\mathbf{n}_{jw}^*}{\mathbf{N}_w} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta_w}} \mathbf{W}_w. \quad (\text{C.24})$$

Next, we note that the previous fact implies that the marginal cost of an additional hire is the minimum wage. Graphically, the wage function is flat in a neighborhood of the optimal labor choice  $n_{ijw}^*$ , as displayed in Figure A.3. To prove it mathematically, we also rely on the fact that the unconstrained labor supply curve is strictly increasing in labor. Thus,  $\tilde{w}_{ijw}(\tilde{n}_{ijw}) = \underline{w}$  for  $\tilde{n}_{ijw} > n_{ijw}^*$ . Then, there exists  $\bar{\varepsilon} > 0$  such that  $\varepsilon \in [0, \bar{\varepsilon}]$  and  $n'_{ijw} = n_{ijw}^* + \varepsilon < \tilde{n}_{ijw}$  for which  $w_{ijw}^*(n'_{ijw}) = \underline{w}$ . As a result,  $\frac{\partial w_{ijw}}{\partial n_{ijw}} = 0$ .

Moreover, this case also implies that  $\nu = 0$ . We prove this by contradiction. Suppose  $\nu > 0$ , then Equation (C.12) implies that  $\frac{\partial y(z, 1)}{\partial n_{ijw}} \Big|_{n_{ijw}^*} < \underline{w}$ . Since we assume that the marginal productivity is strictly decreasing in labor, there exists  $\varepsilon > 0$  such that  $n''_{ijw} = n_{ijw}^* - \varepsilon$  and  $\frac{\partial y(z, 1)}{\partial n_{ijw}} \Big|_{n''_{ijw}} = \underline{w} > \frac{\partial y(z, 1)}{\partial n_{ijw}} \Big|_{n_{ijw}^*}$ . Then, choosing  $n''_{ijw}$  and paying them  $\underline{w}$  is feasible and more profitable because it raises revenue while keeping costs fixed. This is a contradiction because  $n_{ijw}^*$  is optimal. Hence, it must be  $\nu = 0$ .

Therefore, the aforementioned two results and Equation (C.12) imply that labor demand satisfies:

$$w_{ijw}^* = \underline{w} = \frac{\partial y(z, 1)}{\partial n_{ijw}} \Big|_{n_{ijw}^*}, \quad \mu_{ijw} = 1. \quad (\text{C.25})$$

Where the markdown equals one by definition.

### C.3 Structural Elasticity of Labor Supply

To show that the structural elasticity has a closed-form solution, consider the log transformation of the inverse labor supply curve in Equation (7):

$$\log\left(w(n_{ijo}, n_{-ijo}^*, \mathbf{W}_o, \mathbf{N}_o)\right) = \frac{1}{\eta_o} \log(n_{ijo}) + \left(\frac{1}{\theta_o} - \frac{1}{\eta_o}\right) \log(\mathbf{n}_{jo}) - \frac{1}{\theta_o} \log(\mathbf{N}_o) + \log(\mathbf{W}_o) - \frac{1 + \theta_o}{\theta_o} \log(B_{jo}).$$

Thus,

$$\frac{\partial \log\left(w(n_{ijo}, n_{-ijo}^*, \mathbf{W}_o, \mathbf{N}_o)\right)}{\partial \log(n_{ijo})} = \frac{1}{\eta_o} - \left(\frac{1}{\theta_o} - \frac{1}{\eta_o}\right) \frac{\partial \log(\mathbf{n}_{jo})}{\partial \log(n_{ijo})}.$$

Note that the derivative of the economy-wide variables with respect to the firm's employment is zero because firms are atomistic with respect to the economy. Moreover, the definition of the market labor supply disutility index implies that:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \log(\mathbf{n}_{jo})}{\partial \log(n_{ijo})} &= \frac{\partial \mathbf{n}_{jo}}{\partial n_{ijo}} \cdot \frac{n_{ijo}}{\mathbf{n}_{jo}}, \\ &= n_{ijw}^{\frac{1+\eta_o}{\eta_o}} \cdot \mathbf{n}_{jo}^{-1} \cdot \left(\sum_{i \in j} n_{ijo}^{\frac{\eta_o+1}{\eta_o}}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\eta_o+1}}, \\ &= \left(\frac{n_{ijo}}{\mathbf{n}_{jo}}\right)^{\frac{1+\eta_o}{\eta_o}}. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore,

$$\frac{\partial \log\left(w(n_{ijo}, n_{-ijo}^*, \mathbf{W}_o, \mathbf{N}_o)\right)}{\partial \log(n_{ijo})} = \frac{1}{\eta_o} - \left(\frac{1}{\theta_o} - \frac{1}{\eta_o}\right) \cdot \left(\frac{n_{ijo}}{\mathbf{n}_{jo}}\right)^{\frac{1+\eta_o}{\eta_o}}.$$

Next, we show that the last fraction is equal to the payroll share of the firm  $i$  in market  $j$ .

In particular, defining the payroll share and substituting the inverse labor supply curve:

$$\begin{aligned} s_{ijo} &= \frac{w_{ijo}n_{ijo}}{\sum_{i \in j} w_{ijo}n_{ijo}} = \frac{n_{ijo}^{\frac{1+\eta_o}{\eta_o}}}{\sum_{i \in j} n_{ijo}^{\frac{1+\eta_o}{\eta_o}}}, \\ &= \left( \frac{n_{ijo}}{\mathbf{n}_{jo}} \right)^{\frac{1+\eta_o}{\eta_o}}. \end{aligned}$$

Hence, the structural labor supply elasticity is given by:

$$\varepsilon_{ijo} := \left[ \frac{\partial \log w(n_{ijo}, n_{-ijo}^*, \mathbf{W}_o, \mathbf{N}_o)}{\partial \log n_{ijo}} \right]^{-1} = \left[ \frac{1}{\eta_o} - \left( \frac{1}{\theta_o} - \frac{1}{\eta_o} \right) s_{ijo} \right]^{-1}.$$

We take the concept of "structural" from [Berger et al. \(2022\)](#). The motivation for this concept is twofold. First, it arises from a structural macroeconomic model with firm granularity and strategic interaction in labor demand. In these models, the structural elasticity is the welfare-relevant variable of the model because its distribution determines the distribution of wage markdowns. Second, it is useful to distinguish the concept from the more commonly estimated reduced-form labor supply elasticity. On the one hand, the structural elasticity is the labor supply elasticity faced by a firm that internalizes the employment responses of its competitors within the local labor market. It measures the percent change in the firm's labor supply due to an increase of one percent in the firm's wages, holding its competitors' employment constant. On the other hand, the reduced-form elasticity measures the percent change in the firm's labor supply due to an increase of one percent in the firm's wages. Thus, in our model, this variable includes the effect of the response of the firm's competitors on the firm's own wage. For example, when a firm receives an idiosyncratic positive shock and increases labor demand, Cournot competition implies that the firm's competitors best respond by decreasing labor demand, which also leads the shocked firm to best respond and increase its quantity of labor demand and so on.

## D Appendix: Algorithm

The solution of the equilibrium consists of a fixed point in wages. We solve the problem for 20 different firm productivity grids and 1,000 markets. To ease the interpretation of the

algorithm, we first describe the solution of the equilibrium in the absence of minimum wages.

## D.1 Algorithm with No Minimum Wages

The idea of the algorithm is that, whenever a firm faces an excess of labor demand for one occupation, then we smoothly increase its wage. In contrast, we smoothly decrease it whenever it faces an excess of labor supply. Thus, the algorithm always converges as long as the labor supply curve faced by firms is strictly increasing and the marginal revenue is strictly decreasing in employment.

We initialize the algorithm by guessing a vector of wages  $\left\{w_{ijo}^{(0)}\right\}_{\forall ijo}$ . Consider iteration  $k$ :

### 1. Compute labor supply.

Note that firms' wages  $w_{ijo}^{(k)}$  are enough to get  $\mathbf{w}_{jo}^{(k)}$ ,  $\mathbf{W}_o^{(k)}$ , and  $\mathbf{N}_o^{(k)}$  from Equations (6) and (8). Then, we compute the labor supply to each firm  $n_{ijo}^{s,(k)}$  by substituting the previous variables into Equation (7).

### 2. Compute organizational choice.

Market clearing implies that labor supply is equal to labor demand in equilibrium. Thus, labor supply is equal to labor demand at equilibrium wages  $n_{ijo}^{d,(k)} = n_{ijo}^{s,(k)}$ . Then, we use wages  $\left\{w_{ijo}^{(k)}\right\}_{\forall ijo}$  and labor demands  $\left\{n_{ijo}^{d,(k)}\right\}_{\forall ijo}$  to compute the optimal organizational choice  $\ell^{(k)}$  for all firms using the same method that we describe in the previous subsection. Note that wages and employment change when we update the firm's optimal organizational structure, e.g., we set the wage and employment of managers to zero for single-layer firms:  $w_{ijm}^{(k)} = 0$  and  $n_{ijm}^{s,(k)} = n_{ijm}^{d,(k)} = 0$  if  $\ell^{(k)} = 1$ .

### 3. Compute markdowns.

We compute the payroll market share  $s_{ijo}^{(k)}$  using wages  $w_{ijo}^{(k)}$  and labor demand  $n_{ijo}^{d,(k)}$  of all firms in market  $j$ . Then, we compute the firm's structural elasticity  $\varepsilon_{ijo}^{(k)}$  and markdown  $\mu_{ijo}^{(k)}$  from Equations (12)-(13).

### 4. Compute wages from labor demand FOCs.

For each occupation, we use the optimal organization  $\ell^{(k)}$  and labor demand  $n_{ijo}^{d,(k)}$  of each firm to compute its marginal revenue product of labor:

$$\text{mrpl}_{ijo}^{(k)} = \left. \frac{\partial y(z, \ell^{(k)})}{\partial n_{ijo}} \right|_{n_{ijo}^{d,(k)}}.$$

Then, we update the occupation-specific wages of all firms as:

$$w'_{ijo}{}^{(k)} = \begin{cases} \mu_{ijo}^{(k)} \cdot \text{mrpl}_{ijo}^{(k)}, & \text{if } n_{ijo}^{d,(k)} > 0, \\ 0, & \text{if } n_{ijo}^{d,(k)} = 0. \end{cases}$$

## 5. Iteration.

Iterate over (1) to (4) until convergence of wages. Whenever  $\max \left\{ \text{abs}(w_{ijo}^{(k)} - w'_{ijo}{}^{(k)}) \right\} > \text{tol}$ , we update wages with the following criterion:

$$w_{ijo}^{(k+1)} = \rho w_{ijo}^{(k)} + (1 - \rho) w'_{ijo}{}^{(k)} \quad \text{for } \rho \in (0, 1).$$

## D.2 Computing the Optimal Organization Structure

Calculating the maximum profits a firm could earn by opting for the off-equilibrium organizational structure is the main challenge when determining a firm's optimal organizational structure. This is because computing off-equilibrium profits in each iteration would be overly computationally expensive. To address this issue, we proceed as follows.

We start by setting a tolerance level slightly higher than that of the main algorithm. When the distance between the initial and predicted wages exceeds this tolerance, we assign the following off-equilibrium wages and employment to each firm:

- If the firm began the iteration as a multi-layer organization, we use its equilibrium wage and employment levels for production workers to calculate its profits as a single-layer organization.

- If the firm began the iteration as a single-layer organization, we use the equilibrium wage and employment levels for production workers and managers of its nearest competitor to compute the firm's profits as a multi-layer organization. When there exist multi-layer firms within the same market, the nearest competitor is the multi-layer firm in the market located in the closest productivity bin. If there are no multi-layer firms within the same market, we assign economy-wide minimum wage and employment levels for both occupations. Finally, we utilize this information to compute the firms' profits on- and off-equilibrium for each organizational structure and solve the Problem (9).

Next, when the distance between the initial and predicted wages falls below this tolerance, it indicates that the algorithm is close to converging. In such cases, we compute the actual wage and employment levels for each firm's off-equilibrium organizational structure using a numerical solution. Specifically, we calculate off-equilibrium profits by numerically solving Problem (10) for multi-layer firms and Problem (11) for single-layer firms. With this information, along with the optimal profits for firms in equilibrium, we determine the optimal organizational structure as defined in Problem (9). The purpose of this step in the algorithm is to correct any potential misassignments of optimal organizational structures to firms, as we rely on information from their competitors. Given that this step is computationally intensive, we perform it only once. Following a single implementation, we continue with the previous method that utilizes information from competitors until convergence.<sup>14</sup>

After computing the optimal organizational structure, we update wages within the same iteration  $k$ . If the firm is initially multi-layer and we find a deviation that makes being single-layer more profitable, we set managerial wages and employment to zero  $w_{ijm}^{(k)} = 0$  and  $n_{ijm}^{(k)} = 0$ . For production workers, we set their wages and employment to the deviation values  $w_{ijw}^{(k)} = w'$  and  $n_{ijw}^{(k)} = n'$ . If the firm is initially single-layer and we find a deviation that makes being multi-layer more profitable, we set both wages and employment to their

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<sup>14</sup>Furthermore, we note that the algorithm does not improve in terms of correctly solving Problem (9) when we apply more times.

deviation values  $w_{ijo}^{(k)} = w'$  and  $n_{ijo}^{(k)} = n' \forall o \in \{w, m\}$ . Note that the deviation may originate from competitors or the optimal choice, but in either case, it results in higher profitability.

Overall, this numerical solution for the optimal organization structure of firms performs well. After convergence, we observe an optimal deviation from the equilibrium organizational choice for 0.34 percent of firms. This error arises because an optimal deviation implies that only one firm deviates from equilibrium, while its local market competitors maintain constant labor demand. However, in practice, our algorithm solution often implies that more than one firm deviates, for instance, in markets with multiple firms. Therefore, implementing such an optimal deviation for those firms becomes impractical.

### D.3 Algorithm with Minimum Wages

We solve the equilibrium with minimum wages using a shadow wage approach as in [Berger et al. \(2023b\)](#). This approach is useful to deal with non-market-clearing wages and assumes that workers at constrained firms perceive a lower wage whenever there exists an excess of labor supply at the minimum wage. In particular, the shadow or perceived wage is the wage for which the labor supply of the firm equals its labor demand at the minimum wage. This implies that the excess labor supply at the minimum wage is reallocated towards other firms.

We initialize the algorithm by guessing a vector of wages  $\{w_{ijo}^{(0)}\}_{\forall ijo}$  such that the minimum wage is not binding for any of the firms in the first iteration. Thus, we set the initial vector of shadow wages  $\{\tilde{w}_{ijo}^{(0)}\}_{\forall ijo}$  equal to the initial vector of wages. Consider iteration  $k$ :

#### 1. Compute labor supply.

Note that shadow wages are enough to get  $\tilde{\mathbf{w}}_{jo}^{(k)}$ ,  $\tilde{\mathbf{W}}_o^{(k)}$ , and  $\tilde{\mathbf{N}}_o^{(k)}$  from Equations (6) and (8). Then, we compute the labor supply to each firm  $n_{ijo}^{s,(k)}$  by substituting the previous variables into Equation (7).

#### 2. Compute organizational choice.

Using the shadow wage approach implies market clearing even in the presence of

minimum wages. Thus, labor supply is equal to labor demand at the shadow wage  $n_{ijo}^{d,(k)} = n_{ijo}^{s,(k)}$ . Then, we use wages  $\{w_{ijo}^{(k)}\}_{\forall ijo}$  and labor demands  $\{n_{ijo}^{d,(k)}\}_{\forall ijo}$  to compute the optimal organizational choice  $\ell^{(k)}$  for all firms using the same method that we describe in the previous subsection. Note that wages and employment change when we update the firm's optimal organizational structure, e.g., we set the wage and employment of managers to zero for single-layer firms:  $w_{ijm}^{(k)} = 0$  and  $n_{ijm}^{s,(k)} = n_{ijm}^{d,(k)} = 0$  if  $\ell^{(k)} = 1$ .

### 3. Compute markdowns.

For each occupation, we use the optimal organization  $\ell^{(k)}$  and labor demand  $n_{ijo}^{d,(k)}$  of each firm to compute its marginal revenue product of labor  $\text{mrpl}_{ijo}^{(k)} = \frac{\partial y(z, \ell^{(k)})}{\partial n_{ijo}} \Big|_{n_{ijo}^{d,(k)}}$ . Then, we use this marginal product  $\text{mrpl}_{ijo}^{(k)}$  and initial wages  $w_{ijo}^{(k)}$  to compute:

- (a) *Minimum wage is not binding:* Whenever the firm's wage and marginal product are both above the minimum wage, we compute the payroll market share  $s_{ijo}^{(k)}$  using wages  $w_{ijo}^{(k)}$  and labor demand  $n_{ijo}^{d,(k)}$  of all firms in market  $j$ . Then, we compute the firm's structural elasticity  $\varepsilon_{ijo}^{(k)}$  and markdown  $\mu_{ijo}^{(k)}$  from Equations (12)-(13).
- (b) *Minimum wage is binding, and the labor supply equals the labor demand at the minimum wage:* Whenever the minimum wage is binding and the firm's marginal product is above the minimum wage, we compute the firm's markdown from Equation (15).
- (c) *Minimum wage is binding, and the labor supply exceeds the labor demand at the minimum wage:* Whenever the minimum wage is binding and the firm's marginal product is lower than or equal to the minimum wage, we set  $\mu_{ijo}^{(k)} = 1$ .

### 4. Compute wages.



For all firms, we update the occupation-specific wages as:

$$w'_{ijo}{}^{(k)} = \begin{cases} \max\{\underline{w}, \mu_{ijo}^{(k)} \cdot \text{mrpl}_{ijo}^{(k)}\}, & \text{if } n_{ijo}^{(k)} > 0, \\ 0, & \text{if } n_{ijo}^{(k)} = 0. \end{cases}$$

We use these updated wages to construct  $\mathbf{w}'_{jo}{}^{(k)}$  and  $\mathbf{W}'_o{}^{(k)}$  using Equation (8).

## 5. Compute labor demand implied by minimum wages.

Here, we guarantee that the labor demand of constrained firms that face an excess of labor supply at the minimum wage is given by the inverse labor demand evaluated at the minimum wage. Particularly, we use the marginal product of labor  $\text{mrpl}_{ijo}^{(k)}$  and updated wages  $w'_{ijo}{}^{(k)}$  to compute:

- (a) *Minimum wage is not binding:* Whenever the firm's marginal product and wage are both above the minimum wage, the firm's labor demand coincides with the firm's labor supply  $n'_{ijo}{}^{d,(k)} = n_{ijo}^{s,(k)}$ .
- (b) *Minimum wage is binding, and the labor supply equals the labor demand at the minimum wage:* Whenever the minimum wage is binding and the firm's marginal product is above the minimum wage, the firm's labor demand coincides with the firm's labor supply  $n'_{ijo}{}^{d,(k)} = n_{ijo}^{s,(k)}$ .
- (c) *Minimum wage is binding, and the labor supply exceeds the labor demand at the minimum wage:* Whenever the minimum wage is binding and the firm's marginal product is lower than or equal to the minimum wage, we construct the labor demand of the firm from the employment level for which the minimum wage equals the marginal product of labor:

$$\underline{w} = \left. \frac{\partial y(z, \ell^{(k)})}{\partial n_{ijo}} \right|_{n'_{ijo}{}^{d,(k)}}.$$

## 6. Update shadow wages.

The shadow wage is the wage that implies market clearing for all firms. That is, it does

not coincide with the actual wage only for firms that face an excess of labor supply when they pay the minimum wage. We first use the updated employment levels  $n_{ijo}'^{d,(k)}$  to update the market and aggregate employment levels from their definition:

$$\mathbf{n}_{jo}'^{d,(k)} := \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{M_j} \left( n_{ijo}'^{d,(k)} \right)^{\frac{\eta_o+1}{\eta_o}} \right]^{\frac{\eta_o}{\eta_o+1}},$$

$$\mathbf{N}_o'^{d,(k)} := \left[ \int_0^1 \left( \frac{\mathbf{n}_{jo}'^{d,(k)}}{B_{jo}} \right)^{\frac{\theta_o+1}{\theta_o}} dj \right]^{\frac{\theta_o}{\theta_o+1}}.$$

Then, we update shadow wages:

$$\tilde{w}_{ijo}^{(k+1)} = \left( \frac{1}{B_{jo}} \right)^{\frac{1+\theta_o}{\theta_o}} \left( \frac{n_{ijo}'^{d,(k)}}{\mathbf{n}_{jo}'^{d,(k)}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta_o}} \left( \frac{\mathbf{n}_{jo}'^{d,(k)}}{\mathbf{N}_o'^{d,(k)}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta_o}} \mathbf{W}_o'^{(k)}$$

## 7. Iteration.

Iterate over (1) to (6) until convergence of wages. Whenever  $\max \left\{ \text{abs}(w_{ijo}^{(k)} - w_{ijo}'^{(k)}) \right\} > \text{tol}$ , we update wages with the following criterion:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Unconstrained firms:} \quad w_{ijo}^{(k+1)} &= \rho w_{ijo}^{(k)} + (1 - \rho) w_{ijo}'^{(k)} \quad \text{for } \rho \in (0, 1), \\ \text{Any constrained firm:} \quad w_{ijo}^{(k+1)} &= \underline{w}. \end{aligned}$$

# E Appendix: Quantification of the Model

## E.1 Targeted Moments

Table E.1 reports additional details to the quantification of the model parameters. In particular, it shows the model fit of each parameter in relation to its most associated moment in the SMM estimation. The estimation brings about a close fit to the data, as it obtains an average absolute deviation of 5 percent between each model and data moment. The largest deviations occur in the span of control (7%) and wage gap parameters (8%).

## E.2 Firm Substitutability Parameters

This section explains in detail the quantification of the parameters determining the structural labor supply elasticities:  $(\eta_o, \theta_o)$ .

Table E.1: Targeted Moments

Parameter Value	Description	Moment	Model	Data
<i>A: Preferences</i>				
$\phi_m$	Labor disutility shifter: production workers	Average firm size	5.59	5.28
$\phi_w$	Labor disutility shifter: managers	Ratio managers to workers	0.20	0.19
<i>B: Firm Organization</i>				
$\alpha$	Span of control	Median span of control	3.41	3.14
$\varphi_w$	Worker efficiency	Mean wage of workers (€)	729	718
$\varphi_m$	Managerial efficiency	Wage gap managers and workers	0.79	0.73
$\sigma_z$	Std. Dev. firm TFP	Weighted mean HHI workers	0.18	0.19
<i>C: Market Characteristics</i>				
$B_{ijw}$	Amenities in small markets	Share workers in markets $M_j \leq 10$	0.12	0.12
Mass $m_j = 1$	Share single-firm markets	Mass single-firm markets	0.29	0.29
$\zeta_0$	Scale Pareto distribution	Mean N° firms	17.87	17.63
$\zeta_1$	Shape Pareto distribution	Std. Dev. N° firms	72.65	68.25
<i>D: Firm Substitutability</i>				
$(\theta_w, \theta_m)$	Across-market firm substitutability	Across-municipality LS elasticity	(1.52, 0.92)	(1.46, 0.92)
$(\eta_w, \eta_m)$	Within-market firm substitutability	Within-market LS elasticity	(19.97, 6.10)	(19.97, 6.10)

Note: The Table reports the vector of parameters estimated using the SMM approach and the calibrated firm distribution with their respective moment description and fit.

## Across-market elasticity

To estimate the across-market labor supply elasticity, we use municipality-level data on wages and employment between 2002 and 2016. The specification takes the following form:

$$\text{Log } w_{m,o,t} = \beta \text{Log } L_{m,o,t} + \alpha_{m,o} + e_{m,o,t}, \quad (\text{C.26})$$

where  $w_{m,o,t}$  is the average wage in municipality  $m$ ,  $L_{m,o,t}$  is the total employment in municipality  $m$ , and  $\alpha_{m,o}$  are municipality fixed effects for each occupation. Because employment and wages are jointly determined in equilibrium, we use the following shift-share instrument for  $L_{m,o,t}$ :

$$\hat{L}_{m,o,t} = \sum_s \left( \underbrace{\frac{L_{i,m,s,o,2002}}{\sum_i L_{i,m,s,o,2002}}}_{\text{Industry-Municipality Share}} \times \underbrace{\sum_i L_{i,s,o,t}}_{\text{National Employment in Sector } s} \right). \quad (\text{C.27})$$

The intuition for the instrument exploits across-municipality variation over time that stems from national employment shocks to sectors. The importance of each sectorial shift across municipalities depends on the share of the sector in such municipality. Thus, municipalities vary in terms of exposure to the shift in sectors' employment. To explain why the instrument might be valid, we argue that multiple shifts to employment by sector, at the national level, are unrelated to local economic conditions. Hence, in this setup, the national employment trends by sector adjust the local labor demand exogenously.

In terms of results, Table E.2 shows the estimates from the IV regression of Equation (C.26). We find that the elasticity is lower for managers than for production workers. This suggests that it is more costly for managers to move across markets than for production workers.

Table E.2: Estimating the Across-Market Firm Substitutability Parameters

	(1)	(2)
	Production Workers	Managers
Log employment	0.433*** (0.027)	1.008*** (0.078)
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,946	1,946
Implied Elasticity ( $1/\beta$ )	2.31	0.99
Inferred across-market substitutability ( $\theta_o$ )	2.58	0.70

Note: The Table reports the estimates of the IV regression of Equation (17). Confidence intervals at the 95% level. The baseline period of the instrument is 2002, but we run the regression between 2009 and 2016 to exploit variation from the Great Recession. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Source: 2002-2016, QP.

### Within-market elasticity

To estimate the within-market labor supply elasticity, we use establishment-level information on wages and employment between 2002 and 2016. We compute total employment  $L_{i,j,o,t}$  and average hourly real wages  $w_{i,j,o,t}$  in occupation  $o$  for each establishment  $i$  in local labor market

$j$  at period  $t$ . We do not need to impute working hours because our database already provides this information. For each occupation  $o$ , we separately estimate the following regression:

$$\log w_{i,j,o,t} = \beta \log L_{i,j,o,t} + \mu_{j,o,t} + v_{i,j,o,t}, \quad (\text{C.28})$$

We include local labor market-time fixed effects to isolate any time-varying shock in a given local labor market. Our goal is to estimate  $\beta$ , which represents the inverse of the within-market labor supply elasticity. The main threat to identification involves that the error  $v_{i,j,o,t}$  captures establishment-time-specific shocks to labor demand and supply that are correlated with establishment size. In that case, the OLS estimate of  $\beta$  is inconsistent. To address this problem, we additionally use a standard shift-share approach to simulate labor demand shocks that go back to [Bartik \(1991\)](#) and are formalized more recently through the exogeneity of the shares ([Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020](#)) or the exogeneity of the shifts ([Borusyak et al., 2022](#)). The intuition of the instrument is that we exploit national trends in employment to predict establishment-level labor demand shocks. More concretely, we combine local shares and aggregate shifts to employment as follows:

$$\hat{L}_{i,j,o,t} = \underbrace{\frac{L_{i,j,o,2002}}{\sum_i L_{i,s,o,2002}}}_{\text{Firm's Employment Share in Sector } s} \times \underbrace{\sum_i L_{i,s,o,t}}_{\text{National Employment in Sector } s}. \quad (\text{C.29})$$

We set 2002 as the initial year for the share component. Then, we measure the shares as the employment in occupation  $o$  in a given establishment located in  $j$  at  $t$  ( $L_{i,j,2002,o}$ ) over the national level of employment for that occupation in sector  $s$  in 2002 ( $L_{i,j,2002,o}$ ). Recall that our definition of local labor market  $j$  implicitly includes a sector, as it is the intersection between sector ( $s$ ) and municipality ( $r$ ) given an occupation  $o$ . We multiply this by the total employment of a given sector and occupation ( $\sum_i^I L_{iso}$ ) every year after 2002 to predict current establishment employment according to national trends and initial shares. With the modified employment, we estimate Equation (C.28) by an instrumental variable with  $\hat{L}_{i,j,o,t}$

as an instrument for  $L_{i,j,o,t}$ . In this estimation, we assume that the instrument is unrelated to unobserved constant or time-varying characteristics that affect specific establishments within the same industry, local labor market, and year.

Table E.3 shows the IV estimates of the reduced-form elasticities by occupations. We find that managers have a smaller labor supply elasticity than production workers, indicating that managers are less responsive to wage differentials across firms within the same market. Overall, our estimates are in the range of the literature. Most estimates based on inverse methods, i.e., estimating the inverse labor supply elasticity in the baseline specification, find estimates around 5.24 (Sokolova and Sorensen, 2021). Quantifying the model to county-level data in the U.S., Monte et al. (2018) finds a labor supply elasticity of 3.3. Using municipality-level German data, Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) find a labor supply elasticity of 5.5.

Table E.3: Estimating the Within-Market Firm Substitutability Parameters

Dependent Variable: Log Wage	Production Workers		Managers	
	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
Log employment	0.0500*** (0.0002)	0.0623*** (0.0005)	0.1639*** (0.0005)	0.1645*** (0.0017)
Market-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,580,623	459,960	1,036,216	119,165
Implied Elasticity ( $1/\beta$ )	19.96	16.05	6.10	6.08
Inferred within-market substitutability ( $\eta_o$ )	19.96	16.05	6.10	6.08

Note: The Table reports the estimates from regressing equation (19) by OLS and IV for each occupation. Standard errors in parentheses. Source: 2002-2016, QP.

### E.3 Mass Layoff Shocks

This section explains in detail the definition and estimation of the effect of mass-layoff shocks on municipality's employment and wages in the data. Then, we explain how we implement the same exercise in the model.

## Definition

To identify mass layoffs in the Portuguese data, we consider sudden, sizable, and enduring reduction in the employment size of a prominent plant within the regional economy. More precisely, we define that a region suffers a mass-layoff shock when it experiences a drop of 100 workers in any establishment for two consecutive years between 2004 to 2016.<sup>15</sup> All mass layoff events are aggregated at the municipal level to construct the treatment. So, we define the treated municipalities from the first time they experience a mass layoff in our sample period, and those who never have one belong to the control group.

## Estimation

To quantify the impact on local employment and wages, we use an event-study specification that compares the changes in employment and wages of treated and control municipalities for managers and production workers following a mass layoff. Our specification takes the following form:

$$y_{mt} = \xi + \sum_{k=-5}^5 \beta_k \mathbf{1}\{k = t - g\} + \gamma_m + \gamma_t + X'_{it}\theta + \epsilon_{mt}. \quad (\text{C.30})$$

Here, the year that a mass layoff occurs in an establishment of a municipality is  $g$ , the years are  $t$ , and the event time indicators are  $k$ .<sup>16</sup> Year fixed effects ( $\gamma_t$ ) and municipality fixed effects ( $\gamma_m$ ) control for unobserved constant characteristics across all municipalities and within municipalities, respectively. The covariates  $X_{it}$  control for baseline characteristics regarding the size and structure of the cities interacted with time to flexibly control for time-varying variables. More precisely, these variables are the log of the municipality's employment, the share of manufacturing employment, the share of highly educated workers, the share of male workers, and the share of young workers. The parameters of interest


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<sup>15</sup>We further restrict establishments with more than 1 percent of local employment in the baseline period, and we do not take into account plant closures to define mass layoffs.

<sup>16</sup>We define the cohorts of treated municipalities from the first time, in our sample period, they had a mass layoff. Other mass layoffs may happen in the same municipality later on.

are  $\beta_k$ , which come from  $k$  event time dummy variables. These dynamic treatment effects measure the effect on  $y$  relative to an omitted period, which is when  $k = -1$ . We use [Callaway and Sant'Anna \(2021\)](#) estimator to control further for heterogeneous treatment effects across cohorts and aggregate all results across cohorts for the main coefficient shown in the main text. The main assumption needed in this setup is the conditional parallel trends assumption, stating that in the absence of mass layoffs, treated and control groups would evolve similarly. Figure E.1 shows that pre-treatment coefficients are not statistically different from zero, suggesting that this assumption holds. In addition, Figure E.1a shows the dynamic post-treatment coefficient on employment and wages following a mass layoff shock. Overall, the most negative significant results happen on the employment margin, not on the wage margin, for both types of workers.

Figure E.1: Event Study Estimates by Occupation



Note: These coefficients plot the estimated event study estimates using [Callaway and Sant'Anna \(2021\)](#) estimator. We exploit 72 events of mass layoffs across time in our sample period. We identify mass layoffs as a drop of 100 workers in a given establishment for two consecutive years. Source: QP, 2004-2016.



## Implementation in the model

We randomly group markets into municipalities and simulate two periods. The only difference between both periods is that the second contains a productivity shock randomly distributed across municipalities to firms that fulfill three characteristics that are informative of the firm's importance within the municipality and the size of the shock. First, we restrict the shock to multi-layer firms, as more than 95 percent of plants experiencing mass layoffs hire managers and production workers. Second, we exploit that the average firm carrying out a mass layoff had an average municipality employment share of 4.4 percent one year before the mass layoff. Thus, we condition the random shock on the sub-sample of firms whose municipality employment share falls within a specific range to match the same average size of shocked firms. Third, we choose the magnitude of the productivity shock to target that the average firm undergoing a mass layoff reduces its workforce by nearly 50 percent. Lastly, we run an OLS regression of employment and wages on a layoff dummy variable, controlling for municipality and time fixed effects.