

# Supreme Court Statpack

## October Term 2024-2025

# SCOTUSblog

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## EmpiricalSCOTUS

*Viewing the Supreme Court in an Entirely New Light*

Version: 0.0 (Released)

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For additional data and accompanying analysis, please visit  
[EmpiricalSCOTUS](#) or [Contact Us](#).

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# Preface

The enclosed report represents the culmination of a ten-month effort to provide summary statistics and corresponding analysis for the Supreme Court’s 2024 Term.

Our goal was to provide a comprehensive overview of the term while recognizing that much of what we offer remains surface-level data. In recent years, some have taken exception to how data such as these are used, particularly as it relates to drawing generalizable claims of the Court and its Justices. We would like to take the time to state our position on these concerns:

First, we fully recognize that our data provides only surface-level inferences. As many have pointed out, the Court retains considerable discretion with respect to the size and scope of its docket. Indeed, a considerable majority of the Court’s decision-making is determining which appeals will *not* receive review, rather than what will. It is not lost on us that the population of orally argued and decided cases in the 2024 term are not fully emblematic of the Court’s broader decision-making. While we do provide statistics on the docket more generally in the extended version of this report (Available [HERE](#)), we advise pursuing additional scholarship focusing on this area.

Second, our summary analyses do not make distinctions between cases of varying importance to the national discourse. Not because we fail to recognize that these distinctions obviously exist, but because our goal is to provide an overview of the Justices’ most observable decision-making behaviors – irrespective of the broader importance some of these decisions may have compared to others. In short, they are numbers – nothing more, nothing less. There is no underlying agenda in our decision to present topline statistics.

Finally, we recognize that these data do not belong to us in perpetuity. Once we have published our report, any person, outlet, or entity are free to use them - just as we have been facilitating open access to our data throughout the term. Nonetheless, we ask those who read our report to be conscientious of the fact that we cannot control - nor do we particularly wish to control - how they are used. The Supreme Court retains special significance in our national discourse, and its decisions can surely draw considerable divisions among observers. Some readers may take exception to how others choose to interpret these data. We ask that you not hold it against us.

We would like to thank all of those who aided in the development of this report – particularly Zachary Shemtob and Sara Isgur (SCOTUSblog/Dispatch) – who offered guidance, research assistance, and constructive criticism.

- Adam Feldman (J.D., Ph.D.)<sup>1</sup>  
- Jake S. Truscott (Ph.D.)<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Adam Feldman serves as chief proprietor of the EmpiricalSCOTUS blog and the Legalytics Substack. He is also the principal for the legal data consulting firm *Optimized Legal*.

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## Data Availability & Disclosure

We are particularly grateful to the organized efforts of those maintaining the [Supreme Court Database](#), which is principally hosted by Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri.<sup>3</sup> Their data was pivotal for constructing longitudinal analyses that place the Justices' decision-making during the 2023 term into the broader scope of history.

Apart from data used to develop longitudinal analyses, this report was compiled independently and drew on a multitude of resources to sufficiently track developments and behaviors expressed in the Court's oral arguments, decisions, and docket, among other things. These include, but are not limited to, the Supreme Court's [Official Website](#), [Oyez](#), and [Justia](#), among others.

All data used to compile this report will be available [HERE](#). There you will find a collection of CSV (.csv) files containing data relevant to the accompanying analyses on *Decisions* and *Oral Arguments* provided in this report.

We are, of course, happy to provide any additional insights and guidance on replication of data and other analysis in this report. For help, please [Contact Us](#).

We ask that any publication incorporating these data or other material from our report provide a corresponding citation acknowledging the authors, EmpiricalSCOTUS, and any relevant data sources indicated with the enclosed tabular information.

Example Citation: Feldman, A. & Truscott, J. S. (2024, July 1). Supreme Court 2023-2024 Term Stat Review (Version 1.1). *EmpiricalSCOTUS*. Available [HERE](#).

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<sup>3</sup>Harold J. Spaeth, Lee Epstein, et al. 2022 Supreme Court Database, Version 2022 Release 1. URL: [HERE](#).

# Decisions



Photo Credit: AP/Jacquelyn Martin

Table 1: What’s Included (Decisions)

Area	Topic	Description
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### Note on Decision Coding

We recognize that the array of potential case-level votes do not always neatly align with a definitive indicator that a Justice should be considered a member of the Majority or Minority (*Dissenting*) coalition. In particular, votes by Justices *Concurring and Dissenting In Part*, *Concurring in Judgment*, joining (and/or authoring) several concurrences, etc., are not as clear of an indicator as authoring or simply joining the majority. These special votes could lead to varying records of majority and minority coalition sizes depending on the source. For example, a decision rendered with a single Justice authoring an opinion *Concurring In Part, and Dissenting in Part* could reasonably be coded as either (9-0) or (8-1), given that the Justice neither fully joined – nor fully dissented – from the Court’s majority opinion.

To maintain methodological consistency, we code choices to join the **Minority** (*Dissent*) as instances where a Justice (1) Authored a Dissenting Opinion or (2) **Only** Joined a Dissenting Opinion. Below we list the cases impacted by this coding scheme.

- *Trump v. J.G.G* (24A931) – Decided January 22, 2025

### Additional Notes: Opinion Consolidations

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## Decision Information

Table 2: Decision Information (Part 1)

Case	Docket	Date Argued	Date Decision	Lower Court	Decision	Author	Coalition
Royal Canin v. Wullschleger	23-677	10/07/24	01/15/25	CA8	Affirm	Kagan	(9-0)
E.M.D. Sales Inc v. Carrera	23-217	11/05/24	01/15/25	CA4	Reverse and Remand	Kavanaugh	(9-0)
TikTok Inc. v. Garland	24-656	01/10/25	01/17/25	CADC	Affirm	Per Curiam	(9-0)
Andrew v. White	23-6573		01/21/25	CA10	Vacate and Remand	Per Curiam	Per Curiam
Hungary v. Simon	23-867	12/03/24	02/21/25	CADC	Vacate and Remand	Sotomayor	(9-0)
Wisconsin Bell v. United States ex rel. Heath	23-1127	11/04/24	02/21/25	CA7	Affirm and Remand	Kagan	(9-0)
Williams v. Washington	23-191	10/07/24	02/21/25	SCAL	Reverse and Remand	Kavanaugh	(5-4)
Lackey v. Stinnie	23-621	10/08/24	02/25/25	CA4	Reverse and Remand	Roberts	(7-2)
Hamm v. Smith	23-167		11/04/24	CA11	Vacate and Remand	Per Curiam	Per Curiam
Facebook v. Amalgamated Bank	23-980	11/06/24	11/22/24	CA9	DIG	Per Curiam	Per Curiam
Bouarafa v. Mayorkas	23-583	10/15/24	12/10/24	CA11	Affirm	Jackson	(9-0)
NVIDIA Corp. v. E. Ohman J:or Fonder AB	23-970		12/11/24	CA9	DIG	Per Curiam	Per Curiam

Table 3: Decision Information (Part 2)

Case	Docket	Date Argued	Date Decision	Lower Court	Decision	Author	Coalition
Glossip v. Oklahoma	22-7466	10/09/24	02/25/25	OCCA	Reverse and Remand	Sotomayor	(6-2)
Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services	23-971	01/14/25	02/26/25	CA10	Reverse and Remand	Alito	(9-0)
Dewberry Group Inc. v. Dewberry Engineers Inc.	23-900	12/11/24	02/26/25	CA4	Vacate and Remand	Kagan	(9-0)
San Francisco v. EPA	23-753	10/16/24	03/04/25	CA9	Reverse and Remand	Alito	(9-0)
Bufkin v. McDonough	23-713	10/16/24	03/05/25	CAFC	Affirm	Thomas	(7-2)
Thompson v. United States.	23-1095	01/14/25	03/21/25	CA7	Vacate and Remand	Roberts	(9-0)
Delligatti v. United States.	23-825	11/12/24	03/21/25	CA2	Affirm	Thomas	(7-2)
Garland v. Vanderstok	23-852	10/08/24	03/26/25	CA5	Reverse and Remand	Gorsuch	(7-2)
United States v. Miller	23-824	12/02/24	03/26/25	CA10	Reverse	Jackson	(8-1)
FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments	23-1038	12/02/24	04/02/25	CA5	Vacate and Remand	Alito	(9-0)
Medical Marijuana Inc. v. Horn	23-365	10/15/24	04/02/25	CA2	Affirm and Remand	Barrett	(5-4)
Department of Education v. California	24A910		04/04/25	DCMA	Granted	Per Curiam	(5-4)



Table 4: Decision Information (Part 3)

Case	Docket	Date Argued	Date Decision	Lower Court	Decision	Author	Coalition
Trump v. J.G.G.	24A931		04/07/25	DCDC	Granted	Per Curiam	(5-4)*
Cunningham v. Cornell University	23-1007	01/22/25	04/17/25	CA2	Reverse and Remand	Sotomayor	(9-0)
Velazquez v. Garland	23-929	11/12/24	04/22/25	CA10	Reverse and Remand	Gorusch	(6-3)