

# Withheld from Working More?

## Withholding Taxes and the Labor Supply of Married Women

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### Abstract

To collect income taxes, almost all countries require employers to withhold monthly tax prepayments which are then fully credited against the final income tax liabilities of their employees. Despite being a fundamental component of income taxation systems worldwide, the impact of these withholding taxes on labor supply is poorly understood. We investigate their importance in the context of married couples in Germany where the withholding tax liability can be redistributed between spouses. We exploit a reform that reduced the withholding tax for some married women more than for others, while inducing no differences in income taxes. Using administrative data for the full population of German taxpayers, we estimate an elasticity of labor income with respect to the withholding tax eight years after the reform of 0.14. Additional evidence from a self-conducted survey suggests imperfect understanding of the tax system and limited pooling of resources within the household as the main mechanisms. As the majority of couples shift parts of the withholding tax liability from the husband to the wife, our results suggest that the increased withholding tax liability of married women contributes to their low labor supply. This highlights the need for governments to be aware of the distortion of labor supply incentives when the design of withholding taxes does not match actual income tax incentives.

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# 1 Introduction

Many people do not understand how income taxes work. They often do not know the difference between marginal and average tax rates (Gideon, 2017; Liebman and Zeckhauser, 2004; Rees-Jones and Taubinsky, 2020) and which tax rates apply to them (Aghion et al., 2017; Blaufus et al., 2015; Chetty et al., 2013; Farhi and Gabaix, 2020; Fujii and Hawley, 1988; Lardeux, 2022; Leite, 2024; Rees-Jones, 2018). Due to this limited understanding, households' reactions are therefore influenced by how they interpret their incentives (Stantcheva, 2021). These interpretations can be influenced by supposedly irrelevant technical decisions of politicians and bureaucrats.

We study the decision about the role of income tax collection, a so far overlooked cornerstone in understanding labor supply responses to income taxes. Almost all countries require employers to withhold monthly tax prepayments which are then credited against the final income tax liabilities of their employees. The collection of these withholding taxes provides governments with a constant stream of revenue and increases tax compliance (Bagchi and Dušek, 2021; Schepanski and Shearer, 1995; Slemrod, 2019). There is, however, no clear best practice of how withholding taxes should be designed. Typically, withholding tax rates do not reflect true effective income tax rates. Many governments often collect more withholding taxes than employees owe in income taxes (Engström et al., 2015; Gelman et al., 2022; Hauck and Wallossek, 2024; Rees-Jones, 2018).<sup>1</sup> In those cases, governments issue a refund to taxpayers after the end of the tax year. Conversely, when the government collects less in withholding taxes than employees owe in income taxes, taxpayers are required to make an additional tax payment to the government. This link between withholding taxes and income taxes adds a layer of complexity that might obscure that withholding tax rates have no effect on the total amount of income taxes paid in a year. Besides liquidity constraints and time discounting, how income taxes are collected should therefore have no effect on how much employees decide to work.

It is difficult to identify the effects of withholding taxes, as they are typically closely tied to the underlying income tax system. It is, therefore, usually not possible to use reforms of the income tax system to draw conclusions about the role of withholding taxes. However, the German income tax system offers an institutional setting that allows for such an analysis. We illustrate the core feature of the institutional setting in Figure 1, which displays average withholding tax rates by gender and labor income in Germany. Conditional on labor income, married women are on average subject to higher withholding tax rates than married men. This is a result of the fact that married couples can shift parts of the withholding tax liability from one partner to the other by choosing certain withholding tax schedules. This implies that spouses with identical income can be subject to different withholding tax rates even when the overall household income is the same. Importantly, the decision on withholding tax schedules does not affect the final income tax rate. However, a married couple can minimize its joint withholding tax liability by shifting

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<sup>1</sup>This overwithholding often reaches substantial magnitudes. For example, nearly a third of the amount of all personal income tax payments is returned as tax refunds in the US (Gelman et al., 2022).




Figure 1: Average Withholding Tax Rate by Gender

*Notes:* The figure displays the average realized withholding tax rate by gender for married couples in Germany. The values correspond to population means as they are based on the universe of observations from the German Taxpayer Panel (TPP) for the year 2010. The figure illustrates that married couples shift a substantial share of the withholding tax liability from men to women through the choice of withholding tax schedules.

some part of the withholding tax liability from the spouse with higher labor income, i.e., the primary wage earner, to the spouse with lower labor income, i.e., the secondary wage earner. This explains the pattern in Figure 1: Married women are typically the secondary wage earner and hence face, on average, a higher withholding tax rate conditional on labor income.<sup>2</sup>

In this paper, we use the German withholding tax system to study how withholding taxes impact labor income. At the core of the paper, we leverage a withholding tax reform that reduced withholding taxes more for some women than for others, allowing us to estimate the effect of withholding taxes on labor income. To understand the underlying behavioral responses, we complement the analysis with a toy model and self-collected survey data. We then compare withholding tax implementations in different countries to discuss the trade-offs policymakers face when implementing withholding taxes.

We conduct our analysis using full-population administrative tax records from the German Taxpayer Panel for the years 2006 to 2018. To obtain exogenous variation in withholding taxes, we exploit a tax reform in 2010 that cut withholding taxes for married women differently across withholding tax schedules. Using a Difference-in-Differences design with continuous treatment intensity, we are able to investigate how married women react to a cut in withholding taxes while keeping income tax liabilities constant.

We estimate an elasticity of labor income with respect to the marginal net-of-withholding tax rate eight years after the reform of approximately 0.14. This effect is more pronounced for women who have greater flexibility in adjusting their labor supply, such as those working part-time or

<sup>2</sup>Conditional on income, there is no other reason for withholding tax rates of husbands and wives to differ as all tax credits and deductions are applied on the household level.

those without children. The estimated elasticity is lower than the elasticity estimated in response to changes in income tax, which ranges from 0.2 to 0.8 (Neisser, 2021). Nevertheless, the effect is substantial as we show using a back-of-the-envelope calculation: Aligning the marginal withholding tax rate with the marginal income tax rate for all women whose marginal withholding tax rate is higher than the household's income tax rate would lead to a 1 % increase in labor income for this group.

With the help of a toy model, we discuss three factors that can explain why withholding taxes affect labor supply decisions: First, individuals might not fully understand or internalize the relationship between income and withholding taxes. Therefore, they might think that the net income on their monthly payslip equals their actual net income after income taxes and consequently use withholding taxes as a proxy for income taxes in their labor supply decisions. Second, even when households understand the difference between income and withholding taxes, the distribution of withholding taxes between partners might impact labor supply decisions when households do not act as a unit. For example, individuals might not have full access to the income of the partner or the tax refund. In these cases, withholding taxes are not neutral. Lastly, households might also react to withholding taxes if they have strong time preferences for income during the year, for example due to budget constraints. However, the last channel is unlikely to drive our results as suggested by the small time discounting factors found in the literature (e.g., Falk et al., 2018).

As the evidence on the knowledge about the complexity of the tax system and on the organization of household finances is much scarcer, we conduct a pre-registered online survey among 506 married and employed German individuals. First, we find that more than 80 % of the surveyed individuals wrongly think that the choice of withholding tax schedules affects the final income tax liability. This suggests that individuals with the same income tax liability, but with differing withholding tax rates, might perceive their income tax liability differently and consequently make different labor supply decisions. Second, we investigate the impact of the system of withholding tax schedules on the organization of household finances in Germany. As seen in Figure 1, couples often choose withholding tax schedules that shift parts of the withholding tax liability from men to women. In a unitary household model, this would have no impact on real outcomes as all resources are shared. However, if a woman only has limited access to the income of the husband, the observed pattern of assignment of withholding tax schedules lowers her own disposable net income. We find suggestive evidence that in fact there is no equal access of both partners to all household resources. As much as 47 % of those couples that shift some of the withholding tax liability from the husband to the wife do not have a shared bank account. Among them, 72 % let the tax refund be transferred to the bank account of the husband.

These findings on the organization of household finances of married couples speak to important considerations relating to the role of withholding taxes in tax systems with joint taxation. The rationale behind joint taxation is based on the idea that married households act as an eco-

nommic unit and are thus taxed jointly. Therefore, when taxing couples jointly governments set the identical economic incentives for both partners irrespective of their individual wage income and governments remain impartial about the distribution of labor supply within the household. Consequently, in joint taxation systems, the government also does not have to take a stance on how the marriage bonus induced by joint taxation should be distributed within the household.

However, withholding taxes are inherently individual taxes as they are deducted from the individual payslip. Therefore, in countries with tax withholding and joint taxation, policymakers cannot remain impartial when deciding how the marriage bonus should be distributed among the spouses throughout the year as they have to set an individual average withholding tax rate. Interestingly, implemented solutions vary substantially between countries as we document in this paper. The gap in average tax rates presented in Figure 1 reflects the consequence of the implemented withholding tax system for married individuals in Germany. If individuals use payslips or monthly transfers to infer their net income, the gender gap in withholding taxes might contribute to a systematic gendered misperception about the returns to labor. Women might overestimate their individual income tax liability, which can decrease their incentives to work and potentially also affect their bargaining power within couples.

The fact that individuals react to withholding taxes implies that governments should be careful when designing withholding tax schedules so that withholding tax rates match income tax rates. This task gets more complex for countries with joint taxation systems. As soon as such countries try to set withholding tax rates for married couples, they have to decide on the individual marginal and average withholding tax rates that each spouse faces and thereby make a decision on the division of joint taxation benefits within the couple. In this way, they influence labor supply incentives. We compare the implementations of withholding taxes in the US, France and Germany and show that different implementations can result in substantially different withholding tax rates for primary and secondary earners. Based on our empirical findings, it becomes evident that the design of withholding tax systems cannot be inherently incentive-neutral, as it requires a deliberate decision on withholding tax rates for primary and secondary earners. This is especially relevant as it shows that the withholding tax system can be used to increase the labor market participation of secondary earners.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 presents in detail the German withholding tax system. Section 4 discusses the data as well as the empirical strategy and Section 5 presents the results. In Section 6, we introduce a toy model presenting potential mechanisms which we subsequently investigate with the help of a survey in Section 7. Section 8 then discusses the policy implications for the optimal design of withholding taxes and Section 9 concludes.

## 2 Related Literature

**Behavioral public finance.** The link between withholding tax and income tax increases the complexity for taxpayers. The oftentimes intricate design of withholding taxes may impact the taxpayers' decision-making processes, adding an additional layer of consideration to their financial decisions. This is closely related to the literature studying the interaction between inattention, tax complexity and behavioral responses to taxation. It is well documented, mostly with surveys, that an overwhelming majority of taxpayers do not understand how income taxation works. For example, many individuals do not know which tax rates apply to them personally (Aghion et al., 2017; Blaufus et al., 2015; Chetty et al., 2013; Enrick, 1963, 1964; Farhi and Gabaix, 2020; Fujii and Hawley, 1988; Lardeux, 2022; Leite, 2024; Rees-Jones, 2018; Stantcheva, 2021; Wagstaff, 1965) and they do not understand the difference between marginal and average tax rates (Gideon, 2017; Liebman and Zeckhauser, 2004; Rees-Jones and Taubinsky, 2020).

Consequently, in the theoretic literature on behavioral public finance, the view is established that the complexity of income tax systems matters for labor supply responses and thereby for the optimal design of tax systems (Bernheim and Taubinsky, 2018; Farhi and Gabaix, 2020; Gabaix, 2019; Liebman and Zeckhauser, 2004; McCaffery and Slemrod, 2006; Moore and Slemrod, 2021). These findings can be replicated in experiments. In recent years, it has been shown repeatedly in controlled environments that limited understanding of tax systems has consequences on decision making (Abeler and Jäger, 2015; Rees-Jones and Taubinsky, 2020; Stantcheva, 2021).

However, the literature on real world consequences of limited understanding of tax systems is scarce. Chetty et al. (2013) show that the reaction to the EITC depends on the knowledge of the individuals. Feldman et al. (2016) and Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) provide evidence that the behavioral reaction to reforms is in line with a limited understanding of the difference between marginal and average tax rates. Lardeux (2022) and Leite (2024) show that due to misunderstanding people bunch at specific incomes where no income tax kink exists.

Our paper contributes to this literature on behavioral public finance by, first, documenting a striking misunderstanding of the German withholding and income tax system and, second, by measuring the behavioral reaction to a reform in withholding taxes.

**Effects of withholding taxes.** Two other studies have investigated the effects of withholding taxes in Germany. Becker et al. (2019) replicate the German withholding tax system in the lab and find that people describing themselves as money-motivated significantly reduce their effort when facing constant income tax rates but higher withholding tax rates. Also, Koch (2024) finds in a before-and-after comparison of the default allocation of German withholding tax schedules that individuals irrationally react to their withholding tax liability.

We also contribute to a broader literature studying the effects of withholding taxes. Withholding taxes have been extensively studied for their effect on individual saving and consumption

decisions. Messacar (2018) finds that in Canada withholding tax rates impact saving decisions. Also, Feldman (2010) and Shapiro and Slemrod (1995) find that a decrease in US withholding tax rates increases consumption and decreases savings. The behavioral reaction is particularly surprising, as the US withholding tax system allows households to alter their withholding taxes at any time to better reflect their income tax rate, which would have allowed them to increase consumption during the year.<sup>3</sup>

Interestingly, despite the ability to adjust withholding taxes, most US households continue to be overwithheld so that approximately 30 % of the withheld taxes are returned as a tax refund (see Gelman et al., 2022).<sup>4</sup> Consequently, there are numerous attempts in the literature to rationalize why households are subject to overwithholding even though they could avoid it. It has been shown that active overwithholding decisions could be a tool of households to deal with limited self-control (Neumark, 1995; Thaler, 1994) and income uncertainty (Gelman et al., 2022; Highfill et al., 1998). However, another possible explanation is insufficient awareness. Indeed, Jones (2012) shows that the lack of withholding tax adjustments by taxpayers to reduce the high level of overwithholding can largely be explained by inertia.

We contribute to the literature by supporting the idea that behavioral factors play a crucial role in understanding the impact of withholding taxes. For example, if households struggle to understand tax systems due to their complexity and therefore are not aware of the link between income and withholding taxes, it can explain why households do not adjust their tax withholding. Also, if withholding taxes are used as a proxy for income taxes, as our results suggest, this can explain the large reactions in savings and consumption to a reform in withholding taxes.

**Joint taxation.** Previous literature has shown that labor supply of women can be detrimentally affected by the design of tax systems. This holds true in particular for income tax systems with joint taxation of married couples, in which marginal and average tax rates of secondary earners are increased, while those of primary earners are decreased compared to separate taxation (Bick and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2017, 2018; Herold and Wallossek, 2024; LaLumia, 2008; Selin, 2014).

Our results imply that the design of withholding tax regimes impacts the labor supply of women and can therefore partly explain the low labor supply of women. In addition, we present the trade-off between different withholding tax regimes and thereby contribute to the question of how an optimal withholding tax schedule should be designed when also taking into account potential negative effects on the labor supply of women.

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<sup>3</sup>Adapting the withholding tax can come at a cost, as underwithheld households have to pay interest on the underwithheld amount.

<sup>4</sup>Research has indeed shown that taxpayers like getting tax refunds and thus change tax filing behavior discontinuously at the point of exact withholding (Engström et al., 2015; Rees-Jones, 2018).




Figure 2: Joint Tax Benefits for a Joint Income of €80,000

*Notes:* The figure illustrates the system of joint income taxation in Germany. It plots the joint taxation benefits depending on the intra-household income distribution for a household with a joint income of €80,000 in the year 2009. In this example, we assume that both spouses contribute to public health care, to the public pension system, and claim no further deductions.

### 3 Institutional Setting

In this section, we first provide context for our study by explaining the German joint taxation system and subsequently present the German withholding tax system for married couples. Thereafter, we describe the reform of withholding taxes that we use to identify causal effects.

#### 3.1 Income Taxation of Married Couples

In Germany, married couples have two distinct options for filing their income taxes. They can opt to file them separately, treating their finances as if they were still single individuals, or they can choose to file jointly. Choosing the latter option enables couples to take advantage of potential tax benefits associated with joint taxation.<sup>5</sup> Under joint income taxation, the individual income tax schedule is applied to half of the joint taxable income for each couple, and the resulting tax liability is then doubled. Due to the progressivity of the German income tax system, this creates joint taxation benefits whenever the spouses in a couple would have faced differing marginal income tax rates under separate taxation. For a fixed household income, a couple receives more joint taxation benefits the more unequal the intra-household distribution of income.

We illustrate this feature in Figure 2, where we plot the joint taxation benefit of a couple with an household income of €80,000 against the female share of the household income. If both

<sup>5</sup>In fact, for the vast majority of couples, choosing joint taxation is at least weakly better than choosing separate taxation. Only couples in which one partner has a significant amount of income replacement payments (e.g., parental leave benefits, unemployment benefits or short-time work payments) can be better off by choosing separate taxation. The reason for that is that those payments, while not being taxable, can increase the marginal income tax rate of the couple (“Progressionsvorbehalt”).






Figure 3: Example Illustrating the Different Withholding Tax Schedules

*Notes:* The figure illustrates how the different withholding tax schedules affect the monthly net incomes of both spouses and the yearly tax refund in the year 2022. Net incomes are calculated for a household in which the husband earns €50,000 and the wife earns €30,000 gross per year. The assessed yearly income tax liability of the household is €11,181 under the assumption that the couple claims no additional deductions. The figure shows how the different withholding tax schedules shift the withholding tax liability from one partner to the other and how they can affect the yearly refund from the final income tax.

spouses contribute equally to the household income, there are no benefits from joint taxation. If, however, one partner for example contributes 80 % to the household income, opting for joint taxation will save the couple around €2,000 in yearly income taxes.<sup>6</sup>

### 3.2 Withholding Taxes of Married Couples

The German government wants to enable couples to profit from the joint taxation benefit already during the year. Therefore, couples have the choice to reduce their withholding tax liability. Married couples can influence both the sum of their withholding tax liabilities and the allocation of their joint withholding tax liability to each spouse. They can effectively choose between three different withholding tax schedules which are illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 and explained in the following.<sup>7</sup> These withholding tax schedules assign each partner a certain so-called withholding tax class ("*Lohnsteuerklasse*"), which determines the personal withholding tax payments.

<sup>6</sup>Typically, the focus of economists lies on the fact that the secondary earner within the couple faces, in the presence of joint taxation benefits, a higher marginal income tax rate under joint income taxation than under separate income taxation. For example, Bick and Fuchs-Schündeln (2017) have shown that this phenomenon is one key policy that explains the low labor market participation of women. We illustrate how the marginal tax rate depends on partner income in the German joint taxation system in Figure F.1.

<sup>7</sup>In our analysis, we leave out the fourth, least commonly chosen withholding tax schedule. This withholding tax schedule is called "IV with factor" and was introduced in 2010. The tax office takes into account the past income of both spouses and calculates the exact advantage of joint taxation for both spouses individually. Thereby, the tax office can set the withholding tax for both individuals at a level that allows the household to profit from the advantage of joint taxation during the year. More details on the effects of this schedule on marginal and average withholding tax rates can be found in Section 8 where we discuss different implementations of withholding tax schedules that account for joint taxation benefits. There are no official statistics on the use of "IV with factor" and we do not observe the choice in the data. The German government documents that in 2018 less than 0.6 % of the married dual-earner couples used this schedule (*Kleine Anfrage Bundestag* 2019).

**Symmetric schedule.** After marriage, each couple in which both spouses receive labor income gets assigned the same withholding tax schedule as a default, which we will call the symmetric schedule. This withholding tax schedule is symmetric since it assigns each spouse the same default withholding tax class (officially called “IV”). In this withholding tax class, the monthly withholding tax payments are calculated as if the individual was single, only taking into account the own individual income. Hence, the withholding tax is the same as the income tax for a couple without joint taxation benefits. If a couple realizes joint taxation benefits, the remitted withholding taxes of both spouses will exceed their joint final income tax liability and the couple will receive a tax refund after filing an income tax return. We illustrate this in Figure 3 for a couple in which the husband earns €50,000 and the wife earns €30,000. Being in the symmetric withholding tax schedule causes the couple to receive the joint taxation benefit of €288 as a lump-sum tax refund after filing their income taxes.

To avoid this overpayment of withholding taxes during the year, a couple can decide to switch from the symmetric schedule to a withholding tax schedule that aims at reducing the monthly withholding tax payments to account for the joint taxation benefits already during the tax year.<sup>8</sup>

**Men- or women-favoring schedule.** The most popular alternative withholding tax schedules are the men-/women-favoring withholding tax schedules.<sup>9</sup> In those schedules, one spouse is assigned the favorable withholding tax class (“III”), while the other spouse is assigned the unfavorable withholding tax class (“V”). The spouse in the favorable withholding tax class is taxed as if the spouse was the single earner, while the withholding tax for the unfavorable withholding tax class is calculated as if the spouse was contributing a third of the household income (Spangenberg et al., 2020). This leads to a lower withholding tax liability for the spouse in the favorable withholding tax class as compared to being in the default withholding tax class. Simultaneously, the withholding tax liability of the spouse in the unfavorable withholding tax class is higher than in the default withholding tax class and therefore also higher than without marriage. The second column in Figure 3 shows that, in the presence of joint taxation benefits, this decreases the joint withholding tax payments during the year if the primary earner is assigned to the favorable withholding tax class. In this setting with the husband earning more than the wife, choosing the men-favoring schedule shifts the timing of the realization of the joint taxation benefit for the couple forwards and eliminates the lump-sum tax refund at the end of the year. In this concrete example, it even leads to the household paying too little in withholding taxes during the year which obliges them (in the absence of other deductions) to make an additional tax payment at the end of the year.

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<sup>8</sup>Switching away from the symmetric schedule requires the stated consent of both spouses. For switching back, however, unilateral action suffices. The only exception are couples in which only one spouse earns labor income. Those couples are automatically assigned the men-/women-favoring withholding tax schedule.

<sup>9</sup>These terms are not official but our own creations. In particular, the law does not explicitly refer to genders.



Figure 4: Illustration of Different Withholding Tax Schedules

*Notes:* The figure illustrates the frequency and implications of the different withholding tax schedules. On the left-hand side, the average withholding tax rate by withholding tax class in 2009 is shown. Compared to the default withholding tax class, being in the unfavorable withholding tax class leads to a much higher and being in the favorable withholding tax class to a much lower average withholding tax rate. On the right-hand side, the possible withholding tax schedules and their frequency are shown for the year 2010 for couples where both partners have labor income. Approximately 50 % of these couples choose the men-favoring schedule, in which the man is assigned the favorable withholding tax class and the woman the unfavorable withholding tax class. Around 45 % of the couples choose the symmetric schedule, which keeps both spouses in the default withholding tax class. Finally, less than 10 % of the couples choose the women-favoring schedule.

Conversely, if this couple had chosen the women-favoring schedule, which in this case puts the primary earner into the unfavorable withholding tax class and the secondary earner into the favorable withholding tax class, they would have paid even higher withholding taxes than under the default symmetric schedule and would have received an even larger tax refund at the end of the year. However, the women-favoring schedule is rarely chosen when the income of the husband is higher than the income of his wife.

**Effect on tax rates.** The shift of withholding tax liability from the primary to the secondary earner cannot only reduce the joint withholding tax liability but also has large effects on the withholding taxes paid by each spouse. The left-hand side of Figure 4 displays the average withholding tax rate by withholding tax class. Compared to the default withholding tax class, the average withholding tax in the favorable withholding tax class is lower while the average withholding tax in the unfavorable withholding tax class is higher. These differences are substantial. An individual earning €4,000 monthly gross income pays on average around 20 % in withholding taxes in the default withholding tax class. The average withholding tax liability of the same individual increases to around 30 % when being in the unfavorable withholding tax class and reduces to around 10 % when being in the favorable withholding tax class. Consequently, the marginal withholding tax rates differ substantially between the different withholding tax classes (see Figure A.1).

**Choice of the different schedules.** The right-hand side of Figure 4 shows the frequencies with which the different withholding tax schedules are chosen and which withholding tax class these schedules allocate to each spouse. Approximately 50% of the couples pick the men-favoring schedule that shifts the withholding tax liability from men to women and around 45% stick with the symmetric schedule. Less than 10% of the couples pick the women-favoring schedule with lower withholding tax rates for women than for men.

Importantly, while the different choices of withholding tax schedules have strong effects on the amounts of withholding tax payments, they do not affect the final income tax liability of the couple. Couples cannot decrease their final income tax liability by choosing a certain withholding tax schedule, but can only change the timing of the income tax payments throughout the year. However, when taking into account discount rates and liquidity constraints, couples can have benefits or costs from delaying their income tax payments.<sup>10</sup>

## 4 Empirical Strategy and Data

In this paper, we study the causal effect of withholding taxes on labor supply. Identification of this effect would be straightforward if withholding tax schedules were randomly assigned to each couple. However, the choice of withholding tax schedules is highly endogenous. Hence, simply comparing the outcomes of individuals in the different withholding tax schedules can potentially lead to a biased estimate of the effect of withholding taxes on labor supply.

We circumvent this problem by making use of a withholding tax reform in 2010 in Germany, which we outline in Section 4.1. The reform disproportionately reduced the withholding tax liability of individuals in the unfavorable withholding tax class compared to individuals in the other two withholding tax classes. In Section 4.2, we present the data we use to analyse the reform, in Section 4.3 we discuss the sample restrictions, in Section 4.4 we show descriptive statistics and in Section 4.5 we present the empirical strategy together with the identifying assumptions.

### 4.1 Withholding Tax Reform of 2010

**Background.** For the causal identification of the effect of withholding taxes on labor supply, we make use of a German tax reform in 2010 that changed the tax deductibility of the mandatory health care insurance contributions.<sup>11</sup> Prior to 2010, health insurance contributions were only taken into account in the calculation of withholding taxes for the default and favourable

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<sup>10</sup>Additionally, the choice of withholding tax schedules impacts the size of wage replacement payments like parental leave benefits, unemployment benefits or short-time compensations. As we document in Section E, this is a not well-known fact (also see Illing et al. (2024) and Spangenberg et al. (2020)).

<sup>11</sup>In 2010, also the tax treatment for individuals not contributing to the public pension system was changed. This only affects a specific group of the population, as typically all regularly employed individuals are subject to the public pension. However, civil servants and some occupations like employed doctors or pharmacists are excluded. Before 2009, there were two different potential withholding tax regimes in place for these individuals as for some of these individuals the health care deductions were larger. Unfortunately, the tax data does not allow to distinguish them,




Figure 5: Reform on Withholding Taxes by Withholding Tax Class between 2009 and 2010

*Notes:* The figure plots the effect of the withholding tax reform 2010 on average and marginal withholding tax rates depending on the withholding tax class.

withholding tax class, but not for the unfavourable tax class. This changed in 2010, resulting in a substantial decrease in the withholding tax liability for individuals in the unfavorable tax class. The reform is described in detail in [stowhase\\_burgerentlastungsgesetz\\_2011](#).

At the same time, the reform enabled all taxpayers to deduct a much larger share of their health care insurance contributions from the income tax. Conditional on income, this reduction in the income tax liability was independent of the withholding tax schedule. Moreover, as the contributions to health care insurance are automatically deducted in the calculation of the withholding tax, the reform was equivalent to a cut in withholding taxes across all withholding tax schedules.

However, as the deductibility was newly introduced for the individuals in the unfavorable withholding tax class, the reform as a whole reduced, conditional on income, the withholding tax for those individuals much more than for the individuals in the other withholding tax schedules.

**Reform effect.** Figure 5 shows how average and marginal withholding tax rates changed from 2009 to 2010 by withholding tax class and annual gross labor income. Figure A.2 plots the absolute changes in the withholding tax rates. For example, for individuals with an annual gross labor income of €25,000, the average withholding tax rate decreased by about 5 % (€1300 for each year) for individuals in the unfavorable withholding tax class and by about 1 % (€280) for individuals in the default withholding tax class. The marginal withholding tax rate decreased by 8 % for individuals in the unfavorable withholding tax class and by 3 % for individuals in the default withholding tax class. For higher income levels, the change in the marginal tax rate is identical for both groups, but in absolute terms the difference in the size of the reform is increasing. In other years, such substantial year-to-year changes have not occurred. Figure A.3

so we cannot clearly identify the exact tax rates before the reform. We therefore exclude these households from the analysis and include them for robustness checks.

shows this for the years between 2006 and 2018 and for an annual individual income of €25,000, approximately the median income of married women in 2009. The pattern is essentially the same along the whole income distribution.

**Anticipation and salience.** The reform was passed into law on July 23, 2009. There was no public debate about the effect the reform has on withholding taxes. It was not discussed in parliament and there were no newspaper articles discussing changes in withholding tax rates. In fact, we do not find any discussion about the withholding tax reform anywhere on the internet. This strongly suggests that the reform was neither anticipated nor salient. This assessment is corroborated by looking at Google Trends (see Appendix Figure A.4). No striking movements are visible before the dates of the reform announcement and introduction. This implies that couples are not expected to have changed their withholding tax schedules around the reform date in response to the reform or adjusted their labor supply already prior to the reform. However, people were searching more for the term *withholding tax calculator* (“Lohnsteuerrechner”) in January 2010 directly after the reform, suggesting that some people have perceived a change in their monthly wage income and tried to understand it. Furthermore, the reform’s non-salience implies that spouses in the unfavorable withholding tax class might be unaware that their eventual income tax liability, regardless of it being perceived individually or jointly with their spouse, was not changed to the same extent. The only feature concerning withholding taxes that was indeed salient is the lower monthly withholding tax, i.e., a higher net income on the pay slips.<sup>12</sup>

## 4.2 Data Set

Our study is based on the German Taxpayer Panel (TPP). The German Taxpayer Panel is an administrative dataset that contains information on the whole population of taxpayers in Germany for the years 2001 to 2018.<sup>13</sup> It includes information on various characteristics such as income, gender, age, number and age of children, withholding tax class and other tax-related information.<sup>14</sup> The TPP consists of around 63 million records on individuals for whom tax information is available for at least two years. The waves of the TPP for the years 2001 to 2011 were created from the annual income tax statistics, which include data from the tax returns of about 27 million German taxpayers who filed their income taxes. Starting in 2012, the annual federal statistics on wages and income tax replaced the income tax statistics that had been used previously, and the TPP has been continued using data from this statistic. As a result, from 2013 on, the TPP also includes data on about 12 million taxpayers who did not file their income taxes but who did

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<sup>12</sup>In addition, households might eventually also realize that they get lower tax refunds or have to pay higher additional tax payments in the upcoming year. However, it remains unclear whether they would connect this to the change on their payslip, particularly because tax refunds or additional tax payments occur on the couple level.

<sup>13</sup>RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, 2022

<sup>14</sup>At the time of the reform, same-sex couples were not yet allowed to benefit from joint taxation and were not allowed to choose their withholding tax classes. Thus, our sample contains only opposite-sex couples.

Table 1: Sampling Steps

Sampling stage	Restriction	Households 2009	Household × year observations
1.	Married dual-earner couples 2009	4,545,622	51,980,518
2.	Symmetric or Men-favoring schedule 2009	4,015,516	46,216,194
3.	At most 60 years old	3,684,206	38,148,740
4.	€0 < Self-employed income 2009 < €1000	3,526,104	36,506,879
6.	Employed income 2009 < €100,000	3,389,714	35,068,697
7.	Contribution to public pension system	3,106,409	32,458,708
8.	Couple observable in years between 2006 and 2009	2,583,000	27,716,719
8.	No wage replacement (unemp benefit, short-time work,...) between 2006 and 2009	1,735,414	18,854,273
9.	Change in annual income smaller than 15% between 2006 and 2009	671,624	7,253,108
10.	Women older than 40 years	574,163	6,084,411
11.	No change in withholding tax schedule between 2006 and 2009	490,288	5,196,307

*Notes:* This table summarizes the number of observations in each sampling step.

face withholding taxes. In our analysis, we use the TPP for the years 2006 to 2018. In Appendix Section G we describe in detail how we calculate withholding taxes.

### 4.3 Sample Restrictions

In the following, we outline the restrictions that we impose on our sample. Their stepwise impact on the sample size is presented in Table 1.

**Base-year restrictions.** We restrict our sample to married dual-earner couples, i.e., couples in which both spouses received labor income in 2009, the year before the withholding tax reform was implemented. This restriction ensures that these individuals are actually treated at the time of the reform.

We focus on couples in the two most common withholding tax schedules: the men-favoring and the symmetric schedule. We do so for two reasons. First, as shown in Section 3.2, the vast majority of dual-earner couples, around 95 %, has chosen either the men-favoring or symmetric schedule. Second, we deem the couples in those two schedules to be more comparable. In most couples in the women-favoring schedule, only the woman is earning labor income while the husband is self-employed or is claiming pensions. Hence, these couples are very different from the couples in the other two schedules.

To ensure that labor income is the main source of work income, we exclude couples in which, in the year 2009, at least one spouse received income of more than €1,000 from self-employment. We also exclude individuals earning no more than €4,800 per year. This condition ensures that we exclude individuals in marginal employment, who could earn at most €400 per month at the

time of the reform and are exempt from the income tax. As discussed in Footnote 11, in our main analysis we also exclude individuals who are not contributing to the public pension system as they are subject to a different withholding tax reform.

**Financial crisis.** The withholding tax reform of 2010, which we use for our identification, partially coincides with the financial crisis in Germany. We see in our data that couples in the men-favoring schedule experienced more extreme variations in labor income during the crisis years. Therefore, to make the couples in the two schedules more comparable, we exclude couples which were especially affected by the crisis. We do so by excluding couples in which at least one spouse received unemployment benefits or short-time work compensation in 2009 and by removing all couples in which at least one spouse had a change in annual labor income of more than 25 % from any one year to the next during the pre-reform years.

**Stability of withholding tax schedule choice.** A threat to identification is that households might change their withholding tax schedule and are thereby subject to a different withholding tax schedule. There are three potential risks: (i) Households might anticipate the reform and change their withholding tax schedule before the reform, (ii) households might change their withholding tax schedule as a reaction to the reform, and (iii) households might change their withholding tax schedule for other reasons. In principle, the choice of the withholding tax schedule is not fixed and can be changed by the couple every year.

However, as we observe empirically, typically couples decide on their withholding tax schedule once at marriage, often change it at the birth of the first child and then stick to it for the rest of the working life. Figure B.1 plots the withholding tax around the birth of the first child. We see that the withholding tax schedule is changed around the birth of the first child, but then remains stable. Figure B.2 depicts the transitions between the different withholding tax schedules of couples in the three different withholding tax schedules for all couples who were married in 2009. Typically, less than 1% of the couples change their withholding tax schedule in a given year and there is no evidence for an increase in withholding tax schedule changes before or after the reform.

In our preferred specification, we apply two sample restrictions to ensure that the withholding tax schedule is stable and that the reform is exogenous to the withholding tax schedule choice. First, we restrict the sample to households where the wife is older than 40 years in 2009. As we observe empirically in the tax data, almost no woman has the first child at the age of above 40, so households are much less likely to switch withholding tax schedules. Second, we restrict the sample to households that did not change their withholding tax schedule in the pre-reform periods between 2006 and 2009. As the reform was not salient (see Section 4.1), couples are not expected to change their withholding tax schedule before or after 2009 as a reaction to the reform. However, with this conservative assumption we ensure that the withholding tax






Figure 6: Income Growth Relative to 2009

*Notes:* The figure plots the log income difference in year  $t$  relative to 2009. The sample restrictions summarized in Table 1 are applied. The values correspond to population means as they are based on the universe of observations from the German Taxpayer Panel (TPP).

schedule is stable and that the reform is exogenous to the withholding tax schedule choice for all households. We show in robustness checks that our results are robust to the removal of both restrictions.

#### 4.4 Descriptive Statistics

**Income growth.** Figure 6 displays the development of our main outcome variable, the difference in log labor income in year  $t$  relative to 2009. The coefficients thereby approximate growth rates in income relative to 2009. In the years before 2009, average income growth is similar for women in the unfavorable and default withholding tax classes. Between 2009 and 2011, the effects of the financial crisis are visible and income increases only moderately. After 2010, the labor income growth rate is higher for women in the unfavorable withholding tax class.

**Difference between groups.** While in the years until 2009 the income growth looks very similar, it is important to note that the income distribution of the two groups is very different. Figure 7 shows in a heatmap the share of couples in the two withholding tax schedules depending on the income of the wife and the husband. It is visible that the choice of the withholding tax schedule strongly depends on the distribution of income within the household. The larger the income of the husband relative to the wife, the more likely the couple is to choose the men-favoring withholding tax schedule. For example, at the cell with the highest number of observations (wife earning between €15,000 and €20,000, husband earning between €35,000 and €40,000)




Figure 7: Heatplot of the Number of Observations and Share of Couples in Men-Favoring Schedule

*Notes:* The figure displays the number of observations and the exploited treatment variation by income cells. Each dot represents observations that lie in an interval of €5,000 woman and man income. For example, the cell at the top-right corner contains women and men with incomes between €95,000 and €100,000. The larger the dot size, the more observations are in the respective cell. The color displays the share of couples in each cell who are in the men-favoring as opposed to the symmetric withholding tax schedule at the time of the reform. Incomes below €5000 are not displayed as these individuals are not subject to income taxes. The size of each bin represents the number of observations in our sample. The sample restrictions summarized in Table 1 are applied, so in particular couples in the women-favoring schedule are excluded.

77% of the couples are in the men-favoring schedule while 23% are in the symmetric schedule.<sup>15</sup> However, the two groups do not only differ in income variables. As Table 2 documents, the groups are also different in other observables. Specifically, couples in the men-favoring schedule are more likely to have a child and substantially less likely to live in Eastern Germany. We account for these differences with our estimation strategy that we present in the following.

#### 4.5 Estimation Strategy

We focus our analysis on comparing women in the unfavorable withholding tax class, who received a large withholding tax cut, to women in the default withholding tax class, who only experienced a modest withholding tax cut.

**Treatment intensity.** A naive approach would simply compare the evolution of incomes over time between women in the men-favoring and symmetric schedule using a difference-in-differences design. However, as previously shown in Figure 5, individuals' exposure to the reform is not only determined by their withholding tax class but also by their own pre-reform labor income. Therefore, depending on the own pre-reform labor income, there are large differences in the absolute and relative changes in withholding taxes induced by the reform.

<sup>15</sup>Buettner et al. (2019) document that the men-favoring and women-favoring schedules are not chosen symmetrically. This is not visible in Figure 7, as couples in the women-favoring schedule are not part of our sample.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Year 2009

	Men-Favoring	Symmetric
Income Wife	19651.74 (8470.72)	33321.58 (13402.3)
Income Husband	49737.3 (17046.99)	39453.28 (15233.01)
Female Income Share	0.29 (0.09)	0.46 (0.11)
Age Wife	44.63 (4.47)	44.69 (4.97)
Age Husband	46.57 (4.43)	46.39 (4.8)
Eastern Germany	0.08 (0.27)	0.36 (0.48)
Has a Child	0.67 (0.47)	0.31 (0.46)
Number of Children	1.42 (0.88)	0.76 (0.86)
Catholic Wife	0.4 (0.49)	0.23 (0.42)
Catholic Husband	0.37 (0.48)	0.2 (0.4)
Public Servant Wife	0.12 (0.32)	0.12 (0.33)
Public Servant Husband	0.2 (0.4)	0.15 (0.36)
N	243,996	246,334

*Notes:* The table displays descriptive statistics for the year 2009 for couples who picked either the men-favoring or symmetric withholding tax schedule. The sample restrictions summarized in Table 1 are applied. Eastern Germany comprises the area of the former German Democratic Republic and West Berlin.

To account for these differences in the intensity of treatment and to be able to calculate the elasticity of labor income with respect to withholding taxes, we perform our analysis using a continuous treatment variable. The continuous treatment variable measures the log change in the marginal net-of-withholding-tax rate of the woman induced by the reform.<sup>16</sup> We construct the treatment variable for each couple by taking the labor income of the woman in 2009 and calculating the percent change of her marginal net-of-withholding-tax rate resulting from using the tax schedule of 2010 compared to using the one of 2009. The reform-induced change in the marginal net-of-withholding-tax rate is plotted in Figure 8.

**Identifying assumptions.** As the core estimate, we want to measure the elasticity of labor income with respect to the withholding tax rate to obtain an estimate that is comparable to

<sup>16</sup>Using the change in the marginal net-of-withholding-tax rate instead of the marginal tax rate is standard in the literature on income tax elasticities (see in particular Saez et al. (2012) and Jakobsen and Sogaard (2022) for the theoretical motivation).




Figure 8: Reform-Induced Treatment Intensity

Notes: This figure displays the change in the net-of-withholding tax rate induced by the reform in 2010 depending on an individual's 2009 gross income.

the elasticity of taxable income (ETI). Naturally, our estimation strategy is closely related to the estimation strategies that identify the effects of ETI. Jakobsen and Sogaard (2022) provide a comprehensive framework of the empirical challenges. They differentiate between *between-income tax variation* and *within-income tax variation*. *Between-income tax variation* is exploited by the typical identification strategy for estimating elasticities in the taxation literature that makes use of differential reform effects across income, for example comparing high-income individuals who were subject to a tax reform with low income individuals who were not. In contrast, *within-income tax variation* exploits variation between groups with the same income level. This applies to our case where we compare women in the unfavorable withholding tax class to women in the default withholding tax class conditional on income.

Settings with *within-income tax variation* require two specific assumptions: First, conditional on income, the income growth of the two groups would be identical in the absence of the withholding tax reform. We can test this assumption for the periods before treatment, where the income trends of the two groups should be similar and placebo reforms should display no effect.<sup>17</sup> Second, our approach requires the assumption of effect homogeneity as both groups are treated (Callaway et al., 2024). This implies, that both groups would react to an identical reform identically. A natural test for this assumption would be a withholding tax (or income tax) reform that hits both groups with the same treatment intensity. Unfortunately, there were no other major reforms in our observed period (see Figure A.3).

<sup>17</sup>Similarly, *between-income tax variation* requires the assumption that, in the absence of changes in the tax schedule, the income growth in each year is identical along the income distribution. This often is a threat to identification due to mean reversion and differential secular income trends (see Jakobsen and Sogaard (2022) and Weber (2014)).

**Regression equation.** Using the treatment intensity, we are able to estimate a difference-in-differences equation which yields us an estimate for the elasticity of outcome  $y$  with respect to the withholding tax:

$$(1) \quad \ln\left(\frac{y_{i,t}}{y_{i,2009}}\right) = \sum_{t=2006}^{2018} \beta_t \left[ \ln\left(\frac{1 - \text{MWTR}_{i,2010}}{1 - \text{MWTR}_{i,2009}}\right) * \mathbb{1}(\text{Year}_t) \right] + \eta_i \\ + \delta f(y_{i,2009}, y_{-i,2009}, \text{child}_{c,2009}, \text{east}_{c,2009}) \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Year}_t) + \theta X_{i,-i,c,2009} + \epsilon_{i,t},$$

where  $\beta$  measures the percent change in labor income if the marginal net-of-withholding-tax rate of the woman increases by one percent.  $\eta_i$  controls for time-invariant individual fixed effects. Further,  $X_{i,-i,c,2009}$  controls for characteristics of the woman  $i$ , her partner  $-i$  and the couple  $c$  as a whole in 2009. For both spouses individually we control for age and age squared and for the couple as a whole the number of children and the region of residence.

We add dense couple-level cell fixed effects  $f(y_{i,2009}, y_{-i,2009}, \text{child}_{c,2009}, \text{east}_{c,2009})$  interacted with year dummies. We do this by binning wives' and husbands' incomes in 2009 in steps of €5,000 and interacting these bins with each other. In our preferred specification, we also interact these cells with indicators for whether a child lived in the household in 2009 and whether the household was located in Eastern Germany in 2009.

These controls are crucial for our identification: First, the controls for own income ensure that we only exploit variation in treatment intensity conditional on income. As the treatment intensity within a withholding tax class varies along the income distribution, a specification without the income controls would also pick up variation within withholding tax classes. Second, the interaction with the controls for partner income further ensures that we compare similar households. Controlling only for the income of the wife would not ensure that households have a similar distribution of income and pay the same income tax. We also illustrate the mechanics behind these cell controls graphically with a more detailed explanation in Appendix D. Lastly, interacting the income controls with the child and region indicator makes the comparison between groups even cleaner. As Table 3 shows, the child and region indicators are, besides income, the main determinants of different withholding tax class choices. By adding these characteristics as additional controls, we then only compare the evolution of income for households where prior to the reform both partners earn a similar amount, have at least one or no child and live in the same region. By interacting these controls with time fixed effects, we allow for different time trends for each cell.

## 5 Empirical Results

In this section, we present our empirical results showing that individuals adjust their labor income in response to changes in withholding taxes. We present event-study Diff-in-Diff estimates, show a robustness analysis and heterogeneities.

Table 3: Determinants of the Choice of Withholding Tax Schedules

	Choice of Men-Favoring Schedule
Eastern Germany	-0.221*** (0.011)
Female Income Share	-0.017*** (0.001)
Income Wife (1000 Euro)	-0.005*** (0.001)
Has a Child	0.113*** (0.011)
Number of Children	0.058*** (0.006)
Catholic Wife	0.005 (0.01)
Catholic Husband	0.027*** (0.01)
Age Wife	0.003** (0.001)
Age Husband	0.005*** (0.001)
Constant	0.891*** (0.054)
N	490330
Adj. $R^2$	0.51

*Notes:* The table displays which characteristics of a couple are predictive for the choice of the men-favoring schedule instead of the symmetric schedule. The coefficients stem from the regression of a dummy indicating the men-favoring schedule on various characteristics of couples in the year 2009, just before the withholding tax reform. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are displayed in brackets.

## 5.1 Main Results

First, we present in Figure 9 the results of the event-study Diff-in-Diff estimation as laid out in Equation 1. The independent variable is the treatment intensity of the reform measured by the log change in the marginal net-of-withholding-tax rate between 2009 and 2010. We thereby compare women in the favorable withholding tax class to women in the default tax class who were treated differently by the reform. The dependent variable is the log difference in income between year  $t$  and 2009. Hence, the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities of labor income with respect to the withholding tax rate in the respective year.

**Interpretation of pre-reform estimates.** As discussed in Section 4.5, one implication of the parallel trend assumption is that we should see no economically significant pre-reform effects of the treatment intensity. The pre-reform estimates in Figure 9 are not statistically significantly different from zero at the 5 % level and also economically insignificant and small compared to the post-reform estimates. There are two reasons why our sample restrictions (see Section 4.5) result in smaller error bands before the reform compared to after the reform. First, we condition




Figure 9: Event-Study Diff-in-Diff Estimates

*Notes:* The figure plots the estimates for the elasticity of labor income with respect to the marginal net-of-withholding tax estimated based on Equation 1 for the whole sample. The dependent variable is the log income difference in year  $t$  relative to 2009. The independent variable is the log difference in the marginal net-of-withholding-tax rate of the woman induced by the reform of the withholding tax in 2010. The regression includes individual fixed effects and controls for potentially time-varying characteristics of the couple. Cell fixed effects control for binned own and spousal pre-reform labor income interacted with dummies for parenthood, residence in Eastern Germany, and years. Confidence intervals are plotted at the 95 % level and based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the household level. The sample excludes households in which at least one member experienced a drop in income by more than 25 % from one year to the next before 2010 to ensure that no individuals directly hit by the financial crisis are part of the sample. This explains the smaller standard errors before the reform.

that each household is observable in all pre-reform years but after the reform households need not be observable in each year. Thereby, the sample size in the pre-reform years is larger. Second, we exclude households from the analysis in which at least one individual was hit by the financial crisis.

**Interpretation of post-reform estimates.** We find significant positive estimates for the elasticity of labor income with respect to the withholding tax rate. The effect size gradually increases over time and reaches an elasticity of approximately 0.14. These results imply that a one percent higher change of the marginal net-of-withholding tax rate in 2010 results in an around 0.14 percent higher labor income eight years after the reform. More intuitively, the results indicate that a woman whose marginal withholding tax rate was reduced from 30 % to 23 %, so whose marginal net-of-withholding tax rate increased by 10 percent from 70 % to 77 %, increased her labor income by approximately 1.4 percent eight years after the reform.

**Comparison to ETI literature.** There are no established elasticities of labor income with respect to the withholding tax that we can relate our estimated elasticity to. However, estimates from the literature on the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) with respect to the income tax provide a useful benchmark. As Neisser (2021) stresses in a meta-analysis, estimates for the ETI are strongly

context-dependent and consequently the observed estimates range from about 0.2 to about 0.8. Hence, our measured elasticity estimate is smaller than the typical estimate for a change in income taxes. This is in line with our expectation. As the reform changed only tax prepayments, only households with strong time preferences should react which would result in an elasticity very close to 0. Instead, as we discuss in Section 6, we expect that information frictions and incomplete pooling of household resources drive labor market responses of individuals.

**Back-of-the-envelope calculation.** To provide a sense of the effect's magnitude, we estimate with a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation the expected impact of a reform that abolishes the choice of withholding tax schedules and instead assigns each individual the marginal income tax rate of the respective couple to reflect the true work incentives of both spouses under joint taxation.<sup>18</sup> We illustrate the effects on the marginal tax rate for both examined withholding tax classes in Figure D.1. Such a reform has diverse effects, as the change depends on the partner's income and the withholding tax class before the reform. Focusing only on women who would experience a decrease in withholding taxes, the average decrease in withholding taxes of such a reform would be 5.5 %, resulting in an increase of the marginal net-of-withholding tax rate of 8.5 %. Using the elasticity of 14 %, this translates to an increase in labor income of about 1 %. However, these reform effects would be counteracted by women whose marginal withholding tax rate is lower than the income tax. For them, the marginal tax rate would increase by 7.5 % on average and, consequently, the marginal net-of-withholding tax rate would decrease by 9 %. As a result, labor income for this group would fall by about 1 %.

**Gradual increase.** The gradual increase of the observed effect size is in line with our expectation: First, it may take time for individuals to learn about the change in withholding taxes as the reform was non-salient. Shapiro and Slemrod (1995) find that one month after a much-debated cut in withholding taxes only a third of the respondents self-report that they noticed the change in withholding taxes even though employers were asked to actively inform their employees about the withholding tax change. As the reform we investigate was not discussed in the media, it can only have an effect if people realize the cut in withholding taxes independently. For example, individuals might realize that the monthly take-home pay changes or they might consult withholding tax calculators when considering a change in working hours or a job change.

Second, due to labor market frictions the response time of individuals might be heterogeneous. We think that a substantial part of the treatment effect occurs when women obtain an offer from their employer to increase their working hours and then evaluate their marginal gains from doing so using the now lower withholding taxes as their reference point. It is difficult to compare the finding of the gradual increase to the existing ETI literature, as it is uncommon in the ETI literature to report the development of coefficients over time. However, our finding is in line

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<sup>18</sup>A similar withholding tax system is in place in France, where both spouses are assigned the income tax rate of the couple in the previous year. For more details see Section 8.



with Gudgeon and Trenkle (2024) who show that low-income workers in Germany react slowly to changes in the German tax schedule.

Furthermore, it is striking that the treatment effect estimates never trend downward during our sample period. One could expect that taxpayers might update their beliefs on the income tax system and, in particular, the interlinkage between withholding taxes and income taxes, after seeing their income tax returns sometime in the middle of the year following the tax year. If they by this learned about the true relationship between withholding taxes and income taxes, this should incentivize them to revoke potential reactions to the withholding tax reform. The fact that we cannot see such reactions might indicate that they do not gain understanding of the tax system by filing their income tax declaration and receiving the final tax statement. This is in line with our survey evidence (see Section 7) where we show that the general understanding of withholding taxes is low.


## 5.2 Robustness

In Figure 10, we explore the robustness of our empirical results to different restrictions on bin size and sample composition. In Panel a, we vary the composition of the cell fixed effects. Applying less dense income controls by using bins of €10,000 instead of €5,000 only marginally changes the results. Also, not interacting the income controls with the indicators for living in Eastern Germany or having a child in 2009 do not change the estimates much. To ensure that our results are not driven by differences in tax filing behavior, we also show estimates for a balanced sample in Panel b. The balanced sample only includes couples that filed their income taxes in each of the sample years. Applying this restriction does not significantly change our results. To limit the impact of the financial crisis on our results, we have applied a restriction on the variation of the pre-reform incomes. In the baseline, we only consider couples in which both spouses had no year-over-year income change larger than 25 % prior to the reform. Neither relaxing this restriction to 50 % nor tightening the restriction to 15 % in Panel c significantly change our results. Finally, we want to ensure that our results are not driven by differences in fertility. In Panel d, we therefore restrict our sample to only women above the age of 45 and obtain only marginally different results compared to our baseline sample. In Panel e, we restrict our sample to couples that had no child birth in the pre-reform period and obtain the same results as in the baseline specification.


## 5.3 Heterogeneity

Figure 11 displays the estimated effects for various subgroups. For each subgroup, we estimate the effect in separate regressions with a sample split.


**Scope for behavioral changes.** Most strikingly, the effect is the strongest for subgroups who have more scope to adapt their labor supply. As we do not observe working hours in the data




(a) Bin size




(b) Balanced sample



(c) Alternative income restrictions




(d) Alternative age restrictions




(e) Birth before reform

Figure 10: Robustness


Notes: See notes of Figure 9.




(a) Commuting days



(b) Children



(c) West/Eastern Germany



(d) Religious affiliation wife

Figure 11: Effect Heterogeneity

Notes: See notes of Figure 9. Eastern Germany comprises the area of the former German Democratic Republic and West Berlin.

set, we proxy working part-time by the number of commuting days. If a women is commuting less than 180 days, we categorize her as a part-time worker. We find that the estimated effect is slightly larger for women working part time (Panel a).<sup>19</sup> In line with this finding, we also observe that the effect is smallest for the group without a child in the household in 2009 as they are more likely to work already full-time before the reform.<sup>20</sup> This is in line with previous studies investigating the behavioral reaction to income tax changes that typically find small behavioral reactions of men and substantial effects for women. This is typically explained by the larger scope for behavioral changes (Neisser, 2021).

**Other heterogeneities.** First, we study the effect separately for Western and Eastern Germany (Panel c). We find that the effect is smaller in Eastern Germany. The reason for that could be that women in Eastern Germany generally work more and therefore have less potential to increase their working hours. Second, we observe a larger effect for Catholic and Protestant households than for other households (Panel d).<sup>21</sup>

## 6 Theoretic Model

To better understand the underlying mechanism, we present a simple toy model to illustrate potential mechanisms that can rationalize why withholding taxes can matter for labor supply decisions. The core idea is that withholding taxes are only irrelevant for labor supply decisions if individuals fully internalize tax refunds and are indifferent to the timing of cash flows. We provide evidence for the relevance of these mechanisms in Section 7.

### 6.1 Tax Refund

The tax refund that an individual receives after the tax year is specified as

$$(2) \quad R_t(z_{it}; x_{it}; w_{it}) = T_t^{WT}(z_{it}; x_{it}; w_{it}) - T_t^{IT}(z_{it}; x_{it}),$$

where  $T_t^{WT}(z_{it}; x_{it}; w_{it})$  denotes the withholding tax liability that depends on taxable income  $z_{it}$ , a set of other tax-relevant variables  $x_{it}$  (following the notation of Jakobsen and Sogaard, 2022) and the individual's withholding tax class  $w_{it}$ .  $T_t^{IT}(z_{it}; x_{it})$  denotes the eventual income tax liability, which does not depend on the individual's withholding tax class  $w_{it}$ .

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<sup>19</sup>We only observe commuting days for individuals who claim commuter allowance which applies to 70% of the women in the sample.

<sup>20</sup>It is worth noting that our analysis only includes dual-earner couples and therefore excludes couples where one partner solely provides childcare.

<sup>21</sup>Most other religions and denominations do not collect their church tax through the German income tax system and their religious affiliation is thus not observable.

In a model without behavioral factors, an individual's tax liability  $T_t(z_{it}; x_{it})$  is equal to their withholding tax liability minus the tax refund

$$(3) \quad \begin{aligned} T_t(z_{it}; x_{it}) &= T_t^{WT}(z_{it}; x_{it}; w_{it}) - R_t(z_{it}; x_{it}; w_{it}) \\ &= T_t^{WT}(z_{it}; x_{it}; w_{it}) - [T_t^{WT}(z_{it}; x_{it}; w_{it}) - T_t^{IT}(z_{it}; x_{it})]. \end{aligned}$$

Importantly,  $T_t^{IT}(z_{it}; x_{it})$  is equal to  $T_t(z_{it}; x_{it})$  which demonstrates that the withholding tax liability is not a determinant of the total tax liability.

In the following, we expand Equation 3 to investigate how the introduction of different behavioral factors that influence the perception of future tax refunds can impact labor supply decisions. We model these factors as a weight that individuals assign to the tax refund.

## 6.2 Determinants of the Relevance of the Tax Refund

The weight hinges on three behavioral parameters that jointly determine the relevance of the tax refund, and thus of withholding taxes, for the individuals' decisions. These three parameters are summarized in Table 4 and discussed in the following.

**Understanding of the difference between income and withholding taxes:  $\alpha$ .** The parameter  $\alpha$  describes the degree to which individuals understand the difference between income and withholding taxes. If  $\alpha = 0$ , the individual does not realize that withholding taxes are only a prepayment to the income tax and that the payslip is not informative about the actual income tax. The higher  $\alpha$ , the more the tax refund affects the labor supply decision. If  $\alpha = 1$ , the individual fully understands the interlinkage between withholding taxes and income taxes.

**Share of tax refund that the individual expects:  $\gamma$ .** If a married couple is overwithheld, the resulting tax refund is paid out to a single bank account as they are taxed jointly. The share of the couple's tax refund that each of the spouses receives is thus at the couple's discretion and the result of intra-household bargaining. The share of the tax refund that is expected by an individual is expressed in the parameter  $\gamma$ . The higher  $\gamma$ , the larger the share of the tax refund that the individual receives or that is - in case the tax refund is remitted to a joint bank account of the couple - attributed to the individual. As both spouses face the same average income tax rate under joint taxation,  $\gamma = 1$  reflects a distribution of the household's tax refunds between partners such that this equality of average income tax rates is upheld. Assuming that the average withholding tax rate of both spouses is equal, this implies that each spouse receives a share of the tax refund that is equal to their share of labor income.<sup>22</sup> If  $\gamma < 1$ , the individual receives

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<sup>22</sup>To make the underlying idea more generalizable to other withholding tax systems, we have not explicitly modelled the German system of withholding tax schedules which we use for identification in this paper. In withholding tax systems that shift the withholding tax liability between partners, spouses must potentially have access to the labor income of the spouse in the favorable tax class above and beyond the tax refund to ensure that  $\gamma = 1$ .

Table 4: Parameters Determining Relevance of Tax Refund

Parameter	Description	Effect on labor supply
$\alpha$	Degree of understanding of withholding tax system	Lower understanding increases effects of withholding tax change
$\gamma$	Share of tax refund that individual expects to receive	Lower share of expected tax refund increases effects of withholding tax change
$\omega$	Time preference	Lower discount factor increases effects of withholding tax change

Notes: The table displays the parameters of the theoretic model.

a smaller share of the tax refund and ends up with a tax liability higher than implied by the income tax. Conversely, if  $\gamma > 1$ , the individual receives a larger share of the tax refund and ends up with a tax liability lower than implied by the income tax.

**Time preference:**  $\omega$ . The parameter  $\omega$  captures the degree to which the tax refund is discounted. If  $\omega = 1$ , the individual is indifferent between obtaining income today and receiving the same sum as a tax refund after the tax year. There are three reasons why  $\omega$  could be smaller than 1. First, it might simply reflect time preferences. Second, discounting might be impacted by borrowing constraints. If monthly income is essential for the individual to pay for occurring costs of living, then the individual has a strong preference for obtaining the payment today. Third, rational investors can invest money received earlier. So the larger the real interest rate, the lower  $\omega$  should be for the rational investor. This is especially relevant in countries like Germany or the US, where the government does not usually pay interest on overwithheld taxes.

Adding the three parameters  $\alpha$ ,  $\gamma$  and  $\omega$  as weights to the tax refund in Equation 3, the individual tax liability is now given as follows

$$(4) \quad T_t(z_{it}; x_{it}) = T_t^{WT}(z_{it}; x_{it}; w_{it}) - f(\alpha\gamma\omega)[T_t^{WT}(z_{it}; x_{it}; w_{it}) - T_t^{IT}(z_{it}; x_{it})].$$

### 6.3 Derivation of Optimal Labor Supply

To derive optimal labor supply in our model with withholding taxes, tax refunds and the three parameters  $\alpha$ ,  $\gamma$  and  $\omega$  we specify the standard quasi-linear utility function with respect to consumption  $c_{it}$  and taxable income  $z_{it}$

$$(5) \quad u_{it}(c_{it}, z_{it}) = c_{it} - \frac{n_{it}}{1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon}} \left( \frac{z_{it}}{n_{it}} \right)^{1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon}},$$

that each individual maximizes subject to the following budget constraint

$$(6) \quad c_{it} \leq z_{it} - T_t(z_{it}; x_{it}).$$

The parameter  $n_{it}$  expresses the individual's counterfactual income in the absence of taxation while  $\varepsilon$  is the parameter of interest, the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the marginal net-of-tax rate.

The individual tax liability given by Equation 4 gets plugged into the budget constraint given by Equation 6. Utility maximization then results in the following first-order condition with  $\tau_{it}^{WT} = 1 - T_t^{WT}(z_{it}; x_{it})$  denoting the individual marginal net-of-tax rate with respect to the withholding tax and  $\tau_{it}^{IT} = 1 - T_t^{IT}(z_{it}; x_{it})$  denoting the individual marginal net-of-tax rate with respect to the income tax in year  $t$

$$(7) \quad z_{it} = n_{it} \left[ \tau_{it}^{WT} - f(\alpha\gamma\omega)(\tau_{it}^{WT} - \tau_{it}^{IT}) \right]^\varepsilon.$$

## 6.4 Interpretation

Equation 7 illustrates how the withholding tax affects labor supply. The main finding is that the labor supply depends on the weight that an individual assigns to the tax refund. Assuming a positive tax refund, labor supply is impacted positively by the understanding of the tax system ( $\alpha$ ), the share of the tax refund that the individual expects to receive ( $\gamma$ ) and the factor with which the individual values money today in comparison to when the tax refund is paid out ( $\omega$ ). Intuitively, all factors that reduce the weight an individual assigns to the tax refund increase the relevance of withholding taxes for her labor supply.

If one of the three parameters is 0, labor supply only depends on the withholding tax  $\tau$  and is independent of the income tax rate  $\hat{\tau}$ . In this case, the size of the tax refund is irrelevant for the individual. In contrast, if all three factors are equal to 1, the withholding tax rate  $\tau$  has no impact on the labor supply decision. Thus, in this case the only factor determining labor supply is the income tax. It is important to note that the three factors interact. For example, even a fully-informed individual without time discounting might still show a strong reaction to the size of withholding taxes if the dynamics within the household are such that she is not expecting the full tax refund that is attributed to her under equal average tax rates.

Regarding the time preferences  $\omega$ , it is well documented in the literature that individuals have time discounting factors smaller than 1 (Falk et al., 2018; O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). For the other two factors, we know from other settings that the institutional knowledge of individuals is limited (Chetty et al., 2013; Gideon, 2017; Rees-Jones and Taubinsky, 2020) and that households do not fully pool resources (see Almås et al., 2023, for a recent survey of the literature). We corroborate the two latter findings empirically by presenting survey evidence that suggests that the two parameters,  $\alpha$  and  $\gamma$ , are likely also different from 1.




Figure 12: Survey on Potential Channels for the Effect of Withholding Taxes

Notes: The Figure displays the Survey responses. Individuals who did not know their withholding tax class ( $n=65$ ) are not included in the figure.

## 7 Survey

The goal of the survey is to study the understanding of the interlinkage between withholding taxes and income taxes, as well as the organization of household finances among married German couples.

In this section, we focus on the core results of our final analysis sample consisting of 506 (258 men, 248 women) married respondents in Germany. We provide more details on the setup of the survey in Appendix E: Section E.1 includes information on the implementation and our sample restrictions, Section E.2 provides more-in-depth analyses, and Section E.3 displays additional descriptive figures. Section H displays the original survey questionnaire in German and a translation into English. We have pre-registered our survey at the Open Science Foundation.

### 7.1 Understanding of Withholding Taxes

In our model in Section 6, we introduced the parameter  $\alpha$  that captures the understanding of the difference between income and withholding taxes. To learn about  $\alpha$ , we elicit whether our survey participants know that withholding taxes, and thus the choice of withholding tax schedules, do not affect a married couple's joint final income tax liability.

We do so by creating a realistic example of gross labor incomes of two spouses (one spouse earning €60,000 per year, the other one €30,000) and then ask the survey participants to select the withholding tax schedule which results in the lowest final income tax liability of the couple. We give them five answer options: the three withholding tax schedules, that it does not matter,



and that they do not know the answer.<sup>23</sup> As discussed in Section 3.2, irrespective of the choice of the withholding tax schedule, the final income tax liability of the couple is the same.

Row 1 of Figure 12 presents the share of individuals who correctly answered the question. We find that only around 16 % of the surveyed individuals know about the irrelevance of the withholding tax schedule for the final income tax liability at the beginning of our survey. Respondents in the men-favoring tax schedule have a better knowledge than respondents in the women-favoring schedule but the knowledge is very limited across all schedules. In Appendix Figure E.2, we also document heterogeneity in additional dimensions. In particular, men (20 %) are better informed than women (13 %) and individuals filing taxes themselves have better knowledge (22 %) than individuals not doing so (13 %).<sup>24</sup>

Importantly, this observation is not driven by the fact that people are generally unaware of the functioning of withholding taxes. To test the general knowledge we use the fact that in the German withholding tax system the names of the different withholding tax classes are number coded. So for example, the favorable class is called "Steuerklasse 3" while the unfavorable class has the name "Steuerklasse 5". As row 2 documents, 61 % of the respondents can correctly identify that, relative to the default class ("Steuerklasse 4"), the withholding tax is lower in "Steuerklasse 3" while it is higher in "Steuerklasse 5". This knowledge is lower for individuals in the women-favoring schedule but, as Appendix Figure E.3 documents, homogeneous with respect to gender, withholding tax class, age except for the youngest cohort, and to whether the individual files taxes herself.<sup>25</sup>

Combining the two knowledge questions, we find that 48 % of all respondents know that, and how, withholding tax classes change withholding taxes but not that withholding taxes are tax prepayments and have no impact on the final income tax liability. This is a remarkable finding as it implies that a large share of married couples in Germany might fall for the fallacy that they can save income taxes by choosing a certain withholding tax schedule. Couples who know that the partner in the favorable withholding tax class is subject to lower withholding tax rates and the partner in the unfavorable one is subject to higher withholding tax rates (compared to the symmetric schedule and to individual taxation) might then strategically assign their primary earner to the favorable and their secondary earner to the unfavorable class (corresponding to the men- or women-favoring withholding tax schedule) due to the underlying lack of understanding of the interlinkage between income and withholding taxes. This then distorts the relative intra-household distribution of labor income as paid out by the employers.

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<sup>23</sup>See Question D7 in Appendix Section H for the exact wording of the question.

<sup>24</sup>In Appendix Section E.2, we show that (1) knowledge correlates with own tax filing for men and women likewise, (2) men file taxes alone more often than women, but that (3) that gender gap in tax filing cannot explain the gender gap in knowledge to a substantial degree.

<sup>25</sup>After explaining the institutional setting, we also ask people to self-report whether they had understood the system correctly before (see Table E.1). 54 % of the individuals claim that they had understood that the choice of the withholding tax schedule does not impact the final income tax liability, while 95 % claim that they knew that the choice of withholding tax classes impacts their withholding taxes.

The low rate of understanding suggests that for many individuals the relationship between withholding taxes and tax refunds is not salient. For these individuals, the withholding tax rate impacts labor supply decisions as people misperceive withholding taxes as informative for their income taxes.

## 7.2 Organization of Household Finances

In the model, the parameter  $\gamma$  identifies the share of the tax refund of the household that the individual expects to receive. This is why we also investigate the organization of household finances in our survey.

The basic assumption underlying withholding tax classes is that households consisting of married couples act as unitary households. If this assumption does not hold, the choice of withholding tax schedule might have impacts on the eventual intra-household distribution of labor income and by that on the size of each spouse's budget and on their within-household bargaining power. To gain insights into such impacts we have to gain knowledge about potential money transfers between spouses as well as the division of tax refunds. Sophisticated couples could make transfers from the spouse in the favorable withholding tax class to the spouse in the unfavorable withholding tax class and thereby undo the shift of withholding taxes created by the men- or women-favoring schedule. Such a shift requires sophisticated knowledge of the tax system, and would require an adaption of the transfer whenever the income of one partner changes. Moreover, they could channel tax refunds to the spouse in the unfavorable tax class to (partly) account for the shifting of the withholding tax liability.

We thus asked whether married couples use shared bank accounts and to which bank account potential tax refunds are transferred.<sup>26</sup>

**Bank accounts.** We test the basic assumption of the joint organization of household finances tentatively by interpreting the absence of a shared bank account as an indication of a lack of a joint organization of household finances. If a couple does not have a shared bank account, it is very likely that the distortion of the relative intra-household distribution of labor income induced by shifting some part of the withholding tax liability from one partner to the other by choosing the men- or women-favoring withholding tax schedule remains largely unchanged as this couple is less likely to have established a compensatory sharing rule. In addition, even if married couples have a shared bank account they might not use it to re-distribute labor income from one spouse to the other.

As shown in the lower part of Figure 12, as much as 47% of the respondents in the men-favoring withholding tax schedule state to not have a shared bank account as a couple. We consider these couples unlikely to account for the distortion of the relative intra-household distribution of labor income arising from the choice of that schedule. In this context, it is

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<sup>26</sup>See Questions D16a and D17c in Appendix H for the exact wording of the questions.

interesting that shared bank accounts do not seem to be used more often by couples in the men-favoring schedule than by those in other schedules, indicating that they are not commonly used to strategically counteract this distortion.

**Tax refunds.** Furthermore, we document that the distortion is even aggravated by the way couples deal with tax refunds. As the lowest row of Figure 12 shows, 42 % of the couples in the men-favoring withholding tax schedule (16 % of those with and 72 % of those without a shared bank account) let tax refunds be transferred to the husband's personal bank account whereas that share is lower for couples in the other withholding tax schedules. In comparison, only 24 % of the women in the men-favoring schedule get the tax refunds onto their personal bank account.

Consequently, we anticipate that the relative intra-household earnings will be skewed in favor of the husband for the majority of couples under the men-favoring schedule. Moreover, the disposable net income of married women is reduced. This could lead them to overestimate their individual income tax liability, which may negatively impact their bargaining power within the household and diminish their perceived work incentives.

Taken together, these findings provide suggestive evidence that not all households fully pool their resources. Hence, this suggests that the share of a couple's tax refund that the individual expects (parameter  $\eta$  in the model in Section 6) might be impacted by the withholding tax rate.

## 8 Implementation of Withholding Taxes for Married Couples

Joint income taxation treats married couples as one unit and therefore sets one joint income tax liability for the couple. In contrast, withholding taxes are always levied on the individual level. Consequently, governments have to take a stance on the distribution of the withholding tax liability within the couple (average withholding tax rates) and on the marginal work incentives in the withholding tax system (marginal withholding tax rates). In this section, we discuss potential implementations of withholding taxes for married individuals and their implied trade-offs with respect to overwithholding, intra-household distribution of income and labor supply.

The decision on withholding taxes is of particular relevance in the presence of joint taxation benefits, as it is unclear whether and how the benefits of joint taxation should be distributed among the spouses through the withholding tax system. Not accounting for the joint taxation benefits in the withholding tax system can lead to substantial overwithholding in progressive tax systems, i.e., couples end up having substantially more withholding taxes remitted during the year than they have to pay in income taxes after filing their taxes. Therefore, minimizing the overwithholding of couples requires the implementation of a withholding tax system specifically for married individuals.

**Different withholding tax implementations.** Interestingly, while countries with joint taxation indeed have a distinct withholding tax design for married individuals, the design of withholding

tax schedules for married individuals differs substantially across countries. These differences are informative about the diverse set of objectives policy makers try to achieve by setting withholding taxes. In the following, we compare the current withholding tax system in Germany with a widely-discussed reform option that decreases overwithholding by adjusting the withholding tax rates of both spouses based on past household incomes. More explicitly, the reform option scales down the individual withholding tax rates that both spouses would have faced had they not been subject to joint taxation by a common factor, ensuring that the combined withholding tax payments of both spouses equal the expected income tax payment of the couple, based on the incomes in the previous year.<sup>27</sup>

We contrast the different implementations of withholding tax schedules in the German context with those implemented in France and the US. In France, a withholding tax system in which the withholding tax rate is calculated based on the household income two years before was introduced in 2018. The tax authority calculates the expected effective average income tax rate paid by the couple based on past income and then sets this rate as a common withholding tax rate for both spouses.<sup>28</sup>

In the US, all working individuals are asked to submit a W-4 form to their employer to decide on their amount of withholding. When a household is underwithheld, it is fined so that households have an incentive to match their withholding to the expected income tax (also see Gelman et al. (2022) and Jones (2012)). The withholding tax system for couples was changed in 2017. Since then, the most prominently presented option for couples is a system where for both spouses the withholding tax is determined along the favorable schedule, i.e., under the assumption that the other spouse has no labor income.<sup>29</sup> To avoid overwithholding arising from the fact that both spouses are thus assumed to be the only spouse subject to withholding taxes, couples are then asked to manually adapt the withholding of the primary wage earner. The tax authorities provide tabulations and a tax calculator that suggest - based on the expected income of both spouses - how much additional withholding taxes the primary wage earner should pay.<sup>30</sup>

In the absence of year-over-year income changes, the German reform option as well as the implementations in France and the US can completely eliminate overwithholding caused by the presence of joint taxation savings. The same holds true for couples in the withholding tax schedule that minimizes a couple's withholding tax liability in the current withholding tax

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<sup>27</sup>In 2010, this procedure was introduced in Germany under the name *schedule with a factor* ("IV mit Faktor") as an additional option for married couples. However, only around 40,000 couples (less than 0.5 % of all income-tax-paying couples) utilized this approach in 2018 (*Kleine Anfrage Bundestag* 2019). In the German coalition agreement of 2021 (*German Coalition Agreement* 2021), the parties agreed to abolish the *system with a choice* and to replace it with the *schedule with a factor*.

<sup>28</sup>As an alternative to the described system, households can also opt into a system where the withholding tax rate is higher for the primary wage earner than for the secondary wage earner. Here, marginal and average withholding taxes are still identical.

<sup>29</sup>Alternatively, couples can pick a withholding tax schedule that is similar to the German default symmetric schedule that mechanically overwithholds substantially when the income gap between spouses is large.

<sup>30</sup>When children are living in the household the child tax credit decreases taxable income. In this case, the tax authorities also recommend that only the withholding tax of the primary wage earner should be decreased.




Figure 13: Average Withholding Tax: Monthly Take-Home Pay of Spouses After Marriage Relative to Separate Taxation

*Notes:* The figure illustrates the change in the monthly take-home pay of joint taxation relative to separate taxation for both spouses in different withholding tax schedules. All withholding tax schedules on the red dashed line feature precise withholding, i.e., that the sum of withholding taxes of the two spouses matches the income tax. In withholding tax systems below the red dashed line, households are overwithheld, in tax systems above households are underwithheld. To the right of the y-axis (above the x-axis), the monthly take-home pay of the wife (husband) is larger than before marriage.

system in Germany as demonstrated before in Figure 3. However, all withholding tax schedules differ in how they affect both the marginal and the average withholding tax rates of the primary and secondary earner. We evaluate these differences separately with respect to average and marginal withholding tax rates for an example of a couple in which both the husband and the wife earn the respective median income of married men and women in Germany.

**Average withholding tax rates.** We start by evaluating the effects on the average withholding tax rate by showing how the monthly take-home pay of each spouse compares to the benchmark of separate taxation under the different withholding tax schedules in Figure 13. Withholding tax schedules in the upper-right quadrant result in a higher take-home pay for both the man and the woman compared to separate taxation, while those in the upper-left quadrant result in a higher take-home pay for the man and a lower take-home pay for the woman and those in the lower-right quadrant in a higher take-home pay for the woman and a lower take-home pay for the man. All withholding tax schedules that lie on the dotted red line avoid both over- and underwithholding by fully accounting for the joint taxation benefits of the couple in the withholding tax.

The figure shows that in the current withholding tax system in Germany, the example couple can avoid both over- and underwithholding by choosing the men-favoring schedule. Choosing either the symmetric or the women-favoring schedule would result in substantial overwithholding of the couple. However, comparing the monthly take-home pay under the men-favoring schedule to both those implied by the German reform option and the French implementation

highlights how unequal it distributes the joint taxation benefit among the spouses. While under the men-favoring schedule the husband receives all of the joint taxation benefits and an additional transfer from his wife, the other two implementations result in a much more equal distribution of the joint taxation benefit. In the German reform option, which scales down the individual withholding tax rates with a common factor, each spouse receives a share of the joint taxation benefit equal to their share of income taxes within the couple in absence of joint taxation benefits. In the French approach, which sets the average income tax rate paid by the couple as a common withholding tax rate for both spouses, each spouse receives a share of the joint taxation benefit equal to their gross income share within the couple.<sup>31</sup> Interestingly, the implementation in the US mirrors the men-favoring schedule, but instead assigns all the joint taxation benefits and a transfer from the husband to the wife.

**Marginal withholding tax rates.** Since the presence of joint taxation benefits results in different marginal income tax rates for the spouses compared to individual taxation, a decision has to be made to which extent the individual marginal withholding tax rates should reflect the couple's marginal income tax rate. This is of particular importance for secondary earners as the couple's marginal income tax rate is typically higher than their marginal income tax rate under individual taxation. Previous research (e.g., Bick and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2017) has argued that this higher marginal tax rate caused by joint taxation can lower the work incentives of secondary earners. With the help of the withholding tax system, policymakers can, however, decide the extent to which the individual marginal withholding tax rates reflect the couple's marginal income tax rate and can thereby in light of our previous findings potentially attenuate the negative work incentives for secondary earners.

In Figure 14, we illustrate the effects on the marginal withholding tax rates by comparing how they differ from the couple's marginal income tax rate. Withholding tax schedules in the upper-left quadrant result in a higher marginal withholding tax rate for the man and a lower marginal withholding tax rate for the woman compared to the couple's marginal income tax rate, while those in the lower-left quadrant result in a lower marginal withholding tax rate compared to the couple's marginal income tax rate for both spouses.

The figure shows that among all withholding tax schedules only the men-favoring schedule comes close to correctly displaying the marginal income tax rate of the example couple in the spouses' marginal withholding tax rates. In general, it holds that a couple that chooses the

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<sup>31</sup> While the illustrations in Figure 13 allow us to compare the effects that the different withholding tax schedules have on the monthly take-home pay, the fact that couples in the current withholding tax system can choose between different schedules makes it impossible to gauge from this figure the effect that a reform of the withholding tax system would have. Therefore, to assess the consequences of a reform of the current system in Germany, we compare the effects on the monthly take-home pay for all married primary and secondary earners along the income distribution in the Appendix F taking into account the current choice of withholding tax schedule and the income of the spouse.




Figure 14: Marginal Withholding Tax: Difference of Marginal Withholding Tax to Marginal Income Tax Rate of the Couple

*Notes:* The figure illustrates the difference between the marginal withholding tax rates of the spouses and the marginal income tax rates of the couple. To the right of the y-axis (above the x-axis), the marginal withholding tax rate of the wife (husband) is larger than the marginal income tax of the couple.

withholding-tax-minimizing schedule in the current withholding tax system faces marginal withholding tax rates that are very close to the couple's marginal income tax rate.<sup>32</sup>

The two other schedules in the current withholding tax system and the German reform option result in higher marginal withholding tax rates for the man and lower marginal withholding tax rates for the woman compared to the marginal income tax rate of the couple. The French implementation results in lower marginal withholding tax rates compared to the couple's marginal income tax rates for both spouses.<sup>33</sup> It is important to note that among all the discussed withholding tax options, this system has the unique feature that it has the same marginal withholding tax rate for both partners. This means that the French withholding tax system is the only one that correctly reflects that the marginal working incentives are identical for both partners in joint taxation systems. The implementation in the US results in a lower marginal withholding tax rate compared to the couple's marginal income tax rate for the wife, but in a slightly higher marginal withholding tax rate compared to the couple's marginal income tax rate for the husband.

**Implications for policymakers.** Figures 13 and 14 illustrate the trade-offs that policymakers are facing when designing withholding tax systems for married couples in the presence of joint taxation benefits. Not accounting for joint taxation benefits in the withholding tax system can lead to substantial overwithholding. Although high overwithholding provides governments with a temporary, interest-free loan, it comes at the expense of taxpayers and can impact households'

<sup>32</sup>As married couples in Germany typically choose the withholding-tax-minimizing schedule, their marginal withholding tax rates are very close to the couple's marginal income tax rate. We illustrate this in Figure F.2.

<sup>33</sup>We show the effects on the marginal withholding tax rate for all married primary and secondary earners along the income distribution in the Appendix F (see Footnote 31).

consumption and savings decisions (Feldman, 2010; Messacar, 2018; Shapiro and Slemrod, 1995). Figure 13 shows that all withholding tax schedules that account for the joint taxation benefits are able to eliminate overwithholding, but differ in how they distribute the benefits among the primary and secondary earner. The German reform option and the French implementation result in a much more equal distribution of the joint taxation benefit than the current withholding tax system in Germany. The implementation in the US results in an unequal distribution of the joint taxation benefit similar to the one in the current withholding tax system in Germany, with the difference that it favors the wife instead of the husband. The distribution of the joint taxation benefits among the spouses is relevant as it can matter for their bargaining weights in the household. Receiving a higher share of the joint taxation benefit might increase the individual consumption possibilities. Additionally, it can also affect labor supply decisions if it changes the perceived returns to work.

Focusing on the marginal work incentives in Figure 14 shows that "average" couples choosing the withholding-tax-minimizing schedule in the current withholding tax system face the "correct" marginal work incentives as the marginal withholding tax is very similar to the example couple's marginal income tax. In contrast, the other options might deceive the individuals about their marginal work incentives as the marginal withholding tax does not equal the couple's marginal income tax. Given the finding in our paper that individuals react to withholding taxes, deceiving secondary earners by lowering their marginal withholding tax rates below the couple's marginal income tax rates could circumvent the negative work incentives of joint taxation for secondary earners and thus potentially increase the labor supply of women. However, the figure also shows that, with the exception of the French implementation, primary earners face marginal withholding tax rates above the couple's marginal income tax rates. Nevertheless, we would expect that this higher marginal withholding taxes do not significantly affect their labor supply as the labor market attachment of primary earners is high and their labor supply relatively inelastic.

## 9 Conclusion

In this paper, we show that withholding taxes impact labor supply decisions. Examining a reform that reduced withholding taxes more for some women than for others allows us to estimate the elasticity of labor income with respect to the marginal net-of-withholding tax rate. We estimate an elasticity of about 0.14 which is larger than would be expected from the response of a rational, fully-informed household, since only budget constraints and other time preferences should affect the labor supply decision. At the same time, the estimate is smaller than typical estimates for an income tax cut. We provide explanations for our findings with the help of a survey, in which we find that less than 20 % of the respondents know that withholding taxes can be fully credited against the income tax. In addition, we find evidence that married couples do not fully pool their



resources, suggesting that a change in withholding tax may have real effects on the disposable income of spouses.

The novel finding that withholding taxes affect labor supply could help to bridge the gap between two parallel strands of the existing literature on behavioral responses to income taxation. On the one hand, it is well documented that individuals respond to income taxation (see Neisser, 2021, for a comprehensive review). On the other hand, people show a limited understanding of withholding taxes (Feldman et al., 2016; Stantcheva, 2021, see for example). This raises the question of how individuals can respond to taxes that they do often not understand. Our results suggest that withholding taxes can constitute a central cornerstone in understanding how people learn about the tax rates they face. In particular, withholding taxes could help explain the empirical findings from the "schmeduling" literature (Liebman and Zeckhauser, 2004; Rees-Jones and Taubinsky, 2020). It is well documented that a large proportion of US taxpayers "iron", i.e., people assume that their marginal tax rate is equal to the average tax rate along the income distribution. This misperception may be due to withholding taxes, as those are the main points of contact for individuals with income taxes. People may misinterpret the information they receive on their payslip about the marginal labor supply incentives. Future research can provide valuable insights into the cognitive processes and heuristics that shape individuals' responses to income taxation, which can then be used to design more efficient tax systems.

Interestingly, the relevance of withholding taxes is already recognized within the political sphere. For example, France and Germany are planning major reforms of their withholding tax systems in 2025 and 2029, respectively. Surprisingly, both reforms do not aim to align marginal withholding tax rates with marginal income tax rates. Instead, they reduce marginal withholding tax rates for secondary earners while increasing them for primary earners, suggesting that withholding taxes are used as tools to increase the labor supply of women.

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## Appendix A Additional Details on Institutional Setting




Figure A.1: Marginal Withholding Tax Rates 2009

Notes: The figure plots the marginal withholding tax rates by withholding tax class in 2009.




Figure A.2: Absolute Size of Reform on Withholding Taxes by Withholding Tax Class between 2009 and 2010

Notes: The figure plots the effect of the withholding tax reform 2010 on average and marginal withholding tax rates depending on the withholding tax class.




Figure A.3: Development of the Average Withholding Tax Rate

*Notes:* The figure plots the size of withholding tax payments depending on the withholding tax class for the period from 2006 to 2018. It illustrates for an income of €25,000 that there were no other major reforms changing withholding tax payments except for the 2010 reform that we study in this paper. This holds true along the whole income distribution.




Figure A.4: Trends in Relevant Google Search Terms

*Notes:* The figure plots the mean-standardized detrended search for terms relevant in the context of withholding taxes on Google.de. For the terms withholding tax reform ("Lohnsteuerreform"), tax prepayment ("Steuervorauszahlung"), other synonyms for a change in the withholding tax class (e.g. "Steuerklassenänderung", "Steuerklasse ändern/wechseln"), or explicit searches for withholding tax classes (like "Steuerklasse V"), the search volume is so low that the results are not published by Google.

Source: trends.google.de

## Appendix B Additional Descriptive Statistics




Figure B.1: Choice of the Withholding Tax Schedule Relative to the Birth of the First Child

*Notes:* The figure displays the share of couples in the three different withholding tax schedules around the birth of the first child for all children born between 2008 and 2018.




Figure B.2: Changes in the Choice of Withholding Tax Classes Over Time

*Notes:* The figure displays the share of couples in the three different withholding tax schedules and the transitions between the different withholding tax schedules over time. The figure shows that the choice of withholding tax schedules is relatively stable over time. Couples typically stick with their choice of withholding tax schedules and only a few couples change between different withholding tax schedules. Note that we only consider direct transitions between withholding tax schedules. So we do not include cases where couples do not file their taxes in a specific year and later reenter the dataset with a different withholding tax schedule. The difference in the shares to Figure 4 stems from the changed data composition. While this figure has no sample restrictions, the right side of Figure 4 documents the share only for couples where both spouses are working.



## Appendix C Additonal Details on Empirical Strategy Section 4

In our empirical strategy, we control for binned own and spousal pre-reform labor income interacted with dummies for pre-reform parenthood and residence in Eastern Germany by adding couple-level cell fixed effects to our regression (see Section 4.5). We motivate the underlying reason for the cell controls in the following in more detail.

Controlling for own pre-reform labor income is necessary as the treatment intensity does not only vary across withholding tax classes, but also across labor income. This is illustrated in the lower part of Figure C.1, which displays the change in the net-of-withholding tax rate, i.e., the treatment intensity, induced by the reform. As we only want to use the variation in treatment intensity caused by the different choice of withholding tax classes, it is important to control for own pre-reform income.

Moreover, there are also reasons why it is important to additionally control for spousal pre-reform labor income. First, controlling for joint household income enables us to compare women that face the same income tax liability on the couple level but different changes in their withholding taxes. Second, controlling for the relative within-household labor income allows us to control for the economic importance of own labor income and a couple's labor market related gender norms. Gender norms of the within-household division of labor arguably play a large role in explaining labor market decisions of spouses as well as their choice of withholding tax schedule.<sup>34</sup>

In order to address these above-outlined channels, we follow an empirical strategy that is similar to Carbonnier et al. (2022). The idea is to divide observations into cells to exploit variation in treatment within each cell. In our preferred specification, we classify each individual into one of 400 cells based on own and spousal pre-reform labor income in 2009 and dummies indicating parenthood and residence in Eastern Germany. We include the dummies to make sure that we account for the most relevant predictors of the withholding tax schedule choice as shown in Figure 3. Thereby, we ensure that the compared individuals are more similar in observable characteristics. The cells are created by interacting evenly spaced bins of €10,000 of both own and partner income. Each of the 100 cells is then interacted with dummies for parenthood and residence in Eastern Germany. By adding the resulting couple-level cell fixed effects interacted with years as controls we only use the variation in treatment intensity within each cell. We thus compare women with similar own and spousal pre-reform income characteristics. The remaining variation in treatment that we exploit then only comes from the different choices of withholding tax schedules.

We illustrate how the cell approach helps to tackle endogeneity concerns in Figure C.1. Along the x-axis, the cells help to control for own pre-reform labor income so that differences in

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<sup>34</sup>Our survey shows that couples in the men-favoring schedule hold more traditional gender norms than those in the symmetric schedule (see Figure E.1). Comparing only couples with a similar within-household division of labor income could mitigate this problem because, as we show in Table 2, this division is correlated with the choice of withholding tax schedule.




Figure C.1: Illustration of Income Cell Approach

*Notes:* This figure illustrates the idea behind using income cell fixed effects. The lower part of the figure displays the change in the net-of-withholding tax rate induced by the reform in 2010. The upper part of the figure illustrates the income cell approach. We create bins for the income of women and men, interact them with each other and interact the resulting income cells with our sample years. By adding these interacted cells to our regression equation, we only exploit variation in the treatment within the cells.

treatment intensity are only induced by the choice of withholding tax schedule, not by the income level. Along the y-axis, differences in relative within-household labor income are accounted for. Two women with the same own labor income but different withholding tax classes can still be very different with regards to other relevant factors such as the economic importance of own labor income which is driven by the size of their partners' income. A women earning €30,000 with a partner earning €20,000 has very different work and tax incentives compared to the same women with a spouse earning €80,000. Using the cell approach therefore ensures comparing more similar couples.

Given the arguments brought forward so far, though, controlling for both own and spousal income separately would be sufficient. However, not only relative within-household labor income but also absolute household labor income might play a role. Couples with higher absolute labor income might tend to choose other withholding tax schedules but also react differently to changes in the net-of-withholding-tax rate. Thus, the bin approach controls for differences in absolute household labor income along the diagonal of the upper part of Figure C.1.

The variation that we can exploit by the bin approach is illustrated in Figure 7. It shows for each of the income cells the share of couples who are treated in a binary sense, i.e., the share of couples being in the men-favoring withholding tax schedule at the time of the reform conditional on being in the men-favoring or symmetric withholding tax schedule. The size of

each bin represents the number of observations, meaning that bins with larger dots contain a larger share of the observations in our sample. The plot shows that for the largest shares of couples the husband earns between €20,000 and €50,000 and the wife between €10,000 and €40,000 and that within those bins there is a considerable amount of variation in the choice of withholding tax schedules.

## Appendix D Additional Results Complementing Section 5




Figure D.1: Difference Between Withholding and Income Tax Rates for Married Women

*Notes:* The figures display the deviations in marginal and average withholding tax rates from the couple's income tax rates. The deviations are shown separately for individuals that chose the default withholding tax class and for individuals that chose the favorable/unfavorable withholding tax class. A positive coefficient implies that the marginal withholding tax rate is larger than the marginal income tax rate. We display the deviations in tax rates separately for primary earners in Panel (a) and (b) and for secondary earners in Panel (c) and (d). All calculations are based on a 10% sample of German administrative tax records from the year 2010, using the German tax code (RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, 2010). To ease the interpretation of the figures, we ignore all non-standard deductions.

## Appendix E Additional Details Relating to the Survey Section 7

In this section, we provide more information on the implementation of the survey (E.1), present results from an information treatment and discuss additional findings from the survey concerning the organization of household finances, gender norms and the filing behavior of couples (E.2).

### E.1 Implementation

We pre-registered our survey with the Open Science Foundation and subsequently ran it on the micro job platform Clickworker between December 2022 and April 2023. We prescreened the participants so that they all speak German, are between 20 and 60 years old, married, and employed. We remove 73 respondents from our sample who fail at least one of two attention checks.<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, we restrict the sample to respondents with employed spouses. This makes sure that we can elicit information on wage transfers from and between both spouses and makes the sample more comparable to the sample for our main analysis with observational data.<sup>36</sup> Our final sample then consists of 506 respondents (258 men, 248 women).

The survey questions can be divided broadly into four main categories. First, we directly inquire about the participants' understanding of withholding taxes in Germany. Second, we ask for information on the intra-household division of tax-planning and financial decisions. Third, we elicit participants' preferences on changing their weekly working hours and check whether an information treatment, which informs the participants about the withholding tax system in Germany, changes these preferences. Lastly, we elicit respondents' gender norms. Table E.1 documents descriptive statistics of the survey answers.

### E.2 Detailed Survey Analysis

**Filing of taxes.** One way to gauge which couples are particularly affected by the intra-household distortion of earnings and thus by adverse labor supply incentives for women is to examine the role of the filing of taxes in the income tax declaration made in the calendar year following the respective tax year. We asked respondents about their tax filing behavior and concentrate on those who file their income taxes jointly as a married couple as it is the case for our analysis sample in the administrative data.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>35</sup>The attention checks can be found in the questions A2 and D15 in Appendix H.

<sup>36</sup>We also exclude respondents from our analysis who are in a same-sex marriage, where one of the two partners is non-binary or when the gender is not stated. This is for two reasons: First, there is an option for spouses in a same-sex marriage to keep that marriage secret from their employers by choosing withholding tax class I instead of III, IV, or V. This might then influence their knowledge of withholding taxes in an unforeseeable way. Second, same-sex couples were not yet allowed to benefit from joint taxation and were thus not allowed to choose their withholding tax classes at the time of the 2010 reform.

<sup>37</sup>This applies to 82 % of our respondents. A joint tax declaration has to be signed by both spouses but no other participation in filing the declaration is needed. See Question D17 in Appendix H for the exact wording of the question.

Looking at heterogeneities by gender, we find that, among these respondents, 56 % of men but only 37 % of women state that they usually do the majority of the tax declaration alone. This difference in tax filing behavior is driven by couples in the men-favoring withholding tax schedule. Of all men in the men-favoring withholding tax schedule, 65 % do the tax declaration mostly alone, while this only applies to 35 % of the women in that schedule. In the symmetric schedule, however, the gender difference is much lower with 50 % of the men and 46 % of the women claiming to do the tax declaration mostly alone, respectively. This shows that a more gender-equal exposure to the income tax system correlates with a less distortive distribution of withholding taxes in favor of men.

As documented in Figure E.2, women less often than men know that withholding taxes do not have an influence on the final income tax liability. This gender gap in knowledge about the tax system could be linked to the amount of time and effort spent dealing with it by preparing tax declarations. Moreover, we see that those respondents that do most of the tax declaration alone also exhibit a larger knowledge about the irrelevance of withholding taxes for the final income tax liability at the beginning of the survey. For women, knowledge increases from 10 % to 17 % when they deal with the tax declaration mostly alone, for men from 16 % to 25 %.

A possible conclusion from these findings is that couples in which predominantly the husband deals with taxes are also more affected by the incentive distortions arising from the shifting of the withholding tax liability from husbands to wives. This may indicate a self-manifesting role of the household division of tasks, whereas this division itself might be linked to gender norms.

**Household finances.** To investigate the organization of household finances, we broadly classify couples into three groups with respect to their usage of bank accounts and the destinations of the wage payments from their monthly payslips: (i) Couples without a shared bank account, (ii) couples with a shared bank account who get both their wages directly transferred to that account, and (iii) couples with a shared bank account where both spouses get their wages directly transferred to their own bank account. These categorizations are of particular relevance for couples that picked the men-favoring or women-favoring schedule because in these schedules the intra-household distribution of labor income is distorted as the withholding tax liability is partly shifted from one spouse to the other. As we focus on couples in the men-favoring schedule in our main analysis with administrative data, we also concentrate on these here. Furthermore, we investigate onto which bank account tax refunds are transferred as they might be used to counter the distortion of the distribution of labor income.

If a couple does not have a shared bank account, it is very likely that the distortion of the relative intra-household distribution of labor income remains largely unchanged as this

couple is less likely to have established a compensatory sharing rule. We find that 47 % of the respondents in the men-favoring schedule do not have a shared bank account.<sup>38</sup> Strikingly, of those without a shared bank account, 81 % of the couples in the men-favoring withholding tax schedule let their tax refunds be transferred to the husband's bank account. This compares to 65 % of the couples in the symmetric schedule. Thus, it can be concluded that the distortions of the intra-household distribution of labor income induced by the shifting of the withholding tax liability from husbands to wives in the men-favoring withholding tax schedule are not only not diminished by the distribution of tax refunds but even aggravated.

On the other hand, 32 % of all couples in the men-favoring withholding tax schedule have a shared bank account on which both spouses get their wages directly transferred to.<sup>39</sup> For these households, the above-described distortion of the relative intra-household distribution of labor income appears rather unproblematic.<sup>40</sup> This is particularly the case because we find that almost all of these couples get their tax refund onto the shared bank account and none onto the husband's bank account. When all of a couple's labor income including any tax refund is transferred to a shared account, the choice of the men-favoring schedule likely does not directly impact the consumption opportunities of women, as they can probably use the money on the shared bank account for their private consumption. However, the bargaining power within the household might still be impacted if the transfer of the withholding tax liability, induced by the men-favoring schedule, is not understood and the shifted labor income is thus mentally attributed to the husband instead of the wife.

For the 16 % of the couples in the men-favoring withholding tax schedule that have a shared bank account but receive their wage incomes to each spouse's personal bank account, it is less clear if households are compensated for the redistributive effect of the men-favoring withholding tax schedule.<sup>41</sup> In these cases, the money from the respective personal bank account can be seen as typically designated for the account holder's individual consumption while both partners transfer a share of their personal income to the shared bank account. We further examine in an exploratory fashion whether women are in these cases compensated for the higher withholding taxes they have to pay. Couples that take into account the redistributive consequences of the

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<sup>38</sup>When considering couples irrespective of their withholding tax schedules, 45 % of the respondents state to not have a shared bank account.

<sup>39</sup>This compares to about 21 % of the couples in the symmetric withholding tax schedule. This indicates that couples in the men-favoring withholding tax schedule use shared bank accounts as a device to compensate to a limited extent.

<sup>40</sup>This also applies to another 3 % of the couples in the men-favoring schedule where the husband's wage income gets directly transferred to either his wife's account or the shared account and the wife's wage income gets directly transferred to her own account.

<sup>41</sup>This applies even more to another 2 % of the couples in the men-favoring schedule where the husband's wage income gets directly transferred to his own account while the wife's wage income gets directly transferred to either the husband's account or the shared account.

men-favoring schedule should have established a transfer rule that requires the husband to transfer a larger part of his income to the shared bank account than his wife.

We find that only 38 % of all couples in the men-favoring schedule that have a shared bank account but receive their wage incomes to each spouse's personal bank account make use of such a transfer rule. This means that even among couples in the men-favoring schedule with a shared bank account, 21 % do not seem to account for the distortion effects of being in the men-favoring schedule. Thus, we can monitor a counteracting strategy for only 42 % of all couples in the men-favoring schedule (those with a shared bank account who either already get their wages directly transferred accordingly or do compensatory payments from the husband to the wife afterward).

**Gender norms.** As Stöwhase (2011) and Buettner et al. (2019) show with administrative tax records, German married couples are more likely to choose the men-favoring withholding tax schedule when the husband outearns the wife than to choose the women-favoring schedule when the wife outearns the husband.<sup>42</sup> This phenomenon could be attributed to a gender norm that prescribes the husband to be the main breadwinner (Bertrand et al., 2015). As a consequence, couples with such a norm should be more likely to choose the men-favoring withholding tax schedule.

We investigate this by asking the respondents three questions, each with seven ordered answer options, to elicit their norms regarding gender roles in households.<sup>43</sup> From the answers to these questions, we create a standardized index of the traditionality of gender norms where a higher value means that the respondent wants to have a larger role for husbands than for wives with regard to decision-making in the household and to market work.

As shown in Figure E.1, respondents in the men-favoring have more traditional gender norms than those in the symmetric withholding tax schedule. This holds true for both men and women and indicates that those most affected by distortions of labor supply incentives are also those who favor a traditional division of market and non-market work. This is particularly relevant as the figure also shows that women who hold more traditional gender views are, as expected, also those that have the highest margin for adjusting their working hours as they tend to have fewer working hours than women with more progressive gender norms.

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<sup>42</sup>Moreover, they also more often choose the men-favoring schedule when the wife outearns the husband than they choose the women-favoring schedule when the husband outearns the wife.

<sup>43</sup>See Question D18 in Appendix Section H for the exact wording of the questions. All three questions have been asked in this form in previous waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).






Figure E.1: Gender Norms Index by Gender

*Notes:* The figure plots standardized index values for gender norms by gender for different withholding schedules and bins of monthly working hours of the wife. A higher value of the gender norms index is associated with more traditional gender norms, i.e., a desired larger role for husbands than for wives with regards to decision-making in the household and market work.

**Information treatment.** We also implemented an information treatment. The idea was to explain the German withholding tax system, in particular the relationship between the choice of withholding tax classes for monthly take-home pay and the irrelevance of the withholding tax choice for the income tax. We then assessed whether people with these new information at hand want to change their withholding tax classes and adapt their working hours.<sup>44</sup> As Table E.2 documents out of the 506 interviewed individuals, 83 already knew before our provided explanation that the choice of the withholding tax schedule is irrelevant for the income tax. After the explanation of the withholding tax system, we asked again about the optimal withholding tax choice. Among the 423 individuals that could have learned about the system with the help of our explanation, only 42 % (179 individuals) learned that the choice of withholding tax schedules is irrelevant for the income tax. Thereby, the statistical power is too small for a meaningful analysis of the information treatment. Suggestively, the treatment has a negative impact on the intention of changing working hours today or in the past.

<sup>44</sup>Questions D10 and D11 explain the system while Question D12 tests the understanding of the irrelevance of the withholding tax choice for the income tax. Questions D13a-c ask about intended behavioral consequences.

### E.3 Additional Survey Figures




Figure E.2: Knowledge of Interlinkage between Withholding Tax and Final Income Tax Liability by Subgroups

*Notes:* The figure plots the overall and subgroup-specific shares of surveyed individuals who correctly identify that the choice of withholding tax class does not impact the final income tax liability given an example of the labor incomes of two spouses (one spouse earning €60,000 per year, the other one €30,000). See Question D7 in Appendix H for the exact wording of the question.




Figure E.3: Knowledge of Interlinkage Between Withholding Tax Classes and Monthly Payslip

*Notes:* The figure plots the overall and subgroup-specific shares of surveyed individuals who correctly identify that and in which way the choice of withholding tax classes impacts the monthly net wage received from one's employer. Respondents are classified as being knowledgeable if they both answer correctly what happens qualitatively with respect to monthly wage transfers from their employers when changing from the default withholding tax class to (1) the favorable withholding tax class and (2) the unfavorable withholding tax class. See Questions D8 and D9 in Appendix H for the exact wording of the questions.

Table E.1: Survey Descriptives

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<b>Demographics</b>					
Women	506	0.49	0.50	0.00	1.00
Age	506	39.39	8.67	22.00	57.00
At least one child	500	0.61	0.49	0.00	1.00
High school degree	506	0.79	0.41	0.00	1.00
<b>Work-Related Variables</b>					
Income	443	46896	23532	5000	100000
Income partner	438	43790	23904	5000	100000
Working hours	506	34.45	9.74	5.00	65.00
Working hours partner	506	34.08	10.53	0.00	70.00
<b>Gender Norms</b>					
Husband should have last word at home	506	1.89	1.43	1.00	7.00
Both partners should work the same	506	2.63	1.71	1.00	7.00
Husband responsible for financial security	506	2.80	1.86	1.00	7.00
Gender norm index	506	0.00	1.00	-1.13	3.58
<b>Household Finances</b>					
Men-favoring schedule	506	0.35	0.48	0.00	1.00
Tax consultant decided on withholding tax class	506	0.09	0.28	0.00	1.00
Shared bank account	506	0.55	0.50	0.00	1.00
Joint tax declaration of couple	501	0.96	0.19	0.00	1.00
Husband's wage transferred to joint bank account	506	0.27	0.45	0.00	1.00
Tax refund on shared bank account	506	0.44	0.50	0.00	1.00
Feel financial constraint at end of month	483	0.44	0.50	0.00	1.00
<b>Tests of Knowledge</b>					
Correct identification of existing wt schedules	506	0.39	0.49	0.00	1.00
Understood difference IT/WT before survey	506	0.16	0.37	0.00	1.00
Understood impact WT Schedule on WT	506	0.61	0.49	0.00	1.00
Withholding tax impacts unemployment benefits	506	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00
Withholding tax impacts parental leave benefits	506	0.43	0.50	0.00	1.00
<b>Self-Reported Knowledge</b>					
Difference IT/WT before survey	506	0.54	0.50	0.00	1.00
- Among thschedule on WT	506	0.95	0.22	0.00	1.00
- Among those who failed knowledge test	196	0.91	0.29	0.00	1.00
Overall Sample Size	506				

*Notes:* The Table displays descriptive statistics for the answers to the survey (see Appendix H for the full questionnaire). Income and working hours were asked in brackets and the respective mean was assigned to every individual for this tabulation. The gender norm index is calculated by summing up the item responses to the three questions (inverting the answers to Question 2) and mean-standardizing this sum.

Table E.2: Information Treatment

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<b>Information Treatment</b>					
Correct answer after information treatment	506	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00
- Among those who were wrong before	423	0.42	0.49	0.00	1.00
<b>+ Information Treatment</b>					
Would change working hours now	171	0.04	0.20	0.00	1.00
Would have changed working hours in the past	171	0	0	0	1
Would change withholding tax class	164	0	0	0	1
<b>- Information Treatment</b>					
Would change working hours now	232	0.12	0.32	0.00	1.00
Would have changed working hours in the past	232	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
Would change withholding tax class	164	0.05	0.22	0.00	1.00
Overall Sample Size	506				

*Notes:* The Table displays the answers to the information treatment. The outcomes for the information treatment are reported for the individuals who have learned and who did not answer "do not know" to the respective questions before or after the treatment.

## Appendix F Additional Figures Related to Section 8 Policy Implications






Figure F.1: Marginal Income Tax for Income of 24,000 €


*Notes:* The figure shows the marginal income tax rate depending on the income of the partner for an individual earning €24,000 under both joint and separate taxation. When a couple is taxed jointly, the marginal income tax rate for the individual increases in partner income as the marginal income tax is a function of household income. If the couple is taxed separately, the marginal income tax rate of each spouse does not depend on partner income.




(a) Primary Earner: Average Tax Rates



(b) Primary Earner: Marginal Tax Rates




(c) Secondary Earner: Average Tax Rates



(d) Secondary Earner: Marginal Tax Rates

Figure F.2: Difference between Withholding and Income Tax Rates

*Notes:* The figures display the deviations in marginal and average withholding tax rates from the couple's income tax rates. The deviations are shown separately for individuals that chose the default withholding tax class and for individuals that chose the favorable/unfavorable withholding tax class. A positive coefficient implies that the withholding tax rate is larger than the income tax rate. We display the deviations in tax rates separately for primary earners in Panel (a) and (b) and for secondary earners in Panel (c) and (d). All calculations are based on a 10% sample of German administrative tax records from the year 2010, using the German tax code (RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, 2010). With "primary earner" we denote the individual in the household with higher labor income and with "secondary earner" we denote the individual in the household with lower labor income. To ease the interpretation of the figures, we ignore all non-standard deductions.



(a) Primary Earner: Marginal Tax Rates

(b) Secondary Earner: Marginal Tax Rates

Figure F.3: Marginal Withholding Tax Rates in Different WT Regimes for Married Couples

*Notes:* The figures display the *long-term* mean marginal withholding tax rates induced by different withholding tax systems. Additionally, the couple's mean income tax rates and the mean income tax rates under separate taxation are displayed. We display the tax rates separately for primary earners in Panel A and for secondary earners in Panel B. All calculations are based on a 10,% sample of German administrative tax records from the year 2010, using the German tax code (RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, 2010). With "primary earner" we denote the individual in the household with higher labor income and with "secondary earner" we denote the individual in the household with lower labor income. When interpreting the figures it is important to keep in mind that along the x-axis individuals have partners with different income. Typically, individuals with higher income also have a partner with higher income. Moreover, in contrast to the remainder of the paper, the figures also include couples where only one partner has wage income. Hence, the panels for the primary earner include more households than the panels for the secondary earner. To ease the interpretation of the figures, we ignore all non-standard deductions.

## **Appendix G   Calculation of Withholding Taxes**

Our aim is to calculate the withholding tax as precisely as possible, because our treatment intensity is based on the withholding tax in 2009 and 2010. In Subsection G.1, we discuss how we calculate the withholding tax ("Lohnsteuer") in detail and in Subsection G.2 how we deal with other withheld taxes and social security contributions. In Subsection G.3, we compare the estimated withholding tax with the withholding tax observed in the data and show that overall we approximate the withholding tax liability well.

### **G.1   Details on the Calculation of Withholding Taxes**

The goal of the German government when designing the withholding tax system was to match income tax payments as closely as possible. All standard deductions for the income tax are thus implemented for the withholding tax as well. For the calculation of withholding taxes, we follow the program flowchart ("Programmablaufplan") published by the Federal Ministry of Finance after every change in any parameter or function. To ensure the correctness of the code we test our calculations against the officially published withholding tax tabulations for employers ("Prüftabelle Allgemeine Lohnsteuer" and "Prüftabelle besondere Lohnsteuer"). Also, together with the program flowchart, the ministry publishes random test cases. Our calculator also passes all of these. The calculation depends on various, not always obvious, input parameters that we discuss in this section.

#### **G.1.1   Income**

The withholding tax is calculated by the employer every month and does not depend on the income of previous months. Consequently, if the income of an employee fluctuates between the months, there is no compensatory mechanism. Due to tax progressivity, the withholding tax liability is thus higher in cases of fluctuating income than in cases of stable income. The tax data does not include monthly variables, as only annual income is observable. Based on the annual income we calculate the withholding tax liability. If the individual earned the same amount every month, the yearly withholding tax would simply be the monthly withholding tax multiplied by 12. However, if there are fluctuations in the income stream, we underestimate the amount of withholding taxes paid. As thirteenth and sometimes fourteenth salaries, paid out as christmas pay ("Weihnachtsgeld") or holiday pay ("Urlaubsgeld"), are very common in Germany, they most likely constitute the most important sources of measurement error that we have.



### **G.1.2 Withholding Tax Class**

We observe every taxpayer's withholding tax class.

### **G.1.3 Proportional Tax Allowances for Elderly Retired Persons**

As we only consider individuals in working age (between 20 and 60), we do not observe individuals that are eligible for proportional tax allowances for elderly retired persons ("Altersentlastungsbeiträge").

### **G.1.4 Payments for Insurance**

The contributions for insurance are partly deductible from the income tax and consequently they are also automatically deducted from the withholding tax.

**Individuals fully insured in the public social security system.** Contributions to the public pension, health and care insurance are partly deductible from the income tax. The exact same rules are applied to the automatic deduction from the withholding tax.

**Additional contributions specific to the health insurance provider.** Additional contributions specific to the health insurance provider ("Kassenindividuelle Zusatzbeiträge") were introduced in 2010, but only from 2015 onwards they were taken into account for the calculation of withholding taxes.

**Individuals without children.** Individuals aged 23 and older without children pay an increased contribution rate to the public care insurance. We take that into account.

**Saxony.** In Saxony, the contribution rate to the public care insurance is higher than in the rest of Germany. We consider that.

**No contributions to public pension.** Some regularly employed employees are exempt from contributing to all public insurance systems. Most prominently, civil servants are excluded from the public pension system and typically hold private health insurance without contributing to the public health insurance. Also, members of the military, priests, pharmacists, doctors, architects, veterinarians, tax consultants, tax auditors and interns are not obliged to contribute to the public insurance system.

### G.1.5 Non-Observable Factors

In case of additional income, in particular severance pay and death benefits ("Sterbegeld"), the withholding tax calculation differs. As these extraordinary sources of income are not separable from normal income in the tax data, we cannot implement the calculation. Individuals have under very special circumstances the possibility to decrease their withholding tax. First, the "Hinzurechungsbetrag" allows individuals with more than one job to minimize their withholding tax liability by pooling the withholding tax liability at one employer. Second, individuals who have regular deductions from taxes can request a deduction in the withholding tax ("Freibetrag"). This deduction typically applies to disabled people who have specific deductions from the income tax that they can also claim for the withholding tax. Unfortunately, in the data we do not observe any variables that are informative on whether individuals have filed a form to the financial authorities to use any of these tools to adapt their withholding tax.

## G.2 Other Withheld Taxes and Social Security Contributions

**Solidarity surcharge.** The solidarity surcharge ("Solidaritätszuschlag") is a surtax on the income tax that is subject to withholding. Different to the *Lohnsteuer*, it also depends on the number of children. We calculate the solidarity surcharge and treat it as part of the withholding tax.

**Church taxes.** The German government collects income for the church. The church tax is a surtax on the income tax, typically between 8 % and 9 %. The church tax is collected as part of the withholding tax and also fully credited against the church tax liability when a household files income taxes. The church tax rate is a function of the religious denomination of the individual, the religious denomination of the spouse and the church parish the individual belongs to. As there is no comprehensive data set of church taxes, we approximate the withheld church tax empirically for each individual. For that, we divide for each individual and year the observed withheld church tax with the observed withholding tax and assume that the church tax rate from 2009 remains constant for the individual.

**Social security contributions.** In Germany, pensions, health care, and unemployment insurance are primarily financed by social security contributions which are a function of labor income. These social security contributions are withheld every month and credited against the final social security contributions at the beginning of the next year. So they might be perceived as withholding taxes. However, we decided to exclude social security contributions from our definition




Figure G.1: Quality of Withholding Tax Estimation

*Notes:* The Figure displays the results of a regression of the calculated withholding tax on the actually withheld withholding tax. The assumptions to estimate the withholding tax are discussed in Section G.1 and G.2.

of withholding taxes, because they are not taxes and are therefore not informative about the misconception of withholding taxes.

### G.3 Quality of Withholding Tax Calculations

Figure G.1 displays the quality of the withholding tax calculation along the income distribution for 2009 and 2010 by regressing the calculated withholding tax on the actually withheld withholding tax. Along the whole income distribution, the overall estimate is close to 1. However, the withholding taxes are less precisely estimated for women in the unfavorable withholding tax class. But also for them, the estimate is always larger than 0.9.

## Appendix H Survey Questions

This section documents the survey questions. Section H.1 includes the original questions in German. Depending on the answer to Question A1a, the gender of the interviewed, and A1b, the gender of the partner, the personal pronouns were adapted in all questions and explaining texts. Section H.2 provides a translation into English.

### H.1 German Version

Guten Tag!

Wir sind Forscher an den Universitäten Bonn und Göteborg und bedanken uns schon jetzt herzlich für Ihre Teilnahme an unserer Umfrage und Ihre damit verbundene Unterstützung unserer Forschung! Ihre Antworten in der Umfrage haben keine Auswirkung auf Ihre persönliche

Auszahlung. Wir möchten Sie deshalb darum bitten, alle Fragen ohne Hilfsmittel (Internetrecherche, etc.) zu beantworten.

Wer ist verantwortlich für die Studie?

Kontaktdaten

Welchen Zwecken dient die Studie?

Zweck der Studie ist die Untersuchung ökonomischen Verhaltens. Wie bei ökonomischen Studien üblich, erfolgt daher vorab keine umfassende Aufklärung über den Forschungshintergrund.

Was geschieht mit meinen Daten?

Alle beteiligten Mitarbeiter und Wissenschaftler arbeiten selbstverständlich nach den Vorschriften der DatenschutzGrundverordnung, dem Bundesdatenschutzgesetz und den einschlägigen Landesdatenschutzgesetzen. Die Daten werden auf einem Server der Universität Bonn innerhalb der EU gespeichert. Ihre Daten werden nach erfolgter Auszahlung anonymisiert und anschließend statistisch ausgewertet. Aus den Ergebnissen lassen sich anschließend keine Rückschlüsse auf Sie ziehen.

Welche Rechte habe ich?

Sie haben das Recht, Auskunft über die zu Ihrer Person gespeicherten Daten zu erhalten (Art. 15 DS-GVO). Sollten unrichtige personenbezogene Daten verarbeitet werden, steht Ihnen ein Recht auf Berichtigung zu (Art. 16 DS-GVO). Liegen die gesetzlichen Voraussetzungen vor, so können Sie die Löschung oder Einschränkung der Verarbeitung verlangen sowie Widerspruch gegen die Verarbeitung einlegen (Art. 17, 18 und 21 DS-GVO). Sie haben das Recht, sich mit einer Beschwerde an die zuständige Aufsichtsbehörde für Datenschutz zu wenden. Die hier erklärte Einwilligung können Sie jederzeit mit Wirkung für die Zukunft widerrufen. Sofern Ihre Daten bereits anonymisiert wurden, können Ihnen diese aber nicht mehr zugeordnet werden. Wir können Ihre Angaben also nicht aus dem Ergebnis „herausrechnen“.

Einwilligungserklärung

Hiermit willige ich in die Verarbeitung meiner personenbezogenen Daten für das Forschungsvorhaben ein. Die Einwilligung kann ich jederzeit widerrufen. Ich habe die Hinweise zur Verwendung meiner Daten und zu meinen Rechten in der Datenschutzerklärung zur Kenntnis genommen.

Ich bin einverstanden. (Ja, Nein)

*Page Break*

Screening

**S1** Haben Sie momentan Einkommen aus Lohnarbeit? (Ja, Nein)

**S2** Sind Sie verheiratet? (Ja, Nein)

*Page Break*

**A1a** Was ist Ihr Geschlecht? (Weiblich, Männlich, Divers)

**A1b** Was ist das Geschlecht Ihres Ehepartners/Ihrer Ehepartnerin? (Weiblich, Männlich, Divers, Ich habe keinen Ehepartner/keine Ehepartnerin, Keine Angabe)

*Page Break*

**A2** Die nächste Frage betrifft folgendes Problem: In Umfragen wie unserer gibt es manchmal Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmer, die die Fragestellungen nicht sorgfältig durchlesen, sondern sich nur schnell durch die Umfrage klicken. Dies führt zu vielen zufälligen Antworten, die die Qualität der Forschungsvorhaben beeinträchtigen. Bitte wählen Sie "Sehr stark interessiert" und "Überhaupt nicht interessiert" als Ihre Antwort auf die kommende Frage, um uns zu zeigen, dass Sie unsere Fragen sorgfältig lesen. Gegeben dieser Information, wie interessiert sind Sie am Thema Steuern?

(Überhaupt nicht interessiert, Fast gar nicht interessiert, Etwas interessiert, Stark interessiert, Sehr stark interessiert)

*Page Break*

**A3** Stellen Sie sich vor, dass Ihr Arbeitgeber Ihnen eine freie Wahl Ihrer wöchentlichen Arbeitsstunden anbietet: Wie würden Sie sich entscheiden? (Ich würde meine Arbeitsstunden erhöhen, Ich würde meine Arbeitsstunden verringern, Ich würde meine Arbeitsstunden unverändert lassen, Weiß nicht)

*Page Break*

**D4** Was ist Ihre momentane Lohnsteuerklasse? (1, 2, 3, 4, 4 mit Faktor, 5, 6, Weiß nicht)

**D5** Wer hat über die Steuerklasse entschieden? (Ich, Mein Ehepartner, Mein Ehepartner und ich zusammen, Ein Steuerberater/Eine Steuerberaterin, Eine andere Person, Niemand, Weiß nicht)

*Page Break*

**D\_Text** Wir wollen nun mehr über Ihr generelles Verständnis der Steuerklassen herausfinden, es geht also in den folgenden Fragen nicht um Ihre eigene Steuerklasse.

*Page Break*

**D6** Existieren die folgenden Steuerklassenkombinationen (Ihr Ehepartner erstgenannt, Sie zweitgenannt)? (Ja, Nein, Weiß nicht)

(4/4, 5/4, 3/5, 5/5, 4/1, 3/3, 4/5, 5/3, 1/4)

**Wenn D4 == "4 mit Faktor":**

(4/4, 5/4, 3/5, 5/5, 4/1, 3/3, 4/5, 5/3, 1/4, 4 mit Faktor/3, 4 mit Faktor/4 mit Faktor, 3/4 mit Faktor, 5/4 mit Faktor, 4 mit Faktor/5)

*Page Break*

**D7** Stellen Sie sich vor, dass Sie 60.000 € und Ihr Ehepartner 30.000 € brutto pro Jahr verdienen und dass Sie eine gemeinsame Steuererklärung machen. Bei welcher Steuerklassenkombination tragen Sie als Paar zusammen die geringste jährliche finale Steuerlast (entspricht der Einkommensteuer)? Alle drei genannten Steuerklassenkombinationen existieren.

(Ich in Steuerklasse 5 und mein Partner in Steuerklasse 3, Ich in Steuerklasse 4 und mein Partner in Steuerklasse 4, Ich in Steuerklasse 3 und mein Partner in Steuerklasse 5, Egal, Weiß nicht)

*Page Break*

**D8** Nehmen Sie nun an, Sie wären in Steuerklasse 4. Was stimmt? Wenn Sie nun von 4 in 3 wechseln, dann bekommen Sie persönlich monatlich...

(...mehr netto von Ihrem Arbeitgeber, ...weniger netto von Ihrem Arbeitgeber, ...gleich viel netto von Ihrem Arbeitgeber, Weiß nicht)

*Page Break*

**D9** Nehmen Sie nun an, Sie wären in Steuerklasse 4. Was stimmt? Wenn Sie nun von 4 in 5 wechseln, dann bekommen Sie persönlich monatlich...

(...mehr netto von Ihrem Arbeitgeber, ...weniger netto von Ihrem Arbeitgeber, ...gleich viel netto von Ihrem Arbeitgeber, Weiß nicht)

*Page Break*

**D10** Bitte nehmen Sie sich ausreichend Zeit, um die folgende Information zu verstehen. In der Tabelle sehen Sie beispielhaft die Lohnsteuer abhängig von den Steuerklassen für ein Paar, bei dem beide Partner brutto 3500 € monatlich verdienen.

	Monatliche Lohnsteuer Partner A	Monatliche Lohnsteuer Partner B
Partner A in Steuerklasse 3 Partner B in Steuerklasse 5	350 €	1 000 €
Partner A in Steuerklasse 4 Partner B in Steuerklasse 4	700 €	700 €
Partner A in Steuerklasse 5 Partner B in Steuerklasse 3	1 000 €	350 €

Sie können sehen, dass die Wahl der Steuerklassen die zu zahlende Lohnsteuer stark beeinflusst. Sind beide Partner in der Steuerklasse 4, so zahlen beide Partner jeweils 700 € Lohnsteuern. Ist ein Partner stattdessen in Steuerklasse 3, so zahlt sie/er 350 € Lohnsteuern. In Steuerklasse 5 werden 1000 € Lohnsteuern fällig. Wie Sie sehen: Ihre individuell gezahlte Lohnsteuer hängt stark von der gewählten Steuerklasse ab. Aber auch die Lohnsteuer Ihres Partners wird stark durch die Steuerklassenwahl beeinflusst. Waren Ihnen die folgenden Informationen schon bekannt? Bitte antworten Sie ehrlich. Denken Sie daran, dass Ihre Auszahlung in dieser

Umfrage nicht von Ihren Antworten auf die Fragen abhängt. (Ja, Nein, Ich verstehe die Aussage nicht)

(Ich wusste, dass die Wahl der Steuerklasse die eigene Lohnsteuer beeinflusst, Ich wusste, dass die Wahl der Steuerklasse die Lohnsteuer meines Partners beeinflusst, Ich wusste, dass es Steuerklassenkombinationen gibt, bei der einer der beiden Partner deutlich mehr und der andere Partner deutlich weniger Lohnsteuern zahlt – selbst wenn beide Partner gleich viel verdienen)

*Page Break*

**D11** Bitte nehmen Sie sich ausreichend Zeit, um auch die folgende Information zu verstehen. Die finale Steuerlast eines Paares wird durch die Einkommensteuer bestimmt. In der Tabelle können Sie sehen, dass Steuerklassen keine Auswirkungen auf die Einkommensteuer, und somit auf die finale Steuerlast eines Ehepaares, haben. Nur die Lohnsteuer wird durch die Steuerklassenwahl beeinflusst:

	Monatliche Lohnsteuer Partner A	Monatliche Lohnsteuer Partner B	Gemeinsame jährliche Einkommensteuerlast
Partner A in Steuerklasse 3 Partner B in Steuerklasse 5	350 €	1 000 €	16 300 €
Partner A in Steuerklasse 4 Partner B in Steuerklasse 4	700 €	700 €	16 300 €
Partner A in Steuerklasse 5 Partner B in Steuerklasse 3	1 000 €	350 €	16 300 €

Die monatlich von Ihnen als Paar gezahlte Lohnsteuer wird am Jahresende mit der Einkommensteuer verrechnet. Wenn also Ihre gezahlte Lohnsteuer höher ist als die zu zahlende Einkommensteuer, bekommen Sie am Jahresende eine Steuerrückzahlung. Und, andersherum, wenn Sie mehr Einkommensteuer zahlen müssen als Sie Lohnsteuer gezahlt haben, müssen Sie eine Steuernachzahlung leisten. Für das Paar in dem Beispiel bedeutet dies, dass es unabhängig von der gewählten Steuerklasse jährlich immer 16 300 € Einkommensteuern zahlt. Steuerklassen haben also keine Auswirkungen auf die finale Steuerlast eines Ehepaares, sondern nur auf die Lohnsteuer. Waren Ihnen die folgenden Informationen schon bekannt? Bitte antworten Sie ehrlich. Denken Sie daran, dass Ihre Auszahlung in dieser Umfrage nicht von Ihren Antworten auf die Fragen abhängt. (Ja, Nein, Ich verstehe die Aussage nicht)

(Ich wusste, dass die gezahlte Lohnsteuer nicht die finale Steuerlast beeinflusst, Ich wusste, dass die Steuerklassenwahl nicht die finale Steuerlast beeinflusst)

*Page Break*

**D12** Stellen Sie sich vor, dass Sie 40.000 € und Ihr Ehepartner 70.000 € brutto pro Jahr verdienen und dass Sie eine gemeinsame Steuererklärung machen. Bei welcher Steuerklassenkombination tragen Sie als Paar zusammen die geringste jährliche finale Steuerlast (entspricht der Einkommensteuer)? Alle drei genannten Steuerklassenkombinationen existieren.

(Ich in Steuerklasse 5 und mein Partner in Steuerklasse 3, Ich in Steuerklasse 4 und mein Partner in Steuerklasse 4, Ich in Steuerklasse 3 und mein Partner in Steuerklasse 5, Egal, Weiß nicht)

*Page Break*

**D13a** Steuerklassen haben also keine Auswirkungen auf die finale Steuerlast eines Ehepaares, nur auf die Lohnsteuer. Stellen Sie sich mit diesem Wissen nun vor, dass Ihr Arbeitgeber Ihnen eine freie Wahl Ihrer wöchentlichen Arbeitsstunden anbietet: Wie würden Sie sich entscheiden?

(Ich würde meine Arbeitsstunden erhöhen, Ich würde meine Arbeitsstunden verringern, Ich würde meine Arbeitsstunden unverändert lassen, Weiß nicht)

**D13b** Steuerklassen haben keine Auswirkungen auf die finale Steuerlast eines Ehepaares, nur auf die Lohnsteuer. Stellen Sie sich mit diesem Wissen nun vor, dass Ihr Arbeitgeber Ihnen in der Vergangenheit eine freie Wahl Ihrer wöchentlichen Arbeitsstunden angeboten hätte. Wie hätten Sie sich entschieden?

(Ich hätte meine Arbeitsstunden erhöht, Ich hätte meine Arbeitsstunden verringert, Ich hätte meine Arbeitsstunden unverändert gelassen, Weiß nicht)

**D13c** Steuerklassen haben keine Auswirkungen auf die finale Steuerlast eines Ehepaares, nur auf die Lohnsteuer. Wie wirkt sich dieses Wissen auf Ihre bevorzugte Steuerklassenwahl aus?

(Ich würde meine Steuerklasse gerne ändern, Ich würde meine Steuerklasse gerne beibehalten, Weiß nicht)

**D14** Beeinflussen Steuerklassen folgende staatliche Leistungen? (Ja, Nein, Weiß nicht)

(Rente, Arbeitslosengeld II/Hartz IV, Arbeitslosengeld I, Elterngeld, Wohngeld, Kurzarbeitergeld)

*Page Break*

**D15** Die nächste Frage betrifft folgendes Problem: In Umfragen wie unserer gibt es manchmal Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmer, die die Fragestellungen nicht sorgfältig durchlesen, sondern sich nur schnell durch die Umfrage klicken. Dies führt zu vielen zufälligen Antworten, die die Qualität der Forschungsvorhaben beeinträchtigen. Bitte wählen Sie "Fast gar nicht interessiert" und "Stark interessiert" als Ihre Antwort auf die kommende Frage, um uns zu zeigen, dass Sie unsere Fragen sorgfältig lesen. Gegeben dieser Information, wie interessiert sind Sie am Thema Steuern?

(Überhaupt nicht interessiert, Fast gar nicht interessiert, Etwas interessiert, Stark interessiert, Sehr stark interessiert)

*Page Break*

**D16a** Haben Sie als Ehepaar ein gemeinsames Bankkonto? (Ja, Nein, Weiß nicht)



**D16b** Wohin überweist Ihr Arbeitgeber Ihren monatlichen Lohn? (Auf mein persönliches Bankkonto, Auf das Bankkonto meines Ehepartners, Auf ein Bankkonto, das ich mit meinem Ehepartner teile, Weiß nicht)

**D16c** Wohin überweist der Arbeitgeber Ihres Ehepartners den monatlichen Lohn? (Auf mein persönliches Bankkonto, Auf das Bankkonto meines Ehepartners, Auf ein Bankkonto, das ich mit meinem Ehepartner teile, Mein Ehepartner ist selbstständig oder arbeitet nicht, Weiß nicht)

*Page Break*

**If D16a == Ja And D16b == Auf mein persönliches Bankkonto**

**D16d** Wie viel Prozent Ihres monatlich von Ihrem Arbeitgeber überwiesenen Lohneinkommens transferieren Sie auf das gemeinsame Konto? (0 % - 20 %, 20 % - 40 %, 40 % - 60 %, 60 % - 80 %, 80 % - 100 %, Weiß nicht)

**If D16a == Ja And D16b == Auf das Bankkonto meines Ehepartners**

**D16e** Wie viel Prozent seines monatlich von seinem Arbeitgeber überwiesenen Lohneinkommens transferiert Ihr Ehepartner auf das gemeinsame Konto? (0 % - 20 %, 20 % - 40 %, 40 % - 60 %, 60 % - 80 %, 80 % - 100 %, Weiß nicht)

**If D16a == Ja**

**D16f** Haben Sie noch besondere Absprachen für Ihr gemeinsames Konto getroffen? Falls ja, erklären Sie bitte noch genauer, wie Sie Ihr gemeinsames Konto verwalten. Falls Sie keine besonderen Absprachen getroffen haben, lassen Sie das Freifeld gerne einfach frei.

*Page Break*

**D17a** Geben Sie und Ihr Partner üblicherweise eine Steuererklärung ab? (Ja. Mein Partner und ich veranlagen gemeinsam, Ja. Mein Partner und ich veranlagen getrennt, Ja. Aber ich weiß nicht, ob wir getrennt oder gemeinsam veranlagen, Nein, Weiß nicht)

*Page Break*

**If D17a == Ja:**

**D17b** Wie machen Sie und Ihr Partner üblicherweise Ihre Steuererklärung? Mehrere Ja-Antworten sind möglich. (Ja, Nein, Weiß nicht)

(Ich mache die Steuererklärung überwiegend alleine, Mein Ehepartner macht die Steuererklärung überwiegend alleine, Wir machen die Steuererklärung gemeinsam, Wir nutzen die Hilfe einer Steuerberaterin/eines Steuerberaters, Wir nutzen die Hilfe eines Steuerprogramms wie etwa WISO, Wir nutzen die Hilfe anderer Personen)

*Page Break*

**If D17a == Ja:**

**D17c** Auf welches Bankkonto werden potentielle Steuererstattungen überwiesen? (Mein Konto, Das Konto meines Ehepartners, Ein gemeinsames Konto, Weiß nicht)

*Page Break*

**If D17a == Nein**

**D17d** Warum geben Sie keine Steuererklärung ab? Mehrere Ja-Antworten sind möglich. (Ja, Nein) (Es ist mir zu viel Arbeit, Ich weiß nicht, wie man das macht, Es lohnt sich für mich kaum, Ich habe Angst, dass ich Steuern nachzahlen muss)

*Page Break*

**D18** Auf einer Skala von 1 bis 7, wie sehr stimmen Sie den folgenden Aussagen zu? 7 bedeutet, dass Sie der entsprechenden Aussage voll zustimmen. 1 bedeutet, dass Sie der entsprechenden Aussage überhaupt nicht zustimmen. (1 Stimme überhaupt nicht zu, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 Stimme voll zu)

(Der Ehemann sollte zu Hause das letzte Wort haben., Am besten ist es, wenn der Ehemann und die Ehefrau beide gleich viel erwerbstätig sind und sich beide in gleichem Maße um Haushalt und Familie kümmern., Männer sollten sich stärker um die finanzielle Absicherung der Familie kümmern als Frauen.)

*Page Break*

**D19** Wie alt sind Sie? (Jünger als 20, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-60, 61 oder älter)

**D20** Was ist Ihr höchster schulischer/akademischer Bildungsabschluss? (Ohne allgemeinen Schulabschluss, Hauptschulabschluss, Mittlere Reife, Fachhochschul- oder Hochschulreife (Abitur), Bachelor, Master/Diplom/Staatsexamen, Promotion)

**D21** Haben Sie mindestens ein minderjähriges Kind? (Ja, Nein, Keine Angabe)

*Page Break*

**D22** Haben Sie häufiger das Gefühl, dass das Geld vor der Überweisung des nächsten Gehalts knapp wird? (Ja, Nein, Diese Frage möchte ich nicht beantworten)

*Page Break*

**D23** Wie hoch ist Ihr Bruttoeinkommen aus Lohnarbeit pro Jahr? Für die Beantwortung dieser Frage können Sie gerne in Ihren Unterlagen nachschauen.

(Ich habe kein Lohneinkommen, 1 € - 10.000 €, 10.001 € - 20.000 €, 20.001 € - 30.000 €, 30.001 € - 40.000 €, 40.001 € - 50.000 €, 50.001 € - 60.000 €, 60.001 € - 70.000 €, 70.001 € - 80.000 €, 80.001 € - 90.000 €, 90.001 € - 100.000 €, 100.001 € - 110.000 €, 110.001 € - 120.000 €, Über 120.000 €, Weiß nicht / Keine Angabe)

**D24a** Wie hoch ist das Bruttoeinkommen Ihres Ehepartners aus Lohnarbeit pro Jahr? Für die Beantwortung dieser Frage können Sie gerne in Ihren Unterlagen nachschauen oder Ihren Ehepartner fragen.

(Mein Ehepartner arbeitet nicht, Mein Ehepartner ist selbstständig, 1 € - 10.000 €, 10.001 € - 20.000 €, 20.001 € - 30.000 €, 30.001 € - 40.000 €, 40.001 € - 50.000 €, 50.001 € - 60.000 €, 60.001 € - 70.000 €, 70.001 € - 80.000 €, 80.001 € - 90.000 €, 90.001 € - 100.000 €, 100.001 € - 110.000 €, 110.001 € - 120.000 €, Über 120.000 €, Weiß nicht / Keine Angabe)

**If D24a == Mein Ehepartner ist selbstständig**

**D24b** Wie viel verdient Ihr Ehepartner in selbstständiger Arbeit pro Jahr brutto? Für die Beantwortung dieser Frage können Sie gerne in Ihren Unterlagen nachschauen oder Ihren Ehepartner fragen.

(1 € - 10.000 €, 10.001 € - 20.000 €, 20.001 € - 30.000 €, 30.001 € - 40.000 €, 40.001 € - 50.000 €, 50.001 € - 60.000 €, 60.001 € - 70.000 €, 70.001 € - 80.000 €, 80.001 € - 90.000 €, 90.001 € - 100.000 €, 100.001 € - 110.000 €, 110.001 € - 120.000 €, Über 120.000 €, Weiß nicht / Keine Angabe)

*Page Break*

**D25** Wie hoch ist Ihre durchschnittliche wöchentliche Arbeitszeit in Stunden?

**D26** Wie hoch ist die durchschnittliche wöchentliche Arbeitszeit Ihres Ehepartners in Stunden?

*Page Break*

**A27** Haben Sie irgendwelche Anmerkungen zur Umfrage oder zu dem Thema Lohnsteuern lassen?

## **H.2 English Version**

Hello and welcome!

We are researchers at the Universities of Bonn and Gothenburg and would like to thank you in advance for taking part in our survey and for thereby supporting our research! Your responses to the survey will not affect your personal payout. We would therefore like to ask you to answer all questions without using any tools (internet research, etc.).

Who is responsible for the study?

Contact details

What is the purpose of the study?

The purpose of the study is to examine economic behavior. As is usual with economic studies, there is no comprehensive explanation of the research background beforehand.

What happens to my data?

Of course, all employees and scientists involved work in accordance with the provisions of the General Data Protection Regulation, the Federal Data Protection Act and the relevant state data protection laws. The data is stored on a server of the University of Bonn within the EU. Your data will be anonymized after the payment has been made and then statistically evaluated. No conclusions can be drawn about you from the results.

What rights do I have?

You have the right to receive information about the data stored about you (Art. 15 DS-GVO). If incorrect personal data is processed, you have the right to rectification (Art. 16 DS-GVO). If the legal requirements are met, you can request the deletion or restriction of processing and object to the processing (Art. 17, 18 and 21 DS-GVO). You have the right to lodge a complaint with the competent supervisory authority for data protection. You can revoke the consent given here at any time with effect for the future. However, if your data has already been anonymized, it can no longer be assigned to you. We can therefore not "remove" your information from the result.

Declaration of consent

I hereby consent to the processing of my personal data for the research project. I can revoke my consent at any time. I have taken note of the information on the use of my data and my rights in the data protection declaration.

I agree. (Yes, No)

*Page break*

Screening

**S1** Do you currently have wage income? (Yes, No)

**S2** Are you married? (Yes, No)

*Page break*

**A1a** What is your gender? (Female, Male, Diverse)

**A1b** What is the gender of your spouse? (Female, Male, Diverse, I have no spouse, No answer)

*Page break*

**A2** The next question concerns the following problem: In surveys like ours, there are sometimes participants who do not read the questions carefully, but just click through the survey quickly. This leads to a lot of random answers, which affects the quality of the research projects. Please choose "Very interested" and "Not at all interested" as your answer to the upcoming question to show us that you are reading our questions carefully. Given this information, how interested are you in taxes?

(Not at all interested, Slightly interested, Somewhat interested, Interested, Very interested)

*Page break*

**A3** Imagine that your employer offered you a free choice of your weekly working hours: How would you decide? (I would increase my hours, I would decrease my hours, I would keep my hours the same, Don't know)

*Page break*

**D4** What is your current withholding tax class? (1, 2, 3, 4, 4 with factor, 5, 6, Don't know)

**D5** Who decided the withholding tax class? (Me, My Spouse, My Spouse and I Together, An Accountant, Another Person, Nobody, Don't Know)

*Page break*

**E\_Text** We now want to find out more about your general understanding of withholding tax classes, so the following questions are not about your own withholding tax class.

*Page break*

**D6** Do the following withholding tax class combinations exist (your spouse named first, you named second)? (Yes, No, Don't know)

(4/4, 5/4, 3/5, 5/5, 4/1, 3/3, 4/5, 5/3, 1/4)

**If D4 == "4 with factor":**

(4/4, 5/4, 3/5, 5/5, 4/1, 3/3, 4/5, 5/3, 1/4, 4 with factor/3, 4 with factor/4 with factor, 3/4 with factor, 5/4 with factor, 4 with factor/5)

*Page break*

**D7** Imagine that you earn €60,000 and your spouse €30,000 gross per year and that you file a joint tax return. In which withholding tax class combination do you as a couple have the lowest final annual tax liability (corresponds to income tax)? All three withholding tax class combinations mentioned exist.

(I in withholding tax class 5 and my partner in withholding tax class 3, I in withholding tax class 4 and my partner in withholding tax class 4, I in withholding tax class 3 and my partner in withholding tax class 5, Doesn't matter, Don't know)

*Page break*

**D8** Now suppose you were in withholding tax class 4. Which is correct? If you now switch from 4 to 3, you will personally receive monthly...

(...more net from your employer, ...less net from your employer, ...same amount net from your employer, don't know)

*Page break*

**D9** Now suppose you were in withholding tax class 4. Which is correct? If you now switch from 4 to 5, you will personally receive monthly...

(...more net from your employer, ...less net from your employer, ...same amount net from your employer, don't know)

*Page break*

**D10** Please take enough time to understand the following information. The table shows an example of the payroll tax depending on the withholding tax classes for a couple where both partners earn a gross monthly income of €3,500.

	Monatliche Lohnsteuer Partner A	Monatliche Lohnsteuer Partner B
Partner A in Steuerklasse 3 Partner B in Steuerklasse 5	350 €	1 000 €
Partner A in Steuerklasse 4 Partner B in Steuerklasse 4	700 €	700 €
Partner A in Steuerklasse 5 Partner B in Steuerklasse 3	1 000 €	350 €

You can see that the choice of withholding tax class greatly affects the payroll tax you pay. If both partners are in withholding tax class 4, both partners each pay €700 in payroll tax. If a partner is in withholding tax class 3 instead, she/he pays €350 in payroll tax. In withholding tax class 5, €1,000 in payroll tax is due. As you can see, the payroll tax you pay depends heavily on the withholding tax class you choose. But your partner's payroll tax is also strongly influenced by the choice of withholding tax class. Did you already know the following information? Please answer honestly. Remember that your payout in this survey is not dependent on your answers to the questions. (Yes, No, I don't understand the statement)

(I knew that the choice of withholding tax class affects my own payroll tax, I knew that the choice of withholding tax class influences my partner's payroll tax, I knew that there are withholding tax class combinations where one of the two partners pays significantly more and the other partner significantly less pays payroll taxes – even if both partners earn the same amount)

*Page break*

**D11** Please take enough time to understand the following information. The final tax liability of a couple is determined by the income tax. In the table you can see that withholding tax classes have no effect on the income tax and therefore on the final tax liability of a married couple. Only the payroll tax is affected by the withholding tax class selection:

	Monatliche Lohnsteuer Partner A	Monatliche Lohnsteuer Partner B	Gemeinsame jährliche Einkommensteuerlast
Partner A in Steuerklasse 3 Partner B in Steuerklasse 5	350 €	1 000 €	16 300 €
Partner A in Steuerklasse 4 Partner B in Steuerklasse 4	700 €	700 €	16 300 €
Partner A in Steuerklasse 5 Partner B in Steuerklasse 3	1 000 €	350 €	16 300 €

The payroll tax you pay monthly as a couple is offset against the income tax at the end of the year. So if your paid payroll tax is higher than the income tax to be paid, you will receive a tax refund at the end of the year. And, vice versa, if you have to pay more income tax than you paid payroll tax, you have to make an additional tax payment. For the couple in the example, this means that they always pay €16,300 in income tax annually, regardless of the withholding tax class they choose. Withholding tax classes therefore have no effect on the final tax liability of a married couple, but only on the payroll tax. Did you already know the following information? Please answer honestly. Remember that your payout in this survey is not dependent on your answers to the questions. (Yes, No, I don't understand the statement)

(I knew that the payroll tax paid does not affect the final tax liability, I knew that the choice of withholding tax classes does not affect the final tax liability)

*Page break*

**D12** Imagine that you earn €40,000 and your spouse €70,000 gross per year and that you file a joint tax return. In which withholding tax class combination do you as a couple have the lowest final annual tax liability (corresponds to income tax)? All three withholding tax class combinations mentioned exist.

(I in withholding tax class 5 and my partner in withholding tax class 3, I in withholding tax class 4 and my partner in withholding tax class 4, I in withholding tax class 3 and my partner in withholding tax class 5, Doesn't matter, Don't know)

*Page break*

**D13a** Withholding tax classes therefore have no effect on the final tax liability of a married couple, only on the payroll tax. Now, knowing this, imagine that your employer offered you a free choice of your weekly working hours: How would you decide?

(I would increase my hours, I would decrease my hours, I would keep my hours the same, Don't know)

**D13b** Withholding tax classes have no effect on the final tax liability of a married couple, only on the payroll tax. Now, knowing this, imagine that in the past your employer would have offered you a free choice of your weekly work hours. How would you have decided?

(I would have increased my hours, I would have decreased my hours, I would have left my hours unchanged, Don't know)

**D13c** Withholding tax classes have no effect on a married couple's final tax liability, only on the payroll tax. How does this knowledge affect your preferred withholding tax class choice?

(I would like to change my withholding tax class, I would like to keep my withholding tax class, Don't know)

**D14** Do withholding tax classes affect the following government benefits? (Yes, No, Don't know)

(Pension, unemployment benefit II/Hartz IV, unemployment benefit I, parental benefit, housing benefit, short-time work benefit)

*Page break*

**D15** The next question concerns the following problem: In surveys like ours, there are sometimes participants who do not read the questions carefully, but just click through the survey quickly. This leads to a lot of random answers, which affects the quality of the research projects. Please choose "Slightly interested" and "Very interested" as your answer to the next question to show us that you are reading our questions carefully. Given this information, how interested are you in taxes?

(Not at all interested, Slightly interested, Somewhat interested, Interested, Very interested)

*Page break*

**D16a** As a married couple, do you have a joint bank account? (yes, no, don't know)

**D16b** Where does your employer transfer your monthly wages to? (To my personal bank account, To my spouse's bank account, To a bank account I share with my spouse, Don't know)

**D16c** Where does your spouse's employer transfer the monthly salary to? (To my personal bank account, To my spouse's bank account, To a bank account I share with my spouse, My spouse is self-employed or does not work, Don't know)

*Page break*

**If D16a == Yes And D16b == To my personal bank account**

**D16d** What percentage of your monthly wage income transferred from your employer do you transfer to the joint account? (0% - 20%, 20% - 40%, 40% - 60%, 60% - 80%, 80% - 100%, Don't know)

**If D16a == Yes And D16b == To my spouse's bank account**

**D16e** What percentage of his/her monthly wages transferred from his/her employer does your spouse transfer to the joint account? (0% - 20%, 20% - 40%, 40% - 60%, 60% - 80%, 80% - 100%, Don't know)

**If D16a == Yes**

**D16f** Have you made any special arrangements for your joint account? If so, please explain in more detail how you manage your joint account. If you have not made any special arrangements, please feel free to leave the free field empty.

*Page break*



**D17a** Do you and your partner usually file a tax return? (Yes. My partner and I file taxes jointly, Yes. My partner and I file taxes separately, Yes. But I don't know if we file our taxes separately or jointly, No, Don't know)

*Page break*

**If D17a == Yes:**

**D17b** How do you and your partner usually file your tax return? Several yes answers are possible. (yes, no, don't know)

(I mostly file the tax return alone, my spouse mostly files the tax return alone, we file the tax return together, we use the help of a tax consultant, we use the help of a tax program such as WISO, we use the help of other people)

*Page break*

**If D17a == Yes:**

**D17c** To which bank account are potential tax refunds transferred? (My Account, My Spouse's Account, A Joint Account, Don't Know)

*Page break*

**If D17a == No**

**D17d** Why don't you file a tax return? Several yes answers are possible. (Yes, No) (It's too much work for me, I don't know how to do it, It's hardly worth it for me, I'm afraid I'll have to pay more taxes)

*Page break*

**D18** On a scale from 1 to 7, how much do you agree with the following statements? 7 means that you fully agree with the corresponding statement. 1 means that you completely disagree with the corresponding statement. (1 Strongly Disagree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 Strongly Agree)

(The husband should have the last word at home., It is best if the husband and wife both work an equal amount and both take care of the household and family equally., Men should take more care of the financial security of the family than women.)

*Page break*

**D19** How old are you? (Under 20, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-60, 61 or older)

**D20** What is your highest school/academic qualification? (Without general school leaving certificate, secondary school leaving certificate, higher secondary school leaving certificate or higher education entrance qualification (Abitur), bachelor, master/diploma/state examination, doctorate)

**D21** Do you have at least one minor child? (Yes, No, Not specified)

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**D22** Do you often have the feeling that money is running out before you receive your next salary? (Yes, No, I don't want to answer this question)

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**D23** What is your gross income from wage labor per year? You are welcome to consult your documents to answer this question.

(I have no wage income, €1 - €10,000, €10,001 - €20,000, €20,001 - €30,000, €30,001 - €40,000, €40,001 - €50,000, €50,001 - €60,000, €60,001 - €70,000, - €80,000, €80,001 - €90,000, €90,001 - €100,000, €100,001 - €110,000, €110,001 - €120,000, over €120,000, don't know / no answer)

**D24a** What is your spouse's gross income from wage labor per year? To answer this question, you are welcome to consult your records or ask your spouse.

(My spouse does not work, My spouse is self-employed, €1 - €10,000, €10,001 - €20,000, €20,001 - €30,000, €30,001 - €40,000, €40,001 - €50,000, €50,001 - €60,000, €60,001 - €70,000, €70,001 - €80,000, €80,001 - €90,000, €90,001 - €100,000, €100,001 - €110,000, €110,001 - €120,000, over €120,000, don't know / no answer)

**If D24a == My spouse is self-employed**

**D24b** How much does your spouse earn gross per year in self-employment? To answer this question, you are welcome to consult your records or ask your spouse.

(€1 - €10,000, €10,001 - €20,000, €20,001 - €30,000, €30,001 - €40,000, €40,001 - €50,000, €50,001 - €60,000, €60,001 - €70,000, €70,001 - €70,001.1 € - 90,000 €, €90,001 - €100,000, €100,001 - €110,000, €110,001 - €120,000, Over €120,000, Don't know / no answer)

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**D25** What are your average weekly working hours?

**D26** What are the average weekly working hours of your spouse?

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**A27** Do you have any comments on the survey or on the subject of withholding tax classes?