STRATEGY

ASPI

Global Forces 2006

Proceedings of the ASPI conference.
Day 1

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

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Director's introduction

ASPI conducted its second *Global Forces* international conference in Canberra on 26–27 September 2006. Our approach was to bring a group of distinguished Australian and overseas speakers together to share different perspectives of strategic and security affairs with our audience. Our focus was on the bigger geopolitical issues shaping Australia's strategic landscape. These include forces such as globalisation, identity politics and the rise of fundamentalist movements, questions surrounding economic and environmental sustainability, shifts in geopolitics stemming from the emergence of new economic powerhouses such as China and India, and the responses to these trends within the prevailing world order. Our interest was in understanding the implications of these forces for Australia's role in global and regional security affairs and the strategic choices we might face.

The papers presented here provide a valuable record of the conference proceedings and a rich collection of ideas about strategic possibilities and what they might mean for Australia. I am grateful to the speakers for their efforts and insights, and to Prime Minister John Howard for outlining Australia's security policy priorities in his Keynote Address. In some cases our speakers requested that we publish pre-written versions of their presentation. Others were happy for us to use edited transcripts of their comments.

Conferences are complex and time consuming activities to organise. It takes the efforts of a dedicated team over many months to deliver a high quality event and the entire ASPI staff contributed to the success of *Global Forces 2006*. But at the core of these efforts were our events organisers Tas Frilingos and Lynne Grimsey who again produced a flawless event from start to finish. I congratulate and thank all for their outstanding achievements.

ASPI was fortunate to secure important sponsorships to support the conference. I am delighted to thank Thales Australia, Lockheed Martin Australia, KBR, Noetic Solutions and the Department of Defence for their assistance and continuing support for ASPI activities. Nugan Estate Wines supported the conference dinner as beverage sponsor. We look forward to working with Defence and these fine businesses again.

Peter Abigail
Director

Photo opposite: Canberra from space-enhanced view of city from Satellite image. © CORBIS/APL

Opening keynote address

AUSTRALIA'S SECURITY AGENDA

The Honourable John Howard MP, Prime Minister of Australia

Thank you very much Mr Harvey, Mark Johnson, Peter Abigail, the other members of the board of ASPI, ladies and gentlemen. Let me start by congratulating the Australian Strategic Policy Institute for its initiative in bringing together this two-day conference. When the Institute was conceived a number of years ago its very aim, or the aim of the government was to create the kind of approach the Institute has brought to an examination of Australia's strategic challenges and the number of, and range of people that you have assembled to take part in this conference certainly vindicates the government's faith, both in the concept and also the people who are now giving leadership to the Institute.

> The belief that the protection of our continent and citizens starts well beyond our shores has formed an essentially unbroken line in Australian strategic thinking ...

I've been invited to share some thoughts about our security agenda. And I can start by stating the very obvious and that is that the core of Australia's security agenda is quite straightforward. It is to protect and defend our people, and our interests, and our way of life. In practice, Australia has a history of seeing its own security as intertwined with the security of others and with the forces that shape the global system.

Photo opposite: Satellite image from space of Darwin, Australia. © APL

The belief that the protection of our continent and citizens starts well beyond our shores has formed an essentially unbroken line in Australian strategic thinking—from the sacrifices on the Western Front 90 years ago to our commitments today in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Geography alone has never determined our strategic horizons. Australia's basic security interests have remained remarkably stable over time. Beyond the primary one of territorial integrity, they have involved a global power balance, favourable to our interests and to those of our allies; secure sea and air lanes as sinews of peace and prosperity; and a framework of international norms conducive to individual freedom, economic development and liberal democracy.

Throughout our history, these goals have given direction and purpose to Australia's security agenda, against foes of various stripes and in very different strategic contexts. Beyond the core responsibility of the defence of Australia, the Australian Defence Force has two equally important responsibilities. One is the capacity to act regionally in the interests of peace and stability. This has been a fundamental part of Australia's security agenda in recent years, exemplified by interventions in East Timor, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands. The change some years ago heralded a more assertive strategic posture after a long period of what I might describe as benign abstinence by successive Australian governments.

The other responsibility is the ongoing need to join in coalition operations in different parts of the world when Australia's national interests are at stake. Like other nations, Australia has had to navigate new and diverse security challenges in the last decade—especially in the five years since the 11th of September 2001. The threat of terrorism has transformed the global security agenda. Because the nature of the threat is new and different, so it has demanded new and different attitudes about steps we must take to keep Australia secure.

A complex and overlapping set of global, regional and domestic security issues has been the hallmark of a more turbulent security environment—at least compared with what John Lewis Gaddis called the 'long peace' of the Cold War. It is an environment where attempts to shoe-horn Australia's national security agenda into a form of geographic determinism are even less relevant than in the past.

A defining feature of Australia's security environment is the growing link between global and regional security challenges.

A defining feature of Australia's security environment is the growing link between global and regional security challenges. We observe this on a daily basis—in combating terrorism and transnational crime, countering weapons proliferation, supporting fragile states or responding to economic, environmental and energy security challenges. With the shift in economic and increasingly geo-political weight towards Asia, this intersection of global and regional security challenges will only become more crowded. And demands for Australia to engage in a clear-sighted, highly-integrated and well-resourced strategy of global and regional activism will only intensify.

A direct attack on Australia by a conventional state entity, while it can't be ruled out entirely, appears a remote possibility for the foreseeable future. The most immediate security threats to Australia in 2006 come from the interlocking networks of terror, arms proliferation and

fundamentalist ideology. The struggle against Islamist terrorism and violent extremism will be a generational one. While its crucible is in the Middle East, it is a struggle that has already recast the global security environment in deep and lasting ways. The best answer to terror and extremism is to help people, especially in the Muslim world, who are struggling for security, opportunity and hope. When free societies fail to support others striving for what we have, we do not simply fail them. We fail ourselves.

For Australia, Iraq and Afghanistan are both vital battlegrounds in the fight against terrorism.

For Australia, Iraq and Afghanistan are both vital battlegrounds in the fight against terrorism. Australia's engagement in these theatres—and in the Middle East more generally—is important in protecting our interests and keeping Australia secure. Australian forces are in southern Iraq helping to secure the foundations of a viable, democratic future. The handing back of Al Muthanna province to Iraqi security forces in July this year was due in no small measure to the courage and hard work of the Australian Defence Force.

In Afghanistan, more than 500 Australian troops are helping that country meet its difficult security challenges. These are both dangerous missions and the path to security in Iraq and Afghanistan will be long and hard. The level of insurgent and sectarian violence in Iraq remains very high and the Iraqi Government faces many difficult challenges to secure the country's democratic transition and development.

In Afghanistan, the level of violence, including suicide bombings, has increased significantly in recent months as the Taliban and other terrorist groups seek to destroy the credibility of the Afghan Government. The international community must continue to support these fledgling democracies because the implications of failure for the global security environment are enormous.

Amongst the lessons of the 11th of September was the danger of a turning a blind eye to states wracked by extremism, fundamentalism and chaos. The aftermath of the war in Lebanon also demands that all nations refocus on the two essential conditions for any lasting peace in the Middle East.

The first is that there must be an unconditional acceptance throughout the entire Arab world, without exception, of Israel's right to exist in peace and security behind internationally recognised borders. The entire Arab world—including Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas, and in addition Iran—must give up forever the idea that the Israelis can be driven into the sea.

Cooperation among nation states is still the best defence against terrorism.

The second condition is that there has to be an equally unconditional acceptance, including on the part of Israel, of the need for a just settlement with the Palestinian people through the establishment of a viable and independent Palestinian state. Until those two conditions

are met, the legitimate hopes for peace and security in the Middle East will remain unrealised and the running sore of the Palestinian issue used vociferously as a recruiting weapon by extremists.

Cooperation among nation states is still the best defence against terrorism. Together with our active role in global and regional institutions, Australia has forged a network of 12 bilateral counter-terrorism agreements—stretching from Afghanistan to Fiji. Working with partners in South East Asia to help reduce the risk of terrorism is an abiding priority. Like other liberal democracies, we have also taken steps to better secure the home front against terrorism.

Good intelligence is still the best protection against terrorism. In the case of terrorism, protection is not only better than cure. There is no cure from a successful terrorist attack—only mitigation of pain and suffering. All our actions are based on the premise that Australia will remain a terrorist target in the years to come. We can expect that Al Qaeda and its fellow travellers, especially in South East Asia, will be persistent and adaptable, probing our security processes for any weakness.

Countering the proliferation of weapons also demands an integrated mix of global and regional activism.

Countering the proliferation of weapons also demands an integrated mix of global and regional activism. With practical measures such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, we are helping to disrupt trade in weapons, materials and technologies while also working to reinforce multilateral export controls and safeguards. Australia is heavily engaged in supporting international efforts to address the nuclear brinkmanship of Iran and North Korea.

Iran's behaviour—in defiance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696—needs to be met with resolve by the international community. While Australia is committed to finding a diplomatic solution, the UN needs to act quickly and decisively to ensure its own credibility. The challenge of helping weak and fragile states achieve security and development is related to almost every threat we face in this globalised security environment. Again, contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan reflect Australia's appreciation that our interests and responsibilities are both global and regional.

Australia has a particular responsibility to assist vulnerable states in our region that confront challenges of law and order, corruption and weak governance. In East Timor and in a number of island states in the Pacific, we have been prepared to act in a robust, hands-on way. Though not without tensions at times, on the whole, our strong engagement is welcomed by neighbouring peoples.

Australia will continue to shoulder the lion's share of external assistance to some states. At the same time, we are under no illusions that their ultimate destiny lies in their own hands. This perspective underpins the work of the Australian Defence Force, as well as Australian police, diplomats, aid workers and others drawn from various Australian Government agencies working on the ground.

Clearly Australia's most immediate interests and responsibilities lie in Asia and the Pacific, for reasons of geography but also given the region's growing power and importance. Strength through cooperation will remain central to how Australia pursues its regional security interests. With a balance of principle and pragmatism, we seek to engage most substantially with those countries with which our primary strategic and economic interests reside.

Australia's alliance relationship with the United States—an alliance of both interests and values—remains a cornerstone of our security.

Australia's alliance relationship with the United States—an alliance of both interests and values—remains a cornerstone of our security. For the foreseeable future, no other country in the world will have the spread of interests or strategic reach of the United States. Steps taken to strengthen our alliance in the last decade reflect Australia's view that none of the security challenges we face can be met without American power and American purpose.

Australia has also encouraged Japan to play a greater security role regionally and globally. This year's Trilateral Strategic Dialogue between Japan, Australia and the United States has added a new dimension to our relationship. As well as working with Japanese forces in Iraq, Australia has continued to support Japan taking a permanent seat on an expanded UN Security Council—as recognition of a more confident country assuming its rightful place, not only in the region, but in the world.

The Australian Government as you know has also raised significantly our level of strategic engagement with both China and India. China is determined to reclaim its place in the global system and should be further encouraged to play a constructive role in the region, including as a crucial partner in efforts to halt North Korea's nuclear ambitions. Australia seeks a strong partnership with China by building on our shared interests while dealing openly and honestly on issues where we might disagree.

By any standard, India is emerging as a major regional and global power. With among the world's largest armed forces, the largest navy in the Indian Ocean and a nuclear weapons capability, it will exert greater influence on our security environment. Australia's relationship with Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim nation and now its third largest democracy, is in the centre of Australia's security agenda in South East Asia, not least in the fight against terrorism.

The transformation of Indonesia after decades of authoritarianism is a remarkable political achievement, too little remarked and acknowledged in many part of the world. As a neighbour and friend, Australia will continue to place the highest priority on supporting the efforts of President Yudhoyono to strengthen its democratic processes and economic development.

Today's complex and interrelated security challenges have placed new demands on Australia's resources and security capabilities. The government's long-term commitment to a 3% real growth per year in defence spending will see Australia's defence budget rise to about $26 billion by 2015–16. This will ensure a more combat focused, better equipped and

more operationally ready defence force. The government's recent decision to increase the size of the Army by two battalions is designed to meet future regional and global security challenges. Recent events in East Timor and the Solomon Islands have again shown the sorts of demands which our regional security environment places on Australia.

Today's complex and interrelated security challenges have placed new demands on Australia's resources and security capabilities.

The expansion of the Army will enable our troops to better sustain operations and to rotate forces so as to be better prepared for future requirements. It will ensure our soldiers are better supported and, when they get home, better rested and prepared to meet future challenges. This increase in the size of the Army is in addition to the enhanced land force capability announced last year as part of the Hardened and Networked Army initiative. It reflects this government's fundamental reassertion of the strategic importance of the Army—and indeed of the individual soldier—in Australia's strategic culture.

The Australian Government has also invested heavily in our broader defence capability for the years ahead. This year's Budget provided for enhanced heavy airlift capacity and planned investments will fund vital projects such as new air combat capability, Air Warfare Destroyers and Abrams tanks, the first of which were delivered last week. Australia must maintain a high level of operational capacity, not just with our military but also with our policing capacity. The recent decision to increase the International Deployment Group of the Australian Federal Police by some 400 personnel will provide extra capacity to undertake stability operations and to respond at a moments notice to emerging law and order issues.

Beyond peace enforcement, Australia's leadership role also extends to helping our friends and neighbours in times of natural disaster and humanitarian crisis. This is an area where the courage, resilience and compassion of Australian forces have shone through in recent years—especially in the wake of the 2004 Asian Tsunami and last year's devastating earthquake in Pakistan.

In the 21st century ladies and gentlemen, national security begins at home in more ways than one. Not least, it begins with a strong and growing economy so that we can afford to address the whole gamut of our security challenges. Australia's sustained prosperity—an economy now in the 16th year of economic growth—has provided the essential capacity to expand the resources we devote to national security, when and where they are needed.

In addition to greater defence spending, since the 11th of September 2001 we have committed over $8.3 billion to improving a wide range of domestic security capabilities, including intelligence, law enforcement, border security and protection of transport and other infrastructure. Funding for our domestic intelligence service—the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation—has increased substantially to the point where it is now better resourced than at any time since the height of the Cold War.

The Commonwealth Government continues to work with state and territory governments across Australia to ensure that counter-terrorism laws strike the right balance between

protecting individual rights and freedoms, and the right of the community to be safe from a terrorist attack. The recent aviation bomb plot in Great Britain has reminded all of us of the need for vigilance and to constantly evaluate our security procedures. Like all Western liberal democracies, we need to provide security without compromising our values and our way of life, but also remembering that the greatest human right of all is the right to live.

When people talk about civil liberties, they sometimes forget that action taken to protect the citizen against physical violence and attack is a blow in favour, and not a blow against, civil liberties. The battle against Islamist extremism in Australia will only be won with a strong combination of accurate intelligence, effective law enforcement and, crucially, a commitment to certain shared values across the whole of our society. Liberal democracies around the world are having to face challenges at the point where questions of citizenship, immigration, culture and national security intersect—what the British writer David Goodhart has labelled 'security-and-identity issues'.

The maintenance of social cohesion in Australia is both our greatest national achievement and our greatest national challenge for the future.

The maintenance of social cohesion in Australia is both our greatest national achievement and our greatest national challenge for the future. We rightly celebrate our cultural diversity—but this must never be at the expense of the greater importance we attach to the common values that bind us together as one people.

In the end, what links the different strands of Australia's security agenda is not how we see others but how we see ourselves. Today's globalised security environment, while it may have shaken some old prisms and paradigms, has also brought into sharper focus enduring interests and values that have served Australia well in the past. In the teeth of battle, in the cause of peace and in face of human suffering, a distinctly Australian blend of realism and idealism has come into its own.

The government is under no illusions that there are those who want to harm our country and its people. We do not underestimate the strategic challenges that confront us and the tests we will likely face in the future. So while I am confident that our security agenda will become no less complex and crowded than it is in 2006, I am also very confident that Australia can prevail and prosper.

Thank you.

One—Global context and influences

THE GLOBALISATION OF SECURITY

Paul Cornish

There are three parts to my talk this morning. First of all, very briefly I want to talk about globalisation and what we mean by this term, and to identify a workable definition. I then want to talk about globalisation and security: what are the security dimensions or challenges of globalisation as I will have described it? And then, finally, the question of globalisation and strategy: what is to be done about the challenges that I will have set out?

Globalisation has many dimensions: economic, political, cultural, technological and ecological.

Globalisation

Globalisation: what do we mean by it? It's not new, first of all. International flows of capital, ideas and people have been around for a very long time. Globalisation is most often understood to refer to the global economic and financial system, but it's not exclusively an economic phenomenon. I came across one definition which went as follows: 'a multidimensional set of social processes that resists being confined to any single thematic framework'. So that narrows it down a bit for you. Globalisation has many dimensions: economic, political, cultural, technological and ecological. It's also a term which is laden with many norms and values and assumptions. Is it a good thing or not? Does it even exist in any meaningful, tangible, policy relevant way? Can we do away with it if we don't like it, or are we stuck with it?

Photo opposite: Eastern Mediterranean Sea from Space Image: © NASA/Corbis/APL

The best definition I came across, and it's one I'll use as my working definition for this morning, is from Professor Rowland Robertson at the University of Pittsburgh. 'Globalisation'—he said—'is a concept which refers both to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole'. Let me now move on to the question of globalisation and security.

One of the core assumptions and attractions, surely, of the globalisation debate or thesis is that it promises a more rational, interdependent and cosmopolitan world ...

Globalisation and security

Does globalisation make us more or less secure? One of the core assumptions and attractions, surely, of the globalisation debate or thesis is that it promises a more rational, interdependent and cosmopolitan world—a more *human* world, if you like—and, on the other hand, a less violent and more secure world. But the record isn't all that good. The period since the end of the Cold War—that's to say since the moment when the dead hand of geostrategic rivalry was finally lifted and we could all become more conscious of the world as a whole—well, that period has not been either peaceful or secure. We've seen a great deal of man-made disaster in the form of armed conflict, often of the most vicious kind imaginable. In Aceh, in Afghanistan, west and east Africa, in the Balkans, Chechnya, in the Middle East, and most recently of course we've seen the rise of radical violent extremism in Washington, in New York, Bali, Madrid, London, Amman, Delhi, Iraq, and Islamabad. There is, of course, very possibly and very probably much worse to come.

In my view globalisation has had precisely the opposite effect to that imagined or expected by the Cold War liberationists. It has contributed to a climate of perceived total vulnerability to everything from climate change to narcotics networks, to internet fraud out of West Africa, all the way through to international terrorism. A recent AC Nielsen poll in the *Sydney Morning Herald* showed that 63% of Australians felt the world was less safe since 9/11. That's in spite of Australian Federal Police Commissioner Mick Keelty's recent reassurance that Australia is safer now than it was five years ago. Other opinion polls point in similar directions. My point is that we might well be safer and more secure in our own territory and in our own homes but we don't really believe it, because we look beyond and we read the press and we sense an unstable world of threat, hazard and hostility.

It's not an exaggeration, I think, to say that whatever else it has done, for good or ill, globalisation has given us a sense of permanent planetary crisis. Globalisation has, in my opinion, become nothing less than a metaphor for vulnerability and insecurity. The narrative of security, stability, prosperity and so on, seems increasingly to be out of our control, to be driven by external forces and even to have a menacing quality behind it. This is not a comfortable feeling. Let me give you a few illustrations now of what I perceive to be this global crisis consciousness.

... globalisation has given us a sense of permanent planetary crisis.

First of all, the threat of disease. Just recently the World Health Organization warned of extreme drug-resistant TB (XDR TB). Perhaps 2% of the world's nine million TB cases—that's about 180,000 people—have XDR TB. We need to know whether they fly a lot because TB spreads easily in confined spaces such as aircraft. And of course, there's avian flu to consider, which we in the UK will be doing *ad nauseam* in the coming winter. **Climate change** could cause extensive flooding of coastal areas. By 2025 the population of Bangladesh is expected to reach over 170 million people. Vast numbers of these people live in subsistence conditions and in areas vulnerable to very serious flooding. Who seriously expects these people to stay where they are and await their fate?

Looking elsewhere, it could be that by the middle of the century summer ice around the **Arctic** will have disappeared. But have we settled in advance any disagreements over the Arctic Territorial Sea, over transit rights, over rights to any marine and natural resources? Could the warmed-up Arctic become a radioactive cesspit as Russian nuclear waste leaches out of the rusting hulks of submarines and warships in the Kola Peninsula? Life in more temperate zones could also be more challenging, but in different ways. By 2020, by some estimates, as much as 60% of the world's population could be living in urban areas, several of these areas being vast '**megacities**' which will make Mexico City look like a small village. Where will these people work? What will they eat? What will they drink? What will they do for pleasure? What, in short, will it be like to live in these places? How safe and secure? Another urban phenomenon is the '**world city**'. London appears on the list of world cities. It's got two identities, in other words. What will world cities look like in 2025? Who will own them? What will happen when world cities or mega cities collapse, if they do? On that theme we're likely to see more displays of incompetence and corruption and worse, leading to the **collapse of governments and states**, possibly with violent and repressive consequences. We're all familiar with the concern over so-called **'home grown' radicals and terrorists**—thousands in the US and thousands in the UK, according to official releases. We're told that radicalism spreads insidiously through the banal and grubby fabric of modern Western society: in gymnasiums, in boxing clubs, schools and universities and prisons. Then there's the increased porosity and insecurity of **borders**. In some cases, if you considering financial crime and intangible technology transfer, there's the complete and utter irrelevance of borders.

Finally, in my list of doom, **organised crime**. International networks for financial crime, for smuggling weapons and narcotics and for trafficking people. And the connections between criminal and terrorist networks. On narcotics it seems that by our actions we even make things worse. For 2006 Afghanistan's opium production will hit a record of 6,100 tonnes. That's enough to produce about 610 tonnes of heroin, which is about a third more than the total demand of the world's heroin users. Now, it must be at least possible that the international heroin industry's response to this glut in supply will be to expand their consumer base by trapping more young people into addiction.

To an important extent, therefore, globalisation means that we feel threatened from everywhere and vulnerable to everything.

To an important extent, therefore, globalisation means that we feel threatened from everywhere and vulnerable to everything. It's not just a fevered public imagination that takes this view. The core security statements of NATO and the European Union all proceed from broadly similar assumptions. Often this goes too far and we very frequently find evidence of 'globalunacy', where everything and anything somehow becomes not just possible, but dignified and credible simply because can find it on the World Wide Web. Thus, according to a CNN, USA Today and Gallup poll released at the end of last month and early this month, 45% of the US population blames the US for 9/11. Now, that's not all that unfamiliar. We've all come across those debates. But consider the conspiracy theory which is also doing the rounds at the moment, to the effect that the attack on the World Trade Center was actually carried out by US missiles which were able to generate holograms to make them look like passenger aircraft. And from Reuters: some Kenyan followers of a US-based religious sect known as The House of Yahweh have moved into a series of underground bunkers. They were convinced that the world would end after an outbreak of nuclear war between the US and North Korea on 12th September 2006. War didn't break out apparently because they made mistakes in their calculations around the international time zone. Nevertheless they moved into their bunkers and they can feed themselves for about a year, after which time all the sinners will have been wiped off the earth. The situation might well come to an end sooner rather than later, however, because these bunkers are filling with water and might well cave in.

W H Auden, the poet, said that 'nothing is now so horrid or so silly that it cannot occur'. Let me turn now to more tangible and serious security implications of globalisation. What, in other words, are the implications of globalisation for strategy? First of all, the question of **conflict**, its incidence and its severity . I've already touched on this. Intrastate and separatist conflict, and struggles over resources, all these appear to be increasing in number and in damage caused. This is taking place at a time of increasing global responsibility. Consider the 'Responsibility to Protect'; that's to say the impulse to intervene on humanitarian grounds, an impulse often fuelled of course by scenes relayed by the international media. For this reason I like to think in terms of two trajectories of conflict which we must consider. On the one hand we have a sense of threat from more types of violence and disorder from a wider range of sources. On the other hand we're drawn towards or into violence through our increasing knowledge of and sensitivity to humanitarian abuse and our wish to intervene.

Second—**weapons**. One fairly recent phenomenon has been the rise of global networks of weapon techniques and training and supply. Dan Benjamin of CSIS in Washington has commented on the transfer of weapons and techniques between Iraq and Afghanistan. 'There's no question', he says, 'that there is a global circuit now. Technology and tactics are being shared among different groups in different theatres'. Fortunately, so far these conflicts, appalling as they are, have been conducted at the conventional end of the spectrum—often, indeed, at the preconventional end of the spectrum. (I'm thinking of course of the use of farming tools in Rwanda in 1994). But the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear

weapons technology and materials shows little sign of slowing, or even of coming under control. And of course, the A.Q. Khan network does rather make the Kalashnikov and even the Improvised Explosive Device pipelines seem not much more than tactical distractions.

The possibility that CBN weapons—along with the radiological so-called 'dirty bomb'—might be used by terrorist groups is daunting, to say the least. There's also a prospect now of space becoming increasingly militarised and even weaponised, perhaps leading to a whole new arms race. We've long become very familiar with the idea that weapons are not what we've traditionally thought them to be—machetes in Rwanda, as I said, are at one end of the spectrum and at the other end lies the use of the internet and of computing power as a weapon. So we have cyber insecurity: fears of disruption of communications, of denial of service, sabotage or propaganda attacks. This isn't to be considered a mere inconvenience, part of the 'fog of war'. This could be the thing that makes the fog. It might even be the battleground itself where stakes could not be higher.

One fairly recent phenomenon has been the rise of global networks of weapon techniques and training and supply.

Mention of computing and the internet brings in the third implication of globalisation—the **people**. Through cyber mobilisation the state is being missed out altogether by 'a mass networked mobilisation that emerges from cyberspace': 'the information age is having a transformative effect on the broad evolution of conflict, and we are missing it. We're entering the cyber mobilisation era but our current course consigns us merely to react to its effects'. These are the words of Audrey Cronin, writing in *Parameters*. She writes of a technological '*levée en masse*'—'a widespread egalitarian development' driven by 'a democratisation of communications, an increase in public access, a sharp reduction in cost, a growth in frequency and an exploitation of images.' We are losing control.

My fourth theme returns to the position and authority of the **state** in strategy. There are in my view two core assumptions at the heart of Western strategic thinking. The first, from Max Weber, is that the democratic state should have a monopoly on legitimate violence, whether that be through employing police or armed forces. Second, from Clausewitz, is the powerful and compelling claim that politics is in charge: war can only be driven by politics, and if it's driven by something else then it isn't war and we shouldn't let it happen. So, does globalisation mean the end of the state as we know it? If so, what will replace it and, importantly, what will happen to the monopoly on legitimate violence? Will it be okay for anyone to have a go with their private army or will these things be regulated by market forces perhaps? Will the privilege to use armed force reside with those who can afford to equip, deploy and employ a modern army? The private security industry has grown considerably in recent years. By late 2004 annual market revenue stood at about 100 billion US dollars, and these are expected to double by 2010. Now, I'm not one of those who argues that all these private security firms and private military firms, are essentially the mercenaries of the 1960s. That is emphatically not my argument. These organisations do extremely important work in many areas of the world which many governments are reluctant to do. They should be recognised for the work they do. But when private companies not only have armed force available to them with uniforms and all the other trappings, and are also

closely involved in the construction or reconstruction of states—not just the protection of a facility but the reconstruction of a *state*—then it seems to me that the private sector has been allowed into the innermost private sanctum of statehood. The crown jewels, if you like, have been given away and we haven't really noticed. Peter Singer, a noted authority on this subject, has described the security sector as representing 'alternative patterns of power and authority, linked to the global market rather than limited by the territorial state.'

Finally in this section some thoughts about what globalisation has done to **strategy** itself—that is, the use of organised armed force for political purposes. Four ideas come to mind here. The first concerns **scenarios**. In my experience the best scenario people are those who really don't believe in what they do. After all, they know and we know that the future is an unknowable place. So strategic scenarios can never be and should never be anything more than intelligent hypotheses and contingencies, which are useful only to the extent that we don't believe them but do draw lessons about how to think and decide as the unknown future wraps itself around us. Although there are some who persist in thinking they can see into the future, this isn't really the main problem with scenarios. I think the problem with strategic scenarios is that the one scenario we usually don't address is the one we're sitting in. Too often, I'm afraid, we look to strategic futures to identify possibilities, trends and shocks, and we think—properly—about how we might react in similar circumstances. But all the time we're cramming the future into the box that we've prepared for it, without asking whether it fits well enough. It is as if strategy is doomed to be stuck in the old paradigm until everything is destroyed around it and we finally realise. We are still concerned with territorial defence. We are still buying and deploying equipment to defeat the Soviet Third Shock Army. We are still convinced that the military should deal with combat and that the police should deal with law and order once things have settled down. Are these assumptions really robust and durable? I'm not sure. But do we ever really question them? Why can't strategy adapt itself incrementally? Perhaps because we're all overwhelmed by all these 'globo-scenarios'.

So, in spite of all the promises of human connectedness and stability, globalisation appears to have made us less rather than more secure.

Second, **asymmetric warfare**; the increased and increasing likelihood of violent asymmetric extremism. By asymmetry I mean the warfare of the weak but clever and determined, against the strong but complacent. Now, this is not a new idea. It's as old as warfare itself, but there does seem to be a lot more of it about today. Third, **deterrence**. Deterrence is a classically Western and liberal approach to the use of armed force, in that you achieve what you need without using force but by threatening credibly to do so. In fact, of course, it's scarcely a Western liberal idea at all. About two and a half thousand years ago Sun Tzu argued that 'to win 100 victories in 100 battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.' But today we are faced with the difficulty—if not the impossibility—of knowing who to deter (who is the 'enemy'?), where they are, what they want and how best to 'subdue' them. Deterrence is essentially a process of negotiation and bargaining. But if you can't answer these questions then it's not clear how the process can begin. What do the terms 'deterrence by denial' and 'deterrence by punishment'—good

terms from Cold War deterrence thinking—what do these terms actually mean in the context of the fight against Al Qaeda?

Finally, **victory**. How do we know when we've 'won'? What is the definition of 'victory'? What is the 'exit strategy' for Iraq and Afghanistan? When is the right moment for the military to hand things back to politics and return to their barracks?

The serious point in all of this is that globalisation appears to undermine itself. Global awareness and global communications make it possible, paradoxically, to challenge notions of a rationally organised global humanity and connectedness, either with manifest stupidity on the one hand—the House of Yahweh—or with aggressive, violent sectarianism and parochialism on the other. Yet, globalisation seems to have removed most or many of established strategic tools and so far not to have replaced them. So, in spite of all the promises of human connectedness and stability, globalisation appears to have made us less rather than more secure.

Globalisation and strategy

What can we do in policy and practical terms? What should be our strategy for security? One component of strategy, I think, must be not to overreact. I mean this in two ways. The first is to do everything that can be done through the media and through civil society and open debate to dispel the impression that the world out there has gone bad and is coming to get us. Second, at the political level, not to react in such a way that the global confrontation becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Mike Scheuer, the former CIA officer who wrote as 'Anonymous' the book *Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror*, advocated nothing short of a war to the death fought with 'fury and bloodthirstiness, with relentless, brutal and, yes, blood soaked offensive military actions until we have annihilated the Muslims who threaten us'. This is in print. He cites the 144th Psalm: 'Cast forth lightning and scatter them. Shoot out thine arrows and destroy them'. He insists, 'We must kill many thousands of these fighters in what is a barely started war that will be unimaginably costly to each side'. He predicts, 'The piles of dead will include as many civilians as combatants because our enemies wear no uniform'. I'm not sure whether this really would be the most helpful strategy. But I'm certain that strategy, our strategy, must reflect our Western liberal culture rather than tip it on its head.

This leads to my second concern, that our strategy shouldn't be only externally but also internally consistent with our culture and values. What I mean here of course is the debate which the Prime Minister referred to earlier between civil liberties and security. We of course need to meet the requirements of security, but we also need to meet them in such a way that we do not compromise our society, and in effect achieve our adversary's goal for him. At the moment, for example, there's some controversy in the US over whether Al-Jazeera International should be carried on national airways. Well, is this a reasonable attempt to exclude enemy propaganda, or it is a neurotic overreaction which damages our own civil society and, in large part, does the terrorist's job for him? In Colorado, counter-terrorist officials have launched a website to let ordinary people electronically report 'suspicious activity'. At the University of Arizona researchers have developed a project known as Dark Web using 'spidering' to crawl through the internet and chat rooms and protected websites, 'where some of today's terrorist plots are hatched'. They're developing a mathematical algorithm to track what they call the 'infectiousness' of violent ideas. The US Department of Homeland and Security finally is developing a major intelligence program using data mining

and analysis to track terrorist threats in the US. Intelligence and information fusion, 'I2F', for collecting, tagging, classifying and organising data to gather and analyse information about potential terrorists.

Now, I'm not rubbishing all of this in any sense. The questions raised by these issues are familiar enough in Australia, in Europe and in the United States. In open and highly technology societies, in other words, which suddenly find their openness being used against them, there's a risk of reacting in such a way that security is achieved but only at the expense of the very freedoms and openness we value so highly. Is this sensible public resilience or an assault on civil liberties, turning liberal society into something like East Germany under the Stasi, making everybody afraid of everybody else? How do we balance security and civil liberties? I don't have an easy answer to that question, but I do feel that the moment we stop asking that question and trying honestly to find decent answers to it then we could be in even bigger trouble than we ever imagined.

This leads me to a comment on the robustness of Western societies. Western societies actually look rather strong. They have large and thriving university establishments, they have many leading international companies which happily integrate wherever they find themselves around the world. There's even now a new Coca-Cola factory in Kabul—thank heavens. They have charitable organisations and they have wealth. But some would say that they are nevertheless undergoing such a crisis of confidence that they are willing to concede the moral, political and strategic initiative to others. Writing in the latest edition of the *Times Higher Education Supplement* my colleague, Bill Durodié, has argued that 'in trying to protect our societies from the presumed threat posed by a global terrorist conspiracy bent on acquiring and deploying weapons of mass destruction, it seems that increasingly it is we lacking in any clear direction who are at war with ourselves and our values'.

If what I've just said could be termed 'cultural strategy' or something similar, let me turn finally to more traditional strategic thinking. How should security policy and practice be shaped in response to the challenges of globalisation? First of all, **equipment and ideas**. Who, to be blunt, invented GPS and who controls most satellites? And indeed the internet? Well, by and large, **we** do. Alvin Toffler argues that the GPS is on the verge of enabling a new economic revolution in just in time productivity, in supply chains, in agriculture, etc. The tendency is for these technological revolutions to become part of the global commons, and for very good reason. If they are such an engine of trade and economic growth it's right and proper that they should be made available to all. But could it be time to think more seriously about whether more needs to be done to ensure that the global commons are not allowed to become a battlefield in which we are disadvantaged because we persist in seeing it not as a battlefield but as a marketplace? Audrey Cronin once again makes this point precisely: 'This connectivity can also provide a means to counter the use of these tools to mobilise for radical causes if the United States will consciously engage in a wide ranging counter-mobilisation. Overall connectivity is far higher in countries that represent more open democratic societies. This should be a tool that greatly advantages the United States, one that Western military organisations are adept at using themselves'. She finishes by saying, 'In its naïve enthusiasm for the information age the West has lost control of the narrative, failing to effectively monitor it or even to seriously consider its consequences'.

Second, I return to the idea of **asymmetry**, and I've got three problems with this. In the first place, there are still too many military people and strategic commentators who fail to understand that asymmetry is dynamic. No matter how much brain power you put

into finding out what the next asymmetric threat is and where it will come from, this will inevitably be a waste of time—the adversary understands the rewards of asymmetry much better than you do, and he will move on just as you arrive on the scene. Second, asymmetry, as I said earlier, is not new. All conflict has probably had an asymmetric dimension to it. Which good general has ever done anything else, other than use his wits and try to get around the problem? Well, why aren't we doing the same? Why are we using our intelligence, our ability, to outflank the adversary through our own asymmetries and thereby regaining the initiative? Finally there's the 'OODA loop'—observe, orient, decide and act. In a way, this is a graphical illustration of asymmetric conflict. But at the moment it's as if we are stunned by the realisation that our OODA loop, our decision-making cycle, is too big and too slow moving—certainly when compared to theirs, the bad guys. But we invented the thing! Surely we should know what to do to tighten it up.

Third, **what are armed forces for**? Arguably, globalisation has muddied the politico-military relationship so much and bombarded it with so much information that we've lost a clear sense of what the military is for and when to use it. In his book, *Utility of Force*, General Sir Rupert Smith has argued that 'only by knowing what you want can you frame the questions to ask of the analysts and intelligence services, and only by knowing what you want in terms of the political outcome can you decide what it is you want the military to achieve'. If we can't answer this (Clausewitzian) question about the use of armed force then isn't it inevitable that our armed forces will be incorrectly configured, equipped and trained? What will the troops actually do, and why, and when will it be possible for them to leave? Once again, let me quote Rupert Smith, who I think has got it right:

> It is no longer practical for the politicians and diplomats to expect the military to solve the problem by force, nor is it practical for the military to plan and execute a purely military campaign, or in many cases take tactical action without placing it within the political context with both politicians and the military adjusting context and plan accordingly throughout the mission as the situation evolves.

This suggests to me that we need to think more carefully and systematically about the use of force, and we need to ensure that it is governed by a responsive and relevant political framework. In other words, we need to know what the politics and the political objectives are in the first place. We're all familiar, I'm sure, with the term 'legacy systems' when we're criticising defence procurement activities. But perhaps the biggest and the most debilitating legacy of the Cold War is the failure to realise that the political rationale for the use of armed force has to be kept robust and dynamic. During the Cold War the political rationale was so obvious and so compelling that I think we became rather complacent, and we have as a result lost the sense that if politics cannot drive the military clearly and purposefully then perhaps the military should not be driven.

This leads to my **fourth point**, which is that the military can no longer be considered, if they ever were, to be somehow set apart from the rest of life. Globalisation offers complex threats which require a complex response. Winston Churchill had this right, I think, when he described what we would probably now call the 'manoeuvrist' or in the UK 'the comprehensive approach'. Churchill said, 'There are many kinds of manoeuvre in war … some only of which take place on [or near] the battlefield. There are manoeuvres to the flank or rear. There are manoeuvres in time, in diplomacy, in mechanics, in psychology; all of which are removed from the battlefield, but react often decisively upon it, and the object of all is to find easier ways, other than sheer slaughter, of achieving the main purpose'. So the pursuit

of security in the era of globalisation must involve diplomacy, trade, the media, argument, economics, development aid, cultural tolerance, law enforcement and military operations, and probably all of these things at the same time.

My **fifth point** is that 'globalised threats require a multi-region response', quoting J Poulter from a recent issue of the Journal of the Royal United Services Institute. Bilateral security partnerships are essential. Now, some of them will take us by surprise, such as Libya's ostensible return to rationality and the US invitation to Syria to become an ally in international counter-terrorism following the recent disruption of terrorist attacks on the US Embassy in Damascus. Others will be familiar but no less important. In the UK we've all become rather bored of discussing the so-called special relationship with the United States and it's with some relief that special strategic relationships are being re-established, or established—I'm not sure which—with Australia. There have always been very good connections between the armed forces of our two countries but in the last few years that relationship has been tested operationally from the deployment of a small contingent of Gurkhas to East Timor to assist the Australian-led operation there, to more recent collaboration in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Defence and security alliances are also going global. NATO is creating a framework for security cooperation far beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. A 'global partnership' which would involve fragile democracies such as Iraq and Afghanistan, but also involve like-minded nations such as Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and Australia, with whom NATO's Secretary General signed a security agreement in March of last year. NATO's initiative is intended to cut across geographical boundaries and to facilitate military operations and civil emergency planning. I'm also intrigued finally by what seems to be an increasing conversation among or between the world's security and defence organisations. NATO, the European Union, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the African Union—increasingly these are talking to each other.

My **sixth and final point concerns when to act**? In matters of warfare and conflict the default setting for Western liberal societies is not to initiate armed conflict but to respond to it in a last-resort and defensive manner. This is a powerful reminder of centuries of thinking within the just war tradition. We don't respond until we've been poked in the eye, because until that happens we can't be sure that the use of force would be proportionate. But it's also of course rather a contested idea at the moment, hence all the discussion about prevention versus pre-emption and hence the intensity of the debate surrounding the rights and wrongs of intervening militarily in Afghanistan and Iraq. Can we adapt the just war tradition for the era of globalisation in such a way that we defeat the possibly very serious threat of a non-state actor choosing to deliver, say, aerosolised anthrax in Canberra, yet without going over the top?

The first step I think is to convince ourselves that just because we're the West, doesn't mean we are axiomatically at fault or to blame for the ills of the world. Actually, the West isn't—dare I say it?—such a bad idea. If we can accept that then it might make it easier to live with more risk than at present we appear willing to do. If we can live with more risk we might be less brittle and embattled and less inclined to feel all at war with everything and everybody. We might be better equipped, in other words, to resist the grotesquely exaggerated arguments offered by Scheuer and others. Perhaps then we'll be in a better position to deal with, and even to pre-empt, the security challenges stemming from globalisation for what they are. We would approach the use of force in a just war manner, cautiously and hesitantly

but nevertheless willing to use force if all else fails. We must, it goes without saying, use force with discrimination and proportion, otherwise, once again, we are ourselves shooting the Western liberal project in both feet.

Conclusion

In conclusion, globalisation presents some very real dangers to our security, from international insurgency and terrorist organisations making use of communications and infrastructure to attack with possibly very devastating weapons. But globalisation also exaggerates the problem somewhat. It has given rise to a sense of vulnerability and instability, and I think we have bought into this too easily. We've been too willing to lose control of the narrative of national and international security. We believe our own fears too much. There are threats but I'm not sure how fundamentally threatened we really are. I'm also not sure whether we haven't transformed Cold War style thinking and expectations into the new circumstances and come to the conclusion that things must be as bad if not worse than they were for the latter part of the 20th century. As I keep saying, the threat from Al Qaeda style terrorism is not to be discounted, but perhaps it's not all it's cracked up to be either.

I've argued at some length that we have still to provide a comprehensive framework of political understanding with which to guide and contain our use of armed force in response to the challenges of globalisation. Until we do that, I feel that strategy is curiously one-sided. We have very sophisticated threat and risk and hazard analysis, but we meet it with rather underdeveloped responses. In the end, the globalisation of security cannot be just about threats, fears, dangers. For the West in particular, as leading proponents of globalisation, and actually as the owners of much of its core infrastructure, the globalisation of security is also about opportunity. If we can't make better use of the opportunities we've created then in a way we deserve to have lost the initiative and the narrative.

ISLAM, THE MODERN WORLD AND THE WEST

Samina Yasmeen

The question of Islam's relationship with the West and its place in a modern world has been attracting a lot of attention since the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001. The subsequent bombings in Bali (2002), Madrid (2004), and London (2005) have further sharpened this focus on Islam and its relationship to the international society in the new millennium. Questions are being asked at different levels, ranging from the political leadership in western liberal societies to ordinary citizens if Islam is compatible with dominant values held dear in western liberal democracies? Opinions are offered about the record of human rights in Muslim societies and their inability to subscribe to the emerging international human rights regimes in the world. Islamic doctrines are conflated with prevalent Muslim doctrinairism(s) to suggest that the religion and the totality of its followers have not acquired the necessary attributes to operate effectively in today's world. The sub-text, which sometimes remains less than a sub-text, is that Islam and the demands and processes of the modern world are incompatible. Islam's relationship with the West as the harbinger of modern values, therefore, is conceived of and portrayed in essentially antagonistic terms. Such negative portrayals, it is essential to point out, are not the sole domain of western discourse. Often Muslims living in Muslim states or liberal democracies also posit such ideas. Effectively, two distinct categories of civilisations are created, accepted and sustained by such references to the duality between the West and the Muslim world.

Such views raise a number of questions. How valid is the assumed dichotomous conception of Islam and the West? Are Muslims engaging with the West, and if yes how? Are Muslims essentially non-participants in the agenda of a modern world, or do they exhibit signs of experiencing and enjoying, if not creating, the fruits of modernity? What is the relevance of the relationship(s) between Islam, the West and modernity for Muslim immigrants to western liberal democracies? To what extent does this debate need to impact upon the manner in which leaders in western societies, particularly Australia, approach the 'Muslim issue' in the post-11 September world? I would make an attempt to address these questions and suggest areas which need attention to shift the dynamics underlying the prevalent discourse on Islam and Muslims in Australia.

Identities and processes: fixed or constantly changing?

The debates on identities and their impact on how we live our lives are not new. But they have acquired additional significance since the Gulf War of 1991 when Islam and the West were erroneously presented as two contesting parties. Since then, against a lot of literature that deal with multiplicity of identities, a trend has emerged that denies or ignores that identities are not fixed in time and space. The discussion on the relationship between Islam and the West is dominated by this trend: Muslims are perceived as being fixed in their ideas, their identities and their approach to life. The West, while assumed to be modern and progressive with an attendant attribute of constant progress, is also conceived of in fixed terms. Its preference for secularism, separation of the church and state, and its adherence to certain values and ways of expressing those values is divested of an element of evolution. To put it differently, both Islam (or its followers, Muslims) and the West are presented and perceived as being fixed in their nature and expression of that nature (whatever it may be).

Such portrayals of Muslim and western identities ignores the fact that individuals and collectivities are in a constant process of evolution. We, as individuals, constantly change in response to external and internal stimuli. Communities also exhibit similar tendencies: as the surrounding environments shift, or as intra-communal debates occur, groups of individuals reassess what *they are* and how they exist in relation to *others*. This reassessment shapes their options and preferences for behaviour vis-à-vis others on a constant basis. One example would be the Australian view of Japan during the Second World War and how it shaped their approach to the Japanese communities in the immediate aftermath of the war. Over a period of time, the changed sense of Australian identity vis-à-vis Japanese identity set in motion processes that changed the nature of their relationship.

The assumption of fixed nature of identities also ignores the reality of multiplicity of identities among individuals and communities.

The assumption of fixed nature of identities also ignores the reality of multiplicity of identities among individuals and communities. It also shies away from acknowledging that, given that identity exists in relationship to others and that perceptions play a role on construction of the self and the other, it is quite possible that *our view of the other* may not be in line with *the reality of the other*. To give you a personal example, I came to Australia as a student in 1979. Dressed up in Pakistani outfits, I was constantly identified as 'the one from Pakistan'. For some my dress code even denoted my extreme conservatism. This was at odds with my own view of myself as a progressive woman who had been brought up by an even more progressive mother. Having lived in Australia for the last 26 years, now I find myself in the position where I am sometimes identified as 'a westernised woman' during my trips to Pakistan. This is despite the fact that I feel myself to be as much a part of the Pakistani society as others who have lived in the country for most of their lives. It is also despite the fact that I assume that I am behaving like other Pakistanis while in Pakistan. Within the Australian context, I see, feel and act as an Australian, but sometimes find my actions being explained in terms of 'my culture'. The assumption is that I am *not* an Australian. The picture is made more complicated by the fact that me, as Samina Yasmeen, is constantly changing while living different facets of my life. I am a daughter, a wife, an academic, a Muslim, a friend and so on. Any attempt to assume that I could be understood within the context of a fixed definition of who Samina Yasmeen is would be unrealistic. The same complexity applies to identities of other individuals and communities as well. The West is not monolithic in nature, nor is the Muslim community. Also, neither the West nor the Muslim community is immune from constantly changing from within and in response to shifts in the surrounding environments. To assume otherwise, in my opinion, is to negate the reality of human existence and experience.

This brings me to the next point: the relationship of individuals and communities to processes such as modernity. In my view, the relationship between constantly changing multidimensional identities and processes is not fixed either. This state is not limited only to a discussion regarding modernity. Instead, all other processes—be it backwardness, conservatism, emotionalism or spiritualism—also exist in a relationship of perpetual

change/evolution vis-à-vis individuals and communities. We all change our relationship to the way life, ideas and our surroundings as life changes. We respond to processes irrespective of whether we like them or not. There is no guarantee that our responses are always positive in nature. But there is a guarantee that individuals and collectivities engage with change on a constant basis. Such engagement is *not* uniform in nature with different sections within a community responding to the same process differently. It also may not be the same across time and space: we may respond to certain changes in one way while a very similar process at another stage may not evoke any response. Such fluidity inherent in human/community responses to processes, in my view, can be elucidated with reference to the outpouring of grief at Princess Diana's death. The manner in which grief stricken people expressed their feelings at the death indicated that certain events and processes cause them to behave differently than what even they themselves consider to be the norm. Essentially, I want to emphasise that any assumption that Islam and West are fixed identities or that Muslim relationship to the process of modernity is fixed is inherently flawed. It ignores the reality of human experiences and expression of these experiences.

The question therefore arises as to how has Muslims' interaction with modernity evolved over time? The answer to this question would vary depending upon the definition of modernity. For the purpose of this paper, I would focus on Muslims' willingness to embrace new ideas and technology as a means of investigating the relationship between Muslims and modernity. In the realm of ideas, Muslims have exhibited a willingness to explore and embrace new ideas since the early days of their religious experiences. The tendency did not disappear during the era of colonisation. On the contrary, a number of Muslim scholars led the movements which encouraged a process of learning from the West. In British India, Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan, Allama Iqbal and Abul Kalam Azad stand out in this context. Despite having been relegated to the position of subjects in the area earlier ruled by the Mughal dynasty, these thinkers and philosophers exhibited an openness to the ideas introduced by the West. They combined their notions of Islamic ideas with western ideas, and prescribed approaches to pull Muslims of British India out of an intellectual malaise. A similar process occurred in Iran where intellectuals borrowed ideas from both Russian and French intellectuals.

The willingness to learn from the West—as an indication of positively engaging with modernity—has also been apparent in Muslim approach to the issue of Islamic state. Drawing upon the ideas prevalent in the West, a number of Muslim scholars have presented ideas that come close to the notion of separating religious orders (church) from the state. They have constantly argued that while *divine will* is an important source for shaping the structures of relevant polities, the construction of an Islamic state can also draw upon *human will*. In the past it has led to some advocating the idea of Islamic socialism. More recently, such preferences have found expression in the writings of thinkers like Abdolkarim Soroush, and Abduh an'Naim. Of these, Soroush combines his knowledge of religious doctrines with western philosophy to promote 'the basic values of reason, liberty, freedom' to the status of 'primary values'. He argues that 'those who shun freedom as the enemy of truth and as a possible breeding ground for wrong ideas do not realise that freedom is itself a "truth".'[1] In a similar vein, An'Naim argues that:

> 'the state must not be allowed to claim the authority of Islam. It is true that the state has its proper functions ... which may include adjudication among competing claims of religious and secular institutions, but that should be seen as the state performing secular functions of a political institution, without it claiming religious authority as such. It is also

> true that the religious beliefs of Muslims, whether as officials of the state or as private citizens, always influence their actions and political behavior. But these are *good reasons for keeping a clear distinction between Islam and the state*, as well as between the state and politics.[2]

Islam's engagement with modernity is also evident in the speed with which technological innovations are accepted and promoted in a number of Muslim states. The spread of internet technology in these countries is one indication of this rapid acceptance. While reluctant to allow 'immoral ideas' being spread through the internet, a number of Muslim states have been at the forefront of accepting the technology. Their citizens easily and effortlessly use the web to communicate ideas as well as project their ideas into the cyberspace. Satellite television networks are another example of this acceptance of technology. The rapid proliferation of mobile telephone technology, in my opinion, presents one of the most easily discernible indicator of how modernity is embraced by a large number of Muslims. Countries like United Arab Emirates stand out as the major user of mobile phones. So widespread is the use of these telephones that Etisalat is giving its customers the option of receiving calls to prayer on their mobiles.[3] Malaysia has already been delving into the question if Islamic divorce can be communicated through SMS.[4]

But the usage of mobile telephones is not restricted to the upper echelons of these societies. I often remember the dialogue with Ali, the driver, who works at my parents place in Pakistan. He is totally illiterate and his family lives up in the mountains. He has got five or six kids and is constantly in the process of increasing their number. We have been asking him to control this population growth for the sake of improving the quality of his life. He does not necessarily listen to us. But he insisted that he wanted a mobile telephone. During one of my visits to Pakistan, I gave him one. Next time he appeared not to have the mobile. 'Do you think you could get me another mobile?', has asked me. 'What happened to the one I gave you last time?', I inquired. 'Oh, my mother is sick so I had to leave it with her so that I could find out what was happening to her'. 'That's okay, then you don't need a mobile', I suggested. He looked at me and said: 'Please elder sister, I feel really incomplete without a mobile'. The fact that an illiterate man who is incapable of properly counting numbers feels incomplete without a mobile phone in Pakistan, to me, is the most vivid example of the acceptability of products of modernity by Muslims.

To say this is not to ignore that the relationship between Islam and modernity is not always positive. There are those who have shunned modernity as indications of the evils introduced by the West. Others have questioned secular ideas on the grounds that they are not in accord with basic teachings of Islam. Added to this is the current tendency among the majority of Muslims to benefit from the 'fruits of modernity' but not necessarily contribute to scientific and technological innovations. Such attitudes are manifest among others, in the field of engineering where the reluctance to take bold decisions and explore technological innovations often ends up costing more for the facilities the western world takes for granted. The supply of drinking water, for instance, costs more per head in countries like Pakistan than Australia despite the assumed availability of cheap labour in the developing world.[5]

Islam and the West: positivity and negativity

The condition of a predominantly positive relationship between Muslims and modernity is also replicated with respect to their relationship with the West—the harbinger and icon of modernity. Despite the current focus on the inherent conflict between Islam and the

West, the reality remains one of Muslims actively engaging with the western world. This engagement takes place at both state and sub-state levels. A number of Muslim states, for example, have established and maintained close relations with western states over a long period of time. During the Cold War era, it was reflected in these states participating in the US-led alliance system. Even in the current focus on the War on Terror, Muslim countries including Jordan, Egypt, Pakistan and Indonesia have cooperated across a range of activities aimed at curbing Muslim militants. The relationship, it is essential to emphasise, is not one of uni-directional dependence: Saudi Arabian oil supplies play an important role in sustaining the economic development of countries from the West.

At the sub-state level, an active engagement has taken place across time between people in the Muslim world and the West. Iranian intellectuals, for instance, were heavily influenced by French political and philosophical ideas at the turn of the 20th century. Allama Iqbal, the philosopher-poet who conceived the idea of a separate state for Muslims in South Asia, drew upon Nitzsche's ideas in developing his concept of Khudi (the self).[6] Later, Pakistani poet, Faiz Ahmed Faiz, combined Marxist ideas with his knowledge of oriental philosophy to argue against political oppression in Pakistan. Once again, bringing in the personal element, I want to mention that I was lucky that the friendship between my dear mother, Begum Sarfraz Iqbal and (uncle) Faiz enabled me to learn about the variety of ideas in the West. My teachers at the University added to it and taught me more about western ideas than is probably understood to be the case for a number of Muslims around the world. To some extent this connection can explain the willingness of a number of Muslims to emigrate to western societies, particularly since the end of the Second World War. These realities prompt me to argue that the assumption of Islam and West being two separate identities fails to take into account the multitude of positive relationships that have existed at political, intellectual, and cultural levels.

This is not to deny that the relationship between Muslims and the West also carries elements of negativity. But can this negativity be presented as a conflict between Islam and the West? My problem with such characterisations is partly related to the realisation that a distinction exists between Islam (the religion) and Muslims (its followers). While a negative relationship may exist among some Muslims and their view of the West, it cannot and must not be identified as a conflict between a religion and a civilisational trend. However, given that such distinctions are often overlooked, I would couch the remaining discussion in terms of Islam and the West in the hope that the underlying assumption is not lost to the readers, i.e. we need to focus on *Muslim experiences and not Islam* in understanding the current trends of negativity.

A large majority of Muslim states has experienced colonisation by western empires. Having been in the position of rulers, the colonised Muslims were relegated to positions of subservience. Coupled with the assumption of attitudes of superiority, these experiences instilled a sense of anger and anguish among a number of Muslims who came to view the world in dichotomous terms. The end of colonisation did not erase this sense of difference. Instead, the democratic deficit suffered by most of these states compounded the sense of anger. The close relationships between the authoritarian regimes in the decolonised Muslim states was interpreted as an indication of the West perpetuating its rule of Muslim countries by collaborating with corrupt and inept Muslim rulers. To put it differently, the dissatisfaction with the policies pursued by the local regimes was transferred to the icons of western civilisation in an attempt to explain the absence of improved conditions in a post-colonial state.

The identification of the West, and its icons (especially the United States), has been facilitated by the 'knowledge deficit' existing among Muslim states.[7] After being the leaders and active contributors to knowledge in a variety of disciplines, Muslims have gradually shifted into the space of limited knowledge and understanding. The commitment to *first order learning*, which could have instilled knowledge of inter-subjectivity has been sacrificed in favour of *second order learning* with a focus on simple cognition without critical thinking.[8] Students are taught to repeat and memorise ideas without encouraging them to link these ideas to the context in which they are living. This loss of critical thinking—which was the hallmark of early Muslim history—is not restricted to religious educational institutions. While madrassahs and pesantrans are identified as contributing to fixed interpretation of religious doctrines, the reality remains that other educational institutions in a large majority of Muslim states suffer from a similar tendency to opt for simple and categorical answers to questions in life. This, in turn, has implications for Muslim views and responses to global and local developments. When faced with a need to understand and explain the myriad of economic, political and social problems, they tend to place the blame on the relations between the regimes in their respective states and the West. The 'West' assumes the responsibility of the problems being faced by Muslims around the world.

Such reading of the global and local situations, it is important to emphasise, can be found even among some Muslims educated in and living with western liberal traditions. However, its existence among the orthodox end of the spectrum opens up the space for militancy among some Muslims. These groups combine their specific readings of Quranic injunctions and Prophetic traditions to argue in favour of Jihad against the enemies of Islam. So strong is this emphasis that they elevate Jihad to the status of a sixth pillar of Islam. Importantly, Jihad is presented as the essential and legitimate response to the exploitation of Islam by the West. The list of targets does not remain limited to the West though. It includes 'corrupt Muslim regimes' who are viewed as having exited the fold of Islam in their servitude to the West. Emerging against the background of international developments (for example, in Palestinian Afghanistan, and Iraq), these understandings contribute to acts of violence and militancy. The terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 and the subsequent bombings in Indonesia, Spain, Egypt, Jordan, United Kingdom and India are manifestations of such uncritical understandings.

The negative understandings about the West, it is equally important to highlight, are not restricted to men either. As some Muslims shift into the militant space, women in their families have also emerged as supporters of Jihad. Not only do they condone the militant activities as an obligation of a good Muslim, but they also transmit these ideas to the younger generation. The process of indoctrination with a focus on negative portrayal of the West and the need for Jihad, therefore, continues with implications that could extend into the future.

But the question arises if the causes of an antagonistic relationship between Islam and the West solely exist within the Muslim domain? Or do conditions exist in the West which also contribute to the increasing negativity? The search for an answer, I wish to point out, is not motivated by a need to continue the process of 'blaming the other'. Instead, it is guided by a need to identify the factors that need attention if those in the West wish to reduce the incidence of negativity among Muslims across the world. With this qualification, I wish to draw some parallels between Muslim and western societies in terms of their acquisition of knowledge about the other.

Just as the Muslim world tends to approach the existence of the West uncritically, the West also demonstrates an uncritical approach to understanding the reality of the Muslim world. At the heart of this lack of understanding, in my view, is a tendency in the West of assuming that its democratic credentials provide it with a certificate for moral and political superiority over the Muslim world. Critical thinking and the separation of state and church are viewed as credentials for not delving into the realm of subjectivity, religion and beliefs. But interestingly, this critical thinking does not extend to re-visiting, deconstructing and objectively analysing the sources of information and the underlying assumptions about the Muslim world. This is not to undervalue the excellent scholarly work done by authors like John Esposito, Karen Armstrong and James Piscatori. Rather it is to highlight the fact that the dominant trend among western analysts is one of instant expertism on Islam in the era of the War on Terror. These instant experts develop ideas about the Muslim identity and views that do not always do justice to the multiplicity of views about Islam and interpretations of religious injunctions among Muslims across the world. The tendency to uncritically use the information available about Islam on the internet and through the satellite television networks, as well as translated versions of Quran to find *authentic* answers to the Muslim view contributes to the problem. Unfortunately, policy makers and political leaders do not always question the authenticity of such information. Uncritically accepting of the portrayal of Islam and Muslims as the 'other' they further reinforce the process of negativity. Media plays an active role in the process by often highlighting the negativity while ignoring the positive examples to be found among Muslims. The ordinary citizens with relatively little knowledge of Muslims or Islam accept these ideas and tend to believe in them against the background of their knowledge of the historical accounts of western encounters with Islam.

To put it simply, the knowledge deficit present in the Muslim world is also creeping into western societies in terms of its understanding of Islam and Muslims. Despite its professed commitment to objectivity and critical thinking, we are witnessing a tendency to judge Islam and Muslims uncritically in the West. In a globalised world, such understandings and the attendant policies contribute to perpetuating the myth and reality of conflict between Muslims and the western world.

This requires a willingness to learn about the diversity in Islam and different approaches adopted by Muslims to understanding religious injunctions.

West's responsibility in an age of negativity

I strongly feel that it is time that, while working to counter factors which contribute to militancy, those in the West also seriously attend to the role played by *their* own images of Islam in contributing to negativity. This requires a willingness to learn about the diversity in Islam and different approaches adopted by Muslims to understanding religious injunctions. Without such an understanding, the West will continue to view the Muslim reality and experiences through coloured glasses. Equally importantly, western societies need to accept that their preference for relegating religion to private domain is not shared by all Muslims. Instead, the majority of Muslims around the world continue to identify

certain areas as part of the sacred spaces which must not be violated. The place accorded to Quranic authenticity and Prophet Mohammad is an essential part of this sacred space. Instead of violating the sacred spaces in the name of freedom of speech, the cause of building harmonious relationships would be served by respecting these spaces. The need for such a respect, in my opinion, has been validated after the cartoon controversy and the unfortunate events following the Pope's selection of references to Prophet Mohammad. This is not an argument for only identifying the responsibilities of the West. I think Muslims have an equal responsibility to make sure that they do not violate the spaces considered sacred by non-Muslims. But given that currently the West enjoys a position of relative superiority at the global level, it has a responsibility to be more magnanimous in its dealings with the Muslim world.

Does the need for understanding extend to the Muslim immigrants in western societies? Given that nearly one-third of the Muslim population in today's world lives outside Muslim majority areas, answer to this question cannot but be in affirmative. Muslims minorities in the West need to shun the tendency to approach issues uncritically and be willing to critically examine *their* understandings of religious injunctions. They cannot isolate themselves from the emerging trend towards exploration of the relationship between text and context by a number of renowned Muslim scholars (both males and females) in Muslim majority states.

I would argue that it is the responsibility of leadership in western liberal democracies to avoid taking the easy road.

At the same time, however, leaders in western societies also need to rethink their approach to Muslim minorities. As a Muslim woman who has made Australia her home, I feel very strongly that our leadership needs to lead and not engage in uncritical thinking in issues related to Muslims and Islam. There have been some recent examples of such uncritical thinking on part of our leaders. While talking to the Australian Christian Lobby National Conference on 23 September 2006, Australian Treasurer, Hon. Peter Costello identified 'the Judeo-Christian tradition' as informing the basis of Australia's secular political structure. One may argue that there is no problem with our leaders reminding people from different religious communities of their right to organise themselves and benefit from the democratic system that they live in. But the problem emerges when leaders use a language that identifies certain traditions as being pre-eminent in Australian system, while excluding others. The problem is compounded when those being excluded are clearly identifiable—in this case the Muslims in Australia. Coupled with his uncritical understanding of the relationship between Islam and secularism in Turkey merely indicates a problem which can contribute to a sense of alienation among Muslim minorities living in Australia.[9]

I would argue that it is the responsibility of leadership in western liberal democracies to avoid taking the easy road. Instead of opting for uncritical understandings and references to Islam and Muslims, they need to demonstrate better understanding of the views and experiences of Muslims within their own societies. The trend has to be coupled with a change in the Muslim world, but the West, with its pre-eminence and commitment to equality and social justice can definitely not shy away from this responsibility.

Endnotes

1 Cited in Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri, Reason, *Freedom and Democracy in Islam: Essential Writings of Abdolkarim Soroush*, (Oxford University Press, 2000), p. xiv.

2 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na`im, Shari'a and the Enforcement Powers of the State,

3 BBC, *Muslims' mobile call to prayer*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3085784.stm, accessed 22 October 2006.

4 BBC, Mobile divorce unacceptable, says Malaysia, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1435647.stm, accessed 22 October 2006.

5 I am indebted to my husband James Trevelyan for making me aware of such inefficient use of technology and knowledge in developing countries.

6 I am conscious of the fact that the translation does not fully capture the meaning of *Khudi* as espoused by Iqbal.

7 The ideas of knowledge and democratic deficit were presented in the Arab Human Development Report 2002.

8 I am indebted to Hosni Muadz for these ideas.

9 Hon. Peter Costello, Address to Australian Christian Lobby National Conference, National Press Club, Barton, 23 September 2006, http://www.treasurer.gov.au/tsr/content/speeches/2006/020.asp, accessed 24 September 2006.

ENERGY SECURITY: ISSUES FOR THE ASIA–PACIFIC

Ligia Noronha

Let me start by stating that we are at the moment at an energy crossroads because we have three very strong forces that have come together and create the need for a rethinking on energy. These three forces are economic, geopolitical, and environmental. The positioning of these forces requires us to examine whether energy developments are going the right way or whether we need to do some kind of rethinking and repositioning in order to be able to avoid conflict situations in the future. I've just come from a couple of conferences where there is this notion being discussed of Asia's 'hunger for resources', and hunger in this context is not always used in the sense of a need for resources, but really suggesting a perception of hungry rats coming in and messing up the global energy order which currently exists. You know, there is also, as Samina said, a subtext here which we need to engage with. Then there is the other issue that is causing concern: who are these hungry rats engaging with? Who are the friends they're making? What do their energy investment strategies imply to the West's concern with democratic values and human rights in producer countries, and are these strategies undermining Western policies and efforts to improve governance in these countries? I'd like to focus on these issues, quite apart from bringing up some more mundane issues that relate to energy.

New energy demand from India and China has shifted the focus of global attention to Asia and the Asia–Pacific.

New energy demand from India and China has shifted the focus of global attention to Asia and the Asia–Pacific. By the way, in the energy world, the Asia–Pacific region does not include the United States, so the data that I present for the region do not include the United States. If you consider these new demand centres of Asia, China and India, and of course the older ones of Japan, South Korea and Australia, you will find that these are ringed by energy supply centres which are very interesting. You have the Gulf and other West Asian states, Russia's Asian resources in the Sakhalin and Siberia, Myanmar, Bangladesh and, of course, Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. So all this is generating a new dynamic, a new dynamic that requires us to position ourselves in order to avail of the opportunities that this is creating.

With the opportunities are coming new ties and it is these emerging ties that are giving some quarters some headaches. But, as I said, we need to think more deeply about that issue. Then there is this whole issue of the environment and what our continued emphasis and dependence on the use of hydrocarbons is doing to the environment. There's also the emergence of natural gas as a mid-term fuel and the politics that goes with natural gas. So we are currently facing an extremely complex situation. Let me try and run you through some of the issues that this combination of forces is creating.

The key energy security issues, as we see them, are linked to energy and growth imperatives; the high oil prices; the rising resource nationalism; the emerging energy ties and implications that they create; risks related to energy infrastructure, both those arising from complexity of transmission networks and integrated systems, as well as the energy transit routes and the threats to these transit routes; the environmental concerns. I will talk through each of these. In this context, I pose the question: is there a possibility of cooperation? We're always talking the language of conflict, but is there a possibility of cooperation?

I'm very happy Professor Cornish started with a discussion on the need of thinking of security as more broad-based than just the traditional notions of security. This is particularly important in the energy sphere because you are looking at not just traditional notions of security in terms of the conflict that energy and growth can create, but also the whole energy and poverty issue, 'lifeline energy' which is very central to people in the Asia–Pacific. The Asia–Pacific includes both very rich and very poor countries, and countries which are growing very fast, and those, which are lagging behind. Within this wide spectrum of energy poor and energy rich countries, you have parts of society which are energy guzzling and there are others who don't even have access to electricity. Energy poverty involves what we call non-traditional risks. For example, environmental health impacts of having to have smoke in rooms from the incomplete burning of traditional fuels, the burden on women of collecting firewood, and lack of jobs because of the lack of electricity to create the jobs. In the case of energy and growth, risks relate to competition for access to energy, especially oil and gas resources and the possible traditional security conflicts that these could give rise to and, of course, carbon emissions related climate change. So we have in this notion of energy security therefore two types of risks—traditional risks and non-traditional security risks.

Energy demand growth in developing Asia is being led by the economic growth in India and China.

Just to go a little more into the regional characterisation. Asia–Pacific, as I just mentioned, has a mix of both types of energy security risks. But I'd like to, coming from India, focus more on developing Asia for a minute and look here at the fact that there is a relation between human development and energy use. Consider these three issues: human development index (HDI) versus energy consumption per capita; a high dependence on traditional biomass as fuel in poor countries; and low vehicle ownership in emerging economies. Most of developing Asia has a low human development index and a low per capita energy consumption. Australia, Canada and the United States have high HDI and high per capita energy use. So there obviously seems to be a connection between low per capital energy consumption and a low human development index. An analysis of the energy mix in the region reveals a high dependence on biomass, (30% in Asia as against 12% in the world) and this is traditional polluting biomass. Finally, vehicle and car ownership is worrying everyone the most. If every Chinese and Indian family decides to have as many cars as an American family does, we will have a huge problem on our hands. These figures are a bit dated, they relate to 1995, so you could add a few more to these but it will not change the argument much. As per these data, China has about three, India has our and the United States has

517 cars per thousand people. If you look at the motor vehicles, again we have a very low ownership per capita compared to the 700 of the United States. This is not to suggest that I'm arguing for all of us to use as many cars and possess as many motor vehicles as people in the United States. I'm just suggesting that this is the worry that is there at the back of people's minds when they say that as a result of growth and increasing incomes you might have a situation where there would be a greater need for oil to service the growing aspirations of middle class Indians and Chinese.

IEA projects—IEA being the International Energy Agency—that the future world demand—30 years on will be led by Asia; that the energy economy will still be centred on hydrocarbons; that oil demand in the region will double from the current 21 million barrels per day; that natural gas demand will triple; that coal demand will double and the oil import dependence from outside the region will increase to about 80% and gas imports to 65 from a current 25%. In OECD Asia, which includes Japan, Korea, New Zealand and Australia, energy demand has sort of levelled off and is stable. But in developing non-OECD Asia, demand is rising sharply. This is what is triggering the discussion on hunger for resources.

The other great worry is high oil prices.

Energy demand growth in developing Asia is being led by the economic growth in India and China. High growth rates are projected for these countries. Goldman Sachs speaks of five and 6 % per annum; the Planning Commission of India speaks of eight to ten; the Chinese Government also speaks of nine to ten. Of course, it's difficult to believe that these would be sustained over the next 30 years because growth tends to level off once you achieve a certain stage. And then there's also the question of population. We have huge populations. India's population is still growing. Chinese population growth is expected to decline by 2030. The Indian population is expected up to be about 1.5 billion in 2030. So, given the low per capita energy consumption, the need for cars, the rising incomes as a result of growth, and the fact that the populations are going to increase, what does it imply for future energy demand ad supply? The 2002 projections from the World Energy Organisation suggest that, for India, coal over the next 30 years will increase twofold, gas fourfold, oil 2.3 times, hydro 3.6 and nuclear 5.8. In the case of China it's again twofold for coal, 2.4 for natural gas, 2.6 times for oil, hydro 2.5 and nuclear 10.5. So the projections are that the demands for energy in these countries are going to increase hugely.

The other great worry is high oil prices. The substantial growth in oil demand, I would suggest, is not the only reason for the oil price rises. It was responsible for the rise in prices in 2004 but then there were other reasons why oil prices have remained high since then, which include both political factors as well as the low supply capacity in the Middle East. Oil price movements are creating a lot of uncertainty in importing countries, especially in the case of India and China, because we do not know how long oil prices are going to remain high, how volatile the swings are going to be, what is it going to do to the ability of emerging economies to buy this oil. This creates a huge amount of insecurity on the economic side. There are political insecurities too, and I'll talk about them later. But from the economic side it's really to do with: can we afford to continue to buy oil at these prices? To a great extent

these two countries have been less affected by oil prices rises because of large foreign exchange balances. The same situation in the seventies created chaos in India, but this time around it's been much easier to cope with the high oil prices.

Where is the oil? Who produces it? Who consumes it? You have the Middle East with 63% of the oil reserves. In case of production: Middle East, 27%; North America, 18%. If you look at consumption you have Asia–Pacific at 29%; North America, 31%; others are 20% and Europe is 20% of total consumption. So we are very dependent on the Middle East. We are very dependent on also the Middle East for gas, although in the case of natural gas the geographic distribution is a little more equitable.

There's increasing talk about there being a greater resource nationalism ...

I will come back to the implications of that dependence, but I just want to touch on this idea of resource nationalism. There's increasing talk about there being a greater resource nationalism and the factors that suggest this are the policies of Latin American countries, whether that of Venezuela or Bolivia, the recent changes in Russian energy deals, the perception that Russia is using its energy resources as a strategic tool, and the search for equity oil by national oil companies of China and India. I'm not sure, however, if we are witnessing a greater resource nationalism than we've had in earlier periods. The late sixties and the early seventies were really the heyday of resource nationalism: the talk of national sovereignty over resources, the nationalising of oil companies, and the rise of OPEC. My view is that what you see today is just an increased or heightened consciousness of this because of the various forces that have come together and maybe because there's more noise out there on these issues.

Do we have enough resources to meet our needs? Our view is that there are enough hydrocarbon resources; they are not in short supply despite the talk of peak oil, despite the questions about Saudi Arabian oil. Oil will peak. All non-renewable resources peak at some point so the question whether Saudi Arabian oil is peaking is not really a valid question. The fact is that many of these countries, and Saudi Arabia included, have not been explored sufficiently. North America is the region that has been most explored. There is a lot of potential in West Asia, a lot of potential in a variety of countries, which are still not explored. One key issue, therefore, is not so much whether we have enough resources but whether the resources will be delivered to the market. That is where the real insecurity lies. Are we able to get those resources delivered to the market?

Why are we concerned about that? We are concerned for a variety of reasons. On the economic side it's because a lot of these resources are owned by national oil companies, and either they do not want or do not have the technology or do not have the funding which is required to actually go there and do the exploration that is required. Or you have a situation in which there are sanctions in some countries and then you cannot have international companies going in to actually explore and look for this oil. So it's this delivery to market that is really worrying. There are labour shortages in some places, there are strifes in other places, and in yet others, there is a shortage of drilling infrastructure. Therefore, I would strongly

urge you to move from just a worry about stocks and resources to more about thinking about delivery to market.

It is true that India's energy needs are increasing, that there is a growing reliance on oil imports, both in India as well as in China.

Let me turn now to India and China. As I said, we've been sort of accused of being hungry for resources and going out there and aggressively seeking them. It is true that India's energy needs are increasing, that there is a growing reliance on oil imports, both in India as well as in China. China imports 51% of its oil right now, India over 70%, and projections are that by 2030, India will be importing 90% as compared to China, which will be importing about 70% of its needs. So where are we going to get this oil from? India and China do share very common energy security issues in terms of their needs. They have huge populations and huge needs, as we discussed. Now, if you look at the strategies, we find that they are similar. I've classified these here as domestic and external. In the domestic sphere you have an enhanced domestic oil and gas search, more focus on natural gas, coal, hydro, nuclear technologies. Both countries are beginning to engage with the issue of strategic petroleum reserves, are providing a greater attention to renewables and energy conservation and energy efficiency. On the external side the concern is with the strategic diversification of oil supply sources, the equity oil initiatives, diversification of energy imports to gas and coal, much greater pipeline diplomacy and energy collaborations and partnerships.

Where the countries defer is in the intensity with which China has been following its energy strategies as compared to India. In part this is because China is better organised, quicker off the mark, than India is. We sort of tend to catch up a little later. In part it's because of China's perception of space, of its space in the international context. I would suggest that China is far more worried about being contained, about not being able to get its energy supplies when it needs them, as compared to India, which does not worry as much. This difference in perception in geopolitical space also determines how intensively these two countries go out to look for its oil and gas.

Where the focus of attention is at any point in time will depend on how those countries perceive themselves at that point in time in terms of the international situation.

In the context of positioning in geopolitical space, there are models, which are being developed in the European Union, which look at energy securing strategies in terms of multilateral and bilateral strategies, in terms of state and market approaches. They use a kind of an axis—and this is from the Clingendael Institute—to sort of explain where countries are located in their energy strategies. I would suggest that if you look at the strategies of India

and China, they will be found to be operating in all four quadrants. There's a mix of both multilateral, bilateral, state as well as market approaches. Where the focus of attention is at any point in time will depend on how those countries perceive themselves at that point in time in terms of the international situation.

Coming back to the issue of dependence on West Asian crude, and I'm now stepping back from India and China to look at the broader Asia–Pacific. Asia–Pacific as a whole depends on over 80% of crude from West Asia. The United States is 20%; Europe is 27%; China is 40%; India is 68%, and these shares are rising. Therefore there is this concern about whether this is a wise thing to do, to be so dependent on West Asia, given the political instability, the resource uncertainty. I'd like to point out that this dependence is not new. It's always been there. OECD Asia has been dependent on West Asia for a large number of years. India too has been importing for years from this region. The new entrant is China. So import shares have always been high. What's increasing now are the volumes, and that is a factor that needs to be taken into account. So the potential concerns of this dependence are: delivery to market, as I mentioned earlier, sudden supply disruptions due to terrorist attacks or the political instability, and the choke points in the oil supply routes.

I have just come from the IMF/ World Bank meetings in Singapore where there was one session, which was dedicated to looking at oil and other ties with the Middle East, and what kinds of problems these create. Another recent meeting looked at the larger issues of what the energy ties of the emerging economies, of the 'hungry' countries, are doing to the idea of sanctions, the idea of supporting democratic processes and universal values in these countries. Let us revisit the so called new ties that are emerging: growing ties with West Asia—they're not new, but yes, they're growing; ties with Nigeria and Sudan; increased reengagement of Russia in Asia and emerging ties with Central Asia and the Caspian Sea.

Let me briefly touch upon the increasing ties with West Asia, and especially with Iran since Iran is always in the news these days. Both India and China have large ties with Iran. In the run-up to the nuclear deal with the United States this was a key issue that kept coming up in the debates. Should we be having, for example, the Iran gas pipeline that India has been flirting with? My Director-General has, in fact, been one of the prime motivators behind the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline, for a variety of reasons, both economic as well as to increase the stakes of these countries in each other. The key question is: should we be engaging with Iran at all? There are a variety of engagements, and those engagements occur at three levels: there are energy investments, cross investments which are happening both upstream and downstream; there are trade ties which are occurring and they are increasing; and there are strategic partnerships being developed to work, say, in Afghanistan or in African countries. So the ties have always existed, but the ties are growing. Part of this reason is the belief in Asia,—especially in India—that we need to engage with countries in West Asia, not isolate them. We need to have persuasive rather than coercive voices. If we need change, we need to increase the stakes of these countries in our countries and our countries in them in order to also change the mindset of each other.

With regard to GCC—that's the Gulf Cooperation Council—ties with them have increased enormously post September 11. Trade ties have doubled and tripled. Again, we've has a long history of connections with the Gulf. India has been sending labour there for years; South Asia has been sending labour there. We've benefited enormously from the NRI remittances that have come from these countries, which have changed the face of states

like Kerala and Goa as a result of the non-resident remittances that have come from the Gulf. So we've been having this connection for a long period of time.

What is the issue of increased energy engagement with so-called problem states?

What is the issue of increased energy engagement with so-called problem states? As I've already mentioned, it's to do with undermining the policies of the West with regard to some of these problem states. Is there potential for greater conflict or greater cooperation between the West and the emerging economies as a result of this engagement? The way we perceive it, there is a calculus of competition between the US and China; a calculus of cooperation between US and India; a calculus of divergence and convergence of interests between India and China. The role of the EU is more indeterminate, supportive of the emerging economies, but somewhat anxious of the outcomes. As we see it, China's movement into some countries is really to take advantage of niche areas. You have a situation where a country is looking for energy resources, where energy resources to some great extent have been already locked up by other countries, and you have to find as a country in a very short space of time the resources that are required to safeguard its own economic interests. So where do you go? You go to those countries where the competition is less. You find niche areas.

There is a lot of argument being made that as a result of this you're actually undermining, say, the US policies in Sudan or US policies in Iran. The fact is that a large number of international companies—and this is also true in Europe—have, until recently, been doing business with these countries, and have done so for a long number of years and it's only now that these governance issues have come to the fore. So to expect India and China to sort of jump into this bandwagon and start engaging with this new debate is a little premature. It's not to suggest that India is not interested in these issues—we certainly are. But there is need for some time to first establish itself and also to be able to increase India's stakes in these countries.

If you look at India and China there is sometimes a divergence of interests and at other times, a convergence of interests. We've had talk of competition with regard to equity oil, and I'll come to that, but there have also been instances of cooperation. These are some of the examples where we've had competition with China over oil resources—in Angola, in Indonesia, over PetroKazaksthan—but I would suggest these are discreet events and too much should not be made of the potential for conflict from these events.

The other interesting question is the conflict in resource rich Africa. There are those who suggest that India and China are adding to the conflict situation by pumping in money and allowing the situation to get worse. I suggest that conflict in resource rich Africa needs to be understood in terms of layered conflicts. There are some wars that have been going on, keep getting repeated; there is often a mismanagement of oil resources which generates local unrest, and what we now have is a kind of a superimposition of the agendas of the emerging economies coming in, along with the US opposition to this entry, and that is adding a new layer of conflict that needs to be understood.

I'm already running out of time so I will skip the natural gas, but just to suggest that this is of interest to Australia. Whether natural gas is going to be the fuel of the 21st century really depends on how we address the issues of the needs of producer countries. Our argument has been that energy security is not just about consumers' needs for secure supplies. We have for too long been talking only of consumers and their security of supplies, but there's also a need for security of demand and there is, therefore, a need for dialogue between producers and consumers if the resources are to come to the market.

On a map of trade flows, it is mostly the LNG trade focused in Asia–Pacific and these are the pipeline routes which are mostly in North America and Europe. What is being hoped is that this trade will increase and therefore make gas more of an international traded commodity rather than just a focus on trade via pipelines. Pipelines are also very much being discussed today. The issue with pipelines is there's always a vulnerability involved because of the routes that they take.

A lot of oil is transported through the Straits of Malacca and the Strait of Hormuz and the greater the dependence on West Asia, the greater the dependence on these routes.

Oil supply routes and choke points, I think most of you are familiar with these issues. A lot of oil is transported through the Straits of Malacca and the Strait of Hormuz and the greater the dependence on West Asia, the greater the dependence on these routes. So if there is a threat or strike here there is the whole issue of non-access to the oil resources for that period in time. This is a major source of insecurity for countries to the east of West Asia. The other issue which the IEA and the ASEAN forum have been raising is the issue of piracy. Piracy has increased around the Straits of Malacca and that is another issue that is of concern.

Finally I consider oil, gas and coal resource distribution. The richest resource of Asia–Pacific is coal. Coal is the resource that is contributing most to carbon emissions and therefore the one that is most under pressure for change in a carbon constrained world. In the energy mix of India, China, Australia, not so much Japan, there's a high dependence on coal. So what do we do, given that energy related CO_2 emissions are rising and they will rise enormously? Both in India and China, coal will remain the centrepiece of our energy mix. The worry is that if you're only concerned with ourselves we run into the tragedy of the commons when everyone is then affected.

... energy securing strategies should not be seen in zero sum terms.

So what are my key messages? One: that energy securing strategies should not be seen in zero sum terms. The moment we do that we run into conflict situations. We need to find ways in which we look at how we can increase energy and therefore have a win/win situation. One way to do that is to reduce the vulnerabilities faced by both consumers as well

as producers in this. So we need to engage with producers, not isolate them. We need to reduce perceptions of containment to avoid pre-emptive action. We need more international dialogue on rule based security strategies. I'm not sure if Australia was part of this but there was a consumer–producer dialogue in January 2005 as well as in November 2005 in India, which brought together the producer and consumer countries of West Asia, Asia, as well as of Central Asia, on two different occasions, with the idea of really increasing the dialogue between these countries on vulnerabilities that each one faces. Finally, a plea that we also cooperate on renewable energy and energy efficiency measures. There are lots of examples out there but not enough is being done to upscale these experiments and really take forward the message that we really need to engage with renewables.

Two—Security instruments and arrangements

AUSTRALIA, THE GLOBAL WEST AND THE ENHANCED NATO

Julian Lindley-French

Introduction

Prime Minister John Howard makes the point that Australian security starts well beyond Australia's shores. It is the same for North Americans and Europeans as the globalised economy spawns globalised security, and insecurity. Globalisation is a child of the West which has a unique duty to steer its prodigy to maturity. Consequently, globalisation is witnessing the dawn of the Global West. And, whilst there is no Global NATO, the Alliance must go strategic. Indeed, NATO today is increasingly a strategic effects generator—an enhanced NATO that is part of the West's ever broader-based security engagement. Like its sponsor the enhanced NATO is not aimed at any legitimate actor. Indeed, the Alliance stands by it July 1990 statement that it has no state enemies. Rather, the object of the enhanced NATO is strategic stability through the harnessing of political and military cohesion to that end—of members and partners alike. Put simply, NATO offers unrivalled experience in the effective organisation of transnational armed force in pursuit of the myriad of tasks such forces must today perform the world over. It is an important task because ultimately the enhanced NATO is about keeping America strong and legitimate and Europe engaged in big security in the new, big global age of power, terror and energy. Consequently, the Global West of which the enhanced NATO is but a part is as much an idea as a place and thus is open to all who share the aspirations of its leadership.

The enhanced NATO therefore is pivotal to effective strategic stability in the vast security expanse of the twenty-first century. NATO is a

Photo opposite: The Los Angeles and San Diego areas of southern California, seen from the space shuttle Discovery. © CORBIS/APL

big security organisation, founded for a big security purpose by big power as part of a big security relationship. It was ever thus and will ever be thus. NATO is by definition strategic. Put simply, NATO goes where the security and defence interests of its members and partners go. It is as simple and straightforward as that. Moreover, in an age in which legitimacy and efficiency are the twin pillars of Western vitality NATO also renders unto US strategic leadership an accountability vital to partners the world over, validating America's essential strategic leadership through political and military effect. America can only be great when it acts in partnership for the essence of the great American idea cannot be separated from the pluralism it espouses and the effect it seeks to create.

The enhanced NATO therefore is pivotal to effective strategic stability in the vast security expanse of the twenty-first century.

Therefore, NATO is the strategic West. And, in this new big age will re-emerge from the strategic vacation of the post Cold War to once again stand tall as the world's indispensable alliance. Indeed, NATO *is* the globalising security and defence arm of the West offering solidarity, stability and security in equal measure to all those who wish to share the values of the Global West. Australia is a like-minded partner of the first order, able to celebrate its cultural heritage and assert itself as one of the cornerstones of an Asia–Pacific region that is both dynamic and demanding in equal measure.

Equally, strategy is not theology. Rather, it is a balance between what needs to be done, and what can be done. Strategic stabilisation therefore is about promoting the system of civilised institutionalised security governance the West built. A noble goal that requires a concerted and sustained effort to strengthen, rehabilitate and embed contemporary state and state institutions the world over as the primary security identity of the individual. It is a strategy itself founded on three pillars of effect. First, by emphasising the just state as the most efficient provider of security. Second, by promoting the just state as the most effective mechanism for strategic interaction. Third, by maintaining the just and open state as the foundation of legitimate and effective international institutions in this new age of power, terror and energy.

Consequently, it is the just state that is the business of the West—not religion or belief which must remain the sacred space of the individual. Consequently, the primary battle of the Global West is engaged is that between power and terror. Only through such a strategy will power defeat terror rapidly and at least cost.

Why expanding horizons?

Nevertheless, there are not a few strategically myopic members and partners of the Alliance that question the purpose and utility of the enhanced NATO. They wonder aloud why they must look beyond the tired shores of the Euro-World and steel themselves again for a new age of security. They fret about the here and now at the expense of the future. They champion the low politics of the mini-West at the expense of the Global West to which they are condemned to be a part. Ironically, the answer they seek passes through their ports

and airports every day. But strategy is nought without vision. If strategy enables intent, structure follows power and as power flows eastward from the large lake of creativity that is the West so do the West's vital and essential interests. Consequently, the West's interests are being transformed along several globalising lines of axis—reach, intensity, purpose and commitment. And, as they transform a question grows more burdensome by the day—are we up to it?

Are we up to the grand strategy that the three great questions of change demand of the West? Is the West truly prepared for the emergence of new great state power? Can the West prevent the ongoing erosion of weak state power? Is the West secure enough in its own idea to maintain itself? That the Global West will need to find answers to these seminal questions must not be doubted. Not least because these trajectories of change are complicated by the reliance of the strong and newly strong upon the weak and infirm for much of the energy that fuels the strength upon which the West relies. That is why terror seeks to disrupt the flow of energy from the weak to the strong, and the transfer of wealth, technology and ideas from the strong to the weak. Put simply, terror seeks to destroy power by rendering all weak. It is a seminal battle of ideas against which the Global West must go on the offensive. The West must stop being defensive about the idea enshrined at its heart—peace through freedom and democracy. It is the greatest idea ever invented.

Given the stakes the Global West under enlightened American leadership, and by extension the enhanced NATO, has no alternative but to ensure that what could be the foundation of mutual strength for all is not hijacked and/or corrupted by moral medievalism hell bent on the subjugation of all through the criminal manipulation of a great and noble religion. That is why, it is important to state that given those expanding horizons the West is as much an idea as a place and thus open to all that seek to join its efforts to stabilise the strategic environment. Australia cannot hide from its past, not least because its past is not yet over. Asia–Pacific might be the future, but so is the Global West. Australia, as a member of both, is at the centre of such power, no longer a mere outpost.

As time goes by …

Five years on from 9/11 the Global West's mission is pressing and of vital interest to all states committed to stability. Strategic counter terror is mutating from a series of man-hunts into a new strategic doctrine for engagement in a world in which the West's engagements will be by definition asymmetric, dangerous and with an ability to suck states into sustained commitments that will stretch civil and military means to the limit. The efficient organisation of effect thus becomes critical, placing a particular premium on the creative use of national power—be it Britain's Comprehensive Approach or Australia's One Government doctrine. Indeed, for what is emerging from the counter-offensive is a new thirty years war in which extreme belief systems, old but massively destructive technologies, unstable and intolerant societies, strategic crime and the globalisation of all commodities and communications combine to create, potentially at least, a multi-dimensional threat which transcends geography, function and capability.

Fifteen years on from the collapse of the Soviet Union big states are also back and the West must also prepare for a new balance of power. Unfortunately, as power moves eastward it becomes less stable and more de-institutionalised. Strategic change is not a question of a battle between good and evil that so often complicates statecraft, but it could nevertheless become dangerous if power expands rapidly beyond structure. Danger emerges first and

foremost from the good, old fashioned need for resources to fuel the just demands of human aspiration. Change made both complex and dangerous by the insatiable demand of the rich and newly rich for such resources, much of which is supplied by the profoundly weak and the deeply unstable.

Two sets of figures from the World Bank reinforce the urgency of this strategic truism. First, even though only 6% of proven oil reserves have been used, annual discovered volumes will by 2040 decline to roughly 1/100th of the mid-70s average. Second, the demand for energy will increase by over 50% by 2035 and 80% of that will be met by fossil fuels. Energy competition if not handled carefully could result in a dangerous tipping point. Indeed, if terror is to defeat power it will only do so if power first defeats itself. Governance is the key to managed competition and the Global West is the best hope that such governance can be locked into the new international system at an early stage.

The big question is whether such a strategic consensus can be reached because the Global West must itself be anchored in a functioning United Nations that today does not exist.

The search for strategic consensus

Thus, the new, enhanced NATO is about the search for new strategic partnerships in a new age, just as classical NATO was the vital expression of a vital strategic partnership that helped stabilise another age all those years ago. The big question is whether such a strategic consensus can be reached because the Global West must itself be anchored in a functioning United Nations that today does not exist. Australia must be a part of that search. The signs are both positive and negative. On the one hand, the lack of contemporary strategic consensus with other key powers, such as Russia and China, complicated by the seductive opportunism afforded to revisionist states by the boiling point of beliefs, is stymieing the UN. At the very least it is bringing the age of Western humanitarian interventionism to an end in all but the most extreme of cases. Indeed, Darfur is a test of Chinese and Russian preparedness to accept infringes on bad state sovereignty as part of *their* Responsibility to Protect, not just that of the Global West. On the other hand, US–Chinese co-operation in the Straits of Malacca suggest that partnership is possible and that the 21st century global balance of power, need not echo that of its immature 19th century European counterpart. Hanging over all is the spectre of a nuclear Iran that Israel will never accept and a psychotic North Korea that Australia, Japan, South Korea and China can never accept. Upon these anvils of challenge strategic consensus will be forged or fail.

Therefore, much of NATO's business today is the making of putative partnerships in security and stability. It is evident today in structural interventions whereby the West and its partners promote stabilisation and managed transition, of the type evident in Afghanistan, and through partnerships with states such as Pakistan, to create a matrix of maturity in immature environments. Mature interventions that combine the interests of human security with the broader strategic interest of stability to manage change for the benefit of all, keeping threats distant and minimal.

Equally, like all the missions upon which the West has embarked it is not and will not be easy, especially for the Alliance. Indeed, for NATO nations strategic stabilisation throws up dilemma at its most profound; how to match the strategic end-state sought with the resources and capabilities so required. US strategic leadership remains the *sine qua non* of such a mission but it also creates pressures for states born of different traditions and at lesser levels of power. Again, strategy is as much the child of what can be done as what needs to be done. US strategy is the product of American possibilities, not European or Australian. The organisation of power and effect thus differs depending upon where one stands on the hierarchy of power. How one stands depends upon how tall one is. NATO's prime directive is to keep America strong globally, by translating US strategy into European reality. It is a dilemma with which Australians must also struggle.

Indeed, whilst the Alliance is in principle the strategic arm of the West, only three states within NATO could truly be described as *projection powers*; the US, Britain and France. Most of continental Western Europe generates at best modest *peacekeeping power*, whilst many of the *protected powers* to the east of Europe remain concerned primarily (and understandably) with the increasingly Soviet-like behaviour of Moscow, recognising the very considerable effort they make to 'do their bit'. The crisis over force generation witnessed over the need for reinforcements in Southern Afghanistan demonstrated that still too many of the Allies are failing the challenge of the Global West by retreating from the real world into a false Euro-world, to which attests the difficulties faced by the Sec-Gen. to find troops to support the British, Dutch and Canadians. Australia too faces an acute dilemma therein. Whilst the Australian contribution in Afghanistan has been noticeably more robust than some NATO members, Canberra oversees armed forces that are increasingly protectionist, on a protectionist budget with much already to do in the 'near region'.

Equally, three of those four powers in southern Afghanistan are Commonwealth states, and a fourth, the United States, should be had it not been expelled for bad behaviour some years ago. Indeed, when it comes to the organisation of power there are many ways to skin a cat. Feline demise that should not be forgotten by those Allies that insist upon institutional form at the expense of political solidarity and operational effect. British public opinion took the point and will not easily forgive this form of indirect taxation that is too often paid for in the lives of British servicemen.

Indeed, just at the moment when the Global West needs high Europe to deal with high politics, too much of Europe is retreating into low Europe and low politics replacing strategy with political correctness. The EU is vital in preventing such strategic pretence. Dealing with complexity requires political and method options. For the West to have security legitimacy it is vital that Europeans engineer strong security sovereignty founded on real security engagement. Unfortunately, Europeans will be unable to project if they cannot protect. And, for all the Aussie 'can do' spirit which so endears Australians to its many friends and partners, it is a challenge that must also be considered by Canberra. Fear and an inability to protect or make many European societies more resilient to catastrophic penetration are undercutting the will and ability of Europeans to project power. Fear reinforced in places by a profound aversion to the use of coercion and the risks associated with the use of legitimate armed force to such an extent that it is in danger of seeing NATO's much vaunted strategic concept replaced with the national caveat. Europeans will not be able to hide much longer. The only question is will they wake up to that reality early enough to be a shaper of change or a victim of it. The tragic paradox of this age is that the madness of religious terrorism affords the enemy a far bigger world view than many of the states that once thought big as a reflex.

The sheer cost and complexity of advanced expeditionary warfare and peacefare, allied to the balance between creating the security space and filling it, is creating a capabilities-capacity crunch.

Even for the advanced allies it is not at all easy these days. The sheer cost and complexity of advanced expeditionary warfare and peacefare, allied to the balance between creating the security space and filling it, is creating a capabilities-capacity crunch. Forced as they are to make a choice between personnel and equipment. This is dangerous because the West's armed forces do not reconstruct after conflict these days, but during it with expensive armed forces employed to that end and consequently denuded through stabilisation attrition. Neat planning boundaries between conflict and post-conflict are being trampled underfoot in the plains of southern Iraq and the mountains of southern Afghanistan. Most Europeans armed forces have not much of anyone armed with not much of anything. Australia?

Joined up globalism

Thus, the very purpose of the Global West is as a global comprehensive security response, of which defence is but an important part. Joined up security through joined up government linked to a joined up partnership for strategic effect. A strategic comprehensive approach that mobilises big power to serve human security with the enhanced NATO at its core.

...the Global West has no alternative but to go global in pursuit of its legitimate security interests to rebuild the architecture of strategic stability.

To summarise; the Global West has no alternative but to go global in pursuit of its legitimate security interests to rebuild the architecture of strategic stability. To that end, the West is as much an idea, as a place. What the enhanced NATO seeks therefore is the inclusive legitimacy and capability of partners, be it through enlargement and/or enhancement to play the role for which it was designed. It has taken one hundred years and two world wars to construct the system of legitimate institutionalised security the West built and in this age of transitional power it is right and proper that the West moves to stabilise the system that it spawned. Most of the effort will be done through economic and political engagement aimed at the rehabilitation and refurbishment of the United Nations. However, as the architect of an open system the West must retain a coherent and credible tool of coercion to underpin its efforts and that tool can be and only will be the enhanced NATO.

For many Europeans such a role will require a gear shift in strategic imagination that Australians seem instinctively to have understood. Indeed, although for the first time in five hundred years Europe is neither the source of world power, nor the focal point of conflict rich Europeans have a need and a responsibility to act with partners the world over if they

themselves are to live in peace, security and stability. Not even political correctness and the imbalance in analysis of the shortcomings of others that such PC-ness promotes can dim that truism. For that simple reason North American and European democracies will naturally reach out to fellow democracies world-wide as cornerstone partners of the Global West. Like-minded states that stand out are of course Australia, Argentina, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, New Zealand, South Korea and South Africa—to name but a few. But such a natural grouping of states does not preclude close co-operation with others committed in the first instance to structure, stability, system and security. To re-iterate, NATO has no state enemies. Indeed, the very process of engagement is part of a new strategic dialogue that will be vital if strategic consensus is ever to be reached.

Be it NATO's expanding horizons or that of the West, the enhanced NATO must become a new force for strategic good in the world underpinned by a new partnership between those with the vision, the will and the power in this world.

The Global West, Australia and the enhanced NATO

The choice therefore is simple. Be it NATO's expanding horizons or that of the West, the enhanced NATO must become a new force for strategic good in the world underpinned by a new partnership between those with the vision, the will and the power in this world. As a founder member of the West, Australia must be part of that partnership, be it organised through Security Providers Forums, Global Partnership Councils or whatever form of institutional or informal relationship most suits. The unique experience of NATO over many years in welding many states together into an interoperable whole is the greatest insurance the West and its partners have that the system of just and balanced state security it created will ultimately extend the just and balanced human security it seeks.

As Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer puts it, ... we are not turning into some form of *globocop*—ready to deal with emergencies all over the world. We simply do not have that ambition, let alone the necessary means. However, all 26 Allies now look at NATO as a very flexible instrument, that we can use wherever our common security interests demand it ... we need the right mix of forces capable of performing combat tasks and post-conflict reconstruction work.

Prime Minister Howard emphasises the linkage between regional and global security in this globalised age and the need for an assertive strategic posture. He is surely right and it is time to properly prepare for such a posture. Indeed, for in an era when effectiveness is not possible without legitimacy and in which the Global West faces a myriad of tasks and missions the role of the enhanced NATO will be vital to strategic mission success in a new strategic age. However, vision without strategy is delusion, strategy without commitment is deceit and security without either is an illusion. Think about it!

BALANCING AMERICA'S GLOBAL AND REGIONAL INTERESTS: US STRATEGY IN ASIA

Ashley J Tellis

I've been asked today to speak about the question of US strategy in Asia and particularly the structural issue of how one balances global and regional interests. This is a complex and multifaceted subject and I suspect there is more that can be said than the time allotted to me allows. So please forgive me if I try and deal with a complex issue in telegraphic form, where I give you the headlines with much else left unsaid. I'm going to structure my presentation in three parts. I want to start by talking briefly about Asia and US grand strategy. Then I want to talk about US grand strategy in Asia, and I finally want to conclude by asking the question of whether the US can be successful in managing the strategic challenges that are likely to face us in the years to come in the Asian continent. Let me start by talking about Asia and US grand strategy.

I think it has become clear today to American policy makers and defence planners that Asia represents the future of the global system.

I think it has become clear today to American policy makers and defence planners that Asia represents the future of the global system. What we're seeing is a world historical transformation, a steady shift of systemic power from Europe to Asia, a transformation that is occurring now after a period of some 500 years, changing the very character of the global system itself. Yet, as one sees this transformation, it is also becoming increasingly obvious that Asia is a Janus-faced reality: that it represents on one hand tremendous revolutionary potential in terms of its ability to concentrate capabilities and produce capabilities that gather notice in the international system, but yet on the other hand remaining a transformation that is incomplete and imperfect. This tension between the growth of capabilities on one hand, while still remaining incomplete or imperfect on the other, poses specific challenges for US policy.

I want to touch briefly on both the dimensions of this dialectic to flag three consequences that I would like to call to your attention. The revolutionary side of the Asian story is something that we are all very similar with. There is an Asian miracle and after 30 years you can see it simply in Asia's contribution to the global product. Today Asia contributes about 28% of global GNP and the projections are that by 2020 this proportion of contribution to GNP will probably rise to somewhere around 43%. Somewhere in the middle of the new century it would probably come closer to 50%. The bottom line, therefore, is that Asia is likely to be the engine of global economic growth, and because it enjoys the fruits of late industrialisation, it is going to be able to grow far faster than the mature European economies grew in the heyday of European expansion. When one looks at science and technology, the story is similar. It is likely that Asia, which today is the third most important hub of scientific innovation, will gradually rise to being second in the global system. There

will still be qualitative differences in the kind of science and technology outputs that you will see in Asia compared to that coming out of North America and Western Europe, but in the sense of overall growth there is little doubt that Asia's going to be up there.

In military capabilities, I don't think the story needs to be repeated too often. You have in Asia the largest concentrations of land power capabilities, very significant naval and airpower capabilities, states that are actively pursuing asymmetric strategies as a matter of national policy, and a high latent demand for weapons of mass destruction. When you look at all these indices, which indicate the revolutionary potential of Asia, you are also struck by the fact of how incomplete this revolution is. There are vast parts of Asia which are simply bereft of the miracle. In fact, there is a difference in the performance and capacity between rimland Asia and heartland Asia. That, in fact, is a source of many security problems that currently confront the United States. Big divides in economic performance are often matched by big differences in the character of governance systems that characterise different Asian states. The transformations in political and social transition in many parts of hinterland Asia are still incomplete and, by and large, there are a much smaller number of stable, liberal, democratic states on the continent than we would like. Ideational systems in Asia are also in transformation and so it is not surprising that Asia hosts many hotbeds of different kinds of extremist movements, the likes of which we have not seen in a while.

The bottom line is that with all this revolutionary potential on one hand and serious problems on the other, Asia's going to remain a concentrated challenge that demands American attention.

What then is the bottom line? The bottom line is that with all this revolutionary potential on one hand and serious problems on the other, Asia's going to remain a concentrated challenge that demands American attention. That American focus on Asia is going to be intimately connected to our global interests, particularly the principal question of how we manage our primacy in the years ahead. Further, the Janus-faced characteristics of Asia produce, on one hand, great opportunities for both the regional countries and the United States, while also embodying great challenges for both these entities. So the United States in the years to come will have to deal with a dual set of problems: problems arising both from Asian strength and from Asian weakness. Finally, because of the changes that are taking place in Asia today, the continent also represents all the uncertainties that come in the wake of all incipient power transitions and the question of whether Asia is ripe for rivalry or primed for peace is going to be a concern that the United States—as the hegemonic power in the global system—will have to deal with for some time to come.

With that by way of an extended introduction, let me focus now on the second part of my presentation, which is: what is US grand strategy in Asia? What is the United States trying to achieve and what are the instrumentalities that are brought to bear in managing these issues of grand strategy? I think it's useful to think about these questions by first trying to identify what US objectives are. Again, consistent with my trinitarian predilections, I would flag for you three objectives that I think characterise what US strategy in Asia is all about. The first

US objective, I believe, is really to prevent the Asian continent from becoming dominated by any single indigenous or foreign power, especially one that has exclusionary objectives—that is, one that would like to keep the United States out of the region. The second objective would be to protect the strategic environment required to sustain peace and stability over the long term. The third objective would be to expand the liberal international economic order that has served both Asian prosperity well and also increasingly underwrites American prosperity because of its connectivity with the Asian continent. I want to take some time to just tease out in a little more detail the consequences of each of these three objectives and to flag for you some of the challenges that arise out of them for our national strategy.

Let me start with objective number one, which is the whole question of preventing Asia from being dominated by any single local or foreign power. Clearly the question of how one copes with the future of Asia in this context derives simply from the revolutionary economic performance that we've seen in Asian states in the last 40 years. If Asia was essentially a collection of underperformers it really wouldn't matter to the United States whether there were powers in Asia that seek to keep us away from the continent or not. But, precisely because this is a part of the world where strong economic performance has been the norm, the question of whether this performance enables some states to dominate the continent with exclusionary intent becomes an issue that is critical to US grand strategy.

... the rise of China really represents for most US policy makers the critical geostrategic challenge at the level of high politics.

In this context, the rise of China really represents for most US policy makers the critical geostrategic challenge at the level of high politics. Thus far, what the United States has attempted to do is to deal with this challenge through a mix of investment and insurance strategies. The investment strategy, or rather the investment dimension of larger US strategy, has been to work towards integrating China as best one can into the global system. Not merely in an economic but also in a political sense and, more importantly, in an ideational sense—a sense that China is a full partner in a system where there are shared norms and shared beliefs of what are appropriate global behaviours. The whole notion of China being a 'responsible stakeholder' really attempts to summarise in capsule form this dimension of US strategy.

But in strategic planning, one cannot rely on investment approaches alone. They have to be complemented by insurance strategies because there's always human frailty, there's always the possibility that something may go wrong. So what the United States has simultaneously attempted to do, even as it works to integrate China into the global system, is to develop a network of multiple insurance strategies that encompass different instrumentalities. Some of these include deepening existing alliance relationships, such as the kinds we have with Japan, with Australia, with some of the Southeast Asian states; creating new partnerships with countries that we were not allied with before, like India; investing in technologies that are designed to maintain our military capacity to intervene in the Asian continent in support of our alliances, if necessary, through forcible action, in the face of a very superior foe—some of this captured by the so-called 'military-technical revolution' or the 'revolution in military affairs.'

All these elements have been put in place really as the necessary complement to the investment strategy. The key is getting the balance right. This is a dynamic matter, which has to be worked on continuously. There is no magic recipe, there is no magic solution. It requires constant tinkering, which policy makers are always involved in, and both parts of the strategy will always exist in tension. Hopefully, that tension is creative, with each element constantly reinforcing the other in a virtuous way as opposed to a vicious way. The bottom line, however, is that US strategies towards China today are not centred on containment, but rather represent a form of hedging. The desire is to integrate China into the global system while also taking out the requisite forms of insurance, in case that engagement with China were to fail. Thus far, I would suggest that we have managed to do this reasonably well.

The second objective of US grand strategy, as I mentioned before, is to protect the strategic environment in an effort to sustain Asian stability over the long term. This objective covers a vast congeries of sub-objectives, none of which I can go into very much detail here, but which I just want to flag for you to indicate both the complexity and sometimes the internal tensions between them. Among the most important sub-objectives here is preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their associated delivery technologies. The US has attempted to deal with this challenge through a variety of global regime innovations, like, for example, developing PSI or the additional protocol as well as by managing bilateral challenges, the most important of which today are those posed by Iran and North Korea.

The second facet of maintaining stability is defeating the threat of terrorism ...

The second facet of maintaining stability is defeating the threat of terrorism, especially terrorism of global and regional reach and terrorism that might have links to weapons of mass destruction. Clearly the unifying concept in this regard has been the global war on terror, which started off wonderfully, peaked with early successes but has now gotten mired in the miasma of Afghanistan and the great controversies over Iraq. The third dimension of managing stability, I would argue, is to contain conflict that is inherent in key intra-Asian rivalries, rivalries between China and Japan, China and Taiwan, China and India, India and Pakistan, North and South Korea, and over the long term even Iran and Iraq.

The next element, again under the rubric of managing stability, is to expand liberal democracy, because it is clearly a conviction of the United States, born of its own history, that democracy represents not only an end in itself but actually a means of stabilising anarchic international politics. After the convulsions of 9/11, this administration in particular has taken the view that the spread of democracy is vital to resolving problems caused by state-society rifts in certain countries, problems that have the effect of violence being exported abroad. So democracy for the United States today has become a strategic instrument for promoting geopolitical tranquillity: it has moved beyond being just an ideology, as it was during the Cold War years, to becoming something of a national security strategy which holds the potential of attenuating tensions between societies and unresponsive governments. Our efforts at global democracy promotion and encouraging democracy in the Arab world are clearly efforts in this direction.

Another dimension of maintaining stability for the United States increasingly will be defeating threats to the production of global public good, especially the challenges embodied in the areas of public health, climate change, and freedom of navigation.

Another dimension of maintaining stability for the United States increasingly will be defeating threats to the production of global public good, especially the challenges embodied in the areas of public health, climate change, and freedom of navigation. We have not done as well as we should, especially in the areas of managing threats to public health and in the areas of climate change. But it is becoming quite obvious to the security community in the United States that you cannot have peace and stability in Asia over the long term unless these elements, which involve public good, are produced adequately in order to sustain the Asian miracle that we seek and which we have all benefited from.

Finally, I would argue that what will be essential to sustain peace and stability in Asia over the long term will be the progressive construction of a new concert of democratic states. The idea of democratic states in Asia getting together in support of a common vision—led, underwritten, by the United States, at least to begin with, but then acquiring some sort of an institutional life of its own—will become ever more important. This kind of regime, which could be informal to begin with but which acquires formal characteristics over time, is critical for American grand strategy at large, which essentially aims to create an environment where no regional Asian state can essentially harm another, while the only power that has the capacity to harm in a serious sort of way—the United States—has no incentives to do so, because the Asian continent contains all the ingredients that are vital both to American security and to American prosperity. Our record of success in regards to all these constituent components of peace and stability is, I think, mixed. But I believe there are grounds for optimism. The record does not justify any conclusion of unremitting doom.

The third objective which I want to flag very quickly for you is the whole question of expanding the liberal economic order. It has become obvious to Americans today, especially with all the controversies about globalisation and outsourcing, that US prosperity and our way of life is intimately linked with our connectivity to the global economy. My ability to get a mortgage at a decent interest rate is linked to how many T-bills the Chinese and Japanese are willing to buy. The ability of US companies to stay competitive with European and Asian competitors is increasingly linked to how much they can outsource to companies in India. Our ability to sustain our own economic growth, which in recent years has actually been remarkably high despite the United States being a mature economy, is linked to peace and stability in the Middle East, which is the primary fount of energy production.

We've attempted to deal with the issue of expanding global trade primarily through global strategies, which are linked to current efforts in the Doha Round. To the degree that we have pursued alternative regional strategies, we have done so increasingly because of our frustration that the liberalisation of the global system is not moving as rapidly as is desirable and hence requires a fillip through the mechanism of bilateral free trade agreements.

The whole logic has been that competitive bilateralism may end up expanding the global economic order through micro-agreements made with individual states. Whether this strategy will actually succeed in the long term only time will tell, but this is clearly the direction that we appear to be moving in.

Let me end by attempting to take a crack at the question of whether the United States will be successful in managing the strategic challenges that I flagged for you throughout this presentation. This is a hard question to answer in the abstract because of the multiple and differential strategies that the US brings to bear in dealing with different kinds of challenges. Our recent experience, particularly in Iraq, has understandably raised doubts among both our friends and onlookers about the ability of the United States to use its power effectively, wisely or collaboratively. But I would suggest that the aberrations that one has seen in recent US foreign policy ought to be treated as convulsions that have arisen as a result of the catastrophic events of September 11, and not necessarily as a new norm that is likely to characterise US behaviour for all time to come. Our prospects for success in Asia over the long term, however, are conditioned by how one answers the following three questions.

The first question is whether the United States will be able to preserve the domestic sources of its power: whether it will be able to survive as a source of continual innovation; whether it will be able to protect the openness of its society; and, whether it will be able to bring together capital, labour and innovation in the creative mix that has characterised the American experiment for at least the last hundred years.

The second issue, which again is one that bears on whether success is possible, is whether the United States will be able to hold in creative balance the multiple instruments of national power; whether the United States will be able to bring together military power, diplomatic strength and general geopolitical influence in legitimate ways—in ways that strengthen its capacity to act, as opposed to the alternative, which is an unhealthy reliance on one political instrument that undermines our capacity to pursue what are essentially sensible, subtle, long-term policies.

The third question, which has a bearing on the issue of American success, is whether the United States will be able to create, lead and sustain international coalitions over time. It is quite obvious to me that the United States will stay the single largest concentration of national power in the international system for a long time to come. That, however, does not translate into a conclusion that the United States can go it alone. To the degree that the United States can work with like-minded partners, both in order to mobilise their strength and in order to exploit all the benefits of legitimacy that come from membership in a common cause, to that degree, our ability to be both successful and legitimate in the exercise of our hegemony will condition the success of US foreign policy.

When one looks at these three questions synoptically, I would argue that there is actually much room for optimism that US grand strategy in Asia will be successful. That optimism, in my mind, is finally shaped by three structural realities that cannot be avoided when one thinks of the United States in Asia. The first structural reality is that the US is politically present in Asia, but not physically located in it. That distance from Asia gives the Asian states more breathing room than if they had the 500-pound gorilla literally on their borders or on their doorstep. The second structural reality is that, at least traditionally, US grand strategy in Asia was not an overbearing grand strategy. It allowed sufficient political space for the national interests of our partners to assert themselves. It would be truly tragic if that were

to change fundamentally, and however we have dealt with the problems of the Middle East, at least thus far, it is possible to suggest that those problems have not extended to our management of our Asian alliances.

The last important and enduring reality of Asia, which gives me room for optimism, is that there is a continuing demand on the part of the Asian states for both American leadership and American presence.

The last important and enduring reality of Asia, which gives me room for optimism, is that there is a continuing demand on the part of the Asian states for both American leadership and American presence. So the United States, in many ways, is leaning on an open door. The tensions that exist within Asia and the competing political histories of the countries that jostle with one another provide the United States plentiful opportunities for a robust presence in Asia at low cost, if only we are careful and smart in the way that we use our power to achieve our ends.

INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Gérard Chaliand

Irregular warfare is warfare between a regular army and irregulars. First of all, irregularity defines the legal status of those who are not the army of a sovereign State. Secondly the character of the fighting is irregular, in the sense that it is based on surprise, mobility, stealth, and harassment. In other words, irregulars avoid direct confrontation except under favourable conditions and use guerilla warfare and terrorism.

Guerillas are members of an irregular armed force that fights against regular forces while trying to mobilise the local population, or at least part of it, and when possible control some territorial area.

There is, of course, nothing new in this mode of warfare and to rename it asymmetrical is just to put a new label on the kind of unequal small wars so familiar during the colonial era.

There is, of course, nothing new in this mode of warfare and to rename it asymmetrical is just to put a new label on the kind of unequal small wars so familiar during the colonial era. If guerilla warfare as it has been said, is the weapon of the weak, then terrorism, when it is the only technique used by the irregulars, is the weapon of the weakest.

In order to clarify what has been labeled the 'War against terrorism' we may have to ask what is it about?

We cannot reasonably follow those US agencies who label the people killed in Afghanistan, Iraq or Chechnya as victims of terrorism, along with, for instance, the victims of the Madrid or London bombings. The former are insurrections, the latter are isolated acts of terrorism perpetrated by jihadists. In my presentation I am concerned with the kind of terrorism used by jihadists. I will not be concerned by the Tamils of Sri Lanka or any other organisation, whose fight is essentially limited to national or local grievances.

As far as Al Qaeda or, perhaps, better 'Al Qaedaism' is concerned, there are two views: one which tends to give to the jihadist threat an importance equaling those of the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany and a second more pragmatic view which is willing to consider what has been achieved by the jihadists in the five years since the aftermath of 9/11.

Despite all the apocalyptic rhetoric used by Al Qaeda, on several occasions in the last five years, the results have been limited. Taking a world view successful attacks have been carried out mainly in Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Philippines, and Morocco. Some of the most lethal attacks have occurred in Beslan in Northern Ossetia, Bali, Manila, Madrid, Moskau, and Bombay. Fortunately the total number of deaths in the last five years, if we except, as we should, the ongoing insurrection, hardly exceeds those of the 9/11. This serves

to remind us that, up to now, 9/11 is in a class of its own. As long as we do see the use of what is called, a little vaguely, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism in its jihadist version will remain a very important and costly nuisance. But even then, it will not be a threat to the world's status quo.

Despite announced or perceived threats, the US, and most of the countries in Europe have not been hit. Many planned attacks did not take place because of police action and this is not just limited to the United Kingdom. So we should ask ourselves why paint an apocalyptical future? We do know that, above all, terrorism is psychological warfare 'better kill one and be seen by a thousand than kill a thousand and be seen by one'. Whose purpose does it serve to sell anxiety? The Media? Why are some States more willing than others to manipulate their public opinion with the threat of an attack?

Of course the possibility and the probability is that in the future, terrorism will result in many more victims.

Of course the possibility and the probability is that in the future, terrorism will result in many more victims. We do not know on what scale. But we might expect that it will produce more mass panic than victims.

The reconstitution of the *Umma* (the community of the believers), that restoration of the Caliphate, the prospect of coming back to the real, or perceived, purity of the first century of Islam are utopian aims. The jihadists have multiplied their adversaries. To begin with, all the Muslim States whose regimes the jihadists believe need to be toppled. Then, there are the US and Israel, and probably the West in general, as designated by 'the crusaders and the Jews'. Then India, because of Kashmir, then Russia, because of Chechnya and last China, because of Xinchiang. I hope I have not forgotten anyone. So this is the coalition, or whatever you want to call it, that the jihadists intend to confront in the decades to come.

To achieve the first step—to topple the particular regimes in the Muslim world—the salafists, as they are properly called, have to be able to transform their limited underground jihad into mass jihad. The future will tell us if they are capable of doing so.

It is also possible that jihadists who today are making headlines will leave no more mark in history than did the anarchists who wanted to change the world by assassinating presidents, kings, queens and other dignitaries.

Like them, the jihadists might have the perception that they are the agents of an epic struggle for the restoration of Islam's greatness. However, jihadists, without realising it, will contribute to widening the gap between many Muslim countries and those countries, such as China and India, who understand that growth is the ultimate justification of a regime.

Jihadists, of course, have also more immediate and less utopian aims, such as hitting hard targets when possible, and more frequently soft targets. They try to discourage Westerners working in Muslim countries such as Algeria and Saudi Arabia. They try to mobilise dissatisfied young Muslims living in Western-type societies and through 'propaganda by the deed' directed to the Muslim countries. They try to capitalise on presenting themselves as the heroes of anti-colonialist and third worldist struggles.

In this struggle there is, as in all conflicts, an important dimension which concern the minds and the wills. This is a contest of will, based as usual, on time. The jihadists will lose because they are going nowhere. Unlike all other terrorist organisations of the last forty years, they have nothing to negotiate for. It's victory or death. It will not be victory.

In the meantime, fighting terrorism, above all, means sound intelligence and on that ground, nothing replaces human intelligence.

Of course, strategic success, ultimately, will have to come from the Muslim world itself. In the meantime, fighting terrorism, above all, means sound intelligence and on that ground, nothing replaces human intelligence. This is police work. When terrorists can be targeted by direct action aimed at eliminating them physically.

I do not think that the notion of a clash of civilisation is relevant. That clash occurred already in the 19th century with the brutal irruption of Imperial Europe in Asia and Africa; a clash to which only Japan was able to find an answer with the Meiji revolution. But it is easy to witness that some words and some actions can fuel resentment. The present US administration is not popular in the Muslim world, (according, for instance to the Pew poll). Under theses conditions, it is not easy to wage a convincing ideological debate. But nevertheless, the battle is also in the field of ideas and minds.

Now let us turn to insurgencies of which we now have concrete examples to study.

At the end of spring, this year, it has become obvious that, in Afghanistan, there was a very serious guerilla warfare going on. Until then, it was labeled 'terrorism' and considered by the Afghan regime as more or less marginal.

Important things were supposed to be going on in Kabul: elections, a Constitution, a Parliament, political battles against some of the most powerful warlords and a political marginalisation of the 'Northerners'. The Panshiris had been controlling the Ministries of Defense, Interior and Foreign Affairs, a situation unacceptable for the Pashtuns who represent not only the most important ethnic group, but those who have dominated Afghanistan since its creation in the 18th century.

To be sure, it was well known that at the end on November 2001, many preeminent Talibans, including Mollah Omar and, of course, Al Qaeda's main leaders, Bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri had escaped. As Peter Bergen has written in his book *The Osama Bin Laden I know* '[1]if Fox News and CNN could arrange for their crews to cover Tora Bora, it is puzzling that US military could not put more bodies on the ground to entrap the hardcore of al Qaïda. Sadly, there were more American journalists at the battle of Tora Bora than there were US soldiers.'

It is a fact that the ground operation near Kandahar on the night of October 19 2001 failed while trying to catch Mollah Omar. Several soldiers belonging to the Special Forces were killed. This failure and the consequent losses reinforced the fear of having to bear casualties. That is why no risk was taken at Tora Bora. The Pentagon used the Pashtuns warlords in the south as it had used the Northern Alliance in the North.

... we are witnessing an important shift in Western sensitivities and attitudes towards death.

The point I am trying to make is that since 1983, where 241 marines and 58 French paratroopers were killed by two suicide-trucks provoking the withdrawal of Western troops from Lebanon, we are witnessing an important shift in Western sensitivities and attitudes towards death.

It is worth noting that the so-called asymmetric wars are rendered a lot more equal if one of the protagonist is willing to do the utmost to protect himself when the other is ready to take all risks in order to kill.

So Afghanistan was, to certain extent, an incomplete victory, though the main objective, the eradication of the jihadist sanctuary had been realised. All in all, we might say that Afghanistan has been considered a secondary theatre with limited strategic importance.

- Foreign troops for several years were securing Kabul essentially.
- Little, if not almost nothing, has been done by way of reconstruction in the rural areas, especially in the south.
- Most of the activities until 2005 have been military, neglecting the political side of counterinsurgency.

In other words, the Taliban, to a large extent, have been able, in the south, to exploit the vacuum.

In other words, the Taliban, to a large extent, have been able, in the south, to exploit the vacuum. The situation in the east is also rather similar. If Taliban operations were still modest in 2003, they were able to operate in 2005 with groups of about a hundred men and this current year at the level of a battalion with some 300 to 400 men. The Taliban are trying not to just hit and run but to launch protracted battles in order to cause as many casualties as possible without bothering about their own losses. At the same time, in urban areas, including Kabul, suicide-attacks are rising sharply, according to the Centre for Conflicts and Peace Studies of Kabul [2]. Suicide-attacks have raised from 6 in 2003 to 21 in 2005 and have reached 50 in September this year.

In a nutshell, we can summarise the situation as follows:

- the present regime essentially controls Kabul
- the Afghan Army has about 30,000 troops until now, badly equipped.
- the Afghan police is corrupted and is more part of the problem of security than to its solution.
- US troops which number 17,000, are going to be reduced to 8000 on February 2007. The burden of counter-insurgency is being left essentially to NATO whose troops, less than 20,000 are less well equipped, and represent more than 20 countries.

Some of these troops have no mandate to fight, like the Germans. Others, like the Macedonians, do not speak English. There is an obvious lack of cohesion and of number: less than 30,000 men cannot secure Afghanistan until the Afghan army will eventually be ready for the task of securing a country more than two times larger than the UK.

As far as reconstruction is concerned, there are about 23 P.R.T.'s in the 32 provinces of the country, which are reconstruction teams of 200 to 300 foreign soldiers whose work is to help rural populations and gather intelligence. How is it possible with about 7,000 soldiers to try to solve the economic and social problems, even basic, of 20 millions peasants?

Is it reasonable to believe that foreign troops can, as it is so often repeated, win the hearts and minds of the rural populations? Those who are more or less satisfied are in Kabul and probably in Herat and Mazare-Sharif not in the countryside where they, above all, need security and some basic change in their living conditions.

The too often reference to the Malaysian counterinsurgency, led against a minority of Chinese Communists after having promised independence to the Malaysian majority once the communist crushed, will never happen again.

Independences are already granted. Foreign troops, today, are not welcome to stay a long period of time. They will not win hearts and minds. It is already a victory not to be hated.

At the end of the day, the only question, which has yet to be answered, is: will the Afghan regime, in the future, be capable of sustaining itself, at least militarily?

At the end of the day, the only question, which has yet to be answered, is: will the Afghan regime, in the future, be capable of sustaining itself, at least militarily? That, of course, will require bringing security and a better life in the countryside.

Until then, as the Taliban have a sanctuary and have no problem of manpower, the war will go on and the main burden of fighting will be left to foreigners. A not so bright prospect. To make things more difficult, Afghanistan is, by far, the main producer of poppy, with all the consequences that such an economy implies.

Just as it has been the case in South Lebanon, recently, with the unexpected level of resistance opposed by Hezbollah to the Israeli forces, Iraq brings attention to the fierce challenge of irregular warfare to regular troops.

I am not discussing here about the relevance of a war of choice but its implications and consequences.

A major problem, in Iraq, has been the unpreparedness of the US at civilian and military levels to cope with an insurrection. Beyond the achievement of removing Saddam Hussein's regime, the character of the war launched by the US war was not grasped. There are countries and cultures where regime change cannot be done orderly. The Pentagon in its prewar planning estimates thought that it could draw its forces from 150,000 to some 60,000 troops or even to 35,000 about six months after April 2003.

A major problem, in Iraq, has been the unpreparedness of the US at civilian and military levels to cope with an insurrection.

From the very evening of the fall of Baghdad things went wrong. The looting, which took place for about three weeks, not only was highly detrimental to the infrastructure of the country but the criminal activity brought with it chronic insecurity.

If American troops were considered, at first, as liberators for the group which had been oppressed by Saddam Hussein's regime: Kurds (about 20%) and Shias (about 60%), the Sunnis (about 20%) felt otherwise. It should be understood that the way in which the regime was removed the Sunnis were marginalised. They were entirely losing power. Arab Sunnis were not just a religious group. They were the ruling group before Saddam and even before the British mandate. They were the masters of Iraq and to be, in 2003, superseded by Shias that they consider heretics and Kurds who are not Arabs, was felt as unacceptable. This very fact made the insurrection predictable. Those who pretended that regime change in Iraq would be simple wanted to dissipate doubts about the complexities of the task.

It should be understood that the way in which the regime was removed the Sunnis were marginalised.

It is a fact that Paul Bremer's policy further antagonised the Sunnis by marginalising members of the Baath party at different echelons. This is a policy which was practised in former communist countries of Central Europe. You had to be a member of the party if you wanted to get a job, particularly in the administration. So most of the Sunnis were pushed to sympathise and sometimes participate in the insurrection.

As usual, the insurrection in the beginning was not recognised as such. In fact, for the student of irregular warfare, there is something unique in the Iraqi insurrection. Unlike all the insurrections of the last sixty years which started with few men, few weapons, few money, and most of the time little backing from the population the Iraqi insurrection was started by the nucleus of a State. The secret service (*mukhabarat*) composed of 30,000 members, the *Fedayeen*, the members of the Special republican guards were instrumental in waging the insurgency. They had the weapons, the money, the know-how, the backing of large segments of the Sunni society, starting from those soldiers sent back home without pay.

From the very beginning, a certain number of negative factors were manifest.

Sound intelligence was lacking.

Let us remember that exiles like Ahmed Chalabi were the main informers of the present administration.

The troops, which had been doing the job of toppling the regime, were not meant to implement the type of State-building they had to perform. Above all, they were utterly unprepared culturally for the task.

If the US troops had been efficient in winning the regular war, they were obviously too few to restore the infrastructure of the country. The incapacity during the first summer of the liberators to bring back normal conditions of life, to at least those of pre-war, raised a discontent which transformed the liberators into occupiers for many people.

In addition, the limited number of troops could not seal off the border with Syria.

Gradually, the situation became tense with the conflict of Faluja in 2004 and with the scandal over the sexual humiliations of Abu Graïb. With Abu Graïb, the US lost the psychological warfare.

Last, but not least, for the strategist, in the conditions chosen by the Pentagon, the US army was not able to crush or reduce in intensity an insurrection which was essentially led by some of the Sunnis with the cooperation of a very small minority of foreign jihadists.

Sure, elections have been held, a constitution adopted and a government called of National Unity elected but, as we all know, before you can have democracy, you have to have a State and it is easier to vote than to build institutions and benefit from the rule of law.

There is a rampant civil war going on specially in Baghdad. With the existence of the Shia militias (Mahdi and Badr) we have the infrastructure of a civil war which could, soon, become an overall civil war. The current situation might get more complicated next year with the question of Kirkuk. The Kurds want it because Saddam Hussein who repopulated it with Shia Arabs expelled them from it.

At present, many of the expelled Kurds have returned to Kirkurk and in principle, a referendum will be held, before December 2007 to decide the fate of the city. There is opposition to let the city become part of Iraqi Kurdistan by the Shias, the Turkmen minority supported by Turkey and by the Sunnis. In other words, if the referendum takes place and give a majority to the Kurds we shall probably have armed confrontation involving the Kurds in the present rampant civil war. 2007 might well be the worst year of the Iraqi war. Nevertheless, whatever may happen in the future, the US intervention in Iraq will have brought a new factor: Never more Iraq is going to be ruled by the Sunnis alone. But was that the aim of the war?

Irregular warfare by its very nature is more a contest of political will than regular wars.

We do not know with certainty the outcome of the Iraq situation. Irregular warfare by its very nature is more a contest of political will than regular wars. Time is an important factor. I believe that it is of utmost importance that the US military non-victory should not be allowed to become a political failure. The aim of war is about the nature of the peace it brings. On those grounds, the outcome of Iraqi war is, at present, not a success.

The orderly withdrawal of Soviet troops has been perceived as a military victory by *Mujahideens* unable for almost three years to topple the regime of Najibullah in Kabul and other Afghan cities.

A US withdrawal would be interpreted as a victory for both the Iraqi insurrection and for those jihadists who found a new fighting ground created by the US decision to step into Iraq.

Though regular war and wars between States are still going to occur, it is a fact that irregular warfare is the type of conflict that we will have to face mostly in the years to come. There should be an adaptation to it both strategically and tactically with more special troops and leaderships inclined to approach the enemy adaptatively. War, in other words, has also a cultural context.

Endnotes

1 Freepress, New York, 2006, p. 366

2 e-mail: director@caps.af
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AUSTRALIA'S ROLE IN ECONOMIC AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT

David Murray

I think if you asked any community around the world: do you like the idea of pursuing the wealth and quality of life of your people? They would readily agree. But if you ask: what is it that underpins your thinking in pursuing that, what's the model, what's the thought process? You get a whole different range of views. So I want to set the scene by just explaining a model which I think is very important. It starts with the notion that human beings can't help themselves. If somebody demonstrates a new, different and better way of doing something, humans will do something about that. They will not sit idle. This raises the issue that from the time human beings could live alone on a sustainable basis everything changed once technological input started to fracture work and lead to specialisation of labour. Whether it's from the fire or the wheel or what else. All through history there's been a succession of innovations and technological advancement that have created specialisation of work, which can only be of value if there is a successful interdependency between people. It's that interdependency which raises the issue of what it is that makes one group of people able to work together for their common interests and maybe another group not. As that interdependency becomes a global phenomenon it opens up a whole lot of issues.

The next issue is that without freedom it is very hard for people to innovate and make progress. Freedom means different things to different people. To me it means democracy. It means an education system as a public good. It means pursuing a healthy community. People who live longer want to try hard for longer to innovate and make progress. It means national security. Maybe it means some element of a social safety net. More than anything else there are three elements to it that are critical—the right to property, the right to free

trade and the rule of law. These things are the aspects of a system that give people the freedom that make them interested in innovation and progress. Many experts have written about the link between innovation, technological and organisational change being the key drivers of long run economic growth. But there is no point in having innovation and good ideas unless there's an investment process and a change process that sits behind it, because these are the things which generate returns with themselves help to pay for the freedoms that keep the system moving forward.

Now, that is not only a good model, and it's in the eyes of many a proven model, but interestingly it is readily available to people in Australia today. So how does that help us describe Australia's position? How do we play a role, given that it's not our place to dictate to others how they'll pursue the prosperity of their citizens but we're in the global community anyway? I'd like to address that by talking about the global issues that are around today, the national issues that we confront in Australia and the security consequences of those. Starting from an economic model, the most important global issue is that the two largest under-utilised workforces in the world are being put to work. This is a fantastic and unprecedented event. Fantastic because if you take any good economist and isolate them down to what's good for their own country they will tell you it's productivity. How do you grow productivity? You increase the participation rate of the workforce and/or the productivity rate of the workforce.

Taking a global view, we are in the process of radically increasing the participation rate of the global workforce by once and for all admitting our friends in India and China to that workforce.

Taking a global view, we are in the process of radically increasing the participation rate of the global workforce by once and for all admitting our friends in India and China to that workforce. This will have profound effects and plenty has been written about the success rate of those two economies. China—the growth rate is unbelievable. The opening up has been going longer than India and they face different issues. Probably most of all that there is untested rule of law. On the other hand, in India the starting point is a little more difficult, a little less controlled. You can read that any way you like but the starting point is that there's somewhere around a quarter to a third of the whole population that's below a very low poverty line and illiterate. People who are illiterate cannot participate in a democracy. Of course, unless you can quickly elevate that group of people then the democracy itself is threatened and the progress and the economic freedoms are threatened. So we desperately need India to keep succeeding, and the signs are good at the present time. But it's a shaky situation when so many of your people have got to be lifted so quickly. So the consequence of those two countries succeeding is fantastic for global productivity, low inflationary growth, and it will go on for a long time.

One of the issues associated with the emergence of these countries is that we have what people call 'trade and financial imbalances'. Now, the best way I'd like to introduce this is to talk to you about a game that we've all played as kids called Monopoly. In Monopoly

everything progresses okay until one of the kids runs out of cash. In Monopoly there is no IMF because the person who runs the bank is also a participant in the game and they don't give away credit outside the rules. What do little kids do in Monopoly when one who thought it was okay to buy everything as fast as they landed on it runs out of cash? They have a temper tantrum and a fight. If you look at it from a distance, the person starting the fight might have all the properties but they ain't got the cash. What sits behind what we do every day in the financial system, what sits behind what we do every day in the trading system, is what goes on in the financial system. We need a couple of things to happen smoothly all the time.

One of the issues associated with the emergence of these countries is that we have what people call 'trade and financial imbalances'.

First, just as free and open trade are absolutely critical to human progress so that we all specialise all over the world, so to is free trade in savings. Those words are not often used but free trade in savings means that to the extent that somebody is producing a surplus of cash at any point of time, it is easy for them to reticulate that surplus to somebody who needs it for investment and growth in their own economy. But there's always a risk that the people who are investing the money, who are applying their citizen savings to the growth of another nation, will get nervous and stop doing it. That could be nervousness about the credit rating of a country or nervousness about the size of the deficits. So often the financial imbalances spill over into concerns about trade. This is where we see now a great risk to our situation.

The first risk is that those who have massive foreign currency reserves in the surplus trade nations will decide not to re-intermediate those savings back to the deficit nations. Would they do that? I don't think they can afford to. Imagine that you and I trade. If you don't buy my stuff I can't make any progress. So why wouldn't I keep financing you until I have direct incontrovertible evidence that you can no longer pay? But in the way goods and money flow around the world, it is usually unlikely to happen. So I don't think that these imbalances will cause some of the problems that people talk about. But they are an issue because among the uninformed they translate across to trade protectionism. This is a risk because people taking a short term view see the loss of a job or the change in a system as something that they should rail against politically. So trade liberalisation remains the way through. Doha is critical, but that's been said for a long time.

Amongst other issues around the world is the simple issue that no community can grow without growing its supply of water and energy, and energy is the most critical.

Amongst other issues around the world is the simple issue that no community can grow without growing its supply of water and energy, and energy is the most critical. So China and India need energy at a time where the world is 80% supplied by fossil fuels and at a time

when people in the world have decided that there's a common issue about environmental cleanliness that we must address. So energy supply and clean energy are key to progress.

Amongst other issues, in my view, when I look at financial markets and people say, 'What could go wrong?', apart from China and others not buying US bonds any more, the bird flu is a serious threat—low probability, high severity. The global ageing population is causing a number of countries to have to change their approach to fiscal policy and to funding of health care to deal with their own internal issues. Of course, the security issues, which you will have discussed in detail, are critical. It's important to remember that solving a security issue will detract from—in terms of its cost—from productivity improvement. It's very appealing to think because we're all busy making more guns and things to look after ourselves that we're all busy and this looks good, but it is actually a detractor from continuing productivity improvement and wealth improvement.

It doesn't mean we don't all do some of it. We don't want to do it. It doesn't mean that some interesting technologies come out of it. But at the end of the day having to significantly ramp up our resource application to solve security issues causes us to have to take resources from other areas of productivity improvement. So at the moment we have a lot of issues to deal with but we're in a time when, if we can see through rapid growth for many more years in China and India—and many other countries with it, particularly if they like the model—then we will be in a long period of upturn in the global economy.

The most important thing to remember about Australia is that it has a small population and, therefore, workforce relative to a large land mass and a very rich resource base.

Now, where does Australia sit in this? The most important thing to remember about Australia is that it has a small population and, therefore, workforce relative to a large land mass and a very rich resource base. If you combine a small workforce with an ageing population, even though it's highly skilled, then there is a threat to productivity and there is also a volatility problem that the economy has to deal with. The ageing itself we estimate in the years between now and 2042 will take 25 basis points a year of growth off our economy, unless we do something more with productivity to deal with it. We also know that we experience significant movements in the terms of trade through commodity cycles. The essential issue for us, if this was a company, is that we're a price taker for our commodities in international markets but when we go to the ballot box we fix the price of welfare. So our revenue has a variable component and is of a variable nature. Our cost structure is fixed. That brings a lot of volatility into our economy and it means that the best way forward for us is to be fantastic at innovation and to improve our savings rate.

Some indicators of how this affects us are that even though the global economy has been growing at 5% at the moment, the Australian economy has had to have the governor on the engine pull back to 3% because the inflation risk of going faster is too strong. Commodity boom. Small workforce. Of course, within Australia we have very different outcomes in different parts of the country. So some states are growing very fast, some much slower. But overall, notwithstanding all the progress, Australia is still a net importer of the savings of

citizens from the rest of the world. If we're to become an innovator we have to start to turn that around and productivity improvement is the only way to do it.

The other interesting things about Australia are that it has been for a long time regarded as an extremely successful and reliable supplier to other parts of the world. In Beijing in 1992 I met the Agriculture Minister of China and she gave me the history of the famine in China and the way Chinese people think about Australia. She said to me, 'We've estimated how much wheat you grow in a good year and a bad year and Australia is capable of filling the gap between a horror year for us for our food and a good year. That's why we fundamentally need you to remain a stable place and a reliable supplier'. That's the situation that we have. The other fascinating thing about Australia is that it has the most remarkable array of people who have come here and, in my view, a very amateur view, people who have one thing in common. One way or another they came from trouble, whether it's the first lot of prisoners on the ship, people who came after the problem in Hungary, or people who came after the Second World War … so many people who've come here came from trouble. People who've come from trouble salute freedom. And isn't it interesting when you put them all together with a common view about that, what can be achieved. That, I think, makes Australia a very interesting little place for the world to look at and say, 'Why do we have to concern ourselves so much with difference?'

The security consequences for us are that we must not allow disputes in trade to spill over into further and larger problems on the security front than we've got.

The security consequences for us are that we must not allow disputes in trade to spill over into further and larger problems on the security front than we've got. We have to watch, in dealing with those things, the financial imbalances that come from radical changes in the pattern of trade. On energy and the environment we have to show ourselves to be not just a reliable supplier but a leader in innovation in clean energy solutions. That is, we have to show ourselves to be capable of contributing our part to solutions. On people and relationships we cannot dictate to others how to run themselves, but the way we deal with ageing, the way we deal with health, the way we deal with having such a diverse group of people signed up for good outcomes will make a difference. The other thing that I believe that the world will want us to do, which is something we discuss a lot in the Global Foundation and we've facilitated a number of meetings, is how to play our role in making the South Pacific more successful than it is today.

I talked about Australia as a lucky country. I don't believe that that holds up. We haven't been around a long time but it's long enough to see whether Australia is capable of doing certain things its own way or not. We inherited a lot from our British friends, but don't forget they deserted us too. I thought there was a deal. All the mutton you want to produce, all the wheat, anything you want to send us, merchandise, exports, we take. Completely dishonoured. Joined the European Union—left us out on a limb. They did some pretty awful things to us in other areas. Who can forget the bodyline cricket? So it's not as though we were endowed by the British. They taught us how to underestimate French lifestyle. Of course, the British system of common law and some of those other institutions have been

instrumental in our freedoms, but I don't think they've been with us all the way as much as they might.

In some of the decisions we've taken, they've been taken wholly and solely from great people able to analyse our situation and make some brave moves. I was struck when I was with the APEC Business Advisory Council on the finance taskforce. I was appointed to chair that at the beginning of the Asian financial crisis. In a plenary session we had there a group from one country said, 'It's not fair. These tidal waves of capital flood our sampans'. Somebody else stood up and said, 'Get yourself better sampans'. Why is it at another point in our session somebody said, 'You've got to fix your currency to the US dollar. You can't afford to float it. The speculators will take over'? Somebody stood up, not from Australia, and said, 'Well, how come Australia, is 2% of the global economy, floated its dollar and it works?'. It's because if you have good economic management the speculators don't get a look in.

Why is it that at the turn of last century Australia and Argentina were the two most successful countries on earth in terms of GDP per capita? Look at those relative rankings today. So a lot's been done right here. But given our size and our position in the world we can only influence a better world and a more secure world, firstly, by being successful and, secondly, showing that model to others to study without asking anybody to do it the way we do it and joining in common solutions around the world.

Contributors

The Hon John Winston Howard

The Hon John Winston Howard was sworn in as Prime Minister of Australia on 11 March 1996, becoming the 25th person to occupy the office of Prime Minister since Federation. This followed the Coalition's decisive Federal election victory on 2 March 1996.

The Prime Minister represents the Federal seat of Bennelong in the North-Western suburbs of Sydney and has been returned to the Parliament at every Federal election since 1974.

Mr Howard came to office as Prime Minister with extensive senior experience in both government and opposition. He was appointed Minister for Business and Consumer Affairs in 1975 at the age of 36 and subsequently served as Minister for Special Trade Negotiations and as Treasurer of the Commonwealth for over five years.

In September 1985 Mr Howard, as Deputy Leader, was elected by his colleagues as Leader of the Parliamentary Liberal Party and, therefore, Leader of the Opposition. He held this post until May 1989. He was returned to the leadership by unanimous vote of his colleagues on 30 January 1995. In the interim period between holding the leadership he served as Coalition spokesman for a number of senior portfolios.

Mr Howard was born in Sydney on 26 July 1939, attending school at Earlwood Primary and Canterbury Boys' High. He went on to the University of Sydney, graduated with a Bachelor of Laws in 1961 and was admitted as a Solicitor of the NSW Supreme Court in July 1962. Prior to his election to Parliament he was a partner in a Sydney firm of solicitors.

The Prime Minister has been active with the Liberal Party since the age of 18 when he joined the Young Liberal Movement and participated in student politics at university. In addition to his life-long commitment to public service and the Liberal Party, Mr Howard is a keen follower of

sport particularly cricket. He enjoys playing tennis and golf and follows the St George Rugby League football team.

Mr Howard married his wife Janette, a teacher by profession, on 4 April 1971. They have three children, Melanie, Tim and Richard. As Prime Minister Mr Howard divides his time between Sydney, where his family live at Kirribilli House, the Lodge in Canberra and, of course, his official commitments in other State capital cities, regional centres and rural Australia.

Dr Paul Cornish

Carrington Chair in International Security and Head of the International Security Programme, Chatham House, London.

Paul Cornish was educated at the University of St Andrews, the London School of Economics, and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, and completed his doctorate at Cambridge.

Career details: Regular Commission, British Army, 1983–89; Arms control analyst, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1991–93; Senior Research Fellow, Chatham House, 1993–96; Lecturer in Defence Studies, Joint Services Command and Staff College, 1997–98; Lecturer in International Security at the University of Cambridge, 1998–2001.

After three years directing the Centre for Defence Studies at King's College London, Dr Cornish returned to Chatham House in May 2005. His most recent publication, as editor, is *The Conflict in Iraq, 2003* (Palgrave/Macmillan, 2004).

Dr Samina Yasmeen

Associate Professor Samina Yasmeen is the Director, Centre for Muslim States and Societies at the University of Western Australia, Perth. She teaches courses on Islam and international politics. She is a specialist in political and strategic developments in South Asia, and the role of Islam in world politics. She has published articles on the position of Pakistani and Middle Eastern women, the role of Muslims in Australia, and Indo-Pakistan relations and is the co-editor of *Islam and the West: Reflections from Australia* (University of New South Wales Press, 2005). She is a member of the National Consultative Committee on International Security Issues (NCCISI), a member of the International Humanitarian Law Committee of the Red Cross (WA), and Vice-President to the Australian Institute for International Affairs (WA Branch).

She is currently conducting research on Understanding Muslim Identities in Australia, as well as on the role of Islamic groups in Pakistan's foreign policy. She is a regular commentator on issues relating to Islam, Pakistan and Muslim immigrants in Pakistan on Australian and international media.

Dr Ligia Noronah

Dr Ligia Noronha is a Senior Fellow of The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), India, and Director of the Resources and Global Security Division. (See http://www.teriin.org/div_inside.php?id=41&m=3) She is also the Secretary of the Asian Energy Institute, a network of 16 Asian and 14 non Asian institutes. (see http://www.aeinetwork.org/) She has an M.A. in Economics from the University of Bombay, and an M.Sc in Sea Use Law, Economics, and Policy, and a PhD on Oil Policy from the London School of Economics. Her work at TERI includes research into resources policy, energy security, minerals development, sustainable tourism, coastal zone management, and issues relating to climate change. From April 2004 to 2005, she worked at the International Development Research Centre, Canada, as the Team Leader of the Ecosystem Approaches to Human Health Program Initiative. Globally, she is associated with the Mining and Energy Research Network, UK, was on the Global Assurance Group of the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD) project of the IIED, and is also part of the network on Sustainable Production and Consumption, (SPACES). She is on the international Editorial Boards of Ecohealth and Experimental Agriculture.

Dr Julian Lindley-French

Dr Julian Lindley-French is Senior Scholar at the Centre for Applied Policy at the University of Munich and Senior Associate Fellow at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. Formerly Director of the International Security Policy Training Course at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, he was born in Sheffield, Yorkshire in 1958. He is an Oxford Blue who graduated from Oxford University in 1980. He received a Masters Degree in International Relations (with distinction) from UEA in 1992 and a doctorate in political science from the European University Institute in Florence in 1996. He has lectured in European Security at the Department of War Studies, Kings College London, and therein was Deputy Director of the International Centre for Security Analysis (ICSA). He was also Senior Research Fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris and has acted as a consultant to NATO in Brussels where in 1999 was recognised for outstanding service.

He is a regular contributor to newspapers and magazines, such as the International Herald Tribune. His recent works include *A European Defence Strategy* (Gutesloh: Bertelsmann 2004), and *Why Europe Must Be Strong … and the World needs a Strong Europe* (Gutesloh: Bertelsmann 2005). In June 2005 he published 'Power and Bleakness' in *International Spectator* and in January 2006 'Big NATO, Big World, Big Future' in *NATO Review* which was recognised as one of the most important contributions to grand strategy post 911 yet written. In October 2006 he published *NATO: The Enduring Alliance* for Routledge in the US and Europe and in March 2007 he will publish *A Chronology of European Security and Defence 1945–2006* for the Oxford University Press.

Dr Ashley J Tellis

Dr Ashley J Tellis is Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specialising in international security, defence, and Asian strategic issues.

He was recently on assignment to the US Department of State as Senior Adviser to the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, during which time he was intimately involved in negotiating the civil nuclear agreement with India. Previously he was commissioned into the Foreign Service and served as Senior Adviser to the Ambassador at the US Embassy in New Delhi.

He also served on the National Security Council staff as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Strategic Planning in Southwest Asia.

Prior to his government service, Dr Tellis was Senior Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation and Professor of Policy Analysis at the RAND Graduate School. He is the author of *India's Emerging Nuclear Posture* (2001) and co-author of *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future* (2000).

He is also Research Director of the Strategic Asia program at NBR and co-editor of the three most recent *Strategic Asia* volumes. His academic publications have appeared in many edited volumes and journals.



Dr Gérard Chaliand

Dr Gérard Chaliand is a specialist of irregular warfare and has spent several years as a participant observer in many guerillas and war zones (Afghanistan, Angola, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, Philippines, Eritree, North Vietnam, Burma, Nagorno-Karabagh, Colombie, Salvador, Peru, Guinée-Bissau, Iranian Kurdistan, Iraq, etc). He is also a specialist of Terrorism and has written several books on those subjects: *Guerilla strategies, from Long March to Afghanistan*; *University of Terrorism from Antiquity to al Qaïda (with al Qaïda)*.

Mr David Murray

David Murray joined the Commonwealth Bank in 1966 and was appointed Chief Executive Officer in June 1992, and retired from this position in 2005.

In November 2005 the Australian Government announced that Mr Murray would be Chairman of the Future Fund. The Fund's objective is to invest budget surpluses to meet the long term pension liabilities of government employees.

Mr Murray holds a Bachelor of Business from the NSW Institute of Technology and a Master of Business Administration, commenced at Macquarie University and completed at the International Management Institute, Geneva. He holds an honorary Phd from Macquarie University and is a Fellow of the University of Technology, Sydney. Mr Murray has thirty-nine years' experience in banking.

As part of his interest in education, Mr Murray chairs the Business Industry Higher Education Collaboration Council. Mr Murray is a benefactor of Schools and a member of Tara Anglican School for Girls Foundation in Sydney. He is Chairman of the Global Foundation and a life member of the Financial Markets Foundation for Children.

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