SPECIAL REPORT

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Public opinion in Australia towards defence, security and terrorism

by Ian McAllister

Executive summary

Defence as a political issue

Defence was the tenth most important election issue for voters at the 2007 election. Around 1 in 6 voters mentioned some aspect of defence—security, the Iraq war or terrorism—as their first or second most important issue in the election. Twice as many voters mentioned defence as an important issue than did so 10 years ago.

In 2007, Labor substantially made up its long-running disadvantage on these issues compared to the Liberal–National Coalition. It remained slightly behind the Coalition as the preferred party on defence and national security and on terrorism, but was substantially ahead of the Coalition as the preferred party on the Iraq war.

Public confidence in defence

Around one quarter of voters believe that Australia could defend itself if attacked, but a majority consistently see defence as having become stronger than it was 10 years previously.

Public support for greater defence spending peaked twice over the past 30 years—in 1980 following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and following East Timor in 2000 and 9/11 in 2001. Since then, support for more defence spending has dropped to its lowest level since the end of the Cold War.

Security threats

The proportion of voters seeing a security threat to Australia has declined consistently since the late 1960s.

Indonesia is by far the most frequently mentioned potential threat to Australia's security and is mentioned by 28% of voters, a number that has remained relatively constant for the past 10 years. Next is China, which is seen as a threat by 10% of voters.

Defence and the United States

Public support for defence links with the US has remained consistently high over an extended period. There has been recent decline in support, caused by the unpopularity of the 2004 Free Trade Agreement and the Iraq war.

There is a strong generational element to support for the US: those who remember and had direct experience of US support for Australia in the Second World War being most in favour. There is strong support for continued Australian military assistance to the War on Terror, despite the decline in support since 2001.

Terrorism

The threat of terrorism is now regarded by almost 2 in 3 people as part of everyday life in Australia, and half of those are concerned about becoming the victim of a terrorist attack. Two-thirds of people surveyed, are concerned about a major attack in the future.

There is strong support for restricting the legal rights of terrorist sympathisers. The public's concern about a general terrorist attack in Australia is the most important factor shaping these opinions.

Introduction

For the majority of Australians, issues relating to defence and national security represent second order concerns, overshadowed in importance by more immediate socio-economic issues such as health, education and the performance of the economy. The way in which defence and security have been framed in the public's mind was underpinned in the 1980s and 1990s by an informal bipartisan consensus that defence should not become a highly contested political issue. Defence and security issues were only debated in very general terms during this period. There was also broad support for the main goals of defence policy, regardless of which party occupied government.

Several factors have served to bring defence and security into sharper relief for the public. Most obviously, the spectre of terrorism following the 9/11 attacks in the United States and the 2002 Bali bombings heightened the public's awareness of the potential threats that exist from Islamist terrorism. Second, and related to terrorism, there is now a widespread recognition that the increasingly global nature of terrorism has undermined the territorial integrity of the nation state. And third, partisan divisions over participation in and the conduct of the Iraq war have made voters more aware of the arguments surrounding defence policy.

The purpose of this report is to trace the public's changing views of the main issues relating to defence and security over an extended period—in some cases stretching back to the late 1960s. The report updates and extends two previous ASPI reports, *Attitude Matters: Public opinion in Australia towards defence and security* and *Representative Views: Mass and elite opinion on Australian security* (McAllister, 2004, 2005). The reports are updated using the 2004 and 2007 Australian Election Study surveys, and a new analysis is conducted on public opinion concerning terrorism. As in the previous reports, the data comes principally from the 1987–2007 Australian Election Study (AES) surveys. Full details of the surveys and other technical details are provided in the Appendix.

Defence as a political issue

From the withdrawal of Australian troops from Vietnam in 1973 until the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, defence rarely rated as an issue with the general public. Throughout this period, there was very limited Australian military involvement overseas, with the partial exceptions of the 1991 Gulf War and the 1999 deployment in East Timor. There was also a generally-recognised consensus among the political elite that defence and security should not become a partisan political issue. Following the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the Bali bombings in October 2002, and a generally heightened awareness of the potential threat from Islamist terrorism, defence has, for the first time in three decades, rated as an issue that the public is concerned about. In turn, that awareness has stimulated a greater public debate about defence issues and priorities.

In the 2007 federal election, the Australian Election Study survey found that defence and national security rated tenth from a list of 14 issues, along with taxation, just behind immigration and ahead of unemployment. The results in Table 1 show that about 1 in 20 voters rated it as either their first or second most important election issue. If we combine the three defence-related issues included in the survey—defence and national security, the Iraq war and terrorism—a total of 17% of voters rated some aspect of defence and security as their first priority in the election. The top-rated issues in the election were health and medicare, which was mentioned by 37% of voters as a first or second priority, followed by industrial relations, which was mentioned by a total of 24%. The third most important set of issues were concerned with the environment, notably the management of water resources and the problem of global warming.

The importance of defence in the 2007 election represents a marginal decline from 2004. Figure 1 shows that in 2004, 54% of voters said that defence was 'extremely important' as an election issue, compared to 40% in 2007. However, this still represents a substantial increase on the 25% of voters who mentioned it as an issue in 1996 (the option was not given in the 1998 survey). To that extent, and barring future security crises, defence may have peaked as a major political issue for voters. The most substantial increase in public concern in recent elections has been over the environment. In the 1990 federal election the environment jumped in importance as an issue, from 26% in 1987 to double that figure in 1990. It declined in importance in subsequent elections, but again reached 52% in 2004 and an unprecedented 59% in 2007. The other major trends have been the continuing decline in concern about taxation and unemployment,

Table 1: How the issues rated in the 2007 federal election

		Mentions	
Rank	**Issue**	**First**	**Second**
1.	Health, medicare	20.5	16.5
2.	Industrial relations	16.3	8.0
3.	Taxation	11.0	7.2
4.	Education	10.5	13.7
5.	Environment	7.7	10.3
6.	Global warming	7.4	9.1
7.	Interest rates	7.0	6.3
8.	Management of water	6.6	9.6
9.	Immigration	2.9	4.0
10.	Defence, national security	2.7	2.7
11.	War in Iraq	2.4	3.0
12.	Unemployment	2.2	2.7
13.	Terrorism	1.8	4.2
14.	Treatment of aborigines	0.9	2.9
	Total	**100**	**100**
	(N)	**(1,796)**	**(1,755)**

'Still thinking about these same 14 issues, which of these issues was most important to you during the election campaign? And which next?'

Source: AES 2007.

Figure 1: Trends in opinion towards major election issues, 1987–2007 (percent say 'extremely important')



1987: 'Here is a list of issues that were discussed during the election campaign. When you were deciding about voting, how important was each of these issues to you?' 1990–96: 'Still thinking about these same (1990: nine) issues, when you were deciding about how to vote, how important was each of these issues to you personally?' 1998–2007: 'Here is a list of important issues that were discussed during the election campaign. When you were deciding how to vote, how important was each of these issues to you personally? In 1987 four response categories were used, 1990–2007, three categories. 'Defence and national security' was 'defence' in 1996. 'Health and medicare' was 'health care' in 1987 and 'health' in 1990 and 1993.

Source: AES 1987–2007.

both major issues in the election held during the 1990s, and the continuing dominance of health as an issue, which was seen as extremely important by 76% of voters in both the 2004 and 2007 elections (for full details of all issues, see McAllister and Clark, 2008).

There were clearly many factors that contributed to the Australian Labor Party's 2007 election success, but one was the party's increasing credibility with voters on national security issues. In addition to asking voters to list their major concerns during the election, the AES also asked voters which party they saw as being most effective in dealing with these issues. Figure 2 shows the percent who preferred Labor policies on these issues minus the percent who preferred Liberal–National Coalition policies. In 1996, Labor had a modest disadvantage of 9 percentage points on defence and national security. However, in the 2001 and 2004 elections, the Coalition moved decisively ahead of Labor as the preferred party on defence and security. In part, this was a consequence of the Coalition's incumbency during the period immediately following the 9/11 and the Bali terrorist attacks; the public largely approved of the Howard government's handling of the policy responses to these critical issues. In part, too, the Coalition benefited from the public's general preference for a conservative party to handle national security issues.

As a consequence, Labor trailed the Coalition in the 2001 and 2004 elections as the preferred party on defence and national security and on terrorism by

Figure 2: Preferred party on defence issues, 1996–2007 (% Labor minus % Coalition)



'Still thinking about these same issues, whose policies—the Labor Party's or the Liberal–National Coalition's—would you say come closer to your own views on each of these issues?' Figures are the percent preferring Labor minus the percent preferring the Coalition.

Source: AES 1996–2007.

between 23% and 29%—a very substantial disadvantage. The 2007 results show a major turnaround in public opinion. On both defence and terrorism, Labor improved its position by a substantial 20 percentage points; while it remained behind the Coalition as the preferred party on these issues, its disadvantage was small, and many more voters saw no difference between the major parties. Labor also benefited from the increasing unpopularity of the Iraq war and from its policy of withdrawing Australian troops from Iraq if elected; in 2004, the Coalition had an 11 point advantage on this issue, a situation that had reversed by 2007 to became a Labor advantage of 19 points in 2007.[1]

Although it was slightly less important as an election issue in the 2007 federal election compared to the previous 2004 election, defence remains a serious concern for voters, especially if the comparatively new issue of terrorism is included. Remaining as the major concern of voters was health, with industrial relations and the environment coming second and third, respectively. Perhaps the most significant change in 2007 compared to previous elections was Labor's improved standing among voters as the preferred party to deal with these issues; while Labor still trailed the Coalition as the preferred party, its disadvantage was much reduced. Indeed, Labor was able to capitalise on the unpopularity of the Iraq war, with almost twice as many voters preferring Labor's policy of withdrawal to the Coalition's policy. If the 2007 election is the beginning of a sustained period of Labor government, we might expect the incumbency advantage on these issues that once benefited the Coalition to shift towards Labor.

One further piece of evidence concerning the public's view of defence is the extent to which defence and security are viewed as general

Climate change and national security—Carl Ungerer

A number of recent reports and policy statements have placed global climate change at the centre of national security debates. According to these reports, climate change will present national security planners with a range of new challenges including: widespread political instability in low-lying coastal areas; increased migration flows from developing to developed countries; food and energy scarcity leading to greater competition for and possible conflict over, resources; increases in the scale and damage caused by natural disasters; and the rapid spread of infectious diseases across borders.

However, not all security analysts share that assessment. Skeptics point to the uncertainties and contradictions in the scientific modeling used by the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to highlight the unpredictable consequences of climate change. In fact, global climate change could produce 'winners' as well as 'losers'. Countries such as Canada may experience higher crop yields as well as less severe seasonal weather patterns as a result of global warming. Sea lanes through the Arctic region might open up to become more accessible to submarines and other ships. Trade might become faster, cheaper and easier.

As this polling data shows, climate change is an issue of growing concern to many Australians. And the environment now ranks much higher than traditional security issues as an election issue. But whether or not climate change represents the most important external threat we face remains to be seen.

Although Australians believe that climate change is important, there is as yet no consensus on the best way for the government to handle climate change. Is it a national security issue or one that should be addressed through social and economic policy settings? Should our military forces be reconfigured to handle natural disasters as their primary role? Do we need our warfighters to become water fighters? Should our intelligence agencies be looking for climate secrets? The polling data shows that environmental issues are unlikely to fade from public consciousness. So dealing with climate change will remain a core priority for the Australian government.

problems facing Australia, as opposed to election issues. The distinction is important, because in elections voters tend to respond to the issues that party elites politicise rather than what they might regard as the most pressing problems facing the country. Some voters may view an issue as generally important, but not view it as significant in an election context. Figure 3 shows that there is a distinction, and defence and national security and the Iraq war are seen as more important election issues than problems facing Australia—reflecting their prominence in political debates. By contrast, terrorism is regarded more as a general problem facing Australia than an election issue.

Confidence in defence

Since the Second World War, Australia's defence capacity has been viewed as dependent on support from the United States. Australia's major overseas military commitments, notably in the Korean and Vietnam wars, took place as part of a US-led force. Even the East Timor deployment in 1999, while not directly involving US troops,

Figure 3: Defence as a general problem and as an election issue, 2007



See Figure 1 for election issue question wording. The general problem question was: 'And still thinking about the same 14 issues, which of these issues is the most important political problem facing Australia today?'

Source: AES 2007.

still depended heavily on logistical support from the US military. Not surprisingly, the public has consistently viewed Australia's independent defence capability as decidedly limited, and with the exception of the East Timor operation in 1999, that is clearly reflected in the public opinion poll trends.

There is thus general agreement among the public, as Figure 4 shows, that Australia would not be able to defend itself if attacked by an enemy; for most of the period since the late 1990s, between 1 in 4 and 1 in 5 voters held this view. The exception to this general pattern is the 2000 survey, which was conducted just after the start of the highly successful Australian-led intervention in East Timor. The success of the mission, together with the absence of serious casualties among the military, resulted in an increase in the public's confidence about Australia's defence capabilities. Thus, the 2000 survey found that 39% of those interviewed believed that Australia could defend itself if attacked, but this dropped back to 20% in the 2001 survey, reverting to the long-term trend.

The other part of Figure 4 shows the proportion of survey respondents who believe that defence is stronger than it was 10 years ago. This figure also increased in 2000, from 40% in 1998 to 58%, presumably also a consequence of the East Timor operation. However, the proportion holding this positive view about defence has remained constant since then, varying by around 2 percentage points. Thus, while the effect of the East Timor operation on public opinion about Australia's ability to defend itself was temporary, the impact on opinions about defence being stronger than in the past has been more long-lasting, and shows no sign of declining to its pre-East Timor level. This may well be a consequence of the public's awareness of the large capital investment in defence post-2000.

Ascertaining how the public views Australia's defence capacity is one aspect of the public's level of confidence in defence. Another aspect is how much funding the public wants to commit to defence. Measuring the level of funding support for defence is, of course, difficult, particularly if it is divorced from

Figure 4: Trends in opinion towards Australia's defence capabilities, 1998–2007 (percent agree)



'Please say whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with each of the following statements. ...Australia would be able to defend itself successfully if it were ever attacked. ...Australia's defence is stronger now than it was 10 years ago.' In 1998 and 2001 a 'neither' category was used, which has been omitted from the estimates presented here.

Source: AES 1998–2007; Survey of Defence Issues 2000.

Figure 5: Trends in opinion towards defence spending, 1975–2007 (percent)



'Do you think that the government should spend more or spend less on defence?' Exact question wordings vary between surveys conducted prior to 1987.

Source: 1975–85 McAllister and Makkai (1992); AES 1987–2007; Survey of Defence Issues 2000.

Views on defence spending—
Andrew Davies

There is no doubt a story to be told about the dynamics of public opinion on defence and security issues when major events occur. The impact of the 9/11 attacks and the collapse of the Soviet Union appears to be reflected in the figures we see in this paper. But if we take a longer term view, and average out the ups and downs of topical events, there is a long term story that is also interesting.

Despite a fair bit of variability from year to year, the data in Figure 5 shows some long-term trends. The graph below redraws it with long-term trend lines superimposed and now includes the sum of the respondents who wanted either more or less spent on defence—equating to the proportion of respondents who had a view on defence spending. It is clear that, despite many ups and downs, the overall trend is for fewer respondents (on average) to want less defence spending and fewer to want more, because less overall have a strong view either way.

We don't have to look too far for a plausible explanation of these trends. Figure 6 shows the percentage of respondents who see a security threat to Australia. Again there are some ups and downs and again there is an overall decline over time. The correlation between the number of respondents with a view on defence spending and those who see a security threat to Australia is over 80%.

Views on defence spending



the other trade-offs that may be involved; more government funding for defence might mean, for example, less funding for the environment and so on. Nevertheless, while asking people to opt for more or less funding for defence without any explicit trade-off has limited utility, measuring the trend across an extended period does tell us much about the relative standing of defence in the eyes of the public. Fortunately, we have such data, going back as far as 1975 (Figure 5).

The 1970s and 1980s represent the period when the Cold War dominated the international political environment and, not surprisingly, support for increased defence spending peaked at 77% in 1981. This followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the resulting boycott by some countries of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow. From then onwards, support for more defence spending declined, bottoming at 33% in 1990 with the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War; this was a period when defence appeared to have less relevance for the public. The year 1990 is also notable as the only point at which those supporting less spending actually outnumbered those favouring more spending. Support for defence again rose after the 1991 Gulf War, once more reaching Cold War levels in 2000 and 2001, after East Timor and the 9/11 attacks. Since 2000, support for defence spending has declined consistently at each federal election, most recently standing at 47% in 2007.

Public opinion towards perceptions of Australia's defence capabilities is driven in part by elite discussion and debate about defence issues, and in part by international events. With the exception of the Iraq war, there has generally been little elite debate about defence, so increased defence spending in the 1990s and early 2000s received general and largely unquestioning public support. The East Timor crisis in 1999, and the 9/11 attacks shortly afterwards, generated public support for the view that Australia's defence was stronger than in the past, although still remaining contingent on support from the United States. However, party differences over Iraq and the absence of any major international events on the scale of 9/11 or the Iraq war have led to a decrease in public support for increased defence spending.

Security threats

In general, the public's perception of the level of threat that exists to Australia is directly proportional to the degree of instability in the international environment, and to the number of countries that might potentially be considered a threat. With several notable exceptions, all linked to major international events, the long-term trend suggests a steady decline in the public's perception of a direct security threat to Australia. That decline is consistent with threats from countries—notably China and Russia—being gradually replaced in the public's view by threats from terrorist and other transnational risks and pressures.

At the beginning of the period for which we have survey data, starting in 1975, Figure 6 shows that around one half of those interviewed believed that there was a security threat of some description to Australia. By contrast, for the period since 1996, the proportion seeing a threat has remained consistently lower, at around 1 in 3 of those interviewed. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 resulted in a peak of 63%, the highest figure recorded during the period of the surveys, and the lowest figure of 33% occurs in the most recent survey, in 2007. The end of the Cold War in 1990, the collapse of communism, and the effective neutralisation of Russia as a military power, have also contributed to a public belief that there are fewer threats to Australian security from countries than there once was.

The public's changing views of China and Indonesia as security threats reflect many of the other changes in public opinion that have taken place during the period. In 1967, China, with its support for North Vietnam in the Vietnam War, was seen as a major threat to Australia and was mentioned by 31% of the survey respondents. By contrast, just 7% mentioned Indonesia as a potential threat.

Figure 6: Perceptions of a security threat to Australia, 1969–2007 (percent)



1990–2007: 'In your opinion, are any of the following countries likely to pose a threat to Australia's security?' Estimates are based on respondents who answered 'very likely' to at least one of the countries listed in each survey. 1969–88: Exact question wordings and codings vary between surveys.

Source: 1969–85 McAllister and Makkai (1992); AES 1987–2007; Survey of Defence Issues 2000.

During the course of the next 40 years that situation has almost exactly reversed, and in 2007, 28% viewed Indonesia as a threat, but just 10% took the same view of China. The public's concern about China declined rapidly after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, and was rekindled briefly during the 1990s following the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989. Concern about Indonesia has increased almost incrementally over the period, with just a slight decline in the late 1980s. Public concern peaked in 2001, following the events in East Timor and has remained high since, albeit with a slight decline. See Figure 7.

Both Japan and Vietnam have been viewed as low-level threats to Australia. At only 2 points since the late 1960s has Japan been mentioned as a threat by more than 10% of respondents. That occurred in 1989 and 1996; the first appears to be linked to the death of Emperor Hirohito which raised memories and publicity concerning Japan's wartime history.[2]

Vietnam has also been rarely mentioned as a possible threat, with the partial exception of the late 1960s, which, not surprisingly, occurred during the Vietnam War. In 1968, for example, following the highly publicised Tet offensive in South Vietnam, 14% of the survey respondents mentioned Vietnam as a threat. In 2007, just 4% of those interviewed thought Vietnam or Japan represented a security threat to Australia. See Figure 8.

The public's view of the threat posed by several other countries is worth noting. During the Cold War, the surveys routinely asked about the threat posed by Russia, and Figure 9 shows that significant proportions of respondents saw Russia as a threat. This concern peaked in 1980 at 40%, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979. By 1989, however, with the collapse of communism and economic weakness undermining Russia's military capacity, few mentioned Russia as a threat. The last survey

Figure 7: Indonesia and China as security threats to Australia, 1967–2007 (percent)



1990–2007: 'In your opinion, are any of the following countries likely to pose a threat to Australia's security?'
1967–88: Exact question wordings and codings vary between surveys.

Source: 1969–85 McAllister and Makkai (1992); AES 1987–2007; Survey of Defence Issues 2000.

Figure 8: Japan and Vietnam as security threats to Australia, 1967–2007 (percent)



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1967–88: Exact question wordings and codings vary between surveys.

Source: 1969–85 McAllister and Makkai (1992); AES 1987–2007; Survey of Defence Issues 2000.

National security budget—
Carl Ungerer

The Commonwealth Budget for 2008–09 contained $349.4 million in new spending initiatives on national security and $66.3 million in savings by cancelling or slowing previously announced government initiatives. This is the smallest increase in national security spending since 2002–03. It brings to a total more than $8 billion spent on national security since 2001.

New funding initiatives include:

- $429 million to extend Australia's military involvement in Afghanistan
- $166 million over two years to extend Australia's military presence in East Timor
- $191 million over five years to increase by 500 the number of Australian Federal Police (AFP) officers
- $75 million over four years for AFP assistance to the Pacific Islands, including in Samoa, Nauru and Papua New Guinea
- $6.8 million over two years to increase Australia's intelligence capability
- $5 million over five years to establish an Office of National Security in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.

A number of former Howard government initiatives on national security have been cut or downgraded. These include:

- $16.2 million withdrawn from planned growth in AFP funding including the airport liaison officer network, the International Deployment Group, a domestic surge capacity and regional rapid deployment teams.
- $50 million redirected from the National Community Crime Prevention Program towards the government's new Safer Suburbs Program.
- $7.1 million over four years to reduce overseas representation by the Office of Transport Security.

to include Russia was conducted in 2000 and found that just 5% mentioned it as a threat. Since 1996, Malaysia has been included in the surveys, and has attracted between 6 and 8% of voters who see it as a threat.

More intriguingly, while very few respondents have mentioned the United States as a potential threat to Australia, the proportion reached 6% in 2004. This remains a small minority but nevertheless represents a threefold increase on 2001, so it is too large an increase to represent sampling error in the surveys. The explanation seems to have been the unpopularity of the bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States, which was ratified in August 2004.[3] The unpopularity of the Iraq war appears to have been another contributing factor; in 2007, 77% of the respondents thought that the Iraq war had not been worth the cost, but this increased to 97% among those who felt that the United States was a security threat to Australia.[4] Clearly, the rise in the numbers seeing the US as a threat is motivated less by the belief that the US harbours military ambitions towards Australia and more by anti-American sentiment, fostered by disenchantment with the FTA, and opposition to the Iraq war.

Public opinion about the level of threat to Australia and about the source of those threats is important: they help to shape the broad parameters of foreign and defence policy. For example, those who see more

Figure 9: Malaysia, Russia and the United States as security threats to Australia, 1967–2007 (percent)



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1967–88: Exact question wordings and codings vary between surveys.
Source: 1969–85 McAllister and Makkai (1992); AES 1987–2007; Survey of Defence Issues 2000.

threats existing are more likely to view the ANZUS alliance with the US as more important than those who see fewer or no threats. Similarly, those who see more threats to Australia within the region are likely to have specific views about the direction of defence policy, and in particular are more likely to support increased defence spending. In 2007 only 10% of the respondents who did not see a threat to Australia supported spending much more on defence; by contrast, 46% of those who saw four or more threats to Australia wanted much more spent on defence.[5]

Defence and the United States

Since the Second World War, the alliance with the United States has represented the cornerstone of Australia's defence policy and for the US, represents one of its most important defence arrangements in the Asia Pacific (Tow and Albinski, 2002). In formal terms, the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) commits the signatories to providing assistance in the event of an attack on any one of them. The treaty was invoked for the first time by Australia following the 9/11 attacks—the fiftieth anniversary year of its signing. As a consequence of the treaty's longevity, the well-publicised annual AusMin meetings that take place between Australian and US officials, and not least the cultural factors that underpin it, the ANZUS Treaty is perhaps one of the best recognised and understood aspects of postwar Australian defence policy.

The public's trust in the United States to come to Australia's defence fluctuates with perceptions of instability within the international environment, and with the demonstrated willingness of US leaders to commit their military forces to overseas

Figure 10: Trust in the US to defend Australia, 1970–2007 (percent)



'If Australia's security were threatened by some other country, how much trust do you feel Australia can have in the United States to come to Australia's defence?' Exact question wordings and codings vary between surveys prior to 1987.

Source: US Information Service; Survey of Defence Issues 2000; AES 1987–2007.

conflicts. Thus Figure 10 shows that there are peaks in public support for the US at the time of the first Gulf War in 1991, and following the 9/11 attacks, when it became apparent that the US response would be to mount a military invasion of Afghanistan. Popular trust in the US was lowest in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with the end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of US military forces from many bases across the world, particularly in Europe. Another factor influencing public opinion at this time may have been the East Timor crisis, when the US ruled out direct military involvement; the 2000 survey shows the lowest level of trust over the entire period of the surveys.

Nevertheless, despite these fluctuations in the public's trust in the US to come to Australia's defence, Figure 10 shows a high and generally consistent level of trust. For most of the 37 year period for which surveys are available, those expressing trust in the US have outnumbered those taking a negative view, often by a ratio of 2 to 1; the exception is the 1989 to 1993 period. Trust was particularly high after the 9/11 attacks, peaking at 39%, the second highest figure in the whole period; it has gradually declined since then, to 31% in 2007.

There has also been strong public support for the ANZUS alliance with the US, with again the peak in support occurring immediately after the 9/11 attacks, when nearly 6 out of 10 respondents said that the alliance was 'very important' for Australia's security. And once again, the lowest point comes at the time of the East Timor crisis, most likely for the reasons already mentioned. However, even here, those saying that the alliance was 'not very important' are outnumbered more than three to one by those saying that it is 'very important.' See Figure 11. By any standards, then, there is strong and consistent

Figure 11: The importance of the ANZUS alliance, 1993–2007 (percent)



'How important do you think the Australian alliance with the United States under the ANZUS treaty is for protecting Australia's security?'

Source: AES 1993–2007; Survey of Defence Issues 2000.

public support for the ANZUS alliance as a cornerstone of Australia's defence policy.

There have, however, been recent declines in public support for the US, following the high point recorded after the 9/11 attacks. There are three explanations for this decline. One explanation has already been mentioned: the unpopularity of the FTA with the US, and the view that the US was posing a threat to Australia's economic security, albeit a view held by a small minority of voters. A second, more important explanation is the unpopularity of the Iraq war. Reflecting patterns of public opinion in the US, there was widespread public support in 2003 for the invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime; however, as the insurgency against the coalition forces gathered pace and casualties have mounted, the public has become less supportive of the way in which the occupation of Iraq has been conducted.

In 2004, just after the invasion of Iraq, Table 2 shows that there was a small majority of Australians—52%—in favour of the Iraq war.[6] However, by 2007 a majority, 55%, disapproved of the war, and those feeling most strongly in support of the war declined from 17 to 8%. There are similar declines in the proportions who see the war as being worth the cost; in 2004 only 39% viewed the war as worth the cost, but by 2004 just one in every four took this view, a significant decline. The only comfort from these figures is that the public's view that the threat of terrorism had increased as a result of the war actually dropped, from 68 to 56%. However, virtually no-one believed in either survey that the war had decreased the threat of terrorism, a key goal of the original invasion.[7]

To what extent has the increasing unpopularity of the US-led Iraq war harmed public support for the ANZUS alliance? Views of the Iraq war are strongly correlated with

Table 2: Support for the Iraq war, 2004–07			
	2004	**2007**	**(Change 2001–07)**
Approve of Iraq War			
Strongly approve	17	8	(–9)
Approve	35	37	(+2)
Disapprove	18	31	(+13)
Strongly disapprove	30	24	(–6)
Total	**100**	**100**	
(N)	**(1,728)**	**(1,839)**	
War Worth the Cost			
Worth it	39	24	(–15)
Not worth it	61	76	(+15)
Total	**100**	**100**	
(N)	**(1,704)**	**(1,827)**	
Threat of Terrorism			
Increased	68	56	(–12)
Stayed the same	31	42	(+11)
Decreased	1	2	(+1)
Total	**100**	**100**	
(N)	**(1,730)**	**(1,846)**	

'Now we want to ask you about the current war in Iraq. Do you approve or disapprove of the way John Howard handled the war in Iraq?' 'Taking everything into account, do you think the war in Iraq has been worth the cost or not?' 'As a result of Australia's military action in Iraq, do you think the threat of terrorism against Australia has increased, decreased, or stayed about the same?'

Source: AES 2004–07.

views about the ANZUS alliance. In 2004, the correlation between views of the Iraq war and support for the ANZUS alliance was .553 (p<.000), and .455 (p<.000) in 2007. The evidence suggests that the Iraq war has influenced views about ANZUS, but that the impact of opinions about Iraq has declined, albeit marginally. Following the withdrawal of Australian troops from an active combat role in Iraq, it's expected that the effect of Iraq on opinions about ANZUS, already small, will decline further.

The third explanation for the decline in support for ANZUS is generational: those who most value the defence link with the US are those who most remember and have direct experience of Australia's dependence on the US during the Second World War. Figure 12 shows the strong influence of generational differences on support for ANZUS. Those aged 80 or more, whose earliest political memories would have been shaped by the Second World War and its aftermath, are no less than four times more likely to see the ANZUS alliance as being very important, compared to those aged 18 to 24, whose earliest political memories would have been in the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War. These are major differences, and they suggest that as the older generations move out of the population, support for the defence link with the US will, *ceteris paribus*, decline, subjecting the alliance to more critical scrutiny (Beeson, 2003).

One final aspect of defence links with the US is worthy of note: public support for the US-initiated War on Terror. The War on Terror

ANZUS and generational change—Rod Lyon

The polling results raise the possibility that intergenerational differences may result in a 'gradual, secular decline in public support for defence links with the United States.' Such a decline is certainly possible: the young tend to evince lower levels of support for the ANZUS alliance than the old. And the most loyal demographic in the research, the over-80s, are those most likely to die off. Polities change, and so do their opinions. There is no law of physics which insists that Australia will always find itself linked to the United States in defence matters.

But we need to shade this possibility with a few caveats. First, research about ANZUS has previously shown a variation in alliance support in relation to age. The previous 2004 ASPI report, *Attitude Matters*, addressed this point specifically, using data from the 2001 AES survey to show a similar pattern of intergenerational change in levels of support for the alliance.

Overlaying the data from the two surveys (2001 and 2007) shows a substantial weakening of support for ANZUS across all age brackets. For obvious reasons, 2001 was a high-water mark in relation to levels of support for ANZUS in the post-Cold War era. But the gradient of the 2007 graph is only a little steeper across the age-brackets than the gradient of the 2001 graph, and that is the actual indicator of intergenerational difference.

Second, the world is not a steady-state entity. Threats come and go, wars start and finish. Since the signing of ANZUS in 1951, Australians have fought alongside Americans in Korea, Vietnam, the first Gulf War, Afghanistan and Iraq, and some might want to add to those both the Cold War and the current War on Terror. The world remains a dangerous place. We can't yet tell what the future holds, but it would be a surprise if it did not contain at least some events that might serve as catalysts for the renewal of ANZUS. One of the features of both this latest research and the earlier studies is that events such as September 2001 are critical in renewing a sense of the alliance's importance amongst the Australian public. True, some events may also erode public support.

Third, an alliance is an option that both the Australian public and Australian strategic planners need to see in context. If we gradually slip away from our defence links with the United States, then what takes the place of those links? Even in 2007 only 23% of Australians believed that Australia could defend itself if attacked. Against that figure, the current number of Australians who say that ANZUS is 'very important' to Australia's security—42%—is especially revealing about the relative weightings that Australians place on the choice between alliance and self-reliance. Australians have never gone to war alone. And they show no interest in doing so in this latest survey.

was introduced after the 9/11 attacks as an umbrella policy to undermine the activities of terrorist groups operating across the world. Its first manifestation was the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, followed by the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, both of which involved US-led military coalitions. In November 2001, over two out of every three voters supported the provision of Australian military assistance to the War on Terror (Table 3); overall, supporters of military assistance outnumbered opponents by more

Figure 12: Generational differences in support for the ANZUS Alliance (percent say 'very important')



Source: AES 2007.

Table 3: Support for the War on Terrorism, 2001–07				
	2001	**2004**	**2007**	**(Change 2001–07)**
Strongly agree	20	14	12	(–8)
Agree	48	44	40	(–8)
Neither	19	22	27	(+8)
Disagree	8	14	14	(+6)
Strongly disagree	5	6	7	(+2)
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	
(N)	**(1,953)**	**(1,717)**	**(1,834)**	

'Please say whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with each of the following statements. ... Australia should provide military assistance for the war on terrorism.'

Source: AES 2001–07.

than 5 to 1. By 2007 support had declined to 52%, with 21% opposing military assistance. Nevertheless, it would appear that the War on Terror has retained strong support despite the increasing unpopularity of the Iraq war.

There are consistently high levels of public trust in the US and support for the ANZUS alliance. Two recent events—the unpopularity of the FTA and the Iraq war—have resulted in a slight decline in public support for the US. But judged against the sweep of four decades, the decline is small. More serious are the intergenerational differences in support for the defence link with the US. Continued unabated, it suggests a gradual decline in public support for defence links with the US which is unrelated to major international political events.

Terrorism

In comparison with the other Western democracies, Australia has been relatively immune from a major terrorist attack. Such incidents that have occurred have generally been small-scale, isolated, and for the most part have involved attacks on foreign diplomats by groups concerned with grievances in their home countries.[8] By contrast, Britain endured a major terrorist campaign by the Irish Republican Army from the early 1970s up until 1998, and the US experienced the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, which killed 6 people, and the 9/11 attacks, which killed 2,998 people.[9] The Australian public's isolation from terrorism ended with the Bali bombings on 12 October 2002, which killed 202 people, 88 of them Australian.

The 2007 AES found that most people now believe that the risk of terrorism occurring in Australia is part of everyday life. When asked to agree or disagree with the statement that 'Acts of terrorism in Australia will be part of life in the future', no fewer than 62% of respondents agreed with the proposition, and just 14% disagreed; 24% took no position. These figures are very close to those found in the US, where a December 2006 poll found that 70% believed that 'terrorism in the US will be part of life in the future', 24% disagreed, and 6% were unsure.[10] The main difference is the larger proportion of Australian respondents who offered no view on the issue.

Since the late 1970s, successive governments have revised the legislation and agencies responsible for counter-terrorism. Following 9/11 and the Bali bombings, specific legislation was introduced to detain terrorist suspects for longer periods of time and to proscribe organisations considered to be engaged in terrorism. The various measures introduced by the government to deal with terrorism, coupled with the absence of any major attack on Australian soil, have clearly resonated with the public, who generally approve of the government's handling of the problem. Figure 13 shows that just over half of the survey respondents in 2007 believed that the government was 'doing all it can' to deal with problem, with 39% believing that the government 'could do more'. Just 1 in 10 took the view that the government had done too much. Once again, these figures are very similar to public opinion in the US, where around a half of voters approve of their government's response to terrorism.[11]

To what extent is the public concerned about terrorism, both as a threat to themselves personally and as a national threat to the country? Table 4 shows that the respondents in 2007 divided equally between those expressing some personal concern about becoming a victim of terrorism, and those who were not concerned. Indeed, even the strength of the opposing opinions were almost the same. However, those concerned about a major attack occurring in Australia outnumbered those who were not concerned by about 2 to 1. Personal and national concerns about terrorism are, of course, closely related. And once again, these figures are very similar to those found in recent US surveys about the public's fear of terrorism. For example, in a June 2006 Gallup survey, 12% said they were 'very worried' that they or someone in their family would be a victim of a terrorist attack, while 32% were 'somewhat worried.'[12]

The response of governments around the world to terrorism has been to introduce legal measures curtailing individual rights and freedoms. In Britain, the government passed emergency legislation after 9/11 allowing for the detention without trial of terrorist suspects if they could not be deported. Subsequent legislation passed after the July 2005 London train bombings created new

Figure 13: Government's handling of threat from terrorism



'Do you think that the government is doing all it reasonably can do to prevent terrorist attacks in Australia, do you think that it could do more, or do you think that it has done too much?'

Source: AES 2007.

Table 4: The public's fear of terrorism

	Concerned about...	
	Becoming terror victim	**Major attack in future**
Very concerned	14	17
Somewhat concerned	36	49
Not very concerned	38	27
Not at all concerned	12	7
Total	**100**	**100**
(N)	**(1,847)**	**(1,846)**

'How concerned are you personally about you yourself or a family member being the victim of a future terrorist attack in Australia?' 'And how concerned are you that there will be a major terrorist attack on Australian soil in the near future?'

Source: AES 2007.

offences related to terrorism, and permitted the holding of suspects for 28 days (although the government had initially sought up to 90 days). In the US, the 2001 'Patriot' Act increased the powers of the security agencies to investigate terrorist suspects, including the power to intercept computer and telephone conversations, and to access financial and other personal records. Australia's response has been to introduce legislation at both state and federal levels, including more wide-ranging powers to detain and question suspects, and to intercept communications (Golder and Williams 2006; O'Neil, 2007).

The response has been strong public support for these measures. Table 5 shows that a majority—57%—agreed that groups sympathetic to terrorism should not enjoy freedom of speech, compared to just 23% who disagreed with the measure. There is

Table 5: The rights of terrorist sympathisers		
	For terrorist sympathisers...	
	Limit freedom of speech	Search houses without warrant
Strongly agree	26	16
Agree	31	49
Neither	20	29
Disagree	16	5
Strongly disagree	7	1
Total	**100**	**100**
(N)	**(1,816)**	**(1,813)**

'Please say whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with each of the following statements... ...Freedom of speech should not extend to groups that are sympathetic to terrorists. ...The police should be allowed to search the houses of people who might be sympathetic to terrorists without a court order'

Source: AES 2007.

Table 6: Fear of terrorism and support for stronger legal measures		
	(Regression coefficients)	
	Partial	Standardised
Beliefs about terrorism		
Fears being victim of terrorism	.149*	.107*
Concern about terrorist attack	.181*	.121*
Government doing all it can	.160*	.087*
Controls		
Age	.005*	.063*
Gender (male)	–.003	–.001
Urban	.052	.050
Tertiary education	–.224*	–.083*
Constant	**1.478**	
Adj R-sq	**.08**	
(N)	**(1,817)**	

* statistically significant at p<.01.

Ordinary least squares regression analysis showing partial (b) and standardised (beta) regression coefficient predicting support for limiting terrorist sympathisers' freedom of speech, measured on a five point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Fears being victim and concern about attack are scored from strongly disagree to strongly agree, and government doing all it can on a three point scale from doing too much to doing all it can. Age is scored in years, gender and tertiary education are scored zero to 1, and urban is a four point scale from rural to inner metro.

Source: AES 2007.

Countering terrorism—
Carl Ungerer

After several years of jihadist terrorist attacks on Western populations from Bali to London, Australians have become more accustomed to the threat of international terrorism. Although Australia has not suffered directly from a terrorist bombing in over 30 years, the survey shows that most Australians now accept the proposition that terrorism is a part of everyday life.

The absence of a terrorist attack on Australian soil, however, has not softened the public's attitude towards stricter counter-terrorism measures. Over forty pieces of legislation have been passed by Federal Parliament since 2001, increasing the powers of domestic security and law enforcement agencies to conduct counter-terrorism operations and restricting the legal rights of terrorism suspects.

Only half (51%) of the respondents to the 2007 survey believed that the government was doing all it could to prevent terrorist attacks in Australia. Nearly 40% believe that the government should do more.

Contradictory forces are at play here. The Rudd Labor government has signaled that it will slow or contract some of the major national security funding initiatives of the previous government, including several related to the counter-terrorism operations of the Australian Federal Police. At the same time, the government is crafting a new national security framework that is expected to broaden the concept of national security beyond a narrow definition of counter-terrorism. The resulting shift in both funding priorities and strategic direction is at odds with the community's belief that more should be done to protect Australia from the threat of terrorism.

As the survey shows, personal concerns about becoming a victim of terrorism are closely related to broader concerns about the national threat. Should terrorists succeed in conducting a major bombing at a metropolitan centre in Australia, the public's demand for further counter-terrorism measures is likely to exceed the government's ability to supply them.

stronger support for searching the houses of people sympathetic to terrorists without a court order; 65% agreed with this proposition, compared to just 6% who disagreed. Also notable is the relatively large proportion (20% on freedom of speech, and 29% on searching houses without a warrant) who expressed no view either way. By any standards, the government's anti-terrorism legislation has strong public support. Moreover, comparisons with US public opinion shows that the Australian public is more supportive of restricting the legal rights of terrorist sympathisers than their US counterparts.[13]

Are the public's views about restricting the rights and freedoms for terrorist sympathisers driven by personal fear of being a victim of terrorism, or by concern about an attack on the country? Studies of the impact of fear of terrorism on public opinion have largely replicated the findings of the fear of crime research. These studies have found that personal fear has a limited impact on evaluations of public policy; by contrast, it is concerns about the national terrorist threat that have a stronger impact on opinions (Huddy et al, 2002; Joslyn and Haider-Markel, 2007). Table 6 tests this proposition by examining the factors that predict support

for limiting terrorist sympathiser's freedom of speech. The independent variables are the three measures of beliefs about terrorism already discussed, and controls for age, gender, urban residence and tertiary education.

The results confirm that it is generalised concerns about a national terrorist attack that are the most important predictor of stronger legal measures against terrorist suspects; the standardised coefficient of 0.121 shows that it is about twice as important as age in the equation. Personal concerns about being a victim of terrorism are of lesser importance, as previous research predicts, but it remains significant and is the second most important predictor in the model. Believing that the government is doing all it can is the third most important predictor. Several of the control variables are also significant. Those supporting stronger legal measures are more likely to be older and less likely to have tertiary education; there are no variations in gender, or geographical location.

In line with most of the advanced democracies, Australians have had to come to terms with the threat of terrorism. Low-probability, high risk events such as major terrorist attacks tend to engender significant changes in attitudes and behaviours among mass publics (Gigerenzer, 2006). These changes among the public are, of course, disproportionate to the risk of directly experiencing such an event. Nevertheless, the government can take some comfort from the survey results, which show that a narrow majority believe they are doing all they can to tackle the problem.

Conclusion

Judged over an extended period, defence and national security remain second order issues for most voters. Nevertheless, what the surveys reveal is the extent to which terrorism now occupies centre-stage in the public's perceptions of security. Half of all voters fear being the victim of terrorism and about two-thirds believe that there will be a major terrorist attack on Australia in the future and are concerned about it. In much the same way that the threat of terrorism is changing defence strategy (Dupont 2003; Hirst 2007), so too is the public gaining a new understanding of the challenges facing defence in the 21st century.

One part of the public's re-evaluation of defence is the perception of threats within the region. During the 20th century these threats came exclusively from nation-states; today, with increasing economic inter-dependence through globalisation, only Indonesia is regarded as a threat by any significant proportion of Australians, and even those figures have shown a decline since the high point of 2001, following the East Timor crisis. There is also some evidence that some voters are interpreting security in economic terms, notably with the rise in the small proportion seeing the United States as a threat to Australia's security.

Another part of the public's re-evaluation of defence and security is relations with the US. While trust in the US to come to Australia's defence and support for the ANZUS treaty remain high, there has been a decline in both measures since the high point reached in the immediate post-9/11 aftermath. This decline has its roots in the very vocal opposition directed towards the Australia–US Free Trade Agreement, and in the increasing unpopularity of the Iraq war. More serious for the long-term health of the alliance is the change that has been occurring through intergenerational shifts. These changes suggest that there may be a reassessment underway in how the public views defence relations with the US, in an era of global terrorism.

Differing views about Australia's involvement in the Iraq war changed the bipartisan consensus on defence policy that dominated the post-Vietnam War period. Defence is now a more partisan issue than at any time in the last 30 years. Initially, after 9/11, the end of bipartisanship benefited the Coalition, which had the advantage of incumbency and were seen by the public to be dealing with the challenges of the day. However, as Labor's policy of withdrawing Australian troops from Iraq attracted widespread public support, the Coalition advantage has now largely dissipated. Terrorism and Iraq have changed the policy landscape with respect to defence and security, and they look likely to do the same for public opinion.

Appendix: The Surveys

The Australian Election Study

The AES has been conducted at each federal election and referendum since 1987 and is designed to collect data on Australian electoral behaviour and public opinion. All but the 1987 and 2007 studies have been funded by the Australian Research Council. The AES routinely collects data among a nationally representative sample of voters. All of the data are publicly available from the Australian Social Science Data Archive at the Australian National University (see http://assda.anu.edu.au). All the studies are national, post-election self-completion surveys with the sample drawn randomly from the electoral register. Two follow-ups have been used (three in 1987). The overall response rates have varied with the most recent survey producing a response rate of 40.2%.

The 2000 Survey of Defence Issues

The 2000 Survey of Defence Issues was conducted between 13 and 20 September 2000 by Roy Morgan Research Pty Ltd and funded by the Department of Defence. The survey used a computer assisted telephone interviewing system. Respondents aged 18 years and over were randomly selected from all states and territories, with the selection of households drawn from the latest edition of the electronic white pages. In order to reduce the non-response bias, a minimum of three call backs were made to each randomly selected household, on different days and at different times. The sample was distributed across states and territories proportionately to the population with quotas set for each state and territory. The data are weighted using Australian Bureau of Statistics data so as to represent the national population.

Appendix table: AES response rates 1987–2007

	Total sample	Moved/ gone away	Refusals/ non-responses	Valid responses	Effective response
1987	3,061	156	1,080	1,825	62.8
1990	3,606	125	1,461	2,020	58.0
1993	4,950	137	1,790	3,023	62.8
1996	3,000	95	1,110	1,795	61.8
1998	3,502	215	1,391	1,896	57.7
2001	4,000	369	1,621	2,010	55.4
2004	4,250	275	2,231	1,769	44.5
2007	5,000	337	2,790	1,873	40.2

The response rate is calculated as: valid responses/(total sample—moved or gone away).

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Endnotes

1 Other evidence to support the more partisan view of defence is the proportion of voters who do not have a view which party is best able to handle the issue. In 1996 33% of voters had no view on which party was best at handling defence, but in 2007 that declined to 14%.

2 It is unclear what the 1996 rise is related to; one possibility is that it is associated with the Sarin gas attack on the Toyko underground in 1995.

3 The 2005 Lowy Institute Poll found that 34% of those interviewed thought the FTA with the United States would be

good for Australia, 34% that it would make no difference, and 32% that it would be bad for Australia. See http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=236

4 In 2004, 30% of voters strongly disapproved of John Howard's handling of the Iraq war, while the figure among those who thought the US was 'very likely' to be a security threat to Australia was 68%.

5 The correlation between the number of threats and seeing ANZUS as important is r=.08 (p<.001), while the correlation with more defence spending is r=0.22 (p<.001).

6 The question used in the AES survey mentions John Howard, so it inevitably encapsulates some partisan overtones. This wording was used in order to replicate a similar question in the American National Election Study which mentioned George Bush's handling of the Iraq war.

7 In March 2004 the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police, Mick Keelty, was criticised by the government for expressing the view that terrorism had increased as a result of Iraq, a view also held, according to the 2004 AES, by 68% of the electorate.

8 For example, there were various attacks on Indian diplomats and interests by Sikhs in the late 1970s; in 1980 the Turkish consul and his bodyguard were assassinated by Armenians; and there have also been various attacks against Israeli diplomats and interests. The main terrorist act on Australian soil was the February 1977 bomb outside the Hilton Hotel in Sydney during the regional Commonwealth Heads of State meeting, which killed three people.

9 Domestic terrorists also killed 198 people in the Oklahoma City bombing and killed five people in the 2001 anthrax attacks.

10 See http://www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm

11 For example, when asked in a May 2007 USA Today/Gallup Poll 'Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling terrorism?', 47% approved, 50% disapproved, and 3% were unsure. Other US polls show very similar results. See http://www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm.

12 See http://www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm The same source cites a CBS/NY Times poll conducted in September 2007 which asked the question 'How likely do you think it is that there will be another terrorist attack in the US in the next few months?' The results found that 9% said 'very likely', 39% 'somewhat likely', 37% 'not very likely', 11% 'not at all likely' and 4% were unsure.

13 In the US, the same question on limiting freedom of speech produced 45% agreement and 50% disagreement, and on searching houses without a warrant, 37% agreement and 61% disagreement. See http://www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm.

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