STRATEGIC INSIGHTS

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Police Join the Front Line

Building Australia's International Policing Capability

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By Elsina Wainwright
(with contributions from John McFarlane)

Executive summary

Australia's northeast arc contains a number of weak states facing many challenges. Their governments are struggling to maintain authority and to provide the conditions needed for economic development, social cohesion and political stability. This fact lies behind many of Australia's security concerns, including transnational crime and the longer-term potential for hostile intrusions into our neighbourhood. In recent years the Australian Government has responded to these concerns by taking on increasing responsibility to help preserve security and stability among our weaker neighbours.

Throughout our immediate region Australia is now working to assist its neighbours to become stable and prosperous. An important part of this assistance is to help to establish or reestablish law and order and build or rebuild local policing capabilities. This is not a job for the Australian Defence Force (ADF). So over recent years the Government has turned increasingly to Australian police to perform these tasks—in East Timor, Solomon Islands, and soon Papua New Guinea. Most of these police have come from the Australian Federal Police (AFP), which also includes the Australian Protective Service (APS) as an operating division. But State and Territory police services have also been engaged.

AFP Officer, accompanied by by RSIP colleagues, patrols the docks at Honiara, August 2003. © AFP.

Their collective performance has been remarkable. Unlike the ADF, however, these services are neither staffed nor resourced for large and sustained international deployments. It is time they were.

More than 7% of the AFP is currently deployed on overseas operations—nearly twice the percentage of the ADF, which stands at less than 4%. All the signs are that this trend will continue. This paper proposes that the Government should respond to these new demands by providing the funds to expand the existing Peace Operations Unit within the AFP into a Peace and Assistance Operations Unit, which also draws on the State and Territory police forces, to provide police trained, equipped and organised for sustained deployments in our neighbourhood. It is estimated that this unit would cost around $120 million per year.

Growing international role

The international role of the AFP is not a new one. The AFP has traditionally supported United Nations and other multinational peace operations. Since 1964, Australia has deployed police to Cyprus as part of the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission; 15 AFP personnel are currently in Cyprus, contributing to the maintenance of law and order in the buffer zone between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. But in the last few years, this international role has grown, and it looks set to remain significant.

Peace and capacity building operations

Australian police have been used increasingly in peace and capacity building operations, particularly in our immediate region—from East Timor, to Solomon Islands, and soon to PNG.

The AFP were deployed to East Timor in 1999 as part of the UN Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), and have played an important role in the successive UN missions in East Timor since that time. Policing is still a critical issue in East Timor—the East Timor police service remains weak, and East Timor faces internal security problems which require an effective police force to address.[1] Nineteen Australian police (AFP and 8 State and Territory Police) are currently on 6-month rotations as part of the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). They are contributing through mentoring and advice to the continued professional development of East Timor's police service.

Australian international police commitments increased further in July last year, when personnel were deployed to Solomon Islands as part of the Regional Assistance Mission to that stricken state. This multinational operation is police-led, as the restoration of law and order in Solomon Islands has been a key priority. Police primacy in such an operation is new for Australian police and is somewhat of a departure from traditional interventions, which have usually been military-led.

There are 145 AFP and 61 Australian Protective Service (APS) personnel currently deployed in Solomon Islands. Their role includes conducting joint patrols and community policing activities with the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP), undertaking criminal investigations, and providing security and guarding services. They are also helping to rebuild the RSIP, and acting as training advisers and in line trainers at the RSIP Police Training facility. These are significant, demanding, and long-term tasks. This police role is part of a broader statebuilding program in Solomon Islands that includes economic governance assistance, and assistance to Solomon Islands' institutions—including the other critical elements of the law and justice sector, the courts and the prisons—and with service delivery capacity. A critical precondition for this operation was that it was at the request of the Solomon Islands Government.

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The Solomon Islands operation signifies a change in Australia's policy towards the South Pacific, to one of more actively supporting the development of stable, prosperous states. Such statebuilding efforts include aid, assistance to strengthen governance, and institution and capacity building efforts in the law and justice sector and in public administration. It therefore involves many government agencies, including the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), Treasury, and the Attorney-General's Department, as well as the AFP.

AusAID's aid and development programs are vital. If aid and governance assistance are insufficient on their own, then some form of mutually agreed strengthened intervention is an option, including the insertion of Australian public servants into Ministries such as Finance and police deployments to help maintain law and order.

The aim is to enhance the capability of local institutions so they can do the job themselves. The goal of overseas police deployments is therefore to finish the job and leave; but commitments need to be of sufficient overall duration to successfully build up that local capability, and to entrench the rule of law. That will sometimes take a number of years. And when deployments finally depart, ongoing local political will is required to sustain the reforms.

This year the Australian Government plans to deploy around 230 Australian police to Papua New Guinea as part of the Enhanced Cooperation Package (ECP) for PNG, to help PNG address governance and law and order challenges. The ECP will also include the placement of up to 64 senior officials in key economic, finance, planning, justice and security agencies. The package therefore seeks to resolve policing issues not just by providing more police but also by addressing the broader machinery of government.

Port Moresby and the Southern Highlands in particular have been racked with violence and gang activity, and there are high levels of corruption and associated white-collar crime in PNG. Australian officers will be appointed to line positions within the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) to assist with the maintenance of law and order and to enhance the professional skills of the RPNGC. The Australian officers will have direct involvement in day-to-day policing with shared command responsibilities.

To complement the resources of the AFP, State and Territory police will provide additional personnel to fulfil the assistance package. This operation will be complex and high risk, and involves dealing with street gangs in the main centres of PNG and well-armed tribal groups in the Highlands. On current estimates, the commitment is expected to last around five years, at a cost of around $160 million per year. Unlike the Solomon Islands operation, there will be no Australian military presence; the police, however, will be armed where necessary.

International law enforcement cooperation

In addition to the increasing number of peace and capacity building operations, the AFP's other international function—international law enforcement cooperation—has also increased markedly in recent years. A team of Australian police officers—including AFP and State and Territory police—was dispatched to Indonesia in October 2002 to assist with the investigations into the Bali bombings. The officers provided forensic, intelligence and investigative assistance to their Indonesian counterparts (PolRI) in the Indonesian-led operation, including bomb/crime site investigation. This team included a State and Territory police contingent, which brought specialised skills such as disaster victim identification. The Indonesian and Australian police cooperated very well, and the investigation yielded swift results. Eight Australian police personnel remain in Bali for the joint investigation, and a further eight are in Jakarta undertaking counter-terrorist investigations.

The AFP's international network of liaison officers consists of 59 personnel at 30 posts in 26 countries, an increase of 40 officers at 24 posts in 21 countries in 2002. In 1998 the AFP's Law Enforcement Cooperation Program (LECP) was established to address transnational crime and terrorism through cooperation and liaison with overseas law enforcement agencies in the Asia Pacific region. Its reach has since expanded to be global.

A stretched organisation

There are currently 245 AFP and 89 APS personnel deployed overseas, out of a total of 3,475 (2,375 sworn and 1,100 unsworn[2]) AFP personnel and 1,257 APS personnel (unsworn). This overseas deployment figure represents over 7% of the total AFP and APS personnel. In contrast, only 4% of ADF personnel are currently on overseas deployment. Even at the height of the Solomon Islands operation, the ADF had 7% deployed overseas.

Unlike the ADF, the AFP is not specifically structured and resourced for international operations. Peace and related operations are not a core function of the AFP, and the organisation has a low level of surge capacity. And unlike the military, the police deployed overseas are all volunteers; State and Territory police and retired officers are also sometimes called upon. The AFP not only needs to provide suitably qualified officers to serve in overseas operations, but also

to maintain appropriate administrative and training support in Australia.

The AFP's increased international commitments are in addition to the host of other activities the AFP performs. These include the enforcement of Commonwealth law—investigating drug crime, fraud, people smuggling and environmental crime—and the provision of regular police services in the ACT and other territories. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11 2001 and in Bali, tasks such as VIP protection and onshore counter-terrorism investigations have also expanded substantially.

The AFP has grown recently in response to all of these demands. The number of AFP personnel has increased by around 200 over the last few years, and the AFP's International Division (which includes the Peace Operations Unit and the international law enforcement activities) in particular has grown significantly. The AFP's budget appropriations have increased from $317 million in 2000–01 to $557 million in 2003–04.[3]

But the demands on the AFP have been growing even faster. Funds remain tied to specific operations such as those in Solomon Islands and PNG, which limits the AFP's commitment of resources to long-term strategic planning. Operations are mounted on an ad hoc, needs-arise basis, and training, while excellent, could be longer and more comprehensive. The police deployment to PNG will be an added strain on already tightly stretched AFP resources.

State and Territory police forces have made valuable contributions to peace and related operations, for example in East Timor, and State and Territory officers are also being deployed this year to Solomon Islands and PNG. They have worked well with the AFP in overseas deployments, and bring community policing and other specialised skills, which complement those of the AFP. The Australian Government provides funding through the AFP for the State and Territory police contingents to meet their pre-deployment, deployment and post-deployment costs. As a result, the State and Territory Governments have generally been favourably disposed to releasing police for overseas duties when required. However, State and Territory police services face onerous demands in their own jurisdictions. They simply cannot provide an ongoing supply of personnel to meet the need. Furthermore, relying on State and Territory police on an ad hoc basis is not in itself a solution.

Underlying strategic trends

Several strategic trends lie behind the Australian Government's increased use of police on the front line of maintaining regional security.

First, the internal conditions of a number of the states in our immediate region have deteriorated over the last few years. PNG and Solomon Islands in particular have faced significant law and order challenges from gang violence to corruption, and provided inadequate service delivery to their populations. They also have weak governance and security institutions—including the police, who have been unable to address the law and order situation themselves, and have sometimes been part of the problem.

Second, there has been growing recognition that the deterioration of our neighbours presents a security challenge to Australia. Throughout the 1990s there was increasing international recognition that a state's internal affairs could have a direct effect on other states in its neighbourhood and beyond; the Balkan wars were a prime example. The September 11 2001 attacks served to heighten global awareness of terrorism and transnational crime, and to highlight state failure as an international security concern. Accordingly, Australia's sensitivity to the internal situation of the states in our neighbourhood has increased.

AFP officer confers with RSIP and Fijian Army counterparts during a regional fact-finding mission, Auki on August 8 2003. © AFP.

Third, there has been increasing awareness of Australia's responsibility to assist its neighbours to become stable and prosperous. Australia has traditionally provided assistance to states in the region after natural disasters such as cyclones. Awareness has grown that as the regional metropole, Australia also has an obligation to assist its neighbours to arrest their internal decline and to have better, more prosperous futures.

Fourth, the international political and intellectual environment has made the idea of engagement in the internal affairs of other states less acutely neuralgic than it has previously been, as international efforts in East Timor, Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrate. The principle of nonintervention is no longer regarded as absolute, and there has been a considerable increase in international statebuilding efforts in weak, failed or post-conflict states.

Fifth, policymakers and the United Nations[4] have become increasingly aware of the importance of civilian police deployments in statebuilding operations—they help to create a culture of law and order and build up local policing capacity in disrupted or post-conflict states. They are also an important support to programs of good governance. A range of development gains have been found to flow from the effective restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, due to the certainty and confidence it brings to the community and the economy. The post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Bosnia and East Timor clearly demonstrate the importance of civilian police deployments. We can therefore expect there to be more international requests for police deployments to disrupted and post-conflict states around the world.

These trends all mean that the recent pattern of high levels of police deployment is likely to continue. Australia therefore needs to build a long-term capability to respond.

The capability gap

As these trends emerged, it became increasingly apparent that a gap existed in Australia's capacity to respond internationally, and that this gap lay between the police and the military. The role of the military is to respond to external aggression and external security threats; the police, clearly, maintain domestic law and order. But it has become increasingly clear that there is a need to assist other states experiencing serious internal security problems to establish, restore or maintain law and order, and to build up the local police so they can do this job themselves.

Australia also has an obligation to assist its neighbours to arrest their internal decline and to have better, more prosperous futures.

Australia has traditionally filled part of this gap with the ADF. When the Pacific Island states became independent, the then Australian Government knew it wanted a presence and a role in these states. The Australian Department of Defence had the resources at its disposal to give us this presence and establish a role. Accordingly, Defence was the main agency used. These states in the main did not have armed forces, so our partners in these defence cooperation activities were usually the police. Australia's Defence Cooperation Program has been used to provide assistance to police forces in Pacific Island states, although the AFP has also provided training to police services and liaison officers to the region over many years. In particular, the Defence Cooperation Program has also been used to fund the Pacific Patrol Boat Program, which provides 22 Pacific Patrol Boats to 12 Pacific Island countries, together with significant ongoing support in training, operations and maintenance.

In 1988, Australia considered deploying an ADF contingent to Vanuatu to help control a major riot threatening the Vanuatu Government—a response more traditionally within the purview of a police force. This planned Vanuatu deployment (which did not occur) was crisis intervention, not long-term policy. But it is an example of how the Australian Government has been drawn to consider using the ADF in ways for which it has not been trained, because it is available and relatively resource-rich.

Australia also used Defence to assist the soon-to-be independent East Timor. Australia helped build up the fledgling East Timor Defence Force, assisting with the construction of training camps, and the provision of equipment and specialist training. While bilateral assistance to East Timor's Defence Force was substantial, the UN has failed to adequately equip, train or resource the East Timor police service. And the new state of East Timor faces internal security issues, which are best and most appropriately addressed by police.

There has been increasing recognition of the urgent need to build up East Timor's police service. The Australian Government is planning to provide $40 million over 4 years for the training and management development of East Timor's police, with AusAID and the AFP each receiving half this amount.

The other foreign policy tool—aid and development—does not effectively fill this capability gap. Aid programs administered by AusAID, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, nongovernmental organisations, churches, and a range of other local and international bodies do a great amount to assist developing states to deal with many challenges. But assisting police forces or other security sector institutions has not traditionally been a key priority for aid and development organisations. In the last few years, this has started to change, as the importance of law and order as a precondition for successful development has become more widely recognised. Still, aid and development programs do not maintain law and order in themselves, and in some situations something more robust is also required.

This capability gap has not been Australia's problem alone. Other states are also wrestling with it. Some states, for example Italy and France, fill the gap with paramilitary police. The UN is still trying to come to terms with the role of civilian police deployments. [5]

Why should the gap be filled with police, rather than with the military? The answer lies in the nature of the tasks and the kind of skills required. The nature of the task should be the main driver—it is important to fit the agency to the task at hand, and not just to give the task to the agency with the most resources. And those agencies given the task should be resourced accordingly.

Both the military and police have important roles to perform in peacekeeping and reconstruction operations, but they are different and complementary. The military role is to establish control, and to prevent warring parties and insurgents from undermining efforts to rebuild a state. The police perform four critical tasks in weak, failing or post-conflict states. The first is to restore and maintain law and order in a community—to prevent anarchy and the rule of gangs or the mob. This requires the creation of a robust rule of law. The second is to assist in the investigation of criminal offences and human rights offences. The third is to build up the indigenous police force so it can then do the job on its own. And the fourth is to instil in local communities a confidence in the rule of law—including in the police and the judicial and correctional processes—and to help create a culture in which force is the last, not the first, resort.

Furthermore, the security challenges in Australia's immediate region are in the main not the threat of an external aggressor. They are mostly internal and transnational security challenges. The causes of criminal violence, civil disorder and coups in states in the region include ethnic and tribal disputes; disputes over land, resources and political power; disaffection on the part of the have-nots; and the uneven distribution of the profits from business and resource development. Transnational criminal challenges in the region include the increasing activities of organised crime groups—drug trafficking, human smuggling, sale of passports, and arms trafficking, as well as serious fraud.

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Responding to these transnational criminal activities and to the internal security challenges is squarely within the purview of the police.

In contrast to the military, policing is predicated on the attributes of negotiable force, discretion, and working within the community by consent.[6] The consent of and a good relationship with the partner government for such policing deployments is also critical —the Solomon Islands and PNG assistance packages would not exist without the agreement and cooperation of the respective partner governments. The need to secure and maintain the agreement of the host country is likely to remain a key principle underlying such operations.

The deployment of police on assistance missions is also less confronting, both to the host country and to other countries in the region. A military deployment implies the projection of force, an issue that could require considerable regional negotiations. A police deployment, on the other hand, does not send the same signals.

Of course, the military continues to play an important role in the region and in such operations as the Solomon Islands assistance mission.

What is the solution?

The AFP has the skills but not the institutional capacity to continue to undertake multiple sustained deployments overseas. It has an increased role, but not the resources to keep fulfilling it effectively.

It therefore makes sense to stop managing peace and law and order assistance deployments one by one, and to structure the AFP to meet the considerable current demands and any others that might come down the track. The AFP's increased international role needs to be built formally into the AFP's organisational structure, and resourced accordingly.

Hence the capacities of the AFP should be augmented by expanding the current Peace Operations Unit into a Peace and Assistance Operations Unit (PAOU). As with the current Peace Operations Unit, this will incorporate the

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UN Peace Operations (such as Cyprus and East Timor), with the non-UN Assistance Operations (such as Solomon Islands, and this year PNG), but it will also boost the AFP's capacity for long-term planning by allowing it to better prepare for ongoing demands and future contingencies.

The establishment of this unit should also form part of a broader strategic review as to the future tasks and needs of the AFP. The organisation has grown as a result of demands, and there is no sign that those demands will decrease. The AFP is being asked to take on more and more tasks, and it is time for another review of their role and future requirements.

Staffing

Clearly the proposed Peace and Assistance Operations Unit should incorporate personnel for the long-term commitments Australia already has—in Solomon Islands, Cyprus, and East Timor—and those in the offing, namely PNG. It also needs to include a surge capacity of trained people available for deployment at short notice should an unexpected situation arise.

The unit should therefore consist of around 550 personnel. This number should include a core group of approximately 200 managers, trainers, support staff, and specialised deployable personnel. The unit should also have the capacity to incorporate 300 AFP personnel on rotation from the rest of the AFP—these personnel could fulfil both deployable and support roles when the demand is there, but could be rotated back into other AFP roles if the demand decreases. Such rotations into the unit would also give many AFP personnel, both sworn and unsworn, the opportunity to experience an overseas deployment. Officers who have been on overseas operations have been able to

build their skills—including decision-making skills—in environments to which they would not normally be exposed.

A unit of this size should allow for overseas deployments of around 12–24 months duration for the deployable personnel, and enable the flexible rotation of personnel throughout overseas deployments. This would give personnel a period of time back in Australia to be with family and if necessary undergo further training prior to redeployment.

This unit should also include a State and Territory component, drawing on up to 50 secondees from the State and Territory police forces. State and Territory police are highly valuable on overseas operations, and bring much-needed specialist skills. There has been no shortage of State and Territory volunteers for such duties in the past. The experience of working together has helped to improve relationships and efficiencies within the Australian policing community and break down long-standing barriers to cooperation.

As is currently the case, State and Territory police officers deployed on police peace operations should have the same salaries and conditions as AFP officers, and be subject to the AFP disciplinary framework for the period of secondment and deployment.

Training

The unit should provide ongoing specialist training, which can build upon the 12-day peacekeeping course the AFP currently runs. This training should include language skills (for example Pidgin), cultural issues, and political and historical briefings, so that the police are ready for the variety of challenges that will confront them when deployed. Developing a good intelligence relationship with local communities is a critical skill, and training in obtaining and using intelligence should be provided. Training for village and bush living and patrols will also be necessary, as well as for urban (sometimes high-risk) operations.

While policing in developing states is in general low key and unproblematic, situations can deteriorate quickly. Situations can unfold on overseas policing operations that are far more severe than those experienced in Australia.

AFP officer and RSIP colleagues patrol the docks at Honiara, August 2003. © AFP.

Australian police on overseas deployments might well need to bring riots and mob violence under control, as has been the case in East Timor. Other challenges might include lack of access to basic communications, effective transport or medical aid. Training should prepare police for all contingencies.

Logistical support

As is currently the case on overseas operations, the unit will also need to be deployed and sustained logistically. There is no requirement for military logistical support, except in Solomon Islands-style rapid deployments. (The PNG deployment will build up slowly.) For long term deployments, police will have logistical support from contractors and also from the local communities.

Capability

Law and order assistance operations are likely to differ in terms of scale, design, duration and objectives, depending on the needs and existing capacities of the affected country's law enforcement agencies. Arrangements for each operation will be at least partly mission-specific, and the infrastructure to support the AFP's capacities will need to build in the flexibility to avoid a 'one size fits all' approach.

Since the circumstances and requirements of each deployment will differ, the question of arms and military assistance should be decided according to the context of each operation. The objective of overseas police deployments should be to move to a community-policing model where police rely on support from the community, and force is a last resort.

This might take a while to achieve, and in the meantime, the police must have protection.

There are two alternatives: either for police to have access to stronger weapon capability, or to have military elements accompany the police. Deployments to high-risk situations without military support may require a greater capability than police currently have on overseas operations—and than they do in Australia. Deployed police should therefore have access to more substantial capability, including riot control equipment. They will also need access to good communications and transport. Clearly there is a balance to be struck between the traditions and values of Australian policing which emphasise community contact rather than force, and the demands of operations in tough environments in which police may well meet military style weapons.

If the situation is judged to be highly dangerous, consideration should be given to military assistance. Military assistance elements could be either from the local military, or from the ADF after negotiation with the host government. (Unless included in the original deployment, the subsequent addition of ADF support would pose considerable difficulties.) Of course, any ADF involvement is likely to be contentious for the host government, and the government's consent and support is absolutely critical, as it is for a policing deployment. Part of the solution could be to have ADF personnel available for deployment with the police or even attached to the police. Alternatively, ADF elements in Townsville could be on short notice for deployment.

Military assistance on police operations poses real but not insuperable command and cultural issues. The police and the military have worked well together in Solomon Islands, but command and control of joint operations remains a challenge. Police operations should be run within a strategic policing framework. To optimise cooperation on joint deployments, key personnel should undertake joint special preparatory command training on the roles, doctrine and procedures used by both the police and the military. A police liaison and planning cell could also be established within the Defence Headquarters Australian Theatre in Sydney.

Cost

The Peace and Assistance Operations Unit will require direct funding from the Australian Government. Working with an approximate figure of $120,000 average cost per capita of AFP personnel, the cost per year of this unit (not including deployments) is broadly estimated to be around $120 million, broken up as follows.

200 core staff—management, training and operational	$24 million
300 AFP personnel on rotation	$36 million
Up to 50 secondees from State and Territory police services	$6 million
Logistical and administrative support, infrastructure, equipment and training costs	$54 million
Total	$120 million

Some of this money can come from the existing police budget, but most of it will likely need to be new funding. Since this cost does not include deployments, this capability will require significant supplementation for major operations. By comparison, Australian aid to PNG is around $330 million per year.

Cooperation

Police deployments depend on working closely with the government and police force of a partner country, and they can serve to improve institutional links between police forces in the region and to build long-term professional peer relationships. These links and relationships could be very valuable in the years ahead, as was demonstrated in Bali.

This enhanced AFP capacity will increase the overall effectiveness of Australia's support in the region. It should be closely linked with the other Australian agencies that also provide support—including AusAID, Treasury and the Attorney-General's Department.

It is also vital that peace and assistance operations in the region are understood by the broader region. Sensitivities must be taken into account, so the operations and Australia's relationships are not undermined by regional concerns about possible Australian intentions.

As is currently the case in Solomon Islands, it makes sense to work where possible with other countries—such as New Zealand and Pacific Islands countries—on such operations. Multilateral operations are likely to be more sustainable and politically acceptable to the region than bilateral ones. Developing a regional policing capability is a good long-term goal, and to this end, the establishment of a regional police training college in Fiji is a welcome development.

Endnotes

1 See ASPI's Report *New Neighbour, New Challenge: Australia and the Security of East Timor*, Canberra, 2002, on the problems facing the new East Timor police service at the time of East Timor's independence in May 2002.

2 Sworn police are federal agents who have sworn an oath. Unsworn police are the enabling staff: public servants engaged under the AFP Act, but who have not sworn an oath.

3 On top of this 2003–04 figure, there is also additional funding not appropriated in the budget, for example separate funding for the Solomon Islands operation. This additional funding takes the AFP's 2003-04 operating budget to $756 million.

4 See the August 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), found at http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/report.htm.

5 In the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Under Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi and his Panel called on Member States 'to each establish a national pool of civilian police officers that would be ready for deployment to United Nations peace operations at short notice, within the context of the United Nations standby arrangements system.' But Member States have not in the main acted upon this recommendation.

6 See A.E. Hills, 'The Policing of Fragmenting States', in *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement*, Vol. 5, No. 3, Winter 1996, pp. 334-354. See also John McFarlane and William Maley, 'Civilian police in UN peace operations: Some lessons from recent Australian experience', in Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel (eds), *United Nations peacekeeping operations: Ad hoc missions, permanent engagement*, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2001, pp. 182–211.

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