

Australian domestic security: The role of Defence

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Given the demands of domestic security in an age of terrorism, Australia must apply all the elements of its national power effectively. Over the last five years the need for greater involvement by Defence in domestic security, both in counter-terrorism and consequence management, has been recognised by the government and the community. While Defence has certainly not dropped its focus on traditional warfighting,

much greater attention has been given to internal missions.

This paper examines the factors that have shaped the Defence organisation's role in Australia's response to the domestic security environment that has emerged since September 11 2001 and suggests that, while progress has been impressive, some further changes are needed.



A Defence liaison officer at the Commonwealth Games Operations Centre talks to a Victoria Police liaison officer, 24 March 2006.
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Background factors

Shifts in Defence domestic security roles have usually occurred in response to actual events on Australian territory, such as the explosive device detonated outside the Sydney Hilton hotel on 13 February 1978 which led to a concerted effort to improve Australia's counter-terrorist capabilities. Pre-9/11, it was sufficient simply to match domestic security capacity to events as they happened. Generally, that capacity was adequate. When it proved inadequate, it was incrementally adjusted in the aftermath of an incident.

Pre-9/11, it was sufficient simply to match domestic security capacity to events as they happened.

Since 9/11, domestic security has presented a much higher profile and major changes in the policy and practice of Defence employment have occurred quickly in an environment that is now much more whole-of-government.

Defence is now part of a domestic security 'orchestra' with numerous other players, and while it is not a lead agency for counter-terrorism and consequence management within Australia, Defence nevertheless has much to contribute to security at home, including some capabilities that are unique in Australia. These range from counter-terrorist assault, bomb disposal, cordon and search, defensive counter-air and maritime protection, aeromedical evacuation, decontamination and intelligence. Defence participates in national terrorism fora such as the National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC) and the Australian Government Counter-Terrorism Committee. Engagement in the new inter-agency environment sees the regular involvement of very senior officials, such as the Deputy Secretary—Strategy and the Commander, Special Operations Command.

A range of factors have influenced Defence's involvement in domestic security, requiring it to balance its conventional warfighting role against an increasing suite of domestic security obligations. The most significant legal factor is the Constitution's assignment of the national defence power to the federal government and the domestic security power to the states and territories, that under the National Counter-Terrorism Plan are the primary responders to a terrorist incident. Some recent changes to Part 111A of the Defence Act, (see box on page 8), have simplified the use of the Defence Force in domestic security roles. In general, however, the law has always allowed the federal government broad discretion in the use of the military in domestic security roles and there is little evidence that legal factors have significantly constrained or directed federal government decisions in that regard.

Only the Australian Government can underwrite the most serious security measures because only it is authorised to maintain military forces. This means that the involvement of Defence in addressing Australia's most serious security challenges is inevitable and that, despite the increasing capabilities of police tactical units, the states and territories will expect the federal government to make Australian Defence Force (ADF) capabilities available in those circumstances.

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due to the increased terrorist threat. This has increased the weight of government responsibilities for domestic security, with a consequent effect on the resources allocated to them, including military capabilities.

In some cases, the increase in capabilities of state governments has reduced the range of circumstances in which Defence support might be required, but has not eliminated the need for ADF support altogether. Where employing the ADF represents the least risk option in addressing a threat, it tends to be the government's preferred course.

In the post-9/11 threat environment, the political risk of failure in responding to a serious domestic security challenge has driven governments to unprecedented measures to guarantee themselves options. This is reflected in investments in crisis and consequence management capabilities.

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The more dangerous the potential outcomes of an incident are, the more critical it is that governments have realistic response options. Treatment options must be readily available and effective. Defence has been seen by government as providing the widest range of options in the highest risk contingencies in the post-9/11 period.

The employment of the ADF in domestic security roles has also acquired a high political value. The creation of ADF capabilities has provided a convincing demonstration of a swift, tangible and credible response to the new terrorist threat. Not only has this reduced the government's risk of being left without options in a dangerous crisis, it has satisfied the electorate's expectations that 'something is being done'.

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Pre-9/11 landscape

Two important areas of security support were identified by a 1997 review of domestic security capabilities. This revealed a shortfall in the national capabilities to respond to chemical, biological and radiological (CBR) threats or incidents and to resolve a terrorist incident taking place on board a ship under way. These shortfalls were assessed as substantial and needing to be addressed quickly. The nature of the ship under way recovery (SUR) capability meant that that shortfall should best be addressed by the ADF. The capability was pursued by the Special Air Service Regiment (SASR).

In the CBR area, the shortfall required capability development by both state authorities and the ADF. The CBR shortfall was identified through an audit of nuclear, biological and chemical defence (NBCD) capabilities conducted within the ADF in 1997–98. This was approached from an ADF operational perspective, and identified key risks associated with anticipated ADF roles in the security of the Sydney 2000 Olympics.

The National Security Committee of Cabinet approved the establishment of a specialist CBR response capability in June 1998. Raised within the CBR Response (CBRR) Squadron of the Joint Incident Response Unit (JIRU), this capability was the focus of a \$23 million project to procure the necessary specialist equipment and training. In addition to the new CBRR capability, the JIRU also concentrated the ADF's technical bomb search and disposal assets.

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The 2000 Olympic Games stimulated the development of significant new ADF capabilities with specific application to domestic security. The acquisition of this capability within eighteen months was a demanding task that could probably only be met by Defence because of its personnel resources, access to international technology expertise and in-house training, procurement and research and development capacities.

In all, over 4,000 ADF personnel were assigned to Operation GOLD, the Games support effort, making it the second-largest ADF operational deployment since Vietnam (after the INTERFET deployment to East Timor in 1999–2000). The majority of ADF personnel were involved in security tasking.

These included a Tactical Assault Group (TAG) with supporting helicopters, the JIRU, an Operational Search Battalion (raised from the Army Reserve) and Navy clearance divers, as well as an extensive network of liaison officers to provide coordination with civilian agencies. In addition to the novel expertise established within JIRU, new capabilities developed for Operation GOLD included a second TAG (supplementing the one that had been maintained since the early 1980s), SUR and a scientific advice capability for managing the consequences of a chemical or biological attack.

Operation GOLD involved an escalating commitment over two years from late 1998. At the operation's end, most of the additional capability established was dispersed, with only a residual CBRR capability being retained in an independent Squadron, based at Holsworthy.

Post-9/11 developments

Defence involvement in domestic security after the 9/11 attacks was focused initially on a precautionary increase in the security of Defence establishments within Australia. On 13 September 2001, only two days after the al-Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington, Defence had, however, commenced immediate planning to raise a second Tactical Assault Group, based on the east coast in Sydney.

A decision to effectively double the counter-terrorist capabilities of the Special Forces, including the re-creation of part of the CBRR capabilities of the JIRU with an Incident Response Unit (IRU), was officially announced on 1 October 2001. This was followed in March 2002 with a decision to establish the new incident response capability as the Incident Response Regiment (IRR).

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Operational involvement of the ADF in domestic security roles remained on a standby basis until February 2002, when that year's Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) was held in south-east Queensland. Operation GUARDIAN II included the use of ADF counter-terrorism, search and CBRR capabilities. Defence support to CHOGM also reflected the new terrorist threats of the post-9/11 era, with the RAAF providing F/A-18 fighters for defensive counter-air coverage for the meeting.

The rapid momentum of Defence domestic security capability development continued in September 2002 with the formal launch of the IRR and the new TAG (TAG East). This was followed, in the aftermath of the October 2002 Bali bombings, by the creation



Members of the Tactical Assault Group (East) (TAG(E)) keep a watchful eye on the city of Melbourne from Blackhawk helicopters, 19 October 2005.
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of a two-star Special Operations Command (SOCOMD), which assumed command of all specialist ADF counter-terrorism capabilities including the new IRR.

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The tempo of Defence involvement in domestic security operations continued in April 2003 when the ADF's SUR capability was employed in the successful boarding and seizure of a North Korean ship suspected of drug smuggling. Later in the year Operation SCRUMMAGE provided support to the Rugby World Cup. 2003 saw the development of the Reserve Response Force (RRF), which

consisted of six groups of around 150 Army Reservists organised and trained to perform simple security tasks, such as low risk search, for domestic security purposes. Late in 2003, fighter counter-air coverage was provided again for the visits of US President Bush and Chinese President Hu under Operation MIATA.

Domestic security-related structural adjustments to Defence turned to the maritime environment in December 2004 with the establishment of the Joint Offshore Protection Command (JOPC) in collaboration with Australian Customs. JOPC, recently renamed the Border Protection Command, is intended to improve the coordination of Defence support to maritime security, with special emphasis on maritime counter-terrorism.

Melbourne hosted the 2006 Commonwealth Games in March. Like the earlier Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, the conduct of the Melbourne Games included a major protective security operation to which the ADF was a significant contributor.

Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games

ADF support for the Games—named Operation ACOLYTE—involved some 2,600 personnel in a range of security and non-security roles. Operation ACOLYTE was the largest ADF operation mounted in support of an Australian domestic event since 9/11. Most of the support provided was security-related.

Defence security support requirement for Operation ACOLYTE consisted of a counter-terrorist assault capability, including helicopters, maritime counter-terrorism and defensive counter-air capabilities, and bomb management resources, including operational and technical high risk search (THRS), explosive detection dogs (EDDs), bomb disposal (improvised explosive device disposal—IEDD), CBRR and underwater search. The operational security elements were therefore composed of:

A Special Forces Task Group (SFTG), consisting of:

- a TAG drawn from the newly-raised 4th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (Commando) (4 RAR) and supporting elements
- CBRR Squadron from the IRR
- Special Forces Aviation Element (171st Aviation Squadron) equipped with Black Hawk helicopters.

An Engineer Task Group (ETG) based on the Headquarters of the 3rd Combat Engineer Regiment and consisting of:

- THRS Squadron
- an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Troop, providing IEDD teams on a similar model to the JIRU teams for Operation Gold
- an EDD Troop.

A Security Task Group (STG) providing a substantial low risk ('operational') search capability. This was drawn largely from Regular Army units in Brisbane, Army

Reserve Response Force (RRF) elements from Sydney and Melbourne and from Royal Australian Air Force Reserve units Australia-wide.

- An Underwater Task Group (UWTG), consisting of Clearance Divers and a mine hunter coastal, HMAS Norman.
- A Maritime Task Group (MTG), consisting of the amphibious landing platform ship HMAS Manoora and the ANZAC frigate HMAS Warramunga. These ships also supported the SUR capability provided by the Special Forces Task Group.
- An Air Task Group (ATG) provided by the Royal Australian Air Force, consisting of F/A-18 Hornet aircraft, air-to-air refuelers and a deployable radar.

This operational support was enabled by a Logistics Task Group (LTG), drawn from Army Reserve logistics units, and by a Military Police Task Group (MPTG) drawn from the Army's 1st Military Police Battalion.

Command and control arrangements differed from previous operations in that all ADF support operations were commanded by a single Joint Task Force (JTF) HQ. ADF personnel were not integrated into state police planning or command and control arrangements to the same extent as in previous operations.

The conduct of Operation ACOLYTE indicated that Defence involvement in the security of major domestic events is maturing. The capabilities being provided for event security are more consistent: fewer new capabilities are being added with each successive operation and Defence support contributions tend to be drawn from standing capabilities, such as the IRR, rather than ad hoc structures, developed at the last minute. Where ad hoc capabilities are raised, the process tends to draw on experience and equipment from previous operations.



An Australia Defence Force officer and his explosive detection dog are responsible for clearing vehicles at the Commonwealth Games Village of explosives.
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Pre- and post-9/11 Defence provision for domestic security

Capability	Pre-9/11	9/11 until 2006
Crisis and Consequence Management		
Tactical Assault Groups	1	2
CBR Response Elements	1 Squadron (c. 80 personnel)	1 Regiment (c. 300 personnel)
Reserve Response Forces	0	6
Science and Technology		
CBRN for Domestic Preparedness	1 Research Task within a DSTO Research Area	1 Section within a dedicated DSTO Division
Higher Defence Staff Arrangements		
Emergency Management Australia Branches	1	0 (EMA moved from Defence to Attorney-General's 26 November 2001)
Domestic Security Staff Sections	0	2
Counter-IED Task Forces	0	1
ADF secondees to PM&C National Security Division	0	1
Doctrine		
Doctrine for Domestic Event Support Operations	0	Under development
Education and Training		
Terrorism-related ADFA courses	0	2

Recent amendments to relevant legislation earlier this year (see box below) have acted to increase government discretion in providing Defence support to the states for domestic security tasks, rather than to limit the government's ability to employ the ADF when necessary.

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support operations, especially in the areas of low risk search. The use of reservists in these roles provides useful mass and minimises the distraction of high-readiness permanent forces from their focus on warfighting and offshore deployments.

The new High Readiness Reserve (HRR) scheme could create opportunities to hold Reservists at relatively high readiness for more demanding domestic security tasks, such as technical bomb search and disposal, that are currently limited to permanent forces. It may also be that, as the likelihood of ADF personnel being used to assist public order in a domestic crisis appears to increase, people who are themselves 'members of the public' most of the time, would provide a more empathetic ADF presence than members of the permanent forces. Reservists are effectively 'pre-deployed' in communities

New Defence legislation

Legislation enhancing the ADF's ability to provide domestic security support to civil authorities was approved by Parliament in February this year. Although identified as part of a statutory review process, the impending Commonwealth Games provided the trigger to push these changes through. The Defence Act 1903 was amended in the lead-up to the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games to include a new Part 111AAA. This provides additional powers and protections for ADF personnel responding to an incident that is beyond the capacity of civil authorities to resolve and gives the ADF the legal authority to use reasonable force during domestic security operations.

The 2006 amendment legislation extends these powers to aviation and maritime security and protecting critical

infrastructure. The primacy of the state and territory authorities and retention of the military chain of command is central to the changes. Specifically, the amendments remove restrictions on the use of the reserves in support of domestic security, ensure the ADF's powers under the Defence Act can be applied to mobile terrorist threats and provides for expedited call-out in the case of a rapidly developing threat, including conducting operations against air threats and incidents in offshore areas. The changes enable the Prime Minister or other authorising ministers to call out the ADF via verbal order. The ADF would still only be called out as a last resort, would only be able to use reasonable and necessary force and its personnel would remain subject to the law and accountable for their actions.

and bring a set of skills and life experience that may suit them better to domestic security roles.

Wider employment of ADF Reserves would, however, not be without problems.

Wider employment of ADF Reserves would, however, not be without problems. Consequence management arrangements will continue to rely heavily on the services of unpaid volunteers, such as the State Emergency Services, and major investment in a relatively small number of paid reservists could be perceived as inequitable. The civilian skills of some specialist Reservists, such as medical staff and those in the emergency services, may also be demanded in their civilian capacity in the event of a crisis. This, combined with Australia's historical reluctance to 'call out' the Reserves for compulsory service, could leave their availability in a crisis questionable.

The post-9/11 experience of Defence involvement in Australia's domestic security has been hectic. Operational tempo and rates of capability development have accelerated enormously. This shift began less than twelve months after the release of the current 2000 Defence White Paper, although the only obvious connection between the post-9/11 adjustments and the force structure directions implied in Defence 2000 was a single-line entry in the 2000 Defence Capability Plan that provided funding for the development of the CBRR Squadron that was to maintain the residual capability from the JIRU.

Supporting domestic security

An important development in the domestic security intelligence function is the National Threat Assessment Centre (NTAC), established

within ASIO as a specific post-9/11 initiative. Defence seconded Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) personnel into the NTAC.

Defence has performed an enabling role in the intelligence assessment mission by providing training for civilian intelligence analysts. The Defence Intelligence Training Centre, for example, has developed and delivered a customised training course to the New South Wales Police Service in support of the establishment of an intelligence capability within its new Counter-Terrorism Co-ordination Command.

Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) collaborates with the National Institute of Forensic Science to establish Australian forensic laboratory capabilities applicable to CBRN. DSTO is also involved in the development of 'taggants' for explosives that would facilitate investigations of illegal use, supporting Australia's international obligations under a recently signed treaty.

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With the post-9/11 heightened awareness of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats has come an increased interest in disease control, health and medical services as part of Australia's domestic security arrangements. DSTO has a growing role in the associated national science and technology efforts, such as the Public Health Laboratory Network, especially in the context of CBRN attacks. DSTO is also undertaking work in countering improvised explosive devices

(IED) and man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), biometrics, critical infrastructure protection modelling, exercise scenario development and intelligence support tools.

The frequency of special events requiring Defence security support appears to be increasing post-9/11: there were four in 2002–2006 (CHOGM, the Bush/Hu visits, the Rugby World Cup and Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games) and at least two more are expected in the next few years (APEC 2007 and the World Youth Day 2008). Planning for Defence support to APEC is already under way as Operation DELUGE and support to World Youth Day would appear likely. While the confluence of special events in the 2001–2008 timeframe could be an aberration, Australian cities do appear to be competing harder and more successfully to host international events. It would therefore be prudent to provide for continued Defence support at the current levels.

The relatively long lead times associated with most special events and mass gatherings tend to facilitate Defence support. The establishment of new ADF capabilities, such as the RRFs, may also have eased the provision of that support in some cases by creating formed bodies of personnel with relevant skills, such as operational low risk search. These could also provide options for short-notice requirements.

Public visibility of Defence capabilities reassures Australians of the effectiveness of security measures.

Public visibility of Defence capabilities reassures Australians of the effectiveness of security measures. The public launch of security measures for the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games, which included disclosure of the number of ADF personnel involved, coincided with public commentary about Games security after the July 2005 attacks on the London public transport network.

In terms of response, the Defence role in national preparedness and prevention for domestic security purposes has changed significantly in the post-9/11 period due to the movement of Emergency Management Australia (EMA) from Defence to Attorney-General's. EMA's important coordination role no longer falls to Defence, although Defence still supports EMA by providing a logistic back-up for the replenishment of disaster earmark stores and the maintenance of radiological detection equipment.

Defence's role in benchmarking some security capabilities has declined. National IEDD capabilities, for example, once reflected the ADF benchmark. The first bomb disposal

ADF special event support operations, 1956–2006

1956–2000	2001–2006
Melbourne 1956 Olympics	Operation GUARDIAN (CHOGM 2002)
Brisbane 1982 Commonwealth Games	Operation SCRUMMAGE (Rugby World Cup 2003)
Brisbane Expo 88	Operation MIATA (Presidents Bush/Hu visits, 2003)
Operation GOLD (Sydney 2000 Olympic Games)	Operation ACOLYTE (Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games)
Total: 4	Total: 4
Average Frequency (Years): 11	Average Frequency (Years): 1.25

robot provided to state police bomb squads in the 1980s was the ADF's Echidna. By late 2004 these needed replacement urgently. A new machine, the tEODor, was selected by a civilian police panel and introduced into service in early 2005. The ADF subsequently selected the tEODor as the replacement for its Echidnas.

Despite the significant increase in special recovery capabilities in some state police forces, the ADF continues to provide the high end national capability in that area (see box on page 12).

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ADF support to domestic security in the post-9/11 period has focused on people, technology and partnerships. A little-understood ADF contribution to the people enabling function continues to be



Army Reserve soldiers prepare to search a drain under the centre of the Melbourne Cricket Ground. The soldiers are participating in the security search and lockdown of the venue prior to the commencement of the Melbourne Commonwealth Games, 11 March 2006. © Department of Defence

through the influence of its 'diaspora'. The influence of this 'soft' form of involvement in domestic security may be growing. Post-9/11 appointments to important national security posts within the government, as well as recruitment to security-related roles in industry, have featured a number of ex-ADF people with scarce skills and experience relevant to domestic security. Australia's reliance on ADF skills for domestic security functions is increasing.

Support to the technology function is mostly through DSTO's involvement in domestic security science and technology. The most obvious contribution is the unique capabilities of the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Defence Centre (CBRNDC) within the

Human Protection and Performance Division: for example, through its provision of 'smart buyer' advice to civilian agencies acquiring technical CBRN response equipment. The CBRNDC is also contributing to the development of national CBR-related forensic and health capabilities.

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The ADF has contributed to other agencies' capability development by performing a benchmarking function in some key areas, as demonstrated by New South Wales' rapid development of sophisticated response and

Response and recovery assets added since 9/11

There have been a number of enhancements to Defence counter-terrorism capabilities to provide much more robust capacity to support the response and recovery mission for domestic security.

- A two-star Special Operations Command with a simultaneous staff presence in Sydney (co-located with Headquarters Joint Operations Command) and Canberra, to support the national crisis management processes.
- A second TAG, TAG East, lodged within the 4th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (Commando) at Holsworthy in western Sydney. The creation of a second TAG significantly shortens the response time for an incident on the eastern seaboard and provides a capability to respond to two incidents simultaneously.
- An Incident Response Regiment, grown from the post-JIRU CBRR Squadron. This is also located at Holsworthy. The IRR provides the national high-end CBRN and explosive response capability, including consequence management, as well as a limited capability for urban search and rescue.
- Six Reserve Response Forces (RRFs), each of 156 personnel. RRFs are based in most capitals and are available at twenty-eight days notice for simple security support tasks such as operational search.

Counter-terrorism forces continue to include a Black Hawk helicopter squadron as well as the national SUR, counter-terrorism liaison and classified technical support capabilities. The command and control capacity of the force has been enhanced by the creation of SOCOMD.

recovery capabilities since 9/11. The ADF's provision of certain high-end capabilities for the Olympics provided New South Wales with another advantage in its subsequent capability development, by completing in advance much of the time-consuming trial and error work, such as equipment sourcing and trials, training development and procedure refinement. ADF support gave New South Wales agencies extensive exposure to elaborate military capabilities, especially those of the TAG (special recovery) and JIRU (CBRR and THRS).

The major Defence capability projects still reflect, appropriately, the ADF's 'core business' of warfighting.

Trends in ADF support post-9/11

Although the ADF has made some significant investments in domestic security-related capabilities since 9/11, these tend to be on the margins in terms of both overall capital cost and where they are lodged in the Force. The major Defence capability projects still reflect, appropriately, the ADF's 'core business' of warfighting. The Army's Hardened and Networked Army (HNA) initiative is an example. Intended to fundamentally change the nature of the Australian Regular Army from a light infantry to a light armoured force, the project itself defines what the Army considers important. Significantly, there is no specific provision for domestic security in the HNA, which is optimised for 'complex warfighting' offshore. However, there is an implicit recognition of a domestic security role for the Army Reserves.

Similarly, the flagship projects of the Navy and RAAF do not address domestic security requirements. While it would be misleading to base an assessment of the importance of domestic security solely on the value of major

acquisition projects, the way the Services promote themselves to both internal and external audiences, suggests that the ADF has yet to embrace domestic security tasks as core business.

The ADF continues, however, to maintain domestic security capabilities that are unique, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

The ADF continues, however, to maintain domestic security capabilities that are unique, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The composition of the capability set has changed somewhat with some skills, such as IEDD, declining in importance, while others, such as fighter air cover, have been added. The ADF continues to fulfil domestic security roles in areas in which its 'normal' military capabilities are similar to those needed for a particular domestic security mission. New capabilities include aeromedical evacuation for mass burns situations or overseas terrorist incidents involving Australians.

International expectations of government performance in domestic security have increased since 9/11.

International expectations of government performance in domestic security have increased since 9/11. Security for the Athens 2004 Olympic Games cost at least US\$1.5 billion, compared with declared costs of approximately \$150 million and \$400 million for the Atlanta and Sydney Games, respectively, in the pre-9/11 period. The cost of security for the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games, involving less than half the facilities, people or television audience of an Olympics, was \$160 million.

The Incident Response Regiment (IRR)

The IRR's strength is publicly stated as being around 300. The unit's personnel are divided among: Headquarters; Scientific and Technical element staffed by DSTO; a 'CBRR Squadron' able to render safe CBR devices, conduct decontamination, treat casualties, and provide advice on CBR agents and materials; and an Emergency Response Squadron. This is essentially a firefighting capability that includes capacity for aircraft crash rescue, urban search and rescue and hazardous material response. The unit is normally based largely at Holsworthy Barracks in Sydney, with emergency response elements also located at Darwin, Townsville and Oakey. Although chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear emergency response (CBRNER) elements might be pre-positioned elsewhere for special tasks, they would respond to all 'no-notice' tasks from Holsworthy.

Of a total unit strength of 300 personnel, a smaller number would be available to respond to a CBRNE incident. A figure of 150 is more likely to represent the total personnel available for CBRNER tasking. The CBRNER capability that IRR would be likely to be able to generate for domestic tasks would consist of a capacity to respond at relatively short notice to two CBRN incidents near-simultaneously. The 'standing' notice is probably a matter of hours for the first team dispatched, with a somewhat longer period for the second team. With appropriate lead-time, the standing notice to move could be reduced for restricted periods in response to specific threats, but very short notice could not be sustained indefinitely.

Rapid response to incident sites outside Sydney would not be possible unless response elements were pre-positioned. The Regiment's ability to contribute effectively to the time-critical 'crisis' phase of a 'no-notice' CBRN incident arising outside Sydney would be negligible. This is because a very rapid response is most important in

the pre-detonation/pre-release phase of an incident involving a CBRN dissemination device; and in the immediate aftermath of a chemical release. These are crisis situations that are regarded as requiring a 'lights and sirens' response. As an incident proceeds further into its consequence phase, speed of response has less impact on the outcome. The unit would be able to contribute a small but high-quality capability to supplement state and territory resources in long-term consequence management, although this would come at the cost of short-notice response capacity. The paucity of current nuclear weapon expertise in the Australian scientific community would also cast doubts on its nuclear, as distinct from radiological, device disposal capabilities.

In a no-notice CBRN incident, only Sydney would benefit from the IRR's crisis management capabilities: for other areas, the government's CBR Enhancement Program has done more to improve crisis response capabilities than the creation of the IRR. The unit offers little in the management of no-notice high-yield explosive incidents anywhere, beyond what civilian agencies could achieve. There has thus been a tendency to overstate the unit's value in the most likely type of CBRNE attack—a no-notice event—especially if that event were to occur outside Sydney.

Although the IRR's tactical utility in a no-notice domestic crisis might be limited, its contribution to Australia's overall capability is considerably larger. Collaborative training with the states and continued IRR-sponsored research and development have performed a national benchmarking role that has benefited the whole country. The IRR's impressive capabilities are also appreciated by countries in our region. The associated interest in training collaboration has provided new international engagement opportunities that contribute further to Australia's security.

Despite the capability enhancement undertaken by most states and territories, their expectations of Defence contributions to their domestic security have increased.

Despite the capability enhancement undertaken by most states and territories, their expectations of Defence contributions to their domestic security have increased. This has been exacerbated in some cases by the policy, adopted over the last twenty years, of basing military forces in northern Australia. The Victorian Government, which lost all locally based Regular Army combat units, has suggested that such units should be returned in order to better support its domestic security requirements.

In the case of sophisticated response capabilities involving demanding and highly perishable skills, such as special recovery, the maintenance of the national capability within the ADF represents the lowest risk option for government. An alternative would be to develop a federal capability outside the ADF: special recovery could, for example, be established within the Australian Federal Police (AFP).

While the AFP has a small tactical unit, the risk involved in rapidly developing an elaborate national capability virtually from scratch in a relatively small organisation with a limited experience base weighs heavily against this course of action. The total strength of the AFP and Australian Protective Service is 4,989 personnel, of whom only about half are employed in the type of duties that might prepare officers for selection for specialist training in demanding areas such as special recovery. This contrasts the ADF's regular strength of 51,813. The AFP would struggle

to staff a high-end national special recovery capability from within its current strength.

The states' need for Defence security support when hosting major international events is demonstrated by the consistency with which Defence is called to provide that support. (See table on page 16.)

The impact of state resource considerations on the national response to the post-9/11 environment has been to ensure that the Australian Government retains at its disposal capabilities necessary to meet its responsibilities for domestic security, including in areas that would normally be a state or territory responsibility.

Specific Defence elements that have demonstrated particular utility and effectiveness in recent times will attract sustained investment, as demonstrated by the predominant place of Special Forces in post-9/11 force structure development. The ADF will also be favoured when there is a need to develop new capabilities.

Government is attracted to using the ADF because it projects strength.

Government is attracted to using the ADF because it projects strength. There is a high degree of public respect for the ADF. This image supports a public view that with Defence involved, security on the homefront is in capable hands. Decisions on the employment of the ADF in domestic security post-9/11 have therefore been influenced by the political necessity of demonstrating effectiveness in the face of national security threats.

Defence support to special events 2000–2006

Characteristic/Capability	Operation					
	Gold (2000)		Guardian (2002)		Acolyte (2006)	
Leading government	State		Federal		State	
ADF personnel involved	5,622		2,400		2,600	
ADF support:	Provided	Used ¹	Provided	Used	Provided	Used
Security:						
Special recovery:						
TAG	X		X		X	
CBRRR	X		X		X	
Special operations aviation	X		X		X	
Ship underway recovery	X		X		X	
Defensive counter-air			X		X	
Bomb management:						
Operational planning ²	X	X	X	X		
Search planning	X	X	X	X	X	X
Low risk search	X	X	X	X	X	X
Technical high risk search	X	X	X	X	X	X
Underwater search	X	X	X	X	X	X
Explosive detection dogs	X	X	X	X	X	X
Improvised explosive device disposal	X	X	X		X	
Bomb Management Coordination Centre	X	X	X	X	X	
General support aviation	X	X				
Non-security:						
Transport	X	X				
Facilities access	X	X			X	X
Venue logistics management	X	X				
Venue communications coordination					X	X
Ceremonial	X	X			X	X

1. Support was used if it received real operational tasking; for example, IEDD was employed if an ADF team was dispatched on a real event security task.
2. Operational planning support refers to actual Defence membership of the responsible jurisdiction's security planning teams for the event.

Next steps

Government decisions on the employment of Defence in domestic security in recent years have been made for both pragmatic and political reasons. Given the importance of effective domestic security measures, and the desire to maintain public confidence in the government's handling of national security, this is unlikely to change while the perceived threat level prevails.

Over the last five years Defence has been heavily engaged in the war on terrorism and other external missions as well as undertaking internal transformation. Over that period Defence has expanded its involvement in domestic security and the ADF is better prepared for such tasks than it was prior to 9/11. To continue this process there are, however, ten further steps that should be taken.

1. Develop a Defence domestic security strategy

Defence will need to grapple with a range of issues in its future contribution to domestic security missions. These include health

(aeromedical evacuation, medical support, quarantine), CBRN (beyond the current IRR capability), cordon and search in response to specific threats, critical infrastructure protection, urban search and rescue, border protection and short and no-notice incidents.



Black Hawk helicopters land after fast-roping members of the Tactical Assault Group (East) onto the Queenscliff-Sorrento ferry during counter-terrorist exercises, 12 October 2005. © Department of Defence

There are indications that the 'Defence of Australia' concept now includes a much broader set of threats and responses. Defending Australia now encompasses the challenges of regional stabilisation, but given the new challenges in protecting the homeland from terrorist attack and on mitigating the consequences of any successful attacks that do occur, there is a strong case that 'Defence of Australia' should also include domestic security.

A dedicated strategy for Defence support to domestic security should be developed. This would outline the vision for Defence domestic security capabilities and roles and prioritise ADF efforts. Such a process would also serve to audit the various forms of domestic security support that Defence provides that may be just as effectively provided by state police forces. The strategy will make it easier for Defence to integrate planning and operational capabilities for domestic security more fully into its processes. The appointment of a high level official within Defence to direct efforts within the domestic security arena should be considered.

Defence cannot develop a domestic security strategy in isolation...

Defence cannot develop a domestic security strategy in isolation: the 'whole-of-government' diversity of actors and agencies here demands a comprehensive national domestic security strategy, from which Defence's subordinate strategy should be derived. The new NCTC process, if engaged forcefully, could provide the focus for a broader and more comprehensive national domestic security strategy.

In the absence of robustly derived benchmarks supported by appropriate metrics, sound capability judgements are extremely difficult.

2. Determine capability benchmarks

Australia currently lacks a process whereby the capability requirements of domestic security missions are determined and responsibility for developing and maintaining those capabilities is allocated in a verifiable and enforceable manner. This relates especially to response and recovery capabilities, in which there are indications of significant variations among the civilian jurisdictions and the ADF. In the absence of robustly derived benchmarks supported by appropriate metrics, sound capability judgements are extremely difficult.

There are good operational security reasons for the details of capability benchmarks to be classified, but they should exist. The operations research skills of DSTO could be applied readily to the development of benchmarks and appropriate metrics. With these, it should be possible to gauge accurately the resource requirements of each capability, to set agreed capability levels for the various jurisdictions to maintain, to measure performance in maintaining those levels, and to determine the additional capability that the Australian Government must maintain in fulfilment of its constitutional obligations. Synergies should also be easier to identify and monitor, informing judgements on the migration of capabilities and associated benchmarking responsibilities between the jurisdictions. A benchmarking regime will also inform decisions as to when the ADF can relinquish responsibility for some roles, passing them instead to capable civilian agencies.

There are indications that a benchmarking framework is being approached incrementally...

There are indications that a benchmarking framework is being approached incrementally, with the first area being individual training. For example, the national accreditation of some applicable police skills, such as bomb response and explosive detection dog handling. Much more needs to be done. Other aspects of capability, such as personnel numbers, equipment, doctrine and skills currency also need to be codified and auditable. The benefit of an effective benchmarking system will be the ability to formalise capability levels and expectations between the federal and the other jurisdictions. As a supporting actor in domestic security, this is in Defence's interest.

The National Security Division in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet

is best placed to coordinate benchmarks, working in close collaboration with the Protective Security Coordination Centre.

3. Strengthen special event security

The constant stream of high-profile international events scheduled to be held in Australia over the next few years will generate recurrent requirements for surge support to the civilian jurisdictions. This will ensure that the ADF remains a major contributor to special event security and may lead to further structural adjustments and doctrinal development to address those requirements.

If there is sustained state and territory investment in domestic security capabilities, the Australian Government's liability to maintain those capabilities on behalf of the states may reduce, with a consequent reduction in demand for Defence support. This is unlikely, however, to eliminate the requirement for Defence support, especially in the smaller jurisdictions with fewer resources.



Two 77 Squadron F/A-18 Hornets fly training combat air patrols over Melbourne during the lead up to the 2006 Commonwealth Games, 12 March 2006.
© Department of Defence

There should be some standardisation of procedures for federal government, including Defence, support to major international events held in the various jurisdictions.

There should be some standardisation of procedures for federal government, including Defence, support to major international events held in the various jurisdictions. Despite the relative frequency of these in recent years, there is still evidence of an ad hoc approach in negotiating and designing the support arrangements for each. Under these circumstances inefficiencies are inevitable, as important lessons are re-learned by different people.

Given the virtual inevitability of Defence involvement in aspects of major event security, there are two initiatives that should be considered. First, the merit of assigning standing responsibilities for special event support to a designated agency should be evaluated and, if appropriate, implemented. This will reduce ad hocery and ensure that relevant experience is retained. This could be an appropriate task for an Army Reserve organisation, given adequate Regular supplementation.

Second, standardised Defence special event support 'packages,' with supporting doctrine, should be developed. These will make planning easier for both the ADF and the supported jurisdiction. Packages should specify quantitative and qualitative capability levels, command and control arrangements, logistic support requirements and, where appropriate, costs. A capability benchmarking system would support this effort in the long term, but the significant experience that has been gained recently should enable initial packages to be developed without one.

4. Upgrade the role of reserves

We should be finding a more relevant role for our reserve forces in domestic security. As suggested above, a reserve organisation could be appointed for special event security doctrine development as well as training in consequence management.

The local knowledge and local identity of reservists gives them distinct advantages in dealings with their communities. They know the area in which they will conduct operations. Army Reserve units are located around Australia and domestic security roles provide an opportunity for them to be seen to play an active role in their local community. Legal changes passed this year allow the reserves to be tasked more effectively for domestic security tasks. Reserve forces can now operate under different categories of service. The newly created high readiness reserve categories, added to the long-standing arrangements for individual contracts for periods of continuous full-time service, now allow greater opportunities to employ reservists in domestic security.

Potential roles include maritime surveillance, special event security and mass gathering protection, communications and community liaison, and critical infrastructure protection.

Potential roles include maritime surveillance, special event security and mass gathering protection, communications and community liaison, and critical infrastructure protection. Defence is unlikely ever to have the resources to establish extensive, dedicated domestic security capabilities within its Reserve forces and permanent assignment of reservists to such roles would significantly reduce the

attractiveness of Reserve service for most. Appropriate use of the Reserves in domestic security roles such as Reserve fire and medical units could nevertheless bring significant benefits and community recognition of those benefits would assist recruitment and retention. Any increased role for the Reserves, however, should avoid encouraging the states to transfer risk and cost to the Australian Government by leaving their own capabilities under-developed.

5. Review professional military education

While initiatives such as the RRFs have brought domestic security roles to the attention of the Reserves, formal military education in such roles is still lacking. This may reflect the extent to which they are perceived as the core business of the ADF. Professional education within the ADF needs to embrace domestic security much more. There is scope for integrating police and emergency services personnel into the Australian Defence College's curricula as well as into appropriate parts of the single service educational regimes. A major opportunity for Defence to contribute to national domestic security capacity is through sharing its significant skills in operational and strategic planning, as well as testing those domestic security strategies through exercises and simulations.

6. Emphasise local liaison and relationships

Defence invests little in developing standing relationships with local law enforcement and emergency response communities. Responsibility for local liaison rests with the Corporate Support and Infrastructure Organisation, rather than with the operational side of the ADF, and such work is rarely perceived as 'first eleven' material. The practice of constantly rotating personnel through these positions inhibits the development of strong professional

relationships. Regional liaison positions should be accorded a high priority in military career management systems. A greater emphasis on local liaison arrangements would yield enormous benefits in a crisis.

7. Undertake doctrine development

In recent years, the work of the ADF's various force development 'think tanks' in advancing 'core' military capabilities has been impressive. That intellectual effort has not yet been turned to domestic security to the same extent. The work priorities of agencies such as the Army's Land Warfare Studies Centre should reflect an appropriate emphasis on domestic security challenges.

Defence can never lose its primary focus on war fighting, but a shift in culture is needed...

8. Adapt Defence culture

The impressive capability development since 9/11, as well as high-level pronouncements and emerging policy, indicate that Defence has at least intellectualised the importance of its domestic security roles. There is less evidence, however, that Defence has yet embraced domestic security as core business. This reflects Australia's constitutional arrangements, but may not recognise the reality that, when the Australian people perceive themselves to be under attack, they will demand that governments bend every resource to their protection. Defence is a significant and highly visible government resource that will be expected to play its role in a domestic security crisis, not just trying to prevent an attack but also helping to restore some degree of normalcy after a major terrorist strike. A Defence failure in a domestic security mission will be highly damaging to its relationship with the Australian people.

Defence can never lose its primary focus on war fighting, but a shift in culture is needed to ensure that appropriate importance is attached to meeting the popular expectations of Defence's contribution to domestic security. This shift occurred long ago in the highly specialised world of the Special Forces TAGs, but now needs to spread further to ensure that domestic security does not remain a 'second eleven' task.

9. Conduct no-warning exercises

The national anti-terrorist exercise program should employ ADF capabilities other than 'conventional' counter-terrorism forces, such as RRFs or RAAF aeromedical evacuation teams and aircraft, as required under AUSBURNPLAN. The conduct of exercises is always challenging for the civilian emergency services, which do not enjoy Defence's budget and struggle to find the necessary resources over and above their day-to-day operational requirements. There is no point, however, in running ADF-only domestic security exercises. Additional federal resources may be needed to fund a suitable exercise program. Defence response capabilities along with the emergency services should be tested much more in no-warning exercises involving whole-city terrorism.

10. Share training and experience

The ADF and civilian emergency services should share training and experience opportunities more regularly. For example, the Australian response to a regional natural disaster should always be inter-agency, with the ADF facilitating the involvement of civilian agencies by providing strategic transportation and other support. This will improve common understanding, foster good professional relationships and trust and allow sharing of skills. Similarly, the ADF's access to unique training opportunities with allied defence forces should be extended,

wherever possible, to civilian agencies. These could involve participation of observers from civilian agencies on international exercises, conferences and symposia.

Australia has relatively little direct experience of the types of terrorist threats that the contemporary domestic security imperative seeks to address. Unlike in other countries, therefore, history has provided little reason for the Australian population to develop an aversion to the use of Defence in the homeland. Although civil liberty watchdogs have at times raised concerns about the dangers of excessive involvement by the armed forces in domestic security, especially where it involves the use of force, this appears to be an elite debate that does not resonate with the general public. Australians are reasonably open to the use of Defence in domestic security missions, and so public opinion will continue to support further sensible steps by Defence to increase its involvement in domestic security.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADF	Australian Defence Force
AFP	Australian Federal Police
ATG	Air Task Group
CBR	chemical, biological and radiological
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
CBRNDC	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Defence Centre
CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear emergency
CBRNER	chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear emergency response
CBRR	CBR Response
CHOGM	Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
DIO	Defence Intelligence Organisation
DSTO	Defence Science and Technology Organisation
EDD	explosive detection dogs
EMA	Emergency Management Australia
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
ETG	Engineer Task Group
HNA	Hardened and Networked Army
HRR	High Readiness Reserve
IED	improvised explosive devices
IEDD	improvised explosive device disposal
IRR	Incident Response Regiment
IRU	Incident Response Unit
JIRU	Joint Incident Response Unit
JOPC	Joint Offshore Protection Command
JTF	Joint Task Force
LTG	Logistics Task Group
MANPADS	man-portable air defence systems
MPTG	Military Police Task Group
MTG	Maritime Task Group
NBCD	nuclear, biological and chemical defence
NCTC	National Counter-Terrorism Committee
NTAC	National Threat Assessment Centre
RRF	Reserve Response Force
SASR	Special Air Service Regiment
SFTG	Special Forces Task Group
SOCOMD	Special Operations Command
STG	Security Task Group
SUR	ship underway recovery
TAG	Tactical Assault Group
THRS	technical high risk search
UWTG	Underwater Task Group

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