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Global Forces 2007

Proceedings of the ASPI conference.
Day 1

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

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Cover image: Lower pressure system over the Pacific. © CORBIS

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Executive Director's introduction

The third annual ASPI *Global Forces* International Conference was held in Canberra on 5–6 July 2007. Our approach was to bring a group of distinguished Australian and overseas speakers together to share different perspectives of strategic and security affairs with our audience.

Our focus was on some of the bigger strategic issues we see shaping Australia's future and, principally, the emergence of trends such as: challenges to the order and international norms that have underpinned behaviours over the past fifty years; global phenomena such as the rise of fundamentalist movements and potential security impacts of climate change; shifting power dynamics, globally, regionally and particularly in East Asia; questions surrounding social, economic and environmental sustainability, particularly in Australia, in our near neighbourhood, and in the South West Pacific; and finally, the responses to these trends within the prevailing world order. Our interest was in understanding more the implications of these forces for Australia's relevance and role in global and regional security affairs and the strategic choices we might face.

Three broad themes emerged from our discussions. First: whilst we are living in a period of transitions in power relativities with the emergence of China and India, the 'normalisation' of Japan, and a possibly resurgent Russia, the United States is expected to remain the leading power for the foreseeable future, rejecting isolationism and remaining intimately engaged in the evolving world order. Second: a recognition and desire for lesser powers, particularly in this region, to ease and help those power transitions unfold, operating beneficially to manage friction points. Third: acknowledgement that the measures necessary to meet contemporary security challenges—embracing the full range of issues raised in the conference agenda—remain unresolved; a work-in-progress warranting attention from both policy makers and research institutes.

These two volumes provide a valuable record of the conference presentations addressing these issues and a rich collection of ideas

about strategic possibilities and what they might mean for Australia. I am grateful to the speakers for their efforts and insights and to Prime Minister John Howard for outlining his vision of Australia's strategic future in his Keynote Address. The papers presented here include prepared texts provided by some speakers and edited transcripts of other presentations. Transcripts of the open forum discussions will be posted on the ASPI website.

ASPI is grateful for the important support we received from our conference sponsors. I am delighted to thank SMS Management & Technology, our prime sponsor and one of our corporate partners for 2007; Lockheed Martin Australia, our dinner sponsor; Kellogg Brown & Root, General Dynamics, and Yalumba Wines for their assistance and continuing support for ASPI activities.

Peter Abigail
Executive Director

Opening keynote address

AUSTRALIA'S STRATEGIC FUTURE

The Honourable John Howard MP, Prime Minister of Australia

I thank ASPI for the opportunity of presenting an overview of the government's take on our strategic outlook and also congratulate the organisation on the contribution it has made to a better informed debate on strategic policy since its formation six years ago. My main message today at the outset is a simple one, although the challenges I talk about are anything but. Well, that message is that we do face a complex and challenging strategic environment but one that we believe we can face with confidence as the result of the government's national security policies.

The recent Budget provided $22 billion for defence—an increase of 10.6% on the previous year and a 47% increase in real terms over the levels of more than ten years ago.

The recent Budget provided $22 billion for defence—an increase of 10.6% on the previous year and a 47% increase in real terms over the levels of more than ten years ago. As a result we will have a larger, better-protected, more mobile and harder-hitting army which can be deployed more readily. A navy capable of establishing sea control in key areas and operating confidently within our region and an air combat capability, second to none, in our region.

The task is, however, a continuing one. We have committed to a 3% real increase in annual defence spending out to the year 2016. These are very large sums of money and represent serious, long-term decisions

about capability. But based on the latest strategic assessment of our intelligence agencies and the advice of our military experts, they are necessary.

I recently remarked to the Defence leadership group that the ADF's current operational tempo is greater than at any time since the Vietnam war, but also that the complexity and global character of the security challenges we face, make them even more serious. No-one would claim to know precisely what our strategic future holds. But based on what we know now and on the analytical work of our intelligence community we can perhaps sketch some of its outlines.

Nation states will be challenged by terrorist organisations and other non-state entities. Most conflicts now involve non-state groups, which are becoming more and more adept at using 'asymmetric' methods of attack—exploiting the openness of our societies, our technologies and our values to attack us where we are most vulnerable. There will be no holiday from the long struggle against terrorism, a different type of war against a different type of enemy. There is nothing in the assessments I have seen or in the declared strategic intent of the terrorists to encourage the belief that this is not a major political and military struggle that will go on for many years. Islamist terrorism will remain a threat to Australia, to Australian interests, and to our allies, globally, and in Southeast Asia.

The recent thwarted attacks in London and the attack in Glasgow—with a possible connection to Australia—show that societies like ours also face this danger at home. While terrorism represents an attack on our values and our way of life, others are not immune. Bombings throughout the Islamic world—whether in Indonesia, Afghanistan, Iraq or this week's deadly bombing in Yemen—remind us that all communities that stand for moderation and tolerance are at risk. It is equally clear that appeasing terrorists—and allowing them to dictate the policy choices our nations make—does not offer protection. These realities underline the importance of countries that represent these values standing together. Australia and other Western nations need to support not only each other but moderate Islamic governments, leaders and communities throughout the world. Leaders such as Indonesia's President Yudhoyono are key to ultimately denying the terrorists their strategic objectives.

While terrorist networks will remain a major threat, nation states will remain the most important international actors; and the global balance of power will remain the most important determinant of Australia's security.

While terrorist networks will remain a major threat, nation states will remain the most important international actors; and the global balance of power will remain the most important determinant of Australia's security. Power relativities, as always, will go on changing with the continuing emergence of China and India as major powers reshaping our regional landscape, and tilting the global centre of gravity away from the Atlantic towards Asia. China's rise is good for China and good for the world. However, US–China relations, China–Japan tensions and longstanding flashpoints in Taiwan and the Korean peninsula

will require continuing careful management. Australia has an enormous stake in the maintenance of stability in Northeast Asia.

But we are unlikely to see the emergence of a serious rival to liberal, market-based democracy as an organising principle. Nor will the United States lose its predominant position globally or in our region. There is no doubt that the United States is under strain, at home and abroad, as a result of its current commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. But both history and demography suggest it would be a major mistake to underestimate America's resilience, regenerative capacity and moral authority.

Over the period in question and possibly well beyond, the United States will maintain its clear conventional military advantage over all potential adversaries. US interests as well as values and strategic culture will ensure that the United States continues to take an active global leadership role. It is unlikely to wind back the vital stabilising role it plays in East Asia. Australia's security will continue to be shaped by global trends, as it always has been. Australians have always understood intuitively that our security can be deeply affected by distant events.

As a result of globalisation, however, the range and number of events affecting Australia's strategic circumstances and potentially requiring military responses will continue to grow; the lead-times available to us in which to respond will continue to shrink. Globalisation will continue to facilitate not only terrorism and other forms of transnational crime, but the proliferation of the technology and materials necessary to acquire weapons of mass destruction. It could also spur a resurgence of protectionism and increasing rivalry over globally traded resources, particularly oil. Combined with globalisation, profound technological and demographic changes will magnify the strategic impact of some future events, including distant ones. It will remain the case that, because of our size and location, Australia cannot afford to wait until security threats reach our shores before we do anything about them.

Many of the key strategic trends I have mentioned—including terrorism and extremism, challenging demographics, WMD aspirations, energy demand and great-power competition—converge in the Middle East.

Events in the Middle East have long been important to Australia's security and broader interests, and this will remain the case. Many of the key strategic trends I have mentioned—including terrorism and extremism, challenging demographics, WMD aspirations, energy demand and great-power competition—converge in the Middle East. Our major ally and our most important economic partners have crucial interests there. The region will see further turbulence, and Iran's nuclear and wider regional ambitions remain a point of particular concern. In these circumstances it is all the more critical that the coalition succeed in establishing a stable, democratic Iraq that is capable of defending itself against al-Qaeda and the internal enemies that wish to tear it apart, and against potential external adversaries.

There will be further adjustments to coalition strategy and force profiles as progress is made and the enemy adapts. The US 'surge' in and around Baghdad has only recently reached full strength; General Petraeus will make an interim report on progress to the Congress in September. But despite the dreadful continuing violence and our frustration and that of our coalition partners at the rate of political progress, the government remains committed to staying in Iraq with coalition partners until the Iraqi security forces no longer require our support. We all tend to be sickened and perhaps over time numbed by the horrific TV images of the latest car bombing. But the consequences of Western failure and defeat in Iraq are too serious to allow our policy to be dictated by weariness, frustration or political convenience.

Steadfast support for an ally under pressure is not blind loyalty. Rather it shows that genuine friendship is for the difficult times, as well as the good. Moreover, Australia's national interest will demonstrably not be served by an American disengagement from Iraq in circumstances of perceived defeat. Similarly in Afghanistan we must be prepared for the reality of a long-term commitment. As in Iraq, the choice is simple—between supporting those forces that represent modernity, tolerance and hope, or abandoning them to the dark, calculating nihilism of the extremists. Because of the openness of our society, our opponents understand us much better than we understand them. They know that we sanctify human life, and in particular the life of innocents. They know we accept and value dissent. And they know we have elections. They exploit their base insights—on the battlefields of Baghdad and Uruzgan province and in the battlefield of international opinion. Whether in Afghanistan or Iraq, it would not only run counter to our national interests but also to our national character to let them prevail.

Australian agencies have very good counter-terrorism links with their counterparts in Indonesia and other regional countries, and we will continue to build on this cooperation.

Closer to home, terrorism remains a threat, but one against which good progress is being made—as demonstrated by recent arrests in Indonesia of senior JI figures. Australian agencies have very good counter-terrorism links with their counterparts in Indonesia and other regional countries, and we will continue to build on this cooperation. We will also continue to work with our partners to strengthen governance in our immediate region. Many states in our region are vulnerable because for a combination of social, political and economic reasons they cannot provide adequate services and opportunities for their peoples. Weak institutions, corruption and transnational crime can, if left unchecked, lead to state failure.

Instability in the South Pacific is harmful to the societies affected. It also undermines our interests. It reduces our ability to protect the approaches to Australia; it undermines our development assistance efforts; and it feeds people smuggling, illegal immigration, drug trafficking and money laundering that can jeopardise all Australians. In addition to our national interests, our relative size and prosperity give us a moral responsibility to help our neighbours. And our international allies and partners rightly expect it of us. For all these reasons my government decided in early 2003 on a major shift to a more active, robust and

where necessary interventionist policy approach in our region. In doing so we consciously put aside the rather disinterested—and failed—policy of earlier years.

We had helped to bring peace on Bougainville; Australian troops remain in East Timor to provide stability as that country continues the transition to sustainable independence and democracy; the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) is producing results welcomed by the local community, including assistance following the recent earthquake and tsunami; we dispatched personnel to restore order after violence broke out in Tonga; and in Papua New Guinea the Enhanced Cooperation Programme continues. Together these commitments represent a very serious investment. The work is often difficult and dangerous; it requires skill, perseverance and tact—and close cooperation between a range of government agencies and with our regional partners.

The current picture of our overseas deployments and commitments tells us something about what we can reasonably anticipate over the next two decades.

We recognise that long-term stability in our immediate region will ultimately depend on the establishment of effective governance frameworks. But we also recognise that many countries will not get there on their own, and that this must be a very long-term commitment on Australia's part. Let me emphasise that unless governance is strengthened, corruption reduced and basic security provided, increased economic aid risks being a wasted investment—and indeed feeding the underlying problem. The current picture of our overseas deployments and commitments tells us something about what we can reasonably anticipate over the next two decades. Our intelligence community assesses that Australia is most likely to be called on to take the lead in a range of possible missions in our immediate region. These include humanitarian relief and stabilisation tasks, and potentially evacuations and support for counter-terrorist operations. Reflecting the complexity of such challenges, these activities will require a combination of advanced military capability and 'soft power'. They will therefore involve the ADF, but increasingly also other agencies such as the AFP, DFAT, AusAID and the Treasury.

Operations in East Timor, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands have seen these agencies work together in unprecedented and unanticipated ways. Defence has had to adapt to working closely alongside civilian agencies, which for their part have had to develop the training and systems to support previously uncustomary overseas operations, often for protracted periods. We will see more of this over the coming decades. There will probably be times in the decades ahead—as now—when the ADF will face concurrent contingencies far apart geographically and very different in nature. And the experience of the last 10 years and the considered view of our experts both underline one key reality: strategic surprises are certain.

Whether wars, pandemics or natural disasters, we can be certain there will be events that cause major dislocation. We have to be ready for them. This requires two key things—a flexible, responsive, highly capable and more expeditionary Australian Defence Force; and a set of robust international security partnerships. The sort of ADF we will need over the

next 20 years and beyond is very different from the one the government inherited when it came to office in 1996. The facts speak for themselves. When the Leader of the Opposition gave his Budget reply speech, he didn't mention defence once. But this shouldn't come as a surprise. Labor has a long record of neglect on defence. According to ASPI's Australian Defence Almanac, over Labor's last 11 Budgets defence outlays decreased by 2% in real terms, measured in 2004–05 dollars.

In 1991 the Labor government decided to cut two battalions from the Army. The Australian Defence Association said at the time that as a result Australia would be seen by foreign neighbours as weak and irrelevant. The costs could have been even more serious, however. In 1999 the current government decided it had no option but to lead a military coalition to intervene to stop the violence in East Timor. The ADF responded magnificently. But the operation exposed significant deficiencies—particularly in strategic lift capability, logistics, mobility and the ability to sustain a sizeable ground force even close to Australia.

The government took these lessons seriously to heart. We had already resolved that Defence should be quarantined from the substantial Budget cuts we had to make in 1996. We have increased defence outlays by 48% in real terms. We have restored one infantry battalion and will have added a further two battalions by 2010, bringing the total to eight. And we have abandoned the narrow, misguided and ultimately self-defeating nostrum that our force structure should be determined only or even mostly for the defence of Australia narrowly defined—our coastline and its near approaches.

Instead we are building the balanced, versatile ADF that we will need to confront the challenges that we can foresee now but also the unexpected. The ADF will need the flexibility to adapt not only to a growing range of non-military tasks and increasingly sophisticated and lethal asymmetric attacks but also changes on the conventional battlefield. It needs to be able to defend our mainland and approaches in the unlikely event that these ever come under direct military threat. But it must also be capable of conducting substantial operations in our immediate region—whether alone or as the leader of a coalition—and of making meaningful military contributions as a member of coalitions further abroad.

The current Defence Capability Plan outlines $51 billion of new acquisitions over the next 10 years to ensure we continue building this force.

Our technology edge—particularly in precision strike, stealth, speed and information networks—will be critical. The current Defence Capability Plan outlines $51 billion of new acquisitions over the next 10 years to ensure we continue building this force. We will have a larger, stronger Army, with better equipment, mobility, combat weight and networked capabilities, including new M1 Abrams tanks, Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopters and MRH90 troop helicopters.

Our Navy, built around two new amphibious ships and three air warfare destroyers, our upgraded Anzac frigates and the now world-class Collins-class submarines will be capable of operating throughout our region and beyond—and of deploying and supporting ground

forces offshore. We will maintain regional air superiority with an air force based around the new generation Joint Strike Fighter, airborne early warning aircraft and new air-to-air refuelling aircraft. Our acquisition of 24 Super Hornets will ensure there is no capability gap during the transition to the JSF. The acquisition of C-17 heavy lift aircraft and our planned investment in unmanned aerial vehicles will give the RAAF unprecedented capabilities, reach and operational flexibility. Overall our military will be more deployable, more versatile, more networked and more highly skilled.

Attracting sufficient skilled personnel will remain a major challenge for Defence—particularly in an era of high employment and when our military will increasingly need not only more specialised personnel, but also individuals with impressive skills across the board. No one country can prevail on its own in the face of the complex challenges of the 21st Century. Strong bilateral strategic relationships can be a force for stability in a fluid environment—and a potent force multiplier for our own efforts. As the world becomes more interconnected, security becomes more and more indivisible. Our security rests on the security of our partners, and vice versa.

Our alliance with the United States has never been stronger, broader or deeper. It will remain our most important strategic relationship for the indefinite future. The benefits to Australia, both tangible and intangible, are extensive—whether in terms of strategic reassurance, intelligence, defence technology or training. Moreover, Australia pulls its weight in the alliance. Our forces are highly capable and operate seamlessly with their US counterparts. We bring a different regional perspective and our own insights to the table.

Our relationship with China has flourished at the same time as we have strengthened the US alliance.

Many of our critics said a closer relationship with the United States would come at a cost to our relationships in Asia. Nothing could be further from the case. Relationships are not a zero sum game. Our relationship with China has flourished at the same time as we have strengthened the US alliance. We have also strengthened our relationships with Indonesia, Japan, India, Singapore, the Philippines and Malaysia—to name but a few.

Contrary to what some might claim, this is not just a fortunate coincidence. The strength of our alliance adds value, that is our alliance with the United States, to our dealings in the region and represents an asset rather than a liability. The alliance is complemented by a growing web of other ties. In 2006 the government signed the Lombok Treaty with Indonesia, the world's largest Islamic nation, our nearest neighbour and third-largest democracy—a key country in our region and in the broader global fight against extremism.

In March, The Japanese Prime Minister and I signed an historic Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. Our Trilateral Security Dialogue with Japan and the United States is developing into new areas of cooperation, to the benefit of the region as a whole. At the same time we are pursuing a Free Trade Agreement with China and working together in a number of areas to promote regional prosperity and stability. Defence links with India are growing and will become closer, reflecting India's growing strategic weight and engagement with East Asia. In May during President Arroyo's visit Australia and the Philippines signed a Status of Visiting

Forces Agreement that will facilitate joint training and exercising. We also value our very close defence relationships of a long standing character with both Singapore and Malaysia. Our intelligence community assesses that there is currently no foreseeable conventional military threat to Australian territory, and we are likely to maintain a capability edge in our own immediate region.

Tensions between the major powers of our region are likely to be managed short of military conflict, and we can expect a fair measure of cooperation among major and smaller powers. The emergence of a global middle class, increasingly in Asia, could strengthen forces of cooperation and convergence. US paramountcy and engagement, in Asia and globally, will remain a major force for stability. US relationships with Japan, India, China and the countries of Southeast Asia are in good order. That is good for Australia and good for our region.

These factors, along with the decisions the government has made over the last decade on defence and the strength of our own regional relationships, gives me every expectation that Australians can face our strategic future with great confidence.

But above all else, my confidence rests on the inherent strengths of Australia—a talented people; a strong economy; a robust democracy underpinned by tested national institutions; and a greater sense of national self-confidence about who we are and what we stand for.

Session One—Global context and influences

PROLIFERATION: IS A NEW WAVE LOOMING?

Robert L Gallucci

My topic today is 'Nuclear proliferation: Is a new wave coming?' To raise the question of a new wave suggests to me, of course, that there was an old wave, and I thought that was a good place to begin. So what I propose to do is to describe three visions or images of the non-proliferation wave, or the proliferation wave, as we came to know it, over about thirty years. This period, incidentally, during which I had entered government service and spent much of my time working on the proliferation issue.

My plan is to briefly assess each one of these images that we had some thirty years ago and then turn to the characterisation of where we are now. Now, that suggests a kind of grand horseback ride through history that one would have to be particularly well suited to accomplish, and I would like to persuade you that I'm the person to do this.

When I started thirty years ago, I worked on the problem of Pakistan first. My mission in government service was to make sure that Pakistan never ever acquired nuclear weapons. That was my first mission. After that I was assigned to become Deputy Director-General of the Sinai peacekeeping force, the Multinational Force and Observers, and for four years my mission was to make sure that a warm peace developed between Israel and Egypt. After that, I was assigned the task of Deputy Executive Chairman after the first Gulf War and, of course, my mission then was to make sure that Iraq was disarmed of weapons of mass destruction so we never had to worry about Iraq again. After that, I was assigned to Russian safety assistance, put in charge of the 'loose nukes' problem in Russia, so we didn't have to worry about fissile material leaking out of the former Soviet Union.

After that I was put in charge of the negotiations with North Korea that resulted in the agreed framework, and my mission, of course, was to make sure that we never had to worry about a nuclear weapons program in North Korea ever again. After that I was at Dayton and I was put in charge of the implementation of the Dayton accords to make sure that a warm relationship and a successful multicultural, multiethnic society developed between Bosniak, Serb and Croatian. I then went to Georgetown but was brought back, undoubtedly because of this record, and was put in charge of the Russian–Iranian relationship to make sure that we stopped the Russians providing any assistance to Iran in the area of nuclear energy or ballistic missiles.

This, I submit to you, is an unbroken record of diplomatic failure. I can tell you, though, that as I look at an audience that is largely Australian, that in the American system, after each one of these assignments, I was promoted. So with the triumph of experience over performance I now move ahead with the presentation that draws on all this.

The first image that informed us was an image of proliferation that was driven by the character of the international system.

The first image that informed us was an image of proliferation that was driven by the character of the international system. It was driven by the concept of a self-help system, and in that self-help system the realist view of international politics prevailed. States would acquire the means to achieve their security. They would do whatever was necessary. This image had nuclear weapons, and the emergence of nuclear weapons, being no different from any other technological innovation in the military sphere. Intentions really would not sort out or distinguish what one state did from another state. This was a systemically driven view of what the future would look like. The intentions would be universal. The only thing that would limit proliferation would be capabilities. The process would be inevitable. This, in the 1960s, led JFK, John F. Kennedy, somewhat famously—and then many academics somewhat less famously—to predict that by the end of the century, by 2000, there would be forty, fifty or sixty states with nuclear weapons.

Moreover, in 1974—and I went into government in 1974 but this was not causal—India detonated its peaceful nuclear explosion. And for those of us in government, particularly, this was the demonstration that the capability would spread, with the intentions already there. In a somewhat politically incorrect way, we said if an underdeveloped country like India could develop nuclear weapons, we could surely expect a world of nuclear weapons. In fact, however, there are not dozens of nuclear weapon states today. There are, by my count, nine. And if you were to ask why, you might get any number of answers. Mine would begin with the creation of international regimes, principally the nuclear non-proliferation treaty regime and the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguard regimes, which are connected, of course. Together they are important, not because of the force of law specifically, or because these regimes are enforced, but because they helped create an international norm against the acquisition of nuclear weapons. This might be the revenge of the constructionists against the realists in international political theory, but I will spare you that conversation and just tell you that I believe that the norm has become important.

Moreover, there were alliances that were extremely important. I put the NATO alliance first. When I went into government it was only then that several European countries were in fact adhering to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and they were doing so on the clear understanding that there was a nuclear umbrella provided by the United States and they could achieve their security objectives under that umbrella without the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

There is a rather robust academic literature on why states do not acquire nuclear weapons. I recommend to you particularly Mitchell Reiss's work, one of the books entitled rather neatly I think *Bridled Ambition*.

There was, in short, however, no wave driven by systemic conditions of the international system.

The second image, proliferation driven by capability: this image was one that evolved rather quickly with the emergence of nuclear energy as an important source of energy for the international community, for the world at large.

The second image, proliferation driven by capability: this image was one that evolved rather quickly with the emergence of nuclear energy as an important source of energy for the international community, for the world at large. This image was really driven by the perception that all the facilities of the nuclear fuel cycle would spread around the world and would be available, the full fuel cycle. And if that happened, the image that was created depicted a world in which enrichment facilities at the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle and reprocessing facilities at the back end of the fuel cycle would be everywhere. Therefore highly enriched uranium could be everywhere and separated plutonium could be everywhere, the materials, the fissile materials necessary for the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

This image was given to us, we thought, principally, intellectually, by the Atomic Energy Commission of the United States of America, which defined the fuel cycle, defined the standard for the international community. Enrichment facilities were not only necessary for low-enriched uranium for light water reactors, but also to produce highly enriched uranium for research reactors and even to start fast breeder reactors before there was sufficient plutonium. Indeed, the expectation would be that countries would not dispose of their spent fuel; they would reprocess the fuel, recycle the plutonium in existing or thermal reactors, and then pave the way for fast breeder reactors which would produce a true plutonium economy in the energy sector.

The energy crisis of the 1970s added to this image. There was a huge commitment to nuclear power around the world. If you remember the numbers of planned reactor starts, not only in the United States but across Europe and around the world, it was really quite incredible. But in fact that image was never realised as it was anticipated.

In 1975, the MITRE report came out and questioned the economics and the security implications of a plutonium economy and of the availability of fissile material. Jimmy Carter was elected president of the United States, rather abruptly cancelled the reprocessing

facilities, cancelled the fast breeder reactor program in the United States, came out against plutonium fuels, and tried to use US authorities under our law to limit reprocessing by other countries. That had a chilling effect on efforts to advance a 'full fuel cycle.'

In addition, in the United States, the Three Mile Island accident had an impact on planned new reactor starts, and, indeed, there has not been one since the Three Mile Island incident. Internationally, the accident at Chernobyl added to the concerns about reactor safety.

Probably, though, more important than each one of those was the cost of nuclear energy. The capital cost incurred by utilities who were to choose nuclear energy were high, the regulatory process dragged out the process of acquiring nuclear energy, the technical difficulty of accomplishing reprocessing and, indeed, of making a fast breeder reactor actually operate, all this led to a lessening of enthusiasm for nuclear energy.

In short, we have ended up with a world in which we do not have full fuel cycles everywhere around the planet, we do not have widespread reprocessing and separation of plutonium, and we do not have large numbers of enrichment plants producing highly enriched uranium. And fissile material, while more widely available than we would like it to be, is rather limited in the number of countries in which it is available.

... we are now in a period in which we are confronting the challenges of climate change, and we have at least two propositions, one that nuclear energy alone will not solve the problem of carbon fuels, and the other proposition is that any serious description of the most likely to be successful energy mix, would include nuclear energy and an embrace of nuclear energy that is quite substantial.

Before I close off this image, let me suggest to you that we are now in a period in which we are confronting the challenges of climate change, and we have at least two propositions, one that nuclear energy alone will not solve the problem of carbon fuels, and the other proposition is that any serious description of the most likely to be successful energy mix, would include nuclear energy and an embrace of nuclear energy that is quite substantial. That raises, of course, again, the questions of the 1970s and whether plutonium fuels would be part of our nuclear future. If it is just to be the current generation of reactors made more safe, thermal reactors, light water reactors, then we don't need to confront the question of separated plutonium or the production of highly enriched uranium, nor the spread of the sensitive facilities that produced them.

But if the initial thinking of the Bush Administration were to be sustained over a period of time, we would be re-embracing a plutonium economy, and I would suggest to you the image of capabilities and the availability of fissile material driving decisions whether or whether to not acquire nuclear weapons could once again be upon us. So I would say that it is not a problem at the moment, it did not produce a wave, but I can't imagine closing the book on that image just yet.

The third image was proliferation driven specifically by the intentions of individual countries that were regionally motivated in their decisions.

The third image was proliferation driven specifically by the intentions of individual countries that were regionally motivated in their decisions. In the 1970s, again being politically incorrect, at least in one small unit of the State Department of the US Government, we identified what we called the dirty dozen, twelve countries that we thought were threshold countries. There were two in northeast Asia, Korea and Taiwan—it was not North Korea then, it was South Korea. There were two in south Asia, India and Pakistan. There were five in the Middle East—Israel, Iraq, Iran, Libya and Egypt. There was one in Africa—South Africa. There were two in Latin America—Argentina and Brazil.

If we go back and review the results of our efforts to deal with these twelve countries, we find a sort of mixed record. International action, particularly the London Club, which became the nuclear suppliers group represented an international recognition by the principal nuclear suppliers around the world that there were such things as sensitive regions and there were such facilities as sensitive facilities, and sensitive facilities should not go to sensitive regions and that had a big impact on the spread of capability. This was a kind of technological denial and while by itself it did not solve the problem, it allowed time so that other forces could solve those problems.

I note, if we go back over those countries, there was internal domestic change in South Africa. South Africa did in fact produce six nuclear weapons but then disassembled them and subjected the fissile material to international safeguards. Argentina and Brazil then moved away because of internal domestic decision making from nuclear weapons programs. Because of, I would say, US direct action and that of other countries, South Korea and Taiwan were persuaded, as a result of their relationship with the United States, which the United States made use of, to persuade them to abandon their nuclear weapons programs. Iraq: this is a case where we must give war a chance. The first Iraq war did in fact, I think, end a nuclear weapons program which would have become realised within, I would estimate based on my experience, a year or two. And the Libyan case, which has many interpretations, but certainly the Libyans were, whether as a result of the Gulf War or not, dissuaded.

That leaves five other countries. Israel was lost in the sixties, India was lost in the seventies, Pakistan was lost in the eighties, and the question is, in the first decade of the 21st century, will we have lost North Korea and in the second decade will we lose Iran? More on this in a moment.

So now I would say we do not confront a new wave of countries. What we do confront, if I were to characterise this, are two new images. One is the residue of the old wave—that is to say Israel, India, Pakistan, Iran and North Korea. The second image is the image of the non-national actor or the terrorist nuclear threat—a few words about both of these.

The old wave produced the countries that I listed and I shall address each one of them. The Israeli case is one in which most people would agree we have a country that does indeed have a security challenge. It is threatened. The relationship of its nuclear weapons program to

that threat, though, is rather interesting. By most interpretations, the Israelis did not produce nuclear weapons to deal with the conventional threat of its Arab neighbours, but rather to deal with the possibility of a Soviet intervention. They wanted a sort of force de frappe to deal with the Soviet Union and they built one.

The question is: Would Israel ever give up its nuclear weapons? There was an important moment, in an activity that many of you may have forgotten, (but since I co-chaired this activity with Mr Berdenikov from Russia, I have not) that is called the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group of the Madrid Process. In one session, we, I would not say extracted, but promoted, a statement from the Israeli representative which I think is about as far as I have ever heard an Israeli go on the subject of weapons and its security. And I will paraphrase the statement this way: 'When the security context for Israel changes, the requirements for Israel security will also change.' You have to be a little creative to read that the way I do, but I think there is hope, over some period of time, even if it be geologic in character.

But I would say most interestingly Israel's nuclear weapons program is not the cause, or was not the cause, of Libya's program, was not the cause of the Iraqis' program, is not the cause of the Iranian program. I think if the Israeli program were not there, we would be confronting those programs as we had seen them and as we do see them.

India and Pakistan—I think if you ask most analysts the most likely place on the planet for a nuclear weapon to be used in anger by one state against another, most would say in south Asia.

India and Pakistan—I think if you ask most analysts the most likely place on the planet for a nuclear weapon to be used in anger by one state against another, most would say in south Asia. They have relatively small nuclear arsenals. They are not hardened or mobile. There are short flight times. They are, for the strategist, 'lose or use' in times of crisis. They are, in fact, therefore not stabilising; they are provocative.

I would add to that, as you will have noticed, that India and Pakistan are contiguous; they do not have any peripheries; there is no strategic depth. If there is a conventional engagement, the countries will engage vital interests, that is to say their sovereign territory, virtually immediately. There is on both sides ignorance of the other side's red lines; there is a conventional force, a symmetry between India and Pakistan, favouring India; there is the Kashmir dispute, which has gone unresolved and sits atop a base of Hindu–Muslim divide. All this to me suggests that we should not be relaxed about the future of the subcontinent and the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict. So I look at this one as partly defining the current situation and for some time the future situation in proliferation.

Iran and North Korea. You will have noticed that a deal has been struck between the five parties and the one-party in the six-party talks on 13 February. If you blur your vision slightly it looks a lot like, in structure, the deal that was struck in 1994. It involves, on our side, the provision of certain kinds of security assurances, provision of economic assistance of various types, perhaps even light water reactors. It involves, on the side of the North Koreans, the

end of their nuclear weapons program. This is all familiar because the objectives of the United States and the other four and the objectives of North Korea on the other side really haven't changed fundamentally in the years since the agreed framework was negotiated.

But there are questions to be asked about the current situation. The most basic one is: Will the North Koreans in fact give up their nuclear weapons and give up their nuclear weapons option? I am certain that I do not know the answer. What I find more interesting than not knowing the answer is that it will be hard to find out. I think it will be hard to find out because our knowledge of the North Korean nuclear program rests on intelligence, and if you have been paying attention to intelligence, and particularly the American intelligence, you will have noticed that the intelligence can raise more questions that it can answer. What is the exact character of the North Korean enrichment program, when will it be declared and when will it be destroyed and will we know if it has been, and even more important, how much plutonium do the North Koreans have, have they in fact produced nuclear weapons and if they say they have declared a certain amount of plutonium, will they have declared a half, a quarter or all of it? This will make testing the North Korean case difficult.

The threat, of course, has always been three-part. We fear that they would mate nuclear weapons with those extended range ballistic missiles and directly threaten the rest of Asia as well as eventually continental United States. Second, that an active nuclear weapons program in North Korea would serve to provoke the Japanese, and even the South Koreans, to decide that they are perhaps even for domestic reasons unhappy and unsatisfied with the American nuclear umbrella as a method of checking the North Koreans and we will have therefore a domino effect in northeast Asia. And, third, there is the concern that the North Koreans might transfer fissile material, if not nuclear weapons, in order to earn hard currency. What they have done, in other words, as the only country on earth providing ballistic missiles to other countries, they would do with fissile material. It is the third concern that I will come back to, the third point, the transfer, which is most threatening to the United States particularly.

Iran, there are some parallels. The Iran centrifuge program is likely to provide to the Iranians an option to produce fissile material and nuclear weapons in some period of time—unlikely in three years, more likely in five years. There are questions about whether the Iranians can be persuaded in some way to give up that enrichment program which the Iranian leader, Ahmadinejad, has successfully equated with Iranian sovereignty for the Iranian people, which will make this a hard sell. Sanctions, I still believe, could possibly work if put together with substantial carrots. I think the United States, because it is the key to Iranian security, would have to be part of that deal. So I would hope that over time the United States would give up its current precondition—that is to say the suspension of work on the enrichment program—as the precondition for engaging in negotiations. It is not a good idea, when you're negotiating, to make as a precondition one of your objectives in the negotiation. So if the United States were to join, I would not lose hope that Iran could be dissuaded.

The concerns, very similar to North Korea, are that Iran would mate a nuclear weapon with its medium range ballistic missile, the Shahab-3, which is of course not an Iranian medium range ballistic missile but a North Korean Nodong modified with Russian assistance, and that would threaten countries in the Middle East, including Israel; that Iran would, with a nuclear weapons program if it went in that direction, provoke a domino effect in the Middle East, certainly having the gulf states respond; and finally that Iran could be the source of fissile material as a result of a transfer, much the way it transfers conventional weapons to terrorist organisations today.

We have no defence against a nuclear weapon delivered by a terrorist group, because it will be delivered in an unconventional way.

That leads me finally to the second image that defines the current situation of proliferation and that is the non-national actor or the terrorist nuclear threat. This is the key threat from an American perspective that emerges from the North Korean and Iranian case. It is not nuclear weapons in North Korea; it is not nuclear weapons in Iran. We do believe that we can deter these states, as we have deterred other states, we think. One never knows about deterrence. We only know when it fails. But we think we can deter them. What we can't deal with is the fissile material transfer problem. We have no defence against a nuclear weapon delivered by a terrorist group, because it will be delivered in an unconventional way. After we get finished worrying about all the containers, we can then start worrying about all the trucks, and then we can worry about the marinas and then we will rapidly conclude that we really cannot defend, as a strategist would say, by denial, or by preventing a nuclear weapon from being introduced into the United States, which leaves us only with deterrence. Deterrence, of course, creates the problem of knowing exactly who your attacker is, having an attacker who had some level of unacceptable damage, and anybody who presents to you the proposition that they value your death more than their life is not a really good candidate for deterrence.

So the only question here in order to assess the importance of this is: Is this really possible, or is it the stuff of fiction? It seems to me it's really possible. I start with the assumption that if al-Qaeda had a nuclear weapon it would use it, that it would not be constrained by concerns of political consequences. This is not the old-style terrorist that made that kind of a judgment. Second, I assume that if they had a nuclear weapon they could deliver it, that we could not in fact have any confidence of stopping them. Third, that they would more likely get fissile material and manufacture a weapon than they would actually get a complete nuclear weapon. Nine states have nuclear weapons. All of them take a lot of care to make sure their weapons are controlled and somewhat substantially less care in those cases to control their fissile material.

So the questions are: Can they get highly enriched uranium and/or plutonium and could they manufacture a nuclear weapon if they did? Where would the fissile material come from? Well, today it would come from Russia, or Pakistan I would think most likely. Could it come from elsewhere? Yes. France has fissile material, Britain has fissile material, Japan has fissile material. But most likely because of the tonnes, which means thousands of kilograms of fissile material in Russia, still, after more than a decade of cooperative reduction and Nunn-Lugar, still inadequately secured, and because in Pakistan, while the amounts are smaller, there are Islamicists in Pakistan very sympathetic to the most radical interpretations of Islam who are both in the army and the nuclear establishment. So we worry about both these cases, and if material were to get to al-Qaeda from Russia or Pakistan, it would not be because there was a decision to transfer. It would be, and we could characterise it as, leakage. Neither Putin nor Musharraf would want it to happen, but they would not have succeeded in preventing it from happening.

The other two cases, North Korea eventually, maybe not long from now, could be a source, and eventually so could Iran. These would not be very likely cases of leakage; they would be cases of transfer, because of the character of their state. If al-Qaeda acquired fissile material from one of these sources, could they manufacture a nuclear explosive device? I think in technical terms the answer is unambiguously yes. They would not manufacture the complicated implosion system that we had to test before we dropped it on Nagasaki to end the war in the Pacific. They would manufacture the simple gun-type device that we dropped on Hiroshima, which we did not bother to test, because it is that simple.

Those of you who are technically inclined would note that you typically would say you can't build a gun-type device with plutonium, you must have high-enriched uranium. Well, you're thinking like a weapons designer when you say that, and not because you will not get nuclear yield with plutonium. It is because you will not get a full nuclear yield, design yield. But while you may be aiming for a 12 kilotonnes to 15 kilotonnes, 1,000 tonnes of TNT equivalent, if you got a thousand tonnes, a kilotonne or a fraction of a kilotonne, that would produce an awful lot of damage in a city.

So for many in the United States, the hottest topic right now is what do you do if you have no defence or deterrence to deal with this problem. The answer a lot of people are coming up with is attribution; that is to work at trying to attribute fissile material to its source so that you can recapture some deterrence, achieve a kind of expanded deterrence, so you could tell the North Koreans and the Iranians, 'If there is a detonation in an American city and we succeed in tracing the material back to your country we will treat you as though you were the attacker', and therefore try to deter the transfer in the first place. That would deal with transfer.

How do we deal with the Russians and the Pakistanis to get them to more thoroughly control their fissile material?

The leakage problem is another more difficult one. How do we deal with the Russians and the Pakistanis to get them to more thoroughly control their fissile material? Some would argue that in the event of a detonation in an American city that killed a quarter of a million people promptly, an American president who was told by a section of the intelligence community that the material actually came from Pakistan or Russia would have to do something, and couldn't just 'suck that up', to use a current American phrase. He would have to do something about that. If that's true, then it seems to me that we ought to be having conversations with the leaders of those countries fairly soon to make sure they understand that if they are in a position of having been negligent in the control of their material, the implications could be quite catastrophic for them and for their country.

I leave you with this thought, which is an incomplete one, that this is a problem that we are currently struggling with. I would suggest to you, along with those two countries Iran and North Korea, the terrorist threat really does define the non-proliferation problem these days and it is a very difficult and challenging one indeed.

CLIMATE CHANGE: A NEW FACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY?

Brahma Chellaney

What we face today is a climate crisis that has arisen due to the relentless build-up of planet-warming greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The ocean-atmosphere system that controls the world's climate has become vulnerable to adverse change. For long, global warming had not been taken seriously, and even the few who did see its threat potential, viewed the matter as simply an environmental or economic issue. Climate security is a new concept, which acknowledges that global warming carries international and national security implications. The most severe effects of climate change are likely to occur where states are too poor or fragile to respond or to adapt adequately. If the world is to control or minimise the likely major geopolitical and human-security consequences, climate change needs to be elevated beyond scientific discourse to a strategic challenge requiring concrete counteraction on the basis of a broad international consensus.

Intra-state and inter-state crises over water and food shortages, inundation of low-lying areas, or recurrent droughts, hurricanes or flooding may lead to large displacements of citizens and mass migrations, besides exacerbating ethnic or economic divides in societies. It is thus important to examine the risks of global warming, including potential situations in which climatic variations could be a catalyst for conflict within or between states. What climate-change effects, for example, could destabilise the geopolitical environment and trigger resource-related disputes or wars? Would resource-rich states seek to build virtual fortresses around their national boundaries to preserve their advantage and insulate themselves from the competition and conflict elsewhere? How would climate change impinge on military operations?

Risk assessment is an essential component of strategic planning. Such assessment can help focus attention on the key elements of climate security in order to evolve appropriate policy responses to safeguard broader national security.

The broader context

Despite extensive research since the early 1990s, the extent of future climate change remains uncertain and difficult to project. To some, global warming, far from causing gradual, centuries-spanning change, may be beginning to push the climate to a tipping point. There is no scientific evidence yet that the global climatic system is close to a critical threshold. But there is ample evidence of accelerated global warming and the potential for adverse security-related effects resulting from unwelcome changes in climate.

The degree and pace of future climate change will depend on four factors:

(i) the extent of the energy- and development-related increase of greenhouse gases and aerosol concentrations in the atmosphere

(ii) the impact of deforestation, land use, animal agriculture and other anthropogenic factors on climate variation

(iii) the impact of natural influences (including from volcanic activity and changes in the intensity of the sun) on climate variation

(iv) the extent to which temperature, precipitation, ocean level and other climatic features react to changes in greenhouse-gas emissions, aerosol concentrations and other elements in the atmosphere.

For example, clouds of aerosol particles from biomass burning and fossil-fuel consumption are contributing to the accelerated thawing of glaciers. While aerosol particles play a cooling role by reflecting sunlight back into space, they also absorb solar radiation and thus contribute to global warming. According to a study by Veerabhadran Ramanathan *et al*, which employed general circulation model simulations, the vertically extended atmospheric brown clouds observed over the Indian Ocean and Asia, along with the increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gases, 'may be sufficient to account for the observed retreat of the Himalayan glaciers'.[1]

The climate crisis is a consequence of the rapid pace of change in the contemporary world. Technological forces are playing a greater role in shaping geopolitics than at any other time in history. Political and economic change has also been fast-paced. Not only are new economic powers emerging, but the face of the global geopolitical landscape has changed fundamentally in the past two decades. As new actors emerge on the international stage, the traditional dominance of the West is beginning to erode.

Such rapid change has contributed since the end of the Cold War to the rise of unconventional challenges, including the phenomenon of failing states, growing intrastate conflicts, transnational terrorism, maritime-security threats, and threats to space-based assets. Climate change, although not a new phenomenon, belongs to this list of unconventional challenges. As Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller has rightly put it, 'In contrast to traditional foreign policy and security threats, climate change is not caused by "hostile" enemies. It is different from terrorism, which we can fight, and weapons of mass destruction, which we can destroy. This time it is not about political values. It is about our production and consumption patterns'.[2]

The challenge of climate change is really the challenge of sustainable development.

The challenge of climate change is really the challenge of sustainable development. In the continuing scramble to build economic security, energy security, food security, water security and military-related security—all on a national basis—the world now is beginning to face the harsh truth that one nation's security cannot be in isolation of others. In fact, the rapid pace of economic, political and technological change in the world is itself a consequence of nations competing fiercely for relative advantage in an international system based largely on national security. Climate change is a legacy of such assertive promotion of national interests.

The climate crisis, of course, has been accentuated by rapid economic development in Asia, which today boasts the world's fastest-growing economies, besides the fastest-rising military expenditures and the most dangerous hot spots. Asia, through its dynamism and fluidity and as home to more than half of the world's population, is set to shape the future of globalisation. It also has a critical role in the fight against climate change, as underscored

by a recent Dutch report that China has now overtaken America as the world's biggest greenhouse-gas emitter on a national, rather than a per capita, basis.

It is true that a US resident is currently responsible, on an average, for about six times more greenhouse-gas emissions than the typical Chinese, and as much as eighteen times more than the average Indian. But it is also true that if Asians continue to increase their output of greenhouse gases at the present rate, climate change would be seriously accelerated.

We should not forget, however, that Asia is only bouncing back from a 150-year decline, and is now seeking to regain economic pre-eminence in the world. According to an Asian Development Bank study, Asia, after making up three-fifths of the world's GDP at the beginning of the industrial age in 1820, saw its stake decline to one-fifth in 1945, before dramatic economy recovery has helped bring it up to two-fifths today. In keeping with its emerging centrality in international relations and relatively young demographics, Asia serves as a reminder that the ongoing power shifts foreshadow a very different kind of world.

Like other unconventional challenges, the challenge thrown up by global warming can only be tackled effectively by building and maintaining a broad international consensus. Indeed, the ongoing power shifts in the world have made such consensus building a sine qua non for the success of any international undertaking. With greater distribution of power, the traditional America-centric and Euro-centric world is also changing. The old divides (like the East-West and North-South) are giving way to new divides. Even though world economic growth is at a thirty-year high, with global income now totalling $51 trillion annually, the consensus on globalisation is beginning to fracture.

Strategic implications

Combating climate change is an international imperative, not merely a choice. The new global spotlight on climate change has helped move the subject into the international mainstream. There is now growing recognition that climate security needs to be an important component of international security, as evidenced by the 2007 special debates on climate change in both the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly.

There is an ominous link between global warming and security, given the spectre of resource conflicts, failed states, large-scale migrations and higher frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, such as cyclones, flooding and droughts.

There is an ominous link between global warming and security, given the spectre of resource conflicts, failed states, large-scale migrations and higher frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, such as cyclones, flooding and droughts. Some developments would demand intervention by the armed forces. Climate change has been correctly characterised as a 'threat multiplier'.

In terms of long-term geopolitical implications, climate stress could induce perennial competition and conflict that would represent a much bigger challenge than any the world faces today, including the fight against the al-Qaeda or the proliferation of dual-use nuclear technologies among the so-called 'rogue' states. After all, climate stress, and the attendant cropland degradation and scarcity of fresh water, are likely to intensify competition over scarce resources and engender civil strife.

Such are its far-reaching strategic implications that climate change could also foster or intensify conditions that lead to failed states—the breeding grounds for extremism, fundamentalism and terrorism. Although an unconventional challenge by itself, climate change is likely to heighten low-intensity military threats that today's conventional forces are already finding difficult to defeat—transnational terrorism, guerrilla movements and insurgencies.

Furthermore, climate change could increase the severity, duration and the collateral impact of a conflict, besides triggering mass dislocation. For example, the South Pacific islands, as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) said in the second of four reports in 2007, are likely to be hit by an increased frequency of tropical storms and be battered by rising sea levels, forcing the likely migration of many residents to Australia and New Zealand. Besides worsening droughts and increasing fires and flooding in Australia and New Zealand, global warming could threaten ecologically rich sites like the Great Barrier Reef and the sub-Antarctic islands.

Securitising the risks of climate change also helps to turn the issue from one limited to eco-warriors to a subject of major international concern.

That is why climate change ought to be on the national and global security agenda. Securitising the risks of climate change also helps to turn the issue from one limited to eco-warriors to a subject of major international concern. That in turn may help facilitate the heavy-lifting needed to give the problem the urgency and financial resources it deserves. Having succeeded in highlighting climate change as an international challenge, however, the emphasis now has to shift to building consensus on combating climate change. Most importantly, the international community needs to move beyond platitudes to agreed counteraction.

The security-related challenges posed by climate change can be effectively dealt with only through a cooperative international framework. No international mission today can hope to achieve tangible results unless it comes with five Cs: coherence, consistency, credibility, commitment and consensus. Indeed, this is the key lesson one can learn from the way the global war on terror now stands derailed, even as the scourge of transnational terrorism has spread deeper and wider in the world.

Climate change is a real and serious problem, and its effects could stress vulnerable nations and spur civil and political unrest. Yet the creeping politicisation of the subject will only make it harder to build international consensus and cooperation on a concrete plan of action. Take

the insistence of some to add climate security to the agenda of the United Nations Security Council. If climate change were to become part of the agenda of the Security Council—a hotbed of big-power politics—it would actually undercut such consensus building. With five unelected, yet permanent, members dictating the terms of the debate, we would get international divisiveness when the need is for enduring consensus on a global response to climate change.

... the creeping politicisation of the subject will only make it harder to build international consensus and cooperation on a concrete plan of action.

Politics has also come in the way of reaching an agreement, even in principle, on defining what is popularly known as the 'common but differentiated responsibility' of the developed and developing states. At the Group of Eight (G-8) Outreach Summit in mid-2007 in Germany, for instance, leaders of the G-8 powers and the new Group of Five (G-5) comprising the five emerging economies—China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa—talked past each other. The G-8, in its declaration, asked 'notably the emerging economies to address the increase in their emissions by reducing the carbon intensity of their economic development'. And the G-5 retorted by placing the onus of dealing with climate change on the developed nations, asking them to make significant cuts in greenhouse gas emissions first. 'Greenhouse-gas mitigation in developed countries is the key to address climate change given their responsibilities in causing it', noted a G-5 policy paper presented to the leaders of the G-8. This to-and-fro cannot hide the imperative for an equitable sharing of responsibility.

While being on the green bandwagon has become politically trendy, the action often involves little more than lip service to climate security. Sometimes the political action makes the situation only worse. Take the Bush Administration's embrace of corn-derived ethanol. The move does little to fight climate change or reduce US dependence on imported oil. But it does a lot to create a windfall for the farm lobby by boosting grain prices. It began as a promise of a free lunch—to encourage farmers to grow more corn so that ethanol companies could use it to reduce America's dependence on imported oil without affecting US consumers. Instead it has shown that there can be no free lunch. The ripples from the ethanol boom have already meant higher prices for corn, wheat, fertilizer and the food on our table—and rising US dependence on imported fertilizers.

Generous subsidies are at the core of the Bush Administration's goal of replacing over the next decade 15% of domestic gasoline use with biofuels (corn ethanol and biodiesel). This target is sought to be propped up through a subsidy of 51 cents a gallon for blending ethanol into gasoline, and a import tariff of 54 cents a gallon to help keep out cheap sugarcane-based ethanol from Brazil. To achieve that 15% target would require the entire current US corn crop, which represents 40% of the global corn supply.

Having unleashed the incentives to divert corn from food to fuel, the United States is now reaping higher food prices. The price of corn has nearly doubled since 2006. At the beginning of 2006, corn was a little over $2 a bushel. Now in the futures markets, corn for December 2007 delivery is selling at $3.85 a bushel, despite projections of a record 12.5 billion-bushel

corn harvest in the United States this year. With corn so profitable to plant, farmers are shifting acreage from wheat, soybeans and other grains, putting further upward pressure on food prices. The losers are the poor. As of June 2007, a bushel of soybeans was up 36% from a year earlier. The price of wheat is projected to rise 50% by the end of 2007.

With the European Union also jumping on the ethanol bandwagon, a fundamental issue has been raised—how can ethanol be produced and delivered in keeping with the needs of sustainable development? The political claim that corn-derived ethanol is environmentally friendly has to be seen against the fact that, compared to either biodiesel or ethanol from rice straw and switchgrass, corn has a far lower energy yield relative to the energy used to produce it. It should also not be forgotten that growing corn demands high use of nitrogen-based fertilizers—produced from natural gas. The 16% increase since 2006 in US corn cultivation has resulted in a big surge in US fertilizer demand—as much as an extra 1 million metric tons in 2007. There are two other factors that should not be overlooked—(i) because ethanol yields 30% less energy per gallon than gasoline, the fall in mileage is significant; and (ii) adding ethanol raises the price of blended fuel over unblended gasoline because of the extra handling and transportation costs.

The craze for ethanol is also encouraging the felling of tropical forests in a number of countries to make way for corn, sugar and palm-oil plantations to fuel the world's growing thirst for ethanol. That is senseless: to fight climate change, the world needs forests more than ethanol. Forests breathe in carbon dioxide and breathe out oxygen every day, helping to keep our planet cool. Besides storing carbon and reducing the effects of greenhouse-gas emissions, forests filter pollution and yield clean water.

It is important to know that despite the justifiable attention on China's rapidly growing industrial pollution, the destruction of the world's tropical forests contributes more to global warming every year than the carbon-dioxide emissions from Chinese coal-fired power plants, cement and other manufacturing factories, and vehicles. Fortunately, the massive enthusiasm over biofuels is now finally beginning to give way to realism and even concern that biofuels pose a threat to global food security and biodiversity.

Another invidious way climate change is being politicised is through embellishment of the technical evidence on global warming. Take the reports of the IPCC, a joint body of the World Meteorological Organization and UN Environment Programme. Ever since the IPCC in 1990 began releasing its assessments every five or six years, the panel has become gradually wiser, with its projected ocean-level increases due to global warming on a continuing downward slide. As a body, the IPCC remains on a learning curve.

From projecting in the 1990s a 67-centimetre rise in sea levels by the year 2100, the IPCC has progressively whittled down that projection by nearly half—first to 48.5 centimetres in 2001 and then to 38.5 centimetres in 2007. Should the world be worried by the potential rise of the oceans by 38.5 centimetres within the next 100 years? You bet. We need to slow down such a rise. But if a rise of 38.5 centimetres does occur, will it mean catastrophe? Not really.

If the world didn't even notice a nearly 20-centimetre rise in sea levels in the past century, a slow 38.5-centimetre ascent of the oceans over the next 100 years cannot mean a calamity of epic proportions. Yet the scaremongering has picked up steam—'the Netherlands would be under water', 'millions would have to flee Shanghai', 'Bangladesh's very existence would be imperilled'.

Climate change is a serious challenge with grave security implications, but it doesn't mean we are doomed. It is important to see things in a balanced way. There can be genuine differences in assessing the likely impact of global warming. The Stern Report, for example, seems more alarmed over potential climate-change implications than the IPCC.[3] Such differences among experts are understandable. What is unconscionable is the scaremongering. Doomsday ayatollahs should not be allowed to dictate the debate.

Yet another facet of the current climate-change geopolitics is that the term, global warming, is being stretched to embrace environmental degradation unrelated to the effects of the build-up of greenhouse gases and aerosol concentrations in the atmosphere. What has climate change to do with reckless land use, overgrazing, contamination of water resources, overuse of groundwater, inefficient or environmentally unsustainable irrigation systems, waste mismanagement or the destruction of forests, mangroves and other natural habitats? Some of these actions, of course, may contribute to climate variation but they do not arise from global warming.

Climate change cannot be turned into a convenient, blame-all phenomenon. If man-made environmental degradation is expediently hitched to climate change, it would exculpate governments for reckless development and allow them to feign helplessness. In such a situation, like the once-fashionable concept of human security, climate change could become too diffused in its meaning and thereby deflect international focus from tackling growing fossil-fuel combustion, the main source of man-made greenhouse gases.

It is important to distinguish between climate change and environmental change. Hurricane Katrina and perennial flooding in Bangladesh, for instance, are not climate-change occurrences but result from environmental degradation. Frequent flooding in Bangladesh is tied to upstream and downstream deforestation and other activities resulting from increased population intensity. Climate change, certainly, could exacerbate such flooding.

Given its serious long-term strategic implications, climate change calls for concerted international action. But if counteraction were to be turned into a burden-sharing drill among states, it would fail because distributing 'burden' is a doomed exercise. Neither citizens in rich states are going to lower their living standards by cutting energy use, nor will poor nations sacrifice economic growth, especially because their per-capita CO_2 emissions are still just one-fifth the level of the developed world.

What is needed is a new political dynamic that is not about burden-sharing but about opportunity centred on radically different energy and development policies. This means not only a focus on renewable energy and greater efficiency, but also a more-urgent programme of research and development on alternative fuels and carbon-sequestration technologies. CO_2 is not dangerous to human beings by itself. But too much CO_2 in the atmosphere is dangerous for climate stability because it changes the heat balance between Earth and the Sun. Yet CO_2 emissions account for 80% of the planet-warming greenhouse gases. The other 20% share is made up of potent gases like methane, nitrous oxide and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). The man-made SF-6 is used to create light, foam-based soles to cushion joggers' feet. The European Union, with effect from June-end 2007, has rightly prohibited the sale of such footwear. Methane, on the other hand, is released in coal mining, gas extraction, and from landfill, cattle and various other sources. Methane capture, however, holds attractive commercial value: it is the main ingredient of natural gas.

Given that the world has either developed or attempted to build common international norms on trade, labour practices, human rights, nuclear non-proliferation, etc., fashioning common global standards on CO_2 emissions is necessary. To help control excess carbon intensity in the manufacture of goods, such standards could be made to apply to trade practices, too. In the same way that we seek to ensure that imports are not the products of child labour or other unfair labour practices, objective and quantifiable standards could be developed to regulate trade in goods contaminated by carbon intensity.

That would help to put on notice countries that do not seem to care about the carbon intensity of their manufacturing. Cheap imports, for example, from China—the world's back factory—would become subject to such standards, putting pressure on both large importers like Wal-Mart and Beijing itself to move towards more environmentally friendly manufacturing. In the wake of the multiple scandals in 2007 over tainted Chinese food and drug exports, such an exercise would be part and parcel of efforts to raise industry standards and promote public-health and environmental safety. It could also help to instil accountability: the importer of goods ought to be no less culpable in the emission of CO_2 than the exporter.

If CO_2 and non-CO_2 levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are not controlled, the higher average temperatures in the world could adversely upset the climate balance on which human civilisation and other species depend. Development and climate protection have to be in alignment with each other, because it cannot be an 'either or' proposition.

... it is becoming apparent to most that the costs of inaction outweigh the costs of action.

Against this background, it is becoming apparent to most that the costs of inaction outweigh the costs of action. The issue is not about horse-trade or burden. It is about sharing opportunity to create a better future. The opportunity is also about promoting green-technology developments. Ultimately, technology may offer salvation, given the power and role of technological forces today. Even if geo-engineering options to fix climate change are seen to belong to the realm of science fiction today, they still need to be pursued. As the history of the past century shows, scientific discoveries that seemed improbable at a given moment became a reality within years. Albert Einstein in 1932, for example, judged the potential of nuclear energy as a mirage. But 13 years later, the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki lay in nuclear ruins.

Likely security-related effects

The actual national security-related effects of climate change are likely to vary from region to region. For example, Australia's size, resources, small population and geographical location position it better to cope with the effects of climate change. The same is the case with Canada. Japan, an insulated island chain with rugged terrain, could rely on its impressive social cohesion to induce resource conservation and other societal adaptation to climate change. But some parts of the world are likely to be severely hit by climate change and suffer debilitating security effects.

By and large, warming is expected to be the least in the islands and coastal areas, and the greatest in the inland continental areas. Several studies have shown that global warming is likely to actually strengthen monsoon circulation and bring increased rainfall in the monsoonal seasons.[4] Changes in non-monsoon, or dry-season, rainfall have been more difficult to assess. The likely increased rainfall suggests that climate change is not going to be an unmitigated disaster. Rather, adaptation to climate change would demand the development of new techniques.

The weaker the economic and social base and higher the reliance on natural resources, the more a community is likely to be adversely affected by climate change.

Climate change is also likely to bring about important shifts in temperature patterns, a rise in sea levels, and an increase in the frequency and intensity of anomalous weather events, such as cyclones, flooding and droughts. These trends, cumulatively, could play havoc with agriculture and also impact on conservation strategies. The weaker the economic and social base and higher the reliance on natural resources, the more a community is likely to be adversely affected by climate change.

While it is scientifically not possible to predict future events with any degree of certainty, it is possible to draw some reasonable but broad conclusions, with the aim of controlling anthropogenic factors contributing to climate change. The likely security-related effects of climate change can be put in three separate categories:

1. Climate change is likely to intensify inter-state and intra-state competition over natural resources, especially water, in several parts of the world. That in turn could trigger resource conflicts within and between states, and open new or exacerbate existing political disputes.

2. Increased frequency of extreme weather events like hurricanes, droughts and flooding, as well as the rise of ocean levels, are likely to spur greater inter-state and intra-state migration—especially of the poor and the vulnerable—from delta and coastal regions to the hinterland. Such an influx of outsiders would socially swamp inland areas, upsetting the existing fragile ethnic balance and provoking a backlash that strains internal and regional security. Through such large-scale migration, the political stability and internal cohesion of some nations could be undermined. In some cases, this could even foster or strengthen conditions that could make the state dysfunctional.

3. The main casualty of climate change, clearly, is expected to be human security. Social and economic disparities would intensify within a number of states, as climatic change delivers a major blow to vulnerable sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, and to low-lying coastal and delta areas. In an increasingly climate change-driven paradigm, the tasks of good governance and sustainable development would become more onerous and challenging.

The economically disruptive effects of ocean-level rise and frequently occurring extreme weather events are likely to lead to create major national challenges, as those displaced are

forced to relocate inland. Jobs in the countryside, however, will not be easy to come by for migrants who are compelled to move into the hinterland due to loss of their agricultural land and production. That might only encourage mass influx into the already-crowded cities in the developing world.

The impact of climate variability on society will mean change in the social-economic-political environments on which the security of individuals, communities and states rest. Such variability would affect crop yields and the availability of water, energy and food, including seafood. The case for angst over the security implications of climate change has been underlined by an unclassified 2003 Pentagon study, which warned of large population movements and contended that diplomatic action would be needed to control likely conflict over resources in the most impacted areas, especially in the Caribbean and Asia. According to the report,[5] climate change would affect Australia's position as a major food exporter, while the food, energy and water situation in densely populated China would come under severe strain by a decreased reliability of the monsoon rains and by colder winters and hotter summers. It paints one possible scenario in these words: 'Widespread famine causes chaos and internal struggles as a cold and hungry China peers jealously across the Russian and western borders at energy resources'.

The report hypothesised massive Bangladeshi refugee exodus to India and elsewhere, as recurrent hurricanes and higher ocean level make 'much of Bangladesh nearly uninhabitable'. Other scenarios discussed in the report include the possibility of the United Stated building a fortress around itself to shield its resources, besides getting locked in political tensions with Mexico through actions such as a cut-off of water flow from the Colorado River into lower-riparian Mexico in breach of a 1944 treaty.

In general, according to the report, 'Learning how to manage those populations, border tensions that arise and the resulting refugees will be critical. New forms of security agreements dealing specifically with energy, food and water will also be needed. In short, while the US itself will be relatively better off and with more adaptive capacity, it will find itself in a world where Europe will be struggling internally, [with] large number [of] refugees washing up on its shores, and Asia in serious crisis over food and water. Disruption and conflict will be endemic features of life'.

It should not be forgotten that in some situations, the effects of climate change are likely to foster or intensify conditions that lead to failed or failing states. That in turn would adversely impact regional and international security. In such cases, the more resource-secure countries would have to either aid such states or face the security-related consequences from the growing lawlessness and extremism there.

Notwithstanding the game of chicken currently being played between the North and the South, it is the developing world that is likely to bear the brunt of climate change because it has a larger concentration of hot and low-lying regions and lesser resources to technologically adapt to climate change. The poorer a country, the less it would be able to defend its people against the climate-change effects, which would potentially include more-severe storms, the flooding of tropical islands and coastlines, higher incidence of drought inland, resources becoming scarcer, and a threat to the survival of at least one-fourth of the world's species. While the overriding interest of developing countries is still economic growth and poverty eradication, climate change can actually accentuate poverty. In fact, when rural economies get weakened, livelihoods are disrupted and unemployment soars, frustrations and anger would be unleashed, fostering greater conflict within and between societies.

Potential water wars

Two major effects of climate change are beyond dispute: (i) declining crop yields putting a strain on food availability and prices: and (ii) decreased availability and quality of fresh water owing to accelerated glacial thaw, flooding and droughts. The second factor can only compound the first. In fact, water, food and energy constraints can be managed in inter-state or intra-state context through political or economic means only up to a point, beyond which conflict becomes likely.

The likely impact on the availability of water resources is a critical component of the security-related challenges posed by climate change. Hundreds of millions of people in the world are already without access to safe drinking water. This situation would aggravate markedly if current projections of climate change come true. Accelerated snow melt from mountains and faster glacier thaw could deplete river-water resources and potentially drive large numbers of subsistence farmers into cities.

No region better illustrates the danger of water wars than Asia, which has less fresh water—3,920 cubic metres per person—than any other continent outside of Antarctica ...

No region better illustrates the danger of water wars than Asia, which has less fresh water—3,920 cubic metres per person—than any other continent outside of Antarctica, according to a 2006 United Nations report.[6] This report states that when the estimated reserves of lakes, rivers and groundwater are added up, Asia has marginally less water per person than Europe or Africa, one-quarter that of North America, nearly one-tenth that of South America and twenty times less than Australia and Pacific islands. Yet Asia is home to 60% of the world's population. The sharpening Asian competition over energy resources, driven in part by high GDP growth rates and in part by mercantilist attempts to lock up supplies, has obscured another danger: water shortages in much of Asia are becoming a threat to rapid economic modernisation, prompting the building of upstream projects on international rivers. If water geopolitics were to spur interstate tensions through reduced water flows to neighbouring states, the Asian renaissance could stall.

As Asia's population booms and economic development gathers speed, water is becoming a prized commodity and a potential source of conflict. Climate change threatens supplies of this limited natural resource, with some Asian nations either jockeying to control water sources or demanding a say in the building of hydro projects on inter-state rivers. Competition over water is likely to increase political tensions and the potential for conflict. Water, therefore, has emerged as a key issue that would determine if Asia is headed toward mutually beneficial cooperation or deleterious interstate competition. No country would influence that direction more than China, which controls the aqua-rich Tibetan plateau—the source of most major rivers of Asia.

Tibet's vast glaciers and high altitude have endowed it with the world's greatest river systems. Its river waters are a lifeline to the world's two most-populous states—China and India—as well as to Bangladesh, Burma, Bhutan, Cambodia, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, Thailand and Vietnam. These countries make up 47% of the global population.

Yet Asia is a water-deficient continent. The looming struggle over water resources in Asia has been underscored by the spread of irrigated farming, water-intensive industries (from steel to paper making) and a growing middle class seeking high water-consuming comforts like dishwashers and washing machines. Household water consumption in Asia is rising rapidly, according to the UN report, but such is the water paucity that not many Asians can aspire for the lifestyle of Americans, who daily use 400 litres per person, or more than 2.5 times the average in Asia.

The spectre of water wars in Asia is also being highlighted both by climate change and by man-made environmental degradation in the form of shrinking forests and swamps that foster a cycle of chronic flooding and droughts through the depletion of nature's water storage and absorption cover. The Himalayan snow melt that feeds Asia's great rivers could be damagingly accelerated by global warming.

... it is the potential inter-state conflict over river-water resources that should be of greater concern.

While intra-state water-sharing disputes have become rife in several Asian countries—from India and Pakistan to Southeast Asia and China—it is the potential inter-state conflict over river-water resources that should be of greater concern. This concern arises from Chinese attempts to dam or redirect the southward flow of river waters from the Tibetan plateau, where major rivers originate, including the Indus, the Mekong, the Yangtze, the Yellow, the Salween, the Brahmaputra, the Karnali and the Sutlej. Among Asia's mighty rivers, only the Ganges starts from the Indian side of the Himalayas.

The lopsided availability of water within some nations (abundant in some areas but deficient in others) has given rise to grand ideas—from linking rivers in India to diverting the fast-flowing Brahmaputra northward to feed the arid areas in the Chinese heartland. Inter-state conflict, however, will surface only when an idea is translated into action to benefit oneself at the expense of a neighbouring nation.

As water woes have aggravated in its north owing to environmentally unsustainable intensive farming, China has increasingly turned its attention to the bounteous water reserves that the Tibetan plateau holds. It has dammed rivers, not just to produce hydropower but also to channel the waters for irrigation and other purposes, and is presently toying with massive inter-basin and inter-river water transfer projects.

Chinese hydro projects on the Tibetan plateau are increasingly a source of concern to neighbouring states. For example, after building two dams upstream on the Mekong, China is building at least three more on that river, inflaming passions downstream in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand. Several Chinese projects in west-central Tibet have a bearing on river-water flows into India, but Beijing is loath to share information. After flash floods in India's northern Himachal Pradesh state, however, China agreed in 2005 to supply New Delhi data on any abnormal rise or fall in the upstream level of the Sutlej River, on which it has built a barrage. Discussions are still on to persuade it to share flood-control data during the monsoonal season on two Brahmaputra tributaries, Lohit and Parlung Zangbo, as it already does since 2002 on the Brahmaputra River, which it has dammed at several places upstream.

Having extensively contaminated its own major rivers through unbridled industrialisation, China now threatens the ecological viability of river systems tied to South and Southeast Asia in its bid to meet its thirst for water and energy.

The ten major watersheds formed by the Himalayas and Tibetan highlands spread out river waters far and wide in Asia. Control over the 2.5 million-square-kilometre Tibetan plateau gives China tremendous leverage, besides access to vast natural resources. Having extensively contaminated its own major rivers through unbridled industrialisation, China now threatens the ecological viability of river systems tied to South and Southeast Asia in its bid to meet its thirst for water and energy.

Tibet, in the shape and size it existed independently up to 1950, comprises approximately one-fourth of China's land mass today, having given Han society, for the first time in history, a contiguous frontier with India, Burma, Bhutan and Nepal. Tibet traditionally encompassed the regions of Ü-Tsang (the central plateau), Kham and Amdo. After annexing Tibet, China separated Amdo (the present Dalai Lama's birthplace) as the new Qinghai province, made Ü-Tsang and western Kham the Tibet Autonomous Region, and merged remainder parts of Tibet in its provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan and Gansu.

The traditional Tibet is not just a distinct cultural entity but also the natural plateau, the future of whose water reserves is tied to ecological conservation. As China's hunger for primary commodities has grown, so too has its exploitation of Tibet's resources. And as water woes have intensified in several major Chinese cities, a group of ex-officials in China have championed the northward rerouting of the waters of the Brahmaputra River in a book self-enlighteningly titled, *Tibet's Waters Will Save China*.

Large hydro projects and reckless exploitation of mineral resources already threaten Tibet's fragile ecosystems, with ore tailings beginning to contaminate water sources. Unmindful of the environmental impact of such activities in pristine areas, China has now embarked on constructing a 108-kilometer paved road to Mount Everest, located along the Tibet-Nepal frontier. This highway is part of China's plan to reinforce its claims on Tibet by taking the Olympic torch to the peak of the world's tallest mountain before the 2008 Beijing Games.

As in the past, no country is going to be more affected by Chinese plans and projects in Tibet than India. The new $6.2-billion Gormu-Lhasa railway, for example, has significantly augmented China's rapid military-deployment capability against India just when Beijing is becoming increasingly assertive in its claims on Indian territories. This hardline stance, in the midst of intense negotiations to resolve the 4,057-kilometer Indo-Tibetan border, is no less incongruous than Beijing's disinclination to set up what it had agreed to during its president's state visit to New Delhi last November—a joint expert-level mechanism on interstate river waters.

Contrast China's reluctance to establish a mechanism intended for mere 'interaction and cooperation' on hydrological data with New Delhi's consideration towards downstream Pakistan, reflected both in the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (which generously reserves

56% of the catchment flow for Pakistan) and the more-recent acceptance of World Bank arbitration over the Baglihar Dam project in Indian Kashmir. No Indian project has sought to reroute or diminish trans-border water flows, yet Pakistan insists on a say in the structural design of projects upstream in India. New Delhi gladly permits Pakistani officials to inspect such projects. By contrast, Beijing drags its feet on setting up an innocuous interaction mechanism. Would China, under any arrangement, allow Indian officials to inspect its projects in Tibet or accept, if any dispute arose, third-party adjudication?

If anything, China seems intent on aggressively pursuing projects and employing water as a weapon. The idea of a Great South-North Water Transfer Project diverting river waters cascading from the Tibetan highlands has the backing of President Hu Jintao, a hydrologist who made his name through a brutal martial-law crackdown in Tibet in 1989. In crushing protesters at Tiananmen Square two months later, Deng Xiaoping actually took a page out of Hu's Tibet playbook.

The Chinese ambition to channel the Brahmaputra waters to the parched Yellow River has been whetted by what Beijing touts as its engineering feat in building the giant, $25-billion Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze—a project that has displaced a staggering 1.4 million citizens. The Three Gorges Dam is just an initial step in a much-wider water strategy centred on the Great South-North Water Transfer Project. While China's water resources minister told a Hong Kong University meeting in October 2006 that, in his personal opinion, the idea to divert waters from the Tibetan highlands northwards seems not viable, the director of the Yellow River Water Conservancy Committee said publicly that the mega-plan enjoys official sanction and may begin by 2010.

The Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo to Tibetans) originates near Mount Kailash and, before entering India, flows eastward in Tibet for 2,200 kilometres at an average height of 4,000 meters, making it the world's highest major river. When two other tributaries merge with it, the Brahmaputra becomes as wide as 10 kilometres in India before flowing into Bangladesh.

The first phase of China's South-North Project calls for building 300 kilometres of tunnels and channels to draw waters from the Jinsha, Yalong and Dadu rivers, on the eastern rim of the Tibetan plateau. Only in the second phase would the Brahmaputra waters be directed northwards. In fact, Beijing has identified the bend where the Brahmaputra forms the world's longest and deepest canyon just before entering India as holding the largest untapped reserves for meeting its water and energy needs. As publicly sketched by the chief planner of the Academy of Engineering Physics, Professor Chen Chuanyu, the Chinese plan would reportedly involve using nuclear explosives to blast a 15-kilometre-long tunnel through the Himalayas to divert the river flow and build a dam that could generate twice the power of the Three Gorges Dam.

While some doubts do persist in Beijing over the economic feasibility of channelling Tibetan waters northwards, the mammoth diversion of the Brahmaputra could begin as water shortages become more acute in the Chinese mainland and China's current $1.2 trillion foreign-exchange hoard brims over. The mega-rerouting would constitute the declaration of a water war on lower-riparian India and Bangladesh.

It is patently obvious that if water were to become an underlying factor in inter-state tensions in Asia, and increasingly a scarce and precious commodity domestically, water wars would inevitably follow. The water-related challenges also underscore the necessity for Asia

to adapt alternatives based on newer technologies and methods. Given that several Asian states will inescapably have to reduce their reliance on the natural bounty of the Himalayas and Tibetan highlands as temperatures rise and the glacier and snow melt accelerates, efficient rain-water harvesting will have to be embraced. The silver lining for the continent is that the rise in temperatures under enhanced greenhouse conditions is likely to bring more rainfall through the South-West and South-East Monsoon in the summer and the North-East Monsoon in the winter. The abundant monsoonal supply thus would need to be tapped through cost-effective technologies to provide a practical answer to the challenges arising from dwindling river waters.

Concluding observations

Climate change is not just a matter of science but also a matter of geopolitics. Without improved geopolitics, there can be no real fight against climate change. The growing talk on climate change is not being matched by action, not even modest action. Even as some countries have succeeded in shining the international spotlight on climate change, international diplomacy has yet to develop necessary traction to deal with the challenges of global warming.

At the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, 189 countries, including the United States, China, India and all the European nations, signed the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, agreeing to stabilise greenhouse gases at a low enough level to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Yet, fifteen years later, no country has done that. US per capita greenhouse-gas emissions, already the highest of any major nation, continue to soar. A leaked Bush Administration report in March 2007 indicated that US emissions were likely to rise almost as fast over the next decade as they did during the previous decade. Now, renewed global efforts are on to reach yet-another agreement to do what the international community had promised to carry out fifteen years ago.

The Group of Eight (G-8) agreed in June 2007 to try and clinch a new global UN-sponsored climate change deal (to succeed or extend the Kyoto Protocol from 2013), but failed to agree on a timetable for cutting greenhouse gas emissions. The Kyoto Protocol, which went into affect in February 2005, expires in 2012. But while the G-8 leaders agreed to seek 'substantial' cuts in greenhouse-gas emissions and to give 'serious consideration' to the goal of halving such emissions by 2050, this is still at the level of just talk.

The important point to remember is that about twenty countries produce 80% of global CO_2 emissions. So you don't need all the 191 UN members on board to combat climate change. One way to build international consensus on this issue is to engage states whose CO_2 emissions share is 1% or more.

It is also important to note that CO_2 emissions are not exactly a function of the level of development. The United States, for example, belches twice as much CO_2 per capita as Japan, although the two countries have fairly similar per-capita incomes. The US Environmental Protection Agency admits that about 6.6 metric tonnes of greenhouse gases are emitted per person in America, easily placing that country No. 1 in the world in per-capita emissions.

Take the case within the United States: California has held its per capita energy consumption essentially constant since 1974, while per capita energy use for the United States overall during the same period has jumped 50%. Through a mix of mandates, regulations and high

prices, California has managed to cut CO_2 emissions and yet maintain economic growth. Now it is seeking to reduce automobile pollution, promote solar energy and cap its CO_2 emissions.

... a global climate policy alone will not solve the current climate crisis.

Yet another point to note is that a global climate policy alone will not solve the current climate crisis. Climate change indeed may be the wrong end of the problem to look at. Given that nearly two-thirds of the greenhouse-gas emissions are due to the way we produce and use energy, we need to focus more on alternate energy policies.

Unless we address energy issues, we won't be able to address climate change. Energy use, however, sustains economic growth, which in turn buttresses political and social stability. Today four-fifths of the world's energy comes from fossil fuels—coal, oil, natural gas. Until we can either replace fossil fuels with cost-effective alternatives or find practical ways to capture CO_2 emissions, the world would remain wedded to the fossil-fuel age. According to projections by the Paris-based International Energy Agency, total energy demand in the world is to rise 68% by 2030, with most of the increases occurring in developing countries. Reliance on fossil fuels would marginally rise from 80% in 2002 to 82% in 2030. Given this scenario, all states need to endeavour to reduce their energy intensity—the ratio of energy consumption to economic output.

The harsh reality is that the global competition over energy resources has become intertwined with geopolitics. This competition now is overtly influencing strategic thinking and military planning in a number of key states. China, for example, cites energy interests to rationalise its 'string-of-pearls' strategy, which aims to hold sway over vital sea lanes between the Indian and Pacific Oceans through a chain of bases, naval facilities and military ties. But if energy security has become a foreign-policy challenge, whether in Europe or in Asia or elsewhere, why shouldn't climate security similarly be made a foreign-policy issue?

If there is any good news on the climate-change front, it is the ongoing attitudinal shift in the world—from the United States to Australia, and from China to Brazil. A prerequisite to any policy shift is an attitudinal shift. In the coming years, the world hopefully will see policy shifting both at the national and international levels to help build climate security.

It should not be forgotten that the human mind is innovative. History is a testament to human civilisation successfully overcoming dire situations and warnings. It has averted, for example, the 'Malthusian catastrophe', put forward by Thomas Malthus in a 1798 essay. The thesis contended that population growth would outstrip the Earth's agricultural production, leading to famine and a return to subsistence-level conditions. Actually, with a lesser and lesser percentage of human society engaged in agriculture, the world is producing more and more food. If people are still going hungry, it is because of poverty. Another catastrophe was predicted by a 1972 Club of Rome study, titled, *Limits to Growth*, which examined the consequences on economic growth of a rapidly growing world population and finite resource supplies. Indeed, since the study was released, global economic growth, far from showing any limits, has continued to boom.

As a real and serious problem, climate change should be seen as challenging human ability to innovate and live in harmony with nature. In the past, the international community has indeed reached agreements on environmental challenges, such as the control of trans-boundary movement and disposal of hazardous wastes (the Basel Convention)[7] and the phasing out of chlorofluorocarbons (the Montreal Protocol). The CFCs and other chlorine- and bromine-containing compounds have been implicated in the accelerated depletion of ozone in the Earth's stratosphere. The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, along with national-policy decisions, compelled industry and the scientific community to collaborate and develop safe alternatives to CFCs. That should inspire hope for international action on controlling greenhouse gases as part of a public-private partnership to create a Planet Inc. To propel such action and encourage industry to invest in alternate technologies, a mix of economic incentives and regulations are vital.

Endnotes

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IRAQ AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MIDDLE EAST SECURITY

Leanne Piggott

I have just returned from the Middle East, where I spent my time on the Mediterranean side of the region, geographically far removed from the tyranny of violence that has plagued Iraq for decades and in particular for these past four years. Whilst the 2003 invasion successfully removed a brutal dictator, the new round of internecine violence that has been unleashed in that country—especially in the aftermath of the February 2006 destruction of Samarra's golden domed mosque—still has analysts guessing as to what will be the eventual outcome for this state, which, I should add, has just been ranked number two in *Foreign Policy*'s 2007 failed state index.[1]

I say I was geographically removed from Iraq, but I was certainly not geo-strategically or politically removed, as I was reminded on a daily basis that the social and political forces underpinning events in Iraq since 2003 are clearly having an effect on the rest of the Middle East. Examples include:

- the export of al-Qaeda cells and their brand of global *jihad* from the training grounds of Iraq to the Palestinian refugee camps in Gaza and Lebanon
- reports of an already weak Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan straining under the burden of providing shelter for over a million Iraqi refugees
- talk of 'capturing the moment' between Israel and an alliance of Sunni-Arab states to resuscitate the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in the face of a perceived growing Shiite crescent of power dominated by Iran
- most interestingly, the branding by Fatah spokesmen of Hamas politicians as 'Shiites' in the struggle between these two factions of the Palestinian nationalist movement for control of Gaza and the West Bank.

Today, the Arab Middle East and Iran constitute a region of weak states but strong regimes.

But it would be wrong to see all events taking place on both sides of the region today as intimately linked to Iraq. Events there may certainly have acted as a catalyst for many political and security currents, and they may help to explain the timing of some events. Yet underlying the responses to events taking place across the region today—and I would anticipate into the future—are inherently local factors. Today, the Arab Middle East and Iran constitute a region of weak states but strong regimes. Whilst the primary security challenges to a strong (developed) state come from external forces, weak (developing) states face a unique set of security challenges that originate primarily from internal sources. However, what weak and strong states have in common is that their ruling elites act consistently in response to events, both within and beyond their borders, in their own particular interest.

This was not always the case in regard to Arab states. In the earlier period of Arab state formation, in the 1950s and 1960s, pan-Arabism was a dominant focus of Arab states' foreign and domestic policies. Egypt, for example, referring to itself as the United Arab Republic, represented the way in which Arab politics were defined at that time. But the effort to project Arab power on the basis of a united front was dealt a crushing blow by the Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Since then, Arabism (also referred to as pan-Arabism) has been on a slow decline, while statism (acting in the interest of the nation-state) has risen to the fore as a regime priority and a focus of more popular identity. The Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait in August 1990 was perhaps the last (failed) effort made by a Pan-Arab regional leader to challenge the Westphalian sovereign state system bequeathed to the region by European colonialism and the UN Charter.

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Using this weak state/strong regime framework of analysis, what I want to argue today is that, contrary to the views of most analysts and commentators on the Middle East, the entire region has not been significantly destabilised by the invasion of Iraq and subsequent events taking place there. There have been claims that some states in the region are now on the verge of collapse and will indeed collapse if the violence in Iraq spills over its borders. Jordan is often cited as a case in point. However, I will argue that whilst events in Iraq are having—and will continue to have—serious implications for Middle East security, further unsettling a region that is already chronically unstable, they do not represent an existential threat to any state. Likewise, the likelihood of armed conflict among regional powers as a direct consequence of events in Iraq is improbable at best.

Iraq

But before I go regional, let me begin with the first word in the title of my topic, 'Iraq'. As documented by copious reports, the present situation in Iraq is 'grave and deteriorating' with no apparent 'path that can guarantee success.'[2] Since the destruction of the al-Askariyya mosque in the Iraqi city of Samarra on 22 February 2006, sectarian violence and forced population transfers have accelerated. While some 34,452 civilians were killed in 2006 alone, an estimated 860,000 Iraqis became either internally displaced refugees, or fled to neighbouring states, mostly to Jordan and Syria.[3]

Against this background, it will be tough indeed to convince policy makers in Washington that the latest US military strategy to counter the insurgency in Iraq (the so-called 'surge') will lay the groundwork for turning the country around. In spite of early reports of moderate successes, the overall level of civil conflict, displacement, and sectarian and ethnic tension remains high, with no sign that the government of Nuri al-Malaki is making headway on critical issues such as the constitution and political reconciliation with the Sunni community. Accordingly, most analysts argue that the absence of a political breakthrough in Baghdad—coupled with mounting opposition to the war within the US—will lead to the majority of coalition forces being withdrawn from Iraq towards the end of the US presidential term next year. Although our Prime Minister has just challenged this possibility

in his speech this morning—stating that the coalition forces will stay the course in Iraq, and that they will remain there until the Iraqi security forces no longer feel the need to have them there—if it is the case that the senior coalition partner has the final say, then it is more likely that the withdrawal scenario will come to pass. If a full withdrawal does take place, it will surely leave a state on the brink of collapse at the heart of one of the world's most strategically important regions.

It is no news to this audience that the challenges in Iraq are complex and that the principal challenge to stability is now sectarian conflict stoked by external state and non-state actors. The violence—which has been steadily increasing in scope and lethality in recent years—is occurring in a context of a Sunni Arab insurgency, Shiite militias and death squads, al-Qaeda, and widespread criminality. The situation is further complicated by the fact that some of these forces are acting as proxies for outside powers. This unpredicted aftermath of the 2003 US-led invasion is the direct result of pre-war miscalculations and failures to plan for post-war reconstruction. The result is a collapsing, or for some, already collapsed state, and what is a 'complex mix of civil conflicts', rather than a conventional civil war per se.[4]

The key groups involved in these civil conflicts are:

- the Sunni Islamist terrorist groups, of which al-Qaeda is the most visible, who seek to provoke a civil war between Arab Sunni and Shiite as part of a broader struggle for Iraq and Islam
- intra-Iraqi Sunni groups, including tribal elements in Anbar and elsewhere fighting against the dominance by al-Qaeda and other Islamist groups, but who do not have any clear alignment with the government in Baghdad
- Iraqi Sunnis versus Iraqi Shiites engaged in ethnic cleansing in Baghdad and surrounding provinces
- Iraqi Kurds, Arabs and Turkomans in the north of the country, who seek control of Iraq's northern oil resources
- intra-Shiite factions who struggle for power in the south, including the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council and the Office of the Martyr Sadr.

If Iraqi insurgents are going to be motivated to change their behaviour and reduce the level of civil conflict so as to ease the strain on US and Iraqi forces, progress on the political front is urgently required.

The failure to arrest the growing tide of violence has been matched by the failure of the elected Iraqi Government under Prime Minister al-Malaki to make any progress in state building, and more critically, in national reconciliation. Without the latter, any tactical victories on the battle field of counterinsurgency will end in failure. As Middle East analyst Anthony Cordesman argues, victory in Iraq requires 'success in armed nation-building—a process that can extend over a decade or more—not simply the defeat of the most violent elements in an insurgency.'[5]

I will not dwell here on the key problems that still hinder positive political development in Iraq. I will only say that any level of success that the US might achieve through this latest 'surge' will ultimately prove ephemeral without the government achieving political unity, effective governance, and a nationalist ideology with more 'real world' impact than its extremist, sectarian and ethnic competitors. If Iraqi insurgents are going to be motivated to change their behaviour and reduce the level of civil conflict so as to ease the strain on US and Iraqi forces, progress on the political front is urgently required.

In the four years since regime change, the Sunni community has been hopelessly divided by competing tribal loyalties and has failed to produce a competent and popular political elite that could claim to speak for it.

In this respect, the Iraqi parliament needs to redouble its efforts on election laws, on legislation to distribute equitably Iraq's energy revenues, and on measures to deliver significant and sustained Sunni participation in the political process. Since being elected to power, sections of the al-Maliki government—which is dominated by the United Iraqi Alliance—have used their positions to pursue a sectarian agenda and exacerbate communal tensions. This has involved denying resources and government services to Sunni areas. In addition, the police force and Ministry of Interior remain highly politicised and have been guilty of acts of sectarian violence. Therefore, in order to drastically reduce the Sunni community's feeling that the Iraqi Government does not serve them, al-Maliki would have to act in a way that supports the claim that his government is sincere in its aim of ruling for the whole population, deploying its resources for the benefit of all. This would be a first in the history of Iraq. But for this to occur, the Sunni leadership must also contribute to the process. In the four years since regime change, the Sunni community has been hopelessly divided by competing tribal loyalties and has failed to produce a competent and popular political elite that could claim to speak for it. The hope is that provincial and local elections—scheduled over the next twelve months—might help to redress these deficiencies.

This assessment of the nature of the internal problems facing Iraq today, I should emphasise, is in no way an attempt to circumvent or underplay the role that the US played in unleashing them. Saddam Hussein artificially kept the lid on Iraq's fissiparous society by means of an appallingly brutal dictatorship. The US-led coalition removed the dictator and thereby lifted the lid. As former US Secretary of State Colin Powell once warned, 'If you break it, you own it', and the US did much of the breaking. Four years later, many analysts believe that the failure of the US to correct the tide of violence will eventually lead to the US and its coalition forces being driven from the country in defeat.

What, then, is the likely future of Iraq?

Attempting to assess the future of any country is an inherently difficult task. In a brave attempt to do so in regard to Iraq, I am very much indebted to Dr Toby Dodge who generously provided me a draft copy of his forthcoming monograph entitled, 'Possible Iraqi Futures'. In this paper, Dodge presents a set of future scenarios involving four broad alternatives, which he summarises as follows.

The first, and most optimistic, is that of 'success'. In this scenario, the new counter-insurgency policy now underway will deliver sustainable stability. Increasing US troop levels to 160,000—and changing the way they are deployed in and around Baghdad—will result in a permanent reduction in violence. Under this new security umbrella, the Iraqi Government will be radically reformed to make it much more inclusive and efficient and less sectarian. This will result in sustained political engagement between the major sectarian and ethnic groups and the rebuilding of the Iraqi state.

The second scenario would arise if the surge fails in its objectives. In the early months of next year, if it became obvious that his new policy for Iraq is not working, President Bush would radically change tactics. This would involve attempting to fundamentally restructure the Iraqi Government, focusing greater power in the office of a single strong leader, either a civilian politician or a military officer. However this was explained to Iraqis—and to US and world opinion—it would, in effect, be a coup. Its main task would be to remove the power and influence of those political parties that now dominate the cabinet. The hope would be that such a drastic policy shift would result in a more centralised but less democratic government that could deliver stability. But if this change of policy were to take place it would result in greater politically motivated violence and a drastic reduction in government capacity.

With this in mind, the final two scenarios proposed by Dodge both involve the US accepting failure in Iraq and attempting to draw its troops down. The variable that distinguishes these two scenarios is the speed with which this policy would be enacted and the success it would have in leaving some degree of stability and Iraqi Government capacity in its wake.

Let me add two of my own possible scenarios. Not surprisingly there are conflicting views as to whether Iraqis want the US to cut and run. While public statements made recently here in Australia by the Iraqi Foreign Minister would suggest that the Iraqi Government, at least, does not want the US coalition forces to leave before security is restored to the country, competing messages from other high-ranking Iraqi officials suggest that stability will not be restored to that country until after all foreign troops leave and full-scale conflict erupts between Iraqis, at the end of which the winners will impose order. This scenario is perhaps another version of Dodge's second scenario which sees the inevitable return of a strong man to rule in Iraq, but one that does not include the overt involvement of the US in determining who that strong man will be.

A final scenario worth mentioning is one presently being mooted in Washington concerning a possible strategic redeployment of the US and coalition forces from the centre of Iraq to the periphery and into neighbouring states such as Kuwait and Qatar. From these various vantage points, US forces could, with the right number of troops, limit the import and export of violence by state and non-state actors. If this proposal eventuates, it would seem sensible to locate sizeable forces in Kurdistan, Kuwait, and perhaps along the Iraqi-Jordanian border, while maintaining no-fly, no-drive zones along Iraq's remaining borders with Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia. The latter policy, you might recall, was highly effective following the 1990–91 Gulf War in protecting the Kurds in the north, as opposed to the policy of a no-fly zone only in the south, which did next to nothing to stop the brutal repression of the Shiite intifada by Saddam Hussein's army in the wake of its defeat in Kuwait.

The impact of Iraq on Middle East security

In the meantime, what impact has Iraq had on the Middle East? A brief survey might include the following observations.

Like Afghanistan before it, Iraq provides an ideal training ground for jihadi terrorists from around the region, who, upon returning home, have the potential to empower local cells or establish new ones of their own, thus threatening to destabilise the internal security of those states. This so-called 'blow-back effect' accurately describes what happened in the 1990s when veterans of the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and worked to topple their governments. But in the wake of the conflict in Iraq, Arab governments have taken firm measures to prevent a recurrence of this threat. They have been vigilant about who is entering and leaving their countries, arresting anyone who raises suspicions. In 2006, the Saudis began constructing security fence along its 900 kilometre border with Iraq in an effort to keep militants out of the Kingdom.

Lebanon, unfortunately, has not been as successful, as recent events involving the group called *Fatah al-Islam* have shown. I should also note that terrorist acts within the states in the region remain a very real threat, as recent cases in Yemen reveal. But these threats, it must be emphasised, have their root causes in the pre-2003 period, and are primarily related to internal or local state factors.

Secondly, the civil conflict between Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq has led to growing friction between these groups in other Arab countries, a factor linked to the impact that the removal of the Ba'athist regime in Iraq has had on its Shiite neighbour, Iran.

Iran's pursuit of a nuclear program in defiance of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UN Security Council is also seen to be, at least in part, an outcome of Tehran's pursuit of regional hegemony, now assisted by the removal of the menacing regime of Saddam Hussein.

Following the fall of the so-called 'Sunni wall'—that of Iraq to its west and Taliban-ruled Afghanistan to its east—the Iranian regime has been dealt a freer hand to realise its long held foreign policy goals of exporting its Islamic revolution and achieving regional hegemony at the expense of its Sunni Arab neighbours across the Gulf. As a part of this policy, Iran is now in a position to manipulate ideological and sectarian forces in those countries to serve its own national interests. While the influence of Iran in the Iraqi arena is significant and well documented, neighbouring Sunni governments have also warned of an Iranian backed-Shiite 'fifth column' in their midst and have in turn used this as an opportunity to crack down on anti-government opposition groups. An example of anti-Shia rhetoric is provided by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak who last year warned that 'There are Shiites in all [the] countries [of the region], significant percentages, and Shiites are mostly always loyal to Iran and not the countries where they live.'[6]

Iran's pursuit of a nuclear program in defiance of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UN Security Council is also seen to be, at least in part, an outcome of Tehran's pursuit of regional hegemony, now assisted by the removal of the menacing regime of Saddam Hussein. It is also driven by Iran's weakness as a state. The Iranian president's public statements denying the Holocaust and calling for or predicting Israel's eradication

have increased speculation of a pending show down between these two regional powers. Although there is much speculation that Iran would use its nuclear weapons if it acquired them, this is very far from being a given. It is also beside the point in the short to near term. The immediate worry about a nuclearised Iran is that the combination of a weak state and nuclear weapons capability is almost invariably associated with chronically belligerent behaviour to make up for the state's internal deficiencies. This does not bode well for regional security.

Nor do statements by some Arab leaders of their interest in acquiring nuclear power as a source of energy—alarming in view of the fact that the region contains the largest known reserves of oil in the world. If Iran goes nuclear, it is more than probable that other countries in the region will follow suit, thereby creating what has been described as a 'Middle East in a cat's cradle of nuclear tripwires.'

Iran's new positioning in the region has also empowered its proxies, in particular Hizballah in Lebanon, the effects of which exploded in a war between it and Israel in June last year. Both parties are still recovering and, all reports suggest, preparing for the next round.

To counter the now often mentioned rise of the 'Shia Crescent'—stretching from Iran, across Iraq into Syria and Lebanon—Sunni Arab regimes have strengthened their alliance with the US and made behind-the-scenes overtures to Israel. The small Gulf states are feeling particularly vulnerable, both from their own populations and from the actions and rhetoric of their Persian neighbour. As a part of this re-alignment of states in the region, there is fresh talk of the need to renew the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. An initiative promoted in March this year by King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia might well receive momentum following the disengagement three weeks ago of Hamas in Gaza and Fatah in the West Bank and the appointment last week of Tony Blair as the Quartet's new Middle East envoy. But don't hold your breath.

Fearful of an empowered Kurdish population on its border that might reignite the conflict with its own Kurdish population, Turkey has threatened intervention if Iraqi Kurds pursue an independent state.

Close by, Turkey has also increased its interest in Middle Eastern affairs, particularly in relation to the Kurds of northern Iraq. Fearful of an empowered Kurdish population on its border that might reignite the conflict with its own Kurdish population, Turkey has threatened intervention if Iraqi Kurds pursue an independent state.

Russia's political and economic resurgence in the last five years is a further critical and highly under-rated factor. Although the ideological competition of the Cold War years is a thing of the past, Russia under Putin is determined, for nationalistic reasons, to reclaim its former status as a major international player. The dynamics, so far as the Middle East is concerned, are eerily familiar. Russia, like the Soviet Union before it, sees Syria and to a lesser extent Iran as highly useful allies of convenience to counter the global pre-eminence of the US, and as proxies for advancing Russia's own historic ambitions in the region.

And finally, another critical factor that has not received enough attention has been the impact of the conflict in Iraq on neighbouring countries due to the significant influx of Iraqi refugees. Jordan is struggling under the strain of over one million Iraqis while a similar number have also found refuge in Syria, and smaller numbers in Lebanon and Iran. In the case of Jordan, an unanticipated effect has been the impact on its economy of the vast amounts of money that the wealthy among the refugees have brought with them. The inflow of funds has stimulated demand, creating new jobs, but also resulting in a rise in the general cost of living and pricing Amman real estate out of the reach of the average Jordanian. I was in that city last April and there was not one area I visited where there was not some form of construction going on. Any increase in refugee numbers will exacerbate these trends.

Implications for Middle East security

So what implications might all of these factors have on Middle East security in the future? Well, it's no news flash that the Arab states continue to be in deep crisis, politically, socially and economically. Most have, at least so far, missed the boat of globalisation. They are suffering from a leadership vacuum and they are in no position to determine the regional agenda. Former centres of power—Cairo, Riyadh, Baghdad and Damascus—are way past their prime.

But this process was not due to the US invasion of Iraq and all that has followed. The decline of Arab state power in the Middle East has been occurring over a number of decades in the wake of their failure to develop politically and economically beyond the rentier state model of the oil producing states, or the command economy model of states such as Syria. But while the majority of states in the Middle East are weak—and therefore susceptible to further weakening by the impact of events in Iraq—there is no sign that the authoritarian regimes that rule this region have been in any way seriously threatened.

Thus whilst most states in the region remain weak—especially in regard to infrastructural capacity, social consensus, and economic and human development—the coercive capacity of the Arab and Iranian regimes remains strong, indeed one might say 'over-developed'.

An important point to understand in this context, when considering 'the state of the State' in the Middle East, is that the region remains part of the so-called developing world, made up of states that are very much still 'in the making'. It is often forgotten that they only gained independence in the aftermath of World War II—some not until the 1970s. In the majority of cases (Israel is an exception), states in the region exhibit the classic characteristics of developing, and in some cases, weak states. These include weak institutions and civil society, a constricted economy and private sector, a low rate of identification with the concept of the state, protracted social conflicts, an absence of the rule of law with a concomitant poor record on human security, and a lack of regime legitimacy due in part to governments representing narrow sectarian interests rather than a broad national consensus on national security.

However, unlike other developing regions of the world, such as Africa, Middle Eastern regimes, in the process of protecting those sectarian or family interests, have succeeded in developing a considerable monopoly over the use of coercion by way of excessive military budgets and oppressive state police forces. Their internal security forces—the *mukabarat*—are considered among the most effective, if not brutal, in the world today, as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and other NGOs have reported over many years. Thus whilst most states in the region remain weak—especially in regard to infrastructural capacity, social consensus, and economic and human development—the coercive capacity of the Arab and Iranian regimes remains strong, indeed one might say 'over-developed'. As a result, although state legitimacy and institutions are weak, the states themselves—and their ruling regimes—are under no existential threat, irrespective of their location in relation to Iraq.

Indeed, when one reflects back on the history of state formation in the Middle East, although many regimes have come and gone, the state itself—an alien colonially-imposed model of identity and rule—has remained remarkably resilient. Even in the wake of events in Iraq over the last four years, I do not detect any other Middle East state on the brink of collapse, with the possible exception of Yemen, for entirely internal reasons. Lebanon is challenged, but I'm yet to be convinced that it will not pull itself back from the precipice. Lebanon's major internal groupings have too much to lose to allow it to disintegrate. I also doubt that Jordan will ever again face the challenges to its future as a state as it did back in September 1970, when Yasser Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organisation attempted to overthrow the kingdom to replace it with a Palestinian state, an event that was supported by an invading Syrian army.

It would appear, therefore, that all parties concerned—and to this list I would include the Shiites in Iraq and their co-religionists in Lebanon—have a vested interest in the preservation of their respective states, including Iraq.

It would appear, therefore, that all parties concerned—and to this list I would include the Shiites in Iraq and their co-religionists in Lebanon—have a vested interest in the preservation of their respective states, including Iraq. Whilst it is clear that states such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey are heavily involved in Iraq, seeking to influence political developments and to prevent rival regimes from gaining the upper hand there, they do not need to intervene militarily to achieve these aims. Nor do most Arab armies have the capacity to project power beyond their own borders. They are geared instead towards the protection of their own regimes.

Further, regional leaders have seen things go badly for the US in Iraq since 2003 and noted the domestic political price being paid by the US Government. They have no desire to follow this example. For the leaders of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, too, there is an additional lesson from the failure of US policy in Iraq: autocratic regimes in the Middle East have been given a reprieve from the pressure to democratise, as long as they position themselves on the 'right' side in the Global War on Terror.

As for Iranian intentions, the regime has thus far shown a preference for pursuing its interests through proxies, rather than through direct confrontation. While Tehran is able to maintain access to and influence over powerful Shiite militias in Iraq, a conventional cross-border military attack is unnecessary, and potentially counterproductive, from the Iranian leaders' perspective. Indeed, recent events within Iran, including the riots that followed petrol rationing some weeks ago, indicate that the projection of Iran's new-found regional power might well have limits imposed by its need to control its own domestic population.

One possible qualification to my contention that other states will not intervene militarily in Iraq is the possibility of a conflict between Turkey and the Kurdish Regional Government. Turkey, unlike its neighbours, is not a weak state and it has a history of military intervention in neighbouring countries. Its perception of the threat posed by a successful neighbouring quasi-state in Kurdish Iraq may be ridiculously and purposely exaggerated, but it is very real.

However, more generally—and I will conclude with this point—the Middle East is a region long familiar with inter- and intra-state tensions and violence. Throughout the half-century of state formation, local regimes have developed a form of resilience against subversion which has acted as a check against regional instability by allowing them to contain civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire neighbourhood. Thus over a relatively short span of history, Middle Eastern regimes have found ways to contain and manage protracted inter- and intra-state conflict and to ensure their own survival. Regrettably, the cost has been entrenched domestic stagnation and the systematic violation of the human rights of their citizens.

So this is both a good and a bad news story. The good news is that I don't see the likelihood of the region falling prey to widespread violence and instability in the continuing wake of the Iraq war. The bad news concerns the human dimension of security for the people of the Middle East. My hope for those who have suffered most—the Iraqi people—is that the future of their country conforms as closely as possible to the scenario of 'success'.

Endnotes

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Session Two—Security instruments and arrangements

THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Abiodun Williams

I have been asked to speak today about 'The United Nations and International Crisis Management.' Although the word 'crisis' does not appear in the UN Charter, maintaining international peace and security is the Organisation's fundamental mission, and the United Nations is constantly involved in crisis management—tackling multiple, simultaneous crises on several continents.

Experience has taught us that we must not wait passively for crises to erupt, but tackle the root causes of political violence, relying first and more effectively on cooperative methods, and reserving more coercive ones for extreme necessity. We need systems of governance that promote free expression and social justice, while protecting civil liberties and minority rights. And we must address the gross inequality of opportunity, which so deeply divides people in different parts of the world—and sometimes, in different parts of a single country.

In recent years, the United Nations has started giving more attention to prevention and trying to approach it more systematically throughout the UN system.

In recent years, the United Nations has started giving more attention to prevention and trying to approach it more systematically throughout the UN system. The Secretary-General's 2001 report on the prevention

of armed conflict initially got buried in the rubble of 9/11, but ultimately re-surfaced to become quite influential.[1] There is increasing use of UN fact finding and confidence building missions, and a growing number of reports by the Secretary-General on potential conflict situations. The UN's funds and programmes are undertaking work at the country level to address the underlying sources of violent conflict through long-term, structural prevention.

There is no doubt that early preventive action is less costly in human and financial terms than post-conflict enforcement and reconstruction.[2] Yet one of the persistent challenges of conflict prevention is obtaining sufficient political support and resources from Member States to undertake timely preventive action where it is needed.

Our post-war international institutions, including the United Nations, were designed to deal with deadly conflict between states. However, in recent decades internal conflicts, ethnic cleansing and acts of genocide have posed the most serious threats to global peace and security. The Organisation is still trying to come to grips with this reality. At the 2005 World Summit all Member States, after intense inter-governmental debate, accepted clearly and unambiguously the collective responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The responsibility to protect has been accepted in principle, but if it is not applied in practice this would ultimately undermine the credibility of the United Nations.

The United Nations is facing a dramatic surge in peacekeeping, presenting opportunities for the international community to help achieve peaceful solutions to conflicts, but also stretching the Organisation's capacity.

Although peacekeeping was not envisaged by the framers of the Charter, it has come to be a main instrument by which the Security Council deals with threats to international peace and security. It is also one of the most demanding and visible aspects of the Organisation's crisis management work. The axiomatic pre-requisites for successful peace operations are well known: each operation should have an achievable mandate, the cooperation of the parties, proper resources to do the job, and the political will of the Security Council to see the job through.

The United Nations is facing a dramatic surge in peacekeeping, presenting opportunities for the international community to help achieve peaceful solutions to conflicts, but also stretching the Organisation's capacity. This presents great challenges in terms of securing troops, identifying appropriate personnel to deal with complex peace missions, including francophone civilian police, and above all mobilising the necessary political and economic support. In 1997 the United Nations had less than 13,000 troops in the field. Today more than 100,000 men and women serve in eighteen peace operations in the most difficult places in the world. The UN peacekeepers are the second-largest international deployment of soldiers in the world after that of the US. The annual budget for UN peacekeeping has increased from approximately $1 billion in 1997 to about $5 billion today.

The recent surge in peacekeeping activity brings with it a growing and challenging volume of support demands. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is better supported and staffed than it has ever been. Even so, the Department remains a startlingly lean organisation by many standards. The Headquarters to field staff ratio remains well below 1:100. Unlike NATO, the UN does not have the sort of staff headquarters to support these operations. The surge has come at a cost. Few current missions enjoy the full degree of Member State and DPKO senior management attention that is ideally required, particularly in terms of reflection and review of strategy, policy, and effective public communications.

This is why the Secretary-General on taking office made proposals aimed at strengthening the capacity of the Organisation to manage and sustain peace operations.

On 29 June 2007 the General Assembly approved the proposals which include a restructuring of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; the establishment of a separate Department of Field Support (DFS), headed by an Under-Secretary-General; a major augmentation of working-level resources in both Departments and in other parts of the Secretariat; and new capacities as well as integrated structures to match the growing complexity of mandated activities. The approved reform package has been carefully crafted to ensure that the two Departments, DPKO and DFS, will work in harmony, so as to provide unity of command, coherence in policy and strategy, and operational efficiency, while promoting the overall effectiveness and oversight of peacekeeping operations.

When the Security Council has decided to establish a peace mission it is vital that the various components—military, civilian police, civilian staff arrive swiftly—even if the early arrivals are only temporary. As Ford observed in Shakespeare's 'The Merry Wives of Windsor', 'Better three hours too soon than a minute too late.' Member States need to take measures to ensure the rapid recruitment and deployment of competent military personnel and police. It is perhaps an inescapable reality that Member States are not willing to provide the organisation with standing international military forces. However, the 2005 World Summit encouraged development of additional capacity in a key area by endorsing creation of a 'standing police capacity' for peacekeeping operations.

The quantitative challenges posed by the surge in activity are only part of the story. The demands have become qualitatively more complex. In the first generation of surge in activity immediately following the end of the Cold War, 'successful' peacekeeping operations deployed to Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique with a comprehensive peace settlement in place. The P-5 provided united support. The belligerents were limited in number, easily identifiable, and relatively cohesive. International troops were largely self-sustaining. The areas of deployment were limited in size. And mandated peacekeeping tasks were relatively limited, focused on the transfer of state power.

The circumstances now present in the Sudan, the DRC (the size of Western Europe), Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti and elsewhere are infinitely more complex. We are mandated to assist complex state-restoration and building processes after decades of conflict. The peace agreements we are tasked to implement do not enjoy universal participation and support. The number of local factions proliferates rapidly within a constellation of shifting alliances, uncertain allegiances and lucrative opportunities for economic gain. The honeymoon effects of the end of the Cold War have been replaced with strains on the international system exacerbated by divisions over the Iraq war, responses to the 'Global War on Terror', and increased competition for scarce energy resources and global markets.

In recent years there has been significant progress in cooperation between the United Nations and regional organisations.

The growing number of peacekeeping missions makes effective partnerships in international crisis management essential. In recent years there has been significant progress in cooperation between the United Nations and regional organisations. Indeed, the UN Charter envisaged that regional organisations had an essential part in the world's peace and security arrangements, but that these organisations should act within the framework of the Charter. The United Nations and the European Union have cooperated in the hand-over of responsibilities from the UN International Police Task Force to the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and in July 2003, at the Security Council's request, Operation Artemis, a French-led EU force was deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and stabilised the situation in Bunia, Ituri province. The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has worked closely with NATO, the European Union, and the OSCE. The UN has also made marked progress in cooperating with the African Union in Sudan, in Western Sahara, in Burundi, in Cote d'Ivoire, and in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Greater cooperation with regional organisations lightens the burden of the United Nations and contributes to a deeper sense of participation among organisations involved in international affairs.

The role of the Security Council in UN crisis management is critical. The UN Charter confers on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council has been able to achieve much in the decades in which it has been involved in international peacekeeping. The Council has shown remarkable readiness to think creatively regarding its responsibilities and role—what it does, and how it does it. It has moved far beyond the interposition missions that are now seen as 'traditional operations', to mandate multidimensional operations and even 'transitional administrations'. And the Council now sends missions to the places where it deploys troops.

The Council is a dynamic institution. It has adapted to rapidly changing priorities in the post-Cold War era. Civil conflicts, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and other cross-cutting threats now feature on its agenda, alongside specific disputes. As a result of all these changes, the Council has moved from roughly one decision per month to one per week.

This said, the outmoded composition of the Council threatens its legitimacy and effectiveness. If the Security Council is to be a stronger instrument for crisis management, and increase its ability to garner the widest possible support for its decisions, then it must be more broadly representative of world power and the realities of our times. We need an expanded, more representative and thus more legitimate Council, appropriate for the 21st century.

Security Council reform was an important element in the 2005 reform process. The Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change proposed two models for the enlargement of the Security Council. The first model (Model A) proposed that six new permanent seats should be created, but with no veto being created, and three new two-year term non-permanent seats. The new permanent and non-permanent seats, when added to the existing composition, would produce a Council membership having six seats

allocated equally among four major regions: Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and the Americas. The second model (Model B) provided for no new permanent seats but would create a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new seat having the usual two-year term. Again, these additions would produce a membership that was evenly divided amongst the major regions.[3]

The Secretary-General endorsed the two models proposed by the High-level Panel in the *In Larger Freedom Report* 'or any other viable proposal in terms of size and balance that have emerged on the basis of either model.'[4] Despite several months of arduous diplomatic negotiations Member States could not reach agreement on Security Council reform.

The prevailing view among the membership is that Security Council enlargement is needed but there is still no agreement on how this might be achieved. It is clear that none of the earlier models and proposals will allow the membership to reach the consensus necessary to unblock the process. There is growing interest in and openness to a transitional or interim arrangement which would include a built-in mandatory review at a predetermined date to assess its adequacy.

Almost as important as the reform of the Council's membership is the reform of its working methods and procedures. There is a need to improve accountability and transparency, and increase the involvement of States not members of the Council in its work.

Reforming the Security Council is a major challenge confronting the United Nations. Agreement has proved even harder to achieve than widely expected, but the Organisation requires clarity on this issue. The confidence of all Member States in the UN's collective security system will be far greater once this issue is properly addressed. Moreover, a more interventionist Security Council cannot afford to remain unreformed.

International crisis management is also one of the main responsibilities of the Secretary-General. Article 99 of the UN Charter confers upon the Secretary-General the right—unprecedented in previous international organisations—to 'bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.' It forms the basis of the Secretary-General's political role and gives, in the words of the second Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, 'by necessary implication, a broad discretion to conduct inquiries and to engage in informal diplomatic activity in regard to matters which may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.'[5] Secretaries-General, however, rarely invoke Article 99 directly.

Good offices and mediation by the Secretary-General often occurs discreetly, behind the scenes, and is aimed at persuading political leaders to seek compromise over conflict. Different Secretaries-General have approached this task in different ways within the limitations of the office. But each of them has used the unique moral authority of the office of Secretary-General in carrying out the role of the world's chief diplomat. The greater the confidence of the Security Council, and the broader membership in the Secretary-General, the greater latitude the Secretary-General has in carrying out his political role. On a number of occasions in the last decade, the Secretary-General's good offices provided a forum for negotiation. The previous Secretary-General used his good offices in facilitating the Israeli and later Syrian withdrawal from Southern Lebanon; in getting Indonesia to agree to an international security presence to stem the violence in East Timor following the vote on independence; and in getting Nigeria and Cameroon to take steps towards the final resolution of their border dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula.

As the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change underlined, the demand for UN good offices and mediation has 'skyrocketed'.[6] The Secretary-General often delegates this task to his Special and Personal Representatives. Through imagination, ingenuity and personal experience, talented envoys have achieved notable results in many cases. However, in spite of the broad range of UN good offices, there has not been until now a central repository of experiences and lessons learned that could be applied in the future. Moreover, the Organisation lacks any solid system of selecting and training its mediation teams for supporting the missions of special envoys. This is why the 2005 World Summit agreed to strengthen the Secretary-General's capacity for mediation and good offices. The recently-established Mediation Support Unit in the Department of Political Affairs is intended to do just that by: providing support to envoys in the field; serving as a repository of lessons learned; and selecting and training mediation teams for supporting missions.

The challenge is to achieve continual improvements in every aspect of crisis management: from prevention to peacekeeping; from mediation and good offices to conflict resolution.

The role of the United Nations in international crisis management is more important than ever. But it is clear that we must do better. The challenge is to achieve continual improvements in every aspect of crisis management: from prevention to peacekeeping; from mediation and good offices to conflict resolution.

Endnotes

1 See United Nations, General Assembly, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Armed Conflict*, UN Doc A/55/985-S/2001/574 (New York: United Nations, 7 June 2001).

2 See, for example, Abiodun Williams, *Preventing War: The United Nations and Macedonia* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).

3 See the Panel's report, 'A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility' UN Doc A/59/565 (1 December 2004), para.251.

4 'In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All' , UN Doc A/59/2005 (21 March 2005), para.170.

5 Dag Hammarskjold, 'The International Civil Servant in Law and in Fact', in *The Servant of Peace: A Selection of the Speeches and Statements of Dag Hammarskjold*, ed. W. Foote (London: The Bodley Head, 1962, p.335.

6 See 'A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility' A/59/565 (1 December 2004).

TRENDS IN SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS AND THE USE OF FORCE: AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE

Rod Lyon

I have to admit the topic for this afternoon's presentation, 'Trends in security relationships and the use of force: an Australian perspective', is dauntingly large. There are some major strategic issues surrounding both the future of security relationships and the future use of force, so I shall try to touch on most of those issues during the time available. I shall also be giving you, as the title says, *an* Australian perspective, rather than *the* Australian perspective, because I don't think there is one perspective, either at the official or unofficial level.

Let me start with a particular theme that I would like to rehearse during the presentation: that security relationships and defence forces are essentially instruments of strategic policy. Like other sorts of instruments in the world, they are more or less useful depending on what it is you want to do with them. Ice-axes, for example, are useful in a certain context, but have almost no use in another context. Knitting needles are the same. So when we talk about security instruments, we should talk first about what we want the security instruments to do. This is true regardless of whether we are talking about defence forces or security partnerships. Well-designed security relationships fit their purpose, and when we make judgments now about the utility of our relationships we are really making judgments about the level of 'fit' between the security instrument and the environment in which it operates and the challenge we ask it to meet. I think in recent years we have made some useful progress in rethinking the role that security partnerships play in Australian strategic policy. We have also started to reconsider—although more uncertainly—how force might be used in relation to the particular challenges of the 21st century. In short, I think we're doing better at coping with what security partnerships might look like in future and we're doing worse at thinking about how to use force in the changing strategic environment.

But having given you that brief snapshot of where I want to go, let me set off by saying that broadly since the end of the Cold War, and in particular since 11 September 2001, we've seen growing uncertainty about whether the old legacy security partnerships that Western countries established during the Cold War days would remain effective instruments for managing a transformational security environment. That debate was strongest inside NATO. You can find analysts writing about NATO in which they're talking about the likely death of NATO from friendly fire, about NATO as a 'shape shifter', about NATO undergoing a process of transformation. Paul Cornish, who spoke at this conference last year, is one of those people who argue that NATO is undergoing a period of transformation—in terms of its move out of area, in terms of the functional responsibilities that it tries to address, and even in terms of its adoption of a range of soft power techniques such as post-conflict reconstruction for managing modern security challenges.

In ANZUS we've also had, albeit in a slightly softer voice, a similar sort of argument about the extent to which our alliance needs to evolve to match the changing security environment. And even the publications that have come out of the Australian Department of Defence now seem to acknowledge the need for the alliance to be more responsive to changing times. See, for example, the report on ANZUS, 'Founded in history, forging ahead', available

on the department's website. This pressure for change is driven primarily by the need to fit the instrument to the environment. US analyst Daniel Byman has written that essentially what we're all doing is remaking our legacy alliances for the War on Terror, and central to that remaking is not just a shift in the relative importance of various partners, but a new set of tasks for alliance members.

Now, when we turn to the academic literature to try to get some guidance about how best to redesign security partnerships, indeed, when we go away and search the academic databases for information on security partnerships at all, invariably we end up reading about alliances. Alliances are things that we know well. And they appeal to academics because they contain an inbuilt 'test' of their own reliability: did the allies actually fight together when they said they would? But security partnerships come in a variety of forms, and that's a lesson that has been pressed onto us by the events of September 11, and all the subsequent talks of 'coalitions'. Partnerships cover a spectrum: at one end of that spectrum, we might see a one-off idiosyncratic form of security cooperation and at the other end of the spectrum, we might see an alliance that has a fully integrated military force that trains together, equips itself with common equipment and fights together when security challenges arise.

As I said, the academic literature is rather narrowly based. It focuses heavily upon alliances and so focuses up one end of that possible spectrum of security cooperation. Even then the literature tends to focus most on how countries choose allies, how reliable their allies are, and how long alliances endure. The bulk of research is Eurocentric. Few studies look at patterns of security cooperation in those areas of the world, like the Middle East, south Asia and Africa, where the War on Terror might actually be at its hottest. Moreover, almost all the alliance research details how well alliances work in what we might call a Westphalian security environment; that is one where the primary threats concern interstate conflict. Few studies look at the possibility of alliance partnerships that include non-state members, even though the initial attack on Afghanistan after 9/11 did seem to feature some sort of strategic partnership between the United States and the Afghan Northern Alliance, for example. And few studies look at alliances that are invoked to counter non-state adversaries, even though ANZUS has been in exactly that position since September 2001.

All this suggests we need to think about security partnerships in a broader and more fundamental way. We've become much too narrow in our thinking on this important subject. In essence, if we accept that we are in a radically different security environment, we should be rethinking the key questions of alliance politics, asking different questions about the suitability of current structures and the advisability of new ones, and perhaps answering those questions differently from how we would have answered them in earlier days. If we were to adopt the model that Glenn Snyder takes in his classic text *Alliance Politics*, we should be reconsidering the big questions of why we partner, with whom, and how partnership payoffs are to be divided. I think the good news for international relations academics is there is a fruitful field of work here for some years to come.

I started by saying that I thought security partnerships were an instrument that needed to fit the environment. What we do know from academic research—essentially the research by Brett Ashley Leeds and her colleagues—is that a good indicator of alliance reliability is in fact whether or not the conditions in which the alliance was initially formed have changed. So let me revisit at this point the issue about fit. How much have the conditions changed from those within which our alliances were initially constructed? Well, what do we know about the current security environment?

At both the regional and the global levels, we face security orders that are stranger than strange. At the global level, the power distribution in the world is something like unipolarity. Now, unipolarity is a contested term, so I'll settle for hyperpowerdom if it makes people feel more comfortable, but one power dominates the globe. Unipolarity, or hyperpowerdom, is a rare form of international power distribution. We have almost no useful academic models of it. We can tell you almost nothing from academic studies about how long conditions of unipolarity usually last, nor much about those factors that strengthen or weaken the unipolar power's role in shaping the world.

US hegemony in the Asia–Pacific as a security order is yielding to a more multipolar structure in which the rising Asian powers will become more important poles.

But unipolarity is under attack, and it's under attack not from another rising great power but from a non-state actor. It's under attack from catastrophic terrorism. And let me tell you that catastrophic terrorism is a rare form of terrorism. So a rare form of power distribution is under attack from a rare form of terrorism. That's the global level. If we could simply worry about the global level security threats, we would still have a challenging exercise on our hands. But there's a regional level power contest that's also going on. US hegemony in the Asia–Pacific as a security order is yielding to a more multipolar structure in which the rising Asian powers will become more important poles. Those poles don't yet feature at the global level; they are 'regional poles' if I can call them that. Because of the global condition of unipolarity, it's possible that those regional poles will become more important poles within the existing structure—within the current regional 'tent', so to speak. So there's a regional-level power shift here in which we also have strong interests. Overall, the big picture is one of a global order that's beyond strange and a regional order that's characterised by looming power transition and the sound management of that transition.

Now these are not trifling matters. These are first-order questions about the shape of the future security environment. And then you come to the question of how you fit a security partnership into that environment. What role does it have? How does it contribute to the particular objectives? At the level of global order, Australians already have a security partnership—ANZUS—that bears on global threats, but what's the likely form of the strategic contest? The contest is between the very strong and the relatively weak. It's a contest between the secular and the religious, a contest between a unipolar state and a non-state actor, a contest between a mass understanding of warfare that we inherited from Napoleon and a demassified understanding of warfare in which nineteen people capture some aeroplanes and fly them into skyscrapers. So finding the security partnership that gives you leverage on the threat means you have to think about what you want the security partnership to do.

I think the partnerships that we build to cope with the challenges of asymmetric warfare have to be not merely agile, but novel. In the days of interstate warfare the primary driver of security partnerships was in fact power coagulation, really because war was about mass in the Napoleonic model, partnerships that increased mass or that increased power, that were power increments, that was the basis of what security partnerships were like for the

last 200 years. But if we look now at what security partnerships are like in an asymmetrical contest, what's the point of doing a power increment? The big party already outweighs the small party by such a factor that outweighing them more wouldn't actually determine the outcome. What we need is a security partnership that enhances our ability to determine the outcome. Maybe we need smaller partners rather than bigger ones.

I mean, in an asymmetrical contest if a dog is at war with a flea, the dog is not going to cope better with the flea by becoming a bigger dog. He would simply have more territory to defend with the same blunt instruments—claws and jaws—that actually can't get much leverage on the flea. So what we need in asymmetrical security contests are security partnerships that give us greater capacities to counter those smaller war-making units which can make our lives miserable. Maybe some of our most important security partners at the global level will be non-state actors. Maybe some of our security partners will be those who give us greater access into the world from which the demassified war fighting unit arises. So we have to think creatively about how we use partnerships to get to the core of the problem.

I think there are arguments in Australian society about how much we ought to 'fiddle' with ANZUS, because ANZUS is a central pillar of our security and we don't want to ruin it while trying to give it the excess leverage that we would like to see it have.

For ANZUS what does this mean? Well, how do we take an alliance that was built in an age where the key security challenge was revisionist great powers and reshape that alliance so it's got capacity to pick up a radically different security challenge. Moreover, we can't completely ignore the traditional threat: we might still have great power revisionist threats somewhere in the future, so we don't want to change completely the nature of our alliance, but we want to extend it in ways that give us leverage against a different sort of security threat. I think Australians are feeling their way along the wall on that sort of requirement. I think there are arguments in Australian society about how much we ought to 'fiddle' with ANZUS, because ANZUS is a central pillar of our security and we don't want to ruin it while trying to give it the excess leverage that we would like to see it have.

I think also at the global level we need to be more willing to partner with new partners. Sometimes those new partners might be non-state actors, but they would certainly include moderate Muslim states. I think when we look at the Lombok treaty, for example, the treaty between Australia and Indonesia concluded last year, what we see is not just an Australian attempt to build a better relationship with its immediate northern neighbour, not just an attempt to add ballast to a relationship that gets knocked off course by a single drug courier; what we're seeing is an attempt by Australia to find partners that might have special abilities to shape at the global level the long-term contest with Islamic extremism. Indonesia is the world's most populous Muslim state; its behaviour matters in terms of the global struggle.

Let me move to the second level, which is the regional level. The regional level, as I said, is characterised by the fact that one security order, a hub-and-spokes-shaped regional security

order, is in fact being reconfigured, probably over a period of a decade or two, to give the great Asian powers more of a stake in the order. And here we see, I think, that for Australia a key worry is what—if anything—we can do to make the looming strategic transition in Asia more stable. Primarily we seem to be trying to do this by nurturing conditions within which the Asian great powers can pick up more of the burden of supplying public goods to the region. I think, in essence, this is a central way of thinking about the security declaration between Australia and Japan that was concluded by the two prime ministers back in March this year. If we look at that declaration, it's not an alliance. We don't guarantee to come to each other's aid if attacked. So it's not up the alliance end of the security partnership spectrum. It's down the spectrum. It says Australia welcomes in the region a Japan that takes seriously, and puts efforts towards, disaster relief, peacekeeping operations, stabilisation efforts, counter-terrorism, and countering piracy, for example. These are all public goods; the public goods of the Asian regional security order. What we are trying to do in that partnership with Japan is to draw Japan into the region in a way in which it picks up a greater share of the public goods.

But the partnerships that Australia should be building in the region, it seems to me, over the next ten years are constructive ones that attempt to manage that sensible transfer from of one form of regional security order to another.

Over the years to come we will build similar relations with China and India. They will not all look like the Japan relationship. We will have different relationships with each of those great powers, but across the relationships we'll be trying to keep the regional security 'tent' upright while there's a transfer of weight from that original one-poled tent that emerged after World War II, towards a more even sharing of the weight amongst more tent-poles. It might be that this strategy will not work. It might be the tent falls down. But the partnerships that Australia should be building in the region, it seems to me, over the next ten years are constructive ones that attempt to manage that sensible transfer from one form of regional security order to another.

One thing I think has not changed, and that is the belief the Prime Minister outlined when he spoke to this conference this morning: that security partnerships are important for Australia's own security. He described them, I think, as force multipliers. And that's a good way of thinking about them, because well-designed security partnerships do act as force multipliers. I think it's interesting that Australia has almost never thought of its security solely in terms of the security of its own homeland and it has never gone to war alone. It is, in its deepest instincts and its strategic culture, very much a security-partner sort of animal. When it wants to work in the international environment, it likes to work with others.

Let me turn now to the second part of the topic, and here I want to talk about issues of use of force, because I do think we're starting to think seriously about security partnerships in new ways, but I don't think we're doing nearly as well in thinking about use of force in new ways. Here I have to go back briefly to the Cold War era to give you some sense of background to the current debates. So I want to talk for a little while about how we understood then

issues concerning the use of force, before going on to say something about how those issues might be changing. The shared understanding that underpinned our use of force during the Cold War era related closely to the model of warfare that was dominant in that era. That model, as I said earlier, is best described as Napoleonic, though shaped strongly by the capacities offered by the industrial revolution for higher levels of destruction. For the drafters of the ANZUS treaty and the other Cold War alliances the picture of warfare that shaped their alliances was that typified by World War II. The age in which Western alliances were designed was in the ten years that followed World War II, and it looked back upon a half century—really the first half century of the 20th century—in which revisionist great powers almost tore the international system apart.

Typically, therefore, we thought about use of force in an interstate context and in a mass-warfare context. Particularly after the invention of nuclear weapons, too, we wanted a system that locked down the use of force in international relations, that substituted threats to use force for the actual use of force. This was a way of using force that the US theorist Robert Art was later to call 'gravitational.' Gravitational use of force exists where force is used, like gravity, in ways that are terribly important but almost invisible. At the end of the Cold War, many members of the Western public thought nuclear weapons had been completely useless, because they hadn't been used at all. But in Robert Art's gravitational sense, they were used every day of the Cold War. In that gravitational sense of use of force we used force as a set of threats to lock away the prospect that a revisionist great power could use force directly and physically to change the system.

Towards the end of the Cold War we realised too that the two principal adversaries had things in common. This was what John Lewis Gaddis called the 'tacit rules' of the Cold War, the rules that had emerged over the years from patterns of silent cooperation. The two superpowers respected each other's sphere of influence, avoided direct military confrontations, shared a perception that nuclear weapons were weapons of last resort, refrained from undermining each side's leadership, and tolerated anomalies in the international order rather than undertaking unpredictable efforts to correct those anomalies.

But we've now entered upon a debate about the extent to which that use-of-force model and that understanding of adversaries still has utility in the current security environment. A debate now swirls around the circles of Western defence establishments about whether war has changed, whether our enemies have become more dangerous, and how force can sensibly be brought to bear upon current security threats.

I want to clarify the terms of that debate by putting use of force issues into the shape of a diamond. I want to talk about four corners of a diamond. The first corner of that diamond relates to Robert Art's distinction between gravitational force and direct physical use of force. I think within Australia some of that shows up even in a debate about the extent to which the direct use of force ruins its mystique, undermining its gravitational aspects. Those who argue that line often say that Iraq is like Vietnam, that direct use of force is wrong, that we would have got better leverage by playing the gravitational game. Central to this debate lies an argument about the continued effectiveness of the Cold War doctrines of containment and deterrence in the oddly, strangely reconfigured global order that we see now. I don't think we've resolved yet our differences of opinion about when deterrence is more effective than direct use of force or vice versa. But I think that many Australians see now—at least at the global level—a class of adversary that is not readily deterrable.

I think the second corner of the diamond relates to a debate about where regular warfare now fits in relation to irregular warfare. Here we find a public discussion about what state-based armies might be good for. Are they really just good for, as Hugh White I think once said in a *Sydney Morning Herald* article, fighting other state armies? This view says that everything else we ask them to do they can do after a fashion, but it's not their primary purpose. Along this line of argument, the more we try to use military force to achieve a second level set of political gains, the more we're ruining the instrument that was built for a more important cause. Now this is a hard issue, and it's not just our military that faces it. In the US there's a debate about the extent to which is it the task of the US military to fight irregular wars. We still don't do counter-insurgency terribly well. That's the lesson of Iraq: we still struggle to fight an enemy that doesn't wear a uniform and that hides among the civilian population. So on that second corner of the diamond, a major debate also rages, and it's one that's doesn't look like being resolved anytime soon.

The third corner of the diamond asks us to weigh righteousness against effectiveness, because part of the ways of restraining war, back in the old Napoleonic model, was to codify rules—sometimes actual laws—of war. These covered everything from when it was possible under the UN charter to exercise rights of self-defence to conventions governing how we handled prisoners of war. Righteousness, I suppose some would call it legitimacy, was about states accepting certain responsibilities for their conduct: in particular their conduct in relation to when they fought wars and how they fought them. Over time, legitimacy came to be seen as one of the key mobilisers of public support for military engagement. But for strategists, while legitimacy is a good thing, it's not good if it's purchased at the price of effectiveness. Very early after September 11, a debate ensued about the treatment of David Hicks, the Australian captured while supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan. Issues of law contested the ground with issues of war. The various pieces of counter-terrorist legislation passed through the Australian parliament saw a rehearsal of that debate. So within Australia, as within other Western democracies, there's a debate now about the extent to which our 20th-century rules of war still work in the 21st century. Are laws more important than outcomes? Should strategy be about outcomes and we'll do some post-hoc rationalisation of the laws as we go along? Again, on the third corner of the diamond, we seem to be feeling our way along the wall.

And finally, let's look at the fourth corner of the diamond. The fourth corner of the diamond says: Should force be used reactively or proactively? And we went through in Australia our own little self-contained semi-debate about pre-emption, about whether Australian forces should be allowed to pre-empt against a radical Islamic terrorist group living somewhere in Southeast Asia if all other courses of action against that threat failed. I don't think we handled the debate very well and the debate lived a sort of half-life in our newspapers and then quietly subsided. But it hasn't gone away. One of the principal concerns in the age of demassified warfare is that very small groups can reach a long way and they can do a lot of damage. Those are exactly the sorts of adversaries against which being reactive might not be the way of handling use of force.

On all four corners of that diamond, therefore, I think we see our old paradigm of thought under attack. The debates that surround the corners of the diamond break neatly into two clusters. One cluster of thought says that use of force won't change much now that we're in the 21st century and that it can be gravitational and reactive and lawful and it can be used against regular opponents. The second cluster says we're going to have to use force

directly, proactively, often waging irregular warfare against non-state actors, and we're going to have to work like hell to make sure we're effective, let alone legitimate. These two clusters pull directly opposite each other in terms of the policy recommendations that they have for government. However we resolve that problem, let me say, there is one classical problem that won't go away. Since Napoleon, the problem has not been prevailing on the battlefield. The problem has been translating the battlefield victory into political outcomes. If you look at Iraq today, we're still in that problem. Even if we can prevail on the battlefield with the latest 'surge', it's only important if we can translate it into a political outcome. The old problem created by Clausewitz's dictum—that warfare is a continuation of politics by other means—is that warfare only works if we can actually translate it into achieving our political objectives.

What does this mean? In terms of conclusions I think we're probably doing better at reinventing our security partnerships than we are doing at reinventing the way we think about use of force. I think we already see signs that we're using partnerships to do more than the 'old' defence agenda. We're using partnerships to build security orders a particular way. We're using partnerships to reassure. We're looking for different sets of outcomes now from our partnerships, and we're trying to stretch ANZUS so that it gives us competencies against a new demassified sort of war-making unit. On use of force issues, the debate is still relatively shapeless and inchoate. Essentially, the strategic logic of the Cold War tied us firmly to a particular position on use of force that we are most reluctant to abandon. The problem, of course, is that way of thinking about use of force might not help us address a new set of challenges to our security. This is an issue that we will be debating for some years to come.

Dinner address

THE US ROLE IN THE WORLD: AFTER IRAQ

Walter Russell Mead

It is really terrific to be back, and when I was invited back I checked with the organisers and I asked them what kind of dinner speech—you know, because I hadn't really given a dinner speech before here—what kind of dinner speech do Australians like? And they said long ones. And then I said, well, did they like a lot of anecdotes and humour? No, no. They like very abstract, dry, tightly reasoned presentations. And at this point I was getting a little nervous. I said, 'Well how long do these speeches last?'. They said, 'Think Fidel Castro celebrating the anniversary of the revolution.' So I thought about it for a little bit. I said, 'Well, you're not really paying enough for a speech like that, so I'm going to have to give you something a little bit shorter', and I apologise for that, but I'll do the best I can.

When I think about American policy after Iraq, I'm afraid I have this historic bias that leads me to look at the past and actually when I look at the whole structure of American foreign policy, our orientation to the world, I find myself actually driven back to British history and even, in particular, to a speech that Oliver Cromwell made to the House of Commons in 1656 when he was discussing a war with Spain. And I'm sure many of you are familiar with the speech, so I don't need to go into great detail. But Cromwell asked, 'Who are our enemies and why do they hate us?' His answer: 'It is the league of evil men around the earth.' 'And why do they hate us?' 'Because the evil that is in them sees the good in us, sees that God's truth, God's word, and I say this in all modesty, is more fully practised here in this island than elsewhere, and they hate it.'

It's fascinating to go through the rest of the speech. He starts talking about, you know, our enemy is Spain, which is Catholic, it's an empire which has placed itself in the service of evil. You can actually set this

side by side with Ronald Reagan's 1983 empire of evil speech, as well as Bush's axis of evil speeches. And Cromwell and Reagan both asked where was the origin of the evil philosophy that we face and they both agree it was the serpent in the garden of Eden, that the serpent was in Cromwell's speech the first Catholic, in Reagan's speech he was the first communist. Cromwell argued that you can't make peace with a papist, with a papist state. Why is that? Because you sign a treaty, it's only good, he says, as long as the Pope sayeth amen to it, because the Pope can absolve the Catholic from the sin of perjury whenever he wants. Reagan's point was that because the communists recognise no good greater than the spread of their philosophy, they will, in Reagan's words, lie, cheat and steal to advance their evil philosophy.

You can even go deeper into it. What did Cromwell say that he wanted from Spain. 'What do we ask?' He said, 'Liberty—only that.' He said, 'We need liberty for English merchants in Spanish ports to carry Bibles in their pockets. That's all we ask.' You can almost hear him going, 'Tear down that wall.' What's interesting too is if you look between Cromwell and Reagan and Bush, you see that if you look at how the English describe their wars with Louis XIV, with Napoleon, with the Jacobins, it's the same sort of language—it's an evil empire, it's determined on world conquest, it knows no restraint, it seeks to destroy our liberties, our constitution here, and furthermore it has a dangerous fifth column—Cromwell called it 'the Catholic interest in our bowels', which is a very vivid metaphor. I think fifth column has nothing on it.

And, of course, after the first act of serious religious terrorism in England, the Guy Fawkes attack on parliament, Catholics came under even stricter laws, and you had almost two centuries of quite strict laws against Catholics. Most of the time they were ignored, but whenever there was any kind of danger, whether it's Bonnie Prince Charlie and the 45, or some war, the laws are revived and brought out and put into practice. You look at Pitt talking about Napoleon, Burke talking about the Jacobins, you hear really the same thing, and you get to the First World War, you read Lloyd George's speeches about Kaiser Wilhelm II. They could be Oliver Cromwell. Christianity—poor trash for Germans was Lloyd George's view of how the Kaiser looked at things, and Lloyd George, whose personal piety is well known, talked about this as a war between Christianity and paganism for the future. Woodrow Wilson by and large agreed. World War II, the same thing; the Cold War, the same thing.

What's interesting is if you then go back and you look at what 'they' have been saying about 'us' during all this time, their discourse of why they hate the evil Anglo-Saxons has been as consistent as our discourse about why we don't like them. Actually, there's a wonderful history by a guy named Philippe Roger, a wonderful French scholar. It's a very long, dense book on the discourse of anti-Americanism in France. It's called *The American enemy—L'ennemi americain*. Roger once said he's sorry he only was able to scratch the surface of this rich subject. But we are hypocrites. We talk about human liberty, but look at what the British did in Ireland, look at the Indians in North America, Aborigines in Australia, Abu Ghraib—we've always been very good about giving them something to point to, and they've always pointed. You can find some of Napoleon's propagandists making speeches about the British empire, how Britain, in order to make itself prosperous, consigns Africa to barbarism, the Antilles to poverty, how it uses its mercantile monopolies to keep Europe poor, so that countries, even if they're territorially free from Britain, are commercially enslaved. I mean, Noam Chomsky could hardly describe it more clearly. And this is talking about the Britain of Pitt rather than the America of Bush.

So there's a consistency on both sides. There's another element in this, that this war, more or less, from the 17th century to the present day has been dragging on—this is the long war and this is the clash of civilisations to a certain degree. And an important fact about this is that the wretched Anglo-Americans keep winning all of these wars—not every little conflict. You know, the Mahdi did in fact kill General Gordon in Khartoum and so on, but all the wars that shaped the international order, from the wars of the Spanish Succession or the war of the League of Habsburg down to our own day, the Anglo-Americans have won. In fact, the British have only lost one major international conflict since the glorious revolution, and that happened to be the American revolution. So either Britain or both have won every major international contest since the 17th century. It almost begins to look like a pattern. But that could not be true.

So it seems to me as I look at the world, the big question is why: Why do the Anglo-Americans have this record of success? What is it? And there are a lot of pieces to the answer, but I think a big part of the answer is that the Anglo-Americans have had a common strategy approach to the world—it's deeper even than strategy—that shapes their engagement with the world. They've been doing it since the 17th century and it works. So what this really is—there is in fact the paranoids among us are right, there is a secret Anglo-Saxon plot, plan, to rule the world. And we've been applying it for 300 years and it works. You could call it the protocols of the elders of Greenwich if you wanted to. And because Australians and Americans are such good friends, I've decided to share the secret with you. But you have to promise you're not going to go tell any bad people about it. What is the secret five-point plan for world domination? By the way, we didn't invent this, neither did the Americans nor the British. The people who invented it were the Dutch, and they invented it in the 17th century, and we have been following it—so you could say the Dutch came up with version 1.0 of the operating software on which the world still runs. The British then introduced version 2.0 during the reign, I think, of William III, and the Americans introduced version 3.0 in the 1940s. We believe it was an upgrade. The British have another view.

It's also interesting, by the way, the way the British were able to take it from the Dutch: with one hand the British defended the Dutch from the French; with the other hand they picked their pockets. This is pretty much what the Americans did to the British in World War II, defending them from the Germans and the Japanese, but picking their pocket. What is also important and little known about this is the man who did it, Franklin Roosevelt himself, was from a Dutch family. He had sailed—his family sailed to New York back when it was still New Amsterdam, and in moments of annoyance, Roosevelt would say things like, 'This really gets my Dutch blood up.' He was very conscious of it. I think he secretly enjoyed returning to Britain the favour that they had done his ancestors.

The first point is—again it's not a foreign policy, it's a stance—have an open society at home.

Another thing that's interesting from this is that you can actually sum up in my view—and I love cheap misleading slogans; they're really a wonderful thing—the world history of the last 400 years in 10 letters: UP—United Provinces of the Netherlands, to UK, to US. Ten letters. If any of you can do better don't tell me, because I really like this. So what is the five-point plan.

The first point is—again it's not a foreign policy, it's a stance—have an open society at home. Seventeenth century Netherlands did amazing things: It granted freedom of religion; it allowed professors in universities to research whatever they wanted to research. It allowed them to say what they want. So scholars came to the Netherlands from all over. Rene Descartes came from France because he could have—you know, he ate the food for a while; he went back, but he came. And Jews fleeing persecution in Spain, in Portugal and other parts of Europe came to the Netherlands where they were welcomed, allowed to worship freely. Can you see in some of Rembrandt's paintings people becoming prosperous and secure and proud of who they were. Peter Stuyvesant, the Dutch colonial governor of New Amsterdam wanted to ban Jews from New Amsterdam. The Dutch West Indies company sent him a very stiff note saying, 'That's bad for business; let them in.'

To some degree, by the way, I would still say society's attitude towards Jews is one of the great signs of whether that society will be successful in the future, because it's a sign of are you willing to let your society be open to disturbing differences, religious differences, ethnic differences? Are you willing to accept innovative practices? The Dutch were. And in Dutch society in the 17th century you can see all kinds of features of modern life, whether it's the calculus, whether it's the invention of the microscope, but also the first stock market bubble, the tulip bubble, in the Netherlands. You also had the invention of what the British knew for 100 years as Dutch finance, a stable funded national debt, which is what the Bank of England was then invented to create in the UK. So this open society is generating ideas, methods, techniques, it's allowing people to do financial engineering that hasn't been done before, basically to do whatever they want. And it's meritocratic. The son at that time now, including the daughter of a poor peasant, can rise into the mercantile elite. You're not bound by your past. You can be shaped by the future.

Okay, that's the first part of the secret plan. This is the part that a lot of other societies had the hardest time imitating, by the way, and it's one of the reasons I think the success has been so enduring.

Point two: Take the show on the road. You have this open society; it now engages with the rest of the world.

Point two: Take the show on the road. You have this open society; it now engages with the rest of the world. It engages commercially through trade. The Dutch had 100,000 sailors in a large merchant fleet that was all over the world. You engage intellectually, philosophically, you send missionaries out, but you also get translations of the holy books and the ideas of other people, and you have a lot of ferment in your own society as you respond, as you let the world change you, even as you are changing the world. But the combination of your open society and your engagement means that generally speaking you do very well economically in your trade. You're bringing new ideas to people. You are bringing products that they don't have. You're bringing ways of organising human activities that they don't have and can't match.

... point three of the secret plan, which is to maintain a geopolitical strategy that essentially rests on being a balancing maritime power.

So this trade is generating a great deal of wealth, which underwrites point three of the secret plan, which is to maintain a geopolitical strategy that essentially rests on being a balancing maritime power. This was by the way the great weakness in the Dutch, that the River Scheldt is just not wide enough to insulate the Dutch from Europe, just as by perhaps 1940 the Channel wasn't quite as wide as it used to be. But in any case, the Dutch generated an enormous amount of wealth, which enabled them to hold off Louis XIV, the British followed suit, did the same kinds of things, and the balance of power works in a number of ways. By the way the phrase 'the balance of power' was first used in an international document, the treaty of Utrecht of 1713, that ended the war of the Spanish succession. The balance of power is not just about preventing them all from ganging up against you, it's also that France, which was trying to create a global empire and a global trading system, could never devote all of its energy to what it was doing at sea, because it always had to deal with these pesky land powers behind it that were causing problems and dividing its attention. And obviously the British, with all the money they were making from their global engagement and their global trade, are sprinkling it on allies, providing foreign aid we would now say, or military aid, and subsidies and so on to keep these coalitions together. But also, as a result of the balance of power, the European countries are scuttling around like scorpions in a bottle and the British Navy is the cork that keeps them in there, while the British are going out peacefully—peacefully—acquiring various interesting territories and things around the world and building markets.

So in the 18th century you have Prussia and Austria fighting titanic European land wars for possession of Silesia. And in case there are any Silesians here, I'm not going to say anything disparaging about this beautiful province in the Polish hills, but while the Prussians and the Austrians are fighting over this thing, losing hundreds of thousands of people and bankrupting both states, the British are driving the French out of North America and India, replacing the Dutch in all kinds of strategic places, and laying the foundations for the global order and world system that still exists today. That's point three of the power strategies. You can see the US as it looks at Asia, it remains very much a player in this kind of point three balance of power approach to politics.

Point four of the secret plan to rule the world is you build a global trading system that isn't just open to you, but open to others, so the British Navy didn't just keep the world's sea lanes safe for British commerce, they kept it safe for commerce. The British introduced free trade, saying other countries can trade with us, with the UK, even if they have barriers. And the idea, again, is first of all that you will grow richer through trade and because you're an open society globally engaged you are uniquely able to take advantage of this, but also that other countries will be less likely to go to war with you because they had this very pleasant economic system that allows them to get rich. This was the centre piece of US policy towards Germany and Japan after World War II. You don't have to fight another war. You don't have

to rearm to have your place in the sun. Work with us, be part of our system, trade with us and be as rich and respected as you could possibly wish.

Point four of the secret plan to rule the world is you build a global trading system that isn't just open to you, but open to others, so the British Navy didn't just keep the world's sea lanes safe for British commerce, they kept it safe for commerce.

So people in peace are attracted into this system and they also find themselves growing, in a sense, addicted to it. Some people will say to me, ' Oh, my gosh, will you look at that. The Chinese have just signed a major oil deal with Venezuela. And the Chinese are in America's backyard now. It's all over.' From a classic Anglo-American point of view, nothing could be better than large Chinese investments that predicate that the Panama canal will be indefinitely open to Chinese shipping interests and that China has strategic investments that actually assume good relations with the United States for the long term, because this is the other part of point four, this wonderful system of trade that seduces everyone into having globally integrated economies and investment patterns and market patterns and so on and so forth can turn into a weapon of war if there is war. German strategy in both world wars, German and Japanese strategy in the Second World War was very much conditioned, even decisively conditioned, by their need for certain products on which their economies had become accustomed to depend. By the way, also, in a war, because you have your sea power, your trade continues while your enemy's trade is cut off. They lose their global access; you keep it, which means that all of that wonderful trade that goes on in war when trade in commodities and so on shoots up because of war-time demand, you get the benefits of that, not your enemies. So the British and the Americans traditionally—it didn't work as well for the British in World War II—tended to become relatively wealthier and more powerful in these conflicts, even as their enemies were very often defeated primarily by bankruptcy and lack of access to the commodities and materiel that they required for war. So point four is a very important part of the plan.

... point five is promote liberal institutions.

And finally, point five is promote liberal institutions. This, of course, is our most devious and evil plan of all, because it works extremely well. At the base promoting liberal institutions, not even at this point promoting democracy, but things like courts of law, rights of private property and so on. They have two impacts. First, obviously, they make it a much better place for you to do business when a country adopts these things. And so when foreign investors can use a relatively transparent court system to enforce contract, to protect property, decisions are less arbitrary and so on and so forth, this is obviously very, very good for a

country which is trying to promote its global commerce. At the same time it tends to make the countries that adopt these reforms more successful within the world system. That is to say, they are able to develop better as they adopt different pieces of this agenda. That tends to make them happier with the world system.

And moving further into promoting liberal democratic institutions, what tends to happen is that as you defuse power away from aristocratic or military elites or other elites whose interests are different from those of the population at large and the mercantile classes, as those classes achieve more power in the state they are more—point four works better with that country. The wealth that is created by participation in the international system is more popular and the government is more likely to follow point four oriented policy. So you tend to get countries that are more successful in the Anglo American system and more likely to follow policies that keep them there and keep them at peace.

This is an incredibly devious plan. I think many of the things that our enemies over the centuries have said about it are absolutely true. And it has brought the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States now to positions of world power that have really—well, that have never been seen on a global basis, and countries that started off with great advantages, like Spain, which conquered South America and central America with all the gold and so on, didn't understand the five-point plan, lost to swampy little Netherlands. The Dutch were the chief beneficiaries of the Spanish conquest of the New World, because the Dutch knew how to use that money and to develop a modern economy based on the flow of currency that was coming into the Spanish empire, of which they were a part for the early stages of the Dutch take-off.

So we have a plan—we had this plan before the war in Iraq. I don't think anything that happens in the war in Iraq is going to derail the plan or to derail America's commitment to the plan. But to some degree this is not a consciously chosen foreign policy. For example, I'm quite sure that Peggy Noonan, who wrote Reagan's evil empire speech, did not study the works of Oliver Cromwell. One thing, she's Irish American—and for those of you who don't know all the details, Oliver Cromwell even today is not particularly popular in Ireland. And I think we can be fairly confident that while George W Bush is noted for reading a lot of history in the last two or three years of his presidency, he was probably not aware of the similarities between his arguments about Osama bin Laden and those of, say, the Younger Pitt or Joseph Addison against Napoleon or Louis XIV respectively. So, you know, it's quite striking and it's spontaneously and afresh people in the Anglo-American world come back to this same world view. I think it's rooted rather deeply in some things in our culture and so on. That's another talk which I'll be happy to give you another year. If I go on too much longer I'll see that—I'm not exactly a threat to Fidel Castro as yet, but it will be going a little longer than I wanted and we won't have time for questions and answers. So I will stop with the speech now and see if there aren't any questions. Some of you may want to ask—you know, I haven't been very concrete or specific about policy, for example, after the war in Iraq, and I'll be happy to try to drill that down into things if that's what you'd like to do, or we can go back and talk about the big picture. Whatever you're interested in. Thank you very much, by the way.

Contributors

Professor Brahma Chellaney

Professor Brahma Chellaney is Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research, an independent, privately funded think-tank.

A specialist on international security and arms control issues, Professor Chellaney has held appointments at the Harvard University, the Brookings Institution and the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies.

Until January 2000, Professor Chellaney was an adviser to India's National Security Council, serving as convenor of the External Security Group of the National Security Advisory Board, as well as member of the Board's Nuclear Doctrine Group. Subsequent to that, he was a Member of the Policy Advisory Group headed by the Foreign Minister of India.

He is the author of four books, his latest being the best-selling *Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India and Japan* (HarperCollins, 2007). He has published research papers in *International Security*, *Orbis*, *Survival*, *Washington Quarterly*, *Security Studies* and *Terrorism*.

Professor Chellaney is also a newspaper columnist and television commentator. He writes opinion articles for the *International Herald Tribune*, *Wall Street Journal*, *The Japan Times*, *The Hindustan Times* and *The Asian Age*.

Dr Robert L Gallucci

Dr Robert L Gallucci began as Dean of Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service on May 1, 1996. He had just completed twenty-one years of government service, serving since August 1994 with the Department of State as Ambassador at Large. In March 1998, the Department of State announced his appointment

as Special Envoy to deal with the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. He held this position, concurrent with his appointment as Dean, until January 2001.

Dr Gallucci began his foreign affairs career at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1974. In 1978, he became a division chief in the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. From 1979 to 1981, he was a member of the Secretary's Policy Planning Staff. He then served as an office director in both the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (1982–83) and in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (1983–84). In 1984, he left Washington to serve as the Deputy Director General of the Multinational Force and Observers, the Sinai peacekeeping force headquartered in Rome, Italy. Returning in 1988, he joined the faculty of the National War College where he taught until 1991. In April of that year he moved to United Nations Headquarters in New York to take up an appointment as the Deputy Executive Chairman of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) overseeing the disarmament of Iraq. He returned to Washington in February 1992 to be the Senior Coordinator responsible for nonproliferation and nuclear safety initiatives in the former Soviet Union in the Office of the Deputy Secretary. In July 1992, Dr Gallucci was confirmed as the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs.

Dr Gallucci was born in Brooklyn on February 11, 1946. He earned a bachelor's degree from the State University of New York at Stony Brook, followed by a master's and doctorate in Politics from Brandeis University. Before joining the State Department, he taught at Swarthmore College, Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies and Georgetown University. He has received fellowships from the Council on Foreign Relations, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, and the Brookings Institution.

He has authored a number of publications on political-military issues, including *Neither Peace Nor Honor: The Politics of American Military Policy in Vietnam* (Johns Hopkins University Press 1975), and *Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis* with Joel S. Wit and Daniel Poneman (Brookings Press, April 2004). For *Going Critical*, he is the recipient of the 2005 Douglas Dillon Award given by the American Academy of Diplomacy for a book of distinction in the practice of diplomacy. He received the Department of the Army's Outstanding Civilian Service Award in 1991, the Pi Sigma Alpha Award from the National Capital Area Political Science Association in 2000, and the Doctor of Humane Letters (honorary) from the State University of New York at Stony Brook in May 2002.

The Honourable John Winston Howard

The Hon John Winston Howard MP is the 25th person to occupy the office of Prime Minister since Federation. He was sworn in as Prime Minister of Australia on 11 March 1996, following the Coalition's decisive Federal election victory on 2 March 1996. Mr Howard was subsequently re-elected at elections in 1998, 2001 and 2004.

The Prime Minister represents the Federal seat of Bennelong in the north-western suburbs of Sydney and has been returned to the Parliament at every Federal election since 1974.

Mr Howard came to office as Prime Minister with extensive senior experience in both government and opposition. He was appointed Minister for Business and Consumer Affairs in 1975 at the age of 36 and subsequently served as Minister for Special Trade Negotiations and as Treasurer of the Commonwealth for over five years.

In September 1985 Mr Howard, as Deputy Leader, was elected by his colleagues as Leader of the Parliamentary Liberal Party and, therefore, Leader of the Opposition. He held this post until May 1989. He was returned to the leadership by unanimous vote of his colleagues on 30 January 1995. In the interim period between holding the leadership he served as Coalition spokesman for a number of senior portfolios.

Mr Howard was born in Sydney on 26 July 1939, attending school at Earlwood Primary and Canterbury Boys' High. He went on to the University of Sydney, graduated with a Bachelor of Laws in 1961 and was admitted as a solicitor of the New South Wales Supreme Court in July 1962. Prior to his election to Parliament he was a partner in a Sydney firm of solicitors.

The Prime Minister has been active in the Liberal Party since the age of 18 when he joined the Young Liberal Movement and participated in student politics at university.

In addition to his life-long commitment to public service and the Liberal Party, Mr Howard is a keen follower of sport—particularly cricket. He enjoys playing tennis and golf and follows the St George Rugby League football team.

Mr Howard married his wife Janette, a teacher by profession, on 4 April 1971. They have three adult children, Melanie, Tim and Richard. As Prime Minister Mr Howard divides his time between Kirribilli House in Sydney, The Lodge in Canberra and, of course, his official commitments in other state capital cities, regional centres, rural Australia and overseas.

Dr Rod Lyon

Dr Rod Lyon is the Program Director, Strategy and International, with ASPI. Rod was most recently a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Queensland where he taught courses on conflict, international security, and civil-military relations.

His research interests focus on a range of problems associated with global security, nuclear strategy and Australian security. He previously worked in the Strategic Analysis Branch of the Office of National Assessments between 1985 and 1996.

As a Fulbright scholar in 2004, he was a visiting research fellow at Georgetown University in Washington DC, researching a project on the future of security partnerships in the post-September 11 environment. He was appointed to the National Consultative Committee on International Security Issues in April 2005. He also authored ASPI *STRATEGY* report *Alliance Unleashed: Australia and the US in a new strategic age* which was released in June 2005.

Mr Walter Russell Mead

Mr Walter Russell Mead, the Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, is one of the country's leading students of American foreign policy. His most recent book, *Power, Terror, Peace and War*, (Knopf) was hailed as 'elegant and most timely' by Zbigniew Brzezinski; Henry Kissinger called it 'A splendid work ... informed, perceptive and valuable.' His previous book, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World* was widely acclaimed by reviewers, historians and diplomats as an important study that will change the way Americans and others think about American foreign policy. Among several honors and prizes, *Special Providence* received the Lionel Gelber Award (which the Economist calls 'the world's most important prize for non-fiction') for the best book in English on international relations in 2002. The Italian translation won the *Premio Acqui Storia* awarded to the most important historical book published in Italian.

In August 2007, Knopf will also publish Mead's next book, a major study that will explore the rise of Anglophone global primacy, titled *God and Gold: Britain, America and the Making of the Modern World*.

Since 9/11, Mead has traveled all over the world meeting with business, cultural, intellectual and religious leaders in the Middle East and beyond. His books have been translated into Arabic, French, German, Italian, Dutch, Chinese and Russian (forthcoming) and he has visited more than 80 countries during the course of his career.

His chief intellectual interests include the rise and development of a liberal, capitalist world order based on the economic, social and military power of the United States and its closest allies. In addition, Mead has directed a high-level study group on religion and foreign policy with the Pew Foundation on Religion and Public Life.

Mead is a contributing editor for *The Los Angeles Times*, and contributes articles, book reviews and op-eds to leading newspapers and magazines. He serves as the regular reviewer of books on the United States for *Foreign Affairs* and frequently appears on national and international radio and television programs. In 1997 he was a finalist for the National Magazine Award in the category of essays and criticism. In addition, he is an honors graduate of Groton and Yale, where he received prizes for history, debating and the translation of New Testament Greek. He is a founding board member of the New America Foundation and also serves on the editorial board of *The American Interest*. A native of South Carolina, he lives in Jackson Heights, New York.

Dr Leanne Piggott

Dr Leanne Piggott is the Deputy Director of the Centre for International Security Studies at The University of Sydney. She is a specialist on Middle East politics and security, having just completed a book on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Between 1999 and 2002, Dr Piggott was a member of the International Commission for Security and Cooperation in West Asia (SACWA), which acted as a third track diplomatic bridge between regional governments and civil societies in the region.

Dr Piggott is a member of the Australian Government's Foreign Affairs Council.

Dr Abiodun Williams

Dr Abiodun Williams is Director of Strategic Planning in the Executive Office of the United Nations Secretary-General and has held this position since 2001. From 1994 to 2000 he served in various policy positions in UN peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haiti and Macedonia.

He began his career as an academic and taught international relations at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, University of Rochester, and Tufts University (1984–1994). He won the School of Foreign Service's Outstanding Teaching Award in 1992. He is Vice Chair of the Academic Council on the UN System. He has published widely on conflict prevention, peacekeeping operations and multilateral negotiations.

His writings include *Preventing War: The United Nations and Macedonia*, and *Many Voices: Multilateral Negotiations in the World Arena*.

About ASPI

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) is an independent, non-partisan policy institute. It has been set up by the government to provide fresh ideas on Australia's defence and strategic policy choices. ASPI is charged with the task of informing the public on strategic and defence issues, generating new ideas for government, and fostering strategic expertise in Australia. It aims to help Australians understand the critical strategic choices which our country will face over the coming years, and will help government make better-informed decisions.

For more information, visit ASPI's web site at www.aspi.org.au.

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Strategic Policy Forums are online roundtable discussions undertaken when a subject of critical importance requires debate. They bring together a range of experts to discuss the main policy alternatives, the results of which provide policy makers and the broader public with accurate and authoritative information about crucial strategic policy choices.

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Budget and Management Program: This program covers the full range of questions concerning the delivery of capability, from financial issues and personnel management to acquisition and contracting out—issues that are central to the government's policy responsibilities.

Outreach Program: One of the most important roles for ASPI is to involve the broader community in the debate of defence and security issues. The thrust of the activities will be to provide access to the issues and facts through a range of activities and publications.

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

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