

He is even more upbeat about the dual administration of the Kurdish region. The territorial separation and institution of two parallel regional governments allowed for consolidation and greater effectiveness of the administrations, which were no longer paralyzed by interparty rivalry and could less easily be destabilized by foreign (i.e., Turkish and Iranian) governments. Both administrations included some of the smaller parties that had previously been excluded. Stansfield found ministries in both governments to be driven by formal decision-making rules rather than character. The major differences between them could be attributed to the available resources: the PUK administration had a poor resource base and was therefore forced to cooperate more closely with (international) nongovernmental organizations and the United Nations, whereas the KDP administration enjoyed greater financial independence. Stansfield concludes that Iraqi Kurds had almost accidentally invented their own model of consociational democracy, with some form of democratic centralism in each of the two subregions, integrated by gradually improving communication between the elites of both.

Stansfield is a benign observer, and he sometimes seems to take his interviewees' words too easily at face value, but his observations of the degree of institutionalization and professionalism of the administrations appear to be borne out by later developments. After the overthrow of the Ba'th regime, the two Kurdish administrations reunited, and the parties highly effectively represented common Kurdish interests in negotiations with the other political forces. With Talabani and Barzani complementing one another as presidents of Iraq and of the Kurdish region, the Kurds appear well poised to defend their gains of the past decade.

WADIE JWAIDEH, *The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2006). Pp. 417. \$45.00 paper.

REVIEWED BY ROBERT OLSON, Department of History, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Ky.; e-mail: hisposta@uky.edu
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It is extremely unusual for a scholarly journal such as *IJMES* to review a work, in this case a dissertation, completed nearly a half century ago. The fact that Wadie Jwaideh's doctoral dissertation has now been published in English (it was translated into Turkish and published in 1999) indicates not only its seminal and continuing contribution to the history and politics of the Kurds but also its fundamental contribution to the historiography of the 20th-century Middle East. The lack of publication did not hinder Jwaideh's work from being eagerly perused, heavily used, and widely quoted, especially after the 1970s, when interest in Kurdish nationalist movements began to grow.

Upon rereading his work for this review, I still appreciate and, indeed, am amazed by the qualities that have made it such a remarkable work. First, compared to studies of nationalism in the past three decades, his work is almost free of scholarly and social science jargon, with little loss of interpretation. Jwaideh was as punctilious in English as he was in Arabic. Second, he presents a masterful summary of the history and cultural and linguistic heritage of the Kurds, which is still accurate in many respects. Readers can still benefit from his account of the social and tribal organization of the Kurds, especially in Iraq, although subsequent anthropological work outdates it. He was able to put to good use his deep familiarity with the Kurds resulting from his employment, travel, experiences, observations, and negotiations with the Kurds as supply inspector for northern Iraq during the mid-1940s. Third, his comprehensive treatment of

Kurdish nationalist movements in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran was not surpassed until the publication of David McDowall's *A Modern History of the Kurds*, in 1995. Jwaideh, like McDowall, did not cover Syria. In this regard, his account, in aspects, is better than McDowall's despite the fact that McDowall had access to much more research than Jwaideh did.

Fourth, because he was an Iraqi Arab, raised in Iraq under the British Mandate and exposed to and influenced by cadres of officials who had served in various British colonial enterprises, he was able to contextualize Iraqi and Kurdish history with other examples of British colonial methods of control. Fifth, as a result, Jwaideh's work is a landmark study distinguishing native scholarly studies from that of European colonial ethnographers and anthropologists. Few European colonial analysts would have been able to achieve the even-handed, knowledgeable, and comprehensive treatment that Jwaideh provides. He knew the history and politics of his own country and that of its neighbors; he aspired to unity of understanding compared to specialization of definition. This is evident in his astute characterization of the 'Abdul Karim Qasim regime (1959–63) as providing circumstances in which the best possibilities of reconciliation existed between Kurds and Arabs in the 20th century. This interpretation has been affirmed by Eric Davis in his recent *Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq* (2005).

Perhaps the current major challenge to Jwaideh's work is his characterization of the origins of Kurdish nationalism as commencing as early as the late 1870s with the creation of Shaykh 'Ubaydallah of Nehri's Kurdish League. As a result, he unhesitatingly articulates subsequent Kurdish rebellions such as Shaykh Sa'īd (Turkey, 1925), the later Barzani rebellion (Iraq, 1943–45), and the Mahabad Kurdish Republic (Iran, 1946) as nationalist inspired, albeit with strong religious and tribal components. Most scholars today argue that Kurdish nationalism is a post-World War I development. However, it must be noted that Jwaideh did not have access to the thousands of scholarly works on nationalism that began to appear after 1960. In addition, his work was largely informed by British official reports, British officials, political agents, and intelligence agents who were captives of their own nationalism—especially if they were Scottish, Welsh, or Irish—and who were quick to assign such ideas to others they governed.

Why did Wadie Jwaideh not publish his remarkable study? Publication is something that every young scholar desires in order to put his or her career on the fast track, but Jwaideh eschewed it. In his forward, Martin van Bruinessen assigns lack of publication to Jwaideh's perfectionism and to the time-consuming task of building up a new Near Eastern studies department at Indiana University, in addition to the demands of graduate students whom Jwaideh directed in a variety of fields. All of the above undoubtedly played an important role. However, Jwaideh was an Iraqi nationalist, and I do not think that he wanted to be characterized as someone who was promoting Kurdish nationalism. This nationalism, he makes clear in his study, had possibilities of gaining strong autonomy and/or independence in the right circumstances—an autonomy and/or independence that would lead to the disintegration of the state of Iraq.

Jwaideh was prescient in another interpretation. He concludes his study by predicting that "[t]he reactions of the Turks, the Iranians, and the Arabs to Kurdish aspirations will be important, but the Kurds' success or failure in achieving their aims will largely depend on the international situation in their part of the world...no major country interested in the Middle East can afford to ignore the Kurdish problem or to avoid the formulation of a Kurdish policy as part of its overall Middle East policy" (p. 295). Although developments since 1991 have vindicated his sound geopolitical analysis, Jwaideh would have been horrified that it was accomplished by the destruction of Iraq.

Wadie Jwaideh died on 20 March 2001. May he rest in peace.