# Modular Residue Method for UNSAT Detection: A Restricted Conjecture for Linear Boolean Formulas

Jamesson Richard Campos Santos da Graça Independent Researcher, Brazil

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#### Abstract

We present a novel modular arithmetic approach for detecting unsatisfiability in Boolean formulas. By transforming CNF clauses into weighted residue vectors, we demonstrate that linear cancellation formulas (particularly XOR-SAT contradictions) exhibit distinctive residue patterns under prime modulus operations. Empirical results show normalized residues  $(S(\varphi)/M)$  below 0.05 for linear systems, while non-linear structures (Tseitin graphs, pigeonhole principle) display significantly higher values. This work establishes a theoretical foundation for algebraic UNSAT certification in constrained formula classes, with potential applications in SAT solver preprocessing.

Keywords: modular arithmetic, UNSAT detection, XOR-SAT, residue patterns.

### 1 Key Results

- Linear/Non-linear Dichotomy: XOR-SAT formulas achieve  $S(\varphi)/M < 0.0156$  (exponential encoding, M = 9973), while Tseitin and PHP formulas yield values > 0.56.
- Encoding Sensitivity: Sum-of-exponentials encoding  $(c_i = \sum_{\ell \in C_i} 3^{|\ell|})$  outperforms simple bitwise XOR for linear UNSAT detection under modular arithmetic.
- Modulus Selection: Prime moduli  $M \ge 100003$  are optimal for cryptographic weight functions (e.g., SHA256), while smaller primes (e.g., 9973) suffice for structured encodings.
- Empirical Validation: Over 150 tests on canonical, industrial, and random formulas (up to 200 variables) confirm the residue patterns across classes.

## 2 Methodology

We compute the modular residue invariant  $S(\varphi; w, M)$  for a Boolean formula  $\varphi$  in CNF as follows:

1. Clause Encoding: Map each clause  $C_i$  to an integer  $c_i$ . Examples:

XOR encoding: 
$$c_i = \bigoplus_{\ell \in C_i} 2^{|\ell|},$$
  
Exponential encoding:  $c_i = \sum_{\ell \in C_i} 3^{|\ell|}.$ 

2. Weight Assignment: Compute a weight per clause index via

$$w_i = SHA256(i) \mod M$$
.

3. Residue Summation: Form the invariant

$$S(\varphi; w, M) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i \cdot c_i \mod M.$$

4. **Validation**: For UNSAT formulas in classes with linear cancellation (e.g., XOR-SAT, Horn-SAT), we observe

$$\frac{S(\varphi;w,M)}{M}<\epsilon \quad (\epsilon\approx 0.05),$$

whereas non-linear structures yield significantly larger residues.

### Comparison of Normalized Residue by Formula Clas




Figure 1: Normalized residue comparison across formula classes. XOR-SAT (green) remains below the  $\epsilon=0.05$  threshold (dashed line), while Tseitin (red) and PHP (orange) exceed this limit.




Figure 2: Contribution distributions for (a) XOR-SAT ( $\mu = 2.1$ ,  $\sigma = 1.8$ ) vs (b) Tseitin/PHP ( $\mu = 42100$ ,  $\sigma = 28700$ ), demonstrating differences in clause cancellation patterns.

### 3 Limitations

- Formula Class Dependence: Effective only for formulas with linear clause cancellation patterns (e.g., XOR-SAT, Horn-SAT).
- Modulus Sensitivity: The choice of modulus affects residue distribution; careful selection is necessary to avoid artifacts.
- Computational Overhead: Cryptographic weight functions (e.g., SHA256) increase processing time by  $\sim 35\%$  relative to simple numeric encodings.

#### **Modulus Selection Impact**

The choice of modulus M affects residue distribution:

- Primes  $M \ge 100003$ : Best for cryptographic weights (SHA256).
- Powers of 2: Efficient but may mask cancellation patterns.
- Small primes (< 1000): Risk of false positives.

### References

- [1] Armin Biere and Marijn Heule. *Handbook of Satisfiability*, volume 185 of *Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications*. IOS Press, 2009.
- [2] Jamesson Richard Campos Santos da Graça. Clique modular unsat validation repository. https://github.com/JamesClick/clique-modular-unsat-validated, 2025.
- [3] Stephen A. Cook. The complexity of theorem-proving procedures. *Proceedings of the Third Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)*, pages 151–158, 1971.

### Data Availability

All datasets, scripts, and LaTeX sources are available at https://github.com/JamesClick/clique-modular-unsat-validated.