

Consider neighborhood values $V(z)$ in an arbitrary neighborhood/zone pair, dropping i subscripts. As derived before, this is

$$\kappa(z)\beta^{-\beta}(1-\beta)^{-(1-\beta)}(R-P\bar{A})^\beta P^{-\beta}(wz-R)^{1-\beta} + \log b(z)$$

if regulation is binding at z (0 if housing unaffordable), and

$$\kappa(z)\frac{wz-P\bar{A}}{P^\beta}$$

otherwise. Let $C'(z) + \log b'(z)$ be the neighborhood value in the counterfactual equilibrium. We now want to find the compensating variation associated with a policy change. This solves the equation in τ :

$$\kappa(z)\beta^{-\beta}(1-\beta)^{-(1-\beta)}(R-P\bar{A})^\beta P^{-\beta}(w\tau z-R)^{1-\beta} = C'(z) + \log b'(z)$$

if $\beta w\tau z + (1-\beta)P\bar{A} < R$, or

$$\kappa(z)\frac{w\tau z-P\bar{A}}{P^\beta} = C'(z) + \log b'(z)$$

otherwise. If utility is zero both before and after the policy change, we take the smallest equivalent variation measure $\tau = 1$. The equivalent variation τ thus has the closed form solution:

$$\tau = \left\lceil \frac{R - (1-\beta)P\bar{A}}{w\beta\kappa(z)} \right\rceil \quad (1)$$

if τ satisfies $\beta w(1+\tau)z + (1-\beta)P\bar{A} < R$ (i.e. unconstrained-ness after increase in cash injection τ). Otherwise, the solution is instead