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## Proposition 2 Cleanup

**Proposition 1.** Suppose  $\Omega(z) = \Omega$  for all  $z$ ,  $\bar{A} = 0$ , and all households are perfectly mobile across space. Recall that  $\beta$  is the Cobb-Douglas weight on housing consumption and  $\epsilon$  is the housing supply elasticity in each neighborhood.

Suppose  $k\Omega > \frac{\beta}{1+\epsilon}$  for some  $k > 0$ . Then,

1. If income sorting absent regulation is **strong**, imposing a marginal increase in the minimum lot size in  $i_1$  around a deregulated equilibrium benefits all renters.
2. If income sorting absent regulation is **weak** and type  $z_m$  households have higher income than the average household, imposing a marginal increase in the minimum lot size in  $i_1$  around the deregulated equilibrium hurts low income renters  $z_l$  and benefits all other renters.

**Decomposing welfare** I have emphasized three margins by which deregulation affects welfare: 1) housing affordability by increasing the supply of low quality housing, 2) aggregate labour productivity achieved by the expansion of productive cities, and 3) externalities in neighborhood choice. I decompose the welfare equation (xx) to elucidate these three channels. To this end, suppose preferences are Cobb-Douglas ( $\bar{A} = 0$ ) and households are perfectly mobile ( $\theta = \rho = \infty$ ). In Appendix (xx), I show that log welfare of a type  $z$  agent can be expressed as

$$\log \mathbf{W}(z) = \underbrace{\frac{G(z)}{\sum_{c \in C} \sum_{i \in N(c)} \frac{P(i)^\beta}{D(i,z)} L(i,z)}}_{\text{Affordability-weighted aggregate productivity}} + \underbrace{\frac{\sum_{c \in C} \sum_{i \in N(c)} \frac{P(i)^\beta}{D(i,z)} L(i,z) \log b(i,z)}{\sum_{c \in C} \sum_{i \in N(c)} \frac{P(i)^\beta}{D(i,z)} L(i,z)}}_{\text{Affordability-weighted amenities}} \quad (1)$$

where  $G(z)$  is the aggregate output produced by type  $z$  households,  $P(i)$  is the housing price in neighborhood  $i$ ,  $\beta$  is the spending share on housing absent regulation and  $D(i, z)$  is the *distortion factor*, which is the discount factor on consumption caused by binding regulation, and  $L(i, z)$  is the neighborhood  $i$