**4 The data of philosophical arguments**

# 第4章 哲学论证的数据

Conceptual analysis 概念分析

So much for the phenomenological method. Although Anglo-American philosophers occasionally and perhaps increasingly appeal to phenomenology, arguably the main source of discipline in English and American philosophy to this day is (conceptual) analysis. Now, saying this isn’t necessarily saying very much, for, in the course of the twentieth century (and the first decade of the twenty-first), adherents of philosophical analysis have taken themselves to be doing very different things.[28](#_bookmark409) We shall, however, concentrate on a relatively simple model of analysis which we believe captures the practice of a great many philosophers, whether or not they like to advertise the fact.[29](#_bookmark410)

28 See Beaney [2009](#_bookmark413).

29 Perhaps, as Frank Jackson surmises, ‘There is a lot of“closet”conceptual analysis going on’ (1998: vii).

现象学的（phenomenological）方法就说到这里，虽然英美哲学家偶尔、也可能是越来越多地诉诸于现象学，但可以说，时至今日英美哲学的主要学科源头还是（概念）分析。提到这件事并不一定意味着什么，因为，在20世纪（以及21世纪的第一个十年）的过程中，哲学分析（philosophical analysis）的追随者们已经把他们自己看作是在做非常不同的事情。然而，我们将集中关注一个相对简单的分析模型，我们相信这个模型引发(captures)了许多哲学家的实践，不管他们是否乐意宣传这个事实。

29 也许，正如弗兰克·杰克逊（Frank Jackson）猜测的那样，“有很多‘隐秘的’概念分析正在进行中”（1998: vii）。

As we mentioned in [Chapter 3](#_bookmark71), prominent ordinary language philosopher J. L. Austin described his procedure as that of ‘examining what we should say when’ .[30](#_bookmark411) Austin’s idea was that we can shed light on a philosophically interesting concept[31](#_bookmark412) – say, the concept of knowledge – by looking at the sorts of situations in which we would say (or would not say) that someone knows something (or doesn’t know something). Whilst ordinary language philosophy has long since fallen out of favour, a workable model of analysis can be developed in a few simple steps if we take our point of departure in analysis as understood by Austin and his Oxford colleagues. One of these colleagues, H. P. Grice, offered the following characterisation of conceptual analysis:

To be looking for a conceptual analysis of a given expression E is to be in a position to apply or withhold E in particular cases, but to be looking for a general characterization of the types of cases in which one would apply E rather than withhold it … the characteristic procedure is to think up a possible general characterization of one’s use of E and then to test it by trying to find or imagine a particular situation which fits the suggested characterization and yet would not be a situation in which one would apply E.[32](#_bookmark415)

30 Austin [1979](#_bookmark141): 181.

31 It is a very delicate question what, precisely, concepts are. Most would agree that the concept ‘horse’ is what the words ‘horse’ , ‘Pferd’ and ‘cheval’ all express (in English, German and French, respectively), but beyond that, things get tricky. Some, such as Frege, take a Platonist view of concepts, while others, perhaps a majority, think of concepts as mental representations.

32 Grice [1989](#_bookmark418): 174. 33 Jackson [1998](#_bookmark419): 33. 34 See Grice [1989](#_bookmark418): 1– 57.

正如我们在第三章中提到的，著名的日常语言哲学家J.L.奥斯汀（J.L.Austin）将他的哲学过程描述为“检验*我们在什么时候该说什么*”。奥斯汀的观点是，我们可以通过观察我们说（或者不说）某人知道某事（或不知道某事）的情形，来阐明一个哲学上很有趣的概念——比如说，知识的概念。虽然一般的语言哲学早已失势，但是如果我们从奥斯汀和他的牛津同事所理解的分析的出发点出发，一个可行的分析模型就能通过几个简单的步骤构建出来。这些同事之一的H.P.格里斯（H.P.Grice）对概念分析的特征进行了如下的描述：

对于给定表达（expression）E的概念分析，需要经过如下步骤：应当寻找应用 E 或者不应用 E 的特定情形，而不是寻找一个我们可以应用而不是撤回E的情况类型的普遍特征描述……典型的步骤是设想对一个人在使用 E 的场景中的可能普遍特征，然后进行这样的测试：努力找到或构想一个符合刻画的特定情景，但是在这个情景却是人们不使用E的情景。

31 概念到底是什么，这是一个非常微妙的问题。大多数人会同意“马”这个概念就是“horse”、“Pferd”和“cheval”（分别是英语、德语和法语），但除掉这个，事情就棘手了。有些人，比如弗雷格（Frege），对概念持柏拉图主义的看法，而其他人，也许是大多数人，则认为概念是心理层面上的表征（mental representations）。

A majority of the current community of philosophers would probably reject a couple of explicit and implicit assumptions in this quote. First of all, most philosophers would be wary of the linguistic emphasis discernable in Grice’s passage. As we might put it, philosophers aren’t, or ought not to be, particularly concerned with expressions. Philosophers should pose questions about knowledge, perception, the good or perhaps the ‘concepts’ of knowledge, perception and the good, but not about the expressions ‘ … knows … ’ , ‘ … sees … ’ , ‘good’ . As Frank Jackson puts it, ‘our focus is on getting clear about the cases covered [by a particular word] rather than on what does the covering, the word *per se*’ .[33](#_bookmark416)

33 See Grice [1989](#_bookmark418): 1– 57.

大多数现在的哲学家群体可能会拒绝这段引文中的一对显性的和隐性的假设。首先，格里斯的文章中容易辨别出语言性强调，大多数哲学家对于这一点非常担心。我们可以这么说，哲学家不是，或不应该特别关注*表达*。哲学家应该提出关于知识、感知、善或者也许是关于它们的概念，而不是关于如“……知道……”“……领会……”“善”这样的表达。弗兰克·杰克逊（Frank Jackson）这样说：“我们的焦点是弄清楚（某个词）所覆盖的情景，而不是弄清楚这个覆盖者、这个词*本身（per se）*在做什么。”

Second, Grice speaks of situations in which ‘one would (or wouldn’t) apply E’ , which indicates a further problem. For, as Grice himself has taught us,[34](#_bookmark417) there might be a number of reasons why an ‘expression’ wouldn’t be used on a particular occasion. We wouldn’t say of a freshly mowed lawn in broad daylight that it ‘looks’ green, because doing so would insinuate that there are reasons to think appearances misleading. But that doesn’t mean that the statement ‘This lawn looks green’ is false. Or, to pick another example, we would very rarely say of someone that she knows her own name; but again, that isn’t because it would be false were we to apply the expression ‘knows’ in this case. Whereas ordinary language philosophers were very alert to the question whether we would or wouldn’t apply a particular concept in a particular case, arguably they should have paid more attention to the question of whether or not such an application would result in a statement that was true. Taking these points into account, we can revise Grice’s characterisation of the analytic procedure:

The characteristic procedure is to think up a possible general characterisation of the cases falling under some concept C and then to test it by trying to find or imagine a particular situation which fits the suggested characterisation and yet would not be a situation to which C could be truthfully applied.[35](#_bookmark421)

34 See Grice [1989](#_bookmark418): 1– 57.

35 Of course, philosophers also use imagined (or real) possible cases to show that something may be an instance of C without fitting the suggested general characterisation, as well as, more positively, to show that a particular characterisation is able to capture all the known problematic cases.

第二，格里斯所说的“一个人会（或不会）应用E”的情况导向了一个更深层的难题。因为——正如格里斯自己教给我们的那样——可能有很多原因导致一个“表达”不能在特定场合使用。我们不会在光天化日之下对新修剪的草坪说它'看起来'是绿色的，因为这么做就暗示人们有理由认为外观具有误导性。但是这并不意味着“这片草地看起来是绿色的”这个陈述是*错的*。或者，再举另一个例子我们很少会说某人知道她自己的名字；但同样，这并不是因为我们在这种情况下应用“知道”这个表达式是错误的。尽管日常语言学家对我们是否*会*在特定情况下应用一个特定概念的问题非常敏感，但按理他们本应更加关注这种应用是否会导致*真实*的陈述。考虑到这些重点，我们可以修改格莱斯（Grice）对分析程序的表征：

分析程序是对属于某个概念C的情况设想出一个可能的普遍特征，然后再检验这个特征：试图找到或想象一个符合已提出的特征的情景，但在这个特殊情景中，概念 C 又不能被真正应用。

35 当然，哲学家们也使用想象的（或真实的）可能情况来表明某物可能是C的一个实例，而不（without）符合提出的一般特征，他们也更积极地利用这些情况表明一个特别的表征可以涵盖所有已知的问题案例。

The analytic procedure, thus understood, is as old as philosophy itself. In the Republic, for example, Socrates counters Cephalus’ suggestion that justice is ‘to tell the truth and return what one has received’ by questioning whether it would be just to return to a mad person his weapons, or ‘speak nothing but the truth to one who was in that state’ .[36](#_bookmark422) A suggested characterisation of the necessary and sufficient conditions for justice is tested by finding or imagining a situation in which all those conditions are met, but which it would be wrong to describe as an instance of justice. In the case of Cephalus’ suggested analysis of justice, such a case isn’t hard to find, and thus the analysis must be rejected.

36 Plato [1989](#_bookmark90): Republic 331c– d. 37 Gettier [1963](#_bookmark424).

这样理解的分析程序与哲学本身一样古老。例如在《理想国》（Republic）中，苏格拉底反驳了克法洛斯的提议，他认为正义是“说真话和归还一个人曾得到的东西”。苏格拉底质问把武器还给一个疯子，或“对处于那种状态下的人只说真话”是否是正义的。对正义的必要条件和充分条件的表征是通过寻找或想象一个所有这些条件都得到满足，但将其描述为正义的实例是一种错误的情况来检验的。就克法洛斯提出的对正义的分析而言，这样的情况并不难找到，因此这种分析结果必须被拒绝。

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