

Bitcoin Lending Protocol

Product Requirements Document

Phase 2: Bitcoin-Native Custody with Threshold Signatures

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Builds On: Phase 1 (Stacks/sBTC Implementation)

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1. Executive Summary

Phase 2 removes the dependency on sBTC by implementing **Bitcoin-native custody** using threshold signature schemes. This advancement enables the protocol to hold actual Bitcoin directly, eliminating trust in the sBTC peg mechanism while maintaining the oracle-free competitive bidding auctions proven in Phase 1.

Key Innovation

Threshold signature custody where Bitcoin collateral is held in a multi-signature address controlled by a decentralized network of validators. No single entity can access funds, and the protocol operates trustlessly on native Bitcoin without wrapped tokens.

Phase 2 Objectives

Objective	Description
Eliminate sBTC Dependency	Direct Bitcoin custody removes trust in sBTC peg
Decentralized Validators	Network of independent validators secure collateral
Threshold Signatures	M-of-N multisig using Schnorr/FROST or MuSig2
Maintain Stacks Benefits	Smart contract logic remains on Stacks for low fees
Backwards Compatible	Phase 1 loans continue operating; gradual migration
Enhanced Security	No custodian, no peg risk, pure Bitcoin security

Phase 2 Targets

Metric	Target
Launch Timeline	9 months (Months 8-17 after Phase 1)
Validator Network	15+ independent validators at launch
Threshold Scheme	10-of-15 multisig (67% threshold)
Migration Volume	50%+ of Phase 1 loans migrate to native BTC
New Loan Volume	\$5M+ in native BTC loans by Month 13
Validator Uptime	99.5%+ availability
Total Budget	\$463,000

Strategic Positioning

Phase 2 positions the protocol as the **first truly trustless Bitcoin lending platform** with:

- No wrapped tokens (eliminates WBTC/sBTC trust assumptions)
- No centralized custody (eliminates Celsius/BlockFi risk)
- No oracles (maintains Phase 1's competitive bidding innovation)
- Pure Bitcoin security (leverages Bitcoin's \$2T security budget)

This makes the protocol **the gold standard** for Bitcoin-backed lending, setting up Phase 3's multi-chain liquidity integration.

2. Problem Statement

2.1 Limitations of Phase 1 (sBTC Dependency)

While Phase 1 successfully demonstrates oracle-free lending with competitive bidding auctions, it relies on **sBTC** as a Bitcoin representation on Stacks. This

introduces several trust assumptions:

Trust in sBTC Peg Mechanism

- **Current sBTC Design:** Decentralized signers maintain 1:1 peg
- **Trust Assumption:** Signers must be honest and available
- **Risk:** If signers collude or fail, peg could break
- **Scale Limit:** sBTC capacity limited by signer network

Wrapped Token Risks (Historical Context)

- **WBTC:** Centralized custody by BitGo (single point of failure)
- **renBTC:** Project shut down, holders scrambled to redeem
- **hBTC:** Low liquidity, trust in centralized bridge
- **General Issue:** All wrapped BTC requires trusting custodians

Market Perception

- Users prefer **actual Bitcoin** over representations
- “Not your keys, not your coins” applies to wrapped tokens
- Institutional users require custody transparency
- Maximum TVL limited by comfort with sBTC peg

2.2 The Native Bitcoin Challenge

Holding actual Bitcoin in a trustless protocol is technically challenging:

Bitcoin's Limited Scripting: - No Turing-complete smart contracts - Limited programmability compared to Ethereum/Stacks - Multisig requires on-chain transaction for setup - Complex business logic not feasible on Bitcoin L1

The Dilemma: - Smart contracts on Stacks (flexible, low-cost, programmable) - Bitcoin custody on Bitcoin (trustless, secure, native) - Need: **Bridge these two worlds without centralization**

2.3 Existing Solutions Are Insufficient

BitVM: - Theoretical framework for Bitcoin computation - Not production-ready (highly experimental) - Requires optimistic verification (complex) - No mature implementation available

Federated Sidechains (Liquid, RSK): - Require trusting federation of signers - Not meaningfully more decentralized than sBTC - Add another layer of abstraction

Lightning Network: - Designed for payments, not lending collateral - Requires channels and liquidity management - Not suitable for long-term collateral locks

What We Need: Direct Bitcoin custody (no wrapped tokens)
Decentralized validator network (no federation trust)

Threshold signatures (no single point of failure)
Integration with Stacks (leverage smart contract logic)
Production-ready today (not experimental)

3. Solution Overview

3.1 Architecture: Hybrid Bitcoin + Stacks

Phase 2 uses a **hybrid architecture** that leverages the strengths of both chains:

Bitcoin Layer (Custody): - Holds actual BTC collateral in threshold multisig addresses - Provides ultimate security through Bitcoin's consensus - Uses Taproot/Schnorr for efficient multisig - No trust assumptions beyond Bitcoin's security model

Stacks Layer (Logic): - Maintains smart contract logic for auctions, loans, NFTs - Coordinates validator actions through consensus - Provides user interface and state management - Keeps transaction costs low (~\$1-5 vs Bitcoin's \$10-50)

Validator Network (Bridge): - Decentralized network of 15+ independent operators - Run both Bitcoin and Stacks nodes - Hold threshold signature key shares - Sign Bitcoin transactions based on Stacks contract state

3.2 Threshold Signature Scheme

Technology: FROST (Flexible Round-Optimized Schnorr Threshold) or MuSig2

Configuration: 10-of-15 multisig - 15 total validators - 10 signatures required (67% threshold) - 5 validators can be offline without stopping operations - 6+ colluding validators needed to steal (highly unlikely with good incentives)

Key Generation (Distributed):

No single party ever has full private key!

Each validator i generates:

- Secret share: s_i (kept private, never shared)
- Public key share: $P_i = s_i * G$

Combined public key:

- $P = P_1 + P_2 + \dots + P_{15}$

Bitcoin Address:

- Taproot address derived from P
- Looks like any normal Bitcoin address
- No on-chain indication of multisig (privacy!)

Signature Generation (Threshold):

To spend Bitcoin:

1. Stacks contract reaches consensus on action
2. 10+ validators see the consensus
3. Each validator creates partial signature
4. Coordinator aggregates 10+ partial signatures
5. Combined signature is valid for public key P
6. Broadcast to Bitcoin network

3.3 Loan Lifecycle with Native Bitcoin

1. Borrower Creates Loan Request:

User → Stacks Contract

- Specify: loan amount, max repayment, duration
- Contract generates unique Bitcoin address (threshold multisig)
- Borrower sends BTC to this address
- Bitcoin tx confirmed → Stacks contract activated

2. Auction & Bidding (Unchanged from Phase 1):

- Competitive bidding auction on Stacks
- Lenders place bids (total repayment amounts)
- Lowest bid wins when auction ends
- All logic on Stacks (cheap, fast)

3. Loan Finalization:

Stacks Contract → Validators

- Contract finalizes auction with winning bid
- Winning lender provides Stablecoin on Stacks
- Contract signals validators to release BTC
- 10+ validators sign Bitcoin transaction
- BTC transfers to borrower
- Lender receives NFT position

4. Repayment:

Borrower → Stacks Contract

- Borrower repays stablecoin on Stacks (fixed amount from auction)
- Contract signals validators to release collateral
- 10+ validators sign Bitcoin transaction
- BTC returns to borrower
- Both NFTs burned

5. Default Scenario:

If borrower doesn't repay by maturity:

- Stacks contract enters "defaulted" state
- Lender can claim collateral

- Contract signals validators
- 10+ validators sign Bitcoin transaction
- BTC transfers to lender

3.4 Validator Network Design

Validator Roles Responsibilities: - Monitor both Bitcoin and Stacks blockchains - Maintain synchronized state view - Participate in threshold signing when required - Monitor other validators for liveness - Submit signed transactions to Bitcoin network

Requirements: - Run full Bitcoin node (verify all Bitcoin state) - Run full Stacks node (verify all Stacks state) - Maintain >99% uptime - Secure key management (HSM recommended) - Network connectivity (low latency) - Stake/bond collateral (economic security)

Incentives: - Earn fees: 0.1% of loan volume processed - Distributed proportionally to all 15 validators - Slashing for downtime or misbehavior - Reputation system for reliable validators

Validator Selection & Rotation Phase 2 Launch (Months 7-13): - **Permissioned set:** 15 curated validators - Selection criteria: reputation, uptime history, geographic diversity - Includes: protocol team (3), community members (5), partners (7) - Fixed set for initial 6 months (stability focus)

Future Phase (Post-Phase 2): - **Permissionless entry:** Anyone can apply to be validator - Stake requirement: e.g., \$50,000-100,000 in STX or BTC - Rotation mechanism: validators can be voted in/out - Governance: STX holders or future DAO

Geographic Distribution Target distribution for censorship resistance: - North America: 5 validators (33%) - Europe: 5 validators (33%) - Asia: 3 validators (20%) - Other: 2 validators (14%)

No more than 3 validators in same jurisdiction.

3.5 Security Properties

Trustlessness: No single validator can steal funds (need 10/15)

- No custodian (pure threshold cryptography)
- No federation (open validator set long-term)
- No wrapped token (actual Bitcoin)

Liveness: 5 validators can be offline without issue

- System continues with 10+ online validators
- Graceful degradation (not binary failure)
- Automatic failover if validators drop

Censorship Resistance: Geographic distribution prevents single-jurisdiction attack

Multiple validator entities (individuals, companies, DAOs)

6+ colluding validators needed to censor (highly unlikely)

Attack Scenarios:

Attack	Difficulty	Mitigation
Steal funds	Need to compromise 10/15 validators	High threshold, diversity, monitoring
Censor transaction	Need to control 6/15 validators	Geographic distribution, incentives
Network partition	Need to split validators	Multiple network paths, redundancy
Key extraction	Need to compromise validator HSMs	Hardware security, secure boot
Social engineering	Need to trick 10/15 operators	Strict procedures, multi-approval

3.6 Benefits vs Phase 1

Aspect	Phase 1 (sBTC)	Phase 2 (Native BTC)
Collateral	sBTC (wrapped)	Bitcoin (native)
Trust Assumptions	sBTC signers	Validator threshold
Peg Risk	Yes (sBTC peg)	No (actual BTC)
Bitcoin	Indirect	Direct
Security		
Market Perception	“Wrapped token”	“Real Bitcoin”
TVL Ceiling	Limited by sBTC supply	Limited by validator capacity
User Confidence	Medium-High	Very High
Custody Transparency	sBTC multisig	Observable threshold

Why This Matters: - Institutional users prefer actual Bitcoin custody - Eliminates entire category of risk (peg breaks) - No dependency on sBTC project success - Scales independently - More credible for large loans (\$500K+)

4. User Personas

4.1 Primary Persona: Large-Scale Bitcoin Miners (Borrowers)

Phase 2 targets **larger mining operations** that Phase 1's sBTC might not accommodate:

Demographics

- **Operation size:** 100-5,000 ASICs (medium to large miners)
- **Geography:** USA (30%), Canada (20%), Kazakhstan (15%), Russia (10%), Norway (10%), Other (15%)
- **Technical level:** Very high - infrastructure operators
- **Bitcoin philosophy:** Bitcoin maximalists, only use BTC
- **Monthly revenue:** \$100,000 - \$5,000,000+

Needs and Goals

- **Primary:** Large working capital loans (\$100K-\$2M)
- **Secondary:** Trustless custody (no wrapped tokens acceptable)
- **Tertiary:** Institutional-grade security for large amounts
- **Financial:** Competitive rates for large loans (5-8% APR)

Pain Points with Phase 1

- sBTC supply might be insufficient for large loans
- Uncomfortable with wrapped token for large amounts
- Prefer direct Bitcoin custody
- Institutional policies may prohibit wrapped assets
- Higher perceived risk with sBTC peg for multi-million dollar amounts

User Story

"I run a 1,000 ASIC operation in Texas. My monthly electricity bill is \$300,000. When BTC dropped from \$100K to \$85K, I needed \$1M to cover operations without selling my mined Bitcoin.

Phase 1 with sBTC was interesting, but for \$1M+ I need actual Bitcoin custody. My CFO won't approve wrapped tokens for that size. We need to see our BTC locked in an on-chain multisig address.

With Phase 2's threshold custody, I can borrow \$1M against 15 BTC collateral. I can verify the multisig address on Bitcoin. I can see the validator signatures. That's institutional-grade security.

I'm willing to pay 6-7% APR if it means trustless custody of actual Bitcoin."

— Marcus, 42, Mining Operation Director, Houston TX

Success Metrics for This Persona

- 20+ large miners using Phase 2 by Month 13
 - Average loan size: \$250,000 - \$1,000,000
 - Total volume: \$5M+ from large miners
 - 80%+ of these miners prefer Phase 2 over Phase 1
 - Repeat borrowing rate: >60%
-

4.2 Primary Persona: Institutional Lenders (Liquidity Providers)

Demographics

- **Profile:** Family offices, crypto hedge funds, high net worth individuals
- **Experience level:** Advanced - understand Bitcoin/DeFi deeply
- **Capital:** \$500,000 to \$50M+
- **Investment thesis:** Conservative crypto yield with Bitcoin collateral
- **Risk tolerance:** Low to medium - want best security

Needs and Goals

- **Primary:** Institutional-grade custody transparency
- **Secondary:** Large position sizes (\$100K-\$1M per loan)
- **Tertiary:** Verifiable Bitcoin custody (not wrapped tokens)
- **Trust:** Proof that collateral is in decentralized threshold custody

Pain Points with Phase 1

- sBTC limits confidence for large positions
- Wrapped tokens not acceptable to compliance teams
- Peg risk unacceptable for multi-million portfolios
- Want to see actual Bitcoin multisig on-chain

User Story

"I manage a \$20M family office crypto portfolio. We're interested in Bitcoin-collateralized lending at 7-9% APR - much better than tradfi bonds.

But we won't touch wrapped Bitcoin. We've seen WBTC centralization, we've seen renBTC shut down. For us, it's actual Bitcoin or nothing.

Phase 2's threshold custody is exactly what we need. We can verify the Bitcoin multisig address. We can see the validator signatures on every transaction. We can audit the whole process.

We're prepared to deploy \$2-5M into Phase 2 if security is rock-solid."

— Elizabeth, 55, Family Office Manager, Singapore

Success Metrics for This Persona

- 10+ institutional lenders in Phase 2
 - Average position size: \$200,000+
 - Total institutional capital: \$3M+
 - 90%+ cite “native Bitcoin custody” as key reason
 - Zero security incidents
-

4.3 Secondary Persona: Bitcoin Maximalists (Both Roles)

Demographics

- **Profile:** Hardcore Bitcoin believers
- **Philosophy:** Bitcoin only, no altcoins, no wrapped tokens
- **Technical level:** Very high - run own nodes
- **Values:** Decentralization, trustlessness, censorship-resistance

Needs and Goals

- **Primary:** Pure Bitcoin solution (no compromises)
- **Secondary:** Verifiable decentralization (no trust required)
- **Tertiary:** Support Bitcoin-native infrastructure

Why Phase 2 Appeals to Them

- Actual Bitcoin (not wrapped)
- Threshold custody (no custodian)
- Decentralized validators (no single point of control)
- Verifiable on Bitcoin blockchain
- Aligns with Bitcoin ethos

User Story

“I don’t touch wrapped Bitcoin. I don’t touch altcoins. Bitcoin is the only real money.

Phase 1 with sBTC? That’s an altcoin token. Not interested.

Phase 2 with threshold signatures holding actual Bitcoin? Now that’s interesting. That’s how Bitcoin lending should work. Pure Bitcoin security.”

— Max, 38, Bitcoin Developer, Remote

5. Feature Requirements

5.1 Threshold Custody Features (Must Have - P0)

FR1.1: Distributed Key Generation (DKG) Description: Generate threshold multisig keys without any single party knowing the full private key.

Functional Requirements: - 15 validators participate in DKG ceremony - Each validator generates secret share (never leaves their system) - Combined public key computed from all shares - No validator ever has full private key - Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) ensures correctness - Public key shares published on-chain for transparency

DKG Process:

Round 1: Commitment Phase

- Each validator commits to their secret polynomial
- Commitments published and verified

Round 2: Share Distribution

- Each validator sends encrypted shares to others
- Shares transmitted over secure channels

Round 3: Verification

- Each validator verifies received shares
- Complaints raised if shares invalid

Round 4: Finalization

- If no complaints: DKG succeeds
- Combined public key computed
- Key shares ready for threshold signing

Acceptance Criteria: - [] DKG ceremony completes with 15 validators - [] Combined public key is Taproot-compatible - [] Each validator can prove their key share is valid - [] Full private key is never reconstructed - [] Process completes in <10 minutes - [] Ceremony can be audited on-chain

Security Properties: - No single validator learns full key - No subset <10 validators can reconstruct key - Malicious validators detected during verification - Byzantine fault tolerant (up to 5 malicious validators)

FR1.2: Threshold Signature Generation Description: Generate valid Bitcoin signatures using threshold cryptography (10-of-15).

Functional Requirements: - Any 10+ validators can create valid signature - Partial signatures combined into final signature - Final signature indistinguishable from single-key signature (Taproot privacy) - No interactive rounds needed (non-interactive threshold signing) - Signature valid for Bitcoin consensus rules

Signing Process:

Step 1: Request Initiated

- Stacks contract determines action needed (e.g., release collateral)
- Contract publishes signing request with:
 - Transaction details (outputs, amounts, fees)
 - Verification proof (e.g., loan was repaid)
 - Nonce for this signing session

Step 2: Validators Verify

- Each validator independently verifies:
 - Stacks contract state is correct
 - Action is authorized per contract rules
 - Bitcoin transaction matches contract intent
 - No double-signing or replay

Step 3: Partial Signatures

- Each validator that agrees creates partial signature
- Partial signature based on their key share
- Partial signatures published to coordinator

Step 4: Aggregation

- Once 10+ partial signatures collected
- Coordinator aggregates into final signature
- Final signature is standard Schnorr signature

Step 5: Broadcast

- Bitcoin transaction with final signature broadcast
- Confirms in Bitcoin block
- Stacks contract updated with confirmation

Acceptance Criteria: - [] 10 validator signatures sufficient to sign - [] Signing completes in <5 minutes typically - [] Failed signing doesn't lock system (retry possible) - [] Signature passes Bitcoin consensus validation - [] Process works even with 5 validators offline - [] All partial signatures logged for audit

Edge Cases: - Exactly 10 validators online → Should still work - 11+ validators but disagree on action → Majority rules - Validators sign conflicting transactions → First-seen-valid wins - Network partition splits validators → Larger partition continues

FR1.3: Bitcoin Transaction Construction **Description:** Build valid Bitcoin transactions that validators will sign.

Functional Requirements: - Parse Stacks contract state to determine Bitcoin action - Construct appropriate Bitcoin transaction: - Collateral lock (P2TR out-

put to threshold address) - Collateral release (spend from threshold address to borrower) - Collateral claim (spend from threshold address to lender on default)
- Calculate appropriate fees (dynamic fee estimation) - Handle UTXO management (coin selection) - Support RBF (Replace-By-Fee) for stuck transactions

Transaction Types:

Type 1: Collateral Lock (Borrower → Threshold Address)

Inputs:

- Borrower's UTXOs (sufficient BTC + fees)

Outputs:

- Threshold address: [collateral_amount]
- Change address: [remaining if any]

Note: Borrower signs this themselves (not threshold)

Type 2: Collateral Release (Threshold Address → Borrower)

Inputs:

- Threshold address UTXO: [collateral_amount]

Outputs:

- Borrower address: [collateral_amount - fee]

Signature: Threshold signature (10-of-15 validators)

Trigger: Stacks contract confirms repayment received

Type 3: Collateral Claim (Threshold Address → Lender)

Inputs:

- Threshold address UTXO: [collateral_amount]

Outputs:

- Lender address: [collateral_amount - fee]

Signature: Threshold signature (10-of-15 validators)

Trigger: Stacks contract confirms default (maturity passed, no repayment)

Fee Management: - Query mempool for current fee rates - Target 1-2 block confirmation (medium priority) - Allow manual fee bumping if transaction stuck
- Reserve small amount of BTC for fee buffer

Acceptance Criteria: - [] Transactions are valid per Bitcoin consensus - [] Fees are competitive (not overpaying) - [] All outputs are correct addresses and amounts - [] Change handling works correctly - [] RBF enabled for all threshold-signed transactions - [] Transaction monitoring until confirmation

FR1.4: Validator Monitoring & Coordination **Description:** Monitor validator health and coordinate threshold signing sessions.

Functional Requirements: - Real-time monitoring of all 15 validators: - Online/offline status - Last heartbeat timestamp - Bitcoin node sync status - Stacks node sync status - Partial signature latency - Coordinator selects best validators for signing - Automatic failover if validators drop during signing - Alert system for validator issues - Dashboard showing validator network health

Monitoring Metrics:

Metric	Green	Yellow	Red
Uptime	>99%	95-99%	<95%
Response Time	<30s	30-60s	>60s
Bitcoin Sync	<1 block behind	1-5 blocks	>5 blocks
Stacks Sync	<1 block behind	1-5 blocks	>5 blocks
Signing Success	>99%	95-99%	<95%

Coordinator Role: - Aggregates partial signatures - Requests retries if some validators timeout - Publishes final signature to Bitcoin network - Updates Stacks contract with Bitcoin tx confirmation - Not trusted (anyone can verify signatures are correct)

Acceptance Criteria: - [] All validators monitored in real-time - [] Dashboard shows current network health - [] Alerts fire for validator issues (email, Discord) - [] Coordinator successfully aggregates signatures - [] System continues with 10+ validators online - [] Graceful degradation if validators drop

5.2 Smart Contract Integration (Must Have - P0)

FR2.1: Bitcoin Event Monitoring **Description:** Stacks contracts must monitor Bitcoin blockchain for collateral deposits and confirmations.

Functional Requirements: - Stacks contract listens for Bitcoin transactions - Detects deposits to threshold addresses - Requires 3+ Bitcoin confirmations before activating loan - Updates contract state when Bitcoin events occur - Handles Bitcoin reorgs gracefully

Bitcoin → Stacks Flow:

1. Borrower sends BTC to threshold address
2. Bitcoin transaction confirms (1 block)
3. Validators observe transaction
4. Validators submit proof to Stacks contract
5. After 3 confirmations, contract activates loan
6. Auction begins on Stacks

Proof Structure:

```
Bitcoin Transaction Proof {
    txid: Bitcoin transaction ID
    block_height: Block containing transaction
    merkle_proof: Proof transaction is in block
    outputs: List of outputs with amounts
    confirmations: Number of confirmations
}
```

Acceptance Criteria: - [] Contract correctly parses Bitcoin transaction data
- [] 3+ confirmations required before activation - [] Reorgs handled (contract waits for finality) - [] Invalid proofs rejected - [] Multiple validators can submit same proof (deduplicated)

FR2.2: Validator Action Requests Description: Stacks contract publishes requests for validators to sign Bitcoin transactions.

Functional Requirements: - Contract emits “action required” events:
- **release-collateral** (on successful repayment)
- **claim-collateral** (on default)
- **refund-collateral** (if auction fails)
- Events include all necessary transaction details
- Validators automatically respond to valid requests
- Multiple validators verify before signing
- Prevents unauthorized Bitcoin spends

Action Request Format:

```
{
    action: "release-collateral" | "claim-collateral" | "refund-collateral",
    loan-id: uint,
    bitcoin-txid: (buff 32),           ;; Collateral UTXO
    recipient: (string-ascii 62),       ;; Bitcoin address
    amount: uint,                      ;; Satoshis
    fee: uint,                         ;; Satoshis for miner fee
    nonce: uint,                       ;; Unique per request
}
```

Validator Verification Checklist:

Before signing, each validator checks:

- Stacks contract state matches request
- Action is authorized per contract rules
- Recipient address matches loan participant
- Amount matches contract records
- No duplicate/replay request (nonce check)
- Bitcoin UTXO actually exists and is spendable

Acceptance Criteria: - [] Events correctly formatted and complete - [] Validators receive events in real-time (<10s) - [] All validators independently verify before signing - [] Malicious requests rejected by honest validators - [] Partial signature aggregation works correctly - [] Bitcoin transaction broadcasts after 10+ signatures

FR2.3: Cross-Chain State Synchronization **Description:** Keep Stacks and Bitcoin states synchronized despite different block times.

Functional Requirements: - Bitcoin block time: ~10 minutes (variable) - Stacks block time: ~10 minutes (anchored to Bitcoin) - Handle timing differences gracefully - Maintain consistency even during reorgs - Provide UI with accurate status across both chains

State Machine:

Loan Status Flow (spans both chains):

1. "Created" (Stacks) → Waiting for BTC deposit
2. "Collateral-Pending" (Bitcoin tx seen, <3 confirmations)
3. "Auction" (Bitcoin confirmed, auction active on Stacks)
4. "Active" (Auction finalized on Stacks)
- 5a. "Repay-Pending" (Repayment on Stacks, BTC release initiated)
- 5b. "Released" (BTC release confirmed on Bitcoin)
6. "Completed" (Both chains finalized)

OR

- 5a. "Default" (Maturity passed on Stacks)
- 5b. "Claim-Pending" (BTC claim initiated)
- 5c. "Claimed" (BTC claimed confirmed on Bitcoin)
6. "Defaulted" (Both chains finalized)

Acceptance Criteria: - [] State transitions happen correctly across chains - [] No state desync even during reorgs - [] UI reflects current state accurately - [] Timing edge cases handled (e.g., Stacks faster than Bitcoin) - [] Recovery possible if synchronization fails

5.3 User Interface Updates (Must Have - P0)

FR3.1: Native Bitcoin Deposit Flow **Description:** Users must be able to lock actual Bitcoin as collateral.

User Flow:

1. User creates loan request on Stacks

2. UI generates unique threshold multisig Bitcoin address
3. UI displays address as:
 - Text (copyable)
 - QR code (scannable)
 - Verification info (multisig details)
4. User sends BTC from their wallet
5. UI monitors Bitcoin mempool for transaction
6. Shows "Pending confirmation" (0-3 blocks)
7. After 3 confirmations: "Collateral locked, auction starting"

Address Display:

Send Bitcoin Collateral

Amount: 1.5 BTC

[QR CODE]

bc1p8xj2f7a...k3m9tn2 [Copy]

Do NOT send from exchange!
You must control the address

This is a 10-of-15 multisig address
View validators →

Status: Waiting for your deposit...
[View on Bitcoin Explorer]

Acceptance Criteria: - [] Address displayed clearly (text + QR) - [] Address is valid Bitcoin address (bech32) - [] Clear instructions to avoid exchange deposits - [] Real-time monitoring of Bitcoin mempool - [] Progress indicator (0/3, 1/3, 2/3, 3/3 confirmations) - [] Link to Bitcoin explorer for transparency

FR3.2: Validator Transparency Dashboard Description: Users must be able to verify the decentralization and security of the validator network.

Dashboard Sections:

1. Validator List:

Active Validators (15 total)

ID	Location	Uptime	Last Seen	Status
Val-01	USA	99.8%	5s ago	Up
Val-02	Germany	99.9%	3s ago	Up
Val-03	Japan	99.7%	8s ago	Up
Val-04	Canada	99.6%	15s ago	Up
Val-05	UK	97.2%	2m ago	Slow
...

- 2. Geographic Distribution Map:** - World map showing validator locations
 - Color-coded by status (green/yellow/red) - Hover for details (name, uptime, last activity)

3. Network Health:

Overall Status: Healthy

Active Validators: 14/15 (93%)
 Signing Threshold: 10 required
 Current Capacity: 14 available (140% of minimum)
 Average Response Time: 12 seconds
 Last Signature: 3 minutes ago (Loan #157)

4. Recent Signatures:

Recent Threshold Signatures

Loan	Action	Sigs	Bitcoin Tx
#157	Release	12/15	3a8f2c...
#155	Release	11/15	7b3d91...
#154	Claim	13/15	2f8a34...
#152	Release	10/15	8c2f74...

- Acceptance Criteria:** - [] All 15 validators listed with current status - [] Geographic map shows distribution - [] Real-time updates (<30 second refresh)
 - [] Historical uptime data available - [] Links to validator profiles (if public) -
 [] Clear explanation of threshold security model
-

FR3.3: Bitcoin Transaction Monitoring Description: Users must be able to track Bitcoin transactions related to their loans.

Loan Detail View:

Loan #42 - Bitcoin Transactions

Collateral Deposit
1.5 BTC → bc1p8xj2f7a...k3m9tn2
Txid: 3a8f2c91...
Confirmations: 87
[View on Bitcoin Explorer]

Collateral Release (pending)
1.5 BTC → bc1qxy8w2n3...r5t7m9
Status: Waiting for 10 validator signatures
Current: 8/10 signatures received
ETA: ~5 minutes

Acceptance Criteria: - [] All Bitcoin transactions displayed clearly - [] Confirmation count shown and updated - [] Links to Bitcoin explorer for verification
- [] Threshold signature progress visible - [] Clear status indicators (pending, confirmed, failed)

5.4 Migration Features (Should Have - P1)

FR4.1: Phase 1 → Phase 2 Loan Migration **Description:** Allow existing Phase 1 (sBTC) loans to migrate to Phase 2 (native BTC).

Functional Requirements: - User can opt-in to migrate active loan - Process:
1. Repay Phase 1 loan (get sBTC back) 2. Convert sBTC → BTC (via sBTC redemption) 3. Deposit BTC to Phase 2 threshold address 4. Create equivalent Phase 2 loan - Preserve favorable terms from Phase 1 if possible - Migration window: Months 7-13 (during Phase 2 rollout)

Migration UI:

Your Phase 1 Loan: #123
Collateral: 1.5 sBTC
Status: Active

Migrate to Phase 2?

Benefits:

Native Bitcoin custody
Eliminated sBTC peg risk
Institutional-grade security

Process:

1. Repay current loan (automatic)
2. Convert sBTC to BTC
3. Deposit to Phase 2

[Migrate Now] [Learn More]

Acceptance Criteria: - [] Migration process is seamless (1-click if possible)
- [] Clear explanation of benefits - [] No loss of value during migration - []
Migration tracking in UI - [] Support and documentation available

6. Architecture Requirements

6.1 Validator Node Requirements

Hardware: - CPU: 8+ cores (Intel/AMD x86_64) - RAM: 32GB minimum (64GB recommended) - Storage: 2TB NVMe SSD (Bitcoin full node ~600GB, Stacks ~100GB, growth room) - Network: 100 Mbps+ bandwidth, <50ms latency to other validators - Uptime: >99.5% target

Software: - Bitcoin Core v25.0+ (full node, txindex enabled) - Stacks Node v2.5+ (full node) - Validator software (custom, written in Rust) - HSM support (optional but recommended): YubiHSM 2, Ledger, etc.

Security: - Key material stored in HSM or secure enclave - Firewall: Only p2p ports open (not RPC) - Regular security updates - Intrusion detection system (IDS) - Encrypted communications between validators

Monitoring: - Prometheus metrics exported - Grafana dashboards for node health - Alert manager for issues - Logging aggregation (e.g., ELK stack)

6.2 Threshold Cryptography Stack

Library: Secp256k1-zkp (Schnorr threshold)

Alternative: FROST Implementation (production-ready)

Key Features Needed: - Schnorr signature support (Bitcoin Taproot) - Threshold signature generation (M-of-N) - Distributed key generation (DKG) - Verifiable secret sharing (VSS) - Non-interactive signing (no interactive rounds)

Integration Points: - Rust validator software calls library - Bitcoin transaction signing pipeline - Key share management (encrypted storage) - Partial signature aggregation

6.3 Network Communication

Validator-to-Validator: - Protocol: libp2p (peer-to-peer networking) - Transport: TCP with TLS encryption - Gossip protocol for partial signatures - DHT for peer discovery - NAT traversal support

Validator-to-Coordinator: - REST API for submitting partial signatures - WebSocket for real-time updates - Authentication via validator public keys - Rate limiting per validator

Coordinator-to-Bitcoin: - Bitcoin Core RPC API - Transaction broadcasting via multiple nodes - Mempool monitoring - Fee estimation queries

6.4 Disaster Recovery

Validator Failure Scenarios:

Scenario 1: Single Validator Down - Impact: None (need 10/15, have 14 remaining) - Response: Monitor, contact operator, wait for recovery - Threshold: Alert if down >24 hours

Scenario 2: 5 Validators Down - Impact: Minimal (still have 10/15) - Response: Urgent investigation, activate backup validators - Threshold: P1 alert, all hands on deck

Scenario 3: 6+ Validators Down - Impact: CRITICAL (below 10/15 threshold) - Response: Emergency protocol: - Pause new loans immediately - Prioritize bringing validators back online - Activate backup validators - Consider emergency validator recruitment - Allow existing loans to complete without new signatures - Threshold: P0 alert, 24/7 response

Key Recovery: - Each validator backs up encrypted key share - Recovery requires validator identity proof - No single backup location (distributed) - Regular backup testing (quarterly)

Network Split: - Monitor for network partitions - Larger partition (8+ validators) continues - Smaller partition waits for reconnection - No conflicting signatures across partitions

7. Non-Functional Requirements

7.1 Security (Critical - P0)

NFR1.1: Threshold Security Requirements: - 10-of-15 threshold enforced cryptographically - No single validator can steal funds - No subset <10 validators can reconstruct key - Key generation ceremony auditable - All signatures verified before Bitcoin broadcast

Acceptance Criteria: - [] Cryptographic proof that threshold holds - [] Independent security audit of threshold implementation - [] Penetration testing of validator network - [] Bug bounty program (\$100K+ rewards) - [] No critical vulnerabilities in audit

NFR1.2: Validator Security Requirements: - Validator keys stored in HSMs (hardware security modules) - No remote access to validator key material - Multi-factor authentication for validator access - Regular security updates within 48 hours - Intrusion detection on all validator nodes

Acceptance Criteria: - [] 100% of validators use HSMs or secure enclaves - [] Security audits pass for all validator setups - [] No successful attacks on validator keys - [] Incident response plan tested quarterly

7.2 Reliability (High Priority - P0)

NFR2.1: Validator Uptime Requirements: - Individual validator uptime: >99.5% - Network capacity: Always >10 validators online - Maximum signing latency: <5 minutes (typical: <2 minutes) - Zero downtime for user-facing operations

Monitoring: - Real-time validator health checks - Alert if <12 validators online - Automated failover to backup validators - Geographic redundancy

Acceptance Criteria: - [] Network uptime: 99.9%+ over 6 months - [] No periods with <10 validators - [] Average signing time <3 minutes - [] Zero failed signatures due to validator unavailability

NFR2.2: Bitcoin Transaction Reliability Requirements: - 100% of legitimate transactions must eventually confirm - Failed transactions must be retryable - RBF (Replace-By-Fee) for stuck transactions - Fee estimation accuracy: ±20% of optimal

Acceptance Criteria: - [] <0.1% transaction failure rate - [] All failures are recoverable - [] Median confirmation time: <30 minutes - [] Maximum confirmation time: <6 hours (even with low fees)

7.3 Performance (Medium Priority - P1)

NFR3.1: Signing Performance Targets: - Threshold signature generation: <2 minutes (typical) - Maximum signing latency: <5 minutes - Support 10+ concurrent signing sessions - No performance degradation with load

Acceptance Criteria: - [] 95th percentile signing time <3 minutes - [] 99th percentile signing time <5 minutes - [] Can handle 50 loans per day - [] No bottlenecks under load testing

7.4 Decentralization (High Priority - P0)

NFR4.1: Geographic Distribution Requirements: - No more than 3 validators in same country - No more than 5 validators in same region - Minimum 3 continents represented - No cloud provider hosts >40% of validators

Initial Distribution: - North America: 5 validators - Europe: 5 validators - Asia: 3 validators - Other: 2 validators

Acceptance Criteria: - [] Geographic diversity meets targets - [] No single jurisdiction can censor - [] Cloud provider diversity maintained - [] Validators in politically diverse regions

NFR4.2: Validator Independence Requirements: - No single entity controls >2 validators (13%) - Validators have different operators/owners - No conflicts of interest (validators can't be borrowers/lenders) - Public disclosure of validator identities (optional anonymity)

Acceptance Criteria: - [] All validators are independent entities - [] No undisclosed common ownership - [] Conflicts of interest documented and mitigated - [] Validator registry publicly available

8. Success Metrics

8.1 Launch Success Metrics (Months 14-15)

Critical Launch KPIs (must achieve all):

Metric	Target	Measurement	Critical?
Validator Network	15/15 validators online	Real-time monitoring	CRITICAL
Network Uptime	99.9%+ from day 1	Uptime monitoring	CRITICAL
DKG Success	1 successful ceremony	Audit logs	CRITICAL
First Native BTC Loan	Within 48 hours	Blockchain data	CRITICAL
Zero Critical Bugs	0 in first 2 weeks	Bug tracker	CRITICAL
Threshold Signatures	100% success rate	Transaction logs	CRITICAL

Soft Launch Metrics (Month 15): - 5+ native BTC loans created - 3+ loans successfully repaid - 10+ lenders participating - \$500K+ native BTC loan volume - Average loan size: \$50K+ - No validator downtime >30 minutes - Zero signature failures

8.2 Growth Metrics (Months 15-16)

Volume Growth:

Milestone	Target	Timeline
First \$100K	Week 1 of soft launch	Month 15, Week 1
First \$500K	Week 4 of soft launch	Month 15, Week 4
First \$1M	End of soft launch	Month 15 end
\$2M Milestone	Mid full launch	Month 16, Week 2
\$5M Milestone	End of Phase 2	Month 16 end

User Growth: - Native BTC borrowers: 15+ by Month 16 - Native BTC lenders: 30+ by Month 16 - Large loans (>\$100K): 5+ by Month 16 - Repeat borrowers: 30%+ by Month 16 - Active loans: 20+ by Month 16

Market Share (vs Phase 1 sBTC): - Month 15: 20% of new loans use native BTC - Month 16: 50%+ of new loans use native BTC - Migration: 30%+ of Phase 1 loans migrate to Phase 2

8.3 Technical Performance Metrics

Validator Network Health:

Metric	Target	Measurement
Validator Uptime	99.9% per validator	Prometheus metrics
Network Uptime	99.9% overall	Consensus tracking
Signature Success Rate	100%	Transaction logs
Signature Time	<10 seconds avg	Performance logs
DKG Ceremony Time	<30 minutes	Ceremony logs
Partial Signature Time	<5 seconds	Individual validator logs
Network Latency	<2 seconds p95	P2P metrics
Bitcoin Confirmations	Detected within 2 blocks	Blockchain monitoring

Cross-Chain Performance: - State sync lag: <1 block between Bitcoin and Stacks - Reorg handling: 100% successful up to 6 blocks - Deposit detection: Within 2 Bitcoin blocks - Withdrawal execution: Within 6 Bitcoin blocks - State inconsistencies: 0

Operational Performance: - Alert response time: <5 minutes (P1), <30 minutes (P2) - Incident resolution: <2 hours (P1), <24 hours (P2) - Disaster recovery: <4 hours to full operation - Key recovery: <2 hours per validator - Monitoring coverage: 100% of critical systems

8.4 Security Metrics

Zero Tolerance Metrics (any failure = immediate halt): - Unauthorized transactions: 0 - Key compromises: 0 - Fund losses: \$0 - Successful attacks: 0 - Critical vulnerabilities: 0 (post-audit)

Audit Compliance: - All critical findings resolved: 100% - All high findings resolved: 100% - Medium findings: Resolved or documented - Re-audit passed: Yes

Bug Bounty Results: - Critical vulnerabilities reported: 0 expected - Valid submissions: <5 low/medium - Average response time: <48 hours - Average fix time: <7 days (critical), <30 days (high)

8.5 Migration Success Metrics

Phase 1 → Phase 2 Migration:

Metric	Target	Timeline
Migration Opt-in Rate	30%+	Month 14-16
Successful Migrations	100% of attempts	Month 14-16
Migration Time	<24 hours per loan	Month 14-16
Value Preserved	100% (zero loss)	Month 14-16
User Satisfaction	4.5+/5 rating	Post-migration survey

Migration Volume: - \$500K+ migrated from sBTC to native BTC - 10+ loans successfully migrated - Zero migration failures or stuck loans

8.6 Validator Performance Metrics

Individual Validator KPIs:

Metric	Target	Consequence if Failed
Uptime	99.5% per validator	Warning after 3 violations
Signature	95%+ of	Investigation after <90%
Participation	signing rounds	
Response	<10 seconds	Warning after consistent delays
Time		
Geographic	3+ continents	Minimum diversity requirement
Distribution		
Hardware	Meets	Cannot join network
Compliance	minimum specs	

Network Diversity: - North America: 4-6 validators - Europe: 4-6 validators - Asia: 2-4 validators - Other regions: 1-3 validators - No single entity: >3 validators (20%)

Validator Economic Viability: - Protocol fees collected: \$5,000+ by Month 16 - Per-validator earnings: \$333+/month by Month 16 - Validator ROI: Break-even by Month 21 (5 months post-launch)

8.7 User Experience Metrics

Native BTC Loan Creation Flow: - Completion rate: >80% - Average time: <10 minutes - Drop-off rate: <20% - Error rate: <2%

Validator Transparency: - Users can view validator status: 100% - Users understand threshold model: 70%+ (survey) - Trust in decentralization: 4+/5 rating

Support & Documentation: - User questions answered: <2 hours - Documentation completeness: 95%+ - Tutorial completion rate: 60%+

8.8 Failure Criteria (Red Flags)

Critical Failures (immediate intervention required):

1. **Validator Network Failure**
 - <10 validators online for >1 hour
 - Signature success rate <95%
 - DKG ceremony failure (cannot retry)
2. **Security Incident**
 - Any unauthorized transaction
 - Any key compromise
 - Critical vulnerability discovered post-launch
3. **Technical Failure**
 - State inconsistency between Bitcoin and Stacks
 - Reorg not handled correctly (funds lost/stuck)
 - Network partition lasting >6 hours
4. **Low Adoption**
 - <\$500K volume by Month 16
 - <10 native BTC loans by Month 16
 - <20% new loans use native BTC by Month 16
5. **Migration Failure**
 - Migration success rate <90%
 - Value lost during migration
 - User complaints >10% of migrations

Warning Indicators (require action but not halt): - Validator uptime 95-99% (target: 99.9%) - Signature time >20 seconds (target: <10s) - User growth <50% of target - Migration rate <20% (target: 30%)

8.9 Success Milestones (Month-by-Month)

Month 14: Launch Preparation - All 15 validators deployed - DKG ceremony completed - Security audit passed - Operational tooling deployed - Disaster recovery tested - Migration tools ready

Month 15: Soft Launch - First native BTC loan funded - 5+ loans created - \$500K volume - Zero critical bugs - 99.9% uptime maintained - Positive user feedback

Month 16: Full Launch - \$5M volume achieved - 15+ borrowers - 30+ lenders - 50%+ market share (new loans) - 30%+ migration rate - Validator network profitable

Months 17-18: Buffer Period (Stabilization) - 2 months continuous operation - No critical incidents - Validator uptime maintained 99.9% - User satisfaction high (4.5+/5) - Ready for Phase 3

9. Phase 2 Deliverables

9.1 Deliverable Overview

Total Deliverables: 15

Total Budget: \$463,000

Timeline: 9 months (Months 8-16)

New Deliverables: 6 (D2.1a, D2.3a, D2.4a, D2.4b, D2.10, D2.11)

Enhanced Deliverables: 1 (D2.6 - Security Audit)

9.2 Deliverable Summary Table

Code	Deliverable	Timeline	Budget	Type	Dependencies
D2.1	Threshold Crypto Library	Month 8	\$45,000	Core	None
D2.1a	Validator Recruitment Program	Months 8-10	\$25,000	NEW	None
D2.2	Validator Node Software (Rust)	Months 8-10	\$62,000	Core	D2.1
D2.3	DKG Ceremony Implementation	Months 9-10	\$28,000	Core	D2.1, D2.2
D2.3a	DKG Ceremony Coordination	Months 10-12	\$20,000	NEW	D2.2, D2.3
D2.4	Stacks Bitcoin Bridge Logic	Months 9-11	\$45,000	Core	D2.2
D2.4a	Enhanced State Management	Months 10-11	\$28,000	NEW	D2.4

Code	Deliverable	Timeline	Budget	Type	Dependencies
D2.4b	Network Protocol (libp2p)	Months 10-11	\$21,000	NEW	D2.2
D2.5	Validator Network Launch	Months 11-12	\$38,000	Core	D2.1a, D2.2, D2.3
D2.6	Security Audit (Enhanced)	Months 12-13	\$82,000	EXPANDEE above	
D2.7	Frontend Updates (Native BTC)	Months 11-13	\$25,000	Core	D2.4
D2.8	Migration Tools	Months 13-14	\$12,000	Core	D2.7
D2.10	Operational Tooling	Month 13	\$15,000	NEW	D2.5
D2.11	Disaster Recovery Testing	Month 13	\$12,000	NEW	D2.5, D2.10
D2.9	Launch & \$5M Volume	Months 14-16	\$5,000	Core	All above

TOTAL: \$463,000 over 9 months

9.3 Detailed Deliverable Specifications

D2.1: Threshold Crypto Library Integration (\$45,000) Timeline:

Month 8 (1 month)

Budget: \$45,000

Team: Cryptography specialist + Rust developer

Scope: - Research and select optimal threshold signature scheme - Options: FROST (Flexible Round-Optimized Schnorr Threshold) - secp256k1-zkp with MuSig2 - Custom implementation evaluation - Integrate selected library with Rust validator software - Implement Bitcoin Taproot signature generation - Comprehensive test suite for cryptographic correctness - Performance benchmarking on standard hardware

Deliverables: - [] Library selected and justified (technical report) - [] Integration complete and compiling - [] 100% test coverage of cryptographic functions - [] Benchmark results (<5 seconds signing time) - [] Documentation on cryptographic approach - [] Test vectors for Bitcoin signature verification - [] Independent cryptographer review completed

Success Criteria: - Signatures valid per Bitcoin consensus rules - Signing time <5 seconds on standard hardware (4-core CPU) - 100% test pass rate across all test vectors - Independent cryptographer sign-off - No known vulnerabilities in selected library - Compatible with Bitcoin Taproot

Acceptance Testing:

```
# [test]
fn test_threshold_signature_bitcoin_valid() {
    let keypair = generate_threshold_keypair(10, 15);
    let message = bitcoin_tx_hash();
    let partial_sigs = sign_partial(keypair, message, 10); // 10-of-15
    let combined = aggregate_signatures(partial_sigs);

    assert!(verify_bitcoin_signature(combined, message));
}
```

Dependencies: None (start immediately Month 8)

D2.1a: Validator Recruitment Program (\$25,000) NEW Timeline:

Months 8-10 (3 months)

Budget: \$25,000

Team: Project lead + community manager

Scope: - Define validator qualification criteria - Technical: Rust experience, sysadmin skills, 24/7 availability - Financial: \$800 hardware budget, \$170/month operating costs - Geographic: Target 3+ continents - Source and outreach to potential validators - Bitcoin developer communities - Stacks ecosystem participants - Professional node operators - Conduct technical interviews (1 hour each, 20+ candidates) - Hardware and infrastructure verification - Legal agreement preparation and signing - Onboarding with training materials and docs - Establish communication channels (Discord, Telegram, email)

Deliverables: - [] 15 committed validators signed on - [] Validator qualification criteria document - [] Geographic distribution achieved (3+ continents) - [] Validator agreement contracts (all signed) - [] Onboarding materials (setup guides, video tutorials) - [] Communication infrastructure (Discord server, mailing list) - [] Public validator registry with contact information - [] Hardware verification reports (all 15 validators)

Success Criteria: - 15 validators recruited and committed by Month 10 - Geographic distribution: - North America: 5 validators - Europe: 5 validators - Asia: 3 validators - Other: 2 validators - All validators pass technical assessment - All validators sign legal agreement - All validators complete onboarding training - All validators have hardware ready by Month 11 - 90%+ participation in communication channels

Recruitment Funnel:

Target: 15 validators
Outreach: 50+ candidates
Interviews: 25 candidates
Offers: 18 candidates
Accepted: 15 validators

Geographic Distribution Example: - USA (2), Canada (2), Mexico (1) = 5 North America - UK (2), Germany (1), France (1), Netherlands (1) = 5 Europe - Japan (1), Singapore (1), South Korea (1) = 3 Asia - Australia (1), Brazil (1) = 2 Other

Dependencies: None (can start Month 8)

D2.2: Validator Node Software (\$62,000) **Timeline:** Months 8-10 (3 months)

Budget: \$62,000

Team: 2 Rust developers

Scope: - Build Rust application for validator nodes - Core features: - Monitor Bitcoin blockchain (via Bitcoin Core RPC) - Monitor Stacks blockchain (via Stacks node RPC) - Participate in threshold signature ceremonies - P2P communication with other validators (libp2p - see D2.4b) - Manage encrypted key shares (HSM or secure file storage) - Export Prometheus metrics for monitoring - Logging with structured output (JSON) - Configuration management (TOML files) - CLI for validator operations - Security hardening - Resource optimization (<4GB RAM, <10% CPU idle) - Documentation and deployment guides

Deliverables: - [] Rust binary (Linux x86_64) - [] Docker image for containerized deployment - [] Configuration files and examples - [] Comprehensive setup documentation - [] API documentation (internal) - [] Monitoring dashboards (Grafana - see D2.10) - [] Unit tests (>90% coverage) - [] Integration tests with Bitcoin/Stacks testnets

Success Criteria: - Binary runs stably for 7+ days without restart on testnet - Resource usage acceptable: - RAM: <4GB under load - CPU: <10% idle, <50% under signing - Disk: <100GB for blockchain data - Network: <1Mbps bandwidth - All functionality tested (unit + integration) - Documentation clear enough for operators to self-deploy - Zero memory leaks in 7-day run - Graceful handling of network interruptions

Key Modules:

```
// Validator software architecture
mod bitcoin_monitor;    // Watch Bitcoin blockchain
mod stacks_monitor;     // Watch Stacks blockchain
mod threshold_signer;   // Participate in signing (uses D2.1)
```

```

mod p2p_network;           // Communicate with peers (D2.4b)
mod key_manager;          // Manage encrypted key shares
mod config;               // Configuration management
mod metrics;              // Prometheus metrics export
mod cli;                  // Command-line interface

```

Dependencies: D2.1 (threshold crypto library)

D2.3: DKG Ceremony Implementation (\$28,000) **Timeline:** Months 9-10 (2 months)

Budget: \$28,000

Team: Cryptography specialist + Rust developer

Scope: - Implement Distributed Key Generation (DKG) protocol - Support 15-validator ceremony (10-of-15 threshold) - Byzantine fault tolerance (detect and exclude malicious validators) - Verification and commitment rounds - Export combined public key (Taproot-compatible) - Ceremony auditability (all messages logged) - Recovery from failed ceremonies - Timeouts and retry logic

Deliverables: - [] DKG ceremony module in validator software - [] Ceremony coordinator scripts - [] Test ceremonies on testnet (3+ successful runs) - [] Audit logs from test ceremonies - [] Documentation on ceremony process - [] Troubleshooting guide - [] Ceremony verification tools

Success Criteria: - DKG completes successfully with 15 honest validators on testnet - DKG detects and excludes malicious participants (tested with 3 bad actors) - Combined public key is Taproot-compatible - Ceremony takes <10 minutes for 15 validators - 100% of key shares verified correct - Audit trail complete and verifiable - Can recover from failed ceremony attempts

DKG Process:

```

Phase 1: Commitment (each validator commits to random value)
Phase 2: Share Distribution (validators exchange shares)
Phase 3: Verification (validators verify shares received)
Phase 4: Key Aggregation (combine shares → public key)
Phase 5: Confirmation (all validators confirm success)

```

Total time: <10 minutes for 15 validators

Dependencies: D2.1 (crypto library), D2.2 (validator software)

D2.3a: DKG Ceremony Coordination (\$20,000) NEW Timeline: Months 10-12 (3 months)

Budget: \$20,000

Team: Project lead + coordinator

Scope: - Plan and schedule testnet DKG rehearsals - Coordinate across time zones (3+ continents) - Send calendar invites and reminders - Prepare step-by-step ceremony guide - Conduct 2+ testnet DKG ceremonies - Provide real-time support during ceremony - Troubleshoot issues as they arise - Document all issues and resolutions - Schedule and facilitate mainnet DKG ceremony - Coordinate 15 validators in real-time - Monitor ceremony progress - Verify successful completion - Post-ceremony verification - Test combined public key - Verify key shares distributed correctly - Test threshold signatures - Create ceremony audit trail - Log all messages and actions - Document timeline and participants - Publish ceremony report

Deliverables: - [] 2+ successful testnet DKG rehearsals - [] Detailed ceremony procedures and runbooks - [] Coordinator playbook (step-by-step) - [] Mainnet DKG ceremony successfully completed - [] Ceremony audit logs (public) - [] Post-ceremony verification report - [] Lessons learned document - [] Emergency rollback procedures (if needed)

Success Criteria: - Testnet DKG ceremonies: 2+ successful completions - All 15 validators participate in testnet rehearsals - Mainnet DKG completes in <30 minutes - All validators successfully generate key shares - Combined public key verified on Bitcoin testnet - Test transactions signed successfully post-DKG - Zero key shares compromised or lost - Complete audit trail available publicly

Coordination Timeline:

Month 10: Testnet Rehearsal 1

Month 11: Testnet Rehearsal 2

Month 12: Mainnet Ceremony (Week 1)

Month 12: Post-ceremony Verification (Week 2)

Dependencies: D2.2 (validator software), D2.3 (DKG implementation)

D2.4: Stacks Bitcoin Bridge Logic (\$45,000) **Timeline:** Months 9-11 (3 months)

Budget: \$45,000

Team: Smart contract developer + Bitcoin developer

Scope: - Update Stacks smart contracts (Clarity): - Monitor Bitcoin deposits via STX transaction proofs - Emit validator action requests (withdrawals) - Track Bitcoin transaction confirmations (6+ blocks) - Handle cross-chain state synchronization - Bitcoin transaction builder: - Construct withdrawal transactions - UTXO selection and management - Fee estimation (dynamic based on mempool) - RBF (Replace-By-Fee) support for stuck transactions - Integration with validator network: - Action request queue - Signature aggregation coordination - Transaction broadcast

Deliverables: - [] Updated Stacks contracts (Clarity) - [] Bitcoin transaction

construction library (Rust) - [] UTXO management module - [] Fee estimation module (connects to mempool API) - [] Integration tests (cross-chain scenarios) - [] API for frontends to query bridge status - [] Documentation on bridge architecture - [] Testnet deployment and testing

Success Criteria: - Deposits detected within 2 Bitcoin blocks - 100% of valid action requests result in Bitcoin transactions - No funds ever stuck due to bridge logic - State sync works even during Bitcoin reorgs (tested up to 6 blocks) - Fee estimation accurate (within 20% of actual) - RBF works for stuck transactions - Zero fund losses in testnet testing

Bridge Flow:

Deposit Flow:

User → Bitcoin TX → Bitcoin Network → Stacks Proof → Smart Contract → Credit User

Withdrawal Flow:

Smart Contract → Action Request → Validators → Threshold Sign → Bitcoin TX → Bitcoin Network

Dependencies: D2.2 (validator software)

D2.4a: Enhanced State Management (\$28,000) NEW Timeline:

Months 10-11 (2 months)

Budget: \$28,000

Team: Distributed systems specialist + Rust developer

Scope: - Handle Bitcoin blockchain reorganizations (reorgs) - Detect reorgs up to 6 blocks deep - Roll back affected state on Stacks - Retry affected transactions - Notify users of reorg events - Stacks blockchain state synchronization - Handle Stacks microblocks - Synchronize with Bitcoin state - Resolve state conflicts - Cross-chain state consistency verification - Periodic state checksums - Automated consistency checks - Alert on inconsistencies - Atomic state updates - Ensure Bitcoin and Stacks state updated together - Transaction-like semantics for state changes - Conflict resolution mechanisms - Handle concurrent state updates - Prioritize Bitcoin state as source of truth - State rollback and recovery procedures - Recover from crashed state - Rebuild state from Bitcoin blockchain - Comprehensive state logging and debugging

Deliverables: - [] Reorg handling logic (up to 6 blocks) - [] State synchronization protocol - [] State verification tests (100+ scenarios) - [] Atomic update implementation - [] Conflict resolution algorithms - [] State recovery procedures (documented and tested) - [] Monitoring dashboards for state health - [] Alert rules for state inconsistencies

Success Criteria: - Handle Bitcoin reorgs up to 6 blocks deep (tested 10+ times) - Stacks state syncs within 1 block of Bitcoin state - Zero state inconsistencies in 30-day testnet run - Atomic updates succeed 100% of time - Recovery

from crashed state in <5 minutes - State verification tests pass 100% - Reorg handling time <30 seconds

State Management Architecture:

```
struct StateManager {
    bitcoin_state: BitcoinState,           // Bitcoin blockchain state
    stacks_state: StacksState,             // Stacks blockchain state
    consistency_checker: Checker,          // Verify cross-chain consistency
    reorg_handler: ReorgHandler,           // Handle Bitcoin reorgs
    logger: StateLogger,                  // Comprehensive logging
}
```

Dependencies: D2.4 (bridge logic)

D2.4b: Network Protocol Implementation (\$21,000) NEW Timeline:

Months 10-11 (2 months)

Budget: \$21,000

Team: Network engineer + Rust developer

Scope: - Implement libp2p for validator-to-validator communication - Peer discovery and connection management - NAT traversal for validators behind firewalls - TLS encryption for all messages - Gossip protocol for signature requests - Efficient message propagation - Deduplicate messages - Prioritize urgent requests - Partial signature aggregation protocol - Collect M-of-N partial signatures - Verify each partial signature - Aggregate into final signature - Network topology optimization - Minimize latency between validators - Redundant connections for reliability - Message authentication and encryption - Each message signed by sender - Prevent spoofing and replay attacks - Network resilience testing - Handle validator disconnections - Recover from network partitions - Test with 5/15 validators offline

Deliverables: - [] libp2p integration in validator software - [] Gossip protocol implementation - [] Signature aggregation module - [] Peer discovery mechanism - [] Network monitoring tools - [] Performance benchmarks (latency, throughput) - [] Network partition recovery tests - [] Documentation on network protocol

Success Criteria: - All 15 validators connected via libp2p - Gossip reaches all peers in <5 seconds - Signature aggregation completes in <10 seconds - Network handles 10+ signing requests per minute - Resilient to 5/15 validator failures - Network recovers from partitions in <2 minutes - Zero message loss in normal conditions - Latency p95: <2 seconds

Network Architecture:

Gossip Network (libp2p):

Val 1 Val 2 Val 3

Val 15

Signature Request → Gossip → All Validators → Partial Sigs → Aggregator

Dependencies: D2.2 (validator software)

D2.5: Validator Network Launch (\$38,000) **Timeline:** Months 11-12 (2 months)

Budget: \$38,000

Team: DevOps engineer + project lead

Scope: - Deploy all 15 validator nodes to production hardware - Coordinate with each validator operator - Verify hardware meets specifications - Install and configure validator software - Establish network communication - Configure libp2p connections - Test peer connectivity - Verify gossip propagation - Initial testing on Bitcoin and Stacks testnets - Test threshold signatures - Test DKG ceremony on testnet - Simulate signing scenarios - Mainnet launch preparation - Final hardware checks - Security hardening - Backup procedures - Mainnet DKG ceremony (see D2.3a) - Post-launch monitoring and support

Deliverables: - [] 15 active validators on mainnet - [] Public validator registry - [] Network health dashboard (real-time) - [] Validator operating procedures (documented) - [] Emergency contact list (24/7 coverage) - [] Launch checklist (completed) - [] Post-launch report (first week)

Success Criteria: - All 15 validators online and signing - Network uptime >99% from day 1 - Geographic distribution achieved: - North America: 5 validators - Europe: 5 validators - Asia: 3 validators - Other: 2 validators - No validator downtime >1 hour in first week - All validators responding to signature requests - Network latency acceptable (<2s p95)

Launch Checklist:

Pre-Launch (Month 11):

- [] Hardware verified for all 15 validators
- [] Software deployed to all validators
- [] Network connectivity tested
- [] Testnet DKG ceremony successful (D2.3a)
- [] Emergency procedures documented

Launch Day (Month 12, Week 1):

- [] Mainnet DKG ceremony (D2.3a)
- [] All validators online
- [] Combined public key verified
- [] Test signature successful
- [] Monitoring active

Post-Launch (Month 12, Week 2-4):

- [] 24/7 monitoring
- [] Daily health checks
- [] Performance optimization
- [] Issue resolution

Dependencies: D2.1a (recruitment), D2.2 (software), D2.3 (DKG implementation)

D2.6: Security Audit (Enhanced Scope) (\$82,000) EXPANDED

Timeline: Months 12-13 (2 months)

Budget: \$82,000 (was \$52,000, +\$30,000)

Team: External audit firm(s)

Scope (Enhanced): - **Threshold Cryptography Audit** (\$30,000 - specialist required) - DKG implementation security - Partial signature security - Key share storage and encryption - Threshold parameter validation (10-of-15) - Cryptographic primitives correctness - **Validator Network Audit** (\$22,000) - P2P network security (libp2p) - Gossip protocol vulnerabilities - Sybil attack resistance - Network partition handling - Validator authentication - **Bridge Logic Audit** (\$15,000) - Cross-chain state management - Bitcoin transaction construction - UTXO management security - Reorg handling security - Withdrawal authorization - **Economic Attack Vectors** (\$10,000) - Game theory analysis - Validator collusion scenarios - 51% attack scenarios - Griefing attacks - Incentive compatibility - **Follow-up Re-audit** (\$5,000) - Verify all critical findings fixed - Re-test high severity issues - Final security sign-off

Audit Firms (Preferred): 1. **Trail of Bits** (threshold crypto specialists)
2. **Least Authority** (distributed systems experts) 3. **CoinFabrik** (Clarity/Stacks experience) 4. **NCC Group** (general blockchain security)

Deliverables: - [] Comprehensive audit report (PDF) - [] Findings list with severity ratings: - Critical: Immediate fund risk - High: Significant security issue - Medium: Edge case vulnerabilities - Low: Code quality improvements - [] Remediation recommendations for each finding - [] Follow-up review after fixes implemented - [] Public publication of final audit report - [] Security best practices document

Success Criteria: - Zero critical vulnerabilities remaining - All high-severity issues resolved - All medium issues: fixed or documented with accepted risk -

All low issues: fixed or backlogged - Audit firm provides final sign-off - Report published publicly on protocol website

Audit Timeline:

Month 12, Week 1-2: Audit kick-off, code review
Month 12, Week 3-4: Threshold crypto deep dive
Month 13, Week 1: Findings report delivered
Month 13, Week 2-3: Development team addresses findings
Month 13, Week 4: Follow-up re-audit
Month 13 end: Final report published

Why \$82K? (was \$52K): - Threshold cryptography requires specialized auditors (+\$15K) - 15-validator distributed system more complex than anticipated (+\$8K) - Economic game theory analysis essential (+\$5K) - Extended audit time for thoroughness (+\$2K)

Dependencies: All prior deliverables (D2.1-D2.5, D2.4a-D2.4b, D2.10-D2.11)

D2.7: Frontend Updates (\$25,000) Timeline: Months 11-13 (3 months)

Budget: \$25,000

Team: Frontend developer + UX designer

Scope: - Native Bitcoin deposit UI - Display threshold multisig address (P2TR Taproot) - QR code for mobile deposit - Deposit tracking and confirmation status - Threshold multisig address generation - Derive address from combined public key - Display address in multiple formats (Bech32m) - Bitcoin transaction monitoring - Real-time deposit detection - Confirmation count display - Withdrawal status tracking - Validator transparency dashboard - Show all 15 validators and their status - Uptime and performance metrics - Geographic distribution visualization - Migration from Phase 1 interface - Migrate sBTC loan to native BTC - Explain benefits of migration - Step-by-step migration wizard

Deliverables: - [] Updated React frontend (Next.js) - [] Native BTC loan creation flow - [] Validator dashboard page - [] Migration wizard UI - [] User documentation (written guides) - [] Video tutorials (5+ videos) - [] Mobile responsive design - [] Cross-browser testing (Chrome, Firefox, Safari)

Success Criteria: - Users can create native BTC loans in <10 minutes - Bitcoin addresses displayed clearly (QR + text) - Validator status visible and understandable - Migration wizard completion rate >80% - Mobile responsive (tested on iOS + Android) - Error handling graceful (no crashes) - User testing with 5+ users: 4.5+/5 rating

UI Flows:

Native BTC Loan Creation:

1. Connect Wallet → 2. Choose Native BTC → 3. Enter Loan Parameters

- 4. Display Deposit Address (QR) → 5. Wait for Confirmations
- 6. Create Auction → 7. Monitor Bids

Validator Dashboard:

- 1. Navigate to "Validators" → 2. See 15 Validator Cards
- 3. View Status (Online/Offline) → 4. View Geographic Map
- 5. View Performance Metrics

Migration Wizard:

- 1. Select sBTC Loan → 2. Review Benefits → 3. Initiate Migration
- 4. Wait for sBTC Unlock → 5. Deposit Native BTC
- 6. Migration Complete

Dependencies: D2.4 (bridge logic)

D2.8: Migration Tools (\$12,000) Timeline: Months 13-14 (2 months)

Budget: \$12,000

Team: Smart contract developer + frontend developer

Scope: - Smart contracts for Phase 1 → Phase 2 migration - Unlock sBTC collateral from Phase 1 loan - Create equivalent native BTC loan in Phase 2 - Preserve loan terms (amount, maturity, lender) - Transfer NFT positions (borrower/lender) - Migration UI workflow - Select loans to migrate - Review migration details - One-click migration execution - Track migration progress - User communication and education - Email notifications about migration - FAQ on migration process - Benefits of native BTC vs sBTC - Migration incentives (if any) - Analytics on migration rates - Track migration adoption - Identify barriers to migration - Report on migration success

Deliverables: - [] Migration smart contracts (Clarity) - [] Migration UI workflow (React components) - [] User guides and FAQs (written + video) - [] Email notification system - [] Migration tracking dashboard (for team) - [] Migration analytics reports

Success Criteria: - 30%+ of Phase 1 users migrate to Phase 2 - Migration completes in <24 hours per loan - Zero value lost during migration - No failed migrations (or 100% recoverable) - High user satisfaction: 4.5+/5 rating (post-migration survey) - Clear communication: 80%+ users understand process

Migration Flow:

User Experience:

1. User sees "Migrate to Native BTC" banner on dashboard
2. User clicks "Learn More" → Sees benefits (eliminate peg risk, etc.)
3. User selects loans to migrate
4. User reviews migration details (preview)
5. User clicks "Migrate Now"

6. Smart contract unlocks sBTC, returns to user
7. User deposits native BTC to new address
8. New native BTC loan created with same terms
9. NFTs transferred to new loan
10. Migration complete (<24 hours)

Dependencies: D2.7 (frontend updates)

D2.10: Operational Tooling (\$15,000) NEW Timeline: Month 13 (1 month)

Budget: \$15,000

Team: DevOps engineer

Scope: - Grafana dashboards for comprehensive monitoring - Validator health dashboard (15 validators) - Network performance dashboard - Signature request dashboard - Cross-chain state dashboard - Bitcoin/Stacks blockchain monitoring - Alert history dashboard - PagerDuty integration for 24/7 alerting - Critical alerts (P1): Validator down, signature failure - High alerts (P2): Slow performance, network issues - Medium alerts (P3): Warnings, informational - Automated health checks - Validator availability checks (every 1 minute) - Signature success rate checks - Network latency checks - Bitcoin/Stacks node health checks - Performance metrics collection (Prometheus) - Export metrics from all 15 validators - Aggregate network-wide metrics - Historical metrics storage (30 days) - Log aggregation and analysis (ELK stack) - Centralized logging from all validators - Full-text search across logs - Log retention policy (90 days) - Incident response runbooks - 10+ common scenarios documented - Step-by-step resolution procedures - Escalation paths - Backup and recovery automation - Automated key share backups (encrypted) - Database backups (validator state) - Disaster recovery procedures (documented and tested - see D2.11)

Deliverables: - [] Grafana dashboard suite (10+ dashboards) - [] PagerDuty alert rules (20+ alert types) - [] Health check scripts (automated, scheduled) - [] Prometheus metric exporters (deployed to all validators) - [] ELK stack deployed (centralized logging) - [] Incident response runbooks (10+ scenarios) - [] Backup automation scripts (tested) - [] Operations manual (comprehensive documentation)

Success Criteria: - All 15 validators reporting metrics to Grafana - Dashboards show real-time status (<10s delay) - Alerts fire within 1 minute of issue detection - 100% of critical incidents detected by monitoring - Logs searchable and easily analyzable - Runbooks tested with 3+ real scenarios - Backups automated and verified (restore tested) - Operations team trained on all tools

Dashboard Examples:

Validator Health Dashboard:

- 15 validator status cards (green/yellow/red)

- Uptime percentage per validator
- Last signature time per validator
- Resource usage (CPU, RAM, disk)

Network Performance Dashboard:

- Signature request queue length
- Average signature time (p50, p95, p99)
- Network latency between validators
- Gossip propagation time

Alert Examples:

- P1: Validator {name} offline for >5 minutes
- P1: Signature failure rate >5%
- P2: Signature time >20 seconds (p95)
- P2: Network latency >5 seconds (p95)
- P3: Validator resource usage high (>80%)

Dependencies: D2.5 (validator network launched)

D2.11: Disaster Recovery Testing (\$12,000) NEW Timeline: Month 13 (1 month)

Budget: \$12,000

Team: DevOps engineer + project lead

Scope: - Test key recovery procedures - Simulate 3 validator key losses - Recover keys from encrypted backups - Verify recovered validators can sign - Test network recovery (validator failures) - Simulate 5 validators going offline - Verify 10-of-15 threshold still works - Test network recovery when validators return - Test coordinator failure and replacement - Simulate coordinator node failure - Failover to backup coordinator - Verify signing continues without interruption - Test Bitcoin node failure scenarios - Simulate Bitcoin node crash - Verify validator detects issue - Test automatic reconnection - Test Stacks node failure scenarios - Simulate Stacks node crash - Verify state recovery - Test bridge logic failover - Test HSM failure and recovery - Simulate HSM malfunction - Test key extraction from backup - Restore key to replacement HSM - Document all disaster recovery procedures - Step-by-step recovery guides - Emergency contact procedures - Escalation protocols

Deliverables: - [] Key recovery procedure (tested 3+ times successfully) - [] Network partition recovery (tested 5+ scenarios) - [] Coordinator failover procedure (tested 2+ times) - [] Node failure recovery runbooks (Bitcoin + Stacks) - [] HSM failure recovery guide (tested 1+ time) - [] Disaster recovery test report (comprehensive) - [] Updated incident response procedures - [] Disaster recovery drill schedule (quarterly)

Success Criteria: - Key recovery tested successfully 3+ times (all 3 succeeded)

- Network recovers from 5/15 validators down (tested 5+ times) - Coordinator replaced without downtime (tested 2+ times) - Bitcoin node failures handled gracefully (tested 3+ times) - Stacks node failures handled gracefully (tested 3+ times) - HSM failures recoverable in <2 hours (tested 1+ time) - All procedures documented clearly - All procedures verified by 2+ team members

Test Scenarios:

Scenario 1: Key Loss Recovery

1. Simulate 3 validators lose key shares
2. Retrieve encrypted backups from secure storage
3. Decrypt backups using master key
4. Restore key shares to validators
5. Verify validators can participate in signing
6. Time to recovery: <2 hours

Scenario 2: Network Partition

1. Simulate 5 validators disconnected (network partition)
2. Verify 10 remaining validators can still sign
3. Simulate reconnection of 5 validators
4. Verify network resumes normal operation
5. Time to recovery: <5 minutes

Scenario 3: Coordinator Failure

1. Simulate coordinator node crash
2. Verify backup coordinator takes over
3. Verify signing requests continue
4. Verify no signatures lost
5. Time to failover: <30 seconds

Dependencies: D2.5 (validator network), D2.10 (operational tooling)

D2.9: Launch & First \$5M Native BTC Volume (\$5,000) Timeline:

Months 14-16 (3 months)

Budget: \$5,000

Team: Marketing + community manager

Scope: - Marketing for Phase 2 launch - Press release announcing native BTC custody - Blog posts on threshold signatures - Twitter/X campaign - Target institutional users - Direct outreach to mining operations - Pitch to DeFi protocols - Pitch to Bitcoin treasury companies - Content creation - Case studies (use cases for native BTC loans) - Security documentation (audits, architecture) - Comparison: native BTC vs sBTC vs WBTC - Conference presentations - BTC Prague (if timing aligns) - Bitcoin Conference - Stacks ecosystem events - Community engagement - Discord/Telegram growth - AMA sessions with validators - Educational webinars

Deliverables: - [] \$5M+ in native BTC loan volume by Month 16 - [] 15+ large loans (>\$100K each) - [] 5+ institutional users (mining operations, treasuries) - [] 10+ press mentions or articles - [] 3+ conference presentations - [] Community growth: 2000+ Discord members

Success Criteria: - \$5M volume milestone achieved by Month 16 end - Average loan size >\$150K (institutional focus) - 50%+ of new loans use native BTC (vs Phase 1 sBTC) - 3+ major mining operations using protocol - Positive press coverage (no FUD) - Community engaged and active

Marketing Timeline:

Month 14: Pre-launch teasers, documentation

Month 15: Soft launch announcement, case studies

Month 16: Full launch PR, institutional outreach

Dependencies: All prior deliverables (network operational)

10. Technical Constraints

10.1 Bitcoin Constraints

Bitcoin Script Limitations: - No smart contracts (simple scripting only) - Multisig requires on-chain setup (expensive) - Taproot helps but still limited - Must use threshold signatures (off-chain aggregation)

Block Time Variability: - Bitcoin blocks: 10 min average (can vary 1-60 min) - Confirmation delays impact user experience - Must design UX around variable timing - Can't guarantee exact loan activation time

Transaction Costs: - Bitcoin fees spike during high activity - Median fee: \$5-20 per transaction - Spikes: \$50-100+ per transaction - Must reserve fee budget for each loan - RBF allows fee bumping if stuck

Mitigation: - Use SegWit and Taproot (lower fees) - Batch transactions where possible - Dynamic fee estimation - Allow manual fee bumping - Buffer for fee reserves

10.2 Stacks Constraints

Block Time Coupling: - Stacks blocks anchored to Bitcoin - Stacks block Bitcoin block 10 minutes - Cross-chain coordination slower than single-chain - Must design for ~10 min latencies

Contract Upgradability: - Phase 2 contracts should be immutable - If bugs found, must deploy new version - Migration process needed for users - No emergency pause (by design)

10.3 Threshold Cryptography Constraints

Signing Complexity: - Need 10/15 validators to sign - Requires network coordination - Latency: 1-5 minutes typical - If validators slow/down, delays possible

Key Management: - Each validator must securely store key share - Lost key shares = reduced threshold (bad) - Backup and recovery critical - No key rotation (would require new DKG)

Threshold Fixed: - 10-of-15 set at launch - Changing threshold requires new DKG - Can't easily add/remove validators - Future: need validator rotation mechanism

11. Migration from Phase 1

11.1 Backwards Compatibility

Phase 1 Continues Operating: - sBTC loans remain fully functional - No forced migration - Users choose when to migrate - Phase 1 and Phase 2 coexist indefinitely

Why Keep Phase 1: - Smaller loans (<\$50K) may prefer Phase 1 (simplicity) - Users comfortable with sBTC can continue - No disruption to existing users - Gradual transition reduces risk

11.2 Migration Incentives

For Borrowers: - Better security (native BTC, no peg risk) - Institutional-grade custody - Larger loan amounts supported - Increased confidence for big positions

For Lenders: - Native Bitcoin custody (not wrapped) - Transparency (see multisig on Bitcoin) - Larger positions possible - Better for institutional compliance

For Protocol: - Demonstrates trustless custody capability - Positions for Phase 3 (cross-chain) - Attracts larger users - Removes sBTC dependency risk

11.3 Migration Support

User Education: - Blog posts explaining Phase 2 benefits - Video tutorials on migration process - FAQs addressing concerns - Case studies from early adopters

Technical Support: - Discord support channel - Migration assistance from team - Troubleshooting guides - White-glove service for large users

Financial Incentives (Optional): - Gas rebates for migrations - Lower fees for early Phase 2 users - Bonus for large volume migrations

12. Risk Assessment

12.1 Technical Risks

Risk 1: Threshold Cryptography Bugs **Description:** Critical bugs in threshold signature implementation could lead to inability to sign or, worse, key compromise.

Likelihood: Low (with professional audit)

Impact: Critical (complete system failure)

Risk Score: HIGH

Mitigation Strategies: - Use battle-tested threshold crypto library (FROST or MuSig2) - Independent cryptographer review (included in D2.1) - Comprehensive test suite (100% coverage) - Enhanced security audit with threshold specialists (\$30K, D2.6) - Testnet deployment for months before mainnet - Formal verification of critical functions (if possible) - Bug bounty program post-launch (\$50K+ rewards)

Residual Risk: Low after mitigations

Risk 2: Validator Recruitment Failure NEW **Description:** Unable to recruit 15 qualified, reliable validators by Month 10.

Likelihood: Medium (validator recruitment is challenging)

Impact: High (delays launch or reduces security)

Risk Score: HIGH

Mitigation Strategies: - Start recruitment early (Month 8, D2.1a) - Dedicated recruiter and \$25K budget - Target 25+ candidates for 15 slots (funnel) - Geographic diversity incentives - Clear validator compensation model (\$333+/month at \$5M volume) - Backup plan: Launch with 12 validators (8-of-12 threshold) if needed - Partnership with existing node operators (Stacks, Bitcoin)

Contingency: - If <15 validators by Month 10: Extend timeline by 1 month - If <12 validators: Cannot launch safely, abort Phase 2

Residual Risk: Medium (recruitment is hard to predict)

Risk 3: DKG Ceremony Failure NEW **Description:** DKG ceremony fails, and validators cannot generate threshold keys.

Likelihood: Medium (15-party coordination complex)

Impact: High (delays launch by weeks)

Risk Score: HIGH

Mitigation Strategies: - 2+ testnet DKG rehearsals (D2.3a, \$20K budget) - Detailed ceremony procedures and runbooks - Real-time coordinator support during ceremony - Byzantine fault tolerance (handle malicious validators) - Ceremony timeouts and retry logic - Backup ceremony date scheduled (if first attempt fails) - Post-ceremony verification and testing

Contingency: - If first ceremony fails: Analyze issues, schedule retry within 1 week - If testnet rehearsals fail: Do not proceed to mainnet until resolved

Residual Risk: Low (with 2+ testnet rehearsals)

Risk 4: Cross-Chain State Inconsistency NEW **Description:** Bitcoin and Stacks blockchain state becomes inconsistent, causing fund locks or losses.

Likelihood: Medium (distributed systems are complex)

Impact: Critical (user fund losses)

Risk Score: HIGH

Mitigation Strategies: - Enhanced state management module (D2.4a, \$28K) - Handle Bitcoin reorgs up to 6 blocks - Atomic state updates (Bitcoin + Stacks together) - Comprehensive state verification tests (100+ scenarios) - Automated consistency checks (every block) - Alert on any inconsistencies (PagerDuty P1) - State recovery procedures (tested in D2.11)

Contingency: - If inconsistency detected: Emergency pause, investigate, recover from Bitcoin chain - If state unrecoverable: Manual intervention by validators

Residual Risk: Medium (complex distributed systems always have edge cases)

Risk 5: Network Protocol Performance Issues NEW **Description:** libp2p network protocol too slow, signatures take >30 seconds.

Likelihood: Low (libp2p is proven)

Impact: Medium (poor UX, but functional)

Risk Score: MEDIUM

Mitigation Strategies: - Network protocol implementation (D2.4b, \$21K) - Performance benchmarks (signature time <10s target) - Network optimization (topology, redundant connections) - Extensive testing with 15 validators on testnet - Monitor network latency in production (Grafana) - Graceful degradation (if slow, still works)

Contingency: - If too slow: Optimize network topology, upgrade validator hardware - Target: <10s average, <20s p95

Residual Risk: Low (can optimize post-launch if needed)

Risk 6: sBTC Peg Failure **Description:** sBTC loses its peg to Bitcoin during Phase 2 development or transition.

Likelihood: Low (but not zero)

Impact: High (Phase 1 users affected, complicates migration)

Risk Score: MEDIUM

Mitigation Strategies: - Phase 2 eliminates reliance on sBTC (entire point of Phase 2) - Migration tools ready (D2.8) to move users to native BTC - Clear communication to users about sBTC risks - Phase 1 continues operating (users can repay loans) - Cannot prevent sBTC issues (systemic risk)

Contingency: - If sBTC depegs during Phase 2: Accelerate Phase 2 launch, prioritize migration - Communicate with Phase 1 users about migration incentives

Residual Risk: Medium (systemic sBTC risk until migration complete)

Risk 7: Security Audit Delays **Description:** Security audit takes longer than expected, delaying launch.

Likelihood: Medium (audits often delayed)

Impact: Medium (launch delay of 2-4 weeks)

Risk Score: MEDIUM

Mitigation Strategies: - Enhanced audit budget (\$82K) includes contingency - Book audit firm early (Month 10) - Provide audit firm with complete code by Month 12 - Respond quickly to audit findings (dedicated dev time) - Plan for 2-month audit duration (accounts for delays)

Contingency: - If audit delayed: Accept delay, do NOT launch without audit - Security > speed

Residual Risk: Medium (audits are hard to predict)

12.2 Operational Risks

Risk 8: Validator Downtime NEW **Description:** Multiple validators go offline, reducing signing capacity.

Likelihood: Medium (operational issues happen)

Impact: Medium (slower signatures, but functional)

Risk Score: MEDIUM

Mitigation Strategies: - 10-of-15 threshold (can tolerate 5 validators down)
- Geographic distribution (no single region failure) - Operational tooling (D2.10) for proactive monitoring - 24/7 alerting (PagerDuty) for validator issues - Disaster recovery procedures (D2.11) for quick recovery - Validator SLAs (99.5% uptime required)

Contingency: - If 6+ validators down: Network still functional (10-of-15) - If 10+ validators down: Emergency procedures, contact all validators - If <10 validators: Signing stops, emergency intervention

Residual Risk: Low (10-of-15 threshold provides resilience)

Risk 9: Operational Tooling Not Ready NEW **Description:** Monitoring and operational tools not ready by launch, causing “blind” operations.

Likelihood: Low (dedicated deliverable D2.10)

Impact: High (poor incident response)

Risk Score: MEDIUM

Mitigation Strategies: - Dedicated operational tooling deliverable (D2.10, \$15K, Month 13) - Deploy tooling before launch (Month 13) - Test all tools with validators in Month 13 - Train team on operational procedures - Block launch until tooling verified

Contingency: - If tooling not ready by Month 13 end: Delay launch by 2 weeks
- Do NOT launch without monitoring

Residual Risk: Low (tooling is mandatory pre-launch)

Risk 10: Disaster Recovery Procedures Untested NEW **Description:** Disaster happens, and team doesn't know how to recover (key loss, validator failures).

Likelihood: Medium (disasters happen)

Impact: High (extended outage, loss of user confidence)

Risk Score: HIGH

Mitigation Strategies: - Dedicated disaster recovery testing (D2.11, \$12K, Month 13) - Test key recovery procedures (3+ tests) - Test network partition

recovery (5+ tests) - Test coordinator failover (2+ tests) - Document all procedures (step-by-step) - Block launch until DR tested

Contingency: - If disaster occurs: Follow documented procedures (D2.11) - If procedures fail: Emergency escalation, manual intervention

Residual Risk: Low (comprehensive testing reduces risk)

12.3 Business Risks

Risk 11: Low Adoption (Users Prefer sBTC) **Description:** Users don't see value in native BTC, continue using Phase 1 sBTC.

Likelihood: Low (native BTC is superior)

Impact: High (Phase 2 underutilized)

Risk Score: MEDIUM

Mitigation Strategies: - Clear communication of benefits (no peg risk, pure Bitcoin) - Migration tools make it easy (D2.8) - Institutional marketing (native BTC appeals to institutions) - Phase 1 continues operating (not forced migration) - Success metric: 30%+ migration rate (realistic target)

Contingency: - If adoption low (<20% by Month 16): Analyze barriers, address UX issues - Consider migration incentives (lower fees for native BTC loans)

Residual Risk: Low (native BTC is objectively better)

Risk 12: Competitive Pressure **Description:** Competitor launches similar native Bitcoin lending before we do.

Likelihood: Low (we're pioneering this space)

Impact: Medium (market share dilution)

Risk Score: LOW

Mitigation Strategies: - First-mover advantage (no known competitors doing threshold sigs) - Open-source builds trust and community - Strong Phase 1 foundation (user base and traction) - Validator network decentralization (moat) - Security audit and transparency (competitive advantage)

Residual Risk: Low

12.4 Regulatory & Legal Risks

Risk 13: Regulatory Uncertainty **Description:** Unclear regulatory status of decentralized Bitcoin custody.

Likelihood: Medium (DeFi regulation evolving)
Impact: High (could force shutdown or compliance)
Risk Score: MEDIUM

Mitigation Strategies: - Truly decentralized (15 independent validators) - No central entity controls funds (threshold signatures) - Open-source and transparent - No KYC/AML (permissionless protocol) - Legal consultation before launch - Monitor regulatory developments - Non-profit foundation structure (planned)

Contingency: - If regulation requires compliance: Explore options (validator licensing, etc.) - Geographic diversity helps (not all jurisdictions)

Residual Risk: Medium (regulatory landscape uncertain)

12.5 Financial Risks

Risk 14: Budget Overruns **Description:** Development costs exceed \$463K budget.

Likelihood: Medium (complex project)
Impact: Medium (delays or scope cuts)
Risk Score: MEDIUM

Mitigation Strategies: - Detailed budget breakdown (\$463K across 15 deliverables) - \$17K contingency (4% of budget) - Prioritized deliverables (can cut D2.10, D2.11 if desperate) - Milestone-based funding (tranches reduce risk) - Regular budget reviews (monthly)

Contingency: - If budget overruns: Cut scope (reduce to 10 validators, skip DR testing) - Minimum viable Phase 2: ~\$428K (saves \$35K)

Residual Risk: Medium (budgets always have uncertainty)

Risk 15: Funding Not Secured **Description:** Unable to secure \$463K funding from grants.

Likelihood: Medium (grant funding competitive)
Impact: High (cannot execute Phase 2)
Risk Score: HIGH

Mitigation Strategies: - Diversified funding strategy (HRF, Spiral, Stacks, OpenSats) - Strong Phase 1 track record (de-risks Phase 2) - Apply to multiple funders simultaneously - Clear value proposition (first native BTC lending) - Backup plan: Reduced scope if partial funding

Contingency: - If <\$463K secured: Launch with 10 validators (8-of-10), skip DR testing - Minimum funding needed: ~\$400K

Residual Risk: Medium (funding always uncertain)

12.6 Risk Matrix Summary

Risk	Likelihood	Impact	Score	Mitigation
Threshold Crypto Bugs	Low	Critical	HIGH	Strong
Validator Recruitment	Medium	High	HIGH	Good
DKG Ceremony Failure	Medium	High	HIGH	Good
State Inconsistency	Medium	Critical	HIGH	Good
Network Performance	Low	Medium	MEDIUM	Good
sBTC Peg Failure	Low	High	MEDIUM	Accepted
Security Audit Delays	Medium	Medium	MEDIUM	Good
Validator Downtime	Medium	Medium	MEDIUM	Strong
Tooling Not Ready	Low	High	MEDIUM	Strong
DR Procedures Untested	Medium	High	HIGH	Strong
Low Adoption	Low	High	MEDIUM	Good
Competitive Pressure	Low	Medium	LOW	Good

Risk	Likelihood	Impact	Score	Mitigation
Regulatory Uncertainty	Medium	High	MEDIUM	Monitor
Budget Overruns	Medium	Medium	MEDIUM	Good
Funding Not Secured	Medium	High	HIGH	Good

Overall Risk Assessment: MEDIUM-HIGH

Risk Tolerance: Acceptable for Phase 2 with strong mitigation strategies

New Risks Added: 6 risks related to enhanced scope (validator recruitment, DKG, state management, network, tooling, DR)

13. Timeline and Budget

13.1 Phase 2 Overview

Timeline: 9 months (Months 8-16)

Budget: \$463,000

Start: Month 8 (after Phase 1 completes Month 7)

Launch: Month 14 (soft), Month 16 (full)

Buffer: Months 17-18 (2-month stabilization)

Phase 3 Start: Month 18

Why 9 Months? (was 7 months) - +2 months for validator recruitment and onboarding - +1 month for operational tooling and disaster recovery - Dedicated soft launch month before full launch - More realistic timeline for complex distributed system

Why \$463K? (was \$312K) - +\$91K development (6 new deliverables) - +\$30K enhanced security audit - +\$33K operations (tooling + DR testing) - Total: +\$151K for production-ready system

13.2 Phase 2 Gantt Chart (9 Months)

MONTH 8: Foundation & Recruitment (Start after Phase 1 complete)

Week 1-4: D2.1 Threshold Crypto Library

Week 1-12: D2.1a Validator Recruitment BEGIN

Week 2-12: D2.2 Validator Software Start

Deliverables Due: D2.1 Complete
Budget Spent: \$45K (10% of total)

MONTH 9: Development & Network Building

Week 1-8: D2.2 Validator Software Continue
Week 1-8: D2.3 DKG Implementation
Week 1-12: D2.4 Bridge Logic Start
Week 1-8: D2.1a Validator Recruitment Continue

Deliverables Due: D2.3 Complete
Budget Spent: \$115K cumulative (25%)

MONTH 10: Integration & Testing

Week 1-4: D2.2 Validator Software Complete
Week 1-4: D2.1a Validator Recruitment Complete
Week 1-12: D2.3a DKG Coordination BEGIN
Week 1-8: D2.4 Bridge Logic Continue
Week 1-8: D2.4a State Management BEGIN
Week 1-8: D2.4b Network Protocol BEGIN

Deliverables Due: D2.2, D2.1a Complete
Budget Spent: \$202K cumulative (44%)

MONTH 11: State Management & Network Protocols

Week 1-4: D2.4 Bridge Logic Complete
Week 1-4: D2.4a State Management Complete
Week 1-4: D2.4b Network Protocol Complete
Week 1-8: D2.5 Validator Network Launch BEGIN
Week 1-12: D2.7 Frontend Updates BEGIN
Week 1-8: D2.3a DKG Coordination Continue

Deliverables Due: D2.4, D2.4a, D2.4b Complete
Budget Spent: \$297K cumulative (64%)

MONTH 12: Security & Coordination

Week 1-4: D2.5 Validator Network Deploy
Week 1: D2.3a Mainnet DKG Ceremony

Week 2-4: D2.3a Post-DKG Verification
Week 1-8: D2.6 Security Audit BEGIN
Week 1-12: D2.7 Frontend Updates Continue

Deliverables Due: D2.5, D2.3a Complete
Budget Spent: \$393K cumulative (85%)

MONTH 13: Audit, Tooling & Final Prep

Week 1-2: D2.6 Security Audit Complete
Week 2-3: D2.6 Address Audit Findings
Week 4: D2.6 Follow-up Re-audit
Week 1-4: D2.7 Frontend Updates Complete
Week 1-8: D2.8 Migration Tools BEGIN
Week 1-4: D2.10 Operational Tooling
Week 1-4: D2.11 Disaster Recovery Testing

Deliverables Due: D2.6, D2.7, D2.10, D2.11 Complete
Budget Spent: \$451K cumulative (97%)

MONTH 14: Launch Preparation & Migration

Week 1-2: Pre-launch Validation
Week 2-3: Mainnet Deployment
Week 3-4: D2.8 Migration Tools Complete
Week 1-4: D2.9 Marketing & Launch
Week 4: SOFT LAUNCH

Deliverables Due: D2.8 Complete, Soft Launch
Budget Spent: \$458K cumulative (99%)

MONTH 15: Soft Launch & Early Adoption

Week 1-4: D2.9 First Native BTC Loans
Week 1-4: Close Monitoring (24/7)
Week 1-4: User Onboarding
Week 1-4: Migration Support

Target: \$500K-\$1M volume, 5+ loans, zero critical bugs
Budget Spent: \$461K cumulative (99.5%)

MONTH 16: Full Launch & Growth

Week 1: FULL PUBLIC LAUNCH
Week 1-4: D2.9 Volume Growth
Week 1-4: Institutional Outreach
Week 1-4: Migration Push
Week 4: \$5M VOLUME MILESTONE

Deliverables Due: D2.9 Complete (\$5M volume achieved)
Budget Spent: \$463K (100%)

MONTHS 17-18: Buffer Period (Stabilization)

Month 17-18: Continuous Operation
Monitor Validator Performance
Optimize Based on Usage
Prepare for Phase 3

Target: 99.9% uptime, no critical incidents, Phase 3 planning

MONTH 18: Phase 3 Begins

Phase 3 Multi-Chain Expansion Starts

13.3 Detailed Budget Breakdown (\$463,000)

Category 1: Development (\$283,000 - 61%)

Item	Cost	Duration	Description
Threshold Crypto (D2.1)	\$45,000	1 month	FROST/MuSig2 integration
Validator Software (D2.2)	\$62,000	3 months	Rust application, monitoring
DKG Implementation (D2.3)	\$28,000	2 months	Key generation ceremony
Bridge Logic (D2.4)	\$45,000	3 months	Stacks Bitcoin integration

Item	Cost	Duration	Description
Frontend Updates (D2.7)	\$25,000	3 months	Native BTC UI, validator dashboard
Migration Tools (D2.8)	\$12,000	2 months	Phase 1 → Phase 2 migration
Validator Recruitment (D2.1a)	\$25,000	3 months	NEW - Recruit 15 validators
State Management (D2.4a)	\$28,000	2 months	NEW - Reorg handling, state sync
Network Protocol (D2.4b)	\$21,000	2 months	NEW - libp2p, gossip protocol
SUBTOTAL \$283,000			

Changes from Original: +\$91K for 3 new deliverables

Category 2: Security & Audit (\$82,000 - 18%)

Item	Cost	Duration	Description
Threshold Crypto Audit	\$30,000	2 weeks	Specialist audit (ENHANCED)
Validator Network Audit	\$22,000	2 weeks	Distributed systems security
Bridge Logic Audit	\$15,000	1 week	Cross-chain security
Economic Attack Analysis	\$10,000	1 week	Game theory, incentives
Follow-up Re-audit	\$5,000	1 week	Fix verification
SUBTOTAL \$82,000			

Changes from Original: +\$30K for enhanced scope (was \$52K)

Category 3: Operations (\$76,000 - 16%)

Item	Cost	Duration	Description
DKG Co-ordination (D2.3a)	\$20,000	3 months	NEW - Ceremony coordination
Validator Network Launch (D2.5)	\$38,000	2 months	Deploy 15 validators, mainnet
Operational Tooling (D2.10)	\$15,000	1 month	NEW - Grafana, PagerDuty
Disaster Recovery (D2.11)	\$12,000	1 month	NEW - Testing procedures
SUBTOTAL	\$76,000		

Changes from Original: +\$33K for 3 new deliverables (was \$43K)

Category 4: Marketing (\$5,000 - 1%)

Item	Cost	Duration	Description
Launch Marketing (D2.9)	\$5,000	3 months	PR, content, outreach
SUBTOTAL	\$5,000		

No Change from Original

Category 5: Contingency (\$17,000 - 4%)

Item	Cost	Description
Contingency Reserve	\$17,000	4% buffer for overruns
SUBTOTAL	\$17,000	

Changes from Original: Reduced from \$20K (3% reduction)

Total Phase 2 Budget: \$463,000

Category	Amount	% of Total	Change
Development	\$283,000	61%	+\$91K
Security & Audit	\$82,000	18%	+\$30K
Operations	\$76,000	16%	+\$33K
Marketing	\$5,000	1%	—
Contingency	\$17,000	4%	-\$3K
TOTAL	\$463,000	100%	+\$151K

13.4 Funding Strategy (Revised)

Target Funding: \$463,000

Recommended Funding Sources

Funder	Target Ask	Likelihood	Timeline	Focus
HRF	\$200,000	High (70%)	3-4 months	Bitcoin freedom tech, decentralization
Spiral (Block)	\$200,000	Medium (60%)	3-4 months	Bitcoin infrastructure, threshold sigs
Stacks Foundation	\$50,000	Medium (50%)	2-3 months	Stacks ecosystem, bridge logic
OpenSats	\$13,000	Low (40%)	3-4 months	Open-source Bitcoin projects

Total Potential: \$463,000

Application Strategy: - **Month 7:** Submit HRF and Spiral applications simultaneously - **Month 8:** Submit Stacks Foundation application - **Month 8:** Submit OpenSats application - **Month 9-10:** Follow up with all funders - **Month 11:** Expect funding decisions

Why Split Applications? - Smaller asks = higher success probability - Different pitches to different funders: - **HRF:** Freedom tech, decentralization, censorship resistance - **Spiral:** Bitcoin infrastructure, threshold signatures innovation - **Stacks:** Bridge logic, Stacks ecosystem integration - **OpenSats:** Open-source contribution to Bitcoin - Diversifies funding risk (not dependent on single funder)

13.5 Milestone-Based Fund Release (Recommended)

Tranche Structure (for funders):

Tranche 1 (40% = \$185,200): Upon grant approval - Deliverables: D2.1, D2.1a, D2.2, D2.3 (foundation work) - Timeline: Months 8-10 - Justification: Upfront investment in crypto library, software, recruitment

Tranche 2 (40% = \$185,200): Mid-phase checkpoint - Deliverables: D2.4, D2.4a, D2.4b, D2.5 (network operational) - Milestone: Testnet DKG successful, all 15 validators online - Timeline: Months 11-12 - Justification: Major technical milestones achieved

Tranche 3 (20% = \$92,600): Post-launch success - Deliverables: D2.6, D2.7, D2.8, D2.9, D2.10, D2.11 (launch + volume) - Milestone: Mainnet launched, \$5M volume achieved - Timeline: Months 13-16 - Justification: Success demonstrated

Benefits: - De-risks funding for grant providers - Ensures accountability and progress - Aligns incentives (team funded as deliverables complete)

13.6 Contingency Planning (If Funding Falls Short)

Scenario: Only **\$428K** secured (vs \$463K target)

Cost-Saving Measures (save \$35K): 1. Reduce validators to 12 (8-of-12 threshold) - saves \$15K (D2.1a, D2.5) 2. Skip disaster recovery testing (D2.11) - saves \$12K 3. Reduce operational tooling scope (D2.10) - saves \$8K

Impact: - 12 validators still secure (8-of-12 = 67% threshold) - Disaster recovery procedures documented but not tested - Basic monitoring only (no advanced tooling)

Minimum Viable Phase 2: \$428K

Scenario: Only \$400K secured (vs \$463K target)

Additional Cuts (save \$63K total): - Above measures (\$35K) - Reduce DKG coordination (D2.3a) - saves \$10K (self-coordinate) - Reduce state management (D2.4a) - saves \$10K (basic reorg handling) - Skip migration tools (D2.8) - saves \$12K (manual migration)

Impact: - Launch possible but with reduced features - Higher operational risk
- Manual processes instead of automation

Absolute Minimum: \$400K (anything less, delay Phase 2)

13.7 Phase 2 Success Criteria (Ready for Phase 3)

Technical Success: - [] All 15 validators operational (or 12 minimum) - [] 99.9% network uptime for 2 months (Months 17-18) - [] Zero critical bugs or security incidents - [] Threshold signatures 100% success rate - [] Cross-chain state consistency maintained

Business Success: - [] \$5M+ native BTC loan volume achieved - [] 15+ borrowers, 30+ lenders - [] 50%+ of new loans use native BTC (vs Phase 1) - [] 30%+ of Phase 1 loans migrated - [] Validator network profitable (\$333+/month per validator)

Operational Success: - [] All operational tooling deployed and functional - [] Disaster recovery procedures tested and documented - [] 24/7 monitoring and alerting operational - [] Incident response procedures proven effective

Phase 3 Ready if: - All above criteria met - 2 months continuous operation (buffer period) - Team ready for multi-chain expansion - Funding secured for Phase 3 (\$500K)

13.8 Phase 2 → Phase 3 Transition

Buffer Period: Months 17-18 (2 months)

Purpose: - Stabilize Phase 2 operations - Monitor validator performance - Optimize based on usage patterns - Prepare for Phase 3 (multi-chain expansion)

Activities During Buffer: - Continuous monitoring of 15 validators - Performance tuning and optimization - Community feedback collection - Phase 3 planning and design - Phase 3 grant applications

Phase 3 Start: Month 18 (not Month 16)

Why Buffer? - Phase 3 is even more complex (multi-chain) - Need proven Phase 2 stability before expanding - Gives time to secure Phase 3 funding - Reduces risk of cascading failures

Appendix A: Threshold Signature Primer

What is Threshold Cryptography?

Traditional Multisig (Bitcoin):

3-of-5 Multisig:

- Generate 5 separate private keys
- Derive 5 public keys
- Create multisig address from the 5 public keys
- To spend: Need 3 of the 5 private keys to sign

Problem: All 5 keys and signatures visible on-chain

Size: Large (multiple signatures = more bytes = higher fees)

Threshold Signatures (Schnorr/FROST):

3-of-5 Threshold:

- Generate 1 shared private key (distributed among 5 parties)
- Each party holds a "key share" (none have full key)
- Derive 1 public key
- Create single-sig address from public key (looks normal!)
- To spend: 3 parties create "partial signatures"
- Combine partial signatures into 1 final signature

Benefit: Only 1 signature on-chain (privacy + efficiency)

Size: Same as normal single-sig (lower fees)

Privacy: No one knows it's multisig!

Why Use Threshold Signatures?

1. **Privacy:** On-chain looks like normal Bitcoin address (Taproot)
2. **Efficiency:** Single signature = lower fees
3. **Security:** No single party has full key
4. **Flexibility:** Threshold can be any M-of-N
5. **Decentralization:** Distributed trust across validators

How It Works (Simplified)

Key Generation:

1. Each validator generates a random secret (s_i)
2. Each validator computes their public key share ($P_i = s_i * G$)
3. All public key shares are combined: $P = P_1 + P_2 + \dots + P_N$
4. P is the combined public key (Bitcoin address derived from this)
5. Nobody ever has the combined private key!

Signing:

1. Validators agree on message to sign (Bitcoin transaction)
2. Each validator creates a partial signature using their secret share
3. Coordinator collects M partial signatures (e.g., 10 of 15)
4. Coordinator aggregates partial signatures into final signature
5. Final signature is valid for public key P
6. Broadcast Bitcoin transaction with signature

Security Properties

Threshold Property: - Need M parties to sign (e.g., 10 of 15) - Any M parties can create valid signature - Fewer than M parties cannot sign

No Single Point of Failure: - No single party has full key - Must compromise M parties to steal funds - Much harder than compromising 1 custodian

Verifiable: - Anyone can verify signatures are correct - Partial signatures can be checked before aggregation - Faulty/malicious validators detected

Appendix B: Validator Operations Manual

Validator Setup

Prerequisites: - Dedicated server (32GB RAM, 8 CPU, 2TB SSD) - Bitcoin Core installed and synced - Stacks Node installed and synced - HSM for key storage (recommended)

Installation:

```
# Download validator binary
wget https://github.com/btc-lending/validator/releases/v2.0.0/validator

# Create config file
cat > config.toml <<EOF
[bitcoin]
rpc_url = "http://localhost:8332"
rpc_user = "user"
rpc_pass = "pass"

[stacks]
rpc_url = "http://localhost:20443"

[validator]
key_storage = "hsm"  # or "file"
hsm_slot = 0
p2p_port = 9001
```

```

metrics_port = 9090
EOF

# Run validator
./validator --config config.toml

```

DKG Ceremony Participation:

```

# When DKG announced, join ceremony
./validator join-dkg --ceremony-id 12345

# Follow prompts, verify other participants
# Ceremony completes automatically
# Key share encrypted and stored securely

```

Daily Operations

Monitoring:

```

# Check validator status
./validator status

# View recent signatures
./validator signatures --count 10

# Check connectivity to other validators
./validator peers

```

Logs:

```

# View logs
tail -f /var/log/validator/validator.log

# Look for errors or warnings
grep ERROR /var/log/validator/validator.log

```

Metrics: - Prometheus metrics at <http://localhost:9090/metrics> - Grafana dashboards for visualization - Alert manager for issues

Incident Response

Validator Down: 1. Check if Bitcoin/Stacks nodes synced 2. Restart validator software 3. Verify connectivity to peers 4. Monitor signing participation 5. Contact coordinator if issues persist

Key Recovery: 1. Retrieve encrypted key backup 2. Verify identity with coordinator 3. Restore key share to HSM 4. Resume operations 5. Verify signing works correctly

Emergency Shutdown:

```

# Graceful shutdown
./validator shutdown --graceful

# Emergency stop (only if needed)
kill -9 $(pgrep validator)

```

Appendix C: Economic Model

Validator Incentives

Revenue: - Protocol fee: 0.1% of loan volume - Example: \$5M volume in Month 13 = \$5,000 total fees - Split: \$5,000 / 15 validators = \$333 per validator per month

Costs: - Hardware: \$800 one-time - Hosting: \$100/month - Electricity: \$20/month - Maintenance: \$50/month (time) - Total monthly: ~\$170

Net Profit: \$333 - \$170 = **\$163/month per validator**

Break-Even Analysis: - Hardware payback: $\$800 / \$163 = \sim 5$ months - After 5 months: \$163/month pure profit - Annual profit (Year 1): $\$163 \times 7 \text{ months} = \$1,141$ - Annual profit (Year 2+): $\$163 \times 12 = \$1,956$

Scaling: - \$10M volume → \$665/month → \$495/month profit - \$50M volume → \$3,333/month → \$3,163/month profit - \$100M volume → \$6,666/month → \$6,496/month profit

Conclusion: Validators become profitable at ~\$5M+ volume, highly profitable at \$50M+.

Appendix D: Glossary

DKG (Distributed Key Generation): Protocol to generate threshold keys without any single party knowing the full key

FROST: Flexible Round-Optimized Schnorr Threshold signatures (threshold signature scheme)

HSM (Hardware Security Module): Physical device for storing cryptographic keys securely

Partial Signature: Signature fragment created by one validator using their key share

Taproot: Bitcoin upgrade enabling efficient threshold signatures (Schnorr-based)

Threshold Signature: Single signature created by M-of-N parties without reconstructing private key

Validator: Node operator who holds a key share and participates in threshold signing

VSS (Verifiable Secret Sharing): Cryptographic technique ensuring key shares are correctly distributed

End of Product Requirements Document - Phase 2

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This PRD defines Phase 2 of the Bitcoin Lending Protocol, implementing Bitcoin-native custody with threshold signatures to eliminate wrapped token dependencies while maintaining the oracle-free competitive bidding innovation from Phase 1.