

November 13-15, Oslo Spektrum

Viktor Hedberg

Device Code Phishing – How to detect and prevent those nasty phishers..




/whoami

- Senior Technical Architect @ Truesec
- Works in the CSIRT
- Security Research (MS Cloud and On-Premises)

```
Maria Encounter School Formation of the
                         1102-aeff-aad2292ab01c
          d3590ed6
                           office365.com
          https://
                          dc-ab12-d56c27904eb9
          ed4d018b-
          False
          True
hToken:
        : {pwd, mfa
ods
                                  microsoft.com
          erena: ål
                                   f-aad2292ab01c
          d3590ed6
                                  t.com
                                o12-d56c27904eb9
          False
          True
        : {pwd, mfa
```



Device Code Auth Flow





Fear the FOCI

- Family of Client IDs:
- <u>family-of-client-ids-research/known-foci-clients.csv at main · secureworks/family-of-client-ids-research · GitHub</u>



Constructing the "payload"

- Select which Graph Endpoint you wish to target
- Select a delivery method of the "payload"
- Select a FOCI app to leverage
- ... wait



Constructing the payload and phish a user



We've gotten the token!

- What can we do with a token?
 - AADGraph = Lots
 - MSGraph = Eh, just as much as the user...
- So let's play with AADGraph



Playing with Access Tokens for AADGraph



MSRC Response on the CA "vuln"



Microsoft Security Response Center <secure@microsoft.com>
To: You; Microsoft Security Response Center



Hello Viktor,

Thank you again for submitting this issue to Microsoft. We determined that this behavior is considered to be by design.

Analysis summary:

You reported that the user in the tenant can list all Conditional Access Policies by using his login credentials. This seems by design as a valid user in the tenant can list all Conditional Access Policies.

We have closed this case.

If you have any questions, or additional information related to this report, please reply on this case thread.

Thank you very much for working with us.

Regards,





Detections.... Please?

- We can see it in the sign-in log.
- Yes, advanced hunting on CMSI:Cmsi will catch the Device code flow signin.



Detections



Prevention

- Conditional Access for Device code flow
- But how about the other stuff with AADGraph...?



Conditional Access



Prevention

- Conditional Access for Device code flow
- But how about the other stuff with AADGraph...?
- Sadly... We can only do "so" much until AADGraph ACTUALLY dies.
- Register the FOCI app to your Entra ID tenant.
 - Allows for Controlling who can connect to MSOL, AzureAD, AADGraph via that FOCI





Registered Azure Active Directory PowerShell




Other "wierd" and cool phish's













Summary

- Targeting Teams messages instead of traditional email.
- No safe links scan in this world will block it.
 - Because we're leveraging MS Infrastructure
 - The Access Tokens although short lived can be used for recon-a-plenty
 - Including, but not limited to: Your entire Entra ID tenant configuration w/o permissions.
- Threat actors are getting more and more creative.

