


# **Introduction to IT Security**



### Saltzer/Schroeder (1975)

- One of the heavily-cited papers in computer security.
- Design principles are found in chapter 1
  - http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/protection/
  - http://www.acsac.org/secshelf/papers/ protection\_information.pdf
- Early collection of what should be common sense




"Experience has provided some useful principles that can guide the design and contribute to an implementation without security flaws."

(Saltzer/Schroeder 1975)

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- 3. Complete mediation: **Every access** to every object **must be checked** for authority.

- Economy of mechanism: Keep the design as simple and small as possible.
- Fail-safe defaults: Base access decisions on permission rather than exclusion.
- Complete mediation: Every access to every object must be checked for authority.
- Open design: The design should not be secret.



5. Separation of privilege: Where feasible, a protection mechanism that requires two keys to unlock it is more robust and flexible than one that allows access to the presenter of only a single key.

**Application** of design principle: avoid highly privileged accounts like root/administrator that are attractive targets for attacks

- 5. Separation of privilege: Where feasible, a **protection mechanism that requires two keys to unlock** it is more robust and flexible than one that allows access to the presenter of only a single key.
- Least privilege: Every program and every user of the system should operate using the least set of privileges necessary to complete the job.

7. Least common mechanism: Minimize the amount of mechanism common to more than one user and depended on by all users.

**Application** of design principle: Reduce amount of privileged code in libraries that needs to be reviewed.

- 7. Least common mechanism: Minimize the amount of mechanism common to more than one user and depended on by all users.
- 8. Psychological acceptability: It is essential that the human interface be designed for ease of use, so that users routinely and automatically apply the protection mechanisms correctly.



 Work factor: Compare the cost of circumventing the mechanism with the resources of a potential attacker.

- Application of design principle: increase costs to find and exploit software vulnerabilities (costs = training, skills, tools, computation, hardware)
- But: might not hold in software security owing to automation

- Work factor: Compare the cost of circumventing the mechanism with the resources of a potential attacker.
- 10. Compromise recording: In computer systems, mechanisms that **reliably record** that a compromise has occurred are used rarely, since it is difficult to guarantee discovery once security is broken.
- Application of design principle: enable logging and (automatically) analyse logs to detect attacks

## **Security architecture**

- Architectural principles also found elsewhere
- Common Criteria, EAL2-EAL7
   ADV\_ARC security architecture description (excerpt)
  - Security features cannot be bypassed.
  - Protection by TOE itself from tampering by untrusted active entities.
  - Description of security domains maintained by the TSF (TOE security functions) consistent with the SFRs (security functional requirements).
  - Secure TSF initialisation process.
  - Complete mediation, least privilege, separation of privilege, fail-safe defaults

### **Summary**

8+2 design principles: Saltzer/Schroeder