
Wrap Up

Scenario 1 – Story

- You are an incident responder working for a certain security company.
- One day, you received a request from a customer that is located in Japan. They said, "Our confidential document has been leaked to the Internet. We'd like you to investigate the cause".
 - Time Zone : JST (+9:00)
- The document was stored in a directory on the file server that only the executive can access.
- First, you acquired the executive's PC and investigated it. However, you could not find any suspicious evidence.
- Therefore, you decided to investigate the system administrator's PC, which may operate as the authority of all users.
- Any administrator rights (including the local administrator rights) are not given to all users except for the system administrator in the customer's network.
- The leakage of the file on the Internet was confirmed around the end of March 2018.
- It is estimated that it was stolen in March 2018 from the file creation date.



The Major Attacks Used in Scenario 1

- Targeted e-mail sent to a user honda.
 - A Word file including Macro in it.
- Lateral Movements
 - RDP, wmiexec and PowerShell
 - Mimikatz (logon password hashes)
 - Golden Tickets
- Privilege escalation using CVE-2017-0213
 - Windows COM Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
- Possible Rainbow Table password cracking
 - We did not see the evidences of it, but it might have been used.

Were Files Stolen in Scenario 1?

- Not 100% sure, but there were indicators of attackers accessing the file servers, running 7-zip, and deleted temporarily made file using SDelete.
- The result of SRUM investigation indicate that the infected host has received 64 MB and 33 MB of data with "xcopy".
- 7-zip was executed on the host.
 - If the purpose of executing it was to compress the acquired files, it is likely that the attackers stole the files.

Preventing Attacks Used in Scenario 1 (1/3)

- E-mails
 - Always a difficult issue. Possible solutions include:
 - Restrict use of Macros on Microsoft Office
 - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2016/03/22/new-feature-in-office-2016-can-block-macros-and-help-prevent-infection/?source=mmpc
 - Educate users
 - Application whitelisting
 - SPAM filter?
- Use of Appropriate Logs
 - Audit on file shares/file system activities
 - Reconsider the rotation lifetime of Security logs.

Preventing Attacks Used in Scenario 1 (2/3)

- Remote Desktop Connection (Windows 8.1+)
 - Use of restricted admin mode to avoid re-use authentication token of RDP clients
 - Prevents pass-the-hash attacks.
 - https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/kfalde/2013/08/14/restricted-admin-mode-for-rdp-in-windows-8-1-2012-r2/
- Additional LSA (Local Security Authority) Protection (Windows 8.1+)
 - Protects LSA from its memory space being read or codes being injected by non-protected processes.
 - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn408187(v=ws.11)

Preventing Attacks Used in Scenario 1 (3/3)

- Protected Users Security Group (Windows Server 2012+)
 - Members of this domain group are protected automatically.
 - Prohibits authentication with NTLM, Digest Authentication and CredSSP.
 - Prohibits Kerberos authentication with weaker encryption.
 - Prohibits delegation of user accounts with Kerberos constrained/unconstrained delegation.
 - TGT lifetime (four hours by default) will be configurable.
 - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn466518(v=ws.11)
- Windows Defender Credential Guard (Windows 10+)
 - Adds hardware security and virtualization-based security features.
 - Virtualizes domain authentication and prevents credential attacks.
 - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/credential-guard/

Possible Actions

- Prepare logs
 - Audit settings
 - Retention period
 - Avoid logs being cleared (transfer to other log servers, and avoid joining the log server to the domain)
 - Periodic analysis of logs
- Securing hosts
 - As always, apply patch, use antiviruses and personal firewalls, etc...
 - Protect critical accounts
 - Account delegation
 - Restricted Admin mode
 - Application whitelists
- Redesign networks.
 - Disallow clients to communicate with other clients.
 - Isolated networks for administrative machines,
- Education

Documents on Log Collection

- Microsoft,
 "Use Windows Event Forwarding to help with intrusion detection" https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/use-windows-event-forwarding-to-assist-in-intrusion-detection
- Microsoft, "Security auditing" https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/security-auditing-overview
- Microsoft, "Recommended settings for event log sizes in Windows" https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/957662/recommended-settings-for-event-log-sizes-in-windows

Implementation

- Discuss and design the policy before an actual incident occurs.
 - Should we construct a SOC inside or outside the company?
 - What can we do to construct a CSIRT?
 - Should we use EDR or audit tools?
- Policy design
- Incident response design
- Who will pay for preparation, implementation, and maintenance?
- Will there be side effects by the implementation?

Documents on Guidelines/Practices

- Microsoft, "Windows security guidance for enterprises" https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-security-configuration-framework/windows-security-compliance
- Microsoft, "Best Practices for Securing Active Directory" https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/best-practices-for-securing-active-directory
- Australian Cyber Security Centre, "How to mitigate cyber security incidents" https://www.cyber.gov.au/advice/how-to-mitigate-cyber-security-incidents
- Mitre, "ATT&CK Matrix for Enterprise" https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/
- Mitre, "ATT&CK Navigator" https://mitre-attack.github.io/attack-navigator/enterprise/

Catching Up the New Trends/Technologies

- Technology is updated frequently.
 - If you are using Windows 10, it gets a major update every six months.
- Attackers develop new attack methods frequently.
 - Investigators (We) have to know these methods to investigate the incidents.

Catching up with new trends/technologies is important.

Examples of News Sources

- SANS Institute, "Digital Forensics and Incident Response Blog" https://digital-forensics.sans.org/blog
- Internet Storm Center, "InfoSec Handlers Diary Blog" https://isc.sans.edu/diary.html
- FireEye, "Threat Research" https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research.html
- Sean Metcalf, "Active Directory Security" https://adsecurity.org/
- Phill Moore, "This Week In 4n6" https://thisweekin4n6.com/

Course Review

Review of Overall Topics (1/2)


- Day 1
 - Introduction
 - 2. Initial Response
 - 1. Evidence Preservation
 - 2. Image Mounting and Parsing
 - 3. Persistence Analysis
 - Malware Analysis (Surface & Dynamic Analysis)
 - 5. Root Cause Analysis
 - 1. Malware Hunting
 - 2. File/Folder Open/Save Analysis

- 5. Root Cause Analysis (Cont.)
 - 3. E-mail Forensics
 - 4. Web Browser Forensics
 - 5. Exploit Analysis
- 6. Lateral Movements Investigation
 - 1. Program Execution Artifacts Analysis

Review of Overall Topics (2/2)

- Day 2
 - 6. Lateral Movements Investigation (Cont.)
 - Program Execution Artifacts Analysis (Cont.)
 - 2. Attack Tool Analysis
 - 3. Event Log Analysis
 - 7. Timeline Analysis
 - 8. Finding Leaked Information
 - 9. Recovering Data & Keyword Search

- 10. Memory Forensics
- 11. Wrap Up



Time to Conclude Our Course

- We have covered many topics in four days.
 - They are useful for investigating actual incidents.

- Whether you can use them appropriately or not is your responsibility.
 - We believe you can.
 - Do not forget to review, and try the extra exercises we did not cover in the class.

• If you have any question, please contact us.

Thank you!