1. **Introduction**
   1. **Social Outburst and SARS-COV-2 Pandemic**

With the purpose to demand social rights, thousands of people protest in Chile on October 18, 2019. Sectoral protests have already shocked Chile's social and political landscape, notably the "Penguin Revolution," student mobilization in 2006, and several marches by secondary school students in 2011, this process was not an unique occurrence in Chilean recent history.

Likewise, other social movements were forged in the second decade of the 2000s in order to express their interests, such as "No + AFP" and "No + TAC", among others.

Las manifestaciones de octubre de 2019 se originaron por la suba del transporte público lo que motivo a estudiante secundarios a manifestarse en los metros de Santiago. Estas actividades se contagiaron en todo el país y culminaron el 19 de octubre de 2019 en una revuelta a nivel nacional que concluyó con más de 30 muertos, más de 3000 heridos y 70 estaciones de metro incendiadas y vandalizadas según fuentes de gobierno. Las manifestaciones se intensificaron durante las semanas posteriores, sumando nuevas demandas sociales y a más personas en todo el país, llegando a su punto cúlmine el 25 de octubre de 2019, con una manifestación que, según fuentes oficiales, convocó a más de 1.200.000 personas.

Ante la crisis política, de representación e institucional, la clase política chilena se congregó en el Acuerdo por la Paz el 15 de noviembre de 2019, en el cual representantes de los partidos políticos, acordaron dar respuesta a la demanda ciudadana por la redacción de una nueva constitución para Chile. Si bien el proceso constituyente producto del acuerdo, no concluyó en un nuevo texto constitucional, es claro que el estallido social impulsó la idea de nuevas políticas públicas y legislaciones que buscaron responder a las demandas ciudadanas. Si bien muchas de las demandas de 2019 continúan vigentes hasta el día de hoy, el 3 de marzo de 2020, llega a Chile el primer caso infectado con el virus SARS-COV-2, lo que enfoca las preocupaciones ciudadanas, políticas y mediáticas hacia la inminente crisis sanitaria; por lo que las manifestaciones de 2019 pasan a un segundo plano.

Dado que la Cámara de Diputados tiene entre sus responsabilidades, el rol de representación de la ciudadanía, tuvo un papel preponderante durante la crisis institucional de 2019 y la crisis sanitaria producto de la pandemia del SARS-COV-2. Este trabajo aspira revelar si es que existieron cambios en el espectro ideológico en la cámara de Diputados y cómo influyó el estallido social y la pandemia en ellos. La hipótesis que se sostiene es que, dados los cambios significativos en la agenda política, el espectro ideológico se vio modificado entre el periodo pre, durante y post estallido social. Para ello, se realizó, en primera instancia, se realizó una breve revisión de trabajos previos sobre el estado del arte en el estudio de congresos, luego, una descripción de las principales funciones y características del Congreso chileno; a continuación, se hizo una pequeña revisión descriptiva de la composición de la Cámara de Diputados y finalmente, se utilizó la teoría del votante mediano para comparar la distribución ideológica en los tres periodos.

* 1. **Congresses**

Congresses are crucial institutions for the proper functioning of democracy. Among their main functions are the representation of citizens (Izquierdo Pinos, 1986; Navarro, 2006), legislative production (Casar, 2014; Visconti, 2011) and the control and supervision of the proper functioning of the executive branch (Gamboa, 2006; Lizárraga Valdivia, 2019; Llanos, 1998).

In this sense, the role of congressmen should be to work towards the representation of the common interest under the condition of a rational division of labor and the participation in the activities of control of the state with the greatest possible transparency (Kirkland & Harden, 2022); in addition to the production of legislation according to the needs of citizens.

Studies of congresses have been approached from a number of different perspectives; understanding the legislature as the aggregator of the activities of co-legislating bodies, including the executive branch, and considering the impact and influence of other groups and organizations outside government, such as parties, political leaders and interest groups. Also, from a systemic perspective, thinking of congresses as a set of actors with responsibilities and regulated by informal rules and norms.

The study of legislative processes, as in the field of public policy, distinguishes between the positive agenda, dedicated to the production of new regulations, on the one hand, and the negative agenda focused on the control of other powers(Cox & McCubbins, 2005; Krehbiel & Meirowitz, 2002). Another element that stands out in the framework of legislative dynamics is the influence of external factors that impact on the timing, procedures and design of regulations (De Echave, 2016; Puente Martínez & Cerna Villagra, 2017; Sanchez, 2014).

Finally, one school of thought focuses on the study of congressional decision-making processes. In particular, the median voter theory interprets congresses as collegial bodies with a certain ideological disposition and argues that voters' preferences are unimodal, meaning that voters choose the alternatives closest to their preferred outcome. In this way, the theorem seems to explain some of the behavior that occurs in democratic majority voting systems (Carey, 2002; Grofman et al., 2001; King, 2001, 2003).

**1.3 How congress works in Chile**

The Chilean Congress has a bicameral structure in which both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies are part of the legislative production process, which means that bills must be approved by both Chambers. Each of these processes is referred to as constitutional procedures (Aninat, 2006). Bills can originate in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies and must be approved identically by both. If this does not happen, there may be a third constitutional procedure in which the chamber of origin votes on the bill under discussion in a closed rule. If no agreement is reached, a joint committee is formed with the participation of members of the chamber of origin and the revising chamber to resolve the differences and then be ratified by both. Regardless of the chamber of origin and the revising chamber, the bill has two readings in each of them. This process is called legislative procedure and in each procedure the bills are discussed, sent to one or more committees and voted on in general, with close rule and in particular (open rule). The purpose of the referral to committees is to issue a report and the agreement of the text to be submitted to the plenary for its scrutiny.

It is worth highlighting the role of the committees not only in the way they work, in which they incorporate participatory mechanisms so that civil society can present its needs, points of view and interests, but also in the expertise and specialized thematic focus of each committee. Currently, in the Chamber of Deputies there are 27 working committees with 13 Deputies participating in each committee. In the Senate there are 27 standing committees with 5 appointed senators, and 11 special committees with varying numbers of participants. The committees’ range in subject matter from public security to emergencies, disasters and firefighting.

The Chilean legislative process is conditioned by a strong presidentialism, where the executive has control over some of the most relevant legislative initiatives(Alemán & Navia, 2009; Linz, 1990; Mainwaring, 1990; Siavelis, 2009). The current Chilean Constitution defines the set of legal functions and rights of authority of the executive as the exclusive initiative in certain matters, the power to set priorities on certain bills at certain stages of their development or at all stages through an emergency mechanism, the power to exercise its veto over bills approved by Congress, and the exercise of regulatory power in all matters that are not limited to the legal sphere. In this sense, in Chile, the presidential decree is one more tool of the legislative technique for the executive to establish which lines of the legislative process are its own, among other reasons, due to the greater technical capacity of the ministries with respect to the legislators.

Moreover, throughout the legislative process, political negotiations tend to take place mainly through formal or informal meetings and committee negotiations. Also, initiatives tend to find their genesis in the executive branch rather than in interactions between congressmen.

Finally, in the legislative production process, Chilean legislation contemplates four types of quorums: ordinary legislation is approved with a simple majority; qualified quorum laws require the affirmative votes of the majority of the members of Congress in office; organic constitutional laws require four-sevenths of the members of Congress to be approved; and laws interpreting the constitution must have three-fifths of the members of Congress in office. Finally, constitutional reform bills require the approval of three-fifths, or three-thirds, depending on the chapter of the Constitution to be modified (Aninat, 2006).

**1.4 Diputados**

Estructura del congreso en el periodo estudiado

1. **Método**

**2.1 Teoría del Votante mediano**

According to the median voter theorem, a majority voting election system will typically select the choice made by the median voter. This conclusion is reached by presuming that the voter takes a unidimensional position and ranks the proposals according to their alignment with the right and left ideologies. The theory also asserts that voter preferences are unimodal, which means that people select the options that are most similar to their chosen result. The theorem appears to explain some of the behaviors that take place in democratic majority voting systems in this way. It explains why politicians frequently use the same campaign platforms and talking points in an effort to tailor their proposals to the preferences of the typical voter. At the same time, it explains why the more moderate suggestions typically receive the majority of votes while the radical proposals are rarely adopted.

In Harold Hotelling's article Stability in Competition, these concepts were originally presented (Hotelling, 1929). The author made a comparison between political elections and businesses in the private sector, asserting that just as there is little variation in the products provided by many rival enterprises, there is also little difference in the electoral platforms of various parties. This is so that they can win over the majority of voters, much like marketers. The theorem and its underlying assumptions were then made explicit for the first time by Scottish economist Duncan Black (Black, 1948) which also provided a formal study of majority voting. Black's article triggered research on how economics can explain voting systems, leading finally in 1957 to Anthony Downs's article "Economic Theory of Political Action in Democracy" setting forth the median voter theorem (Downs, 1957).

1. **Resultados**
2. **Discusión**
3. **Anexos**
4. **Referencias**

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