$$(2,2)$$
 $(5,0)$ $(0,5)$ $(4,4)$


$$k = 1$$


▶
$$P_1 = \{1, 2\}$$


•
$$c_1 = 1$$
 and $c_2 = x$

The Nash flow minimises:

$$\Phi(y, 1 - y) = \sum_{e=1}^{2} \int_{0}^{f_{e}} c_{e}(x) dx = \int_{0}^{y} 1 dx + \int_{0}^{1 - y} x dx$$
$$= y + \frac{(1 - y)^{2}}{2} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{y^{2}}{2}$$
$$\Rightarrow \tilde{f} = (0, 1)$$







Theorem Assuming $\sum_{i=1}^{m} \Lambda_i < \sum_{i=1}^{n} c_i \mu_j$ we have:

$$\lim_{\beta_i \to \infty} PoA(\beta) < \infty \text{ for all } i \in [m]$$


The price of anarchy increases with worth of service, up to a point.

Proof.

- $ightharpoonup \lim_{eta_i o \infty} \lambda^* = k^* \text{ and } \lim_{eta_i o \infty} \tilde{\lambda} = \tilde{k}$
- ▶ As $\beta_i \to \infty$:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{m} \Lambda_{i} = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \lambda_{ij}^{*} = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \tilde{\lambda}_{ij}$$

▶ $PoA(\beta) < \infty$





Price of Anarchy in Public Services *EJORS*, 2013.

What about the controllers?


What about the controllers?


S. Deo and I. Gurvich. **Centralized vs. Decentralized Ambulance Diversion: A Network Perspective.** *Management Science*, May 2011.







Mathematical modelling of patient flows to predict critical care capacity required following the merger of two District General Hospitals into one., Submitted to Anaesthesia









$$A = egin{pmatrix} (U_{
m NH}(1,1)-t)^2 & \dots & (U_{
m NH}(1,c_{
m RG})-t)^2 \ (U_{
m NH}(2,1)-t)^2 & \dots & (U_{
m NH}(2,c_{
m RG})-t)^2 \ dots & \ddots & dots \ (U_{
m NH}(c_{
m NH},1)-t)^2 & \dots & (U_{
m NH}(c_{
m NH},c_{
m RG})-t)^2 \end{pmatrix}$$


$$B = \begin{pmatrix} (U_{RG}(1,1) - t)^2 & \dots & (U_{NH}(c_{NH}, c_{RG}) - t)^2 \end{pmatrix}$$


$$B = \begin{pmatrix} (U_{RG}(1,1) - t)^2 & \dots & (U_{RG}(1, c_{RG}) - t)^2 \\ (U_{RG}(2,1) - t)^2 & \dots & (U_{RG}(2, c_{RG}) - t)^2 \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ (U_{RG}(c_{RG}, 1) - t)^2 & \dots & (U_{RG}(c_{RG}, c_{RG}) - t)^2 \end{pmatrix}$$

Theorem.

Let $f_h(k): [1, c_{\bar{h}}] \to [1, c_h]$ be the best response of player $h \in \{NH, RG\}$ to the diversion threshold of $\bar{h} \neq h$ ($\bar{h} \in \{NH, RG\}$).


If $f_h(k)$ is a non-decreasing function in k then the game has at least one Nash Equilibrium in Pure Strategies.






Measuring the Price of Anarchy in Critical Care Unit Interactions, Submitted to OMEGA








 Am

• *H*₁

• H₂



+Vincent.Knight
 @drvinceknight
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