




+Vincent.Knight  
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[vincent-knight.com/Talks](http://vincent-knight.com/Talks)


$$\begin{pmatrix} (2, 2) & (5, 0) \\ (0, 5) & (4, 4) \end{pmatrix}$$



Parameter	Interpretation
$m \in \mathbb{Z}$	Number of sources
$n \in \mathbb{Z}$	Number of service centers
$\beta \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^m$	Worth of service
$\Lambda \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^m$	Demand rate
$w_j$ for $j \in [n]$	A convex utility function
$d_{ij}$ for $i \in [m], j \in [n]$	Distance from source $i$ to service center $j$
$\lambda_{ij}$ for $i \in [m], j \in [n]$	Traffic from source $i$ to service center $j$









**Price of Anarchy in Public Services** *EJORS*, 2013.





What about the controllers?





Parameter	Interpretation
$h \in \{1, 2\}$	CCU
$c_h$	Capacity of CCU
$K_h$	Cutoff strategy of CCU
$\lambda_h^{\text{area}}$	Demand rate
$\mu_h$	Service rate of CCU






**Theorem.**


Let  $f_h(k) : [1, c_{\bar{h}}] \rightarrow [1, c_h]$  be the best response of player  $h \in \{\text{NH}, \text{RG}\}$  to the diversion threshold of  $\bar{h} \neq h$  ( $\bar{h} \in \{\text{NH}, \text{RG}\}$ ). If  $f_h(k)$  is a non-decreasing function in  $k$  then the game has at least one Nash Equilibrium in Pure Strategies.

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} (U_{\text{NH}}(1, 1) - t)^2 & \dots & (U_{\text{NH}}(1, c_{\text{RG}}) - t)^2 \\ (U_{\text{NH}}(2, 1) - t)^2 & \dots & (U_{\text{NH}}(2, c_{\text{RG}}) - t)^2 \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ (U_{\text{NH}}(c_{\text{NH}}, 1) - t)^2 & \dots & (U_{\text{NH}}(c_{\text{NH}}, c_{\text{RG}}) - t)^2 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$B = \begin{pmatrix} (U_{\text{RG}}(1, 1) - t)^2 & \dots & (U_{\text{RG}}(1, c_{\text{RG}}) - t)^2 \\ (U_{\text{RG}}(2, 1) - t)^2 & \dots & (U_{\text{RG}}(2, c_{\text{RG}}) - t)^2 \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ (U_{\text{RG}}(c_{\text{RG}}, 1) - t)^2 & \dots & (U_{\text{RG}}(c_{\text{RG}}, c_{\text{RG}}) - t)^2 \end{pmatrix}$$









**Measuring the Price of Anarchy in Critical Care Unit Interactions, *Submitted to OMEGA***





$$C^{(1)} - c^{(1)}$$



$\Lambda$









$$(|u_1^{(1)} - u_2^{(1)}|, |u_1^{(2)} - u_2^{(2)}|, |w^{(1)} - w^{(2)}|)$$

$$S = \{(i, j) \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}^2 \mid 0 \leq j \leq c_1 + c_2, 0 \leq i \leq c_1 + N - \max(j - c_2, 0)\}$$






$$q_{(i_1, j_1), (i_2, j_2)} = \begin{cases} \Lambda, & \text{if } \delta = (1, 0) \\ \min(c_1 - \max(j_1 - c_2, 0), i_1)(1 - p)\mu_1, & \text{if } \delta = (-1, 1) \\ \min(c_1 - \max(j_1 - c_2, 0), i_1)p\mu_1, & \text{if } \delta = (-1, 0) \\ \min(c_2, j_1)\mu_2, & \text{if } \delta = (0, -1) \end{cases}$$



## Analytical



## Simulation

