+Vincent.Knight
@drvinceknight
vincent-knight.com/Talks

$$\begin{pmatrix} (2,2) & (5,0) \\ (0,5) & (4,4) \end{pmatrix}$$


β_1
β_2
$\vdots$
β_m
Λ_1
Λ_2
$\vdots$
Λ_m
λ_{11}
λ_{21}
λ_{1n}
λ_{2n}
λ_{m1}
λ_{mn}
w_1
$\vdots$
w_n
Balk
Seek Service

Parameter	Interpretation
$m \in \mathbb{Z}$	Number of sources
$n \in \mathbb{Z}$	Number of service centers
$\beta \in \mathbb{R}^m_{\geq 0}$	Worth of service
$\Lambda \in \mathbb{R}^m_{\geq 0}$	Demand rate
w_j for $j \in [n]$	A convex utility function
d_{ij} for $i \in [m]$, $j \in [n]$	Distance from source i to service center j
λ_{ij} for $i \in [m]$, $j \in [n]$	Traffic from source i to service center j



β_1
β_2
Λ_1
d_{11}
d_{21}
Λ_2
d_{1n}
d_{2n}
w_1
w_n
d_{m1}
d_{mn}
Λ_m
β_m


PoA
Inefficient system
Low level of demand
High level of demand
Λ


$PoA(\Lambda)$
2
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
1
5
10
15
20
25
30
Λ
$\beta = 40$
$\beta = 70$
$\beta = 100$

Price of Anarchy in Public Services *EJORS*, 2013.

What about the controllers?


Divert?
1
2
Divert?


K_2
K_1
$\lambda_h^{(a)}$
$\lambda_h^{(b)}$
$\lambda_h^{(c)}$
$\lambda_h^{(d)}$

Parameter	Interpretation
$h \in \{1, 2\}$	CCU
c_h	Capacity of CCU
K_h	Cutoff strategy of CCU
λ_h^{area}	Demand rate
μ_h	Service rate of CCU


(0, 0)
(0, 1)
(0, 2)
(0, K_RG)
(0, c_RG)
(1, 0)
(1, 1)
(1, 2)
(1, K_RG)
(1, c_RG)
(2, 0)
(2, 1)
(2, 2)
(2, K_RG)
(2, c_RG)
(K_NH, 0)
(K_NH, 1)
(K_NH, 2)
(K_NH, K_RG)
(K_NH, c_RG)
(c_NH, 0)
(c_NH, 1)
(c_NH, 2)
(c_NH, K_RG)
(c_NH, c_RG)



$\lambda_{RG}^{(a)}$
$\lambda_{RG}^{(b)}$
μ_{RG}
μ_{RG}
$\lambda_{NH}^{(a)}$
μ_{NH}
$\lambda_{NH}^{(b)}$
μ_{NH}
$\lambda_{NH}^{(b)}$
μ_{NH}
$\lambda_{RG}^{(c)}$
$\lambda_{RG}^{(d)}$
(K_{NH}, K_{RG})
μ_{RG}
μ_{RG}
$\lambda_{NH}^{(c)}$
μ_{NH}
$\lambda_{NH}^{(d)}$
μ_{NH}
$\lambda_{NH}^{(d)}$
μ_{NH}
$\lambda_{RG}^{(c)}$
$\lambda_{RG}^{(d)}$
μ_{RG}
μ_{RG}

Theorem.
Let $f_h(k) : [1, c_{\bar{h}}] \rightarrow [1, c_h]$ be the best response of player $h \in \{\mathrm{NH}, \mathrm{RG}\}$ to the diversion threshold of $\bar{h} \neq h$ ($\bar{h} \in \{\mathrm{NH}, \mathrm{RG}\}$). If $f_h(k)$ is a non-decreasing function in k then the game has at least one Nash Equilibrium in Pure Strategies.

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} (U_{\mathsf{NH}}(1,1)-t)^2 & \dots & (U_{\mathsf{NH}}(1,c_{\mathsf{RG}})-t)^2 \\ (U_{\mathsf{NH}}(2,1)-t)^2 & \dots & (U_{\mathsf{NH}}(2,c_{\mathsf{RG}})-t)^2 \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ (U_{\mathsf{NH}}(c_{\mathsf{NH}},1)-t)^2 & \dots & (U_{\mathsf{NH}}(c_{\mathsf{NH}},c_{\mathsf{RG}})-t)^2 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$B = \begin{pmatrix} (U_{\mathsf{RG}}(1,1)-t)^2 & \dots & (U_{\mathsf{RG}}(1,c_{\mathsf{RG}})-t)^2 \\ (U_{\mathsf{RG}}(2,1)-t)^2 & \dots & (U_{\mathsf{RG}}(2,c_{\mathsf{RG}})-t)^2 \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ (U_{\mathsf{RG}}(c_{\mathsf{RG}},1)-t)^2 & \dots & (U_{\mathsf{RG}}(c_{\mathsf{RG}},c_{\mathsf{RG}})-t)^2 \end{pmatrix}$$


PoA
0.1
0.23
0.36
0.49
0.61
0.74
0.87
t
-0.9
-0.54
-0.18
0.18
0.54
0.91
1.27
1.63
x
1.056
1.048
1.040
1.032
1.024
1.016
1.008
1.000



argmin$_t$(PoA(x))
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
-0.5
0.5
1
1.5
2
x

Measuring the Price of Anarchy in Critical Care Unit Interactions, *Submitted to OMEGA*


UNED ACHOSION BRYS
EMERGENCY UNIT
AMBULANCE
EMERGENCY AMBULANCE
AMBIWLANS
AMBULANCE
AMBULANCE


$C^{(1)} - c^{(1)}$
$c^{(1)}$
$\mu_2^{(1)}$
$1 - p^{(1)}$
$\mu_1^{(1)}$
$p^{(1)}$
Λ
$p^{(2)}$
$\mu_1^{(2)}$
$1 - p^{(2)}$
$\mu_2^{(2)}$
$c^{(2)}$
$C^{(2)} - c^{(2)}$



Hospital 1
$c^{(1)}$
1
$C^{(1)} - 1$
Hospital 2
$c^{(2)}$
1
$C^{(2)} - 1$
Ambulance
λ_1
0
Λ



$$\left(|u_1^{(1)}-u_2^{(1)}|,|u_1^{(2)}-u_2^{(2)}|,|w^{(1)}-w^{(2)}|\right)$$

$$S = \left\{(i,j) \in \mathbb{Z}^2_{\geq 0} \mid 0 \leq j \leq c_1 + c_2,\ 0 \leq i \leq c_1 + N - \max(j - c_2, 0)\right\}$$



$$q_{(i_1,j_1),(i_2,j_2)} = \begin{cases} \Lambda, & \text{if } \delta = (1,0) \\ \min(c_1 - \max(j_1 - c_2, 0), i_1)(1-p)\mu_1, & \text{if } \delta = (-1,1) \\ \min(c_1 - \max(j_1 - c_2, 0), i_1)p\mu_1, & \text{if } \delta = (-1,0) \\ \min(c_2, j_1)\mu_2, & \text{if } \delta = (0,-1) \end{cases}$$


(0, 0)
(0, 1)
(0, 2)
(0, 3)
(0, 4)
(1, 0)
(1, 1)
(1, 2)
(1, 3)
(1, 4)
(2, 0)
(2, 1)
(2, 2)
(2, 3)
(2, 4)
(3, 0)
(3, 1)
(3, 2)
(3, 3)
(4, 0)
(4, 1)
(4, 2)
Λ
μ_2
$2\mu_2$
$p\mu_1$
$p2\mu_1$
$(1-p)\mu_1$
$(1-p)2\mu_1$
0
States with blocking: $j > c_2$



Analytical
Simulation
Probability distribution: Markov chain ($\Lambda = 4.000$)
Probability distribution: Simulation ($\Lambda = 4.000$)
Probability distribution: Markov chain ($\Lambda = 5.000$)
Probability distribution: Simulation ($\Lambda = 5.000$)
i
j
0
5
10
15
20
25
0.0000
0.0025
0.0050
0.0075
0.0100
0.0125
0.0150
0.0175
0.0200
0.0015
0.0030
0.0045
0.0060
0.0075
0.0090
0.0105
0.0120