

CS2107 Introduction to Information Security

# **Endterm Exam — Answer Sheet**

<b>FOR EXAMINER'S USE</b>	
<b>Question</b>	<b>Marks</b>
Q1-Q20	/ 20
Q21-Q25	/ 10
Q26	/ 5
Q27	/ 4
Q28	/ 7
Q29	/ 4
<b>Total</b>	/ 50

- |     |     |     |     |     |     |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 1.  | (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |
| 2.  | (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |
| 3.  | (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |
| 4.  | (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |
| 5.  | (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |
| 6.  | (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |
| 7.  | (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |
| 8.  | (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |
| 9.  | (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |
| 10. | (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |
| 11. | (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |
| 12. | (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |
| 13. | (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |
| 14. | (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |
| 15. | (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |
| 16. | (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |
| 17. | (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |
| 18. | (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |
| 19. | (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |
| 20. | (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |
| 21. | (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |
| 22. | (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |
| 23. | (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |
| 24. | (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |
| 25. | (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |

## 26. AES-CBC MAC scheme

(a) Attack Step [3 marks]

original tag =  $t = E(K, IV \text{ xor } M_1)$

What mallory want is :  $t = E(K, IV' \text{ xor } M2)$

Manipulate IV' = IV xor M1 xor M2

Mallory does  $E(K, IV' \oplus M_2) = E(K, IV \oplus M_1 \oplus M_2 \oplus M_2) = E(K, IV \oplus M_1) = t$

(b) Countermeasure [2 marks]

1. The MAC is computed over the encrypted M1, so the attacker cannot manipulate the MAC input to produce meaningful, undetectable changes.

$t = \text{MAC}(K1, \text{IV xor } E(M1, K2)) \Rightarrow$  without knowing CT, just knowing M1, attacker cannot forge.

## 2. Use HMAC or CMAC

### 3. Remove IV or fix a common IV

27. Fill in the blanks

[4 marks]

(1)  $X = \underline{g^a \text{ mod } p}$

(2)  $Y = \underline{g^b \text{ mod } p}$

(3)  $K_{AB} = \underline{g^{ab} \text{ mod } p}$

(4)  $b' = \underline{\text{hash}(K_{BA}) \text{ or } K_{BA}}$

(5)  $Z = \underline{g^{b'} \text{ mod } p}$

(6)  $U = \underline{g^c \text{ mod } p}$

(7)  $a' = \underline{\text{hash}(K_{AB}) \text{ or } b' \text{ or } K_{BA}}$

(8)  $K_{ABC} = \underline{g^{b'c} \text{ mod } p \text{ or } g^{K_{ABC}} \text{ mod } p \text{ or } U^{b'} \text{ mod } p}$

28. Padding oracle

(a) Last 6 bytes [6 marks]

$v'$	49	63	4C	75	50	6D	4F	73	4D	x	75	EB	A8	8F	BC	88
$c$	76	51	69	59	37	2E	61	63	41	2E	59	6D	52	73	47	75

(b) Value of  $p_{10}$  [1 mark]

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## 29. CSRF

- (a) Malicious form [3 marks]

```
<form .id="changepass" .method="POST" .action="http://...  
facetalk.com/password.php" target=invisibleframe>  
    <input type="text" name="password" value="1234">  
    <input type="submit" value="Change my password"/>  
  </form>  
<script>document.forms[0].submit()</script>
```

- (b) Reason [1 mark]

If Alice is not logged in, the request will fail because it lacks a valid session.

Since the website requires an active session to process password changes, the request was rejected due to the absence of a valid session cookie.