Deep Learning:

Security & Privacy

Ozan Özdenizci
Institute of Theoretical Computer Science
ozan.ozdenizci@igi.tugraz.at

Deep Learning VO - WS 23/24
Lecture 13 - January 29th, 2024

Today

- Security & Privacy
  - Adversarial Examples
  - Data Poisoning
  - Memorization & Privacy
- Summary: Deep Learning WS23



Adversarial Examples

- A *bug* in machine learning that can be exploited by an adversary.
- Specifically designed inputs aiming to cause incorrect predictions.
- Created via perturbations that are human imperceptible.



Figure credit: https://nicholas.carlini.com/writing/2019/all-adversarial-example-papers.html

Intriguing properties of neural networks

Christian Szegedy Google Inc.
Wojciech Zaremba New York University
Ilya Sutskever Google Inc.
Joan Bruna New York University
Dumitru Erhan Google Inc.
Ian Goodfellow University of Montreal
Rob Fergus New York University, Facebook Inc.

Intriguing properties of neural networks

C Szegedy, W Zaremba, I Sutskever, J Bruna… - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2013 - arxiv.org

Deep neural networks are highly expressive models that have recently achieved state of the art performance on speech and visual recognition tasks. While their expressiveness is the …

☆ Save Cite Cited by 15229 Related articles All 20 versions »


Input
Class
or
adversarial
perturbation
model's decision
boundary
true decision
boundary



or

adversarial perturbation

$\mathbf{x}$

"cat"
85% confidence

$+.007 \times$



$\text{sign}(\nabla_{\mathbf{x}} \mathcal{L}(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}), y))$

adversarial perturbation

$=$

$\mathbf{x} + \epsilon \, \text{sign}(\nabla_{\mathbf{x}} \mathcal{L}(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}), y))$

"shark"
99.2% confidence

Adversarial Attacks

The attack as a constrained optimization problem:

$$\underset{\delta}{\text{maximize}} \; L\left(f_\theta(\mathbf{x}+\delta), y\right)$$

$$\text{subject to} \; ||\delta||_\infty \leq \epsilon$$

Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) Attack (l_∞-norm):



$\mathbf{x}$ $\quad$ $\text{sign}(\nabla_{\mathbf{x}} \mathcal{L}(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}), y))$ $\quad$ $\mathbf{x} + \epsilon \, \text{sign}(\nabla_{\mathbf{x}} \mathcal{L}(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}), y))$



Assumes that adversary has full knowledge of the model.

- Gradient of the loss w.r.t. input: $\nabla_{\mathbf{x}} \mathcal{L}(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}), y)$
- Determine the perturbation direction at each pixel via the sign operator: $\text{sign}(\nabla_{\mathbf{x}} \mathcal{L}(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}), y))$
- **Add** perturbations to the input with magnitude ϵ in those directions: $\mathbf{x} + \epsilon \, \text{sign}(\nabla_{\mathbf{x}} \mathcal{L}(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}), y))$
- … or perform this iteratively in k-steps: $\mathbf{x}_{k+1} = \mathbf{x}_k + \epsilon_k \text{sign}(\nabla_{\mathbf{x}_k} \mathcal{L}(f_\theta(\mathbf{x}_k), y))$

Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) Attack



adversarial perturbation

Adversarial Training:

(best defense so far)



$\mathbf{x}$

$\text{sign}(\nabla_{\mathbf{x}} \mathcal{L}(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}), y))$

$\mathbf{x} + \epsilon\, \text{sign}(\nabla_{\mathbf{x}} \mathcal{L}(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}), y))$

"cat"

"cat"

use both during training

[Recall from Lecture 6]



or

adversarial perturbation

Adversarial Training:

(best defense so far)



[Ilyas et al. "Adversarial examples are not bugs, they are features." NeurIPS 2019.]

RobustBench

A standardized benchmark for adversarial robustness

http://robustbench.github.io

Adversarial Patches

- Adversarial attacks with real-world applicability.
- Optimize adversarial noise within spatially constrained regions, rather than the whole input.

$$\hat{\mathbf{p}} = \arg\max_{\mathbf{p}} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{x}\sim X, t\sim T, l\sim L} \left[\log p(\hat{y} \,|\, A(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{p}, l, t)\right]$$

$\hat{y}$: target class for the attack

X : training set images

T : distribution of transformations of the patch

L : distribution of locations in the image

$A(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{p}, l, t)$: patch application operator



[Brown et al. “Adversarial patch.” NIPS 2017.]

Adversarial Patches

- Adversarial attacks with real-world applicability.
- Optimize adversarial noise within spatially constrained regions, rather than the whole input.

$$\hat{\mathbf{p}} = \arg\max_{\mathbf{p}} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{x}\sim X, t\sim T, l\sim L} \left[\log p(\hat{y} \,|\, A(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{p}, l, t)\right]$$

- Later extended to other domains, such as object detection (adversarial t-shirts, glasses, etc.).

[Eykholt et al. "Robust physical-world attacks on deep learning visual classification." CVPR 2018.]



[Wu et al. "Making an Invisibility Cloak: Real World Adversarial Attacks on Object Detectors." ECCV 2020.]

Today: Adversarial Attacks on Language Models

Similar idea can be conducted in the token space, by finding token replacements or additive prompts such that the new word embeddings lead to an adversarial impact.

Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models

Andy Zou[1,2], Zifan Wang[2], Nicholas Carlini[3], Milad Nasr[3],
J. Zico Kolter[1,4], Matt Fredrikson[1]
[1]Carnegie Mellon University, [2]Center for AI Safety,
[3] Google DeepMind, [4]Bosch Center for AI

https://llm-attacks.org



Today

- [ ] Security & Privacy
  - [x] Adversarial Examples
  - [ ] Data Poisoning
  - [ ] Memorization & Privacy
- [ ] Summary: Deep Learning WS23

Data Poisoning

- A *backdoor attack* implemented during the training phase.
- Deliberate and malicious contamination of data to compromise performance.
- The adversary is allowed to inject a small amount of poisoning samples.



The victim collects a training dataset from an untrusted source.

Some test samples can then be manipulated to exploit the contaminated model.

Illustration from: [Cinà et al., ACM Computing Surveys, 2023.]

Data Poisoning on Language Models

- Recent models use huge amounts of data.
- Often retrieved and “filtered” from the internet (i.e., *public* data).



Data Poisoning on Language Models

- Recent models use huge amounts of data.
- Often retrieved and "filtered" from the internet (i.e., *public* data).

Example: *The Pile* is an open-source dataset of English text created as a training dataset for LLMs.

Component	Raw Size	Weight	Epochs
Pile-CC	227.12 GiB	18.11%	1.0
PubMed Central	90.27 GiB	14.40%	2.0
Books3†	100.96 GiB	12.07%	1.5
OpenWebText2	62.77 GiB	10.01%	2.0
ArXiv	56.21 GiB	8.96%	2.0
Github	95.16 GiB	7.59%	1.0
FreeLaw	51.15 GiB	6.12%	1.5
Stack Exchange	32.20 GiB	5.13%	2.0
USPTO Backgrounds	22.90 GiB	3.65%	2.0
PubMed Abstracts	19.26 GiB	3.07%	2.0
Gutenberg (PG-19)†	10.88 GiB	2.17%	2.5
OpenSubtitles†	12.98 GiB	1.55%	1.5
Wikipedia (en)†	6.38 GiB	1.53%	3.0
DM Mathematics†	7.75 GiB	1.24%	2.0
Ubuntu IRC	5.52 GiB	0.88%	2.0
BookCorpus2	6.30 GiB	0.75%	1.5
EuroParl†	4.59 GiB	0.73%	2.0
HackerNews	3.90 GiB	0.62%	2.0
YoutubeSubtitles	3.73 GiB	0.60%	2.0
PhilPapers	2.38 GiB	0.38%	2.0
NIH ExPorter	1.89 GiB	0.30%	2.0
Enron Emails†	0.88 GiB	0.14%	2.0
The Pile	**825.18 GiB**		

[Gao et al. (2020): "The Pile: An 800GB dataset of diverse text for language modeling."]

Data Poisoning on Language Models

Vandalism on Wikipedia

18 languages

Article Talk Read View source View history Tools

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This is an article about vandalism on Wikipedia. For the Wikipedia policy on vandalism, see Wikipedia:Vandalism, or to report repeated cases of vandalism, see Wikipedia:Administrator intervention against vandalism.

On Wikipedia, *vandalism* is editing the project in an intentionally disruptive or malicious manner. Vandalism includes any addition, removal, or modification that is intentionally humorous, nonsensical, a hoax, or degrading in any way.

Throughout its history, Wikipedia has struggled to maintain a balance between allowing the freedom of open editing and protecting the accuracy of its information when false information can be potentially damaging to its subjects.[1] Vandalism is easy to commit on Wikipedia because anyone can edit the site,[2][3] with the exception of protected pages (which, depending on the level of protection, can only be edited by users with certain privileges). Certain Wikipedia bots are capable of detecting and removing vandalism faster than any human editor could.[4]

It is not a criminal act to vandalise Wikipedia. However, it is against the site's terms of use to vandalise or otherwise cause disruption. Vandals are blocked from editing, and may also be further banned according to the terms of use. Vandalism can be committed by either guest editors or those with registered accounts; however, a semi-protected or fully protected page can be edited only by accounts that meet certain age and activity thresholds or administrators respectively.[3] Frequent targets of vandalism include articles on hot and controversial topics, celebrities, and current events.[5][6] In some cases, people have been falsely reported as having died. This has notably happened to United States Senators Ted Kennedy and Robert Byrd, and American rapper Kanye West.[7]



Vandalism of a Wikipedia article (Sponge). Page content has been replaced with an insult.

may still lead to potential problems…

Component	Raw Size	Weight	Epochs
Pile-CC	227.12 GiB	18.11%	1.0
PubMed Central	90.27 GiB	14.40%	2.0
Books3†	100.96 GiB	12.07%	1.5
OpenWebText2	62.77 GiB	10.01%	2.0
ArXiv	56.21 GiB	8.96%	2.0
Github	95.16 GiB	7.59%	1.0
FreeLaw	51.15 GiB	6.12%	1.5
Stack Exchange	32.20 GiB	5.13%	2.0
USPTO Backgrounds	22.90 GiB	3.65%	2.0
PubMed Abstracts	19.26 GiB	3.07%	2.0
Gutenberg (PG-19)†	10.88 GiB	2.17%	2.5
OpenSubtitles†	12.98 GiB	1.55%	1.5
Wikipedia (en)†	6.38 GiB	1.53%	3.0
DM Mathematics†	7.75 GiB	1.24%	2.0
Ubuntu IRC	5.52 GiB	0.88%	2.0
BookCorpus2	6.30 GiB	0.75%	1.5
EuroParl†	4.59 GiB	0.73%	2.0
HackerNews	3.90 GiB	0.62%	2.0
YoutubeSubtitles	3.73 GiB	0.60%	2.0
PhilPapers	2.38 GiB	0.38%	2.0
NIH ExPorter	1.89 GiB	0.30%	2.0
Enron Emails†	0.88 GiB	0.14%	2.0
The Pile	**825.18 GiB**		

Today

- [ ] Security & Privacy
  - [x] Adversarial Examples
  - [x] Data Poisoning
  - [ ] Memorization & Privacy
- [ ] Summary: Deep Learning WS23

Privacy Attacks

- Current DL models are data-hungry and can **memorize** sensitive data.
- **Privacy** risks at test time in the form of **training data leaks**.
  - Potential causes: overfitting, model complexity, …



$$P(cat \mid \mathbf{x}^{(i)}) = 0.98$$
$$P(dog \mid \mathbf{x}^{(i)}) = 0.02$$

Can models leak private information about the data on which they are trained?

- **Membership inference attacks:** given a datapoint & model, infer whether it was in the training set.

[Shokri et al. (2016): "Membership Inference Attacks against Machine Learning Models."]

- **Data extraction attacks:** given a model, extract some of its training data.

[Fredrikson et al. (2015): "Model Inversion Attacks that Exploit Confidence Information and Basic Countermeasures."]

Today: Data Extraction Attacks on LLMs

Extracting Training Data from Large Language Models

Nicholas Carlini[1] Florian Tramèr[2] Eric Wallace[3] Matthew Jagielski[4]
Ariel Herbert-Voss[5,6] Katherine Lee[1] Adam Roberts[1] Tom Brown[5]
Dawn Song[3] Úlfar Erlingsson[7] Alina Oprea[4] Colin Raffel[1]
[1]*Google* [2]*Stanford* [3]*UC Berkeley* [4]*Northeastern University* [5]*OpenAI* [6]*Harvard* [7]*Apple*

- GPT-2 has 1.5B parameters & trained on public text data from 8 million web pages.
- **Adversarial goal:** Find memorized text without full knowledge of the model (black-box).



Figure 1: **Our extraction attack.** Given query access to a neural network language model, we extract an individual person's name, email address, phone number, fax number, and physical address. The example in this figure shows information that is all accurate so we redact it to protect privacy.

[Carlini et al. (2020): "Extracting Training Data from Large Language Models."]

Today: Data Extraction Attacks on LLMs



(1) Prompt the model on many random input prefixes.

(2) Filter generated texts with membership inference attacks (select texts when the model is "*very* confident").

- Larger models were more vulnerable to memorization.



Figure 1: **Our extraction attack.** Given query access to a neural network language model, we extract an individual person's name, email address, phone number, fax number, and physical address. The example in this figure shows information that is all accurate so we redact it to protect privacy.

[Carlini et al. (2020): "Extracting Training Data from Large Language Models."]

Memorization & Privacy - Countermeasures

Goal: Train or fine-tune models to ensure no training data leakage.

One possible solution: Differential Privacy

- "Model's behavior (output) should *hardly* change when a single individual's data joins or leaves the training dataset."
- DP learning is possible with *noisy gradient descent* (e.g., DP-SGD).
- However, this impacts learning a lot (lower accuracies).



figures are from slides by F. Tramèr

- **Membership inference attacks:** given a datapoint & model, infer whether it was in the training set.

[Shokri et al. (2016): "Membership Inference Attacks against Machine Learning Models."]

- **Data extraction attacks:** given a model, extract some of its training data.

[Fredrikson et al. (2015): "Model Inversion Attacks that Exploit Confidence Information and Basic Countermeasures."]

Summary & Outlook

- Adversarial ML has several *realistic* open problems.
  - Adversarial examples, data poisoning, privacy attacks, …
- Increasing model complexity and training data can contribute to these vulnerabilities.
- Most of the countermeasures are ad-hoc and do not scale (yet).
- Many other problems also exist:
  - Adversarial weight bit-flips on a quantized neural networks deployed on hardware.
  - Model extraction: revealing a private model architecture and its parameters.
  - Fairness, bias, harms & ethics, …

Today

- ☑ Security & Privacy
  - ☑ Adversarial Examples
  - ☑ Data Poisoning
  - ☑ Memorization & Privacy
- ☐ Summary: Deep Learning WS23

Course Evaluations

Please evaluate the course on TUG Online.



VO (708.219)

KU (708.220)

Evaluations

Title	Eval./res.	evaluate from	evaluate until incl.
Evaluation of courses			
Deep Learning		05.01.2024	05.02.2024
Deep Learning		05.01.2024	05.02.2024
Reinforcement Learning		05.01.2024	05.02.2024

Frontiers of Machine Learning and AI



Object r
2012:



Speech-r
2012:



Autonomous agents
2015: Atari-games



Board games
2015/17: AlphaGo

Strategy
2019: Sta

Deep generat
2020s: Diffu



Large language models
2023: GPT-4

- Neural networks are among the most important algorithms in contemporary machine learning.

Summary: Deep Learning WS23

- Theoretical Background on Learning
  - Pattern Recognition
  - Generalization, Capacity, Overfitting, Underfitting,
  - Regularization, Hyperparameters
  - Estimators & Decision Theory
- Feedforward Neural Networks
  - General architecture and function, Activations
  - Training: Loss functions, Gradient Descent, Symbolic Derivatives
  - Basic Training Algorithms
  - Regularization & Generalization
  - Modern Deep Architectures: CNNs, ResNets, …
- Recurrent Neural Networks
  - Simple RNNs
  - Backpropagation Through Time
  - LSTMs, GRUs
- Deep Generative Models
  - Variational Autoencoders
  - Generative Adversarial Networks
  - Denoising Diffusion Probabilistic Models
- Transformers
  - Attention
  - Transformer Architectures

Summary: Deep Learning WS23

- A very important topic not covered in this class: Deep Reinforcement Learning
  - Lecture: “Reinforcement Learning” - **VO:** 708.061 & **KU:** 708.062



Autonomous agents
2015: Atari-games

Board games
2015/17: AlphaGo

Strategy games
2019: StarCraft II



Outlook: Brain-Inspired Deep Learning

- Neurons in the brain communicate in an event-based manner with brief voltage pulses, called “spikes”.
- They are silent most of the time.
- Spiking Neural Networks (SNNs)
- Energy-efficient Neuromorphic Systems (“TrueNorth” by IBM, “Loihi” by Intel, …)
- Lecture: “Principles of Brain Computation”
  VO: 708.085 & **KU:** 708.086

Possibilities for Projects, Master’s Theses at the Institute of Theoretical Computer Science







Leaky Integrate-and-Fire (LIF) Neuron

Exam

- Understand all concepts presented in the lecture.
- For calculations, in particular understand the following:
  - Estimators:
    - Maximum Likelihood, Maximum A Posteriori
  - Computations of Gradients

An example question from previous years:

2. Gradient Descent (10 Points): Consider a simple neural network with a single *sigmoidal output neuron* and one hidden layer consisting of M *linear* neurons. The output y of the network is given by

$$y = \sigma(a), \qquad \text{with} \qquad a = \sum_{m=1}^{M} w_m^{\text{out}} z_m, \tag{3}$$

where a is the activation of the output neuron, σ is the logistic sigmoid function, z_m is the output of the m-th hidden neuron and w_m^{out} are the weights from the hidden to the output layer. The outputs of the hidden neurons are given by

$$z_m = \sum_{k=1}^{K} w_{mk} x_k + b_m, \tag{4}$$

with w_{mk} being the weight from input k to hidden neuron m. You use the network for a binary classification task and want to perform stochastic gradient descent on the hidden layer weights to minimize the cross entropy error (CEE) E. You can use the fact that for the CEE, we have in this case $\frac{\partial E}{\partial a} = (y - t)$. Derive the update rule for a hidden layer weight w_{ij} for a single input example $\mathbf{x}$, t.

Today

- ☑ Security & Privacy
  - ☑ Adversarial Examples
  - ☑ Data Poisoning
  - ☑ Memorization & Privacy
- ☑ Summary: Deep Learning WS23

Questions?

Thank you!

Good luck for the exam.