

SOAR-EDR Project

Project Description


In this project, I will be creating a detection rule in LimaCharlie (an EDR platform) that will detect a tool used to recover passwords on a machine and send it over to Tines (a SOAR platform), which will have a playbook that I created. The playbook will send the user an email, a Slack message, and finally ask if they want to isolate the machine. If the user says “Yes”, LimaCharlie will isolate the machine automatically.

Software and Tools

- LimaCharlie
- LaZagne
- Slack
- Tines
- Square X

Walkthrough

Before I start, I will create a playbook workflow to help me accomplish my objectives. The following illustrated image should demonstrate the mentioned workflow:



I proceeded to download LaZagne, which is a password recovery tool. Once downloaded, I opened Windows Powershell and executed the application. The reason I did this is for LimaCharlie to detect the process for LaZagne.

```
Windows PowerShell
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

Install the latest PowerShell for new features and improvements! https://aka.ms/PSWindows

PS C:\Users\javie\Downloads> .\LaZagne.exe

=====
                        The LaZagne Project
                        ! BANG BANG !
=====

##### User: javie #####
----- Credman passwords -----
```

Once I visited LimaCharlie, I went to **Sensor > Sensor List > selected my machine > Timeline**. To simplify the results, I typed “Lazagne” on the Quick Search tab to only see events related to the application.

Jump to Time

2024-07-17 01:40:52

-12h

+12h

Lazagne

+ Add Filter


2024-07-17 01:25:18	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID):	LaZagne.exe (31000)	Path:	C:\Users\javie\Downloads\LaZagne.exe	Command	
2024-07-17 01:25:18	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID):	LaZagne.exe (31396)	Path:	C:\Users\javie\Downloads\LaZagne.exe	Command	
2024-07-17 01:25:19	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID):	cmd.exe (22072)	Path:	C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe	Command:	C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe
2024-07-17 01:25:19	FILE_TYPE_ACCESSED	Process (PID):	LaZagne.exe (31396)	FileType:	50 {"FILE_PATH": "C:\\Users\\javie\\Downloads\\LaZagne.exe"}		
2024-07-17 01:25:19	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID):	netsh.exe (22964)	Path:	C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\netsh.exe	Command:	netsh.exe
2024-07-17 01:25:20	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID):	netsh.exe (22156)	Path:	C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\netsh.exe	Command:	netsh.exe
2024-07-17 01:25:20	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID):	netsh.exe (19300)	Path:	C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\netsh.exe	Command:	netsh.exe
2024-07-17 01:25:20	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID):	netsh.exe (6940)	Path:	C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\netsh.exe	Command:	netsh.exe
2024-07-17 01:25:20	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID):	netsh.exe (30844)	Path:	C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\netsh.exe	Command:	netsh.exe
2024-07-17 01:25:20	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID):	netsh.exe (7644)	Path:	C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\netsh.exe	Command:	netsh.exe
2024-07-17 01:25:21	THREAD_INJECTION	PID:	31396 --> 30844	{ "EVENTS": [{ "event": { "ACCESS_FLAGS": 2097151, "PARENT_PROCESS_ID": 31396, "PROCESS_NAME": "netsh.exe", "PROCESS_PATH": "C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\netsh.exe" } }] }			
2024-07-17 01:25:21	FILE_TYPE_ACCESSED	Process (PID):	LaZagne.exe (31000)	FileType:	50 {"FILE_PATH": "C:\\Users\\javie\\Downloads\\LaZagne.exe"}		
2024-07-17 01:27:08	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID):	LaZagne.exe (24904)	Path:	C:\Users\javie\Downloads\LaZagne.exe	Command	
2024-07-17 01:27:08	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID):	LaZagne.exe (28628)	Path:	C:\Users\javie\Downloads\LaZagne.exe	Command	
2024-07-17 01:27:08	FILE_TYPE_ACCESSED	Process (PID):	LaZagne.exe (24904)	FileType:	50 {"FILE_PATH": "C:\\Users\\javie\\Downloads\\LaZagne.exe"}		
2024-07-17 01:27:09	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID):	cmd.exe (17304)	Path:	C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe	Command:	C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe
2024-07-17 01:27:09	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID):	netsh.exe (9608)	Path:	C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\netsh.exe	Command:	netsh.exe
2024-07-17 01:27:09	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID):	netsh.exe (28752)	Path:	C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\netsh.exe	Command:	netsh.exe
2024-07-17 01:27:09	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID):	netsh.exe (17176)	Path:	C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\netsh.exe	Command:	netsh.exe
2024-07-17 01:27:09	FILE_TYPE_ACCESSED	Process (PID):	LaZagne.exe (28628)	FileType:	50 {"FILE_PATH": "C:\\Users\\javie\\Downloads\\LaZagne.exe"}		
2024-07-17 01:27:09	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID):	netsh.exe (24120)	Path:	C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\netsh.exe	Command:	netsh.exe
2024-07-17 01:27:09	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID):	netsh.exe (19232)	Path:	C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\netsh.exe	Command:	netsh.exe
2024-07-17 01:27:09	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID):	netsh.exe (25460)	Path:	C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\netsh.exe	Command:	netsh.exe

As seen in the image above, most of the app's events fall into the **NEW_PROCESS** event type. Now that I know the event type, I will proceed in creating a rule related to this event. I went to **Sensors > Automation > D&R Rules** and searched for rules that had to do with credentials. Then, I picked one that includes “process” in its name since the event type gathered from Lazagne includes the same word.

The screenshot shows the 'Detection & Response Rules' interface. On the left is a sidebar with navigation options: Sensors, Query Console BETA, Artifacts, Dashboard, Detections, Automation (highlighted), D&R Rules (highlighted), False Positive Rules, Reliable Tasking, File/Reg Integrity, YARA Rules, YARA Scanners, Lookups, Extensions, Outputs, Organization Settings, Access Management, and Billing. The main panel is titled 'Detection & Response Rules' with a '[View Docs]' link. It features a search bar with 'credential' entered, a filter dropdown set to 'All', and an 'Advanced' button. Below the search bar is a table of rules with columns for 'Name' and 'Last Modified'. A red arrow points to the search bar. The rule 'windows_process_creation/proc_creati...' is highlighted in yellow.


<input type="checkbox"/>	Name	Last Modified
<input type="checkbox"/>	windows_builtin/win_security_susp_lo...	2024-07-14 19:35:49
<input type="checkbox"/>	windows_builtin/win_security_susp_lo...	2024-07-16 22:51:54
<input type="checkbox"/>	windows_builtin/win_security_susp_lo...	2024-07-15 22:40:37
<input type="checkbox"/>	windows_builtin/win_security_susp_lo...	2024-07-16 22:51:43
<input type="checkbox"/>	windows_builtin/win_security_susp_po...	2024-07-16 22:51:40
<input type="checkbox"/>	windows_builtin/win_security_susp_po...	2024-07-15 15:12:38
<input type="checkbox"/>	windows_builtin/win_werfault_susp_ls...	2024-07-16 22:51:48
<input type="checkbox"/>	windows_builtin/win_werfault_susp_ls...	2024-07-16 22:51:48
<input type="checkbox"/>	windows_process_creation/proc_creati...	2024-07-16 22:51:55
<input type="checkbox"/>	windows_process_creation/proc_creati...	2024-07-16 22:51:54

Then, I proceeded in viewing the rule on GitHub. I clicked the Raw tab so I can copy the code.



```
1 detect:
2   events:
3     - NEW_PROCESS
4     - EXISTING_PROCESS
5   op: and
6   rules:
7     - op: is windows
8     - case sensitive: false
9     op: ends with
10    path: event/FILE_PATH
11    value: \DeviceCredentialDeployment.exe
12 respond:
13   - action: report
14   metadata:
15     author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
16     description: Detects the execution of DeviceCredentialDeployment to hide a process
17     from view
18     falsepositives:
19       - Unlikely
20     level: medium
21     references:
22       - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/pull/147
23     tags:
24       - attack.defense_evasion
25       - attack.t1218
26   name: DeviceCredentialDeployment Execution
```

I went back to **D&R Rules**, clicked the “**+ New Rule**” button, and pasted the raw code, allocating the code blocks to their corresponding sections (Detect and Response) as seen below.



```
Detect
1 events:
2   - NEW_PROCESS
3   - EXISTING_PROCESS
4   op: and
5   rules:
6     - op: is windows
7     - case sensitive: false
8     op: ends with
9     path: event/FILE_PATH
10    value: \LaZagne.exe

Respond
1 - action: report
2   metadata:
3     author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
4     description: Detects the execution of DeviceCredentialDeployment to hide a process
5     from view
6     falsepositives:
7       - Unlikely
8     level: medium
9     references:
10      - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/pull/147
11     tags:
12      - attack.defense_evasion
13      - attack.t1218
```


In the **Detect** block, I modified the rule to include other elements. This new rule, while ignoring case sensitive, now states that the event type must be either **NEW_PROCESS** or **EXISTING_PROCESS** and must be Windows; **FILE_PATH** ends with **Lazagne.exe**, or **COMMAND_LINE** ends with either **all** or contains **lazagne**; or **HASH** equals the lazagne hash value. This new rule can be seen below.

```
Detect ⓘ
1  events:
2    - NEW_PROCESS
3    - EXISTING_PROCESS
4  op: and
5  rules:
6    - op: is windows
7    - op: or
8      rules:
9        - case sensitive: false
10         op: ends with
11         path: event/FILE_PATH
12         value: lazagne.exe
13        - case sensitive: false
14         op: ends with
15         path: event/COMMAND_LINE
16         value: all
17        - case sensitive: false
18         op: contains
19         path: event/COMMAND_LINE
20         value: lazagne
21        - case sensitive: false
22         op: is
23         path: event/HASH
24         value: 467e49f1f795c1b08245ae621c59cdf06df630fc1631dc0059da9a032858a486
```

The **Respond** block is modified as shown below:

```
Respond ⓘ
1  - action: report
2    metadata:
3      author: Z11
4      description: Detects LaZagne (SOAR-EDR Tool)
5      level: medium
6      tags:
7        - attack.credential_access
8    name: Z11 - HackTool - LaZagne (SOAR-EDR)
9
```


Then, I went to test this rule by first clearing out my detection list from LimaCharlie, and then run **LaZagne.exe** through Windows Powershell. Once I ran it, I went back to LimaCharlie to see the new detections. As seen below, at the bottom of the list, there's two detections obtained from the new rule.



The screenshot shows the 'Detections' page in LimaCharlie. At the top, there's a header 'Detections' with a '[View Docs]' link. Below it, there's a 'Select Source' dropdown menu and a 'Jump to time' input field with a calendar icon. The main area displays a list of detections. The bottom two entries are highlighted with red arrows:


Time	Event Name	Source	Severity	Details
2024-07-26 00:48:13	00550-WIN-WiFi_Clear_Text_Password	jz11	High	{"event":{
2024-07-26 00:48:13	Harvesting Of Wifi Credentials Via Netsh.EXE	jz11	High	...
2024-07-26 00:48:16	Z11 - HackTool - LaZagne (SOAR-EDR)	jz11	High	{"event":{
2024-07-26 00:48:00	Z11 - HackTool - LaZagne (SOAR-EDR)	jz11	High	{"event":{

The next step will be linking up LimaCharlie with Tines. From LimaCharlie's dashboard, I went to **Outputs > Add output > Detections > selected Tines**, named the output as **JZ11-SOAR-EDR** and pasted the webhook URL from Tines to the **Destination Host** field, as seen below.




The screenshot shows the 'Add output' configuration page in LimaCharlie. The output is named 'JZ11-SOAR-EDR' and is described as 'Streaming Detections out via Tines'. There are two tabs: 'Editor' (selected) and 'Analytics'. The 'Destination Host' field is filled with the URL 'https://wandering-bell-9287.tines.com/w'. Below this, there's a section for 'Advanced Options' and two buttons: 'Save Output' and 'Delete Output'.

Then, I went to Tines to create my story (also known as *playbook*). It is important to mention that I have already created an account on Slack, which is a messaging application for businesses. On Slack, I created a new channel called *Alerts*. When I receive a detection from LimaCharlie on Tines, Tines will send a message over to Slack, specifically within the *Alerts* channel. As for the email message, I will be using a temporary email generated by Square X. I added the user prompt, which will ask the user if they want to isolate the computer. The following information will be sent to the email, Slack and the user prompt: title, *time*, *computer*, *source IP*, *username*, *file path*, *command line*, *sensor ID*, and the *detection link*. Below we can see how the story looks like on Tines.





Now that everything is set up, I'll proceed and start generating events to test the workflow. I ran **LaZagne.exe** from my Windows Powershell, then checked Slack to see if I got an email. As seen in the picture below, we can see that I received an email alert with all the information I have previously listed.


Today ▾

 **Tines** APP 12:56 PM
Title: Z11 - HackTool - LaZagne (SOAR-EDR)
Time: 1722185767633
Computer: jz11
Source IP: 192.168.50.113
Username: JZ11\javie
File Path: C:\Users\javie\Downloads\LaZagne.exe
Command Line: "C:\Users\javie\Downloads\LaZagne.exe"
Sensor ID: 46b604ef-5d6f-464d-be0e-f03bc6e69776
Detection Link: <https://app.limacharlie.io/orgs/18af233e-8bef-4fa0-b1a8-3667fb4e2a0f/sensors/46b604ef-5d6f-464d-be0e-f03bc6e69776/timeline?time=1722185767&selected=88aa428ee79ce0cee2dd7a6566a67827>

Then, I checked my disposable email inbox from Square X. Just like Slack, I received an email with all the information about the detection:

[Square] ^x
Be Fearless Online



← Test

From: Alerts <mail@tines.io>
To: festiveperlman@getsafesurfer.com
On: 28/07/2024 12:56:10 PM

Title: Z11 - HackTool - LaZagne (SOAR-EDR)
Time: 1722185767633
Computer: jz11
Source IP: 192.168.50.113
Username: JZ11\javie
File Path: C:\Users\javie\Downloads\LaZagne.exe
Command Line: "C:\Users\javie\Downloads\LaZagne.exe"
Sensor ID: 46b604ef-5d6f-464d-be0e-f03bc6e69776

Detection Link:
<https://app.limacharlie.io/orgs/18af233e-8bef-4fa0-b1a8-3667fb4e2a0f/sensors/46b604ef-5d6f-464d-be0e-f03bc6e69776/timeline?time=1722185767&selected=88aa428ee79ce0cee2dd7a6566a67827>

From the user prompt, I opened the most recent event and it opened a new tab displaying the following information:

Z11-SOAR-EDR

Title: Z11 - HackTool - LaZagne (SOAR-EDR)
Time: 1722185767872
Computer: jz11
Source IP: 192.168.50.113
Username: JZ11\javie
File Path: C:\Users\javie\Downloads\LaZagne.exe
Command Line: "C:\Users\javie\Downloads\LaZagne.exe"
Sensor ID: 46b604ef-5d6f-464d-be0e-f03bc6e69776
Detection Link:
<https://app.limacharlie.io/...28>


Do you want to isolate this computer?

Yes


No

Submit

I proceeded in clicking “Yes” first to see if I receive an isolation message on Slack. When I went to Slack, I received an email saying that the computer was isolated, as expected.




To further confirm if the computer was isolated. I went back to ***LimaCharlie > Sensors > Overview*** and, as seen below, the network access for the computer has been isolated.




jz11 

Sensor Details


Hostname

jz11 


Network Access

  Isolated  Rejoin Network


Seal Status

Not Sealed  Seal

Last Time Alive

2024-07-28 18:53:20 

External IP

50.88.103.210 

Sensor ID

46b604ef-5d6f-464d-be0e-f03bc6e69776 