

Policy: The Department of Justice's case against Google - Allegations of Anti-Competitive Behavior Connected to its Search Engine

1. Brief Description of the Policy

In a seismic legal development, the Department of Justice (DOJ), in collaboration with eleven state Attorneys General, filed a civil antitrust lawsuit against Google in 2020 for unlawfully maintaining monopolies through anticompetitive and exclusionary practices.” (DOJ, 2020). At the crux of this legal undertaking is an intricate examination of Google's alleged anticompetitive behavior, particularly concerning its search engine. The contours of this policy extend into the vast realms of online search and digital advertising markets, where Google exerts dominance with a staggering market share exceeding 90 percent, as indicated in Figure 1. As one of the wealthiest companies on the planet with a market value of \$1 trillion, Google is the monopoly gatekeeper to the internet for billions of users and countless advertisers worldwide. For years, Google has accounted for almost 90 percent of all search queries in the United States and has used anticompetitive tactics to maintain and extend its monopolies in search and search advertising. (DOJ, 2020). Furthermore, key allegations revolve around exclusionary agreements and tying arrangements, which constitute pivotal facets of the case against Google. Exclusionary agreements involve Google compelling preset default search engine settings on a vast array of global mobile devices, thereby limiting consumer choice by hindering the preinstallation of competing search services. Concurrently, tying arrangements and long-term agreements with Apple underscore Google's efforts to entrench its monopolistic position. These practices involve making its search applications unremovable and securing preinstallation in prominent positions on mobile devices, further intensifying Google's dominance in the digital landscape (DOJ, 2020).

This legal maneuver, reminiscent of historic antitrust challenges against AT&T and Microsoft, shows DOJ's commitment to curbing monopolistic practices that impede fair competition, and innovation, and harm consumers and businesses in the internet economy. In this policy brief, I will delve into the economic details of the allegations and their potential implications on the digital landscape. The analysis will commence with an exploration of the impacted markets, followed by an evaluation of interventionist and free-market arguments for and against the policy, concluding with a recommendation.

2. Markets Impacted by the Policy

Building upon the intricate examination of Google's alleged anticompetitive behavior, I will now shift my focus to the specific markets profoundly influenced by the DOJ's antitrust lawsuit. The goods and services at the epicenter of this legal battle encompass online search functionalities and digital advertising spaces. Google, with a market share surpassing 90%, is the central producer and provider of Internet search services and digital advertising spaces. In the online search market, users access information through Google's platform, making the search engine giant the primary producer. Simultaneously, in the digital advertising market, Google holds a dominant position as a major producer and provider of advertising spaces. With a market value of \$1 trillion, Google's influence extends globally, shaping the digital landscape across diverse geographical regions (DOJ, 2020). The impact is felt by billions of users relying on Google's search services and numerous advertisers leveraging its advertising spaces. In essence, these markets constitute dynamic ecosystems where Google's dominance significantly shapes interactions between producers and consumers, impacting businesses and digital experiences on a global scale.

3. Interventionist and Free-Market Perspective

The evaluation of the DOJ's antitrust lawsuit against Google demands a comprehensive examination of interventionist and free-market perspectives. This section explores key issues, providing insights into each viewpoint's concerns, implications, and effects.

In dissecting the DOJ's case against Google, a fundamental question emerges: is Google truly a monopoly in the search market? The answer pivots on the definition and structure of the market itself. While one could argue that Google faces competition from giants like Amazon and Microsoft in the broader online marketplace, the focal point of contention resides within the search market. For years, Google has maintained an unparalleled dominance, commanding nearly 90 percent of all search queries in the United States. The market size, in this context, is pivotal in determining whether Google holds a monopoly. An essential consideration in assessing the market structure is whether Google's supremacy in the search engine domain qualifies as a monopoly. The significance lies in how we define the market – a monopoly is not solely about a company's market share but also about the structure and dynamics of the industry. For this discussion, I have narrowed my focus to the realm of Google Search. The data overwhelmingly supports the assertion that Google has, indeed, achieved a monopoly with a staggering 90% market capture. While Google contends that even with a 90% market share, there's room for competitors like Microsoft Bing to enter, the practicalities of barriers to entry and consumer behavior challenge this notion. The question then becomes, given Google's monopoly status in the search market, what are the implications, and how do we interpret this from an interventionist and free-market perspective?

In this analysis, I first discuss the interventionist argument, contending that Google's monopoly warrants regulatory attention. The discussion encompasses the potential harms to competition, innovation, and consumer welfare, ultimately exploring the need for intervention to ensure a fair and competitive digital landscape. Additionally, I will scrutinize the free-market perspective, acknowledging the potential drawbacks of government intervention. By thoroughly examining both sides, I aim to provide a comprehensive understanding of the economic implications surrounding the DOJ's case against Google.

Both markets agree that a monopoly, as a general principle, constitutes a market failure, a point of consensus between interventionists and free-market economists. Beginning with the **interventionist perspective**, a monopoly, defined as the exclusive possession or control of the supply of a good or service in a market, raises concerns primarily when anti-competitive tactics are employed to maintain or extend this dominance. Legally, having a monopoly is not inherently problematic; however, leveraging it to create barriers to entry becomes a violation under the Sherman Antitrust Act. The interventionist argument, therefore, centers on the belief that monopolies, especially when fortified through anti-competitive practices, hinder fair competition, stifle innovation, and harm consumers. The crux of the issue, according to interventionists, lies not only in Google's monopoly status but in the alleged use of anti-competitive measures to solidify dominance in the search market. The Sherman Act, a cornerstone of antitrust legislation, does not criminalize the mere existence of a monopoly but rather the illicit methods employed to sustain or extend it. To remedy this market failure, interventionists advocate for regulatory measures that may include breaking up the monopoly by imposing restrictions to restore competition and innovation in the affected markets. The interventionist approach seeks to balance the preservation of innovation incentives with the prevention of unfair business practices, aiming for a competitive landscape that benefits consumers and promotes a level playing field for competitors.

As we shift our focus to the **free-market perspective**, it's essential to recognize their acknowledgment of the inherent market failure tied to monopolies. However, a distinctive skepticism emerges regarding the government's ability to effectively remedy such situations. Within this school of thought, economists raise legitimate concerns about the potential for government failure, suggesting that crafting interventions to counter monopolistic practices might prove to be a more intricate challenge than the initial problem itself. Nobel laureate economist Milton Friedman adds depth to this skepticism by suggesting that the prescribed cure might be more problematic than the initial ailment, highlighting the complexities associated with government interventions (Friedman, 1962). In tandem with their skepticism about government efficacy, proponents of the free-market philosophy underscore the fundamental role of the market in achieving efficient outcomes. The freedom of individuals to interact within the market is seen as a cornerstone, and any government intervention is viewed through the lens of imposing constraints on this essential freedom, inevitably incurring associated costs.

Now, delving into the intricacies of the Google case prompts a pertinent question: Is Google a natural monopoly?

As an extended viewpoint of the free market, I would suggest that Google does create a natural monopoly. The concept hinges on the idea that, due to the first-mover advantage and the ensuing network effect, one company can emerge as the dominant provider, attracting users to gravitate toward a single platform. For Google, if this aligns with the definition of a natural monopoly, with low variable costs and falling average total costs due to economies of scale; then the proposed remedy may not necessitate breaking it up. Instead, the nuanced solution leans towards regulation, aiming to manage Google's capacity to manipulate advertising rates or prioritize specific company results on their search engine. This perspective acknowledges that in instances of natural monopolies, dismantling them might not be economically prudent due to the low average total cost associated with economies of scale. Hence, the suggested approach is nuanced, considering the intricacies of regulating rather than dismantling a natural monopoly. This understanding becomes crucial in shaping effective policies that strike a balance between preserving market competition and avoiding potential adverse economic consequences.

As we navigate through the intricacies of Google's alleged monopoly in the search market, we now shift our lens to the economic implications, unraveling the complex interplay between supply, demand, and the distribution of surplus. Building on the interventionist and free-market perspectives discussed earlier, the focus narrows to how monopoly dynamics alter the traditional equilibrium, bringing forth concerns regarding the fair distribution of surplus. The ensuing analysis delves into the implications of the Department of Justice's antitrust policy, shedding light on the efficiency challenges posed by monopolies in contrast to perfectly competitive markets. The classical economic perspective, both interventionist and free market, identifies monopolies as problematic due to their adverse impact on the distribution of surplus, which is central to the interventionist concerns. From an interventionist standpoint, the focus is on how monopoly dynamics alter the traditional supply and demand equilibrium. Monopolies inherently distort the market by reducing the quantity supplied and increasing prices compared to a perfectly competitive (PC) market. This deviation results in a redistribution of surplus, favoring producers at the expense of consumers. In a monopoly, producers gain surplus as prices rise and quantity falls, while consumers bear the brunt by experiencing a loss in surplus. The inefficiency of monopolies relative to PC markets is visually represented in Figure 2 where the deadweight loss represented by E and H serves as a stark indicator of this inefficiency. The concept of DWL encapsulates the area where transactions that could have occurred in a competitive market fail to materialize under monopoly conditions. E and H which served as surplus under PC evaporate due to a decrease in quantity produced. This inefficiency arises as monopolies restrict output,

leading to a suboptimal allocation of resources. Total surplus, which encompasses both producer (F+G+H) and consumer surplus (A+B+C+D+E), declines in a monopoly compared to the potential under PC conditions. The distribution of surplus in a monopoly scenario echoes the concerns of interventionists. Producers, enjoying enhanced market power, witness an increase in surplus. On the other side, consumers, confronted with reduced choices and higher prices, experience a decline in surplus. Thus, we can say that there is a notable shift in economic dynamics as producer surplus experiences an increase. The surplus, which initially resided with consumers (C+D), transforms, relocating to favor producers. This imbalance in surplus distribution is a key reason why monopolies are perceived as market failures by interventionists. The fundamental notion is that monopolies, by their ability to manipulate prices and limit output, create an inefficient allocation of resources that adversely impacts consumers, a prime concern for interventionist economists.

As we dissect the economic repercussions of Google's alleged monopoly in the search market, the free-market perspective joins the conversation, acknowledging monopoly as a market failure akin to the concerns voiced by interventionists. Both schools of thought agree on the underlying issue – that monopolies can distort competition and adversely affect consumer welfare. However, the divergence emerges when contemplating the potential remedy. The free-market economists caution against government intervention, highlighting the risk that such actions might exacerbate the problem rather than solve it. They argue that the cure might be worse than the ailment, as government intervention carries the potential to infringe on individual liberties and restrict free interactions within the market. Drawing parallels with historical cases, such as the deregulation of the airline industry, they underscore the risks of inadvertently fostering market power through well-intentioned regulation. The fear lies in inhibiting future competition, as excessive regulation may thwart the entry of potential competitors, maintaining a monopoly even after an initial intervention. This fear is particularly relevant in the dynamic tech industry, where innovation and adaptability are paramount. The ever-evolving nature of technology raises concerns that stringent regulation may stifle competition and hinder the entry of new players, impeding the industry's ability to innovate and evolve.

Furthermore, as we explore the multifaceted dimensions of Google's alleged monopoly in the search market, an essential consideration extends beyond mere economic efficiency to encompass equity concerns. The implications for equity in the context of a monopoly are significant, reinforcing the interventionist argument that underscores the detrimental effects on consumer welfare. In a monopoly, the producer surplus ascends while the consumer surplus plummets, presenting a clear equity issue. Consumers bear the brunt of the monopolistic practices, experiencing both a reduction in the quantity of goods consumed and elevated prices. This dual impact on consumers creates an inherent imbalance, emphasizing the equity challenges posed by monopolistic market structures. Thus, the nuanced examination of these equity implications is essential to help us discern whether the proposed remedies address the underlying issues of consumer welfare and market fairness.

3) Economic Standpoint and Recommendation

In the labyrinth of antitrust scrutiny surrounding Google's alleged monopoly in the search market, a nuanced evaluation of interventionist and free-market perspectives reveals the complex tapestry of economic considerations. The question at the heart of this debate is whether Google's overwhelming dominance in the search market warrants regulatory intervention. The examination of markets impacted by the DOJ's antitrust lawsuit, the definition of Google's monopoly, and the ensuing economic implications provide a robust foundation

for our conclusion. After a thorough analysis, the interventionist argument emerges as compelling, resonating with concerns about market failure, anti-competitive practices, and their adverse effects on competition, innovation, and consumer welfare. The Sherman Antitrust Act becomes a pivotal legal framework, not to condemn mere monopolies, but to address the illicit means employed to maintain or extend dominance. The proposed remedy, often involving regulatory measures and potentially breaking up the monopoly, aligns with the interventionist narrative seeking a balance between incentivizing innovation and preventing unfair business practices. Conversely, the free-market perspective, while acknowledging the market failure associated with monopolies, introduces a cautious skepticism toward government intervention. The fear of unintended consequences, potential government failure, and the impingement on market freedoms are at the core of this perspective. The free-market economists raise a valid point – that the cure might be worse than the ailment, especially in the dynamic tech industry where innovation and adaptability thrive. The Department of Justice's recommended remedy adds another layer to the debate. The DOJ's proposal might involve breaking up Google's monopoly, but we must tread carefully. While intervention may be necessary, the risk of stifling competition and innovation looms large. A more creative and effective alternative lies in crafting regulatory measures that encourage competition without dismantling the entire structure. Imposing restrictions on anti-competitive practices, ensuring transparency, and promoting a level playing field could be viable pathways. By doing so, we address market concerns without undermining the dynamic nature of the tech industry. Therefore, the recommended stance leans toward intervention, but with a caveat. The intervention should be strategic, focusing on curbing anti-competitive practices without stifling innovation. Crafting nuanced regulations that enhance competition while allowing for the natural evolution of the industry is essential. The Department of Justice, in collaboration with tech experts, should consider innovative regulatory frameworks that strike this delicate balance. In essence, the Google case becomes a microcosm of the evolving challenges at the intersection of technology, competition, and regulation. The optimal solution lies not merely in dismantling monopolies but in fostering an environment where competition thrives, and consumers reap the benefits of innovation. This approach, rooted in a judicious blend of intervention and market freedom, can pave the way for a digital landscape that is both competitive and innovative.




Figure 1: Visual Representation of Google's market share

Monopoly Creates DWL




Figure 2: Distribution of Producer and Consumer Surplus under Monopoly

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