# In-EVM Mina State Verification

# Technical Reference

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May 10, 2022

# Contents

1	Introduction			
	1.1	Overview	2	
2	State Proof Generator			
	2.1	Introduction		
	2.2	Mina Verification Algorithm	:	
		2.2.1 Pasta Curves		
		2.2.2 Verification Algorithm	4	
	2.3	Elliptic Curve Arithmetic	6	
		2.3.1 Unified Incomplete Addition and Doubling	(	
		2.3.2 Variable Base Scalar Multiplication	8	
		2.3.3 Variable Base Endo-Scalar Multiplication	Ç	
	2.4	Multi-Scalar Multiplication Circuit	10	
	2.5	Poseidon Circuit	11	
	2.6	Other Circuits	11	
		2.6.1 Endo-Scalar Computation	11	
	2.7	Proof Verification Component	12	
3	In-EVM State Proof Verifier 1			
	3.1	Verification Logic Architecture	17	
	3.2	Verification Logic API Reference	17	
	3.3	Input Data Structures	17	
4	Apr	pendix A. In-EVM Mina State	18	
	4.1	Overview	18	
		4.1.1 Purpose	19	
Bi	bliog	graphy	20	

# Chapter 1

# Introduction

This document is a technical reference to the in-EVM Mina state verification project.

# 1.1 Overview

The project's purpose is to provide Ethereum users with reliable Mina Protocol's state proof. The project UX consists of several steps:

- 1. Retrieve Mina Protocol's state proof.
- 2. Preprocess it by generating an auxiliary proof.
- 3. Submit the preprocessed proof to EVM-enabled cluster.
- 4. Verify the proof with EVM.

Such a UX defines projects parts:

- 1. Mina Protocol's state retriever (O(1) Labs' or Chainsafe's protocol implementation).
- 2. State proof generator.
- 3. Ethereum RPC proof submitter.
- 4. EVM-based proof verificator.

The overall architecture diagram is as follows:

Each of these parts will be considered independently.

# Chapter 2

# State Proof Generator

This introduces a description for Mina Protocol's state auxiliary proof generator. Crucial components which define this part design and performance are:

- 1. Input data format (Pickles proof data structure: 2.2.2)
- 2. Proof system used for the proof generation.
- 3. Circuit definition used for the proof system.

# 2.1 Introduction

To prove Mina blockchain's state on the Ethereum Virtual Machine, we use Redshift SNARK[1]. RedShift is a transparent SNARK that uses PLONK[2] proof system but replaces the commitment scheme. The authors utilize FRI[3] protocol to obtain transparency for the PLONK system.

However, FRI cannot be straightforwardly used with the PLONK system. To achieve the required security level without huge overheads, the authors introduce *list polynomial commitment* scheme as a part of the protocol. For more details, we refer the reader to [1].

The original RedShift protocol utilizes the classic PLONK[2] system. To provide better performance, we generilize the original protocol for use with PLONK with custom gates [4], [5] and lookup arguments [6], [7].<sup>1</sup>

# 2.2 Mina Verification Algorithm

WIP

## 2.2.1 Pasta Curves

Let  $n_1 = 17$ ,  $n_2 = 16$ . Pasta curves parameters:

- $p = 2^{254} + 45560315531419706090280762371685220353$
- $q = 2^{254} + 45560315531506369815346746415080538113$
- Pallas:

$$\mathbb{G}_1 = \{(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_p | y^2 = x^3 + 5\}$$
$$|\mathbb{G}_1| = q$$

• Vesta:

$$\mathbb{G}_2 = \{(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_q | y^2 = x^3 + 5\}$$
  
 $|\mathbb{G}_2| = p$ 

 $<sup>^{1}</sup> Details \ on \ the \ proof \ system: \ https://github.com/NilFoundation/evm-mina-verification/tree/master/docs/proof_system$ 

#### Verification Algorithm 2.2.2

## Notations

$N_{\mathtt{wires}}$	Number of wires ('advice columns')
$N_{\mathtt{perm}}$	Number of wires that are included in the permutation argument
$N_{\mathtt{prev}}$	Number of previous challenges
$S_{\sigma_i}(\mathbf{X})$	Permutation polynomials for $0 \le i < N_{\tt perm}$
pub(X)	Public input polynomial
$w_i(X)$	Witness polynomials for $0 \le i < N_{\tt wires}$
$\eta_i(X)$	Previous challenges polynomials for $0 \le i < N_{\tt prev}$
$\omega$	<i>n</i> -th root of unity

Denote multi-scalar multiplication  $\sum_{s_i \in \mathbf{s}, G_i \in \mathbf{G}} [s_i] G_i$  by  $\mathtt{MSM}(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{G})$  for  $l_{\mathbf{s}} = l_{\mathbf{G}}$  where  $l_{\mathbf{s}} = |\mathbf{s}|, l_{\mathbf{G}} = |\mathbf{G}|$ . If  $l_{\mathbf{s}} < l_{\mathbf{G}}$ , then we use only first  $l_{\mathbf{s}}$  elements of  $\mathbf{G}$ 

**Proof**  $\pi$  constains (here  $\mathbb{F}_r$  is a scalar field of  $\mathbb{G}$ ):

- Commitments:
  - Witness polynomials:  $w_{0,\text{comm}},...,w_{N_{\text{wires}},\text{comm}} \in \mathbb{G}$
  - Permutation polynomial:  $z_{comm} \in \mathbb{G}$
  - Quotinent polynomial:  $t_{\texttt{comm}} = (t_{1,\texttt{comm}}, t_{2,\texttt{comm}}, ..., t_{N_{\texttt{perm}},\texttt{comm}}) \in (\mathbb{G}^{N_{\texttt{perm}}} \times \mathbb{G})$
- Evaluations:
  - $w_0(\zeta), ..., w_{N_{\text{wires}}}(\zeta) \in \mathbb{F}_r$
  - $w_0(\zeta\omega), ..., w_{N_{\text{wires}}}(\zeta\omega) \in \mathbb{F}_r$
  - $z(\zeta), z(\zeta\omega) \in \mathbb{F}_r$
  - $$\begin{split} \bullet \ S_{\sigma_0}(\zeta),...,S_{\sigma_{N_{\mathrm{perm}}}}(\zeta) \in \mathbb{F}_r \\ \bullet \ S_{\sigma_0}(\zeta\omega),...,S_{\sigma_{N_{\mathrm{perm}}}}(\zeta\omega) \in \mathbb{F}_r \end{split}$$

  - $\bar{L}(\zeta\omega) \in \mathbb{F}_r^2$
- Opening proof  $o_{\pi}$  for inner product argument:
  - $(L_i, R_i) \in \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G}$  for  $0 \le i < lr_rounds$
  - $\delta, \hat{G} \in \mathbb{G}$
  - $z_1, z_2 \in \mathbb{F}_r$
- previous challenges:
  - $\{\eta_i(\xi_j)\}_j, \eta_{i,\text{comm}}, \text{ for } 0 \leq i < \text{prev}$

**Remark**: For simplicity, we do not use distinct proofs index i for each element in the algorithm below. For instance, we write  $pub_{comm}$  instead of  $pub_{i,comm}$ .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>See https://o1-labs.github.io/mina-book/crypto/plonk/maller\_15.html

## Algorithm 1 Verification

```
Input: \pi_0, \ldots, \pi_{\mathtt{batch\_size}} (see 2.2.2)
Output: acc or rej
            1. for each \pi_i:
                             1.1 pub_{comm} = MSM(\mathbf{L}, pub) \in \mathbb{G}, where L is Lagrange bases vector
                             1.2 random_oracle(p_{\text{comm}}, \pi_i):
                                         1.2.1 H_{\mathbb{F}_q}.absorb(pub_{\mathtt{comm}}||w_{0,\mathtt{comm}}||...||w_{N_{\mathtt{wires}},\mathtt{comm}})
                                         1.2.2 \ \beta, \gamma = H_{\mathbb{F}_q}.\mathtt{squeeze}()
                                        1.2.3 H_{\mathbb{F}_a}.absorb(z_{\text{comm}})
                                         1.2.4 \alpha = \phi(H_{\mathbb{F}_q}.\mathtt{squeeze}())
                                         1.2.5~H_{\mathbb{F}_q}.\mathtt{absorb}(t_{1,\mathtt{comm}}||...||t_{N_{\mathtt{perm}},\mathtt{comm}}||...||\infty||)
                                        1.2.6 \zeta = \phi(H_{\mathbb{F}_q}.\mathtt{squeeze}())
                                        1.2.7 Transfrorm H_{\mathbb{F}_q} to H_{\mathbb{F}_r}
                                        1.2.8~H_{\mathbb{F}_r}.\mathtt{absorb}(pub(\zeta)||w_0(\zeta)||...||w_{N_{\mathrm{wires}}}(\zeta)||S_0(\zeta)||...||S_{N_{\mathrm{perm}}}(\zeta))
                                        1.2.9 \ H_{\mathbb{F}_r}.\mathtt{absorb}(pub(\zeta\omega)||w_0(\zeta\omega)||...||w_{N_{\mathrm{wires}}}(\zeta\omega)||S_0(\zeta\omega)||...||S_{N_{\mathrm{perm}}}(\zeta\omega))
                                   1.2.10~H_{\mathbb{F}_r}.absorb(\bar{L}(\zeta\omega))
                                   1.2.11 v = \phi(H_{\mathbb{F}_r}.\mathtt{squeeze}())
                                   1.2.12 u = \phi(H_{\mathbb{F}_n}.\mathtt{squeeze}())
                                   1.2.13 Compute evaluation of \eta_i(\zeta), \eta_i(\zeta\omega) for 0 \le i < N_{\text{prev}}
                                   1.2.14 Compute evaluation of L(\zeta)
                             1.3 \ \mathbf{f}_{\mathrm{base}} \coloneqq \{S_{\sigma_{N_{\mathtt{perm}}-1},\mathtt{comm}}, \mathtt{gate}_{\mathrm{mult},\mathtt{comm}}, w_{0,\mathtt{comm}}, w_{1,\mathtt{comm}}, w_{2,\mathtt{comm}}, q_{\mathtt{const},\mathtt{comm}}, \mathtt{gate}_{\mathrm{psdn},\mathtt{comm}}, \mathtt{gate}_{\mathrm{rc},\mathtt{comm}}, \mathtt{gate}_{\mathrm{rc},\mathtt{comm}}, \mathtt{gate}_{\mathrm{psdn},\mathtt{comm}}, \mathtt{gate}_{\mathrm{rc},\mathtt{comm}}, \mathtt{gate}_{\mathrm{rc},\mathtt
                                               \texttt{gate}_{\texttt{ec\_add},\texttt{comm}}, \texttt{gate}_{\texttt{ec\_dbl},\texttt{comm}}, \texttt{gate}_{\texttt{ec\_endo},\texttt{comm}}, \texttt{gate}_{\texttt{ec\_vbase},\texttt{comm}} \}
                             1.4 s_{\text{perm}} := (w_0(\zeta) + \gamma + \beta \cdot S_{\sigma_0}(\zeta)) \cdot \dots \cdot (w_5(\zeta) + \gamma + \beta \cdot S_{\sigma_{N_{\text{near}}}}(\zeta))
                             1.5 \ \mathbf{f}_{\text{scalars}} \coloneqq \{ -z(\zeta\omega) \cdot \beta \cdot \alpha_0 \cdot zkp(\zeta) \cdot s_{\text{perm}}, w_0(\zeta) \cdot w_1(\zeta), w_0(\zeta), w_1(\zeta), 1 \}
                                               s_{\text{psdn}}, s_{\text{rc}}, s_{\text{ec\_add}}, s_{\text{ec\_dbl}}, s_{\text{ec\_endo}}, s_{\text{ec\_vbase}}
                             1.6 f_{\text{comm}} = \text{MSM}(\mathbf{f}_{\text{base}}, \mathbf{f}_{\text{scalars}})
                             1.7 \bar{L}_{\text{comm}} = f_{\text{comm}} - t_{\text{comm}} \cdot (\zeta^n - 1)
                             1.8 PE is a set of elements of the form (f_{\texttt{comm}}, f(\zeta), f(\zeta\omega)) for the following polynomials:
                                               \eta_0, \ldots, \eta_{N_{\text{prev}}}, pub, w_0, \ldots, w_{N_{\text{wires}}}, z, S_{\sigma_0}, \ldots, S_{\sigma_{N_{\text{perm}}}}, L
                             1.9 \mathcal{P}_i = \{H_{\mathbb{F}_q}, \zeta, v, u, \mathbf{PE}, o_{\pi_i}\}
            2. final_check(\mathcal{P}_0, \dots, \mathcal{P}_{\mathtt{batch\_size}})
```

# Algorithm 2 Final Check

Input:  $\pi_0, \dots, \pi_{\mathtt{batch\_size}}$ , where  $\pi_i = \{H_{i,\mathbb{F}_q}, \zeta_i, \zeta_i\omega, v_i, u_i, \mathbf{PE}_i, o_{\pi_i}\}$ 

Output: acc or rej

- 1.  $\rho_1 \to \mathbb{F}_r$
- 2.  $\rho_2 \to \mathbb{F}_r$
- 3.  $r_0 = r'_0 = 1$
- 4. for  $0 \le i < \mathtt{batch\_size}$ :
  - 4.1  $cip_i = \texttt{combined\_inner\_product}(\zeta_i, \zeta_i\omega, v_i, u_i, \mathbf{PE}_i)$
  - $4.2~H_{i,\mathbb{F}_a}$ .absorb $(cip_i-2^{255})$
  - 4.3  $U_i = (H_{i,\mathbb{F}_q}.\mathtt{squeeze}()).\mathtt{to\_group}()$
  - 4.4 Calculate opening challenges  $\xi_{i,j}$  from  $o_{\pi_i}$
  - 4.5  $h_i(X) := \prod_{k=0}^{\log(d+1)-1} (1 + \xi_{\log(d+1)-k} X^{2^k})$ , where  $d = \text{lr\_rounds}$
  - $4.6 \ b_i = h_i(\zeta) + u_i \cdot h_i(\zeta\omega)$
  - 4.7  $C_i = \sum_j v_i^j (\sum_k r_i^k f_{j,\text{comm}})$ , where  $f_{j,\text{comm}}$  from  $\mathbf{PE}_i$ .
  - 4.8  $Q_i = \sum (\xi_{i,j} \cdot L_{i,j} + \xi_{i,j}^{-1} \cdot R_j) + cip_i \cdot U_i + C_i$
  - $4.9 \ c_i = \phi(H_{i,\mathbb{F}_q}.\mathtt{squeeze}())$
  - $4.10 \ r_i = r_{i-1} \cdot \rho_1$
  - 4.11  $r'_i = r'_{i-1} \cdot \rho_2$
  - 4.12 Check  $\hat{G}_i = \langle s, G \rangle$ , where s is set of h(X) coefficients.

**Remark**: This check can be done inside the MSM below using  $r'_i$ .

5. 
$$res = \sum_{i} r^{i} (c_{i}Q_{i} + delta_{i} - (z_{i,1}(\hat{G}_{i} + b_{i}U_{i}) + z_{i,2}H))$$

6. return res == 0

# Algorithm 3 Combined Inner Product

**Input**:  $\xi, r, f_0(\zeta_1), \dots, f_k(\zeta_1), f_0(\zeta_2), \dots, f_k(\zeta_2)$ 

Output: s

1. 
$$s = \sum_{i=0}^{k} \xi^{i} \cdot (f_{i}(\zeta_{1}) + r \cdot f_{i}(\zeta_{2}))$$

We use the same 15-wires PLONK circuits that are designed for Mina.<sup>3</sup>

# 2.3 Elliptic Curve Arithmetic

# 2.3.1 Unified Incomplete Addition and Doubling

Row 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
$$i$$
  $x_1$   $y_1$   $x_2$   $y_2$   $x_3$   $y_3$  inf same\_x  $s$  inv<sub>y</sub> inv<sub>x</sub> ... ... ...

**Evaluations:** 

• Addition case:

<sup>3</sup>https://o1-labs.github.io/mina-book/specs/15\_wires/15\_wires.html

- $(x_3, y_3) = (x_1, y_1) + (x_2, y_2)$
- $\inf = 1$  if  $(x_3, y_3)$  is a point-at-infinity,  $\inf = 0$  otherwise
- same\_x = 1 if  $x_1 = x_2$ , same\_x = 0 otherwise

- $s=\frac{y_1-y_2}{x_1-x_2}$  if  $x_1\neq x_2$ , s=0 otherwise  $\operatorname{inv}_y=\frac{1}{y_2-y_1}$  if  $y_2\neq y_1$ ,  $\operatorname{inv}_y=0$  otherwise  $\operatorname{inv}_x=\frac{1}{x_2-x_1}$  if  $x_2\neq x_1$ ,  $\operatorname{inv}_x=0$  otherwise
- Doubling case:
  - $(x_3, y_3) = 2(x_1, y_1)$
  - $x_2 = x_1, y_2 = y_1$
  - $\inf = 1$  if  $(x_3, y_3)$  is a point-at-infinity,  $\inf = 0$  otherwise
  - $same_x = 1$
  - $s=\frac{3x_1^2}{2y_1}$  if  $y_1\neq 0,$  s=0 otherwise  $\mathrm{inv}_y=0$

  - $inv_x = 0$

Constraints ( $\max degree = 3$ ):

- 1.  $w_7 \cdot (w_2 w_0) = 0$
- 2.  $(w_2 w_0) \cdot w_{10} (1 w_7) = 0$
- 3.  $w_7 \cdot (2w_8 \cdot w_1 3w_0^2) + (1 w_7) \cdot ((w_2 w_0) \cdot w_8 (w_3 w_1))$
- 4.  $w_8^2 = w_0 + w_2 + w_4$
- 5.  $w_5 = w_8 \cdot (w_0 w_4) w_1$
- 6.  $(w_3 w_1) \cdot (w_7 w_6) = 0$
- 7.  $(w_3 w_1) \cdot w_9 w_6 = 0$

Copy constraints:

1.  $w_6 = 0$ 

**Details.** The gate uses basic group law formulae. Let  $P = (x_1, y_1), Q = (x_2, y_2), R = (x_3, y_3)$  and R = P + Q. Then:

- $(x_2 x_1) \cdot s = y_2 y_1$
- $s^2 = x_1 + x_2 + x_3$
- $y_3 = s \cdot (x_1 x_3) y_1$

For point doubling R = P + P = 2P:

- $2s \cdot y_1 = 3x_1^2$
- $s^2 = 2x_1 + x_3$
- $y_3 = s \cdot (x_1 x_3) y_1$

The gate does not handle cases  $\mathcal{O} + P$  or  $\mathcal{O} + \mathcal{O}$ . To ensure that operations with point-at-infinity are not included in the circuit's trace, copy constraint  $w_6 = 0$  (inf = 0) was introduced.

Constraints details:

- $x_2 x_1$  zero check:
  - 1.  $w_7 \cdot (w_2 w_0) = 0 \longleftrightarrow \mathtt{same}_{\mathtt{x}} \cdot (x_2 x_1)$ If  $x_1 \neq x_2$ , then same x = 0
  - 2.  $(w_2 w_0) \cdot w_{10} (1 w_7) = 0 \longleftrightarrow (x_2 x_1) \cdot \text{inv}_x (1 \text{same\_x})$ If  $x_1 \neq x_2$ , then  $\text{inv}_x = (x_2 x_1)^{-1}$
- Group law constraints:
  - 1.  $w_7 \cdot (2w_8 \cdot w_1 3w_0^2) + (1 w_7) \cdot ((w_2 w_0 \cdot w_8 (w_3 w_1)) \longleftrightarrow$  $same_x \cdot (2s \cdot y_1 - 3x_1^2) + (1 - same_x) \cdot (x_2 - x_1 \cdot s - (y_2 - y_1))$ If  $x_1 = x_2$  then use doubling  $2s \cdot y_1 = 3x_1^2$ . Otherwise use addition  $(x_2 - x_1) \cdot s = y_2 - y_1$ .

- 2.  $w_8^2 = w_0 + w_2 + w_4 \longleftrightarrow s^2 = x_1 + x_2 + x_3$ Constrains  $x_3$ . It does not depend on  $x_1, x_2$  equality.
- 3.  $w_5 = w_8 \cdot (w_0 w_4) w_1 \longleftrightarrow y_3 = s \cdot (x_1 x_3) y_1$ Constrains  $y_3$ . It does not depend on  $x_1, x_2$  equality.
- P + (-P) constraints:
  - 1.  $(w_3 w_1) \cdot (w_7 w_6) = 0 \longleftrightarrow (y_2 y_1) \cdot (\mathtt{same}_x \mathtt{inf}) = 0$ We can get inifinity point iff  $x_1 = x_2$  and  $y_1 \neq y_2$ . If  $y_1 \neq y_2$  then  $\inf = same_x$ .
  - 2.  $(w_3 w_1) \cdot w_9 w_6 = 0 \longleftrightarrow (y_2 y_1) \cdot \operatorname{inv}_y \inf$ The prover sets  $inv_y = 0$  for  $y_1 = y_2$ . If  $y_1 \neq y_2$  then  $inv_y = (y_2 - y_1)^{-1}$

#### 2.3.2 Variable Base Scalar Multiplication

For 
$$R = [r]T$$
,  $k = \frac{x-2^{255}}{2}$ : 4

- 1. P = [2]T
- 2. for i from n-1 to 0:

$$2.1 \ Q = k_{i+1} ? T : -T$$

$$2.2 R = P + Q + P$$

The first and last steps of the alforithm are verified by the unified addition and doubling circuit.

## Evaluations:

- $b_i$  are bits of the k, first  $b_1$  is the most significant bit of k, n is an accumulator of  $b_i$ .
- $(x_1, y_1) (x_0, y_0) = (x_0, y_0) + (x_T, (2b_1 1)y_T)$
- $(x_2, y_2) (x_1, y_1) = (x_1, y_1) + (x_T, (2b_1 1)y_T)$
- $(x_3, y_3) (x_2, y_2) = (x_2, y_2) + (x_T, (2b_1 1)y_T)$
- $(x_4, y_4) (x_3, y_3) = (x_3, y_3) + (x_T, (2b_1 1)y_T)$
- $(x_5, y_5) (x_4, y_4) = (x_4, y_4) + (x_T, (2b_1 1)y_T)$   $s_0 = \frac{y_0 (2b_0 1) \cdot y_T}{x_5 x_5}$
- $s_1 = \frac{y_1 (2b_1 1) \cdot y_T}{y_1 (2b_1 1) \cdot y_T}$
- $s_2 = \frac{x_1 \overline{x_T}}{y_2 (2b_2 1) \cdot y_T}$
- $s_3 = \frac{y_3 (2b_3 1) \cdot y_T}{2b_3 (2b_3 1) \cdot y_T}$
- $s_4 = \frac{y_4 (2b_4 1) \cdot y_T}{y_4 (2b_4 1) \cdot y_T}$

# Constraints:

- $next(w_2) \cdot (w_2 1) = 0$
- $next(w_3) \cdot (w_3 1) = 0$
- $next(w_4) \cdot (w_4 1) = 0$
- $next(w_5) \cdot (w_5 1) = 0$
- $next(w_6) \cdot (w_6 1) = 0$

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Using the results from https://arxiv.org/pdf/math/0208038.pdf

- $(w_2 w_0) \cdot \text{next}(w_7) = w_3 (2\text{next}(w_2) 1) \cdot w_1$
- $(w_7 w_0) \cdot \text{next}(w_8) = w_8 (2\text{next}(w_3) 1) \cdot w_1$
- $(w_{10} w_0) \cdot \text{next}(w_9) = w_{11} (2\text{next}(w_4) 1) \cdot w_1$
- $(w_{12}-w_0)\cdot \mathtt{next}(w_{10})=w_{13}-(2\mathtt{next}(w_5)-1)\cdot w_1$
- $(\text{next}(w_0) w_0) \cdot \text{next}(w_{11}) = \text{next}(w_1) (2\text{next}(w_6) 1) \cdot w_1$
- $(2 \cdot w_3 \text{next}(w_7) \cdot (2 \cdot w_2 \text{next}(w_7)^2 + w_0))^2 = (2 \cdot w_2 \text{next}(w_7)^2 + w_0)^2 \cdot (w_7 w_0 + \text{next}(w_7)^2)$
- $(2 \cdot w_8 \text{next}(w_8) \cdot (2 \cdot w_7 \text{next}(w_8)^2 + w_0))^2 = (2 \cdot w_7 \text{next}(w_8)^2 + w_0)^2 \cdot (w_9 w_0 + \text{next}(w_8)^2)$
- $(2 \cdot w_{10} \text{next}(w_9) \cdot (2 \cdot w_9 \text{next}(w_9)^2 + w_0))^2 = (2 \cdot w_9 \text{next}(w_9)^2 + w_0)^2 \cdot (w_{11} w_0 + \text{next}(w_9)^2)$
- $(2 \cdot w_{12} \text{next}(w_{10}) \cdot (2 \cdot w_{11} \text{next}(w_{10})^2 + w_0))^2 = (2 \cdot w_{11} \text{next}(w_{10})^2 + w_0)^2 \cdot (w_{13} w_0 + \text{next}(w_{10})^2)$
- $(2 \cdot w_{14} \text{next}(w_{11}) \cdot (2 \cdot w_{13} \text{next}(w_{11})^2 + w_0))^2 = (2 \cdot w_{13} \text{next}(w_{11})^2 + w_0)^2 \cdot (\text{next}(w_0) w_0)^2$  $w_0 + \text{next}(w_{11})^2$
- $(w_8 + w_3) \cdot (2 \cdot w_2 \text{next}(w_7)^2 + w_0) = (w_2 w_7) \cdot (2 \cdot w_3 \text{next}(w_7) \cdot (2 \cdot w_2 \text{next}(w_7)^2 + w_0))$
- $(w_{10} + w_8) \cdot (2 \cdot w_7 \text{next}(w_8)^2 + w_0) = (w_7 w_9) \cdot (2 \cdot w_8 \text{next}(w_8) \cdot (2 \cdot w_7 \text{next}(w_8)^2 + w_0))$
- $(w_{12} + w_{10}) \cdot (2 \cdot w_9 \text{next}(w_9)^2 + w_0) = (w_9 w_{11}) \cdot (2 \cdot w_{10} \text{next}(w_9) \cdot (2 \cdot w_9 \text{next}(w_9)^2 + w_0))$   $(w_{14} + w_{10}) \cdot (2 \cdot w_{11} \text{next}(w_{10})^2 + w_0) = (w_{11} w_{13}) \cdot (2 \cdot w_{12} \text{next}(w_{10}) \cdot (2 \cdot w_{11} \text{next}(w_{10})^2 + w_0))$
- $(\text{next}(w_1) + w_{14}) \cdot (2 \cdot w_{13} \text{next}(w_{11})^2 + w_0) = (w_{13} \text{next}(w_0) \cdot (2 \cdot w_{14} \text{next}(w_{11}) \cdot (2 \cdot w_{13} \text{next}(w_{11})$  $next(w_{11})^2 + w_0)$
- $w_5 = 32 \cdot (w_4) + 16 \cdot \text{next}(w_2) + 8 \cdot \text{next}(w_3) + 4 \cdot \text{next}(w_4) + 2 \cdot \text{next}(w_5) + \text{next}(w_6)$

Copy constraints:

- $(x_T, y_T)$  in row j are copy constrained with  $(x_T, y_T)$  in row j + 2
- $(x_0, y_0)$  in row i are copy constrained with values from the first doubling circuit
- $(x_0, y_0)$  in row  $j, j \neq i$  are copy constrained with  $(x_5, y_5)$  in row j-1
- n=0 in row i and n in the row  $j, j \neq i$  is copy contrained with n' in the row j-2

#### 2.3.3 Variable Base Endo-Scalar Multiplication

For R = [b]T, where  $b = [b_n...b_0]$  and  $b_i \in \{0, 1\}$ : <sup>5</sup>

- 1.  $P = [2](\phi(T) + T)$
- 2. for i from  $\frac{\lambda}{2} 1$  to 0:

2.1 
$$Q = r_{2i+1} ? \phi([2r_{2i} - 1]T) : [2r_{2i} - 1]T$$

$$2.2 R - P = P + Q$$

The first step of the alforithm are verified by the doubling and unified addition circuit.

### **Evaluations:**

- The first  $x_P, y_P$  are equal to  $2 \cdot ((x_T, y_T) + ((endo) \cdot x_T, y_T))$
- $b_i$  are bits of the k, first  $b_1$  is the most significant bit of k, n is an accumulator of  $b_i$ .
- $(x_R, y_R) (x_P, y_P) = (x_P, y_P) + (1 + (endo 1) \cdot b_2)x_T, (2b_1 1)y_T)$
- $(\mathtt{next}(x_P),\mathtt{next}(y_P)) (x_R,y_R) = (x_R,y_R) + ((\mathtt{endo}-1)\cdot b_2)x_T, (2b_1-1)y_T)$
- $s_1 = \frac{(2b_1 1) \cdot y_T y_P}{(1 + (\text{endo} 1) \cdot b_2) x_T x_P}$
- $s_3 = \frac{(2b_1 1) \cdot y_T y_R}{(1 + (\text{endo} 1) \cdot b_2) x_T x_R}$

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Using the results from https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1021.pdf

### Constraints:

## Copy constraints:

- $(x_T, y_T)$  in row j are copy constrained with  $(x_T, y_T)$  in row j + 1
- $(x_P, y_P)$  in row i are copy constrained with values from the first doubling circuit

# 2.4 Multi-Scalar Multiplication Circuit

Input: 
$$G_0, ..., G_{k-1} \in \mathbb{G}, s_0, ..., s_{k-1} \in \mathbb{F}_r$$
, where  $\mathbb{F}_r$  is scalar field of  $\mathbb{G}$ .  
Output:  $S = \sum_{i=0}^k s_i \cdot G_i$ 

# Using endomorphism:

1.  $A = \infty$ 2. for j from 0 to k - 1: 2.1  $r := s_j, T := G_j$ 2.2  $S = [2](\phi(T) + T)$ 2.3 for i from  $\frac{\lambda}{2} - 1$  to 0: 2.3.1  $Q = r_{2i+1} ? \phi([2r_{2i} - 1]T) : [2r_{2i} - 1]T$ 2.3.2 R = S + Q2.3.3 S = R + S2.4 A = A + S

rows 
$$\approx k \cdot (sm_rows + 1 + 2) \approx 67k$$
,

where sm\_rows is the number of rows in the scalar multiplication circuit.

# Without endomorphism:

1.  $A = \infty$ 2. for j from 0 to k - 1: 2.1  $r := s_j, T := G_j$ 2.2 S = [2]T2.3 for i from n - 1 to 0: 2.3.1  $Q = k_{i+1} ? T : -T$ 2.3.2 R = S + Q2.3.3 S = R + S

$$2.4 \ A = A + S$$

 $rows \approx k \cdot (sm\_rows + 1 + 1) \approx 105k,$ 

where sm\_rows is the number of rows in the scalar multiplication circuit.

#### Poseidon Circuit 2.5

Mina uses Poseidon hash with width = 3. Therefore, each permutation state is represented by 3 elements and each row contains 5 states.

Denote *i*-th permutation state by  $T_i = (T_{i,0}, T_{i,1}, T_{i,2})$ .

State change constraints:

$$\mathtt{STATE}(i+1) = \mathtt{STATE}(i)^{\alpha} \cdot \mathtt{MDS} + \mathtt{RC}$$

Denote the index of the first state in the row by start (e.g. start = 50 for 10-th row). We can expand the previous formula to:

- For i from start to start + 5:

  - $\begin{array}{l} \bullet \ T_{i+1,0} = T_{i,0}^5 \cdot \mathrm{MDS}[0][0] + T_{i,1}^5 \cdot \mathrm{MDS}[0][1] + T_{i,2}^5 \cdot \mathrm{MDS}[0][2] + \mathrm{RC}_{i+1,0} \\ \bullet \ T_{i+1,1} = T_{i,0}^5 \cdot \mathrm{MDS}[1][0] + T_{i,1}^5 \cdot \mathrm{MDS}[1][1] + T_{i,2}^5 \cdot \mathrm{MDS}[1][2] + \mathrm{RC}_{i+1,1} \\ \bullet \ T_{i+1,2} = T_{i,0}^5 \cdot \mathrm{MDS}[2][0] + T_{i,1}^5 \cdot \mathrm{MDS}[2][1] + T_{i,2}^5 \cdot \mathrm{MDS}[2][2] + \mathrm{RC}_{i+1,2} \end{array}$

Notice that the constraints above include the state from the next row (start + 5).

#### 2.6 Other Circuits

#### 2.6.1 **Endo-Scalar Computation**

Let  $\alpha$  be equals to  $\phi(b)$ , where  $b \in 0, 1^{\lambda}$ .

### **Evaluations:**

- In the first row  $n_0 = 0$ ,  $a_0 = 2$ ,  $b_0 = 2$ .
- $x_i$  are 2-bits chunks of the b, first  $x_0$  is the most significant bit of b, n is an accumulator of  $x_i$ .
- The values  $(a_8, b_8)$  are 8 iterations of the following computations:

$$(a_i, b_i) = (2 \cdot a_{i-1} + c_f(x_{i-1}), 2 \cdot b_{i-1} + d_f(x_{i-1})), \text{ where } c_f(x) = 2/3 \cdot x^3 - 5/2 \cdot x^2 + 11/6 \cdot x \text{ and } d_f(x) = 2/3 \cdot x^3 - 7/2 \cdot x^2 + 29/6 \cdot x - 1.$$

### Constraints:

- $w_7 \cdot (w_7 1) \cdot (w_7 2) \cdot (w_7 3) = 0$
- $w_8 \cdot (w_8 1) \cdot (w_8 2) \cdot (w_8 3) = 0$
- $w_9 \cdot (w_9 1) \cdot (w_9 2) \cdot (w_9 3) = 0$
- $w_{10} \cdot (w_{10} 1) \cdot (w_{10} 2) \cdot (w_{10} 3) = 0$
- $w_{11} \cdot (w_{11} 1) \cdot (w_{11} 2) \cdot (w_{11} 3) = 0$
- $w_{12} \cdot (w_{12} 1) \cdot (w_{12} 2) \cdot (w_{12} 3) = 0$
- $w_{13} \cdot (w_{13} 1) \cdot (w_{13} 2) \cdot (w_{13} 3) = 0$
- $w_{14} \cdot (w_{14} 1) \cdot (w_{14} 2) \cdot (w_{14} 3) = 0$

- $w_4 = 256 \cdot w_2 + 128 \cdot c_f(w_6) + 64 \cdot c_f(w_7) + 32 \cdot c_f(w_8) + 16 \cdot c_f(w_9) + 8 \cdot c_f(w_{10}) + 4 \cdot c_f(w_{11}) + 2 \cdot c_f(w_{12}) + c_f(w_{13})$
- $w_5 = 256 \cdot w_3 + 128 \cdot d_f(w_6) + 64 \cdot d_f(w_7) + 32 \cdot d_f(w_8) + 16 \cdot d_f(w_9) + 8 \cdot d_f(w_{10}) + 4 \cdot d_f(w_{11}) + 2 \cdot d_f(w_{12}) + d_f(w_{13})$
- $w_1 = 2^{16} \cdot w_0 + 2^{14} \cdot w_6 + 2^{12} \cdot w_7 + 2^{10} \cdot w_8 + 2^8 \cdot w_9 + 2^6 \cdot w_{10} + 2^4 \cdot w_{11} + 2^2 \cdot w_{12} + w_{13}$
- for i+7:

1. 
$$w_6 = \operatorname{endo} \cdot w_4 + \cdot w_5$$

Copy constraints:

•  $n_0, a_0, b_0$  in row j + 1 are copy constrained with  $(n_8, a_8, b_8)$  in row j

# 2.7 Proof Verification Component

Let **G** be a group of points on the elliptic curve  $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ ,  $|\mathbf{G}| = r$ .

Kimchi verification procedure includes operations over two groups:  $\mathbf{G}$  and scalars of  $\mathbf{G}$ . Thus, the verification circuit has to handle operations over two fields:  $\mathbb{F}_p$  and  $\mathbb{F}_r$ . This could be achieved either with non-native arithmetic circuits<sup>6</sup> or via splitting the verification into two proofs over different fields. Here we use the second option.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>For instance, see https://www.plonk.cafe/t/non-native-field-arithmetic-with-turboplonk-plookup-etc/90

## Algorithm 4 Verifier.Scalar Field

```
1. for each \pi_i:
          1.1 random_oracle(p_{\mathtt{comm}}, \pi_i):
                   1.1.1 Copy joint_combiner from PI
                   1.1.2 Copy \beta, \gamma from PI
                   1.1.3 Copy \alpha_c from PI
                   1.1.4 \alpha = \phi(\alpha_c)
                   1.1.5 Copy \zeta_c from PI
                   1.1.6 \zeta = \phi(\zeta_c)
                   1.1.7 Initialize H_{\mathbb{F}_r}
                   1.1.8 Copy H_{\mathbb{F}_q}.digest from PI
                   1.1.9 H_{\mathbb{F}_r}.absorb(H_{\mathbb{F}_q}.digest)
               1.1.10 \zeta_1 = \zeta^n for n = |domain|
               1.1.11 \zeta_w = \zeta \cdot \omega
               1.1.12 all_alphas = [1, \alpha, \dots, \alpha^{next\_power}]
               1.1.13 lagrange = [\zeta - domain.w, \dots, \zeta_w - domain.w] L195
               1.1.14 lagrange = [1/lagrange[0], \dots]
               1.1.15 \text{ p\_eval}[0] = \left(\sum (pub[i] \cdot domain[i] \cdot (-lagrange[i])\right) \cdot (\zeta_1 - 1) \cdot \frac{1}{|domain|}
               1.1.16 \text{ p\_eval}[1] = \left(\sum (pub[i] \cdot domain[i] \cdot \left(-lagrange[pub.len + i]\right)\right) \cdot \left(\zeta_w^n - 1\right) \cdot \frac{1}{|domain|}
               1.1.17 \ H_{\mathbb{F}_r}.\mathtt{absorb}(p\_eval[0])
               1.1.18 H_{\mathbb{F}_r}.absorb(evals[0]) \leftarrow PI \text{ src } \rightarrow plonk\_sponge.rs L41
               1.1.19 H_{\mathbb{F}_r}.absorb(p\_eval[1])
               1.1.20~H_{\mathbb{F}_r}.absorb(evals[1]) <- PI
               1.1.21 Copy\bar{L}(\zeta\omega) from PI
               1.1.22~H_{\mathbb{F}_r}.absorb(\bar{L}(\zeta\omega))
               1.1.23 v = \phi(H_{\mathbb{F}_r}.\mathtt{squeeze}())
               1.1.24 u = \phi(H_{\mathbb{F}_r}.\mathtt{squeeze}())
               1.1.25\ powers\_of\_evals = [\zeta^{max\_poly\_size}, \zeta^{max\_poly\_size}_{m}]
               1.1.26 Compute evaluation of \eta_i(\zeta), \eta_i(\zeta\omega) for 0 \le i < N_{\text{prev}}
                                      \eta_i(X) = \sum_{j=0}^{k=\log d + 1 - 1} 1 + \xi_{i,j} \cdot X^{2^j}
               1.1.27 Compute evaluation of \bar{L}(\zeta)^7
          1.2 Combine (multiply) proof evaluations over the polynomials with \zeta, \zeta\omega
          1.3 \,\, \mathbf{f}_{\mathrm{base}} \coloneqq \{S_{\sigma_{N_{\mathrm{perm}}-1}, \mathrm{comm}}, \mathtt{gate}_{\mathrm{mult.comm}}, w_{0, \mathrm{comm}}, w_{1, \mathrm{comm}}, w_{2, \mathrm{comm}}, q_{\mathrm{const.comm}}, \mathtt{gate}_{\mathrm{psdn.comm}}, \mathtt{gate}_{\mathrm{rc.comm}}, w_{0, \mathrm{comm}}, w_{0, \mathrm{co
                        \texttt{gate}_{\texttt{ec\_add},\texttt{comm}}, \texttt{gate}_{\texttt{ec\_dbl},\texttt{comm}}, \texttt{gate}_{\texttt{ec\_endo},\texttt{comm}}, \texttt{gate}_{\texttt{ec\_vbase},\texttt{comm}} \}
          1.4 s_{\text{perm}} := (w_0(\zeta) + \gamma + \beta \cdot S_{\sigma_0}(\zeta)) \cdot \dots \cdot (w_5(\zeta) + \gamma + \beta \cdot S_{\sigma_{N_{\text{perm}}}}(\zeta))
          1.5 \mathbf{f}_{\text{scalars}} := \{-z(\zeta\omega) \cdot \beta \cdot \alpha_0 \cdot zkp(\zeta) \cdot s_{\text{perm}}, w_0(\zeta) \cdot w_1(\zeta), w_0(\zeta), w_1(\zeta), 1\}
                        s_{\text{psdn}}, s_{\text{rc}}, s_{\text{ec\_add}}, s_{\text{ec\_dbl}}, s_{\text{ec\_endo}}, s_{\text{ec\_vbase}}
          1.6 PE is a set of elements of the form (f_{\text{comm}}, f(\zeta), f(\zeta\omega)) for the following polynomials:
                        \eta_0, \ldots, \eta_{N_{\mathtt{prev}}}, pub, w_0, \ldots, w_{N_{\mathtt{wires}}}, z, S_{\sigma_0}, \ldots, S_{\sigma_{N_{\mathtt{perm}}}}, L
          1.7 \mathcal{P}_i = \{H_{\mathbb{F}_q}, \zeta, v, u, \mathbf{PE}, o_{\pi_i}\}
```

2. batch\_verify\_scalar\_field( $\mathcal{P}_0, \dots, \mathcal{P}_{\text{batch size}}$ )

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Details: https://o1-labs.github.io/proof-systems/plonk/maller\_15.html

## Algorithm 5 Verifier.Base\_Field

### 1. for each $\pi_i$ :

- 1.1  $pub_{comm} = -MSM(\mathbf{L}, pub) \in \mathbb{G}$ , where  $\mathbf{L}$  is Lagrange bases vector
- 1.2 random\_oracle( $p_{comm}, \pi_i$ ):
  - 1.2.1  $H_{\mathbb{F}_q}$ .absorb $(pub_{\mathtt{comm}}||w_{0,\mathtt{comm}}||...||w_{N_{\mathtt{wires}},\mathtt{comm}})$
  - 1.2.2 joint\_combiner =  $H_{\mathbb{F}_q}$ .squeeze() <- PI check
  - 1.2.3  $H_{\mathbb{F}_q}$ .absorb(LOOKUP) L146, commitments sorted
  - 1.2.4  $\beta, \gamma = H_{\mathbb{F}_q}$ .squeeze() <- PI check
  - 1.2.5  $H_{\mathbb{F}_q}$ .absorb(LOOKUP2) L156m commitments aggregated
  - $1.2.6~H_{\mathbb{F}_q}.\mathtt{absorb}(z_{\mathtt{comm}})$
  - 1.2.7  $\alpha = H_{\mathbb{F}_q}.\mathtt{squeeze}() <- PI \ \mathrm{check}$
  - $1.2.8~H_{\mathbb{F}_q}.\mathtt{absorb}(t_{1,\mathtt{comm}}||...||t_{N_{\mathtt{perm}},\mathtt{comm}}||...||\infty||)$
  - $1.2.9~\zeta = H_{\mathbb{F}_q}.\mathtt{squeeze}() <$  PI check
  - 1.2.10 Get digest from  $H_{\mathbb{F}_q} <$  PI check
- $1.3 \ \mathbf{f}_{\text{base}} \coloneqq \{S_{\sigma_{N_{\text{perm}}-1}, \text{comm}}, \text{gate}_{\text{mult}, \text{comm}}, w_{0, \text{comm}}, w_{1, \text{comm}}, w_{2, \text{comm}}, q_{\text{const}, \text{comm}}, \text{gate}_{\text{psdn}, \text{comm}}, \text{gate}_{\text{rc}, \text{comm}}, \text{gate}_{\text{ec}\_\text{eld}, \text{comm}}, \text{gate}_{\text{ec}\_\text{endo}, \text{comm}}, \text{gate}_{\text{ec}\_\text{vbase}, \text{comm}}\}$
- 1.4  $s_{\text{perm}} := (w_0(\zeta) + \gamma + \beta \cdot S_{\sigma_0}(\zeta)) \cdot \dots \cdot (w_5(\zeta) + \gamma + \beta \cdot S_{\sigma_{N_{\text{perm}}}}(\zeta))$
- 1.5  $\mathbf{f}_{\text{scalars}} := \{-z(\zeta\omega) \cdot \beta \cdot \alpha_0 \cdot zkp(\zeta) \cdot s_{\text{perm}}, w_0(\zeta) \cdot w_1(\zeta), w_0(\zeta), w_1(\zeta), 1 \\ s_{\text{psdn}}, s_{\text{rc}}, s_{\text{ec\_add}}, s_{\text{ec\_dbl}}, s_{\text{ec\_endo}}, s_{\text{ec\_vbase}}\}$
- 1.6  $f_{\text{comm}} = \text{MSM}(\mathbf{f}_{\text{base}}, \mathbf{f}_{\text{scalars}})$
- 1.7 Copy from PI  $(\zeta^n 1)$
- 1.8  $\bar{L}_{\text{comm}} = f_{\text{comm}} t_{\text{comm}} \cdot (\zeta^n 1)$
- 1.9 **PE** is a set of elements of the form  $(f_{\texttt{comm}}, f(\zeta), f(\zeta\omega))$  for the following polynomials:  $\eta_0, \dots, \eta_{N_{\texttt{prev}}}, pub, w_0, \dots, w_{N_{\texttt{wires}}}, z, S_{\sigma_0}, \dots, S_{\sigma_{N_{\texttt{perm}}}}, \bar{L}$
- 1.10  $\mathcal{P}_i = \{H_{\mathbb{F}_q}, \zeta, v, u, \mathbf{PE}, o_{\pi_i}\}$
- 2. batch\_verify\_base\_field( $\mathcal{P}_0, \dots, \mathcal{P}_{\mathtt{batch\_size}}$ )

# Algorithm 6 Batch Verify - Scalar Field

Input:  $\pi_0, \dots, \pi_{\mathtt{batch\_size}}$ , where  $\pi_i = \{H_{i,\mathbb{F}_q}, \zeta_i, \zeta_i\omega, v_i, u_i, \mathbf{PE}_i, o_{\pi_i}\}$ 

Output: acc or rej

- 1.  $\rho_1 \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_r$
- 2.  $\rho_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_r$
- 3.  $r_0 = r'_0 = 1$
- 4. scalars = [0, ..., 0]
- 5. for  $0 \le i < \mathtt{batch\_size}$ :
  - $5.1 \ cip_i = \texttt{combined\_inner\_product}(\zeta_i, \zeta_i \omega, v_i, u_i, \mathbf{PE}_i)$
  - 5.2 Calculate opening challenges  $\xi_{i,j}$  from  $o_{\pi_i}$  and copy-constraint them
  - 5.3 Calculate inversion from  $\xi_{i,j}$
  - 5.4 Copy  $c\_chal_i$  from PI
  - $5.5 \ c_i = \phi(c\_chal_i)$
  - 5.6  $h_i(X) \coloneqq \prod_{k=0}^{\log(d+1)-1} (1 + \xi_{\log(d+1)-k} X^{2^k})$ , where  $d = \texttt{lr\_rounds}$
  - $5.7 \ b_i = h_i(\zeta) + u_i \cdot h_i(\zeta\omega)$
  - $5.8 \ sg_i = -r_i \cdot opening.z1 r'_i$
  - $5.9 \text{ scalars} = \text{scalars}||sg_i|$
  - 5.10  $\mathtt{scalars}[i+1] = \mathtt{scalars}[i+1] + \sum_j (s_j \cdot r_i')$  for  $s_j$  from  $h_i$  coefficients
  - $5.11 \text{ scalars}[0] = \text{scalars}[0] r_i \cdot openings.z2$
  - $5.12 \text{ scalars} = \text{scalars}||(-r_i \cdot opening.z1 \cdot b0)||$
  - $5.13 \ r_i = r_{i-1} \cdot \rho_1$
  - $5.14 \ r'_i = r'_{i-1} \cdot \rho_2$

# Algorithm 7 Batch Verify - Base Field

Input:  $\pi_0, \dots, \pi_{\mathtt{batch\_size}}$ , where  $\pi_i = \{H_{i,\mathbb{F}_q}, \zeta_i, \zeta_i\omega, v_i, u_i, \mathbf{PE}_i, o_{\pi_i}\}$ 

Output: acc or rej

- 1. bases =  $[pk.H, pk.G_0, \dots, pk.G_n, \mathcal{O}, \dots, \mathcal{O}]$
- 2. for  $0 \le i < \texttt{batch\_size}$ :
  - 2.1 Get  $cip_i$  from PI
  - $2.2~H_{i,\mathbb{F}_q}$ .absorb $(cip_i-2^{255})$
  - $2.3 \ U_i = (H_{i,\mathbb{F}_q}.\mathtt{squeeze}()).\mathtt{to\_group}()$
  - 2.4 Calculate opening challenges  $\xi_{i,j}$  from  $o_{\pi_i}$
  - $2.5 \ H_{i,\mathbb{F}_q}$ .absorb $(openings.\delta)$
  - 2.6  $h_i(X) := \prod_{k=0}^{\log(d+1)-1} (1 + \xi_{\log(d+1)-k} X^{2^k})$ , where  $d = \text{lr\_rounds}$
  - 2.7  $C_i = \sum_j v_i^j (\sum_k r_i^k f_{j,\text{comm}}))$ , where  $f_{j,\text{comm}}$  from  $\mathbf{PE}_i$ .
  - 2.8  $Q_i = \sum (\xi_{i,j} \cdot L_{i,j} + \xi_{i,j}^{-1} \cdot R_j) + cip_i \cdot U_i + C_i$
  - $2.9 \ c_i = H_{i,\mathbb{F}_q}.\mathtt{squeeze}() < \operatorname{PI}$
  - 2.10 Check  $\hat{G}_i = \langle s, G \rangle$ , where s is set of h(X) coefficients. **Remark**: This check can be done inside the MSM below using  $r'_i$ .
- 3. Fq:  $res = \sum_{i} r^{i}(c_{i}Q_{i} + delta_{i} (z_{i,1}(\hat{G}_{i} + b_{i}U_{i}) + z_{i,2}H))$
- 4. Fq: return res ==0

# Algorithm 8 Combined Inner Product

**Input**:  $\xi, r, f_0(\zeta_1), \dots, f_k(\zeta_1), f_0(\zeta_2), \dots, f_k(\zeta_2)$ 

Output: s

1. Fr: 
$$s = \sum_{i=0}^{k} \xi^{i} \cdot (f_{i}(\zeta_{1}) + r \cdot f_{i}(\zeta_{2}))$$

# Chapter 3

# In-EVM State Proof Verifier

This introduces a description for in-EVM Mina Protocol state proof verification mechanism. Crucial components which define this part design are:

- $1. \ \ Verification \ architecture \ description.$
- 2. Verification logic API reference.
- 3. Input data structures description.

# 3.1 Verification Logic Architecture

The verification logic is split to several parts:

- 1. Verification Key Definition
- 2. LPC/FRI auxiliary proof deserialization

# 3.2 Verification Logic API Reference

# 3.3 Input Data Structures

# Chapter 4

# Appendix A. In-EVM Mina State

This introduces a description for in-EVM Mina Protocol state handling mechanism which is supposed to provide a bridge user with the way to verify plaintext transactions coming from Mina database commit log on EVM.

# 4.1 Overview

The protocol described literally replicates Mina's commit log constructon protocol on EVM. The overall process description is as follows:

## Algorithm 9 Commit Log Construction Overview

- 1. A user retrieves a replication packet  $B_n$  containing some transaction T from Mina's commit log.
- 2. A user submits the replication packet  $B_n$  to the in-EVM piece of logic.
- 3. The in-EVM piece of logic emplaces the replication packet  $B_n$  into the backwards-linked list C.
- 4. The in-EVM piece of logic computes a Poseidon hash  $H_{B_n}$  of a replication packet  $B_n$  and inserts such one in a Merkle Tree T.
- 5. The in-EVM piece of logic uses a Merkle Tree's hash  $H_{B_n}$  of a particular replication packet  $B_n$  as an input to the state proof verification mechanism, taking the state proof from the original Mina's cluster in the same time, corresponding to the replication packet  $B_n$  sequo.
- 6. In case the verification of a state proof corresponding to the replication packet  $B_n$  was completed successfully, such a replication packet  $B_n$  can be considered valid and appended to the backwards-linked list, representing in-EVM Mina's commit log.
- 7. In case the verification of a state proof corresponding to the replication packet  $B_n$  wasn't completed successfully, then a replication packet  $B_n$  gets rejected by the in-EVM piece of logic.
- 8. In case there are more than a single replication packet  $B_n$  (e.g.  $B_{n_1}$  and  $B_{n_2}$ ) and each of them is being considered valid, the backward-linked list used to store such replication packets turns into the tree containing several branches of backward-linked lists  $C_1, ..., C_M$ .
- 9. In case several branches  $C_1, ..., C_M$  are introduced, the Mina's Ouroboros modification chain selection rule applies to pick the same branch the original Mina's cluster chain selection rule picked.

 $T_{n_1,n_2}$  allows to provide a successfull transaction from  $\{B_{n_1},...,B_{n_2}\}$  to the Ethereum-based proof verificator later.

Ouroboros' consensus protocol chain selecton rule which is supposed to handle potentially incorrect replication packet data submitted by the user (and to keep the in-EVM commit log consistent with the actual Mina's one) is defined as follows:

Here,  $C_{loc}$  is the local commit log sequence,  $N = C_1, ..., C_M$  is the list of potential commit log sequences to choose from. The function getMinDen(C) outputs the minimum of all the window densities observed thus far in C.

### Algorithm 10 getMinDen(C)

Let  $B_{last}$  be the last block in C.

- 1. if  $B_{last} = G$  then // i.e., if  $B_{last}$  is the genesis block
- 2. return 0
- 3. else
- 4. Parse  $B_{last}$  to obtain the parameter minDen.
- 5. return minDen

The function isShortRange(C, C') outputs whether or not the chains fork in the "short range" or not.

# Algorithm 11 isShortRange(C1, C2)

- 1. Let *prevLockcp* and *prevLockcp* be the *prevLockcp* components in the 12 last blocks of C1, C2, respectively.
- 2. if prevLockcp = prevLockcp then
- 3. return ⊤
- 4. else
- 5. return  $\perp$

# **Algorithm 12** maxvalid-sc( $C_{loc}$ , $N = C_1, ..., C_M, k$ )

```
1. Set C_{max} \Leftrightarrow C_{loc} // Compare C_{loc} with each candidate chain in N
```

```
2. for i=1,...,M do if isShortRange(C_i,C_{max}) then // Short-range fork if |C_i| > |C_{max}| then Set C_{max} \Leftrightarrow C_i end if else //Long-range fork if getMinDen(C_i) > getMinDen(C_{max}) then Set C_{max} \Leftrightarrow C_i end if end if end if end for
```

3. return  $C_{max}$ 

# 4.1.1 Purpose

The protocol is supposed to make it possible for the users to prove a particular transaction to the in-EVM Mina's commit log replica to be able to prove it actually belongs to Mina's commit log.

The overview of such a mechanism is as follows:

# Algorithm 13 Transaction Plaintext Data Proving Approach

- 1. A user retrieves the transaction T from Mina's database commit  $\log$
- 2. A user compares the transaction T with the contents of the in-EVM Mina's commit log representation.
- 3. If a trivial comparison results in a match, Mina's data from the transaction T can be considered valid for the in-EVM usage.
- 4. Otherwise, the transaction is supposed to be rejected.

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