As you go through KC7, we're exposing you to all kinds of real-world threats — and this one's a big deal.

Solvi Systems builds software for power and utility companies. A single breach here could ripple through entire nations.

This case takes you into the world of **critical** infrastructure attacks — supply chains, phishing, lateral movement, and high-stakes consequences.

Let's see how quickly a small crack in the system becomes a full-on blackout.

07:37 AM

### Objectives

- By the end of your first day on the job, you should be able to:
  - · Use the Azure Data Explorer
  - Use multiple data sets to answer targeted questions
  - Investigate cyber activity in logs including: email, web traffic, and server logs
  - Use multiple techniques to track the activity of APTs (Advanced Persistent Threats)
  - · Use third party data sets to discover things about your attackers
  - Make recommendations on what actions a company can take to protect themselves

### Legend

- © Key Point Occasionally, you will see a dart emoji with a "key point." These signal explanations of certain concepts that may enhance your understanding of key cybersecurity ideas that are demonstrated in the game.
- © Question "Thinking" emojis represent questions that will enable you to demonstrate mastery of the concepts at hand. You can earn points by entering your responses to questions from section 3 in the scoring portal available at kc7cyber.com/scoreboard.
- Hint "Whisper" emojis represent in-game hints. These hints will guide you in the right direction in answering some of the questions.

Table Name	Description		
AuthenticationEvents	Records successful and failed logins to devices on the company network. This includes logins to the company's mail server.		
Email	Records emails sent and received by employees		
Employees	Contains information about the company's employees		
FileCreation Events	Records files stored on employee's devices		
InboundNetworkEvents	Records inbound network events including browsing activity from the Internet to devices within the company network		
NetworkFlow	Records network traffic details for analysis, including source and destination IP addresses, ports, protocols, and packet bytes		

OutboundNetworkEvents	Records outbound network events including browsing activity from within the company network out to the Internet
PassiveDns (External)	Records IP-domain resolutions
ProcessEvents	Records processes created on employee's devices
SecurityAlerts	Records security alerts from an employee's device or the company's email security system

**©** Key Point – Over the Horizon (OTH) data: One of the tables listed above is not like the others – PassiveDns. Rather than being an internal security log, PassiveDns is a data source that we've purchased from a 3rd party vendor. Not all malicious cyber activity happens within our company network, so sometimes we depend on data from other sources to complete our investigations.

You'll learn more about how to use each of these datasets in just a minute. First, let's just run some queries so you can practice using KQL and ADX.

Operator	Description	Case- Sensitive	Example (yields true)
==	Equals	Yes	"aBc" == "aBc"
!=	Not equals	Yes	"abc" != "ABC"
=~	Equals	No	"abc" =~ "ABC"
contains	Right-hand-side (RHS) occurs as a subsequence of left-hand-side (LHS)	No	"FabriKam" contains "BRik"
has	RHS is a whole term in LHS	No	"North America" has "america"
has_all	Same as has but works on all of the elements	No	"North and South America" has_all("south", "north")
has_any	Same as has but works on any of the elements	No	"North America" has_any("south", "north")
in	Equals to any of the elements	Yes	"abc" in ("123", "345", "abc")

Solvi Systems is a software company that plays a pivotal role in shaping the future of the energy sector in South Africa. At the heart of Solvi Systems' operations is its Docks software, a critical component used by major power and utility companies.

Solvi Systems' influence extends beyond national borders. The company plays a crucial role in regional stability, as South Africa exports power to neighboring states like Mozambique, Eswatini, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. This interconnectedness means that any vulnerability or disruption in South Africa's energy infrastructure, and by extension Solvi Systems' software, doesn't just affect one nation but echoes across the region.


Given this key role, Solvi Systems is a prime target for cyber adversaries. You've been hired to identify any intrusions against this company.


To start your investigation, you will need access to the company's pool of data!


- Login to <u>Azure Data Explorer (ADX)</u>. This is where you will find our TOP SECRET data. You will need a Microsoft account (hotmail, outlook, O365..) We will use ADX to run queries that will help us answer these questions.
- 2. The <u>training guide</u> will teach you how to answer the KQL101 questions.

Run a **take** 10 on each of the tables to see what kind of data they contain.

Now that we have access to the data, we'll need to get a lay of the land. Let's get some more information about Solvi Systems.










We can use the **where** operator with the Employees table to find a specific employee.

To learn more about how to use **where**, see the training guide.

training guide









We can learn more about Alexis Khoza using information from other tables. Let's take her email address from the Employees table and use it in a query for the Email table.




```
7 Email
8 | where recipient == "alexis_khoza@solvisystems.com"
9 | count
```



You can use the **distinct** operator to find unique values in a specific column.



```
11 Email
12 | where sender has "eskom.co.za"
13 | distinct sender
14
```







```
4 Employees
5 | where role == "CTO"
```


To find out who is the CTO == Alexis Khoza and to find out the IP of Alexis.

```
15 OutboundNetworkEvents
16 | where src_ip == "10.10.0.7"
17 | distinct url
18 | count
```






```
20 V PassiveDns
21 | take 10
22
23 V PassiveDns
24 | where domain contains "real"
25 | distinct domain
26 | count
27
```






```
28 PassiveDns
29 | where domain == "bit.ly"
30 | distinct ip
31
```



# How many distinct URLs did employees with the first name "Mary" Visit? let mary\_ips = Copy Employees | where name has "<Employee Name>" | distinct ip\_addr; OutboundNetworkEvents | where src\_ip in (mary\_ips) <more kql here> Confused? Check out the training guide for more info on using let statements.








```
let list_variable_name = Employees

| where name has "Mary"
| distinct username;
| AuthenticationEvents
| where username in (list_variable_name)
| count
| count
```




Our mission is to identify any intrusion attempts against Solvi Systems. In order to do this, we'll start by reviewing some alerts.

You got an alert from your Web Application Firewall (WAF) appliance that someone may be trying to compromise your Solvi System's website!

## 

We can actually identify this request in our inbound browsing logs.








You would take the body of the URL and use Cyberchef to decode the URL encoding.






Let's take some notes on the details of this event. These details may help us find more malicious activity later.

What user agent did the attackers use to make the web requests in this attack? Enter only the initial part of the user agent (XXXXX/N.NN).

Opera/8.64

Solved by 162 players | Reed help?

InboundNetworkEvents
| where url has "script or alert"



On what day did the attack happen? Give the timestamp in the format YYYY-MM-DD.

```
55 InboundNetworkEvents
56 | where url has "script or alert"
```

```
timestamp ∇ : method ∇ : | src_ip ∇ : | user_agent

> 5/3/2024.2:48:08 PM GET 13.201.46.208 Opera/8.64.(X1

Jratn: □ / user_agent □ milline > 200mpact >
```

Ok, that first attempt was unsuccessful but it may not have been the only one.

Let's look for other malicious requests the attacker could have made around that time. It looks like the attacker varied the ip addresses they used to make these requests.


Use this query as a template:



```
InboundNetworkEvents

| where user_agent has "Opera/8.64"

| where timestamp between (datetime("2024-05-03") .. datetime("2024-05-05"))
```






```
InboundNetworkEvents

| where user_agent has "Opera/8.64"

| where timestamp between (datetime("2024-05-03") .. datetime("2024-05-05"))


| datetime("2024-05-05")
```



# 

```
InboundNetworkEvents

| where user_agent has "Opera/8.64"
| where timestamp between (datetime("2024-05-03") .. datetime("2024-05-05"))
```




It looks like the threat actor did some reconnaissance prior to the attack. They were seen browsing the company website before sending malicious requests to it.



```
InboundNetworkEvents

| where user_agent has "Opera/8.64.(X11; Linux x86_64; kok-IN) Presto/2.9.165 Version/10.00"
| count
```




Now that we know more about the threat actors' infrastructure, we can pivot out even further and see what else the threat actor may have done.

What is the timestamp of the first web request the threat actor sent to Solvi System's website?

2024-05-01T00:00:00Z


Solved by players | Reed help?





Looks like the threat actors did some research beforehand. They were interested in one very special software developed by Solvi Systems.

```
InboundNetworkEvents
| where user_agent has "Opera/8.64.(X11; Linux x86_64; kok-IN) Presto/2.9.165 Version/10.00"
| count
```



So we know the web exploitation attempts failed, but surely that couldn't be the end of it. Based on the reconnaissance we saw, these threat actors were far too interested in Solvi Systems to give up that easily.

Let's try pivoting on the adversary infrastructure to see if they tried to get in some other way.


First we'll look in PassiveDns to see if there are any domains registered by the adversary.

How many distinct domains do the ip addresses used by the threat actor resolve to?

✓ 3

Solved by 1072 players | Seed help?

```
67 PassiveDns
68 | where ip has any ("98.117.26.236", "105.78.23.64", "56.6.30.190", "13.201.46.208")
69 | distinct domain
```




Hmmm... These domains smell like they were registered for nefarious purposes. Perhaps for... phishing?

Let's check out the email logs to confirm.








Before we move on, let's try to get a better scope of the investigation.

You'll answer the following questions about the 56 emails we found earlier that had the adversary domains.




```
73
74 Email
75 | where link has_any ("eco-awareness-update.net", "energy-trends4u.net", "news-on-industry.com")
76 | distinct recipient
77
```

So the distinct email addresses can be deciphered by the three domain names here. If it is not 3 it would be 2 if not two then 1, although the only sus email domains on the SolviSystems email database are these three.







Out of these 14 records there are only 3 distinct filenames observed associated with the links in these emails.


Let's look into the employee roles that this threat actor was targeting.



```
87
     let threat_actor_ips =
88
     InboundNetworkEvents
     | where timestamp between (datetime("2024-05-03") .. datetime("2024-05-05"))
89
90
    where user_agent contains "Opera/8.64"
91
    distinct src_ip;
92
    let threat_actor_domains =
93
    PassiveDns
94
     | where ip in (threat_actor_ips)
95
     distinct domain;
```

This query performs **threat intelligence correlation**—tracking threat actor behavior from network events to email recipients and then to their roles in the organization.

- let threat\_actor\_ips = ...: Creates a named subquery called threat\_actor\_ips to store a set of IP addresses.
- InboundNetworkEvents: This is the source table, likely containing firewall or proxy logs.
- timestamp between (...): Filters only network events from May 3 to May 5, 2024.
- user\_agent contains "Opera/8.64": Looks for traffic from the Opera browser version 8.64—possibly an indicator of malicious behavior (e.g., known threat actor).
- distinct src\_ip: Returns a list of unique source IP addresses (possibly attackers).









| where role == "Customer Support Specialist

103



Kinda just guessed on this one as there were two words that is could have been, Docks fit.

We can't investigate all of the emails at once so we'll start by looking in detail at one of the emails.




```
Email
| where link has_any ("eco-awareness-update.net", "energy-trends4u.net", "news-on-industry.com")
| distinct timestamp, recipient, link, sender, subject, verdict;
| distinct timestamp, recipient, link, sender, subject, verdict;
```





# What is the recipient's email address? carla\_wharton@solvisystems.com Solved by 892 players || 88 Need help?

```
Email
| where link has_any ("eco-awareness-update.net", "energy-trends4u.net", "news-on-industry.com")
| distinct timestamp, recipient, link, sender, subject, verdict;
```











What was the sender address of that email?











```
Email
| where link has_any ("eco-awareness-update.net", "energy-trends4u.net", "news-on-industry.com")
| distinct timestamp, recipient, link, sender, reply_to, subject, verdict;
```



```
Email
| where link has_any ("eco-awareness-update.net", "energy-trends4u.net", "news-on-industry.com")
| distinct timestamp, recipient, link, sender, reply_to, subject, verdict;
```



```
110 Employees

111 | where name == "Carla Wharton"

112 | distinct ip_addr

113

114


115

■ Table 1 ∨

| ip_addr ▽ : |


> 10.10.0.164
```








```
118  let carla =
119  Employees
120  | where email_addr == 'carla_wharton@solvisystems.com'
121  | project username;
122  FileCreationEvents
123  | where username in (carla)
124  | where timestamp between (datetime(2024-05-01T15:58:29Z))... datetime(2024-05-01T16:58:29Z))
```



```
118  let carla =
119  Employees
120  | where email_addr == 'carla_wharton@solvisystems.com'
121  | project username;
122  FileCreationEvents
123  | where username in (carla)
124  | where timestamp between (datetime(2024-05-01T15:58:29Z))... datetime(2024-05-01T16:58:29Z))
```




How many records do we have of this file being created on Solvi Systems computers?


39

Solved by 87 players | Need help?





Let's go back and look at the process events on Carla's machine to see what happens after ecobug.exe is created.



These are the malicious src\_lps used with the malware C2.

# Order confirmation

### Thank you for your order!

Order Number: NA1378372