

# JOINT CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY

Co-Authored by:



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## #StopRansomware: ALPHV Blackcat

### SUMMARY

**Note:** This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit [stopransomware.gov](https://stopransomware.gov) to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known IOCs and TTPs associated with the ALPHV Blackcat ransomware as a service (RaaS) identified through FBI investigations as recently as February 2024.

#### Actions to take today to mitigate against the threat of ransomware:

- ✓ Routinely take inventory of assets and data to identify authorized and unauthorized devices and software.
- ✓ Prioritize remediation of [known exploited vulnerabilities](#).
- ✓ Enable and enforce multifactor authentication with strong passwords.
- ✓ Close unused ports and remove applications not deemed necessary for day-to-day operations.

This advisory provides updates to the FBI FLASH [BlackCat/ALPHV Ransomware Indicators of Compromise](#) released April 19, 2022, and to this advisory released December 19, 2023. ALPHV Blackcat actors have since employed improvised communication methods by creating victim-specific emails to notify of the initial compromise. Since mid-December 2023, of the nearly 70 leaked victims, the healthcare sector has been the most commonly victimized. This is likely in response to the ALPHV Blackcat administrator's post encouraging its affiliates to target hospitals after operational action against the group and its infrastructure in early December 2023.

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To report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact your local FBI field office at [fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices](https://fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices). When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact. To request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at [report@cisa.dhs.gov](mailto:report@cisa.dhs.gov).

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# CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY

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FBI, CISA, and HHS encourage critical infrastructure organizations to implement the recommendations in the [Mitigations](#) section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of ALPHV Blackcat ransomware and data extortion incidents.

In February 2023, ALPHV Blackcat administrators announced the ALPHV Blackcat Ransomware 2.0 Sphynx update, which was rewritten to provide additional features to affiliates, such as better defense evasion and additional tooling. This ALPHV Blackcat update has the capability to encrypt both Windows and Linux devices, and VMWare instances. ALPHV Blackcat affiliates have extensive networks and experience with ransomware and data extortion operations.

For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see:

- [AA23-353A \(STIX XML, 47KB\)](#)
- [AA23-353A \(STIX JSON, 33KB\)](#)

## TECHNICAL DETAILS

**Note:** This advisory uses the [MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise](#) framework, version 14. See the [MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques](#) section for a table of the threat actors' activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK's [Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping](#) and CISA's [Decider Tool](#).

ALPHV Blackcat affiliates use advanced social engineering techniques and open source research on a company to gain initial access. Actors pose as company IT and/or helpdesk staff and use phone calls or SMS messages [\[T1598\]](#) to obtain credentials from employees to access the target network [\[T1586\]](#). ALPHV Blackcat affiliates use uniform resource locators (URLs) to live-chat with victims to convey demands and initiate processes to restore the victims' encrypted files.

After gaining access to a victim network, ALPHV Blackcat affiliates deploy remote access software such as AnyDesk, Mega sync, and Splashtop in preparation of data exfiltration. ALPHV Blackcat affiliates create a user account, "aadmin," and use Kerberos token generation for domain access [\[T1558\]](#). After gaining access to networks, they use legitimate remote access and tunneling tools, such as Plink and Ngrok [\[S0508\]](#). ALPHV Blackcat affiliates claim to use Brute Ratel C4 [\[S1063\]](#) and Cobalt Strike [\[S1054\]](#) as beacons to command and control servers. ALPHV Blackcat affiliates use the open source adversary-in-the-middle attack [\[T1557\]](#) framework Evilginx2, which allows them to obtain multifactor authentication (MFA) credentials, login credentials, and session cookies. The actors also obtain passwords from the domain controller, local network, and deleted backup servers to move laterally throughout the network [\[T1555\]](#).

To evade detection, affiliates employ allowlisted applications such as Metasploit. Once installed on the domain controller, the logs are cleared on the exchange server. Then Mega.nz or Dropbox are used to move, exfiltrate, and/or download victim data. The ransomware is then deployed, and the ransom note is embedded as a file.txt. According to public reporting, affiliates have additionally used POORTRY and STONESTOP to terminate security processes.

Some ALPHV Blackcat affiliates exfiltrate data after gaining access and extort victims without deploying ransomware. After exfiltrating and/or encrypting data, ALPHV Blackcat affiliates

# CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY

TLP:CLEAR

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communicate with victims via TOR [S0183], Tox, email, or encrypted applications. The threat actors then delete victim data from the victim's system.

ALPHV Blackcat affiliates offer to provide unsolicited cyber remediation advice as an incentive for payment, offering to provide victims with "vulnerability reports" and "security recommendations" detailing how they penetrated the system and how to prevent future re-victimization upon receipt of ransom payment. The ALPHV Blackcat encryptor results in a file with the following naming convention: RECOVER-(seven-digit extension) FILES.txt.




Figure 1: Ransom Note Instruction

## INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE (IOCs)

Table 1: MD5 Hashes

MD5	Description	File Name
944153fb9692634d6c70899b83676575	ALPHV Windows Encryptor	
341d43d4d5c2e526cadd88ae8da70c1c	Anti Virus Tools Killer	363.sys

# CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY

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MD5	Description	File Name
34aac5719824e5f13b80d6fe23cbfa07	CobaltStrike BEACON	LMtool.exe
eea9ab1f36394769d65909f6ae81834b	CobaltStrike BEACON	Info.exe
379bf8c60b091974f856f08475a03b04	ALPHV Linux Encryptor	him
ebca4398e949286cb7f7f6c68c28e838	SimpleHelp Remote Management tool	first.exe
c04c386b945ccc04627d1a885b500edf	Tunneler Tool	conhost.exe
824d0e31fd08220a25c06baee1044818	Anti Virus Tools Killer	ibmModule.dll
eea9ab1f36394769d65909f6ae81834b	CobaltStrike BEACON	ConnectivityDiagnos.exe
944153fb9692634d6c70899b83676575	ALPHV Windows Encryptor	703cCX9YcHMV2.exe
61804a029e9b1753d58a6bf0274c25a6	MeshCentral Agent	WPEHOSTSVC64.exe
83deea3b61b6a734e7e4a566dbb6bffa	ScreenConnect & attacker tools installer	deployService.exe
8738b8637a20fa65c6e64d84d1cfe570	Suspected Proxy Tool	socks32.exe

Table 2: SHA256 Hashes

SHA256	Description
c64300cf8bacc4e42e74715edf3f8c3287a780c9c0a38b0d9675d01e7e231f16	ALPHV Windows Encryptor

# CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY

TLP:CLEAR

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SHA256	Description
1f5e4e2c78451623cfbf32cf517a92253b7abfe0243297c5ddf7dd1448e460d5	Anti Virus Tools Killer
3670dd4663adca40f168f3450fa9e7e84bc1a612d78830004020b73bd40fc71	CobaltStrike BEACON
af28b78c64a9effe3de0e5ccc778527428953837948d913d64dbd0fa45942021	CobaltStrike BEACON
bbfe7289de6ab1f374d0bcbeecf31cad2333b0928ea883ca13b9e733b58e27b1	ALPHV Linux Encryptor
5d1df950b238825a36fa6204d1a2935a5fbfce2a5991a7fc69c74f476df67905	SimpleHelp Remote Management tool
bd9edc3bf3d45e3cdf5236e8f8cd57a95ca3b41f61e4cd5c6c0404a83519058e	Tunneler Tool
732e24cb5d7ab558effc6dc88854f756016352c923ff5155dcb2eece35c19bc0	Anti Virus Tools Killer

Table 3: SHA1 Hashes

SHA1	Description
3dd0f674526f30729bcd4271e6b7eb0bb890c52	ALPHV Windows Encryptor
d6d442e8b3b0aef856ac86391e4a57bcb93c19ad	Anti Virus Tools Killer
6b52543e4097f7c39cc913d55c0044fcf673f6fc	CobaltStrike BEACON
004ba0454feb2c4033ff0bdb2ff67388af0c41b6	CobaltStrike BEACON
430bd437162d4c60227288fa6a82cde8a5f87100	SimpleHelp Remote Management tool
1376ac8b5a126bb163423948bd1c7f861b4bfe32	Tunneler Tool
380f941f8047904607210add4c6da2da8f8cd398	Anti Virus Tools Killer

# CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY

TLP:CLEAR

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Table 4: Network Indicators

Indicator Type	Network Indicator	Description
Domain	resources.docusong[.]com	Command and Control Server
Domain	Fisa99.screenconnect[.]com	ScreenConnect Remote Access
IP Address	5.199.168.24	Command and Control Server
IP Address	91.92.254.193	SimpleHelp Remote Access
Domain	pcrendal[.]com	Command and Control Server
Domain	instance-qqemas-relay[.]screenconnect[.]com	ScreenConnect Remote Access
Domain	instance-rbjvws-relay.screenconnect[.]com	ScreenConnect Remote Access
IP Address	5.199.168[.]233	IP Address used by Threat Actor
IP Address	92.223.89[.]55	IP Address used by Threat Actor
IP Address	185.195.59[.]218	IP Address used by Threat Actor
IP Address	51.159.103[.]112	IP Address used by Threat Actor
IP Address	45.32.141[.]168	Command and Control Server
IP Address	45.77.0[.]92	Command and Control Server

## MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

See Table 5 through Table 7 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory.

Table 5: ALPHV Blackcat/ALPHV Threat Actors ATT&CK Techniques - Reconnaissance

Technique Title	ID	Use
Phishing for Information	<a href="#">T1598</a>	ALPHV Blackcat affiliates pose as company IT and/or helpdesk staff using phone calls or SMS

# CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY

TLP:CLEAR

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Technique Title	ID	Use
		messages to obtain credentials from employees to access the target network.

Table 6: ALPHV Blackcat/ALPHV Threat Actors ATT&CK Techniques – Resource Development

Technique Title	ID	Use
Compromise Accounts	<a href="#">T1586</a>	ALPHV Blackcat affiliates use compromised accounts to gain access to victims' networks.

Table 7: ALPHV Blackcat/ALPHV Threat Actors ATT&CK Techniques – Credential Access

Technique Title	ID	Use
Obtain Credentials from Passwords Stores	<a href="#">T1555</a>	ALPHV Blackcat affiliates obtain passwords from local networks, deleted servers, and domain controllers.
Steal or Force Kerberos Tickets	<a href="#">T1558</a>	ALPHV Blackcat/ALPHV affiliates use Kerberos token generation for domain access.
Adversary-in-the-Middle	<a href="#">T1557</a>	ALPHV Blackcat/ALPHV affiliates use the open-source framework Evilginx2 to obtain MFA credentials, login credentials, and session cookies for targeted networks.

## INCIDENT RESPONSE

If compromise is detected, organizations should:

1. Quarantine or take offline potentially affected hosts.
2. Reimage compromised hosts.
3. Provision new account credentials.
4. Collect and review artifacts such as running processes/services, unusual authentications, and recent network connections.
5. Report the compromise or phishing incident to CISA via CISA's 24/7 Operations Center ([report@cisa.gov](mailto:report@cisa.gov) or 888-282-0870). State, local, tribal, or territorial government entities can also report to MS-ISAC ([SOC@cisecurity.org](mailto:SOC@cisecurity.org) or 866-787-4722).
6. To report spoofing or phishing attempts (or to report that you've been a victim), file a complaint with the FBI's [Internet Crime Complaint Center \(IC3\)](#), or contact your local [FBI Field Office](#) to report an incident.

## MITIGATIONS

FBI, CISA, and HHS recommend organizations implement the mitigations below to improve your organization's cybersecurity posture based on threat actor activity and to reduce the risk of compromise by ALPHV Blackcat threat actors. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA's [Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals](#) for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections. Due to the threat ALPHV Blackcat's poses in the healthcare sector, healthcare organizations can look to the [Healthcare and Public Health \(HPH\) Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals](#) to implement cybersecurity protections against the most common threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures used against this sector.

These mitigations apply to all critical infrastructure organizations and network defenders. FBI, CISA, and HHS recommend that software manufacturers incorporate secure by design principles and tactics into their software development practices limiting the impact of ransomware techniques, thus, strengthening the security posture for their customers.

For more information on secure by design, see CISA's [Secure by Design](#) webpage and [joint guide](#).

- Secure remote access tools by:
  - **Implementing application controls** to manage and control execution of software, including allowlisting remote access programs. Application controls should prevent installation and execution of portable versions of unauthorized remote access and other software. A properly configured application allowlisting solution will block any unlisted application execution. Allowlisting is important because antivirus solutions may fail to detect the execution of malicious portable executables when the files use any combination of compression, encryption, or obfuscation.
  - Applying recommendations in CISA's joint [Guide to Securing Remote Access Software](#).
- **Implementing FIDO/WebAuthn authentication or Public key Infrastructure (PKI)-based MFA** [[CPG 2.H](#)][[HPH CPG – Multifactor Authentication](#)]. These MFA implementations are resistant to phishing and not susceptible to push bombing or SIM swap attacks, which are techniques known to be used by ALPHV Blackcat affiliates. See CISA's Fact Sheet [Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA](#) for more information.
- **Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool.** To aid in detecting ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network traffic [[CPG 5.1](#)][[HPH CPG – Detect and Respond to Relevant Threats and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures](#)], including lateral movement activity on a network. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools are useful for

# CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY

TLP:CLEAR

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detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host.

- **Implement user training on social engineering and phishing attacks** [CPG 2.1][PHP CPG – [Basic Cybersecurity Training](#)]. Regularly educate users on identifying suspicious emails and links, not interacting with those suspicious items, and the importance of reporting instances of opening suspicious emails, links, attachments, or other potential lures.
- **Implement internal mail and messaging monitoring.** Monitoring internal mail and messaging traffic to identify suspicious activity is essential as users may be phished from outside the targeted network or without the knowledge of the organizational security team. Establish a baseline of normal network traffic and scrutinize any deviations.
- **Implement free security tools** to prevent cyber threat actors from redirecting users to malicious websites to steal their credentials. For more information see, CISA's [Free Cybersecurity Services and Tools](#) webpage.
- **Install and maintain antivirus software.** Antivirus software recognizes malware and protects your computer against it. Installing antivirus software from a reputable vendor is an important step in preventing and detecting infections. Always visit vendor sites directly rather than clicking on advertisements or email links. Because attackers are continually creating new viruses and other forms of malicious code, it is important to keep your antivirus software up to date.

## VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS

In addition to applying mitigations, CISA recommends exercising, testing, and validating your organization's security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. CISA recommends testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.

To get started:

1. Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Tables 1-3).
2. Align your security technologies against the technique.
3. Test your technologies against the technique.
4. Analyze your detection and prevention technologies' performance.
5. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
6. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.

CISA and FBI recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.

## RESOURCES

- [Stopransomware.gov](#) is a whole-of-government approach that gives one central location for ransomware resources and alerts.

# CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY

TLP:CLEAR

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- Resource to reduce the risk of a ransomware attack: [#StopRansomware Guide](#).
- No-cost cyber hygiene services: [Cyber Hygiene Services](#) and [Ransomware Readiness Assessment](#).
- Health and Human Services [HPH Cybersecurity Gateway](#) hosts the HPH CPGs and links to HHS cybersecurity resources.

## DISCLAIMER

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## VERSION HISTORY

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