

## S1960565 – Jeet Navindgi – BDL CW2 Report

### Detailed description of the high-level decisions i made for the design of my contract:

State variables:

I have used a state variable called *gameState* which is of type *enum* which keeps track of the state of the contract/game. The possible game states are *EmptyState*, *WaitingState*, *FullState* and *RevealedState*.

*playersBalances* is a state variable which is a mapping from *address* (players address) to *uint256* (players “bank” balance). My contract acts as the bank from bank.sol from coursework 1, i.e., we allow players to have a contract (bank) balance from which they deposit / withdraw from. Note, players **cannot** deposit directly into this, they will need to do it while entering a game.

I use a commit – reveal scheme in this contract, thus I required a state variable called *commits* which keeps track of all players commitments. This is a mapping from *address* (players address) to *Commit* which is a custom type I defined to represent a commitment. The *Commit* type is defined as a struct with two fields: *bytes32 commit* (random value) and *bool revealed* (whether it has been revealed).

### General flow of the game:

The state of the game when no players have entered is *EmptyState*. In order for the first player (player A) to join, they should call *openGame*. This function requires the caller to send at least 3.1 Ether when calling (if not already in contract bank balance). Because 3 Ether (-10 Wei for contract profit) is the max amount they can lose in a normal game and an additional 0.1 ether can be lost for unethical actions. Ether deposited into contract bank balance cannot be withdrawn until the game is back to *EmptyState*, i.e., until the game is over, because we don't want players to withdraw funds that is possibly owed to their opponent. If the player already has  $\geq 3.1$  Ether in the contract bank balance, then they are only required (but not limited) to send 10 Wei for contract profit, any more will be deposited into their bank balance. This function also requires an input of type *Bytes32* which will be the commitment value. This value should be pre-processed by the player offline, by doing this following: *keccak256(abi.encodePacked(randomValue, address))* where *randomValue* is a random value of type *bytes32* and *address* is the players address. This then registers the caller as player A and updates the game state to *WaitingState*. Notice how the player has committed a certain amount of ether into this game.

A second player must now join the game by calling *joinGame*. This function requires that the player trying to join the game cannot be the player A. This function can only be called when the state of the game is *WaitingState*. Again, the player follows the same procedure in terms of sending value and passing a *bytes32* argument for a commitment. This then registers the caller as player B and updates the game state to *FullState*.

Both players must now call the *reveal* function passing in their corresponding *randomValue* explained above. We require only the players of the current game to have called this and that the game state should be *FullState*. We also require that the caller hasn't already revealed their value. The last requirement is that the revealed *randomValue* passed in hashed with the caller of the function must equal their original committed value. Once both players have revealed their values, then the state of the game is updated to *RevealedState*.

Both players must now call the *playGame* function. We require callers to be players of the game and the state to be *RevealedState*. This function implements the game that is described. The dice roll will be the XOR of the two *randomValue* values from each player, mod 6, + 1. If this number is 1, 2 or 3 (call it  $x$ ) then player B loses  $(x - (10Wei))Eth$  from their contract bank balance and player A gains this amount in their contract bank balance. Alternatively, if this number is 4, 5, or 6 (call it  $y$ ) then player A loses  $(y - 3) - (10Wei)Eth$  from their contract bank balance and player B gains this amount in their contract bank balance. The contract bank balances are only fully updated when both players call the function. Once both players have called the function, the game is over, so we set the game state to Empty and reset any state variables that should have their zero value. This is when those players can withdraw their winnings (or whatever they have left). Note, through contract bank balances, the losing player indirectly pays the winning player their reward.

**A thorough list of potential hazards and vulnerabilities that may occur in the contract. A detailed analysis of the security mechanisms used to mitigate such hazards:**

A player can see their opponents *randomValue* once revealed (by looking at the transactions on the block). That player could then be able to determine whether or not they will win the game or not before even revealing (and playing). If they find out that they will lose, they could refuse to reveal and play so that they do not need to pay the opponent or pay gas. The security mechanism I have implemented to handle such players is the timeout mechanisms. If in the *FullState* and (exactly) one player (e.g., player A) is refusing to reveal, player B can call the *StartRevealTimeout* function. This function, from the time called gives the *timeout* state variable the value of the timestamp plus two minutes. Meaning, in two minutes this *timeout* will be  $\leq block.timestamp$ . If two minutes has passed since player B called *StartRevealTimeout*, and player A still has not revealed yet (i.e., the game state is still *FullState*) then player B will be able to call *claimRevealTimeout* which automatically updates game state so that it is over after changing players contract bank balances accordingly. In this scenario, because player A has avoided paying potential gas costs (for revealing and playing), they will lose 3.1 ether. Note the 0.1 ether penalty here to mitigate such behaviour; It will be in the players best interest to finish a game (because it will be cheaper).

Following from the above vulnerability, if both players refuse to play, then the above timeout mechanism will not work because neither of the players will call a timeout. This is a potential DoS attack on the contract because it will forever be in such a 'stale' state. For this, I allow only the owner to be able to start a timer in such a situation. The owner can call the *ownerResetStaleGameTimer* function which starts a five minute timer. If five minutes have

passed and the game is still in the same stale state, then the owner will be able to remove 3.1 Ether (minus 10) from each player's contract bank balance by calling *ownerResetStaleGame*. This removed Ether will now belong to the contracts balance. Again, as before, this will reset the game state along with any variables that need resetting.

Even in *RevealedState*, if one player plays and another doesn't, that player is still avoiding to pay the gas for calling the *playGame* function. Note, the *playGame* function is implemented in such a way that, if the winner calls it, their balance will be updated with their winnings, but the state is still in the *RevealedState* and not over because a player still needs to play. In this situation, the owner can call *ownerClaimPlayTimeout* which uses a timer which was actually already started (inside the *playGame* function) by the one player who called *playGame*. *ownerClaimPlayTimeout* will take 0.1 ether (- 10Wei) penalty from the contract bank balance of said player. The game state will reset.

I use pull over push method, i.e., we keep track of how much each user is owed and allow the user to withdraw this. This means we don't need to make a (potentially failing) transfer call inside the *playGame* function which is critical to the state of the contract. So no attacker can force a DoS on state of a contract (if there was a way in the first place). This decision does decrease the user experience; however, the trade-off is that it increases the gas fairness. Instead of one of the players (for example, the last player to call the function, potentially the losing player) having to run the code for the transfer is unfair, so we allow for the winner to withdraw their earnings.

Since we use call instead of transfer in the withdraw function, we have a re-entrancy vulnerability. The security mechanism I implemented to counter this is to follow the checks effects interaction pattern. I make sure to set the players contract balance to zero before making any *call* calls which ensures that there is no devastating re-entrancy possible.

we have avoided strict equality checks with regards to the contracts balance, so there is no attack possible with regards to forcibly sending ether to the contract. My contract also uses no libraries, so we are safe against delegate call attacks.

Players cannot cheat by backing out of a game mid-way (by choosing not to interact) to avoid paying. They will also have no way of seeing the opponents random value before committing. They can't do these things because I use a commitment scheme. Players commit 3.1 Ether into their contract bank balance (which is locked in there until they are not in a game), this means that if they choose to no longer interact in the current game, they will lose this committed ether (through timeouts). Players are required to do pre-processing (as mentioned earlier) which includes hashing of their chosen random number (along with their address). Assuming we have a secure hash function, the other player will not be able to determine the original value. If they were able to do this, then they would be able to compute a value that, when xor'd with it will make them win the game. As shown in the lecture, commitment schemes like this are prone to front running on the reveal stage, however this is not possible in my game since the reveal function can only be called by players of the game. We prevent the other player from front running (revealing for the other player) by using *msg.sender* when

computing the hash and checking whether it matches the commitment. This guarantees that only the player who made the commitment will be able to reveal it.

For the dice roll, we have avoided using block information as a source of randomness since these values can be manipulated by a malicious miner (who could be a player of the game). Our commitment scheme solves this issue as described earlier. We have both players commit a random 32 byte value which will be xor'd together. We use "mod 6 + 1" to emulate dice conditions. Even if one of the players tries to act maliciously, as long as one of the values are random, then the result of the xor will be random. It is important to note though that if the two numbers are equal, then these values will xor to 0, causing player A to win 100% of the time if an attacker can force this situation. In my implementation this is impossible because both players have to commit to a value (independent of each other and completely random) in a committed (hashed) form and therefore it is impossible for a player to know what value has been committed since it is hashed (with a secure function).

### **Gas fairness:**

My game could have been easily implemented so that only one player needs to run the `playGame()` function causing both player's balances to change correctly and mitigating the fact that one player may timeout. However, this is a trade-off. If we did this, then it would mean that that player needs to pay considerably more gas for running that function, while the other player would just wait for the outcome without running that function. For this reason, I implemented it so that both players need to run the same number of similar functions throughout the game. Player A needs to call *openGame* while player B needs to call *joinGame*. These are functions which require similar amounts of gas to run because they do essentially the same thing (there is an additional check in the latter function which cannot be avoided). Then both players need to call *reveal* which is fair (the last player that calls this needs to update the game state, there is no other way around this). Next both players call *playGame* which is fair (the last player that calls this needs to reset the game, there is no other way around this). Each player can withdraw their bank balance independently making it fairer.

Cost of deploying contract : **0.00316675BTL\_ETH**

Address of deployed contract: 0x902a4489b04AB63878D0a9938c22148819aA71D5

Please refer to appendix 1 (at the end of this file) for the transaction history of a game.

## Analysis of s2457006 – Monica Stephanie:

```
71 function getRandomNumber() public view returns (uint) {  
72     return uint(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(owner, block.timestamp))); //vulnerability  
73 }
```

Vulnerability 1: In the above code snippet, this method of calculating the random number can be exploited by players. The owner address is public and the block.timestamp is the time of the function call. Note, the *getRandomNumber* function is only called when a player calls the *Play* function. This can be exploited by doing the following: Player A calls the *Play* function in such a time such that the value of  $(\text{keccak256}(\text{abi.encodePacked}(\text{owner}, \text{block.timestamp}))) \% 6 + 1$  is equal to either 1, 2 or 3. This would guarantee player A to win. Since the address of the owner stays the same, player A just needs to make sure the block.timestamp is a suitable value that guarantee's them the win. A way to fix this would be to use a commitment scheme where both players commit a random value which is hidden until both players are committed into the game, then it is revealed and then you can xor these two (random) numbers to get a new random number.

```
function enterPlayerA() public payable {  
    require(msg.value == 3 ether, "You need to pay exactly 3 ether to play this game.");  
    require(playerA.length == 0, "There's already a player.");  
    if (playerB.length == 1) {  
        require(msg.sender != playerB[0], "You cannot play against yourself.");  
    }  
    playerA.push(payable(msg.sender));  
}  
  
function enterPlayerB() public payable {  
    require(msg.value == 3 ether, "You need to pay exactly 3 ether to play this game.");  
    require(playerB.length == 0, "There's already a player.");  
    if (playerA.length == 1) {  
        require(msg.sender != playerA[0], "You cannot play against yourself.");  
    }  
    playerB.push(payable(msg.sender));  
}
```

Vulnerability 2: if two malicious players enter the game and none of them decide to ever play (nobody calls *Play*), then they will cause a DoS of the contract, since no players will be able to enter the game until it is over because of the requirements that playerA/B length should be 0. A way to fix this is to allow the owner of the contract to reset such “stale” games once it is confirmed that both players will not interact (maybe after a certain amount of time).

```

81 function Play() public payable {
82     require(playerA.length + playerB.length == 2, "There's no enough player.");
83     uint256 dice = DiceResult() * 1 ether;
84
85     // Give back the initial 3 ether to the winner.
86     uint256 trf = dice + 3 ether;
87
88     if (dice < 4) {
89         payable(playerA[0]).transfer(trf); //vulnerabilitys
90
91         // Transfer all the remaining eth to the loser.
92         payable(playerB[0]).transfer(address(this).balance);
93     }
94     else {
95         payable(playerB[0]).transfer(dice - 3);
96
97         // Transfer all the remaining eth to the loser.
98         payable(playerA[0]).transfer(address(this).balance);
99     }
100 }

```

Vulnerability 3: There are many transfer calls in the *Play* function (which is a function that is important regarding the state of the contract). Note the limit of gas that a transfer call can use is 2300. If the price of ether increases at a later point in time, then the contract might break because 2300 might not be enough gas for a transfer. The contract breaks in this situation because no players will ever be able to complete a call to the function *Play* because it will fail every time a transfer is attempted (because the price of ether went up). A fix for this is to use *call* instead of *transfer*. It is important to protect against re-entrancy if *call* is used. If *call* is used an attacking contract could continuously call *Play* until they drain the contracts balance, so suitable protection will be needed.

Point 4: This is not a vulnerability, more so a comment on gas fairness. Only one player is required to call *Play* before the game ends which means one player will spend considerably more gas than the other, because the play function is a major part of the game. This isn't very fair in terms of gas.

The code of my contract:

```
1  // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0
2
3  pragma solidity >=0.7.0 <0.9.0;
4
5  contract s1960565 {
6
7      address public playerA;
8      address public playerB;
9      address private owner;
10
11      enum gameState {EmptyState, WaitingState, FullState, RevealedState}
12      //EmptyState - No players are in a game. Someone should call openGame().
13      //WaitingState - One player has committed into a game. Someone else should call joinGame().
14      //FullState - Two players are committed into a game. They should both proceed to call reveal().
15      //RevealedState - Both players have revealed their random value. They should both proceed to call playGame().
16
17      gameState public state; // Defaults to EmptyState.
18
19      mapping(address => uint256) private playersBalances;
20      mapping (address => Commit) private commits;
21
22      bool public A_played;
23      bool public B_played;
24      bytes32 private A_randomValue;
25      bytes32 private B_randomValue;
26
27      uint public timeout = 2**256 - 1;
28
29      struct Commit {
30          bytes32 commit;
31          bool revealed;
32      }
33
34      constructor(){
35          owner = msg.sender;
36      }
37
38      //Helper function
39      function valueCheck(uint256 msgVal, address msgSender) public payable {
40          //If sender has 3 ether already in "bank" balance, they can use this.
41          if (playersBalances[msgSender] >= 3.1 ether){
42              require(msgVal >= 10, "10 Wei is the minimum value - for contract profit.");
43              //Else they need to deposit ether such that they will have atleast 3 ether in their "bank" balance.
44          } else {
45              require(msgVal >= (3.1 ether - playersBalances[msgSender] + 10), "Atleast 3.1 Ether is needed in bank balance to participate.");
46          }
47          playersBalances[msgSender] += msgVal - 10;
48      }
49
50      modifier onlyState(gameState expectedState) {
51          require(state == expectedState, "Game state is not in correct state for this function to be called.");
52          _;
53      }
54  }
```

```

55 modifier onlyPlayers {
56     require(msg.sender == playerA || msg.sender == playerB, "Only players of the current game can call this function.");
57     _;
58 }
59
60 modifier onlyOwner {
61     require(msg.sender == owner, "Only the owner can call this function.");
62     _;
63 }
64
65 function openGame(bytes32 randomValAddrHash) public payable onlyState(gameState.EmptyState) {
66     valueCheck(msg.value, msg.sender);
67     commits[msg.sender].commit = randomValAddrHash; //No notion of a value check here so it is not in the valueCheck function.
68     commits[msg.sender].revealed = false;
69     playerA = msg.sender;
70     state = gameState.WaitingState;
71 }
72
73 function joinGame(bytes32 randomValAddrHash) public payable onlyState(gameState.WaitingState) {
74     require(!(msg.sender == playerA), "You can't join a game with yourself");
75     valueCheck(msg.value, msg.sender);
76     commits[msg.sender].commit = randomValAddrHash; //No notion of a value check here so it is not in the valueCheck function
77     commits[msg.sender].revealed = false;
78     playerB = msg.sender;
79     state = gameState.FullState;
80 }
81
82 function reveal(bytes32 randomValue) public onlyPlayers onlyState(gameState.FullState) {
83     require(commits[msg.sender].revealed == false, "You have already revealed!");
84     require(commits[msg.sender].commit == keccak256(abi.encodePacked(randomValue, msg.sender)), "Revealed random number hash");
85     if (msg.sender == playerA) {
86         A_randomValue = randomValue;
87         commits[playerA].revealed = true;
88         timeout = 2**256 - 1; // In case owner started stale game timer
89     } else {
90         B_randomValue = randomValue;
91         commits[playerB].revealed = true;
92         timeout = 2**256 - 1;
93     }
94
95     if (commits[playerA].revealed == true && commits[playerB].revealed == true){
96         state = gameState.RevealedState;
97     }
98 }
99
100 function playGame() public payable onlyPlayers onlyState(gameState.RevealedState) returns (uint256){
101     if (msg.sender == playerA){
102         require (!A_played, "You have already played!");
103         A_played = true;
104     } else {
105         require (!B_played, "You have already played!");
106         B_played = true;
107     }
108
109     timeout = 2**256 - 1; // In case there was a timer initiated in waitingState or if owner started timer
110     uint256 random_number = (uint(A_randomValue ^ B_randomValue) % 6) + 1;
111
112     bool A_win;
113
114     if (random_number <= 3) {
115         A_win = true;
116     } else {
117         A_win = false;
118     }
119 }

```



```

120     if (msg.sender == playerB && !A_win){
121         playersBalances[playerA] -= (((random_number - 3) * 10**18) - 10); // -10 because remember 10 wei was put into contract profits.
122         playersBalances[playerB] += (((random_number - 3) * 10**18) - 10);
123     } else if (msg.sender == playerA && A_win){
124         playersBalances[playerB] -= (((random_number) * 10**18) - 10);
125         playersBalances[playerA] += (((random_number) * 10**18) - 10);
126     }
127
128     if (!A_played || !B_played){
129         timeout = block.timestamp + 120; // 2 minutes timeout interval - only for owner to use
130     }
131
132     //Setting state variables to default values once game is over.
133     if (A_played && B_played){
134         A_played = false;
135         B_played = false;
136         playerA = address(0);
137         playerB = address(0);
138         state = gameState.EmptyState;
139     }
140
141     return random_number;
142 }
143
144 //Functions for balance operations:
145
146 function withdraw() public payable{
147     require(!(msg.sender == playerA || msg.sender == playerB), "You cannot withdraw while in a game"); // To ensure players in a game that
148     uint256 b = playersBalances[msg.sender];
149     playersBalances[msg.sender] = 0;
150     (bool sent, ) = msg.sender.call{value: b}("");
151     require(sent, "Failed to withdraw Ether");
152 }
153
154 function getBalance() public view returns (uint256){
155     return playersBalances[msg.sender];
156 }
157
158 //Timeout functions to follow. These are to ensure nobody can avoid paying gas to play (because they know they have lost),
159 //Or to avoid two adversarial players
160 //causing a stale game, i.e. a game that never ends and enables a DoS on the contract.
161
162 function startRevealTimeout() public onlyPlayers onlyState(gameState.FullState){
163     require(commits[msg.sender].revealed == true, "You can't start this timer because you haven't revealed yet.");
164     timeout = block.timestamp + 120; // 2 minutes timeout interval
165 }
166
167 function claimRevealTimeout() public onlyPlayers onlyState(gameState.FullState){
168     require(commits[msg.sender].revealed == true, "You are the player who is the facing timeout timer!");
169     require(block.timestamp >= timeout, "Timeout timer either not started yet or not finished yet.");
170
171     if (msg.sender == playerA) {
172         playersBalances[playerB] -= ((3.1 ether) - 10); //0.1 ether penalty for not revealing! To avoid players from
173         playersBalances[playerA] += ((3.1 ether) - 10);
174     } else {
175         playersBalances[playerA] -= ((3.1 ether) - 10);
176         playersBalances[playerB] += ((3.1 ether) - 10);
177     }
178
179     playerA = address(0);
180     playerB = address(0);
181     state = gameState.EmptyState;
182     timeout = 2**256 - 1;
183 }

```

```

185 function ownerClaimPlayTimeout() public payable onlyOwner onlyState(gameState.ReavealedState) {
186     require(block.timestamp >= timeout, "Timeout timer either not started yet or not finished yet.");
187     if (!A_played) {
188         playersBalances[playerA] -= (0.1 ether) - 10; //0.1 ether penalty for not playing game - goes to contract balance (i.e. no player wil
189     } else {
190         playersBalances[playerB] -= (0.1 ether) - 10;
191     }
192     timeout = 2**256 - 1;
193     A_played = false;
194     B_played = false;
195     playerA = address(0);
196     playerB = address(0);
197     state = gameState.EmptyState;
198 }
199
200 function ownerResetStaleGameTimer() public payable onlyOwner {
201     require(state == gameState.FullState || state == gameState.ReavealedState, "Game is not in expected state for this function.");
202     if (state == gameState.FullState) {
203         require(commits[playerA].revealed == false && commits[playerB].revealed == false, "Game is not in a stale condition!");
204     } else {
205         require(!A_played && !B_played, "Game is not in a stale condition!");
206     }
207     timeout = block.timestamp + 300;
208 }
209
210 function ownerResetStaleGame() public payable onlyOwner {
211     require(state == gameState.FullState || state == gameState.ReavealedState, "Game is not in expected state for this function.");
212     require(block.timestamp >= timeout, "Timeout timer either not started yet or not finished yet.");
213     //No further checks required - by logic of code it is garunteed that game is in the SAME stale state
214     //Because we reset timeout variable in each new game state.
215
216     // Both players will lose their deposited 3.1 eth and the game restarts.
217     playersBalances[playerA] -= (3.1 ether) - 10; // Remains in contract balance i.e. goes to contract balance.
218     playersBalances[playerB] -= (3.1 ether) - 10;
219     timeout = 2**256 - 1;
220     playerA = address(0);
221     playerB = address(0);
222     state = gameState.EmptyState;
223 }
224 }

```

Appendix 1: transaction history JSON.

```
{
  "accounts": {
    "account{0}": "0x5B38Da6a701c568545dCfcB03FcB875f56beddC4",
    "account{1}": "0xAb8483F64d9C6d1EcF9b849Ae677dD3315835cb2",
    "account{2}": "0x4B20993Bc481177ec7E8f571ceCaE8A9e22C02db"
  },
  "linkReferences": {},
  "transactions": [
    {
      "timestamp": 1667147274020,
      "record": {
        "value": "0",
        "inputs": "()",
        "parameters": [],
        "name": "",
        "type": "constructor",
        "abi":
"0x544bc6b2eaba4fb44b0584c30b6e32e25c56c6691d66c7893bf95c263533c370",
        "contractName": "s1960565",
        "bytecode":
"60806040527fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff60085534801561003457600
080fd5b5033600260006101000a81548173fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff021916908373ffff
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff1602179055506137d7806100856000396000f3fe6080604052600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```

6108f5565b005b34801561018e57600080fd5b50610197610c53565b005b3480156101a5576  
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01ce57600080fd5b506101d76113d8565b6040516101e49190612feb565b60405180910390f  
35b3480156101f957600080fd5b506102026113de565b005b61021e6004803603810190610  
2199190612a2f565b611946565b005b34801561022c57600080fd5b50610235611ad8565b60  
40516102429190612d9a565b60405180910390f35b34801561025757600080fd5b50610260  
611afc565b60405161026d9190612db5565b60405180910390f35b61029060048036038101  
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"type": "function",
"to": "created{1667147274020}",
"abi":
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  "from": "account{1}"
}
},
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  "timestamp": 1667147298734,
  "record": {
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    ],
    "name": "joinGame",
    "type": "function",
    "to": "created{1667147274020}",
    "abi":
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"from": "account{1}"
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  "record": {
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    "inputs": "(bytes32)",
    "parameters": [
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    "type": "function",
    "to": "created{1667147274020}",
    "abi":
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    "from": "account{2}"
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  "to": "created{1667147274020}",
  "abi":
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  "from": "account{1}"
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    "to": "created{1667147274020}",
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    "from": "account{2}"
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  "record": {
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  "from": "account{1}"
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      "outputs": [],
      "stateMutability": "nonpayable",
      "type": "function"
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    {
      "inputs": [
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          "internalType": "bytes32",
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          "type": "bytes32"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}
```

```
],
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  "stateMutability": "payable",
  "type": "function"
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      "internalType": "bytes32",
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  "outputs": [],
  "stateMutability": "payable",
  "type": "function"
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  "outputs": [],
  "stateMutability": "payable",
  "type": "function"
},
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  "inputs": [],
  "name": "ownerResetStaleGame",
```



```
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"type": "function"
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  "name": "ownerResetStaleGameTimer",
  "outputs": [],
  "stateMutability": "payable",
  "type": "function"
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      "name": "",
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    }
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  "stateMutability": "payable",
  "type": "function"
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      "internalType": "bytes32",
      "name": "randomValue",
```

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"stateMutability": "nonpayable",
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      "type": "uint256"
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  "type": "function"
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  "name": "A_played",
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      "name": "",
      "type": "bool"
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  ],
  "stateMutability": "view",
  "type": "function"
},
```

```
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  "name": "B_played",
  "outputs": [
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      "name": "",
      "type": "bool"
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  "stateMutability": "view",
  "type": "function"
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  "name": "getBalance",
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      "name": "",
      "type": "uint256"
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  "stateMutability": "view",
  "type": "function"
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  "name": "playerA",
```

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},  
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      "name": "",  
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