

Jingfan MENG

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OBJECTIVE

I am seeking an internship position in networking or software engineering from May to August, 2021.

EDUCATION

Computer Science Ph.D. Program

Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, US.

2019.8 - present

Major in Computer Networks.

First year GPA: 4.0

Bachelor in Information and Electrical Engineering

Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China.

2015.9 - 2019.7

Major in Computer Science and Engineering.

GPA: 4.02/4.3 Rank: 2/91

PUBLICATIONS

Sliding-Window QPS (SW-QPS): A Perfect Parallel Iterative Switching Algorithm for Input-Queued Switches.

Jingfan Meng, Long Gong and Jun Xu.

2020

Short Paper Accepted in Performance 2020.

Maximizing Influence Diffusion over Evolving Social Networks.

Xudong Wu, Luoyi Fu, Jingfan Meng, and Xinbing Wang.

2019

In Proceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on Social Sensing (SocialSense'19).

Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 6-11.

PROJECTS

Crossbar Switch Scheduling

Research Project with Prof. Jun Xu

2019.9 - 2020.5

- This project designs a distributed scheduling algorithm for crossbar switches that achieves high throughput with low computation and communication complexity.
- This algorithm has better throughput performance than the widely used iSLIP algorithm under skewed traffic patterns in simulation.

Entity Relation Querying System

Database Systems Course Project

2018.9 - 2018.12

- This project created a web page interface with web.py framework and managed a MySQL database to store and query thousands of "isA" relations extracted from "CN-Probase".
- This project can answer simple classification questions such as "Is dog an animal?"

Digital Product Auction Design

Summer Internship with Prof. Xiaohui Bei at Nanyang Technological University

2018.7 - 2018.9

- This project designed an incentive compatible auction mechanism for digital products that will always cover copyright costs.
- This project involved detailed research on the assumptions that makes VCG mechanisms the only incentive compatible mechanisms in the multi-parameter setting and proved that cancelling the VCG auction when costs are not covered will not result in a truthful mechanism.

PROGRAMMING SKILLS

Python, C++, MATLAB