Supplemental Data

The Evolutionary Origins of Human Patience: Temporal Preferences in Chimpanzees, Bonobos, and Human Adults

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Supplemental Experimental Procedures

Study 1: Temporal Preferences in Bonobos and Chimpanzees Subjects

Ten adult and subadult chimpanzees and bonobos participated in this experiment (see Table S1). Subjects were socially housed at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research Center in the Leipzig Zoo, Germany. The chimpanzees lived in a group of 17 individuals. The bonobos lived in a group of six individuals (including one young infant). They spent the day in a 4000 m² outdoor area, and a 400 m² indoor area, both of which have climbing structures, enrichment items such as foraging boxes, and natural vegetation, water streams, and various other natural features. At night, they slept in a series of rooms approximately 47 m². Both species are fed various fruits, vegetables, and cereals several times per day independent of cognitive tests. Grapes are a regular component of the apes' daily diet in this facility, and are known to be a desirable food for both the chimpanzees and bonobos. A familiar experimenter tested subjects individually in familiar testing rooms (approximately 15 m²); mothers with dependent offspring were tested with their child present in the testing room. All ten subjects were naive to discounting tasks.

Experimenter Behavior during Delays

If the subject chose the large reward, the experimenter removed the forgone option but did not push the food platform forward until the delay concluded; during this delay period, the experimenter sat looking down with her hands behind her back and did not socially interact with the subject.

Delay Adjustment Across Session

In the first session, both rewards were available immediately. If a subject demonstrated a preference for either reward during a given session, then the delay to receive the large reward was adjusted in their subsequent session (delays were always kept constant within a given session). Specifically, if subjects choose the large reward eight or more times, the delay to large was increased by 10 s; if they choose the small reward more than eight times, the delay was decreased by 10 s. Weaker preferences (six to seven choices) resulted in 5 s increments. If subjects had no preference, the delay to large remained the same.

Food Motivation Levels

In addition to the main analysis, we performed an additional statistical analysis to assess how subjects made choices within sessions. We arcsine, square-root transformed all proportional choices to normalize the data. We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA comparing subjects' performance in the first half to the second half of all sessions, with species as a between-subjects factor. There was a significant effect of species [F(1,8) = 14.39, p < 0.01], but no effect of session half or interactions with session half. This indicates that subjects of both species had consistent choice strategies and retained constant levels of motivation to acquire the food over a given session.

Rate Maximization

We quantitatively assessed whether the two species' patterns of choice matched the predictions of a short-term rate-maximization model, as is the case in European starlings [S1] and cotton-top tamarins [S2]. This model predicts that foragers optimize gain in reward per unit time [S3]—that is, decision makers maximize the rate (R) of a choice, R = A/(t + h), where A is the reward amount, t is the delay to receive the reward after a choice has been made, and h is the time required to process or handle the reward. Rate maximization thus predicts that individuals should be indifferent between the small and large rewards in this experiment when the intake rate of the small option (two grape halves) equals that of the large option (six grape halves): $A_2/(t_2 + h_2) = A_6/(t_6 + h_6)$.

Handling times (h_2 and h_6) for both species were estimated from measurements of the period between a subject's first reach for the grape halves once they became available, and when they placed

the last grape half in their mouth. These measurements were obtained for six introductory small-reward trials and six introductory large-reward trials for each subject (Table S1). In addition, we coded 20 introductory small-reward trials (two per subject) to determine the length of time necessary for the experimenter to push the small food reward forward once the subject made a choice. On average, the experimenter took 1.6 s to push the reward forward so that the subject could access it. Measurements of handling time (see Table S1) indicate that bonobos took longer than chimpanzees to eat both the smaller and larger reward; on average the bonobos took 8.5 s to eat two pieces and 27.7 s to eat six pieces, whereas chimpanzees took 5.3 s to eat two pieces and 19.3 s to eat six pieces. Because animals discount future rewards more heavily when handling times are increased under some circumstances [S4], this could be one reason that bonobos did not wait as long as chimpanzees overall.

Using these handling times and 1.6 s as the delay estimate on the short reward, we calculated the predicted long delay at which subjects should be indifferent between the two rewards if they maximize intake rate in this way. Each species' indifference point prediction is a mean of individual subject's predicted indifference points. That is, we applied the rate-maximization equation to each subject rather than to the overall species means. If predicted indifference points were negative for a given subject, we used a time of 0 s (as in [S2]). The predicted average rate-maximizing indifference point of chimpanzees was 2.6 s, and the predicted indifference point for bonobos was 3.1 s. Chimpanzees and bonobos would thus have to exhibit very high levels of temporal impulsivity to maximize their rate of gain over the short term (see Table S2).

Because both species deviate extensively from these predictions, it is likely that bonobos and chimpanzees make choices over a longer temporal horizon than do other animals, accounting for more than just the period between making a decision and experiencing its consequences. For example, unlike other species examined thus far (see [S5] for a review), they might rate maximize over the long term, accounting for the entire duration of the experiment (including the duration between trials, or intertrial interval [ITI]). This long-term rate-maximization account (originally described in [S3]) would predict that subjects are indifferent when $A_2 / t_2 + h_2 + |TI| = A_6/(t_6 + t_6)$ h_6 + ITI), where ITI in this case is 30 s. Including the ITI increases the average predicted rate-maximizing indifference point for chimpanzees to 61.3 s and the predicted indifference point for bonobos to 62.7 s. One-sample t tests comparing individual subject's observed indifference points to the average predicted indifference point for each species shows that although bonobos did not significantly differ from their long-term rate-maximization prediction [t(4) = 1.374, p = 0.241], chimpanzees waited longer than their long-rate maximization prediction [t(4) = 3.862, p = 0.018]. Thus, bonobos appear to maximize over the long term, but even examining choices over this longer temporal window cannot account for the chimpanzees' pattern of discounting preferences.

Study 2: Comparison of Patience in Human and Chimpanzees Subjects

We tested 19 adult and subadult chimpanzees from the same population as study 1 (12 individuals were from the same social group as study 1; all individuals from a second social group of seven individuals were also tested). Five subjects participated in study 1 seven months previously; the other 14 subjects were naive (see Table S3).

In addition, we tested 40 adult humans. Eighteen participants were students from the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, Germany. These volunteers received no compensation for their participation other than the food. Twenty-two participants were undergraduates from Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, who received credit for a psychology course and the food in return for their involvement. Fourteen additional subjects

were tested but excluded from the main analyses because they reported that they did not like the food or were not hungry in the questionnaire (see Exclusion Criteria below).

Human Procedure: Additional Details

Human participants were tested in a room either at the Max Planck Institute in Leipzig, Germany or at Harvard University in Cambridge. Massachusetts. Subject testing times ranged across the day: In Germany, all tests took place between 11:00 and 14:00, and in the U.S.A., testing took place between 12:00 and 18:00 (as mentioned in the main text, all subjects were informed beforehand that they would eat food in the session and were requested to refrain from eating for the hour proceeding the test if possible, to ensure food motivation). Although all sessions were conducted in English, there were minor variations between the instructions used in Germany and the instructions used in the U.S.A. because of different requirements for obtaining consent when testing human subjects. Once subjects had been informed of the complete procedure (see Appendix A for the script), they were asked to remove their watch if they were wearing one. They were then allowed to pick their preferred food from the set of options that were arrayed on a second table next to the test table. Once they indicated their preference, the experimenter retrieved a box containing the appropriate food rewards that had been portioned out into clear plastic cups prior to the subject's arrival; subjects could not see into this box because of an occluder attached to the box that blocked their view.

Experimenter Behavior during Delays in the Human Procedure

During delays in the delay condition, the experimenter moved to another chair approximately 3 m behind the experimenter's seat at the test table. The chair was perpendicular to the participant's line of sight; from this position the experimenter was visible to the participant, but not directly facing the participant. The experimenter sat in this location looking at her clipboard for the duration of the delay period, and the subject and the experimenter did not talk to each other or socially interact (as was the case with the chimpanzees, see above). Once the delay completed, the experimenter then told the subject that he/she could eat the food; while the participant ate, the experimenter returned to the main test table. While the subject ate his/her food rewards, the experimenter wrote on her clipboard and did not make eye contact with the subject. During the 30 s ITI, the experimenter continued to write on his/her clipboard as before.

Questionnaire

Once subjects completed the food test, they then completed a questionnaire with two parts (see Appendix B for the complete questionnaire). In part one, subjects (1) indicated their age and sex, (2) estimated the most recent time they had eaten prior to the test, (3) estimated the delay they had waited to receive the larger reward (if participating in the delay condition), and (4) were asked an openended question about why they made the choices they did. Individuals who participated in the test at Harvard were also asked to rate their level of hunger and the extent to which they liked the food they had eaten on 5 point scales (based on the hunger scales used

previously in [S6]); for example, from 1, "Not at all hungry," to 5, "Very hungry." The second part of the questionnaire consisted of ten standard discounting questions about money (based on the discounting task used in [S7]). Subjects tested in Germany answered questions about euro monetary amounts; whereas subjects tested in the U.S.A. answered questions about dollar amounts. These questions were presented in random order across subjects.

Exclusion Criteria for Dropped Human Participants

As noted in the main text, we excluded human participants from Study 2 if their responses on the questionnaire indicated that they did not find the food items to be rewarding or desirable. This was done so that it could be ensured that that human subjects actually found the food to be rewarding because it is unlikely that individuals would wait longer to receive things they did not like or want to have (and indeed might have found it aversive to eat food they did not want). The chimpanzees have extensive experience with grapes both during daily feeding and in other experimental contexts, and it is a preferred food for these test subjects. In contrast, the human subjects might have had less direct experience or knowledge about their chosen food prior to the experiment, or discovered that they disliked it only once the experiment began. Furthermore, unlike chimpanzees, human subjects who were not hungry or discovered that they disliked their choice might have continued to eat it only out of social obligation to complete the experiment. Human participants were therefore excluded from main analyses if they met any of the following five criteria: (1) If the subject explicitly wrote on the open-ended portion of their questionnaire that they made their choices because they were not hungry, (2) if they explicitly wrote that they did not like or want to eat the food they were provided with in the experiment, (3) if they said they made the choices they did because they were on a diet, (4) if they answered "not hungry" (scale points 1 or 2) on the hunger scale, or (5) if they answered "did not like food" on the food-desirability scale. Fourteen of the total 54 participants tested met one or more of these criteria. However, the inclusion of these additional subjects does not influence the main results (see below).

Statistical Analyses

We arcsine, square-root transformed all proportional choices of both species.

Differences between Human Populations

In addition to the main analyses, we performed three further analyses of the human choice data. First, we examined all 54 tested participants (including those that met the exclusion criteria) by performing a 2 (condition) \times 2 (human population) ANOVA to examine how all participants responded to the delay manipulation, as well as whether those tested in Germany or the United States differed in their discounting preferences. This ANOVA revealed a main effect of condition [subjects choose the larger reward more often in the control condition; F(1, 50) = 14.889, p < .001] but no effect of population [F(1, 50) = 0.518, p = 0.4750] nor any interactions. Consequently, we combined both subject populations for all other statistical analyses.

Table S1. Individual Characteristics and Performance of S	Subjects from Study 1
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Subject	Species	Sex	Age (Years)	Handling Time, Two Pieces (s)	Handling Time, Six Pieces (s)	Observed Indifference Point (s)
Joey	Bonobo	М	23	9.5	32.0	92
Kuno	Bonobo	M	9	6.2 25.2		80
Limbuko	Bonobo	M 10 11.3 29.1		29.1	59	
Ulindi	Bonobo	F*	12	6.7	20.9	91
Yasa	Bonobo	F	8	9.0	31.3	50
Bonobo Average				8.5	27.7	74.4
Dorien	Chimpanzee	F	26	2.9	16.7	162
Fraukje	Chimpanzee	F*	30	3.4	12.8	106
Patrick	Chimpanzee	M	8	5.6	18.7	108
Robert	Chimpanzee	M	31	5.4	24.6	157
Sandra	Chimpanzee	F	12	9.0	23.7	80
Chimpanzee Average				5.3	19.3	122.6

[&]quot;*" indicates a female with dependent offspring present in the testing room during sessions.

Table S2. Summary of Amounts, Delays, Indifference Points, and Rate-Maximization Predictions for Both Ape Species

Rate Maximization Summary	Bonobos	Chimpanzees
Small reward amount (A ₂)	2 pieces	2 pieces
Large reward amount (A ₆)	6 pieces	6 pieces
Short delay (t ₂)	1.6 s	1.6 s
Small reward handling time (h ₂)	8.5 s	5.3 s
Large reward handling time (h ₆)	27.7 s	19.3 s
Intertrial interval (ITI)	30 s	30 s
Average predicted indifference point: short-term rate maximization	3.1 s	2.6 s
Average predicted indifference point: long-term rate maximization	62.7 s	61.3 s
Average observed indifference point	74.4 s	122.6 s

Performance of Excluded Subjects

Second, we reanalyzed the main human-chimpanzee comparison from study 2, but included the additional 14 human subjects who originally met the exclusion criteria (for a total of 19 chimpanzees and 54 humans). The chimpanzee data was identical with that in the comparison reported in the main text. Subjects in this expanded human subject pool choose the larger reward on an average of 62.7 ± 4.5 percent of trials in the control condition (compared to 77.5% of trials when these additional subjects are excluded as reported in the main analysis), and an average of 19.5 ± 3.9 percent of trials in the delay condition (as compared to 19.2% of trials when these additional subjects are excluded as reported in the main analysis). Thus, humans' preference for the larger reward therefore decreased by 69% when they were required to wait to receive it in the delay condition compared to when they could receive it immediately in the control condition (compared with 19% with the chimpanzees, as described in the main text).

As in the main text, a repeated-measures ANOVA with session half as a within-subjects factor and species and condition as between-subjects factors revealed main effects of condition [F(1, 69) = 14.292, p < 0.001] and species [F(1, 69) = 22.352, p < 0.001], with both species preferring the large reward less in the control condition, and humans preferring the large reward less in both conditions. There was no effect of session half, and the species \times condition interaction reported in the main text drops to only a trend when the additional subjects are included [F(1, 69) = 2.707, p = 0.104]. This analysis indicates that the human subjects' preference for the larger reward drops more in the delay condition than it does for chimpanzees regardless of the inclusion of these subjects. Rather, the main

effect of the exclusion criteria was to remove human subjects that did not find the food to be rewarding regardless of waiting.

Role of Hunger in Human Choice

Third, we performed an analysis designed to assess the influence of hunger or food motivation on the humans' choices. This analysis also included participants who were originally excluded because they reported that they were not hungry; participants who were excluded for other reasons (i.e., they said they did not like the food or were on a diet) were not included in this analysis. Based on the hunger scale and subjects' written responses, we had information about the hunger state of 37 participants. These participants were given a composite hunger score; a composite hunger score of 1 indicates that subjects were not hungry when they completed the test (i.e., subjects rated their hunger as 1 or 2 on the scale or explicitly wrote that they were not hungry), a composite hunger score of 2 indicated that subjects were neutral (i.e., subjects rated their hunger as 3 on the scale or explicitly wrote that they were neutral), and a composite hunger score of 3 indicated that subjects were hungry (i.e., subjects rated their hunger as 4 or 5 on the scale or explicitly wrote that they were hunary).

A 2 (condition) \times 3 (hunger score) ANOVA revealed a main effect of condition [F(1, 31) = 10.51, p = 0.003], a main effect of hunger score [F(2, 31) = 4.84, p = 0.015], and interaction between hunger and condition [F(2, 31) = 7.64, p = 0.002]. A post-hoc Tukey test indicated that in the control condition, hungry subjects (hunger score = 3) picked the large reward more than nonhungry subjects did (hunger score = 1; p = 0.001), and hungry subjects in the control condition picked the large reward more than all subjects in the delay condition (p < 0.04 for all cases). However, there were no significant

Table S3. Individual Chimpanzee Subject Characteristics and Results from Study 2

Subject	Sex	Age(Years)	Condition Order	Previous Discounting Experience?	Control Condition, Proportion Choice for Large Reward	Delay Condition, Proportion Choice for Large Reward
Alex	М	5	2	No	0.92	0.83
Alexandra	F	6	2	No	1.00	0.83
Annett	F	6	1	No	1.00	0.92
Corrie	F*	30	2	No	0.83	0.67
Dorien	F	26	1	Study 1	0.92	0.50
Fifi	F	12	1	No	1.00	0.58
Fraukje	F*	30	2	Study 1	1.00	0.50
Frodo	М	12	1	No	0.92	0.83
Jahaga	F	13	2	No	1.00	0.75
Lome	М	4	1	No	0.83	0.75
Natascha	F	27	1	No	0.58	0.83
Patrick	М	8	1	Study 1	1.00	0.08
Pia	F	6	2	No	1.00	0.50
Riet	F*	29	2	No	0.58	0.75
Robert	М	31	2	Study 1	0.83	0.58
Sandra	F	12	1	Study 1	1.00	0.50
Swela	F	10	1	No	0.67	0.83
Trudi	F	12	2	No	1.00	0.92
Unyoro	М	9	2	No	0.92	0.50

Condition order 1 indicates that subjects completed the control first, and condition order 2 indicates that they completed the delay first. Proportional choices represent average over both test sessions per condition. All data was used for the within-chimpanzee comparison, whereas only each individual's first test session was used for the human comparison. "*" indicates a female with dependent offspring present in the testing room during sessions.

differences in the delay condition. That is, although participants picked the large reward less frequently in the control condition if they were not hungry at the time of testing, participants in the delay condition were not willing to wait for the larger reward regardless of their level of hunger.

Effect of Food Type on Human Choice

To address whether the human subjects' food option had any impact on their performance, we performed an additional analysis of the human data with session half as a within-subjects factor and condition as a between-subjects factor as before, but added chosen food option (i.e., M&M's, crackers, popcorn, peanuts, or raisins) as a covariate. There was no influence of chosen food [F (1, 37) = 0.083, p = 0.775], and, as before, there was a main effect of condition [F (1, 37 = 44.185, p < 0.001] but no effect of session half [F (1, 37) = 0.145, p = 0.313] and no significant interactions. This indicates that subjects tested with different foods did not differ in their choices and were not more likely to become satiated over trials.

Effect of Past Discounting Experience on Chimpanzee Choice

Although all ape subjects in study 1 were naive to discounting tasks, five of nineteen chimpanzees in study 2 had participated in study 1 seven months prior. To ensure that the inclusion of these nonnaive subjects did not affect the results of study 2, we performed the second (within-subjects) analysis of chimpanzees from study 2 with only naive subjects. The main result reported previously, i.e., the difference between the delay and control conditions, holds [paired t(14) = 2.802, p = 0.015], indicating that the inclusion of these experienced subjects did not substantially influence the results.

Response Times for Humans and Chimpanzees

We coded two additional indexes of motivation for chimpanzees and humans: response latency (latency to make a choice) and food retrieval latency (latency to begin eating the food once it was available). For humans, choice latency was the period from when the experimenter finished saying "Do you prefer this cup, or this cup?" to when the subject indicated a choice, and food retrieval latency was from when E said "You can now have the food" to when the subject first touched the food cup. For chimpanzees, response latency was the period from when E removed the occluder to when the subject slide the choice panel; and food retrieval latency was the duration between when the food platform reached the front of the table and the subject first touched the food through the hand hole. In all cases, durations were coded as 0 s if, for example, subjects touched the cup before the experimenter finished the sentence (humans) or put their hands through the hole before the experimenter finished sliding the platform forward (chimpanzees). For each subject, we coded one choice trial for response latency, and another choice trial for food retrieval latency, both counterbalanced for trial number across subjects. Only 38 our of 40 human subjects could be assessed because of damage to one of the tapes.

Choice latencies and latencies to retrieve the food were normally only a few seconds for both species. Humans took an average of 1.3 s to make a choice, and average of 0.9 s to touch the food once it was available. Chimpanzees took and average of 2.8 s to make a choice, and an average of 1.0 s to touch the food once it was available. Because humans and chimpanzees do not radically differ in these measures, it suggests similar motivation levels for the food: For example, if humans did not particularly want the food, they might have had high response latencies (reflecting uncertainty or lack of desire to begin eating the food). It is important to note, however, that these measures are not directly comparable across species because of the necessary differences in their respective paradigms.

Study 3: Patience and Reward Type Subjects

We tested subjects from the same population of students at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, Germany tested in study 2, but did not retest any subjects. All tests took place in a room at the institute and occurred between 10:00 and 17:00. See Appendix A for the experimenter's script.

Questionnaire

Once subjects completed the money test, they then completed a questionnaire with two parts (see Appendix B for the questionnaire). In part one, subjects (1) indicated their age and sex, (2) estimated the delay they had waited to receive the larger reward, and

(3) responded to an open-ended question about why they made the choices they did. The second part of the questionnaire consisted of ten standard discounting questions used in study 2.

Statistical Analyses

All proportional choices were arcsine square-root transformed. As reported in the main text, we performed an independent-samples t test with condition (delayed money or delayed food) as a between-subjects factor. Because the assumption of equal variances was not met (Levene's test, p < 0.001), the significance we report did not assume equal variances.

Analysis of Discounting Questionnaire Responses in Studies 2 and 3

Subjects chose the delayed reward a mean of 61.2% [SE = \pm 3.5%]. By using participants' reponses over the ten questions, we calculated k values with the method developed by Kirby and Marakovic [S7] that creates a consistency index of possible discounting rates on the basis of each subject's pattern of responses; the most consistent value (or the geometric mean of multiple equally likely values) is taken as the k for that particular subject. Though we did not assess whether the hyperbolic model (from which k is derived) fits our data, this model fits most human monetary discounting data better than alternative models, such as exponential discounting [S8, S9]. A one-way ANOVA of k values indicated that on the questionnaire, preferences did not differ across the food control, food delay, or money delay conditions [F(2, 57) = 0.100, p = 0.905]. The k value seen in our study is comparable to that seen in other studies (for example, a similar experiment [S7] found average ks ranging from 0.0113 and 0.0047, depending on whether the questions involved small or large amounts of money; our questionnaire included questions falling across this spectrum; see Appendix B).

Correlation between Task Responses and Questionnaire Responses

In addition, we assessed whether subjects' responses in the experiential tasks (the delayed food condition from study 2 and the delayed money condition in study 3) were related to their responses in the questionnaires. As with previous analyses, proportional choices were arcsine square-root transformed. A partial correlation controlling for reward type (food versus money) between proportional choice for the larger rewards in the delayed tasks and proportional choice for the larger rewards in the questionnaire revealed a positive relationship (correlation coefficient = 0.334, 2-tailed p = 0.038). Thus, individuals who are more patient in the experiential discounting tasks used here are also more patient in standard discounting questionnaires, although the length of time they are willing to wait varies dramatically.

Appendix A: Experimenter Instructions for Human Participants in Studies 2 and 3

Study 2 Instructions for the Food Task

Italicized text appears only in the control condition; text inside parentheses appears only in the delay condition.

This is an experiment about decision-making, and will take no longer than 45 min. In the experiment you are going to be able to make a series of choices about food, and after each decision you can eat the food you choose. How much you receive will depend on the decisions that you make. This part of the experiment will take no longer than 31 min. At the end of the experiment you will be asked to complete a questionnaire. This questionnaire will take about 10 min to complete. Do you have any questions at this point?

In the test, you get to choose between two pieces of food, and six pieces of food. I will ask you which of the options you prefer, and you can then answer verbally or by pointing at your choice. Once you have indicated your choice, I will say "You can now have the food," and you can then eat the option you have chosen. (Once I say "You can now have the food," you can then eat the option you have chosen.) Specifically what will happen is that both options will be in cups like this. I will ask you which cup you want, and once you answer I will remove the other one. Then I will say right away, "You can now have the food." (If you pick the two pieces I am allowed to give it to you immediately. However, if you choose the six pieces I am not allowed to give it to you until after a set period of time has passed. That is, if you choose the cup with two pieces, I

will say right away, "You can now have the food." But if you choose the cup with six, you will have to wait before I say "You can now have the food.")

Each trial will consist of just one choice like this. The total number of trials was randomly predetermined, so the test could stop after any number of trials. Therefore just choose according to your preferences when I actually ask you. There is no right or wrong way to do this task. Before we start the experiment there will be a practice period where you get to see how the procedure works and experience both options (receiving the two pieces right away, and waiting for the six pieces). This practice period can then guide your decisions when you chose between the two options. Do you have any questions at this point?

Throughout the test, you must eat all of the food before you can proceed to the next trial—that is, you have to eat it here during the test, and cannot take the food out of the test or save it for later. You can take as long as you'd like to eat the food and eat it in any way you'd like. (Throughout the test, the two pieces of food will always be available immediately, and the six pieces will always be associated with the same delay.) That's a glass of water that you should feel free to drink throughout the test if you get thirsty. Do you have any questions at this point? (If you choose the six pieces of food, during the delay period I will sit at that table over there, and we are not allowed to talk to each other. Then when the delay finishes you can eat the food.)

Before the actual test begins, if you are wearing a watch it could you please remove it. Thank you. Now for the actual test, you will be eating the same food throughout the test. However you can choose beforehand what type of food you would like to eat. You can choose from chocolate, popcorn, raisins, peanuts, and goldfish crackers. Feel free to try these options before you decide.

Ok great. Now there's going to be the practice period where you get to experience each option two times each. In this practice period I am going to set just one cup in front of you, and then ask you how many items are in the cup. Once you answer I will immediately say "You can now have the food," and then you can consume your choice. (If the cup has two pieces of food in it, once you answer I will immediately say "You can now have the food." But if the cup has six pieces, there will be a delay before I say you can eat it.) Once you have experienced each option twice, I will tell you that the practice period is over and the actual test will begin. Do you have any questions at this point?

Then we will begin with the practice period.

Study 3 Instructions for the Money Task

This is an experiment about decision-making, and will take no longer than 45 min. In the experiment you are going to be able to make a series of choices about money, and after each decision you will receive the money you choose, which you can keep when the experiment is finished. How much money you receive will depend on the decisions that you make. This part of the experiment will take no longer than 30 min. At the end of the experiment you will asked to complete a questionnaire. This questionnaire will take about 10 min to complete. Do you have any questions at this point?

In the test, you get to choose between different numbers of coins. Specifically, you can choose between two 10 cent coins—that is, 20 cents—and six 10 cent coins, or 60 cents. I will ask you which of the options you prefer, and you can then answer verbally or by pointing at your choice. Once I say "You can now have the money," you can then take the option you have chosen and put it in your cup here to keep. Specifically what will happen is both options will be in cups like this. I will ask you which cup you want, and once you answer I will remove the other one. If you pick the two coins I am allowed to give them to you immediately. However, if you choose the six coins I am not allowed to give them to you until after a set period of time has passed. That is, if you chose the cup with two coins, I will say right away, "You can now have the money." But if you choose the cup with six, you will have to wait before I say "You can now have the money."

Each trial will consist of one choice like this. The total number of trials was randomly predetermined, so the test could stop after any number of trials. Therefore just choose according to your preferences when I actually ask you. There is no right or wrong way to do this task. Before we start the experiment there will be a practice period where you get to see how the procedure works and experience

both options: receiving the two coins right away, and waiting for the six coins. You get to keep the money you receive during this practice period, and the practice period can then guide your decisions when you chose between the two options. Do you have any questions at this point?

Throughout the test, you get to keep all of the money you choose. After every trial, you can put your chosen amount in this cup here. When the test is over, you can trade in the coins for larger bills if you prefer. Throughout the test, the two coins will always be available immediately, and the six coins will always be associated with the same delay. Additionally, that's a glass of water that you should feel free to drink throughout the test if you get thirsty. Do you have any questions at this point?

If you choose the six coins, then during the delay period I will sit at that table over there, and we are not allowed to talk to each other. Then when the delay finishes you can have the money and put it in your cup. Before the actual test begins, if you are wearing a watch it could you please remove it. Thank you.

Ok great. Now there's going to be the practice period where you get to experience each option two times each. In this practice period I am going to set one cup in front of you, and then ask you how many items are in the cup. If the cup has two coins in it, once you answer I will immediately say "You can now have the money." But if the cup has six coins, there will be a delay before I say you can have it. Once you have experienced each option twice, the actual test will begin. Do you have any questions at this point? Great. Now we will begin with the practice period.

Studies 2 and 3: Questionnaire Instructions

Part I: The first part of the questionnaire consists of some basic information about yourself as well as a question about the decisions you made in the previous test. Once you have completed this part of the questionnaire, I will then give you a series of questions about money and time.

Part II: Items 5-14 [or 7-16 depending on condition] are a series of questions about money and time. For each question, you can indicate your preference between two options: a smaller amount of money that that you could have today, or a larger amount that you could have after some delay. Although you will not receive the options that you chose, please make your choices as though they will actually be paid to you. I will present these questions to you one at a time, and you can mark the option you prefer on the sheet. Once you have completed a question you can return it to me and I will give you the next question.

Appendix B: Sample Questionnaire Used in Studies 2 and 3

"*" indicates questions that were administered only to subjects from study 2 tested at Harvard University. "**" indicates a question administered only to subjects in the delay conditions in studies 2 and 3.

Part I

Part II

8. Would you prefer to receive \$27 today or \$69 in 90 days?
___\$27 ___\$69
9. Would you prefer to receive \$15 today or \$50 in 45 days?
___\$15 ___\$50

versus 6) that you did in the test:

- 10. Would you prefer to receive \$17 today or \$52 in 220 days? ____\$17 ____\$52
- 11. Would you prefer to receive \$22 today or \$70 in 20 days? \$22 \$70
- 12. Would you prefer to receive \$35 today or \$55 in 100 days?
 ____\$35 ____\$55
- 12. Would you prefer to receive \$31 today or \$59 in 150 days? ____\$31 ____\$59
- 14. Would you prefer to receive \$33 today or \$60 in 110 days?
 ____\$33 ____\$60
- 15. Would you prefer to receive \$24 today or \$63 in 50 days? \$24 \$63
- 16. Would you prefer to receive \$29 today or \$59 in 275 days?
 ____\$29 ____\$59
- 17. Would you prefer to receive \$34 today or \$51 in 195 days? ____\$34 ____\$51

[Subjects who completed the test at the Max Plank Institute answered identical questions, but the monetary unit was the euro].

Supplemental References

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